Dehumanization: understanding the paradox of human interaction

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DEHUMANIZATION
UNDERSTANDING THE PARADOX OF HUMAN INTERACTION

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree

Doctor of Philosophy
from the
University of Wollongong

by
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Department of Psychology
1990
I certify that the thesis entitled Dehumanization: Understanding the Paradox of Human Interaction, and submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, is the result of my own research, except where otherwise acknowledged, and that this thesis (or any part of the same) has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

Signed :

Date : 19.12.90....
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................................................. viii
Dedication ................................................................................................. x
Abstract ..................................................................................................... xi

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1

PART 1 : THE DYNAMICS OF DEHUMANIZATION

CHAPTER ONE :

DEFINING DEHUMANIZATION ................................................................ 8

What Does It Mean To Be A Human Being? ........................................ 9

Limitations of Human Agency ............................................................... 10

People as Social Beings ......................................................................... 13

People as Moral Beings ......................................................................... 17

Treating People as Human Beings ......................................................... 21

The Paradox of Dehumanization ......................................................... 24

CHAPTER TWO :

DEHUMANIZATION - A PRESENT-DAY PROBLEM FOR SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: THE RELATIONSHIP TO PREJUDICE, RACISM AND
STIGMATIZATION ............................................................................... 31

Prejudice ................................................................................................... 32

The Function of Prejudice .................................................................... 35

Group Loyalty ......................................................................................... 36

Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice ............................................................. 37

The Fluctuation of Prejudice ................................................................. 38

Prejudice and Dehumanization: Their Relationship ......................... 39
PART 2: UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLAINING DEHUMANIZATION

CHAPTER 3:

DESIDERATA FOR AN ADEQUATE THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION

The Nature of a Theory Dealing With People

Identifying a Problem

Understanding a Social Problem

Agents in Explanations

Conceptualizing the Limitations in Human Agency

A Framework for Explaining and Thus Understanding Dehumanization

The Relevance of Prediction and Control

Requirements of the Form of Knowledge Offered By a Theory Dealing With People

Desiderata for an Adequate Theory of Dehumanization

Desideratum 1
CHAPTER 4:
DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING HUMANE RELATIONSHIPS: A MODEL OF THE IDEAL-TYPICAL HUMANIZING ENVIRONMENT ...............  82

The Explanatory Principle of the Model .......................  84
People as Social Beings ...........................................  87
Developing the Human Identity .................................  89
Understanding the Social World ...............................  90
Development of Self-Meaning ...................................  92
A Humanizing Social Environment ............................  97
Glimpses of a Humanizing Environment .....................  99
The Model ................................................................ 102
Preliminaries .......................................................... 102
Principles of a Humanizing Environment .................... 103
Operations .............................................................. 108
Coming from a Humanizing Environment ..................... 117

CHAPTER 5:
A THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION .................................. 122

Personal Thoughts on Theorizing ............................... 123
A Theory of Dehumanization .................................... 126
Preamble ................................................................. 127
Part 1: Dehumanization Between Groups ................... 130
Developing the Hierarchy of "Us" and "Them" 131

Different Realities - The Seeds of Dehumanization Between Groups 131

The Boundaries of Social Reality - Who Are To Be Considered "Real" People 133

Defining the Self and Defining Others 135

The Attraction of Dehumanizing Other Groups 139

An Inherent Paradox 139

Maintenance of Dehumanization Between Groups 142

The Inevitable Meeting of Different Social Orders - Forming Hierarchies of Superiors and Inferiors 143

The Anomalous Role of Power in Social Relations 146

Part 2: Dehumanization Within Groups 150

The Development of Intrasocietal Hierarchies 151

Guidance - A Value for Survival and Expansion 153

Control - A Value for Expansion 155

The Employment of Discipline, Control and Force in the Submission of Group Members 157

The Attraction of Dehumanizing Group Members 160

Social Stratification - The Precedent for Dehumanization Within the Group 160

Maintenance of Dehumanization Within Groups 163

Maintaining Dehumanization to Sustain the Human Identity Within the Group - The Irony of a Hierarchical Society 163

Self Dehumanization - The Ultimate Paradox 166
Living in a Hierarchical Society - Making Dehumanization a Day-To-Day Occurrence of Within Group Relations .............................................. 170

Part 3 : To Lessen and Preclude the Occurrence of Dehumanization in our World .................................................. 175

Moving Towards a Humanizing Environment .................. 178

Dissolving Hierarchies ..................................................... 179

The Morality of Obedience - Removing the Keystone of Hierarchies ................................................................. 181

Changing the "Grassroots" of Hierarchies - Raising the Awareness of Being Autonomous ..... 182

Removing the Need for Subordinates and Masters ............................................................................................................. 183

Changing the Valuations of Superiority and Inferiority to an Appreciation of "Uniqueness" ... 186

Equality and Social Order - Asserting the Right of Citizenship .......................................................................................... 187

Encouraging People's Agency - A Focus on Responsibility ............................................................................................... 189

To Prevent a Disintegration of Remedial Efforts .................................................................................................................. 191

In Conclusion - Hope for the Future? ................................ 194

**PART 3 : CASE STUDIES - APPLYING THE THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION**

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 198

Case Study 1 : The Genocide of Australia's Tasmanian Aborigines ................................................................. 200

The Social and Moral Order of the Aborigines ................. 201

The Social and Moral Order of the Early Settlers ............ 205
The My Lai Massacre ................................................................. 254
Applying the Theory of Dehumanization .............................. 260
TO CONCLUDE: ........................................................................... 266
REFERENCES ............................................................................... 274
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For all the people who speak and are not heard;
who cry and are not held;
who reach out and their hands remain empty;
who try to live and are hated and hurt for existing.

D.K.
ABSTRACT

People are social beings. Moreover, a person's human identity is socially bestowed, sustained and transformed. People are also moral beings: they have beliefs and rules about how they should act towards each other and how people should treat each other - that is, as human beings, as moral equals. The phenomenon of dehumanization, however, contradicts these beliefs and rules. To dehumanize people is to treat them as less than or other than human. To be dehumanized is to be reduced in the consideration of others to be a thing that can be subjugated, dominated and controlled. As such, dehumanization is the paradox of human interaction.

The phenomenon of dehumanization is mapped out in the field of social psychology through an explication of the conceptual relationship between dehumanization and the phenomena of prejudice, racism and stigmatization. Relating dehumanization to prejudice, racism and stigmatization reveals the specific dimensions and dynamics of dehumanization. Furthermore, current theories in social psychology that examine people's inhumane treatment of others prove unable to provide an adequate understanding of or insight into dehumanization.

To understand dehumanization it is necessary to develop an adequate theory of this paradoxical social phenomenon. Four desiderata for a theory of dehumanization can provide adequate understanding of the phenomenon: 1. a theory of dehumanization needs to be based upon a model of an ideal-typical humanizing environment; 2. a theory needs to provide understanding of the different dimensions of dehumanization - that is dehumanization between and within groups; 3. a theory needs to provide understanding of the attraction and maintenance of dehumanization; 4. a theory needs to present possibilities and probabilities for lessening and precluding dehumanization in human interaction.

A model of an ideal-typical humanizing environment is presented based on usufruct and the equality of unequals. The aim of the non-hierarchical operations of the group would be for all members to consider themselves and to respect all others as capable of managing their own lives. By
developing a model of an ideal-typical humanizing environment it becomes possible to identify where given social environments depart from the ideal type and thus are conducive to the development of dehumanization.

The theory of dehumanization shows how people have come to value having power-over others so as to maintain the moral order of their own group or their own identity within their group. Consequently, social relations have become structured on the basis of people and groups who are superiors over inferior "Others" (different individuals and different groups). Once established, hierarchies need to be maintained so that the members may sustain their identity as being superior to Others. Furthermore, with the maintenance of a hierarchical social structure, those lower in the hierarchy relinquish their agency by submitting to the commands of those at the top. Consequently, people who have increasingly less or no power-over Others in a hierarchy may come to see themselves as determined beings, dehumanizing themselves and thus further sustaining the social hierarchy. The situation seems impossible to change; however the theory suggests ways in which dehumanization may be lessened and precluded from social interactions.

INTRODUCTION
Few people I think would disagree with the statement that human beings are both unique and complex, but the reasons given for our unanimity are varied. We have evolved into beings who have an almost endless array of capabilities, as evidenced in the history of people's achievements both as individuals and within groups, whose efforts have been directed towards servicing the "betterment" of the human condition. People can think, debate, imagine and construe, they can direct their skills and energies to invent, build and create. We have thoughts, notions and ideals. We are aware of ourselves and we are aware of others, and we are aware of our need for the importance of our relationships with others. Our philosophies and religions alike have seemingly since time immemorial taught and preached to us that we are all kindred souls and that we should act towards each other in the spirit of such beliefs. What is more, many of the laws and strictures of society reflect these same ideals. Yet despite our apparent social nature and our capacity for benevolence, our actual treatment of others often falls far short of our ideals. It may even be said that sometimes our actions completely contradict our ideals, our beliefs about how we should act towards others and how we should live our lives. What history shows us is that people have simultaneous capacities for invention and destruction, kindness and cruelty, love and hate.

Although we are aware of our need to relate to others and acknowledge and expound the desire for such relations to be beneficial for all concerned - that is to act in a humane way in our interactions - in actuality we often treat each other inhumanely. It was my experiences with the inhumane actions of
people - through a visit to South Africa as a child, making contact with people of various races and cultures, and associated racial tensions; increased knowledge of the history of human conflict and growing awareness of the meaning of genocide through my school years; and possibly of greatest influence the treatment which I myself have received in reaction to my being disabled (the disability being achondroplasia or "dwarfism") - which were the accumulated catalysts for my seeking to understand why people treat others inhumanely in contradiction to what we are taught and how we believe we should behave; all on the basis of what appeared to me, as I thought when I was a naïve child, to be simply because "we look different".

Over the years my knowledge has accumulated and I hope my analytical abilities have become more refined; however, I have never lost that initial childhood wonder at the existence of the contradictions between people's beliefs about and capacities for humane relations and people's inhumane treatment of others. Our relationships with others seem to display quite a painful paradox. We have become exceptionally advanced in certain areas in caring for our kin but in other areas we seem unwilling, even incapable of caring for our kind. We have the capacity for and at times have achieved mutually advantageous, interdependent, harmonious and highly cooperative cohabitation; but we have also shown ourselves to be quite capable of being abusive, violent, and even genocidal in our intentions and interactions with others and in a less "physical" fashion, we have forced others into social isolation through our degrading their existence. It is for this reason - the contradiction between how we think and believe and
have shown ourselves capable of treating each other, and how we actually live and what we actually do in our social interactions - that has led me to examine the complexity of human social relations. This work is an academic product of my attempt to understand the paradoxes in human social relations, presenting something of the analytical evolution through which my knowledge, thoughts and ideas have progressed.

Fromm (1973) suggests that people have inhibitions against killing and cruelty, and these inhibitions are founded upon people's sense of identification and empathy with others. If Fromm is correct, it seems logical to ask why we do not treat all our conspecifics, that is all others, as conspecifics - as human beings? Why do we seem unwilling or unable to live in accord with our beliefs and ideals as regards our social relationships; and assuming that it is possible, how can we achieve that accord? An aim of this work is to provide some insight, understanding, and possible answers to these questions by developing a theory of dehumanization.

To treat people - human beings - as if they are not people, that is not human, is to dehumanize them. Moreover and ironically, to treat people as less than or other than human enables the dehumanizers to convince themselves that they are living up to their ideals, their morality, despite their contradictory actions. By defining others as less than human, the dehumanizers put those they dehumanize outside the moral universe and that is the seeming paradox of dehumanization: in order to live up to their moral code of being human, people make claims that other people are not human.
This thesis examines dehumanization from a psychological perspective - that is how groups form and interact, and how people interact within groups such that dehumanization becomes characteristic of these interactions. Part 1 is an account in two chapters of the dynamics of dehumanization. Chapter 1 defines dehumanization, identifying the dimensions of the phenomenon, and describes and discusses some fundamental assumptions, widely shared in the human community, pertaining to the concept of humanity and the treatment of people. Chapter 2 provides further conceptual clarification of dehumanization by mapping out the problem in the field of social psychology. This is achieved by an explication of the conceptual relationship between dehumanization and the phenomena of prejudice, racism and stigmatization. Definition and clarification of the phenomenon of dehumanization are the initial steps towards developing an understanding of this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon. Part 2 contains three chapters which undertake the task of providing an explanation and thus an understanding of dehumanization. Chapter 3 discusses the nature of a theory and presents four desiderata for a theory to be considered an adequate explanation of dehumanization. The first of these desiderata shows that a model of an ideal-typical humanizing social environment would be the explanatory principle best suited for a theory of dehumanization. Because such a model has yet to be established in social psychology, and development of an explanatory principle is an essential precursor to any theory, Chapter 4 remedies this situation by presenting a model of an ideal-typical humanizing environment. A theory of dehumanization is presented in Chapter
5 along with suggestions as to ways in which dehumanization may be lessened and possibly even precluded from human social interactions. In conclusion, Part 3 presents three Case Studies to show how applying the theory of dehumanization provides understanding of this paradoxical phenomenon. These case studies are: 1. The Genocide of Australia's Tasmanian Aborigines; 2. Joseph Merrick - "The Elephant Man"; and 3. Sanctioned Massacres - An Effect of War.
PART 1

THE DYNAMICS OF DEHUMANIZATION
CHAPTER 1
DEFINING DEHUMANIZATION
We are all kindred souls. We are all human beings. And we should treat each other as such. These statements can more appropriately be described as assumptions shared by most people, tenets of behavior to which I think most people would want and expect themselves and others to adhere. However we do not always treat each other as kindred souls. In fact as our history clearly shows, people often treat others in ways they would not want to be treated themselves, in ways other than that which most people consider to be treatment befitting human beings. To treat others or to even consider others in a manner which negates their being human can most accurately and appropriately be termed dehumanization. But what does dehumanization mean - what are the effects of dehumanization upon social interaction and human relationships? As dehumanization is the negation of another's humanity, to define dehumanization it is necessary to first understand what it means to be a human being and to be treated as being human. Most people take their humanity, their being human as a basic assumption, but what are those distinctively human qualities disregard for which is a sufficient condition for dehumanization?

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A HUMAN BEING?

The initial differentiation between inanimate objects and human beings can be made as Secord (1984) suggests, by the identification and conceptualization of their powers or capacities, which are intrinsic to their nature and are logically independent of prevailing conditions. As regards animals and human beings, it is generally accepted that the higher an animal has risen in the stages of evolution, the less is the likelihood of
stereotyped behavior patterns that are strictly determined and phylogenetically programmed. Human beings are usually considered to be at the top of the evolutionary scale. People's capacity for sentient life clearly distinguishes them from inanimate objects and their differentiation from other animals can be made on the basis of their particular intrinsic powers and capacities.

People's sentience enables them to feel sensations, to have emotions and to entertain moods (LeMoncheck, 1985). Moreover it may be said that people are self-conscious beings, able to formulate a self-image - an awareness of themselves as being individuals. These capacities for self-consciousness and self-awareness are basic endowments which arguably are not characteristics shared by other animals, but one feature of human beings which can easily distinguish them from other animals is intelligence; not just instrumental intelligence, but reason - the capacity for people to apply their knowledge to understand objectively. Downie and Telfer (1969) refer to people's ability to formulate purposes, plans and policies, and their ability to carry these out without undue reliance on the help of others, as evidence of people's reasoning. Given that people are self-conscious, self-aware, reasoning beings, these characteristics would therefore suggest that people have the capacity for self-determination - that human beings have the capacity to be agents of their behavior.

Limitations Of Human Agency

Agency can be defined as the capacity, condition, or state of acting or exerting power for the achievement of some end; an
agent produces or is capable of producing a certain effect (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971). To talk of human agency then is to consider actions of the agent as flowing from their intentions, motives, desires and purposes - their self-determination. Given this consideration, to what extent can we describe human beings as agents?

To be an agent is to be in possession of an ultimate power of decision and action. Pure agents are described by Harré (1983) as capable of deciding between equal alternatives and able to overcome temptations, distractions and adopt new principles so as to realize their plans and achieve their goals. This conceptualization describes an abstract ideal type - a person capable of any action at any time without limitation or qualification - and if human behavior is examined within context, that is in reference to people's capacities and the conditions under which their behavior occurs, then it becomes evident that human agency is something other than pure, rather human agency is limited.

If we adhere to Harré's theoretical account of an agent, human agency may be described as a generic self-theory which endows the person with certain powers of action. That is, what people will be capable of will be dependent upon whether they construe themselves as more or less autonomous, determined and so on. A person can be considered a pure agent relative to some action when both the tendency to act and the release of that tendency are in the power of that person. Alternatively, for people to be non-agents, or as Harré terms "patients", means unless they receive an external stimulus, patients remain
quiescent, unchanging, neither manifesting action themselves, nor producing a change in anything else. Patients must be stimulated to act whereas agents need only be released. Beings are completely passive if both their tendencies to act and the conditions for their release or blockage are outside of their control, but agents are not only able to act upon themselves but also upon other beings.

As regards human beings, Secord (1984) says, "From the fact that an individual has the capacity and opportunity to act, we cannot predict that he will act" (p.25). When we are presented with a case of human inaction (which may be perceived as an apparent inability to behave in any other way than in the mode displayed), there can be three different explanations which Harré (1983) describes as follows: firstly, the person is a patient who has not been stimulated; secondly, the person is a potential agent at the patient stage and has not yet acquired a tendency (a disposition towards a particular state or attribute), though it is not blocked; and thirdly, the person is an agent with the appropriate tendency, but is blocked from acting, from realizing that tendency. Therefore irrespective of whether people have the potential for action or have the ability to act but are prevented from doing so, their agency can be described as limited: that is, people's actions are contingent upon their internal states (their powers, skills, abilities, liabilities and motivation), circumstantial conditions and situational contexts (Secord, 1984). What is more, the conditions under, within or into which people act, may be either enabling or constraining upon their agency.
A significant aspect of being human is that people's capacities for self-consciousness, self-awareness and agency when combined, provide them with what may be considered as a most enabling characteristic, the capacity to act upon themselves (Fromm, 1973): that is, self-monitoring or self-intervention. Secord (1984) describes the characteristic of self-intervention as people doing what they can do so as to create conditions that enable them to do that which they cannot ordinarily do; or conversely in the mode of constraint, as people doing what they can do to create conditions that make their performance of undesirable actions less likely to be executed or possibly even eliminated. This characteristic may justifiably be claimed as uniquely human for it is the cornerstone of human social interaction.

People As Social Beings

The capacities of an individual are only part of what it means to be a human being because a person lives as one amongst many; therefore the relationships which a person develops with others are also important definitive characteristics. People are social beings and the idea of the pure individual isolated and free from social influence is an abstraction. Consequently inclusive to the meaning of being human are the social relationships and the social environments of people. The term social refers to the quality of interaction, which is interrelationship and mutuality. A social situation can be defined as one in which people orient their actions towards one another from which develops a web of meanings and expectations (Berger, 1963), and society is a large complex of such relationships - a system of human interactions.
An example of the importance of the social aspect for inclusion in the meaning of being human is given in Lane's (1976) account of Victor, *The Wild Boy of Aveyron*, who had lived his infant years in social isolation. Lane describes Victor in his early interactions with people as incapable of pity or malice and as one who lives only for himself. As such, one may concur with Lane when he says:

> The mind of a man deprived of the commerce of others is so little exercised, so little cultivated, that he thinks only in the measure that he is obliged to by exterior objects. The greatest source of ideas among men is in their human interactions. (p.38)

Lane's work, and that of others who have studied children brought up with little human contact, suggests that people need to interact with others so that their own individual capacities may be enhanced. Therefore it may be said that human agency is realized and expressed both through the individual and the collective.

People's capacities for self-consciousness, reasoning and self-monitoring have enabled them to interact with others, organizing their individual skills and abilities such that as a collective, the effectiveness of human agency is increased. Alone a person can do much: together, people can do much more. But what is unique to the human social condition is yet another transaction between the individual and the collective, in which many of the functions of the collective result in a further increase in the individuals' capacity for agency. Hence the continuous advancement, progression and increase in the achievements of humankind, as compared with other social animals.
It is evident that people are social beings whose orientation is towards the formation and maintenance of groups. As such it may be said that the meaning of being human has both a personal and social referent in that human capacities are valued by the individual but also that individuals themselves are valued by others. This leads Kelman (1973) to suggest that to consider someone as a human being is to accord the person an identity which incorporates community membership. To accord people an identity is to perceive them as individuals, independent and distinguishable from others, capable of making choices, and entitled to live their lives on the basis of their goals and values. To accord people community membership is to perceive them along with oneself, as part of an interconnected network of individuals who care for each other, who recognize each other's individuality, and who respect each other's rights (a concept discussed later in this chapter). It is these features that constitute the basis of a person's identity as a human being in that through their social relationships people develop a sense of their own worth and the worth of others. Therefore it can be said that the identity of an individual is socially bestowed, socially sustained and socially transformed through actions of social recognition and social interaction.

People are brought into this world, immediately entering a social environment which they did not design, and they become part of already well established practices. People's lives are embedded within the historical and social aspects of the community from which they derive their identity. As such, the social situation can be described as a form of reality agreed upon
ad hoc by those who define the situation (Berger, 1963). From the viewpoint of the individual participant this means each social situation they enter confronts them with specific expectations and demands of them specific responses to these expectations. Consequently it may be said that what human agents are able to do is deeply affected by the fact that they can consider themselves as actually never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of events. Harré (1983) even suggests that during moments of solitude and acting for themselves alone, individuals' linguistic capacities and knowledge of conventions ensures the presence of the many through the persistence of collective conventions and interpretations of what can be thought and planned.

The limited agency of people is the definitive feature of their social behavior. When people interact they function simultaneously as agents and as limits upon the agency of others. It is this transaction between people being able to act and monitoring their action conditional upon the action of others which is the essence of social behavior. Therefore people may be described as self-determining beings whose identity and actions are made meaningful and moderated by their mutual interaction with other people. Given that people are by nature social beings, it is justifiable to assume that people desire to maintain a network of social relationships and as such, will behave in a fashion conducive to that aim. It is on the basis of this assumption that people develop and adopt rules as regards "acceptable" social behavior. These rules are the morals of individuals and the established norms of social groups.
People As Moral Beings

Given the capacities characteristic of our sentient life, many of which are not shared by other animals, it can hardly be denied that people are unique beings. Our social relations and networks afford us more than just an existence but a progression, a constant and rapid changing of our mode of living. We are social beings but our social networks differ from those of other social animals for, as Kant (1791; cited in Pekarsky, 1982) suggests, a person can be considered as a subject whose actions can be ascribed to them from which it logically follows that a person is subject to no other laws than those which they (alone or along with others) give themselves. Therefore it may be said that the social behavior of people is the freedom of rational beings under moral laws. Morality being the espousal of a total quality of life rather than a principle of action in the narrow sense. Moral responsibility comes into being in a society by way of the people acknowledging their agency whilst at the same time renouncing something of that agency so as to remain within the social group and maintain their social life by living in accord with others (Harré, 1983).

One view of morality is of social rules having been developed which express the accumulated wisdom of humankind on the consequences of action (Downie & Telfer, 1969). Another view describes such rules as prescriptions of the types of action conducive to majority interest, their existence helping to secure the compliance of most people. Non-moral obligations stem from rules which coordinate a person's own interests, whereas moral obligations stem from rules which coordinate the interests of
other people with those of the individual. Therefore morality can be seen as a matter of the individual's own personal obligation towards others with regard to any social interactions which may occur publicly or privately.

Morality is in a great sense practical because it is closely connected with action. For example, people often justify their conduct in terms of rules and reasons. In so doing people are logically bound to see those rules and reasons as justifying similar conduct of others in similar situations. Yet it cannot be assumed that agreement among all moral agents constitutes verification of moral insights. Despite this almost paradoxical idiosyncracy of morality it remains logical to ask if there are universal moral principles regarding human behavior. Downie and Telfer (1969) claim there is only one idea which, because it can be considered fundamental to social relations, can be described as the most basic of moral principles. This idea has been espoused in many philosophies and religions alike, and is exemplified by the statement of the philosopher Kant (1791):

Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. (cited in Hill, 1980, p.84)

In other words what Kant is proclaiming, like many philosophers, religious leaders and social thinkers before and since, is a principle of respect for people by recognizing and acknowledging a universal kindredship between human beings; that is to value people as beings of supreme worth and respecting those features which make them what they are as people: to treat human beings as human beings.
From the practical perspective, the principle of respect is exemplified in the moral rules which forbid humankind to hurt one another, or to wrongfully interfere with each other's freedom as proclaimed in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (cited in Reardon, 1977, p.1)

These public proclamations are yet another illustration of people's beliefs and intentions that we should treat each other as kindred - respecting the humanity of each person. Another philosopher, Mill (1884), suggests it is such maxims of behavior which are most vital for human well-being for they present the best mode of managing some departments of human affairs. They also present a peculiarity for they are fundamental in determining the social relations between people. The moralities which protect every individual from being harmed by others, either directly or by being hindered in their freedom of pursuing their own desires, are at once those which each person has most at heart in their own self interest and, as such, are those which each person has the greatest interest in promoting and enforcing by word and deed.

People's ideals and rules of behavior - their morality - are examples of people trying to understand and function effectively in their world in relation to others. Morality is evidence of people's capacity to reason, and this uniquely human
characteristic has throughout the history of people's examination and contemplation of their social relations, led people time and again to proclaim *equality* as the fundamental principle to which we should adhere in our social relations.

It is important to make clear that equality is not *sameness*, as so many mistake the concept to mean, for as Duncan (1962) says, equality does not deny social difference. On the contrary, it can stimulate differences, because equals can express differences which superiors and inferiors must hide. When people are considered equal though they may be quite different in various aspects, their differences are not denied but rather they are acknowledged. More importantly, the differences between equals are respected and sought to be understood such that each in their actions may make allowances for those differences, resulting in social interactions which are as appropriate as possible to the requirements, needs and desires for interaction of all concerned. Equals use differences during opposition to identify, emphasize and employ rules acceptable to both sides in a struggle or contest and in this way, the respect and worth of the identity of the other and the self is in no way compromised or devalued.

A society operating on the basis of equality is presented as one in which no human identity is given greater value nor enjoys more benefits than any other. From the global perspective, if the world society functioned on the basis of human equality, the ideal would be for social benefits to be enjoyed by all people. This would achieve a form of mutually advantageous interdependence which Reardon (1977) describes as a global community
characterized by an equitable sharing of all benefits available - be they economic, social, political, intellectual, aesthetic or spiritual.

People are social beings with a unique capacity for reason which has led to our development as moral beings. Our morality has led us further still to conceive of the universal kindredship of people as regards our unique capacities for self-consciousness, self-monitoring and reason. Furthermore, our morality has also led us to the development of the maxim of behavior that all people should be treated equally - that is all people should be treated as human beings. Therefore essential to the understanding of what it means to be a human being, is the understanding of what it means to be treated as a human being - that is treatment which is respectful of people being human.

Treating People As Human Beings

The foundation of social relationships is the acknowledgement and treatment of others as conspecifics. As regards human social interaction, this means to acknowledge and treat others as human beings which, given our unique characteristics, more specifically means to have a subjective appreciation for people's capacities to be self-determining, self-monitoring, reasoning beings and to behave toward them in a manner that testifies to this appreciation - to be mindful of our own capacities which may function as a limit on the behavior of others. Put more simply, it may be said that to regard a person as a human being is to address them with a measure of respect in accordance with the fundamental principle of equality. For Downie and Telfer (1969), the expression of respect for people is
to treat them as valuable in themselves and not only useful as instruments. This idea of the individual person as of great worth is basic to the moral, political and religious ideals of most societies. Therefore given that human dignity - that is people's sense of their own worth as human beings - is a matter of social permission as Berger (1963) suggests, then it becomes necessary to understand how respect for people is expressed or denied in social interactions.

To treat another as a human being, the other must first be acknowledged as being human, as being our equal. People's tendency to form groups means that these groups make assumptions and function on the basis of those assumptions, that the members of the group are like each other, all human. Consequently people come to expect that those in their group will act towards each other in certain ways and not others. Furthermore, because these claims come from those with whom people identify as beings of worth, and as the source of their own worth, there is a greater possibility the claims will be considered legitimate, and will be honored. This argument extends to what LeMoncheck (1985) suggests to be important, that the more people consider a state of physical or psychological well-being to be valuable, for example, to avoid enduring extreme pain, the more likely it is people will demand others not interfere with the pursuit of that well-being. The less valuable the state, the less likely any claims to it will be either made or honored.

LeMoncheck suggests further, that the treatment people value or are believed to value, is in turn a function of the capacities of people to experience themselves and the
surrounding world. Therefore if beings (such as animals) or objects, have significantly more limited capacities to experience themselves and the world around them, it would be logical to suggest they would not value or be believed to not value, any particular treatment from people. As such, people could not be severely admonished for treating animals or objects on a significantly more limited quantitative and qualitative spectrum to that of their treatment of human beings. In turn, it can be said that animals and objects may also have significantly more limited claims to (or against) the treatment they receive from people than people themselves.

Given our understanding of those characteristics which may be considered uniquely human, it follows that intrinsic to the notion of treating people with respect to their being human, is that the efforts of people to understand, to deliberate and choose, to execute their choices, and the capacities presupposed therein, should not be undermined or damaged or otherwise treated with contempt. It is precisely when people are mistreated in these ways that dehumanization occurs.

People are social beings but more than that, people are moral beings. Our morality - our rules, principles and ideals of behavior - based on our ability to reason, states that we are all kindred, we are all human beings and that our social relations should progress as such - as social relations between human beings. Given that the human identity and human dignity are socially bestowed, sustained and transformed, it becomes necessary to understand how, despite our capacity for agency and morality,
that reality presents us with a negation of our principles, a paradox in our social relations - the paradox of dehumanization.

**THE PARADOX OF DEHUMANIZATION**

To regard individuals as human beings is to be appreciative of the fact they are self-determining beings in the sense specified earlier, and it is to behave toward them in ways that testify to this appreciation. However, should a person fail to apprehend in others those characteristics by virtue of which they are ends-in-themselves, or who apprehended these characteristics but was unimpressed with them, the ideal that humanity be treated as an end-in-itself would seem arbitrary. Similarly, a person who did regard humanity as worthy of respect, but who viewed certain individuals or groups of individuals as being outside the scope of humanity, could easily treat these people in most degrading ways without any moral self-recrimination. This is because the principle of conduct associated with the attitude of respect for people is applicable only when those with whom people deal are recognized and appreciated as human beings - as having the capacity to be self-conscious, self-monitoring, reasoning beings.

"To dehumanize...(is) to divest of human qualities or personality...make impersonal or unconcerned with human values" *(Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971, p.595)*. In the social sciences the term dehumanization was for a long time, applied chiefly in accordance with Marx who saw it *(Entmenschüng)* as an inseparable element of the general alienation of labor in a social system where workers are obliged to work in order to survive rather than to manifest and develop
their individual personalities or sensibilities. Even today the term is widely used in connection with those mechanical, repetitive, assemblyline tasks which reduce the performers to the level of components in a machine. However the term has evolved another dimension in meaning still consistent with Marx, and that is the restriction or denial of free play to those qualities, thoughts and activities which are characteristically human (Bullock & Woodings, 1983). Dehumanization in this sense is alienation of the self rather than alienation from an external structure or system. But the term dehumanization can quite appropriately be expanded still further as regards relationships between people, in which dehumanization can refer both to what is done and the justification for what is done to people by others.

In this work, to dehumanize means to regard people or groups as though they were not human beings; the victims of dehumanization are "divest of human qualities" in the sense that the dehumanizer fails to recognize their presence, their abilities and limitations, to appreciate them, and to act toward them in accord with the moral rules pertaining to the treatment of human beings. Furthermore, once people are not appreciated as human beings, that is dehumanized, they are able to be treated in ways that may actually strip them of human qualities and thus ex post facto provide "justifications" for inflicting suffering upon the "Others".

To dehumanize people is to regard them as not belonging to the human community. It is to withdraw from them the attitude of reverence that is ordinarily attached to people which is the basis of our respectful treatment of others. LeMoncheck (1985)
says that to be treated as a person is to be treated as a moral equal. Consequently, when dehumanization occurs, the victims are considered as less than the moral equals of the dehumanizers. The interests of the victims no longer matter to the victimizers: the dehumanizers no longer consider themselves obligated in any way to treat the dehumanized in accord with the moral rules pertaining to their treatment of others. As such, the dehumanizers perceive their treatment of the dehumanized as beyond reproach, certainly from the victims, for dehumanizers have no respect for, nor do they value, those they dehumanize.

It is evident that dehumanization presents a very real threat to human social interactions because when people do not consider other people to be human, their interactions may no longer be subject to the same moral restraints that operate to define, guide and limit people's actions during social situations. Given the extent to which the victims are dehumanized, then principles of morality may no longer apply to them. In such extreme cases the act of destructiveness and cruelty can assume a different quality such that the inhibitions against killing fellow human beings, or our conspecifics, which are generally very strong, can be more readily overcome (Kelman, 1973). If Fromm's (1973) claim is true, that any group which is slightly different can be viewed by members of other groups as not sharing the same humanity, this would suggest, given the expansion and unavoidable meetings of the different peoples of the world, that dehumanization has the potential for becoming the characteristic mode of interaction between groups. But dehumanization is not just limited to
relations between groups - dehumanization also occurs within groups.

Dehumanization between groups may involve an explicit declaration that the Others are less than the moral equals of the dehumanizing group, but dehumanization between group members may be described as more pervasive and insidious within their interactions, in which the humanity of the Other is not necessarily actively denied but is lost sight of or forgotten. In this situation, dehumanization takes on an almost invisible quality: always present, but not necessarily in the conscious awareness of the dehumanizers or those they dehumanize. Given that it is within-group interactions that initially and essentially bestow and sustain the identity of people as human beings, then as Marietta (1972) says, dehumanization within the group may be described as "systematically" subjecting people to injury in areas of their vulnerability.

Regardless of whether dehumanization occurs between or within groups, the effects are the same - the subordination, degradation, subversion, and/or manipulation of people's feelings, desires or interests in what LeMoncheck (1985) describes as a prima facie inappropriate way of providing some form of satisfaction for the dehumanizers. Moreover, when people are dehumanized, the dehumanizers consider their victims to be reduced to the kind of thing that can be subjugated, dominated and controlled and, as a consequence, those who are dehumanized typically feel some physical and/or psychological distress, and/or some constraints on their freedom of movement and expression. Furthermore, even those who dehumanize others are
not free from such a fate because the actions of the dehumanizer make their own dehumanization an inescapable condition of their life (Pekarsky, 1982). In dehumanizing Others the dehumanizers lose their capacity to care for Others, to have compassion for them, to treat them as human beings and so develop a sense of detachment which can sharply reduce their capacity for emotion, their sense of being part of a community.

Dehumanization is a phenomenon which can threaten the unique existence and quality of life of each and every one of us. People are social beings but more than that, people are moral beings, and our self-consciousness, our reasoning, our morality suggests that despite obvious differences, those who share our unique capacities are our equals, are human beings and should be treated as such. Yet despite our ability for such reasoning, many of our social interactions present the paradox of dehumanization - a contradiction between what people believe and how people actually live - a paradox made up of a number of different aspects, as indicated in the definition and description of dehumanization. For example, many societies and individuals espouse the desire and need for social relations to function on the basis of equality of people, and the ubiquity of dehumanization is sufficient evidence of the universality of notions of equity. Consequently, one aspect of the paradox of dehumanization is that in order to live up to the moral code of their social group which defines their being human, people claim that others who do not adhere to the same moral code in the same way, are not human. Another aspect of this paradoxical phenomenon is that despite the universality of such maxims of
social behavior as those of equity and the treatment of human beings as human beings, it is apparent that people define others as not human in order to justify treating them badly. Therefore, dehumanization may be described as a complexity of paradoxes.

For thousands of years believers in axial religions - differing systems of personal commitment, faith and worship of a God or sacred teachings - have preached that we are all children of God and major philosophies have expounded the universality of humankind, yet at the same time dehumanization has come to characterize many inter and intra group relations. If we believe and intend to treat each other as kindred, what is preventing us from doing so and what actions may be taken to remedy the problem and possibly preclude dehumanization from our world?

Historically, in preliterate times, dehumanization seems confined to relations between groups - intergroup dehumanization - however with the evolution of civilization and the origin of the State (that is, recorded history), dehumanization has developed a further dimension - intragroup dehumanization - the dehumanization of people within social groups. It is evident that we can care for our kin, why and how has it come about that we seem unwilling to care for our kind? The problem is complex and dynamic, emphasizing a clear contradiction between what we believe, teach and preach, and how we live and what we do. Man's inhumanity towards man has become a familiar catch-phrase. We are aware of the problem and many theories have been presented as possible answers, yet our social relations still display the paradox of dehumanization. In the following chapter I shall examine some of the theories purporting to explain man's
inhumanity towards man. My aim is to show the reason an adequate answer has not been found to the problem is that the fields of examination have been too limited, and what is required is both an integration of what is already known, along with a different approach to understanding the paradox of dehumanization.
CHAPTER 2

DEHUMANIZATION - A PRESENT-DAY PROBLEM FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE RELATIONSHIP TO PREJUDICE, RACISM AND STIGMATIZATION
Human beings are capable of self-consciousness, self-monitoring and reasoning. We have developed ideals of social relations and publicly espoused their universality in declarations designed both as rules for the social interactions of individuals and as guides for governing bodies in their establishment of social institutions. Despite people's often evidenced capacity for such "noble" reasoning, we seem to have a propensity towards ignoble behavior. Although we have shown ourselves capable of highly humane thoughts we have also shown ourselves capable of intentional inhumane actions. This apparent contradiction in the human condition has come under quite extensive examination, resulting in a large body of literature in the field of social psychology, propounding various answers to the problem.

Prejudice, racism and stigmatization are three phenomena which come under this category of explanations for the inhumane actions of people towards each other. Dehumanization contains elements of each of these phenomena yet is also distinct and different. In this chapter I shall describe prejudice, racism and stigmatization and examine theories and research on these phenomena. I shall discuss their function in social interaction, and discuss how each concept is a manifestation of and related to dehumanization. I shall then give an account of the distinctiveness and difference of dehumanization. My aim is to clarify and emphasize those dynamics of dehumanization which need to be understood and explained.

**PREJUDICE**

The word prejudice comes from the Latin noun *praejudicium*, meaning previous judgement, precedent, detriment. The popular
and broad application of the term prejudice is described in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as:

(a) preconceived judgement or opinion...unreasonable predilection, inclination, or objection: an irrational attitude of hostility directed against an individual, a group, a race or their supposed characteristics. (1971, p.1788)

It may be noted that reference has been made to prejudice being of a negative nature. While it is important to be aware that a prejudice may be positive as well as negative, the majority of work on this subject deals with racial and ethnic prejudice which is considered to be predominantly negative and based upon antipathy (e.g. Allport, 1954; Rose, 1958; Reardon, 1977; Berry & Tischler, 1978; Bagley & Verma, 1979). For this reason, I shall discuss the phenomenon of prejudice mainly in reference to interracial/interethnic relationships.

From the definition we can identify three main components of prejudice these being prejudgement, attitude and behavior. The essential defining component is prejudgement: specifically judgements formed on the basis of scant, even nonexistent, evidence (Allport, 1954). The view of prejudice as being based upon simple misconceptions has led some authors to suggest that education, in the form of gathering knowledge about out-groups and their individual members, is the major instrument in the reduction of prejudice (e.g. Rubin, 1968; Bagley & Verma, 1979). But to consider prejudice as based solely on generalizations ignores the emotion, feeling and bias with which prejudices are held (Berry & Tischler, 1978).

Prejudgements which form overgeneralizations can be described as beliefs. In prejudice, just as in any form of
judgement, beliefs are allied with attitudes. Attitudes are likes and dislikes which have their roots in emotions, are evidenced in behavior, and influenced by social conditions (Bem, 1970). The relation between beliefs and attitudes in prejudice is exemplified in the research into people who express a high degree of antagonistic attitudes on tests for prejudice. In a significant study of this type Rose (1947) found that the subjects who were prejudiced expressed negative attitudes against certain groups and that these attitudes were usually accompanied by beliefs that those groups possessed a large number of objectionable qualities.

Although seemingly arbitrary, I concur with the many social psychologists who suggest it is important to distinguish between the attitude and belief components of prejudice, especially if we consider that programs designed to reduce prejudice have been successful only in altering the beliefs and not necessarily changing underlying attitudes. A possible reason is that beliefs, in the form of prejudgements, can be rationally attacked and altered through education (Rubin, 1968; Bagley & Verma, 1979); attitudes often have a functional significance for the bearer and as such, alteration of attitudes may be viewed by the prejudiced person as an alteration to their pattern of living which meets with great resistance, thus making attitudes harder to change (Allport, 1954).

The behavior component of prejudice is referred to as discrimination. Discrimination can be described as behavior which is intended to demarcate and separate groups on the basis of race, ethnic identity and physical characteristics. Such
discrimination results in personal and social benefits being denied to the separated people (Reardon, 1977). Any negative prejudiced attitude tends somehow, somewhere to express itself in the action of discrimination, and the more intense the attitude the more likely it is to result in vigorously hostile action (Allport, 1954).

Prejudice has for a long time been acknowledged as a problem in human social relations and there are numerous theories which attempt to explain the phenomenon. I do not intend to present a critique of the theories of prejudice. My aim instead is to use the theories as contributions to understanding the functional significance of prejudice in social interaction.

**The Function Of Prejudice**

Definitions of "normal" individuals describe balanced persons whose combination of traits allow them to function effectively in a variety of ways (Heath, 1945). Two such traits which Allport (1954) has shown help people to function effectively in all groups are erroneous generalizations and hostility. These traits characterize and define prejudice, which suggests prejudice is a "natural" phenomenon and therefore may be a somewhat unavoidable feature of social life. If this is the case, then prejudice must function in such a way as to be of some benefit, either real or perceived, to the prejudiced person. To identify these benefits it is necessary to understand the conditions of social and group living and features of human thinking which are conducive to the development of antagonism between different peoples.
Group Loyalty

There is a universal separateness amongst groups in the sense that people live their lives in somewhat homogeneous clusters. Much of this automatic cohesion is due to little more than convenience because there is no need to turn to other groups for companionship when less effort is required to interact with people who have similar presuppositions (Allport, 1954). Tajfel (1970) considers this form of group loyalty as developing out of interpersonal or traditional social ties where culture assumes the guise of normative and ideological superstructures. The individual is emotionally attached to the social system. The alternative form of group loyalty is instrumental attachment. Such loyalty is demonstrated when an individual views the social system as providing the organization for a smoothly running society in which people can participate to their mutual benefit and have some assurance that their needs and interests will be met.

Each individual is born and raised within a group and usually unquestioningly accepts the standardized scheme of the cultural pattern as a guide to all situations normally occurring within the social group (Schutz, 1964). Members of a group value the same things, they adhere to a common value-system. When values contrary to their own exist, the group defines such discrepant values as being "wrong". Consequently people from other groups who have another value-system are considered wrong, not simply different. For example, in many Western societies where equal expression between the sexes is valued and women are considered responsible for their own bodies and lives, there is
disagreement and protest against the Middle East practise of female circumcision and arranged marriages. Similarly, when certain types of behaviors are valued, such as heterosexuality, little regard is given to the differentness of homosexuality, only the "wrongness" of such behavior. In relation to the difference between cultural groups, it may be said that people's national and ethnic loyalty is primarily the expression of protecting what they value.

Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice

Any change in the status quo between groups usually results in the group members constructing causal explanations to account for the change. Tajfel (1969) describes these explanations as being of two types: one being situational, the other referring to the characteristics of the groups. Situational explanations are in terms of preceding events that do not originate in the groups involved, for example, a natural disaster. When events of this nature cannot be identified as the immediate cause for any change in the status quo between groups then members seek their explanation in reference to the characteristics of the groups and their members. Causal attributions to characteristics are also of two types: the first refer to non-psychological characteristics, the second refer to psychological characteristics of the groups which are best fitted to shift the locus of responsibility for change from an individual to a group, or from one group to another. Consequently, it can be said that identification with social groups has meant devaluation of others so as to defend identity.
As people's social world becomes more complex and their understanding of that world requires the use of increasingly abstract notions, the need for people to simplify becomes greater (Tajfel, 1970). Balanced individuals possess a combination of traits which allow them to function effectively within a complex social group. One such central trait is the individual's belief system which is neither completely open, nor closed, but which expands and contracts within limits, as conditions vary (Rokeach, 1960). All belief-disbelief systems serve two powerful and conflicting sets of motives at the same time: the need for a cognitive framework to know and to understand, and the need to ward off threatening aspects of reality. When a group's or individual's values are "threatened" by increasing confrontation with contrary or wrong values of others, any inquisitiveness is weakened, resulting in a more closed belief system so as to reinforce the group's or individual's own value-system. Closed belief systems and the necessity to simplify the social world allows for susceptibility to the development of stereotypes. These generalizations provide rationalizations for keeping others at bay.

The Fluctuation of Prejudice

Any pattern of prejudice anywhere receives marked illumination when it is examined from an historical perspective. Throughout history, difference has served as a basis for conflict between nations and between groups within nations.

Tajfel (1969) found characterizations of human groups in terms of crude traits (generalizations) alter fundamentally as functions of social, political or economic changes. Specifically,
generalizations become more pronounced and hostile when social tensions arise, exemplified by the social attitudes prior to and during, periods of conflict. Rokeach (1960) suggests it is for these reasons that throughout history there has been the formation of social castes and classes which are visibly distinguishable from each other, with ethnic/racial cues being more visible than belief cues. Hostilities are hard to direct towards an "enemy" if the enemy cannot be identified. Therefore prejudice, emerging under extreme threats or regression, can simply be described as a will to dominate in the act or process of defending, maintaining and/or improving one's own group or group situation.

An historical overview of national and international relations reveals the consistency with which humankind enters into hostilities. Furthermore, given that group loyalty is a decisive factor in the separation and identification of groups and that the cognitive processes of the individuals involved follow a similar pattern, it becomes apparent that prejudice actually functions to strengthen the identity of the individual and the cohesion of the group during periods of hostility and social unrest.

Prejudice And Dehumanization: Their Relationship

Although to harbor prejudiced thoughts and feelings and to act in a prejudiced manner against another person or group is removed from the ideal of non-discriminatory, equalitarian human relations, it seems that in many ways such thoughts, feelings and behaviors function to protect the prejudiced person's own identity. Moreover, prejudice is not just an example of the
operations of ignorance, fear and misunderstanding upon the relations between different groups and individuals, but the functioning of prejudice emphasizes the importance and centrality which self-consciousness and self-awareness have in the development of people's sense of themselves as being unique - in people developing their identity as human beings.

Prejudice can be described as transitory, that is, improvement to an individual's or group's status, an increase or return to social stability, and education about the Others can all result in the dissipation of prejudice (e.g. Rose, 1958; Secord & Backman, 1964). This feature of prejudice in itself suggests that when people or groups consider themselves to be threatened in some way, their mode of defense is actually attack - to attack the identity of the other individual or group by devaluing the Other's identity. But differentness of individuals and groups is not the instrumental factor in the development of prejudice, for under non-threatening circumstances differentness can be tolerated. The catalytic point comes when an individual's or group's differentness from others no longer provides them with their sense of being unique yet equal, but with a sense of being unique and unequal (particularly if the inequality is considered to disadvantage the individual or group). Given that prejudice functions in this way, it can hardly be denied that to adhere to prejudiced attitudes, beliefs and behaviors, does have its attractions, for in the process of devaluing the Others, the prejudiced individuals or groups justify, strengthen and reinforce their status as worthy, unique, valuable beings - even if only to themselves.
It is the devaluation of the identity of the Other which is the common denominator between prejudice and dehumanization. In this sense, prejudice may be considered as a manifestation of an essential dynamic of dehumanization.

Examining human relations from an historical perspective, it could be said that prejudice would be the initial breakdown in relations between different peoples once there was a perceived inequality which threatened any aspect of the peoples' sense of themselves as being human. However, given its transitory nature, prejudice has a limited application as an explanation of the many forms of people's intentional inhumane actions towards others. One of the greatest of the limitations is the inability of prejudice to adequately explain human relations in which there is a continued and systematic infliction of suffering when the victimizers could be considered (even by themselves) to be in a position of advantage in relation to their victims.

I shall now describe the phenomenon of racism, and using the theories on racism, give an account of the functioning of this phenomenon which has been offered as an alternative explanation for human relations characterized by inhumane actions for which prejudice is considered an inadequate explanation. Racism identifies different dynamics to those operating in prejudice, but they are dynamics which are also manifest in dehumanization.

RACISM

Racism is defined as:

The assumption that psychocultural traits and capacities are determined by biological race and that races differ decisively from one another which is usually coupled with a belief in the inherent superiority of a particular race and
its right to domination over others. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971, p. 1870)

The definition also includes - a doctrine or political program based on the assumption of racism and designed to execute its principle; and a political or social system founded on racism. Reardon (1977) describes racism as:

the belief that racial differences carry with them superior and inferior capacities. It leads to discriminatory social customs and cultural separation of groups according to race, physical characteristics and ethnic identity. Social benefits are then denied to the separated people. (p. 11)

Racism refers exclusively to relations between racial and ethnic groups, and given the similar direction of the majority of the work on prejudice, it is necessary to clarify the meaning and to distinguish between these concepts.

Racial And Ethnic Groups

The concepts of race and culture or ethnicity, are inextricably interwoven. Although scientists and anthropologists may provide clear distinctions between race and ethnicity, such distinctions are unnecessary when the functions of racism and prejudice are identical for both types of groups. The victims of racism are racial/ethnic groups. These groups are defined by Vander Zanden (1972) as social groups whose members share special characteristics, either physical (based on race) or cultural, or both; they are self-conscious social units, characterized by a consciousness of kind, and a person does not become a member but is born with the status of being a member of a racial/ethnic group.

In 1973 UNESCO released an official statement that the division of the human species into races is partly conventional
and partly arbitrary and does not imply any hierarchy whatsoever (Reardon, 1977). There is no scientific basis for the notions that racial differences carry with them superior and inferior human capacities. Yet it was such false notions which brought about the development of racism as a systematic ideology during the 19th Century (Rose, 1947). Even if there were scientific findings suggestive of some form of racial *superiority*, this still would not be justification for the ill-treatment of *inferiors*, especially given our reasoning which espouses a universal kindredship based upon the equality of people regardless of the actualization of their capacities.

**Racism - A Social Institution**

Although racism is usually described as developing in the 19th Century, Lyman (1984) views modern race relations as beginning with the expansion of Europe in the 16th Century. This expansion introduced European peoples, customs and power into the lives of Africans, Asians, and Americans, and established new hierarchies of racial group position in all the areas of the world where the contacts and collisions of such peoples took place.

Racism is a complex social phenomenon involving attitudes, customs and values, as well as laws and other social, economic and political institutions. A major defining characteristic of racism is that it becomes *institutionalized*, meaning that racism occupies an enduring and cardinal position within a society, and is usually maintained and stabilized through social regulatory agencies such that the practice of racism becomes widely sanctioned or tolerated. Reardon (1977) considers systematic
discrimination by institutions to be "structural violence", in which social customs and political institutions can make it inevitable that certain groups and individuals within a society will have limited standards of life and health.

An institution is commonly defined as a distinctive complex of social actions - a regulatory agency channeling human actions in much the same way as instincts channel animal behavior (Berger, 1963). Institutions provide procedures through which human conduct is patterned, compelled to go, in ways deemed desirable by society. To compel people to act in a certain way is achieved by making the ways of society appear to people as the only possible ones, with a seeming inevitability to their dictates. Berger suggests that ideologies, such as racist ideologies, develop and become institutionalized when a certain idea serves a vested interest in society.

Albury (1983) traces the history of the use of sociobiological ideas to serve dominant class interest in U.S. society. Albury shows how as the struggle of the women's movement for the passage of an equal rights amendment to the U.S. Constitution became intense, sociobiologists claimed that men are innately dominant while women are innately docile and domestic. At a time when ethnic minorities pushed for the demands for social and economic equality, sociobiologists maintained that xenophobia is a genetically endowed component of human nature. At a time when U.S. foreign policy required a revival of military strength after something of a quiescence of the post-Vietnam period, sociobiologists proclaimed the "biological joy" of
warfare. The list continues, even including the basic analogy between the selfish gene and the selfish capitalist.

Lyman (1984) in his study of race relations at the macro-sociological level describes race relations as a social organization based on hierarchy and racial group position. He suggests that any established pattern of race relations indicates the structure of group positions that have been institutionalized in time and space by the concrete acts of people in power. As such, racism is a matter of history and politics, not a function of individual attitudes. Attitudes in turn are, according to Lyman, "merely the lowest form of expression of these historically established positions, and...not remediably correlative with conduct" (p.110). Therefore, racism can be referred to as a sense of group position and a form of social hierarchization.

Racism embraces four basic types of feelings: these are a feeling of superiority; a feeling that the subordinate race is intrinsically different and alien; a feeling of proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage; and a fear and suspicion that the subordinate race harbors designs on the prerogatives of the dominant race (Lyman, 1984).

The institutionalization of racism can have something of a stabilizing affect in a social network. That is, when race is defined functionally, the subsequent race relations, racism and possible conflicts become firmly entrenched in the functioning of a society and frequently form an integral part of its system of values. This occurs by way of the racism developing into an insidious, systematic, normative phenomenon which leads the various affected groups to resign their social situation to being
set and continuous within society and thus considered virtually unchangeable. It is for this reason that changes in the power structure of racist societies are seen as the only weapon with which to battle racism. Specifically, a change of law is seen as possibly leading to a change in racist behavior because laws can create social conditions in which human familiarity and contact can be fostered (Bloom, 1971). Development of equal status contact is seen as another means of reducing racism along with the cooperation of the education system of a society, which Bloom suggests is the most promising area for equal contact.

**Racism And Dehumanization: Their Relationship**

Racism functions on a plane different to that of prejudice. Where prejudice is the expression of individuals' needs, wants and desires to establish and reinforce their identities as human beings, it can be said that racism is the collective expression of those same needs, wants and desires. Intrinsic to the meaning of being human is identification with and attachment to a group - racism reflects this aspect of being human.

If it can be said that the expression of prejudice is something of a defense of the identity of individuals when they experience their identity as being threatened in some way, then it may justifiably be said that the expression of racist ideologies is the defense of the identity of the collective. What is more, the institutionalization of racism functions not only to reinforce that defense but also to justify the original ideologies by establishing a social system which can be described as a self-fulfillment of the ideologies. For example, to deride the hygienic
practises of a group whilst denying their access to soap and water is ensuring the Others' unhygienic state.

For individuals to be human beings they need to experience themselves as capable agents unique from others. Yet at the same time for individuals to be human beings they need to also identify themselves as being similar in certain ways with others. People need to experience themselves as individuals but as individuals within a group. To be afforded the opportunity to strengthen one's identity as a human being is obviously an action with desirable results (not least of which is a possible increase in the capacity for agency). To be afforded the opportunity to strengthen the cohesion of the group is to reinforce one's identity two-fold along with any associated benefits - a most attractive option. Given the frequency with which human relations are presented with the conditions conducive to the development and expression of prejudice and the inherent benefit of a strengthened identity, it is scarcely surprising that people would seek to continue and reinforce that state given their being in the advantageous position. Hence the attraction of institutionalized racism, and the dynamic relatedness between racism and dehumanization.

Institutionalized racism is a manifestation of dehumanization in its hierarchization of individuals and groups. In establishing a hierarchy of social relations, those upper in the hierarchy may subjugate, dominate and control those in lower positions. Moreover, in maintaining such a hierarchy, the subsequent social relations become so fixed in their modes of functioning that the subjugation, domination and control of Others takes on a seemingly invisible quality. That is, to
subjugate, dominate and control people virtually becomes an "accepted" and "unquestioned" form of social relationship.

Yet like prejudice, racism has its limitations as an explanation of people's inhumane actions towards others. The most obvious of these limitations is that racism can only refer to the relations between different racial/ethnic groups. Racism cannot explain the seemingly gratuitous and systematic inhumane actions inflicted upon those who are members of the victimizers' own group and who through their shared group membership, are most like the victimizers themselves - that is the victim and the victimizer would share the same values, meanings and rules of their social interactions - and as such, prejudice is also an inadequate explanation. There does remain an alternative explanation and that is stigmatization. I shall now give an account of stigmatization and its relationship to dehumanization.

**STIGMATIZATION**

In the literature concerned with explanations of the cruel treatment of people inflicted by others, racial antipathy dominates the subject matter. Goffman's theory of stigma, developed in 1963, went beyond race relations to include other relations involving the physically and mentally disabled and those of "flawed character" (e.g. ex-criminals). The major thrust of Goffman's theory describes the effects which a stigma has upon a person's social identity.

Goffman defines a stigma as a discrediting attribute public knowledge of which results in the "spoiling" of the identity of the person possessing such an attribute, or combination of attributes. Goffman cites three different types of stigma: the
stigmata of the body - such as physical and mental disabilities; the stigmata of character - as when a person is labelled an ex-criminal; and the stigmata of belonging to a certain nation and/or religion (which Goffman calls a tribal stigma). Goffman maintains these stigmata have identical effects: firstly, upon the social identity of the person who is stigmatized and secondly, upon the person's interactions with non-stigmatized others. For ease of discussion and variation from the previous subjects, I will examine Goffman's theory in reference to the stigma of physical disability.

Goffman further differentiates between two types of stigmatized people, the "discreditable" and the "discredited". A discreditable person can usually present as able-bodied because the person's stigma is not apparent to others. So the issue for the discreditable person is not managing tension generated during social contacts, but rather managing successful strategies of concealment (e.g. discreditable conditions - epilepsy, cancer, heart disease). In comparison, a discredited person is an individual whose stigma is known to others either prior to contact with the discredited person, or the stigma is evident upon the individual's presentation before others (e.g. discredited conditions - blindness, paraplegia, dwarfism).

An important aspect of Goffman's differentiation between discreditable and discredited individuals is that a discreditable person becomes discredited when the person's stigma becomes both known to others and known by the person to be known to others. When a discreditable disclosure occurs about an individual its effect is to produce doubt in others about many
areas of the now discredited person's activity in which the person may have nothing to conceal (Goffman, 1959).

Goffman suggests the stigmatized are reduced in the minds of others from "whole" and "usual" persons to "tainted" and "discounted" ones. Therefore, the stigmatized develop what Goffman describes as a "spoiled identity". They are individuals who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse but these individuals possess a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn others whom they meet away from them, overriding any claim their other attributes may have upon people.

The reason offered by Goffman (1963) for the stigmatized developing a spoiled identity lies in the social expectation that people in a given category should not only support a particular norm but also achieve the norm. When the disabled contradict the most basic social norm of physical appearance, others believe them to be "not quite human". This role of non-person usually engenders in others a tendency to impute to the stigmatized person a wide range of imperfections, generalized from the solitary observable, physical stigma (Goffman, 1969). As such, stigma is an emergent property, a product of definitional processes arising out of social interaction, and not as an attribute that people automatically possess (Jones, Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller & Scotts, 1984). Stigmatization is a process in which particular social meanings come to be attached to physical attributes, categories of behavior, and as a consequence, to individuals.
In certain circumstances the social identity of those a
person is "with" can be used as a source of information by others,
concerning the person's own social identity (Goffman, 1963). On
this basis, an able-bodied person can become stigmatized through
association with a disabled person. Goffman says that fear of
such identification through association, can result in able-bodied
people avoiding the stigmatized.

In his work on stigma, Goffman (1963) describes how, when
the able-bodied and the disabled enter one another's immediate
presence:

especially when they attempt to sustain a joint
conversation encounter, ... these moments will be the ones
when the causes and effects of stigma must be directly
confronted by both sides. (p.24)

He suggests that interactions of this kind are anxious and
unanchored for both participants because they prefer, especially
the able-bodied person, to withdraw from the interaction. In
obligatory involvement however, the forms of alienation
constitute behavior of a kind Goffman (1959) calls
"misinvolvement". Attention is furtively withdrawn from its
obligatory targets, and self-consciousness and "other-
consciousness" occurs, expressed in what Goffman (1963) terms
"the pathology of interaction" - uneasiness.

Goffman contends that the stigmatized hold to the same
norms of identity that normals do. As a result of this, and the
uneasiness they experience in interactions with able-bodied
people, the disabled develop modes of stigma management, or
techniques by which they try to lessen the obtrusiveness of the
stigma in interactions with others.
Stigma management is considered by Goffman to pertain to the contact between strangers or acquaintances in public life. The disabled may develop special techniques for moving past the initial uneasiness; they may attempt to move on to a more "personal" plane where their disability ceases to be a crucial factor or they may even succeed in "redefining" the stigma as a favored or interesting attribute. But stigma management is only employed by discredited individuals. Discreditable people constantly monitor information from others about their status as able-bodied individuals, for they are always aware of, and try to avoid, discreditable disclosure. This technique of social interaction employed by discreditable individuals Goffman calls "information control". Should discreditable disclosure occur, the discreditable person - who is now discredited - may then employ various techniques of stigma management.

The disabled individual, having previously experienced alienation upon entering a mixed social situation, may employ many techniques of stigma management. One technique may be an anticipatory defensive cowering. Another may be to approach mixed contacts with hostile bravado, but this can induce in others its own set of hostile retaliatory behaviors. Anticipation of contacts can also lead disabled individuals, and some able-bodied people, to arrange to avoid contact completely. All these forms of stigma management can result in transforming disabled individuals into faulty interactants, a transformation which only further magnifies their present stigmatized status and alienation from interaction.
Stigmatization And Dehumanization: Their Relationship

Stigmatization is quite different from prejudice and racism in explaining people's inhumane actions towards Others. Where prejudice and racism may be considered somewhat limited in their applicability to human relations, their reference being mainly to race relations, stigmatization can be described as rather diverse. Similarly, stigmatization adopts more of an interactional approach to social relations than prejudice and racism, accounting for the reactions of the victims and the effect their behavior has upon their social relations. As such, it may be said that stigmatization is a more comprehensive explanation of the inhumane actions of people than prejudice and racism. However, like prejudice and racism, stigmatization still does not adequately explain all the dynamics of this phenomenon.

The instigation of the stigmatization process is the breaking of an established norm of social behavior or appearance. A norm is a particular standard or rule, and in regard to social behavior, standards and rules equate with the morals established by a group which operate upon a social situation within the group. Therefore it can be said that if prejudice may initiate the breakdown in relations between different peoples as a result of their need to defend their identity from a perceived threat, and that if the dynamics of racism function such that through people's capacity for collective agency the defense of their identity is constantly reinforced, then stigmatization may be seen as an extension of this process in which stigmatization functions such that the identity of the group members is further reinforced by forming a hierarchy of the group members.
themselves. Therefore people not only establish themselves as members of a particular group, but they may also be able to be established as particular types of members of the group (which may be desired or not by the people themselves).

There is another aspect of stigmatization which further reveals the complexity of human social relations but which also reveals a major limitation of stigmatization as an explanation of people's inhumane treatment of Others. Goffman's accounts of the difference between discredited and discreditable people, the discreditable person's reliance upon information control and the discredited person's employment of techniques of stigma management, are all based upon the premise that the stigmatized adhere to the same norms as the non-stigmatized. This of course is only relevant to the relations within a particular group because between groups the norms are quite likely to differ. Therefore the effects of stigmatization can really only refer to social relations within a particular group, which is a prime manifestation of dehumanization, but cannot adequately account for such relations occurring between groups. Furthermore, the effect which stigmatization has upon the identity of people is initially for them to be considered "not quite human" (a definite manifestation of dehumanization), but the basic effect is that they are seen by others as faulty interactants who need to be avoided so that the stigmatizers may also avoid any possible dissemination or sharing of the stigma. As such, the most likely result of stigmatization is that the stigmatized person will become a social isolate. Therefore another limitation of stigmatization is that it may explain the inhumane actions of the
avoidance and isolation of Others but stigmatization cannot adequately explain a systematic, continuous attack upon Others.

I have tried to show in this account of prejudice, racism and stigmatization that although our capacity for reasoning draws us to the exposition of a unification of humanity in which relations are based upon equality and as far as possible, free from any needless suffering, our reality in fact contradicts our ideal. People's inhumane treatment of Others has been acknowledged as a problem for a long time, as the history of the research into prejudice, racism and stigmatization shows. Yet despite this virtual wealth of knowledge, prejudice, racism and stigmatization have each been shown to be limited in their capacities to explain why our relations with Others in the present-day remain far removed from even attaining something like unification. The reason, which is manifest in each of the problems of prejudice, racism and stigmatization, is the phenomenon of dehumanization.

DEHUMANIZATION: A PRESENT-DAY PROBLEM FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Prejudice, racism and stigmatization are all phenomena which provide different explanations for different forms of peoples' inhumanity towards Others. Each phenomenon focuses upon a different dynamic within different dimensions of human relations as being the catalyst for inhumane actions. Each phenomenon provides insight into the complexity of the problem which faces the society of today, yet each is also limited in its application because the inhumane treatment of Others has become pervasive throughout our known social world. No longer
may the concept of Others be used to refer exclusively to members of a different race, a different culture or the physically and intellectually disabled. Each and everyone of us may at some time experience ourselves as treated as an Other. Each and everyone of us may at some time be treated in a way which suggests that we are no longer respected nor regarded as a human being. Each and everyone of us may at some time be subjugated, dominated and controlled in such a way that we are dehumanized, and in our turn we may also at some time, be the dehumanizers.

Prejudice shows how, given an initially natural separateness, antagonism and animosity may arise from the meetings of different peoples through a need to protect the group identity from the perceived threat of the different identity of the Others. Racism explains how, given repetitions of such meetings, groups may structure their social environment into a hierarchy such that their treatment of the Other group (at the expense of the Others) functions to emphasize the differences of the groups so as to strengthen and reinforce the identity of the dominating group. Stigmatization provides an account of how people within a structured society may protect and reinforce their individual identities by forming a further hierarchy of the group members based upon the standards and rules of the group.

Prejudice, racism and stigmatization are the negative aspects of people's development from social beings to human beings. These phenomena are given a negative valuation because our capacity for reasoning, a defining feature of our being human, has led us to expound the apparently logical ideal of a unified humanity. The desire has been expressed for people to expand
their codes of morality to refer to every person, to conceive of each and every person as being a moral equal, to progress our development to that of a universal kindredship. But this final progression also has a negative aspect which is the paradox of dehumanization. Just as the social being and the moral being are different manifestations of the human being, so prejudice, racism and stigmatization are different manifestations of dehumanization. What is more, although prejudice, racism and stigmatization are manifestations of dehumanization, these phenomena have another relationship to dehumanization and that is prejudice, racism and stigmatization can be used as justifications or reasons for dehumanizing people. In other words, people's treatment of Others as less than their moral equals may be "justified" or "explained away" by their being "prejudiced" or "racist", an action which can lend acceptance and silent encouragement to inhumane behavior by not attempting to understand and possibly change people's treatment of Others as less than human.

No longer can there be a viable differentiation between different types of people's inhumane treatment of different types of Others because our reasoning suggests there cannot be a viable differentiation between people as human beings and not human beings. Therefore the issue becomes the continuing treatment of human beings as not human beings or, dehumanization.

We are social beings, we are moral beings, and we are human beings, yet we do not always treat each other as such. Dehumanization is a phenomenon which seems to be thoroughly enmeshed in society and has as yet, to be adequately understood.
In Part 2 of this work I shall move towards rectifying this deficiency by developing a theory of dehumanization.
PART 2

UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLAINING DEHUMANIZATION
CHAPTER 3

DESIDERATA FOR AN ADEQUATE THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION
Dehumanization is the paradox of human social interaction. Through our interactions with others we both express and establish our humanity, through our social interactions our unique human capacity for reason has led to our development into moral beings, and has also led to the logical proclamation that all people are human and should be treated as such - as moral equals - a universalizing of kindredship. Dehumanization however, negates this principle of social behavior for when others are dehumanized they are not acknowledged as being human nor are they treated as being human, rather their humanity is ignored or denied and the treatment they receive from the dehumanizers is devoid of the respect accorded to those whom the dehumanizers acknowledge as being human.

It is apparent there is a contradiction between how we think and believe we should act and live with others, and what we actually do and how we actually live with others. That contradiction is the paradox of dehumanization. What is more, the history of human relations reveals the frequency with which people seem to readily treat others inhumanely - as Others.

Dehumanization is perplexing. This seeming capacity for people to readily treat those of their own kind without regard for their being human has long been acknowledged as problematic to social relations. Yet despite quite concerted research efforts in the social sciences, dehumanization has yet to be adequately explained. In Part 2 of this work my aim is to rectify this deficiency in the literature by developing a social psychological theory specifically to provide understanding of dehumanization. The first step in this process, undertaken in this chapter, is to
present the desiderata for an adequate theory of dehumanization which upon the presentation of the theory, can then function as the criteria by which to judge the theory as an adequate explanation of dehumanization. To devise these desiderata it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the nature of a theory: to be specific, the nature of a theory dealing with people - the nature of a social psychological theory. The reason for my specificity is that the explanations of phenomena are as many and varied as the phenomena themselves. Moreover, in our search for knowledge and questions about our world, the physical sciences have consistently provided us with reliable answers. It is hardly surprising therefore that many turn to the physical sciences for explanations of social phenomena. But as I shall show, the nature of a theory dealing with people because of the uniqueness of the subject matter (i.e. human interaction), needs to be quite different from theories dealing with inanimate objects, and the desiderata for an adequate theory of dehumanization reflect those differences.

THE NATURE OF A THEORY DEALING WITH PEOPLE

Identifying A Problem

Even before a theory is formed, there must first be identification of the phenomenon as a problem requiring explanation, and that act in itself is based upon what is considered important or is valued in the world. Given that it is through our social relations that we are able to sustain ourselves, it seems logical for people to place value and importance upon their social relationships and that any phenomenon which may hinder or endanger the quality of people's
enabling social relations would be considered highly problematical. Moreover, because people are self-conscious beings, it may be said that they are most likely to place importance and value upon their capacities to be self-monitoring, reasoning - moral beings; and that because people's morality entreats them to treat human beings with respect, it is logical that people expect they will be treated by others in kind - as human beings - as moral equals. If we consider however, that there is a contradiction between people's reasoning and reality - the paradox of dehumanization - and that those who are dehumanized experience some form of psychological and/or physical suffering and/or constraints upon their self-expression and their lives generally, and that most people would prefer their lives to be free of such constraints and suffering, then it seems obvious that dehumanization be considered a significant social problem. From this perspective, it may be said that the identification of a social problem like that of dehumanization and the method employed in its explanation, is a moral choice (Becker, 1968), and that an examination of such social relations is an examination of people's morality and their capacity to act as moral beings, that is the capacity of people to act as they think they should. Harré, Clarke, and De Carlo (1985) suggest that an effective criterion by which to identify those social phenomena requiring an alternative explanation from the physical sciences, are those phenomena related to moral orders: for they form part of the network of rules, conventions, emotions and social expressions of approval and disapproval.
Given the identification of a problem, it may be asked what constitutes an explanation, or what are the necessary elements by which a theory may be considered as an explanation of a social phenomenon? At this point it is important to clarify the definition and use of the terms theory and explanation, for in the social sciences these terms have developed quite particular meanings. Moreover, in psychology, like the physical sciences, theory and explanation have come to mean the presentation of an easily statable set of propositions that identify the cause of a problem. However, as regards social phenomena and the interactions of people, to expect a set of specific propositions to provide adequate understanding of a problem would result in a theory far too limited in its field of reference and application. Rather, as regards the social phenomenon of dehumanization, I am using the terms theory and explanation in their root sense and common definition. That is, theory coming from the Greek *theòria* - contemplation; *theòros* - spectator; *theasthai* - to observe; *thea* - a viewing; whilst "to explain" means to make plain or understand; to give the meaning or significance of (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971). What I mean by the terms "an adequate theory" and "an adequate explanation" of dehumanization, is to give an account or view of dehumanization that leads to an understanding of this complex and perplexing phenomenon. For example, part of the means of achieving such understanding would be to make plain and clear the functional significance of dehumanization in social relations, though an adequate theory would be more than just a functional explanation as shall be shown.
Understanding A Social Problem

A theory serves as the basis for an explanation of a specific phenomenon, but the theory itself is based upon "what is already believed to be true" (Richards, 1981, p.47). In other words, it may be said that theories are founded upon bodies of knowledge or assumptions the truth of which are taken for granted.

In trying to explain dehumanization, the inextricable connection with people's humanity and the notion of humanization cannot be denied nor ignored. Logically and even linguistically these two concepts are intrinsically and intimately interwoven, meaning that an understanding of dehumanization cannot be achieved independently of an understanding of humanization, for as Winch (1958) says, "Since understanding something involves understanding its contradiction, someone who, with understanding, performs X must be capable of envisioning the possibility of doing not X" (p.91). As such it may be said that the assumptions forming the basis for a theory to explain dehumanization are those assumptions as to the meaning of being human - an understanding of people's humanity and humanizing social relations.

From the assumptions or body of knowledge, a theory develops as an explanation of a phenomenon by accounting for the means by which the phenomenon comes into existence. To adequately do so, a theory is required to provide understanding of why the phenomenon exists through understanding the functioning of the phenomenon and how the phenomenon has come to function as such.
Agents in Explanations

To meet these conditions for an adequate explanation, a theory needs to refer to interactions between things which result in a certain outcome, or which may be described (at least in the physical sciences) as the cause of the outcome. Moreover, a theory needs to be more than just a codifying device, or descriptive statements about the phenomenon as it exists, or a quantification of results from experiments (Harré, 1972). Rather a theory needs to refer to mechanisms of nature which are the actual characteristics/features/powers/abilities/liabilities of the agent(s) that are the catalysts of the phenomenon (Harré & Madden, 1975).

It is important to note that this particular interpretation of the explanation of a phenomenon is one of a number of competing ways of conceptualizing scientific theories. The reason for adopting this particular conceptualization is that given people have capacities for self-consciousness and self-monitoring, people are moral beings, it seems logical that to provide an adequate explanation of a human social phenomenon, a theory would need to incorporate the notion of agency - an understanding of what "empowers" people to act as they do.

The adequacy of a theory of human interaction which conceptualizes people as having the capacity for agency, is made clear in a comparison with theories in the physical sciences. The physical sciences may be described as causal sciences for they explain events in the physical world and the nature of physical things by reference to "causes"; that is, when conditions are right, each step in the chain of cause and effect leads inexorably
to the next (Harré et. al., 1985). In this sense, causes are deterministic. If we consider the way human beings act - their thoughts, feelings, interpretations of their own and others' actions - there seems a great difference of complexity in comparison to the simple causal mechanisms in the physical world.

Characteristic of being human is that people can reflect on their actions, making appropriate plans and changes. Therefore as Harré et. al. (1985) suggest, people's "actions are typically performed in accordance with rules rather than determined by causes" (p.10). Although it may be said that plans and decisions are types of causal factors, the difference is with regard to people's relation to their actions (Harré et. al., 1985), that is people could have acted otherwise. As Harré et. al. suggest, such a qualification has the consequence of considering people's actions in moral terms: if considered in causal terms, such an important qualification seems almost impossible to justify. Therefore an adequate theory of human interaction needs to achieve an understanding of such phenomena in terms of the relevant moral order or orders: that is to try and reveal the system of tacit rules and conventions that people follow in the creation of their daily lives. There is a further qualification however and that is in Chapter 1 human agency was shown to be limited, consequently it is important to clarify how this limited agency of people may be conceptualized in a theory so as to adequately explain such social phenomena as dehumanization. This qualification is of particular importance if we consider that dehumanization contradicts that aspect fundamental to people's
social interaction - the acknowledgement and treatment of others as moral equals. If human beings are agents who have expressed their intentions for their relationships to progress on the basis of people being moral equals, then it is necessary to identify what prevents/limits people from acting as they think they should.

Conceptualizing the Limitations of Human Agency

To conceptualize people as being limited agents is to consider them as having powers, skills and capabilities which do not necessarily have to be expressed to be valid, for as Secord (1983) says, "their exercise depends upon the presence of certain activating conditions, of both an internal and external kind" (p.7). Consequently a theory based on the limited agency of human beings would focus upon identifying those internal or external structures and mechanisms that help or hinder people to generate various kinds of behaviors (Secord, 1983).

Recognition that larger social structures can affect human behavior does not necessarily deny or negate the reality of agency. Rather, as Secord (1986) suggests and was discussed in Chapter 1, people construct social situations but at the same time they are constrained by the very situations they are constructing, and other structures yet again. Social structures condition people's actions, but at the same time people's actions produce social structures - a continuous process conditioned further by the consequences of previous social actions. Secord describes these social structures as being in some sense unintentional creations, because people's intentions in acting are subsidiary to the structures themselves. Consequently it may be
said that various social behaviors are facilitated or discouraged by social structural factors (Secord, 1986), and that a theory must identify and give an account of the structural enablements and constraints which as Secord (1983) says, "play a part in creating the problem" (p.15).

It is important to note, that the concept of social structures is often used in social psychology to refer to social institutions. Social institutions are abstract conceptualizations of forms of relationships between people and it is the form of these relationships that are the explanatory factors (Secord, 1983). Therefore in explaining social behavior in the sense of giving an account of the functional significance of the behavior, reference to social structures is actually a reference to the structure of people's social relationships.

In the context of a theory of dehumanization, considering that people have consistently expressed intentions to treat each other humanely - as human beings - and have shown themselves capable of doing so, what is required is for a theory to reveal those structures (social relationships) and mechanisms which function so as to prevent people from acting as they intend, from acknowledging and treating all others as human beings.

From this discussion of the requirements for a theory to adequately explain and thus provide understanding of a social problem, it is now possible to establish a framework for a theory of dehumanization.
A Framework For Explaining And Thus Understanding

Dehumanization

As was discussed previously, theories are initially based upon a set of assumptions. In reference to a theory of dehumanization, those assumptions are about what it means to be a human being and to be treated as such. But theories may be based on more than assumptions for there may be a body of knowledge already well established, which provides some prior insight or indications as to the direction and progress to be adopted by a theory for the theory to provide a comprehensive understanding of a particular problem. The work on prejudice, racism and stigmatization as discussed in Chapter 2, provides just such indications and insight for a theory of dehumanization. If we combine these assumptions and prior knowledge, and apply them to the account of an explanation of a social problem, it is possible to form the framework, or what may be described as the "plan" for a comprehensive explanation of dehumanization.

Given that people's sense of themselves as human beings is bestowed, sustained and transformed through their social relations, and that our unique human characteristics are enhanced through our cooperative association with others - through our formation of groups - then as regards the concept of agency in explanations, human groups may be considered as potentially enabling structures. In Chapter 2 however, it was shown through the work on prejudice, that under certain situations, what may be considered constraining structures, human social relations can break down. A breakdown in social relations may be considered as a constraining structure in and of itself. Moreover, the work on
racism suggests that such a breakdown of human relations often occurs between specific group divisions, whilst the work on stigmatization indicates that human relations can even deteriorate within the social group itself. Of great significance is that despite our apparent human tendency towards forming social relations which are enabling structures, there are other structures which discourage these social relations. Furthermore, although the work on prejudice shows that a breakdown of human social relations tends to be transitory, the work on racism and stigmatization indicates that in some situations, relations between people can seem to remain this way, and this again can occur between and within groups.

Taking all this knowledge into consideration, it is evident that a breakdown in human social relations can occur in two dimensions - between groups and within groups - and a theory needs to explain dehumanization in both dimensions so as to provide a comprehensive understanding of the problem. Furthermore what is also known of our social relations is that there are constraints which can facilitate a breakdown in social relations and others which discourage such happenings, but there seems to be other structures yet again that actually encourage a perpetuation of constraining social relations. Therefore, to adequately explain dehumanization a theory needs to give an account of those structures between and within groups that initially facilitate a breakdown in social relations such that some people come to consider others as less than their moral equals - or what may be described as the dynamic of the attraction of dehumanization; but more than this, a theory needs
to also give an account of those structures between and within groups that facilitate the perpetuation of people's consideration of Others as being less than human - or what may be described as the dynamic of the maintenance of dehumanization.

The Relevance Of Prediction And Control

Apart from the essential feature of providing understanding of a phenomenon, is there anything more a theory need entail? Prediction and control have long been considered as requirements of a theory. The opposition between Kuhn's philosophy on prediction and Popper's on refutation as the most acceptable method of providing support for the truth of a theory is a debate which continues to the present-day. I think reliance upon either prediction or refutation alone as providing evidence of the adequacy of a theory is very much dependent upon the phenomenon in question as I shall show later in reference to dehumanization, but it would seem that discerning the relevance of a theory is more a matter of a combination of prediction and refutation. Successful prediction may be the initial aim in examining a theory, however should a result occur which refutes the initial prediction, the theory may then be modified or abandoned in accordance with the resultant refutation. The physical science of astronomy is indicative of this process in which calculations of the movements of celestial bodies are supported by the presence of the body at a predicted time and place but if the celestial body should be absent without reason of intervention or destruction, then the subsequent refutation would result in a reexamination and probable modification of the original calculation.
The argument that an adequate theory would allow for the control of the phenomenon and is thus an essential feature of a theory is an issue, like prediction versus refutation, which has met with much debate. The claim that an adequate theory should by necessity, enable the phenomenon to be controlled is a logical progression from the claim that successful predictions be considered as supporting a theory. This logical progression is that if a theory has accounted for the powers of the things seen as the causal factors of the phenomenon, has shown how these things are arranged so that their interaction results in the given phenomenon, then controlling what happens is a matter of reorganizing their relative positions and/or modifying their potency (Richards, 1981). This argument suggests that given the reorganization and/or modification of the causal factors is possible and desirable, then the reorganization/ modification would result in a change in the nature of the interaction of the factors in such a way as to no longer result in the given phenomenon. But again, I would contend that enabling for the control of the phenomenon is not an essential feature but rather a conditional feature for an adequate theory of a phenomenon. Those conditions being firstly, the particular phenomenon in question; secondly, the type, degree, and mode of control made possible and considered desirable; and thirdly, what may eventuate given that the attempt to control is successful.

These issues related to the claims that an adequate theory should allow for the prediction and control of phenomena are based upon and reflect the knowledge sought by theories in the physical sciences, that being the identification of causes and
their effects. However as regards theories dealing with people, the concepts of prediction and control need to be applied quite differently so as to provide the form of knowledge which may be considered most appropriate and desirable for human interaction.

Requirements Of The Form Of Knowledge Offered By A Theory Dealing With People

I can imagine there would be little disagreement with the generalization that the most desired form of knowledge offered by a theory would be knowledge considered to be of at least some social utility. If we employ this generalization to the field of social psychology and human interaction, we can say that the aim of such theories would be - given what it means to be a human being and to be treated as being human - to enhance the understanding people have of one another. But more than this, if we consider people as having the capacity to be self-determining beings whose reason and their ability to govern their conduct by rules has led to their development into moral beings, and that from their morality has evolved the belief in human equality and respect for people, it is logical to suggest that within this framework the form of knowledge providing the greatest social utility offered by a social psychological theory would be the form of knowledge enabling people to be more powerful agents (Mixon, 1986), or at least knowledge which would lead to a decrease in the limitations and constraints placed upon people's agency. Such knowledge would mean that people would have an increased ability to live their lives in accordance with their beliefs and intentions as to how they want to act and how they want to live their lives. In other words, it may be said that the most
appropriate and desirable form of knowledge offered by a theory dealing with people would enable people to augment their powers of self-management (Harré et. al., 1985).

As was noted previously, conceiving of people as being limited agents differs from the causalism which is the basis of the physical sciences and is predominant in many social sciences. When the concepts of prediction and control as applied in a causal sense are applied to human interaction, they grossly oversimplify what ought to be the purpose of a theory dealing with people. The prediction and control criterion of causal theories originally referred to objects thought to have no moral content except in serving people. However, to adhere to the conceptualization of causalism in social psychology would lead to the conclusion that if the forces which supposedly "cause" human behavior are identified and, if in turn, these forces are "controlled", this would result in the "control" of human behavior.

It is evident that knowledge offered by a social psychological theory based on causalism could take the form of conceptual tools to achieve domination and absolute control of people (Mixon, 1986). The value of prediction and control in a causal framework is evidenced in many of the achievements of the physical sciences, especially in the field of medicine. However when such knowledge has been employed for the domination and control of people's social behavior there has often ensued social and political problems because the control and domination of the people has often been for the benefit of the dominators with little, if any, regard for those whom they want and try to dominate. Therefore it may be said that the form of
knowledge fostered by the principle of causalism has the potential to be socially mischievous and harmful when applied in the field of social psychology (Mixon, 1986). As Harré et. al. (1985) suggest, a psychology that conceived of social interaction as causes and effects could actually reduce human autonomy by encouraging people to forbear from acting. As a consequence, people would be less able to act as agents because they would increasingly expect to be "trained" to cope, being more inclined to consider themselves as not having responsibility for their actions and subsequently for any social situation to which they may be party. Such knowledge is hard to legitimize as being desirable social knowledge.

In contrast to the principle of causalism, a social psychological theory which conceived of people as limited agents would present a form of knowledge in which people's social worlds would be assumed to be open in the sense of there being a multiplicity of alternative ways for people to act and choices of particular actions. As such, psychologists would focus their efforts upon finding ways of transforming the structural enablements and constraints in people's social worlds so that people may be more able to create the social environment and situations they desire (Secord, 1983). This may be achieved by people coming to an explicit understanding of that which is implicit in their daily lives (Harré et. al., 1985). Moreover, Secord (1983) says that what is required of social scientists is that they are "able to describe the social structures and individual changes in behavior necessary to produce a planned change and to find a way to create those structures and changes" (p.15).
If we consider that dehumanization brings distress and suffering to those who are the victims, and that equality and humanitarianism are long espoused values in people's morality, it is logical to assume that people would desire to have their world without dehumanization - that is to have a humane social environment. Therefore it would be necessary that to provide an adequate understanding of dehumanization a theory which explained the phenomenon on the basis that people are capable of agency, would identify and give an account of the ways in which dehumanization may be made largely ineffectual, unnecessary and even impossible in the social world by removing the constraining conditions on people's capacity to act in accordance with their beliefs about treating people as moral equals. In other words, a theory of dehumanization would be required to give an account of remedial actions through which we may be able to lessen and eventually even preclude dehumanization from our social interactions and from our world.

Although this discussion of the nature of a theory may be considered brief in relation to the importance and relevance of the subject matter, as regards the aim of this work - to provide an understanding of the social phenomenon of dehumanization - this chapter has identified the desiderata for an adequate theory of dehumanization which will provide a metatheoretical framework for an explanation of this social phenomenon. I shall now give a brief summary of those desiderata.
DESIDERATA FOR AN ADEQUATE THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION

Desideratum 1

Before a theory of dehumanization can be developed, that is an account or view of this social phenomenon that makes clear the functional significance of dehumanization in social relations, it is essential to identify and clarify those assumptions, values and beliefs which will form the basis of the explanation.

Dehumanization is inextricably linked with the concept of humanization, which suggests that to develop an adequate theory of dehumanization it is necessary to have an appropriate and adequate understanding of humanization. An understanding of the concept of humanization may best be achieved through developing a model of the ideal-typical humanizing environment. Such a model would incorporate and explicate those assumptions, values and beliefs about what it means to be treated as a human being: moreover, the functioning of humane human relations. In so doing, a model of the ideal-typical humanizing environment will identify and provide understanding of those structures which enable people to act humanely - an understanding of the type of social environment in which all people are acknowledged and treated as moral equals.

A model of a social environment that identifies enabling social structures most conducive to humane human interaction will function as a firm foundation or knowledge base for the development of a theory of dehumanization by indicating those social structures which function as constraints upon people's capacities to treat each other as moral equals, as human beings.
Desideratum 2

The work on prejudice, racism and stigmatization has shown that people's inhumane treatment of Others is a phenomenon that can occur between different social groups and between people within the same group, even though it is in relation with those in their most immediate social environment that people develop their sense of themselves as being human. Therefore so as to be comprehensive, a theory needs to explain dehumanization in the two different dimensions: between groups and within groups.

Desideratum 3

Under certain constraining structures, human social relations can breakdown, but as the work on prejudice suggests, this situation is usually transitory. Dehumanization however, has shown to be a durable and enduring phenomenon. Therefore to adequately explain dehumanization a theory needs to account for those constraining structures between and within group relations that initially facilitate a breakdown in social relations and those constraining structures that facilitate a perpetuation of these conditions and situations. In other words, a theory needs to account for the dynamics of the attraction and maintenance of dehumanization so as to adequately explain this phenomenon.

Desideratum 4

Assuming that the most desirable form of knowledge offered by a theory is that which may be considered of some social utility, and given that people would prefer to live in a humane social environment - a world without dehumanization - then given the incorporation of the three previous desiderata, an adequate theory of dehumanization would give an account of
remedial actions through which people may be able to lessen and eventually preclude dehumanization from their social world.

These four desiderata provide a clear metatheoretical framework for a theory to adequately explain and thus provide understanding of dehumanization. As regards the nature of a theory, the development of these desiderata have shown that there is an undeniable and unavoidable difference between theories in the physical sciences and the theories of social psychology. The theories of physical science have a distinct objectivity. The theories of social psychology are imbued with morality. Furthermore, the very nature of the subject matter, that is people's social behavior, ensures that the concepts of explanation in social psychological theories cannot be value free, and as regards the complex social phenomenon of dehumanization, cannot be adequately presented as a limited set of propositions. Moreover, most theories in social psychology aim to have at least some social utility; they are based upon principles of social behavior, and thus often present prescriptions for social change which are implicit with value judgements (Gergen, 1973). Therefore the apparent moral nature of social psychological theories cannot be avoided and it may be said, is actually required for a theory to adequately explain the social behavior of people, for people are by nature and necessity moral beings, as is reflected in these desiderata for an adequate theory of dehumanization.

The first of the desiderata is that a theory base the explanation of dehumanization upon a model of the ideal-typical humanizing environment, and that such a model would present
people as limited agents in social interactions. Causalism has been the predominant doctrine throughout the physical sciences and subsequently throughout the development of psychology. However, causalism disregards the possibility of the agency of human beings. As such, it is only in relatively recent times that the concept of limited agency has taken form in the psychology literature (e.g. Harré, 1979; Harré & Secord, 1972; Mixon, 1980; Secord, 1984; and Shotter, 1984). Consequently it is not possible to refer to an established model that meets the specific requirements of this work. Therefore in the following chapter I shall develop and present an ideal-typical model of a humanizing social environment, thus establishing and clarifying the explanatory principle for a theory of dehumanization.
CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING HUMANE RELATIONSHIPS:
A MODEL OF THE IDEAL-TYPICAL HUMANIZING ENVIRONMENT
The dynamics of dehumanization suggest that this social phenomenon is the paradox of our human state. The relationship between our ideals of human relations and the reality of human relations - a spectrum varying from a capacity for reasoning that tells us we are all human, to inhumane actions - seems nothing less than a conundrum. People are capable of reason and the application of that reason in action, yet people are also capable of dehumanization and acting towards Others in ways which seem to negate reason. This paradox has not gone ignored yet the search for an adequate explanation and understanding of dehumanization has to date, proven unsuccessful.

Mixon (1983) suggests that, "If we wish to understand ill-understood aspects of the world...we do not simply observe those aspects, we relate them to something we already understand (the model)" (p.98). Applying this principle to the paradox of dehumanization, and considering the suggestion by Winch (1958) that to understand something requires an understanding of its contradiction, it would seem that an effective method by which to develop an adequate theory of dehumanization would be to base the explanation upon a model of the development and maintenance of humane relationships, or what may be described as the humanization of people in a humanizing environment.

Given the understanding from Chapter 1 that the human identity is socially bestowed, socially sustained and socially transformed, then the model for a theory of dehumanization would be of the type of social environment in which the human identity is developed and maintained. It may be said that most of us have at least a partial glimpse of a humanizing environment:
the relationship with kindred, those within our group. We have only a "partial glimpse" however, because as was shown in Chapters 1 and 2, people may even consider certain members of their group, of their kin, as less than their moral equals and thus not worthy of respect. What this means therefore is that a model for a theory of dehumanization must by necessity be of an ideal-typical social environment. That is, given our reasoning has provided us with ideals as to how we should behave towards others and that we are capable agents, an ideal-typical model is created by removing those limitations or constraints on people's agency that are preventing them from behaving as they believe they can and should behave.

Because of the unique nature of human beings, that is their capacity for agency, causalism is an inadequate explanatory principle for human interaction. Although human beings have the capacity for agency, their agency has been shown to be limited and that human interaction is affected by various enabling and constraining structures. Therefore because causalism does not allow for the concept of limited agency, it is necessary to first clarify the form of a model, or the explanatory principle, which would adequately incorporate the concept of limited agency prior to developing the specifications for a model of an ideal-typical humanizing environment.

THE EXPLANATORY PRINCIPLE OF THE MODEL

Causalist theories are based upon a "regulative" explanatory principle, that is explaining a phenomenon micro-reductively - "from the top down" (Harré et. al., 1985). In reference to human behavior this has meant seeking explanations of large units -
social phenomena - in terms of the smaller units - individuals - in the possible hope of discovering the "behavioral atom". This form of explanation is most adequate as regards physical phenomena but in reference to social phenomena and the concept of limited agency, another form of explanation is required. The alternative to a regulative explanatory principle is what Harré et. al. (1985) describe as a "constitutive" explanatory principle.

A theory based upon a constitutive principle conceives of social phenomena as built "from the bottom up", in which parts of one level become the wholes of the next (Harré et. al., 1985). All people have individual repertoires of thoughts, beliefs and actions - their personal domain: but all human action simultaneously occurs in a social context - sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit - this is the social domain. Moreover, there is no sharp distinction between the two domains, for as Harré et. al. (1985) state, "Nearly all that is personal to any individual is the result of influences that are predominantly social" (p.21). From this perspective it may be said that the fine details of social behavior are explained by reference to the gross social structure and that social and collective patterns of human interaction cannot be reduced to the individual because social structures influence the content of a person's conscious experience (Harré et. al., 1985). Therefore the task in explaining social phenomena involves both cataloguing the relevant components and accounting for the way they are organized as a structure, and also identifying what Harré et. al. (1985) describe as the "template" responsible for the pattern or structure of a social phenomenon. Consequently a constitutive explanatory principle progresses
from the fine details of social action towards the larger social patterns which as Harré et. al. (1985) say, "are the sign of major organizing principles, by virtue of which the smaller...events occur as they do" (p.60, their italics).

To develop an ideal-typical model of a humanizing social environment which provides a constitutive explanatory principle for a theory of dehumanization, I shall first give an account of the premise upon which the model is based, discussing the concepts of social beings, social environments and social interaction. Second, I shall distinguish between human beings and other social animals by examining the unique agency of human beings, that is their identity as human beings and the development of the human identity through the social environment. Finally I shall present an ideal-typical model of a humanizing social environment: the social structures - their principles and operations - that would most enable people to develop and maintain humane relationships. I shall show how we can form a rather clear notion of a humanizing environment by examining equalitarian primitive groups. But as Liedloff (1977) found, even equalitarian primitive groups do not consider other groups "as people". Therefore the model presented in this chapter uses the experience of such primitive groups to project an ideal modern community. That is a community in which all individuals experience themselves and recognize and treat all others as human beings - thus enabling for tolerance of diversities between groups.
PEOPLE AS SOCIAL BEINGS

The premise upon which the model of the ideal-typical humanizing social environment is based is that people do not live in isolation for they are social beings. This means that people form or have a tendency to form, cooperative and interdependent relationships with others of their kind, developing a mutually advantageous interdependence in which there is reciprocal action or influence.

This premise that people are social beings, can hardly be denied given that people rarely survive for any great length of time in complete isolation from others: or at least such a human state is not known to us and if it were, the isolation would then be destroyed unless it were actively sought by the people themselves. Although cases of self-chosen hermitage have and undoubtedly still do occur, such people are certainly in the minority, and of course have been socialized before becoming hermits.

This social nature means that not only are people born into the social condition, but they have a propensity towards the formation of groups and as such it may be said that group formation, interaction and maintenance are the medium of human life. Moreover, a person's world is not just an environment to which the person must respond (Blumer, 1969). On the contrary, because of their social nature, people are constantly in a mode of interaction. That is, the participants in social interaction take account of what the others are doing or about to do and direct their own conduct and situation accordingly. In other words, the
activities of others of their kind are positive factors in the conduct of a social being.

Groups form from a convergence of individuals' wants and needs, commencing with the most basic need of survival. But what often follows with the maintenance of groups is a subsequent convergence of expectations such that groups come to define the vague hankerings and discontents of individuals as determinate wants and needs, according to pre-existing group practices. Schelling (1960) describes the convergence as "everyone's expectation of what everyone expects of everyone, with the new arrivals' expectations being molded in time to help mold the expectations of subsequent arrivals" (p.92). What is described is something of a "social contract", the particular terms of which are sensed and accepted by each incoming generation. Therefore groups or collectives are characterized by an interlinkage of the separate acts of the participants. Blumer (1969) describes this interlinkage of actions as the social process which creates and upholds group life. Most importantly however, it need always be remembered that a group does not function automatically because of some inner structural dynamics or system requirements, it functions because the group members at different points act in such a way as to maintain the network.

This account of social interaction and group formation does not necessarily differentiate human beings from other social animals, nor does it establish in any significant way what has been described as the uniqueness of humans. To differentiate human beings from other social animals it is necessary to show
how, within the social situation, people display their capacity to be self-determining, self-aware, self-monitoring, rational beings and how these capacities function such that people develop their unique identity as human beings.

**DEVELOPING THE HUMAN IDENTITY**

But if I am not merely a 'body', what am I then? You are, first of all intelligence, was Socrates' reply. It is your reason that makes you human; that enables you to be more than a mere bundle of desires and wishes; that makes you a self-sufficient individual and entitles you to claim that you are an end in yourself. (Popper, 1945a, p.190)

Popper's words succinctly describe the fundamental difference between human beings and animals. We are sentient beings. We are conscious beings. Our existence and all that is entailed in our awareness of our existence is evidence of this assumption. But we cannot lay claim to being privy to this characteristic. Our capacity for reasoning is evidenced in our social existence which in turn is the base from which the unique identity of each person as a human being is developed. As Marx's epigram states, "It is not the consciousness of man that determines his existence - rather, it is his social existence that determines his consciousness" (cited in Popper, 1945b, p.89).

Most people, it would seem, have a strong inclination to accept the peculiarities of their social environments as if they were "natural" (Popper, 1945a). Consequently many detailed comparisons have been made of human societies with various animal groups in efforts to find answers to puzzling social issues such as crime and war. Needless to say, the answers derived are largely dependent upon the animal groups chosen as the models, which are dependent yet again upon the researchers' preconceived
vague ideas or philosophy of the nature of human beings. The
problem with such a practise and the reason why such a practise
will not produce adequate answers to human issues is as
Bookchin (1982) suggests, because human terms and concepts are
unjustifiably applied to animal relations and highly structured
animal behaviors rooted in instinctual drives, are too inflexible
to be regarded as social, in the sense that we describe ourselves
as social beings. The distinction can be described as being
between laws of nature and normative laws or rules of conduct. I
shall examine how the unique human capacities for self-
consciousness, self-monitoring and reasoning function such that
individuals develop the sense of themselves as human beings.

Understanding The Social World

People are social beings and as such, their world entails an
inherent complexity of relationships. Furthermore, the social
situation cannot be regarded as merely an arena for the
expression of an individual's behavior because in order that they
may act effectively as social beings, people need to first make
sense of their world. In other words, people are required to
interpret the world that confronts them. The social situation then
is the basis for the development of meaning, arising from the
ways in which people act towards each other and in concert with
each other, as regards objects and subjects. So meaning can be
described as a relational phenomenon, a joint product of actor and
interactor. It may be said then that what people do, how people
act, is the result of how people define and interpret the situation
in which they are called on to act.
Social situations are defined by the participants as having particular meanings and it is through shared meanings and definitions that social situations become a reality agreed upon ad hoc by the participants. Harré and Secord (1972) suggest that shared meanings also form the basis for the common acceptance of conventions and rules which result in apparent similarities and synchronicity of people's social interactions. Their concept of rules of social interaction relates to how people account for their own participation or conduct within a social situation and applying the concept of rules enables others to evaluate what is being done in any given situation. In short, rules are not the causes of behavior - they are amongst the resources people use to interact in ways considered "acceptable".

From this perspective, the social situation may be seen as presenting the interactants with specific expectations which require specific responses. According to Berger (1963) social situations and society as a whole exist by virtue of the fact that most of the time, most people's definitions of the most important situations at least coincide approximately. However, according to Penman (1988), meaning is never complete, never determined because in continually bringing about a new state of affairs "joint actions and the implicated meanings are always emergent and never finished" (p.399). Therefore the social world and a person's social environment is a complex web of meanings, expectations and definitions which are dynamic, continuously evolving and ever-changing and this process is no more evident than in the development of people's self-meanings, that is identifying themselves as unique individual human beings.
Development Of Self-Meaning

In the process of trying to understand their social world, people take each other into account. That is, people become aware of and identify others in various ways. People observe and interact with others, defining each other's actions, and thus giving the social situation a meaning which enables the interactants to orient and direct their conduct accordingly. But most importantly, it is through their interactions with others that people not only define themselves, forming their self-image, but they also develop an understanding of how others define them: that is, what they mean to others, or how others value them. It must be noted however, that people's self-image - their definition of who they are as unique individuals - may not necessarily be in accord with the definition or meaning that others have of them. The importance and centrality which people's interactions have upon the development of their self-meaning is clearly illustrated by the fact of how much people actually mind, how much it matters to people, whether the actions of others - particularly "certain" others - reflect attitudes, feelings, perceptions towards them of goodwill, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other.

Strawson (1974) provides a more detailed account of this process by describing how, if someone treads on your hand accidentally while trying to help you, the pain may be no less acute than if they had trodden on it in contemptuous disregard for your existence or with a malevolent wish to cause injury. But generally, people would feel in the latter case a kind and degree
of resentment that they would not feel in the former case. Alternatively, if someone's actions help you to some desired benefit, then you are benefited in any case; but if they intended the actions to benefit you so because of their general goodwill towards you, it is reasonable to expect you would experience a feeling of gratitude which you would not feel if the benefit was an incidental consequence, unintended or even regretted by them, of some plan of action with a different aim. Consequently people's social identities it can be said, are bestowed upon them through the process of social interaction in which people are defined by others through the meaning others place upon their action, and the meaning people place on others' actions directed towards them.

People's social worlds may be described as based on interactions in which people observe and interpret each other's actions, each aware their own actions are being interpreted and possibly anticipated, and each person acting with regard to the meaning and expectations which their actions may form. Therefore the particular self-meaning which an individual develops and the meaning which the individual has for others is established through the process by which the individual has been and is defined.

Harré (1979) describes people's *dignity* as the sense which people have of themselves as valuable beings. Human dignity has been described previously as an unconditional and incomparable worth, a value not dependent upon contingent facts. Harré suggests however, that given the social nature of people, their dignity flourishes through their being recognized and considered
by others as valued beings of intrinsic worth: thus making social recognition the instrumental factor in the development of a person’s self-meaning and the focus of social interaction.

According to Harré, the resultant desire which people have for social recognition means that any public ritual of respect is dominant over personal feeling in social interaction. Conditional to this social recognition is that people recognize themselves as responsible to and for others in the daily routines of life. Therefore group interaction becomes a relational network of social practices defining and redefining the worth of people. Because of their participation in group interaction, people become committed to certain actions. By fulfilling these commitments, people develop what Harré terms as a reputation, the pursuit of which Harré also suggests is the overriding preoccupation of human life. In other words, to employ another catch-phrase, when people make a reputation for themselves, they are forging their own unique individual human identity. It may be said then that the individual and the group, the public and the private, the social and the personal are continuously and usually successfully blended through a process consisting of ritually created obligations and commitments, mediated by the meanings conventionally associated with certain acts and actions.

People draw upon social knowledge, which is the meanings brought forth in the communication process (Penman, 1988), to perform actions considered appropriate to achieving the intended form of social recognition. In other words, the rules and conventions operating within any given group or social situation
provide the options for the ways in which people may establish their desired reputation.

Expanding upon this conceptualization of the development of a person's self-meaning, Goffman (1963) and later Harré (1979) included a social-historical dimension. Goffman coined the term *moral career* to refer to an individual's personal social history which is composed of the attitudes of respect and contempt others have of an individual and the meaning and understanding which the individual has of these attitudes. The attitudes are realized and displayed through the group's treatment of and reaction to the individual's participation in those institutions, rituals and social situations through which respect and/or contempt are achieved. A person's moral career is formed through the opinions others develop of an individual from their knowledge of the individual's success or failure at social events through which a person may gain respect by risking contempt. Goffman described such events as occasions of *hazard*.

In placing a greater emphasis upon the ways in which people attribute permanent moral qualities to each other, Harré expanded the concept of moral career to include the concept of *character*. Character is formed from the attributes that a group ascribes to an individual on the basis of impressions they form of the person from the individual's expressive activities. These attributes, or as Harré suggests - beliefs about the attributes - determine the expectations that a group forms of a person. They are the foundations of people's willingness to defer to, praise, denigrate, or simply ignore others. Similarly, individuals form beliefs about themselves with regard to how they are seen by
others on the respect/contempt continuum. Needless to say, people's views of themselves may not be in complete agreement, and are often different from the group's perspective. Therefore, from Harré's work, we draw the idea of a moral career as the personal histories of people in reference to the attitudes and beliefs that others have of them, plus the attitudes and beliefs which people have of themselves which have been formed from their own interpretations of the attitudes and beliefs of others.

It is evident that the development of self-meaning is very much dependent upon the social relations, the social experiences which characterize a person's life. As Penman (1988) says, "Our notions of our selves do not 'reside' in our minds, they 'reside' in our interactions with others" (p.404). Therefore it may be said that people require acknowledgement from others of their presence, acknowledgement that their communications and actions have meaning, and acknowledgement that they have intrinsic value as people. In other words, people require recognition from others of their being human because people exist as human beings only in relation to others and human beings come to define and value themselves as people through qualitative social relations, that is through acknowledgement of their self-expression in social interactions. To return to the words of Popper (1945b), "we owe our reason...to intercourse with other men" (p.225), but what is of great importance and integral to understanding the development and maintenance of humane relationships and the conceptualization of a humanizing environment, is that people come to know themselves as individuals only insofar as they differentiate others from
themselves (Gilligan, 1983), which suggests that the
development of the human identity is actually a combination of or
a balance between, people's seemingly contradictory sense of
themselves as being "similar to" yet at the same time "different
from" others.

The account given above of people as social beings and the
development of people's identity as human beings, presents the
personal domain of the constitutive explanatory principle for
understanding the development and maintenance of humane
relationships. What is to follow is an account of the social
domain: that is the form of larger social patterns and structures
which, given the functioning of the personal domain, would be
most conducive to developing and maintaining humane
relationships. Given that dehumanization has seemingly become
thoroughly enmeshed within society, this suggests that existing
cultures and civilized societies are social domains structured
such that dehumanization has become an implicit pattern of
interaction; therefore it is necessary to move into an abstract
mode and develop a model of the ideal-type of social environment
which would enable each individual to have their needs met, and
to develop their unique human capacities to the fullest without
any individual considered of greater worth than any other, and in
which the treatment received by each individual is in accordance
with the treatment considered worthy of human beings.

A HUMANIZING SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

People develop their self-meaning through their social
relationships. Through their experiencing the social environment
people come to understand their social worlds by interpreting the
actions of others, thereby giving meaning to all subjects and objects within their world. People then monitor their own behavior and actions within this social context so as to allow for the greatest likelihood that others will define, value, and thus treat them in ways which are respectful of their being human.

It can be said of people then that they intend and choose, and engage in self-monitoring and thus are self-determining beings, but as Mixon (1983) suggests, there are occasions when people cannot fully be agents of their behavior because their agency is only part of their human condition. People are limited, their actions may be restrained by their character, reputation, past moral career, and the existing social context. As such, "at any given moment all of us are limited in what we can do and who we can be" (Mixon, 1983, p.100).

Through the continuous transactions between people, their understanding of the social world, their actions, and their social environment, people bring about social reality and develop generic self-meanings through sustaining the fabric of meanings that are brought into the social situation by the participants. Taking all this into consideration, an ideal humanizing environment would therefore be a social world in which each person is respected for those features which make them what they are as a person and which when developed, constitute their realization as a human being. That is, free play is given to those qualities, thoughts and activities which are characteristically human, meaning that people's efforts to understand, deliberate and choose and the execution of their capacities are not undermined, damaged or treated with contempt.
Glimpses Of A Humanizing Environment

Although the idea of an ideal humanizing social environment may be passed-off as Utopian given the insidious pervasiveness of dehumanization, our present social environment is not completely devoid of humanizing features. As I have said previously and as relates to the development of the individual's human identity, most of us have at least a partial glimpse of a humanizing environment through our relationships with our kindred. Those most immediate to us, those within our group, are "one of us" but it would seem that people's reference groups are restricted, excluding certain Others from their membership. Moreover what seems to be the pattern is that as people's social worlds expand, introducing greater diversity within their social worlds and coming into contact with the different social worlds of others, people's reference groups become increasingly more restricted. It is therefore apparent that the ideal-typical social environment in providing a model of the ideal modern social world must, like the phenomenon of dehumanization, incorporate both dimensions of human relations - that is within and between groups. The ideal-typical humanizing environment is one in which each person within a group is considered by all others within the group as their moral equal, but also all outside of the group, that is other groups, are considered to be their moral equals - to be human beings.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The United Nations Declaration on Discrimination are public proclamations which not only expound the desire for a humanizing environment of such dimensions but which make a definite effort towards
identifying and establishing the principles upon which such a world society would function. Moreover the values intrinsic to these proclamations, which are peace, social justice, economic equity, political participation and ecological harmony (Reardon, 1977), indicate that we are at least aware of the need for a humanizing social environment which has the capacity for expansion and thus emphasizes the intrinsic value of all people. Yet despite the optimism which may be gleaned from such attempts to at least lay foundations for developing a humanizing environment, inadequacies still remain.

The most significant of these inadequacies (some may disagree with the claim inadequacy) is that the Declarations of Human Rights and Discrimination in their efforts to establish social relations based on an equality of treatment and respect for individuals, do so from what can be described as a negative isolationist perspective rather than a constructive, interdependent, community perspective. In other words, these public proclamations expound the concept of a humanizing environment as one based on an individual's liberation and freedom from social relations, conditions and situations considered to be in opposition to the achievement of such an environment, that being the inequitable sharing of benefits - economic, social, political, intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual (Reardon, 1977). In placing such a strong emphasis upon the liberation of the individual, these declarations virtually ignore a most essential aspect of a humanizing environment and that is the responsibility of community.
The development of the human identity is dependent upon the person's relationship to and their functioning within, the social community. As Bookchin (1982) says:

The displacement of public virtue by personal rights has yielded the subversion not only of a unifying ethical principle that once gave substance to the very nature of a public, but of the very personhood that gave substance to the notion of right. (p.37)

Therefore although the Declarations of Human Rights and Discrimination, and their inherent principles and values, would be integral aspects of a humanizing environment, they cannot stand alone as an adequate model. Furthermore, as has been shown through the account of the development of the human identity, people come to an understanding of their social world through their interactions and relationships with their more immediate others. Therefore it is evident that the development of a humanizing social environment which is expansive in its terms of reference, that is includes all human groups, needs to be based upon the principles and operations of an equalitarian community because it is within the group that people come to their understanding of what it means to be human, and what it means to be treated as a human being.

In the following model, I aim to give an account of the functioning of a community, of group life, in which the interdependency of the members is conducive to each and every individual identifying themselves and being identified by other members as an intrinsically valuable member of the community, and in which the group members are capable of expanding their field of reference to include not just their fellow group members as being moral equals, but also the members of other groups.
THE MODEL

Preliminaries

To form a functional society Popper (1945a) suggests that the decisions taken must be compatible with what he calls "natural laws" (which include conditions of human physiology and psychology) if they are to be effective. If decisions regarding the form of society run counter to these natural laws, then Popper suggests the decisions could not be completely carried out. From the perspective of the constitutive explanatory principle of a humanizing environment, Popper's suggestion means that the model of such an environment would need to take into consideration the features of the human condition - the personal domain, the features of social living - the social domain, and how each moderates the other.

Given that the capacities for self-awareness and self-determinacy are fundamental to the human condition, it would seem logical that the ideal humanizing environment would enhance these capacities in people's development of their human identities. To live without restrictions has often been conceptualized as the ideal of "freedom" (Bookchin, 1982). But as Popper (1945b) has shown, this ideal contains a paradox.

Complete freedom in the form of people having no restrictions upon their behavior, given that people are social beings, would result in tyranny. To be precise, tyranny of stronger people over weaker, for the weaker would have their freedom stolen from them: this is the paradox of freedom. Therefore the ideal humanizing environment would need to consider the freedom of the individual as having necessary social limitations. Such a
socially oriented conceptualization of personal freedom has been described by French (1985):

Freedom is the sense we are choosing our own bonds. It is not a lack or absence, but the presence of harmonious relations between us and our condition, our acts, our relationships. Freedom includes duty, responsibility, and bonds as well as our relatively independent states and acts; it is the sense that we are using well those parts of the self we want to use...in acts and states we wish to be immersed in. (p.542)

When placed within the social context, freedom may be described as people's capacity to express themselves as the people they are in relationships based upon mutual respect. Therefore a humanizing environment would be a voluntary association in which the identities of the individual members - their self-meaning, that is their characters, reputations and moral careers - would be fostered through social acts oriented towards the common good, or what Horowitz (1964) describes as the practise of mutual aid.

Principles Of A Humanizing Environment

To be a truly humanizing environment a collective would need to function as a social community - an interdependence based upon mutual respect. This respect not only refers to the members of the community but also to the physical environment because the existence of the community is inextricably dependent upon the physical environment. Therefore a humanizing environment entails both social aspects and aspects of the natural physical world.

Bookchin (1982) examined a number of communities that presented an intense solidarity both internally and with the natural world, and Liedloff (1977) details the functioning of such
a community in her account of the Yequana - natives of South America. Because of these features such communities may be called "organic communities" and it is interesting to note they were all preliterate peoples, in fact groups that may be described as "primitive". One of the central features of these communities was their outlook toward life, in which life - people, things and relations - was conceived in terms of uniqueness and dissimilarity. There was a notable absence of the valuations of superiority or inferiority, with unity and harmony considered indispensable to the composition of the world. These communities fostered what may be described as equalitarian social domains. It is important therefore to understand the functioning of these communities so that they may be used as indicators of the form which modern social patterns and structures need to adopt so as to achieve equalitarianism without returning to primitive tribal life.

Given our understanding of the meaning of being human and the development of the human identity, it is evident that to develop a model of a humanizing environment it is necessary to initially focus upon the basic unit of the social community because it is through these more immediate, fundamental relationships, these social patterns and structures, that people come to understand their world. A community which acknowledges and functions on the basis of the moral equality of the members would be more conducive to acknowledging and relating to other groups as their moral equals. What is more, it seems logical that for a community to function on the basis of something other than equalitarianism - that is on the basis of a
hierarchy of superiors and inferiors - would be conducive to
people developing an understanding of the social world in which
people are not considered to be moral equals, whether they be
members of the group or other groups, which may be described as
a foundation of dehumanization.

Other interesting features Bookchin and Liedloff recount of
the communities they studied was a complete parity between
individuals, sexes and age-groups; usufruct (the right of all
members to use and enjoy the fruits and products of the group)
and reciprocity; an avoidance of coercion in internal matters; and
what is described as the value of the "irreducible minimum" - in
which all people in the community regardless of the amount of
work they contributed, were never denied acquisition of the
means of life, that is food, shelter and clothing. Furthermore the
communities were not completely homogeneous because the
members were often defined by certain daily roles apparently
based on sex, age and ancestral lineage. These roles Bookchin and
Liedloff similarly report, did not seem to be structured
hierarchically nor did they seem to involve any domination of one
person over another. Rather, the function of these roles was to
define the individuals' responsibilities to the community by
simplifying the nexus of personal relationships.

Perhaps the most crucial, certainly the most significant
feature of the organic societies was that the concept of freedom
did not seem to exist (Bookchin, 1982). The word apparently
having no meaning to the people because their societies lacked
any hierarchical structures or relations based on domination.
There was no contrast between freedom and "unfreedom" (to
which hierarchy and domination may be likened) so there was no need to define a condition intrinsic to their lives.

Despite the fact these societies possessed no concept of freedom, Bookchin suggests they nevertheless were founded upon an implicit commitment to social freedom. Operating on the basis of an irreducible minimum meant that members of these communities were assured of the material means for survival irrespective of their productive contribution to the community. Consequently the society would compensate for the infirmities of the old, disabled, and ill and for the dependency of the very young. As Bookchin notes, to base a society on the principle of the irreducible minimum entails the affirmation of existing inequalities within the group, that is an inequality of skills and powers. In organic societies however, these inequalities were not denigrated, but rather the society compensated for the inequalities. As such Bookchin (1982) suggests that in reference to an organic community, "Equity...is the recognition of inequities that are not the fault of anyone and that must be adjusted as a matter of unspoken social responsibility" (p.144). The organic community functions on the principle that given the means exist, they are to be shared as much as possible according to needs - needs which are unequal - as gauged according to people's abilities and responsibilities. Therefore it may be said that an organic society operates according to the equality of unequals (Bookchin, 1982), so as to form a culture based on a compensatory distributive system.

Many present-day visions of Utopian societies or Shangrilas view the "ideal life" as a materially secure, indeed highly
affluent existence. But adopting a more realistic perspective, the concept of the idyllic life needs to place the emphasis upon human relations within the confining facts of our physical condition and environment. Bookchin's (1982) examination of organic communities and Liedloff's (1977) account of the Yequana tribe, societies which may be considered as having achieved at least a semblance of these features, indicates that in actuality to "live well" implies people's commitment to the well-being of those within their immediate social network and to the public body. The aim seems to be to achieve a generous balance that combines freedom with coordination, sharing with self-discipline, and enjoyment with responsibility. Bookchin (1982) provides a most perceptive summation of people's relationship not only to others within society but also to the natural world when he says:

what we call "human nature" is a biologically rooted process of consociation, a process in which cooperation, mutual support, and love are natural as well as cultural attributes...the formation not only of individuality but also of personality consists of being actively part of a permanent social group...human nature is formed by the workings of an organic process...it is formed by a continuation of nature's cooperative and associative tendencies into the individual's personal life. Culture may elaborate these tendencies and provide them with qualitatively new traits...thus producing what could authentically be called a society, not merely a community. But nature does not merely phase into society, much less "disappear" in it; nature is there all the time. (p.317)

From this preliminary discussion of the model of a humanizing environment, it may be said that a society which provided such an environment would be based upon the principle that the identity of an individual as a human being - a person of
value and worth - can be achieved through interdependence and consociation fostered through strong communal ties. The community itself would have an "organic core" in which loyalties are freely given, the system of distribution of the irreducible minimum for existence is based on the equality of unequals, and interpersonal relations are respectful of the capacity for individual autonomy. Given this clarification of the principles of a humanizing environment, it is now necessary and possible for the completion of the model, that is to give an account of the operations of such an environment from a modern perspective. In other words, to show how, based on this principle, a modern society would operate and function as a humanizing environment.

Operations

The preliminary discussion of the paradox of freedom suggests that any human society entails some form of limitations on the freedom of the members. Given that this paradox and the resultant need for limitations stems from the value given to the human capacity for self-determinacy, and considering that people are social beings with a capacity for self-awareness and self-monitoring, an ideal-typical humanizing environment would avoid a superfluity of rules and achieve harmony and balance between people’s agency and the limitations necessary for social living because through their humanization, people would internalize the principles of interdependency and consociation to such a degree that any superfluous external constraints on people would not be required (Horowitz, 1964). Ideally, people would be a law unto themselves, without violating the integrity of others. Moreover, the society would function within a moral framework in which
there is no distinction between what people do for themselves and what is done for others; thus mutual aid would be a "way of life" and self-consciousness would be the improving force in the development of humanity.

In placing such an emphasis upon the importance and responsibility of the individual within the social structure, a humanizing society would consider the actions of collectives as being the actions and behavior of human individuals. In this way as regards modern communities, official bodies and states would maintain a socially oriented morality, the desired result being as Popper (1945a) says, "to moralize politics, and not to politicize morals" (p.113), or in other words, political hygiene. If we take into consideration the unique nature of collective human agency in which social institutions and the services they provide can expand the agency of individuals beyond the power of their muscles, and as Popper observes, that fundamentally institutions develop through establishing the observance of certain norms with a particular aim in mind, then it may be said that in a humanizing environment the social domain would be formed of governing institutions that would aim for the greatest freedom for individuals. Therefore as regards a modern social environment that developed and maintained humane relationships, the relevant issue becomes the form which the institutions need to take so as to adhere to the principle of freedom.

In accord with the ideal of maximizing the social freedom of its constituents, a society would need to be formed of what Bookchin (1982) describes as "libertarian institutions". Such institutions would literally be "peopled" institutions because
they would be structured around direct face-to-face relationships which stress the importance of active citizenship, that is the participation and involvement of the group members in the functioning of the society. In this way people would experience themselves and consider each other as capable of directly managing social affairs. This extends the conception of people as being capable agents of their personal domain to the social domain, in which people are considered to be competent self-governing citizens - moral agents and thus moral equals.

In being active citizens people would be free to participate in any decisions no matter how far-reaching, regarding their community. Such a situation may be described as direct democracy. The governing bodies within these communities would be related and able to be recalled, and their duties would be limited to strictly administrative responsibilities (Bookchin, 1982). Such a limiting definition of the operations of these bodies allows for easy identification and the disbanding of any governing body which impinges upon the policy-making capacities of the assembly of citizens. Moreover, limiting governing bodies to a strictly coordinative function would produce a system of accountability in which excessive, dysfunctional or needless administrative bodies could be readily identified and disbanded.

The value implicit to these governing operations is that of equalitarianism. Although it cannot be denied that individuals are in very many respects very unequal in the sense of not being the same in skills and abilities, it is essential for the establishment and maintenance of a humanizing environment in regard to issues of governing the community, that equality before the law or more
particularly moral equality, be not only a fact but an assumption. As Popper (1945a) says, equalitarianism proper is the impartial treatment of citizens by those in governing positions. Moreover, it is the requirement that birth, family connection, or wealth of any form does not influence the community administrators, but that positions of privilege be conferred by the citizens upon those with the necessary skills whom they respect. The guide for selection being as Sennett (1980) suggests, that such people will use their skills or abilities in the care of the community and all its members. Therefore governing or administrative bodies would be both visible and legible to the public. That is, those in such positions would be explicit about their functioning - what they are able and unable to do and what they want and intend to do - and specific as to how this open statement could come about.

A humanizing environment operating by libertarian democracy would differ from the familiar "majority rules". Rather a humanizing environment would form a safeguard against tyranny because individuals would consider themselves capable and able to differ from the majority and, employing democratic methods, work towards a revision, change and improvement of any majority decision. As Duncan (1962) says, "Where we cannot question, we cannot reason. The purpose, or value, of rules must be subject to reason as well as faith" (p.327). Therefore in a humanizing environment people would be capable of being heard, of their views being considered and of their being active, effective, and thus valuable members of the society.

If we consider that the perpetuation of any group is dependent upon the survival and development of the weakest
constituents of the group, and that the human identity is formed and developed through qualitative, respectful social interactions, such reasoning suggests that a humanizing environment being based upon the principle of equality of unequals, would be a social world the orientation of which would be to provide help and support for the weak, or to provide help to those who require help to survive. As Schmookler (1984) suggests, the long-term fulfillment of all creatures requires that their systems function so as to perpetuate the conditions of life and that the most desirable of such systems would be one in which the parts serve each other in serving themselves.

The means of life and the irreducible minimum would be guided by the concepts of usufruct and complementarity with respect to age, acknowledged infirmities and care for the young. In abiding by the practise of usufruct, the resources of the community would be freely appropriated by people merely by virtue of the fact of their needing to use the resources (Bookchin, 1982). Therefore the emphasis as regards resources of a group and their role in fostering solidarity, is upon the concept of function replacing that of possession, eliminating entanglements of proprietorship and even reciprocity. Bookchin (1982) suggests however that reciprocity would be the significant base from which to develop fellowship between groups.

More specifically, and most importantly, a humanizing environment would need to be communal in scale. That is freely created, simple affinities, which are intimate and consciously created relationships. Larger or composite communities would be networked confederally through what Bookchin (1982) describes
as bioregions and biomes, integrated with the indigenous ecosystems. What is taken from the earth would be returned in recycling processes employing natural sources of power such that mass-producing, highly mechanized installations would be minimal and people would view themselves in relationship with, and as an elementary part of the natural world.

It may appear initially that what I am suggesting is that to live in a humanizing environment would require a reversion back to preliterate tribal life, but this is not the case. Given humanity's proven ingenuity for invention and technology, a humanizing environment would rely upon this ability to form and maintain an environment which would actually enhance other qualities of people that are also uniquely human.

Operating on the basis of usufruct, a humanizing environment would ensure that all people had access to the irreducible minimum means of life. As such, people would not succumb to exploitation to survive. Moreover, they would rely upon their ability for productivity to develop technology which improved people's lives by removing any necessity for labor which was asocial, unrewarding drudgery. Marx foresaw such a need when he insisted that productivity be used to shorten the labor day (Popper, 1945b), a fundamental pre-requisite for people to consider the day and their energies to be mostly under their own direction, to be spent in accord with their needs and the needs for the maintenance of the group. Any necessary industrial work would be shared through rotation, like the positions of public responsibility, and physically onerous tasks would be collective enterprises adopting festive forms where possible (Bookchin,
1982), thus reinforcing the conceptualization of libertarian institutions as peopled organizations.

As a result of such personal involvement in the development and maintenance of the community and its services, it is possible that people's desire for goods would reflect the same. That is, the community's emphasis would be upon the quality of goods - their value being considered as much for their artistry and permanence as for their function. Consequently the production of goods would be more craft-like and valued for being so, rather than a mechanized mass of dispensable items. People's energies having been freed from the concerns of existence or dominated by laborious drudgery, could be directed towards the shaping of their material lives in forms that are ecological, rational and artistic (Bookchin, 1982). Productivity in this form would be intrinsically valuable as an avenue for the encouragement and expression of people's agency through creativity, imagination and ingenuity (uniquely human qualities) in ways which simultaneously reinforce the solidarity of the community.

The image of life in an ideal-typical humanizing environment is of people who experience themselves and others as valuable, active, integral members of a community. Because of the emphasis and value placed upon people's involvement in the functioning of the community, people's lives would be characterized by complexity, variety, contrast, plurality, and multiplicity - in fact a miriad of choices of ways in which they could express themselves as unique individuals within the community as a whole. Such a sense of security and assurance of
acceptance would be fostered through the care and education of the young.

In a humanizing environment the major aim of the educational system would be to help develop in the young those skills most required for their to be able to make independent, rational choices and decisions. This aim may be achieved by giving broad reign to the children's creativeness, encouraging inquisitiveness, and emphasizing the importance, value, and effectiveness of the individual within the community. Rather than encouraging complete, unquestioning obedience, the emphasis instead being upon cooperation (Liedloff, 1977), the young would develop an independence of mind which is always curious and questioning, which Russell (1938) describes as "somewhat sceptical", but readily and actively seeking answers, explanations and solutions. Through such active learning people would develop a wisdom far beyond that of recondite knowledge; through their active learning people would not only develop their reasoning but also their respect - respect for the knowledge and reasoning of others, respect for the uniqueness of others from which develops an acceptance of the differentness of others.

Moreover, the education system of a humanizing environment would work towards people developing what Socrates called "true rationalism" (Popper, 1945b): that is, people being aware that they themselves and others are limited in what they do "know" and can "know" and thus the possibility of their sometimes being in error. Therefore matters and issues of difference would be considered opportunities for people to learn to see differently and perhaps more clearly than before. Adopting this approach of
intellectual modesty would promote respect for the views of others, reinforce the equalitarianism of people's capacities and abilities to be effective agents within their worlds, and afford a high regard for individual autonomy and voluntarism as an essential feature of a unified community. But most importantly, an education which emphasized and enhanced reason through cooperation, coordination and allegiance in understanding the world, could best lead people to the recognition of what Bookchin (1982) calls a "shared humanitas" - humane relationships between groups.

Fostering curiosity, inquisitiveness, creativity, reasoning and a security of self-expression in the young all within a community operating on the principles of equalitarianism and usufruct, would be conducive to developing and encouraging a conceptualization of social relations that could embrace different others and exogenous cultures. As Popper (1945b) says, reason supported by imagination would enable people to understand that those who are different, far away, and whom may never be seen, are essentially like other people in their relationships with one another. This ability for generality and universalization would not be the only domain of reasoning developed through a humanizing education. Because curiosity and creativity, difference and uniqueness are respected and valued, then the individuality of people - their actions, experiences and relationships - could also be identified, acknowledged and appreciated for their uniqueness as different perspectives of being human and possibilities for increasing human potential.
It may be deduced from this account that the main emphasis in the operations of an ideal-typical humanizing environment would be upon a "dynamic unity of diversity" (Bookchin, 1982), in which the integrity of each person would be developed through an harmonious balance of complexity, variety, and diversity of the social environment. I shall now give an account of the most relevant and effective consequences of the active, varied and diverse operations of a social world in which the relationships between people and communities are based upon usufruct and equalitarianism.

Coming From A Humanizing Environment

This model of a humanizing environment presents the ideal-typical community as functioning through mutually free, self-organized people whose community relationships display respect for each person's autonomy, and thus are non-hierarchical and based upon the principles of active citizenship and equality of unequals. If as Penman (1988) suggests, "we understand the world not in terms of direct, physical experiences, but in terms of social 'realities'" (p.393): that is the patterns and structures of the social domain affect the personal domain, it may be said that the social realities and understandings brought about through such an active cooperative process as that presented in the model, would create a social world - meanings, values and social institutions - which communicates to all individuals and through which all individuals communicate their acknowledged responsibility and worth as integral and active members of the community. Also such a process of social creation based on
synthesis would have the capacity to be self-generating (Penman, 1988).

Being born into and maturing within an actively cooperative social world would be conducive to fostering what Horowitz (1964) describes as "universally longed-for qualities" of life which people have glimpsed on occasions. Those qualities are generosity of people; a social world continually changing and refreshing; people's skills and ingenuity being embodied in the whole product they create for the community; little covetousness for status through material property; free expression and exchange of ideas; each person contributing to the community decision-making; each person being capable of living in accord with their nature; peaceful habitation with different peoples (that is humane relations between groups); and the capacity for a continuous critique of the situation to strive for improvement.

The qualities which Horowitz describes are features of a social world which I think most people would agree as being a desirable place in which to live, but what is of most importance to this work is that under these conditions people would recognize and acknowledge each other as human beings and they would act toward each other accordingly. An actively cooperative equalitarian society would afford the constituents not only innumerable opportunities for expression of their unique selves - thus establishing their individuality - but what is most essential for humanization is that these opportunities for individual self-expression would also be social actions having relevance and import to the community as a whole. Thus people would also be provided with opportunities to establish their reputations, their
characters and their moral careers in ways assuring both their being respected and valued as group members - and a continuation of this process - but most importantly, a reciprocation of that respect resulting in the achievement of moral equalization. Therefore it may be succinctly said that in an ideal-typical humanizing environment, humanization - people's sense of themselves (their selfhood) and their sense of others as being human - would be the result of "integration, community, support, and sharing without any loss of individual identity and personal spontaneity" (Bookchin, 1982, p.366).

Humans are complex beings. There are many aspects to what constitutes being human and how the human identity is formed. In this chapter I have presented an ideal-typical model of an environment which would enable all people who developed within such an environment to consider themselves and others as moral equals - as human beings.

To summarize: the model presents the development and maintenance of humane relationships from a constitutive explanatory perspective in which the personal domains of individuals - made up of those characteristics that are uniquely human - join together to form the larger patterns and structures of the social domain - groups, institutions, cultures and societies - and these patterns and structures simultaneously form the framework within which people's personal domains - their understanding of the world, their individual identities and relationships with others - take shape. Moreover, the social domain of an ideal-typical humanizing environment would be one in which the development of the human identity is dependent upon
people's relationship to and their functioning within the social community. The identity of a person as a human being would be achieved by interdependence and consociation fostered through strong communal ties. The system of distribution within the community would recognize an irreducible minimum of needs and function on the principles of the equality of unequals, usufruct and complimentarity. Furthermore, because of the respect for individual autonomy, the community would avoid a superfluity of rules, whilst the way of life would centre upon mutual aid. The necessary social institutions would be libertarian institutions: that is, institutions aiming for the greatest freedom for the people and they would, in the main, have strictly administrative roles. The young would be educated for independence whilst cultivating the principle of intellectual modesty. Such social structures and relations would encourage active citizenship whilst discouraging coercion, tyranny, competition and the sense of there being superiors and inferiors. The ultimate aim in developing such social structures would be for the social domain of the ideal-typical humanizing environment to function as a dynamic unity of diversity in which the parts serve each other in serving themselves. Therefore the model presents the social world of human beings as developing through a continuous transaction between the capacities of individuals to be agents and all that agency entails and implies, and the patterns and structures of the social domain which function to enable or constrain individuals in their interactions.

Given the assumption that people are innately social beings, the account of the development and maintenance of humane
relationships from the model of the ideal-typical humanizing environment suggests that the phenomenon of dehumanization develops out of particular types of patterns and structures in the social domain. In other words, so long as people live in societies in which dehumanization is implicit in the social structures, that is they are treated as less than the moral equal of others, it can be no more than a pious hope that such people will refrain from dehumanizing others. If as Popper (1945b) says:

> it simply cannot be denied that we can examine thoughts, that we can criticize them, improve them, and further that we can change and improve our physical environment according to our changed, improved thoughts. And the same is true of our social environment.... (p.209)

then it is possible that through our personal domains we can change our social domains so as to be more conducive to the development and maintenance of humane relationships. To be able to do so however, people must become aware of how their social domains are structured so as to constrain their social nature. In other words, to understand and explain dehumanization it is necessary to make that which has become implicit - dehumanizing social patterns and structures - explicit. In the following chapter I shall present a theory of dehumanization based upon this constitutive explanatory principle.
CHAPTER 5

A THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION
PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON THEORIZING

When I commenced work on dehumanization I had both a number of goals in mind and a number of expectations. The goal which at that time came first and foremost was to obtain a Doctoral degree in Psychology. The reason for the choice of subject I think has already been accounted for in the Introduction. In the course of my research I have learnt much, both about dehumanization and about the method by which I chose to learn - that being theoretical rather than empirical.

The greatest of my expectations with which this task was commenced, I have now discovered, were actually in reference to theorizing itself. My original aim was to find "the" answer to the question why do people dehumanize other people? As the research progressed I came to want and hope that my work might at the very least bring some clarity to a subject area whose paradoxes can easily lead to misunderstanding and possibly misdirected research; and at the most I wanted and hoped to develop a theory to understand the phenomenon of dehumanization. I think I have achieved both these goals, but a most valuable lesson learnt along the way is about the process involved in the development of a social psychological theory.

When I started this work my impression was that the process would involve researching the subject area extensively - related theories and relevant empirical studies - identifying the inadequacies, and then by accommodating for those inadequacies, and employing my own thoughts, philosophy and experiences of dehumanization, presenting a theory of dehumanization. The pinnacle of my work I assumed would be the presentation of the
theory itself. Reality however has shown the naïveté of my preconceived ideas. I in fact found that defining the problem - the assumptions underlying the phenomenon, and the implicit morality - and coming to understand the extent to which dehumanization has become an ever-present yet seemingly invisible aspect of social relations, presented as the most time and thought-consuming problem.

To understand dehumanization it is necessary to understand its opposite - humanization. To try to understand humanization - that is, how we become human, what makes us human - is an immense task and one for which I have found there to be no simple, hard and fast answers, certainly not within the limitations of a single thesis, and has shown to be one of the most valuable lessons I have learnt about theorizing.

To develop an adequate theory of a phenomenon, to clarify and define the phenomenon and inherent moral assumptions as accurately and "objectively" as possible is the first step in the process, and possibly the most crucial. Certainly in reference to social behavior, the theories developed to answer problems presented must, by the necessity for adequacy, acknowledge the moral and diverse nature of the phenomenon.

Throughout this work I have emphasized the dynamic and moral nature of dehumanization which is a reflection of the dynamic and moral nature of human social behavior. In the process of understanding such a phenomenon a theory is required to be clear and relatively concise. However to be concise has come to mean in many schools of the social sciences and certainly in the expectations of many people, to be reduced and
simplified to the specific, preferably quantifiable values and terms. As regards the social nature of dehumanization, to produce such a theory would in fact result in an inadequate explanation of the phenomenon.

Theorizing is not just simplifying the values of specific factors the transaction of which result in a certain phenomenon: the ultimate aim of theorizing is to provide understanding. How a theory leads people to understand a phenomenon is very much dependent upon the actual nature of the phenomenon itself. Dehumanization is a social phenomenon and as we are all participants in social interaction and given that there is very little discrepancy between different people's intuitive understanding of the meaning and nature of social interaction, I would suggest that the process of theorizing about such a social phenomenon is a matter of drawing people's attention and awareness to the ways in which certain social actions of people in interaction with others and within the context of the social environment, can result in the particular phenomenon. In other words, the explanation of a social phenomenon such as dehumanization need not be a matter of "revealing" some hidden, unquestionnable "truth". Rather, to enable understanding of a social phenomenon, an adequate theory indicates to the reader or points to what are probably familiar aspects of social interaction. However, because social interaction is a constant, day-by-day occurrence in the lives of each and everyone of us, people can become unaware of what they do in their interactions, and the way their interactions affect their lives. Therefore, drawing attention to social interactions and their enabling or
constraining effects upon people's lives can lead people to an awareness of how their actions and interactions are enabling or constraining for themselves and for others. It is awareness of the enabling and constraining factors in social interactions and the social environment which provides understanding of social phenomena.

In reference to dehumanization, since my work is based upon the assumption that people believe they should treat others as human beings, and that they can do so, what I am pointing to are those aspects of civilized life that prevent people from fulfilling their intentions. This is knowledge to which we are all privy, but of which some are more aware than others. In this work so far, I have defined the problem, identified those aspects of dehumanization which require explanation, and presented a model of a humanizing environment which would enable people to develop and maintain humane relationships, I shall now present a theory of dehumanization - the final stage in this process towards understanding this paradoxical phenomenon.

A THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION

Dehumanization is a phenomenon of which most people are familiar because not only does history provide ample evidence of the consistency with which people consider Others to be less than human beings, but the existence of dehumanization as a current practice bears witness to the insidious, and pervasive nature of this phenomenon, despite the human capacity for reasoning which often espouses the desire for equalitarianism in relations with our conspecifics. As such, dehumanization is the paradox of human social relations but despite its pervasive
nature, or maybe because of it, psychology has yet to examine the phenomenon in such a way as to provide an adequate understanding of why and how dehumanization has come to exist and to characterize many human social relations. An aim of this work is to increase our knowledge of dehumanization, and to do so this chapter presents a theory which has been developed to explain and thus understand dehumanization. So as to achieve as comprehensive yet as concise an explanation as possible, the theory of dehumanization shall be presented in three parts. Firstly the theory shall indicate the attraction and maintenance of dehumanization between social groups; secondly the theory shall point to the attraction and maintenance of dehumanization within social groups thus accounting for the apparent insidious nature of this phenomenon; and thirdly, through understanding these dimensions of dehumanization, the theory shall then identify ways in which dehumanization may be lessened and possibly even precluded from our world such that social relations may move towards achieving the ideal-typical humanizing environment.

**PREAMBLE**

The model of a humanizing social environment suggests that because people are social beings, their identities are bestowed and maintained through social interactions in which the participants acknowledge each other through actions which signify the others' awareness and respect for the person's expression of their capacity for agency, or their self-expression. Furthermore, because people are self-conscious beings with the capacity for self-monitoring, such social recognition is both
required and actively sought by people: and because they are also intelligent beings with a capacity for reasoning, the groups which people form are capable of sustaining themselves and organizing their activities such that the capacities of each individual group member may overcome and develop beyond limits existing within the natural physical environment. In other words, the esteem in which people are held by others directly reflects and affects people's capacity to live their lives in ways they deem most desirable. Therefore it may be said that people are acutely aware of their own dignity and have a strong desire to be recognized by others as beings of worth (Harré, 1979), or rather, as worthy beings. So as to develop a viable reputation, people will pursue positive social recognition through regulating their actions in accordance with their awareness and knowledge of what is considered appropriate social action. Goffman (1969) describes this aspect of people's social behavior as their "expressive order", and according to Harré (1979), at most times the expressive order is more dominant than, and shapes, the practical order - that is the material aspect of most people's lives.

Through the process of action and interaction, through their expressive orders, people can communicate to others how they want the others to take them to be - for most people that is as the person they are, as a self-conscious, reflective agent aware of their humanity, dignity and moral worth (Sabini & Silver, 1982). Considering that our understanding of the social world - our "social reality" - is also brought about through an interactive effort, it is logical to suggest like Penman (1988), that what
people understand to be reality is a function not of an absolute truth (something requiring independent, objective verification), but of the vicissitudes of the interaction process. Thus interaction and communication create our social worlds, our realities and ourselves. Penman cites Maturana and Varella (1980) as coining the term "autopoiesis" to describe this self-reproductive feature of human social worlds.

This conceptualization of the social world being self-generating through the process of interaction, presents reality as a continuous, unceasing process and in many ways circular, without beginning or end. Yet despite this seemingly expansive, all-encompassing feature of people's social worlds, the process does set limitations and boundaries. As Shotter (1984) says, people "act into" their situations because through their past activities they construct a setting of constraints and possibilities for their current activities. In other words, past activities point to the directions of people's present activities. Moreover, although our understanding of the reality of our social world may be brought about in an interactive effort, that does not mean that the process is necessarily a cooperative one. It is possible for understanding to develop out of active uncooperative efforts (Penman, 1988). As such, it may be said that the form of understanding people have of their social world is very much dependent upon whether the process through which the understanding is developed is cooperative or uncooperative. It may be said therefore that because dehumanization occurs both between and within groups, that it is a particular form of understanding the social world which develops through social
interactions which are simultaneously yet independently, cooperative and uncooperative, such that people's social interactions - that which is fundamental to people's existence and their understanding of themselves and others as human beings - can become so paradoxical as to have the potential for exactly the opposite effects - the destruction of people by their own kind, and for people to consider themselves and others as less than human.

PART 1
DEHUMANIZATION BETWEEN GROUPS

In this first part of the theory my aim is to show how through people's uniquely human characteristics - their personal domains - they form groups - their social domains. Although these groups are the same in function, they can be quite different in specific characteristics. Now although people are by nature social beings whose reason and morality entreats them to act towards each other with respect - that is as members of the human group - the meeting of different social groups has often resulted in either one or both of the groups treating the members of the other group in ways that would be considered inappropriate and inhumane for members of their own group. In other words, either one or both of the groups are dehumanized by the other group. Moreover, the members of the different groups may come to consider themselves as "superior" to the "inferior" members of the other group and in their efforts to maintain their status in continued contacts, the groups come to form a hierarchy - a social domain conducive to the maintenance of dehumanization between the groups.
DEVELOPING THE HIERARCHY OF "US" AND "THEM" 

Different Realities - The Seeds Of Dehumanization Between Groups 

It may be said that truth, or the reality of the social world, does not exist in an absolute sense, for our understanding of the social world arises out of our interactions, and our interactions are subject to vicissitudes. Thereby what we understand of our social world is subject to similar vicissitudes. What we understand of our social world is derived from our social life, from our interactions with others, which in turn, inform all of our activities in the physical and social world (Penman, 1988). It is the means by which we come to know of the world, the way in which meanings and values are constructed, and the means by which we come to know of ourselves - to form, establish and maintain our identities as human beings. 

People desire and seek interaction with others, we desire and seek acknowledgement from others of our worthiness, and people act in accord with what they understand others to consider a proper and competent social person so that they may be respected as such (Harré, 1979). Consequently, people come to value public displays of respect as acknowledgements and reaffirmations of their worth, and such public displays may be valued far more than their own personal, private feelings. 

Through this desire and capacity to express themselves as beings of worth by acting in accord with what is understood by the social group to be appropriate behavior, people display the moral aspect of their humanness, which is what essentially identifies them as conspecifics to others. Therefore people prove
themselves to be competent social beings through their observed success in social encounters, success being defined as achieving the desired acknowledgement and respect from others of the person's competence and worth (Harré, 1979). Moreover, when people are successful in social encounters they are also confirming and reaffirming the others as worthy beings by acknowledging and respecting the significance of the others' meanings, values and rules - their moral being.

People make sense of their world and their own existence through the sharing of their values and meanings with those with whom they interact. Furthermore through constant interaction, rules are developed which reinforce these values and meanings. Mumford (1951) suggests that the main function of social heritage and tradition is that it provides a stable foundation of values, meanings and even purpose to peoples' lives such that people can consider all aspects of their life and the activities in which they take part, to have significance. What people come to know of their social world is their reality, which people share with others who adhere to the same values, meanings and rules, the same morality. But most importantly, it is through this sharing that people establish their identity as human beings by being acknowledged by others as moral equals.

It is evident that morality is an intrinsic and essential feature of being human, and because of this, it may be said that most people would be strongly inclined to accept the peculiarities of their social environment as the "norm", or as "natural". What is more, Penman (1988) cites Cronen (1986) as saying there is as yet no known society the operations of which
are free of some form of obligations, prohibitions and legitimations. This leads Cronen to conclude that all human social orders are moral orders. Furthermore, because these moral orders are continually being reconstructed through the individual actions of the members, there is more than one moral order because there can be as many moral orders as there are social orders (Cronen, 1986; cited in Penman, 1988), and there may even be different moral orders within the one social order, because of different factions within the group. In other words, it may be said that because there are many different human social orders, there are also many different social realities, all of which are considered by the members of the groups which form the orders to be the natural reality or what is normal for people.

**The Boundaries Of Social Reality - Who Are To Be Considered "Real" People**

Given the plurality of human social groups and the continuous self-generation of the moral orders of the groups, it would be logical to consider that principally these moral orders would be relatively open and flexible in relation to other moral orders. But such is not usually the case. As Penman (1988) shows, people's social worlds become stable and organized because constraints and boundaries of what may be interpreted as "real" or natural are brought into effect and maintained through the members' past actions and implicated meanings. In other words, through the development of, and adherence to their meanings and values, people impose at least some form of temporary closure in what may otherwise be considered a frighteningly unstable social
world. This is especially evident in what may be described as the most basic of social values - group membership.

Identification with a group or community is an essential aspect of being human. It is through their expressive order in consistent interaction with group members that people can establish their reputations as persons of worth. In developing a reputable moral career people require some form of stability. Therefore it may be said that people both desire and require cohesion and maintenance of their group so as to maintain their identities as human beings.

Group cohesion and maintenance is the foundation of people's humanness, but it is also the basis of people's understanding of the social world - of their reality. In relation to group cohesion, Harré (1979) points out that the more properties used in the definition of a typical member of a group, the fewer the number of individuals likely to exhibit those properties, thus limiting the extension of the group. A person can only be "placed" or "situated" within the group and thus be recognized and identified as a competent group member if they act in accord with the appropriate values, meanings and rules of those who are already considered competent and worthy group members. Furthermore, Shotter (1984) describes how it is also necessary for people to be able to account for their actions in reference to the "structure of normality" of the group, that is the values, meanings, rules and laws of the group, for them to be considered as group members. Given that self-expression and accountability are inextricably interlinked requirements for group membership (Shotter, 1984), and that people's understanding of the social world is established
within the framework of group relations, one of the basic boundaries of peoples' social worlds is between those who may be considered as group members and those who are not group members. But more than this, it may be said that the boundary is between those who confirm and reaffirm the worth of the group members by identifying, acknowledging and respecting the morality of the group, and those who, because of their failure to identify themselves with the group, are placed outside of the group and thus do not qualify as "real" people.

Defining The Self And Defining Others

Goffman (1959) says that when people interact with others their presentation of themselves and their subsequent performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the accredited values of their social group. If we also consider that through the process of interacting people project their definition of the situation to others, regardless of how passive their actions may be, by virtue that it is considered significant to the others, their actions need to confirm and reaffirm the values of the social group.

Throughout this work I have endeavored to show that through their interactions and their desire for and the subsequent maintenance of their social group and their shared values, people's definitions of the most important situations usually come to coincide, certainly within the group. As Berger (1963) says though, if a wide discrepancy should occur, then some form of disorganization or maybe social conflict will probably result. Given that people's identities as human beings are established and reinforced through their social interactions, and that
intrinsic to being human is identification with a social group, this suggests that an interaction which for the participants fails to at least acknowledge if not reaffirm the values of their social group, and at worst may be seen by the people as blatantly disregarding those values, would be interpreted by the people as their being considered by the others as not worthy of being moral equals of the others.

Noble (1983) provides a clear illustration of how a person may interpret the actions of an other as disregarding the values of the person's social group and thus by corollary disregarding the person as a human being. Noble's example is in reference to interactions between a hearing impaired person and others who do not share the same disability:

A person who does not hear properly damages the usual, expected course of social interaction. Such a person does not respond appropriately to the casual overtures of and contacts of social life, hence fails to reciprocate the affirmation ritual initiated by the other. Such a person may be observed to engage in de-humanization of the other by apparently ignoring, or avoiding social contact. (p.18)

It may seem that what is suggested by this quotation and the direction of my argument, is that when people are confronted by others who adhere to different values than themselves that those who meet with such a difference are affronted in some way and it is this experience which is the basis of dehumanization between groups. In other words it may almost appear to be an argument which is "blaming the victim". Such a criticism however would be premature.

As I have said many times, people's identities as human beings and as individuals are socially bestowed, maintained and
transformed. Through their social interactions with fellow group members people come to share their values and develop a network of meanings and rules which not only bind the group together but lend a coherence, stability and consistency to social life which enables people to develop their moral careers and thus establish themselves as beings of worth. Moreover, a society is bound together by shared values such that what is socially expected becomes individually needed for people to achieve their desired dignity and integrity. Should these cherished values be threatened in any way, either publicly or privately, the resultant disequilibrium may be experienced as a form of crisis (Mills, 1959). Should such crises continue, resulting in a genuine conflict of interests, Mills says that a resolution is rarely found through logical analysis and factual investigation because paradoxically reason plays a very minor role in major moral problems:

We can clarify the meaning and the consequences of values, we can make them consistent with one another and ascertain their actual priorities, we can surround them with fact - but in the end we may be reduced to mere assertion and counterassertion; then we can only plead and persuade. (p.88)

Of all the values to which people adhere, it would be logical and reasonable to say that by far the most important and most persuasive are the ones that purport to define what it means to be a human being. I think it is also justifiable to say that although specific qualities may be almost universally acknowledged as being characteristically human, that particular idiosyncratic differences exist between social groups. Moreover, it may also be said that what people believe about the essential
nature of human beings has a rather strong influence upon social expectations. As Chorover (1979) says, such beliefs tend to shape the ways in which people in any given social context are treated, and these in turn, significantly influence how people act.

Human social behavior can be described as based upon the principle of universalizability; yet it can also be described as a personal perspective of social interaction. That is, the values, meanings and rules - the morals - of a social group are considered by the members of the group to pertain to not only themselves as individuals, but also to all others within the group. Furthermore, because most people view their social environment as natural, then it may be said that it is "natural" for people to assume and expect that all others believe in, adhere to, and respect the same values, meanings and rules - the same morality, as themselves, especially with regard to those values which are the quintessence of people's social interactions - what it means to be a human being.

To regard people as self-determining and rule-following is to take their conduct seriously: that is, to assume they are rational beings who intend and thus are responsible for their actions. As we are expected to act appropriately as human beings ourselves so we expect the same of others: that is, for them to show they are aware of the interests of others and the relation of their actions to the interests of others as well as their own; or, in Shotter's words (1984), "knowing how to recognize people as people implies that we already know...the whole nature of the circumstances in which human beings are constituted as persons" (p.96). The fact is however, with the multiplicity and potential
idiosyncrasies of different social groups and moral orders, such comprehensive knowledge is beyond most people's capabilities, certainly it has been in the past and is in the present. As I have tried to show, different social groups have different social realities, the basic boundaries of which define the self as a human being, others as human beings, and Others as not human.

**THE ATTRACTION OF DEHUMANIZING OTHER GROUPS**

**An Inherent Paradox**

People's definitions of themselves as human beings may be described as moral conceptualizations developed and reaffirmed through their interactions with others. Moreover, people's conceptualizations of what it means to be a human being are established and continuously reinforced within the boundaries of people's social realities - their social groups. Therefore not only do different groups of people develop different social realities but concomitantly, different social realities may provide different perspectives or emphases upon aspects of what it means to be a human being.

People's self-consciousness - their awareness of themselves as being human - is so intrinsic and essential to their social existence as to not allow nor enable ideas or knowledge to the contrary. Moreover, a social reality presenting a conceptualization of what it means to be a human being which includes aspects both quantitatively and qualitatively different from other social realities may be extremely difficult for other social groups to incorporate, especially if the differences are in the extreme, for to do so may be considered and experienced by the social groups as negating their own humanity. It seems
apparent that faced with the possibility of such a contradiction, the relevant differences are unable to be tolerated. Therefore what may seem the logical alternative to the different peoples, or what may be considered initially as the most attractive and if not possibly the easiest alternative, is to negate the others' humanity, thus conceiving of them as Others, and thus dehumanizing them.

If we consider the great diversity of peoples in this world and the qualitative and quantitative nature of those differences it comes as little surprise that one group upon meeting another, who may be not only physically different but act differently in the way they talk, the way they think about life, the way they express their emotions, what they wear, what they eat, and the way they eat, that the possibilities for the number and degrees of differences between the groups seems endless. It may be said that we can quickly and easily recognize the differences between us and them. These differences can be quite apparent, explicit, and visible: and the dehumanization which can result from confrontations between different groups may be categorized the same - as visible dehumanization - dehumanization which is easily recognizable. Although our reasoning may profess that we are all human and we should be treated as human, it would seem that such a proclamation is conditional upon the homogeneity of people's moral orders. As such, an aspect of the paradox of dehumanization is that dehumanization itself entails a paradox which takes the following form:

*Only because those who are dehumanized are human and possess features/characteristics/faculties/qualities which identify*
them as human, are these people worth dehumanizing: for in doing so the dehumanizers reaffirm, at least to themselves, their conceptualization of their own humanity. But to justify or licence their actions the dehumanizers must define those they dehumanize as not human - as Others - as not like themselves. This justification is achieved in what can be described as a logical progression: in not being like them (the dehumanizers), that is not human, the Others forfeit any claim to being treated like humans - in a humane way - because the Others do not behave in a manner the dehumanizers define as human. That is, the Others do not behave in accordance with the same morality as the dehumanizers.

If we consider the social nature of human beings, then the paradox inherent to dehumanization becomes very evident and I would suggest exists in all cases of dehumanization, though as regards the specifics of the morality to which I refer, details would differ from case to case. As Popper (1945b) bluntly states, "To tell men that they are equal has a certain sentimental appeal. But this appeal is small compared with that made by a propaganda that tells them that they are superior, and that others are inferior to them" (p.96).

Given the human capacity for expressiveness, people's desire to be acknowledged and considered as worthy beings, and people's capacity for self-consciousness, self-monitoring and reasoning, the paradox of dehumanization is very perplexing. The differences between societies that have developed separately represent different ideas and values of human life, and although dehumanization presents an apparently attractive, possibly even
easy answer to reaffirming one's human identity in a situation in which one's identity may be under some strain, it would be logical to suggest that given people's social nature, dehumanization would possibly be an initial almost reflexive reaction in meetings between different social orders, but that people's social nature would ensure that the reaction would only be transitory. This is not an unreasonable suggestion if we consider, probably because of the visible quality of dehumanization between groups, that inhumane relationships of this type are quite widely and publicly deplored. However dehumanization between groups is often anything but transitory as the long history of the enslavement of conquered peoples and the genocide of different groups stands as brutal evidence. As such, given that dehumanization is the paradox of human social interaction, apart from understanding the attraction of dehumanization between groups, it is essential to understand how dehumanization between groups is maintained: that is how people continuously regard and treat other people inhumanely. As French (1985) says, "If there were in fact a group of humans who were in every way naturally superior to other humans, they would rule automatically; they would not require force to maintain supremacy" (p.72, French's italics).

MAINTENANCE OF DEHUMANIZATION BETWEEN GROUPS

Dehumanization is the paradox of human relations because dehumanization is the antithesis of the social interaction which develops and sustains people's identities as human beings. Moreover, an aspect of the paradox of dehumanization is that dehumanization presents as an attractive, seemingly logical way
for people to maintain their own sense of themselves as being human when they experience their identities as threatened by the differentness of Others. What lends to this paradoxical aspect of dehumanization is that it has been maintained such that dehumanization may be described as characterizing relations between different peoples rather than being just the initial transitory reaction to their meeting.

If we consider that questions of interpretation, meaning, expression and understanding are bound to arise for people who have to deal with moral orders different to their own, it becomes evident that in a rapidly changing social world, such questions and relevant problems are likely to arise quite frequently. Furthermore, given that people exist as human beings in their relationships with others, then if their moral order is destroyed, people experience anomie for they no longer have the base upon which to structure their moral careers. Therefore people are likely to consider the preservation of their moral order as essential to their own existence, that is their honor, their worth, their dignity as human beings. It is evident that to understand the maintenance of dehumanization between groups, it is necessary to understand the development of group relations and as such, the theory must initially adopt something of an historical account of how dehumanization has come to characterize relations between different groups.

The Inevitable Meeting Of Different Social Orders - Forming Hierarchies Of Superiors And Inferiors

People's capacity to apply their intelligence and skills to adapt and survive in the world has meant that most social groups
have achieved much more than just their survival, they have also expanded. We live in a finite world, so it would seem an inevitable consequence that continuously growing groups will eventually meet. Such meetings would usually mean a confrontation of different moral orders. When different groups confront each other Schmookler (1984) describes four alternatives available to what he terms the "threatened" societies, these being withdrawal, destruction, transformation, or imitation. Considering that each person's self worth and dignity are founded upon and sustained within the moral order of their social group, it would seem obvious that the desire of most people would be for the preservation of their moral order. As such, it could be said that most people would probably be prepared to fight and even die for their group. What is more, in so doing people may be held in even greater esteem by their fellow group members thus achieving greater dignity and integrity.

Because of the limited confines of the physical environment, withdrawal from confrontation with different groups would not always be possible, and to imitate the moral order of the other group would be akin to the destruction of the person's own moral order which would virtually mean the destruction of the person's moral career - their integrity and dignity - and this would probably seem unthinkable. Therefore the most likely outcome of such confrontations would be in Schmookler's terms, to attempt to destroy or to transform the Other group. Given that to sustain their own moral order a group may consider the Others as less than their moral equals, then the Other group has been transformed into something other than human, the Other group
has been dehumanized: but more than this, transformation through dehumanization enables the group to treat the Others as less than human, and thus to try to destroy them.

Dehumanization of one social group by another entails a ranking of the groups as relatively superior or inferior to one another. The notion of superiority of one group over inferior Others in this sense attaches itself to a certain consensus of values which are different for each group yet assumed by the members of each group to be universal. The dehumanization which stems from a confrontation of different moral orders can be likened to what Cohen (1972) describes as a "moral panic", in which certain people or groups come to be defined as a threat to societal values and interests. He gives the term "folk devils" to those who present the threat, for they become the personification of that which the group considers as wrong, "bad", or what people should not be, with often a very strong emphasis on the difference of the Others. But more important to the issue of dehumanization is how the group employs their values to legitimate any actions which the group makes towards the Others.

The moral order of a social group is the platform upon which members of the social group "launch" their moral careers. It is the basis of their reputation, integrity, worth and dignity - their identification as human beings. Therefore the maintenance of the moral order is imperative to the group members but, moreover, maintenance entails the enforcement of the rules which stem from the values and meanings of the group. As Becker (1963) says, because the group members consider it essential to their
welfare, their desire is for all people to subscribe to their morality, and if this does not happen, then it is likely that the group will not only want to make the Others adhere to their moral order, they will also try. It is at this point that power becomes a basic factor in social relations and the maintenance of dehumanization.

The Anomalous Role Of Power In Social Relations

In describing the role which he sees power having taken in social relations, Russell (1938) provides a rather accurate indicator of the role of power in the maintenance of dehumanization:

Of the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires of power and glory. These are not identical, though closely allied...As a rule, however, the easiest way to obtain glory is to obtain power...The desire for glory, therefore, prompts, in the main, the same actions as are prompted by the desire for power, and the two motives may, for most practical purposes, be regarded as one. (p.9)

Although the term power has many meanings, in this context Russell defines power as the production of intended effects upon the outer world. Considering that for people one of the most important aspects of their worlds are their social relations, then Russell may be interpreted as saying, as has been said throughout this work, that people desire to be effective - to be acknowledged, and for their actions to be considered meaningful by others. In this sense, people’s desire for power may be described as the "power-to" be able to do, which when taken to its most basic form, may be referred to as people's capacity to be able to express themselves and to be acknowledged as self-
conscious, self-monitoring beings - as human beings. But as I have said, power comes in many forms.

Perhaps the most important differentiation between the forms of power as regards the maintenance of dehumanization is that between having power-to and "power-over". The division is not clear, for to have power-over something requires that people have the power-to achieve that aim. However the distinction becomes more clear, more relevant, and more important in reference to people's social relations: especially in reference to social hierarchies which are a particular kind of social organization of people and groups, for it is in the development and maintenance of social hierarchies that people come to establish a conceptualization of there being certain people or groups who are superior to inferior Others.

When people in social situations are using their power-to express themselves and thus establish their identities as human beings, they are using their expressive order to establish their reputations so as to form their moral careers. To do so successfully, they are required to interact with others in a cooperative manner. Therefore people's power-to is the means by which they are able to achieve their identities as human beings and as such, it may be said that power-to enhances social relations through people acknowledging and taking account of each other as all having power-to, as being equals, as being humans. If however, the notion of power as the production of intended effects is placed within the context of hierarchy, then power takes on a different role in social relations: for in this context the concept of power refers to having power-over those
lower in the hierarchy, which entails the concept of force and the annulment of people's capacity for agency.

When there is a meeting of different moral orders and given that the meeting results in a confrontation between the groups, to establish the desired hierarchy, the relations between the groups involves power, but this time having power-to becomes transmuted to having power-over. In a confrontation of different groups, each group wants the members of the Other group to forfeit that group's morality and to take on or adopt the morality of their group. What is more, it is highly likely both groups will compete vigorously to achieve this goal, and at the same time, both groups will vigorously resist taking on or adopting the morality of the Other group, for to do so would mean the destruction or annulment of their own moral order. In such a situation, where decisions have to be made about the arrangements under which people will live, there is a further meaning added to the notion of power as the production of intended effects, and that is the capacity for people to achieve their will against the will of the Others. To have power-over the Others is to be able to use force upon the Others: that is to force the Others into submission, into an inferior position, into enslavement, into retreat, or into non-existence. Given the seemingly continuous expansion of societal groups, Schmookler (1984) says that the realistic perception of what he terms these "intersocietal struggles" is that social groups must achieve power-over Other groups simply to survive nationally and culturally.
In social relations, having power-to may be described as playing a positive role in that it sustains people's identities as individuals within a community network, whereas the resultant effect of having power-over people is to not regard them as individuals, as moral equals, thus making ambivalent the concepts of individuality and community. From this perspective, power is not so much a substance - something concrete - rather it is an interaction. French (1985) says that when we speak of having power-over people what is referred to is having entry to a network of relationships in which people try to get others to do what they want or need them to do by whatever means, often without regard for the welfare of those people. Therefore to have power-over people can entail the negation of their capacity to function as self-conscious, self-monitoring beings - to negate their being human.

If we consider that in a confrontation of different moral orders the groups may resort to the dehumanization of the Others because the Others contradict their understanding of what it means to be human beings, then, should the groups enter into an intersocietal struggle, what results is that each group will try to establish dominance over the Other group. What is more, the act of attempting to have power-over or to dominate the Others, reinforces the social groups' negation of the Others as moral equals because now not only are the social groups negating the values, meanings and rules of the Others, but in trying to dominate the Others, the social groups are also negating the capacity of the Others to be self-conscious, self-monitoring beings, thus negating their capacity to be respected as
responsible agents. Therefore it may be said that dehumanization between groups is maintained through each group attempting to have power-over or to dominate the Others so as to establish a hierarchy of the different groups: for in so doing, the group who achieves superiority is more likely to sustain their own moral order, their sense of themselves as human beings.

From this account of dehumanization between groups it can be seen that given the understanding of the development of the human identity within the social environment, this quite visible and explicit form of dehumanization requires little explanation to be understood. Dehumanization however has another dimension - dehumanization within groups - and it is this dimension, because of its seemingly "invisible" nature, that has given the phenomenon of dehumanization a most pervasive and insidious quality. I shall now present an account of within-group dehumanization so as to provide understanding of this paradoxical phenomenon.

PART 2

DEHUMANIZATION WITHIN GROUPS

Apart from the quite explicit dehumanization that can occur between different groups, dehumanization can also occur between members within the same group. Part 2 of this theory is designed to illuminate this within-group dimension of dehumanization.

When dehumanization occurs between groups, the phenomenon can be quite visible in explicit claims and treatment of the Other group as being less than human. When dehumanization occurs within the same group however, the dynamics are similar but the results are effectively different: that is dehumanization takes on
an almost invisible quality - a virtual "hidden agenda" in social interactions. Within a group a hierarchy of superiors and inferiors can become so entrenched that the treatment of particular group members as less than the moral equals of certain other members becomes an implicit characteristic of the functioning of the group. What is more, because the personal domain is so intimately a part of a person's social domain, when dehumanization becomes an implicit aspect of social interactions, people can come to develop a sense of themselves as being worthless, which can be described as self dehumanization. Given that it is within the social group that people come to develop an understanding of themselves and others as human beings, within-group dehumanization presents as a truly paradoxical phenomenon. However, if we return to Russell's (1938) words "Of the infinite desires of man, the chief are the desires of power and glory" (p.9), they suggest that to understand within-group dehumanization it is necessary to understand the development of intrasocietal hierarchies.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTRASOCIETAL HIERARCHIES

Through the discussion of the relations between different social groups, power has been presented not as something which is necessarily tangible; rather power is perceived as people having certain capacities, and this perception is developed through the interactions and relationships between people which have certain effects upon and results for the people involved. If we place this understanding within the context of the development of the human identity, it may be said that people's capacities for self-consciousness and self-monitoring is their
power-to present themselves through their expressive orders as worthy beings. Furthermore, these capacities are also their power-to acknowledge and sustain others as the same. On the basis that people require, desire and thus value such acknowledgement from others of their worthiness, of their being human, it is logical to suggest that people will strive to express themselves in accordance with the group's values, with the group's social reality of what it means to be a human being.

Social groups are formed through people's shared values, meanings and rules. Given the fact of human diversity of features, qualities and skills, then within a group it is to be expected that people may differ widely from each other in their abilities to express themselves in accord with the values of the group. As such, it may be said that people are limited in their agency. Obviously the degree to which people's agency is limited in this way is dependent upon the stringency of the values of the social group. However those whose agency is less limited than others may be considered by others as being notable members of the group. To be considered as such is to have achieved that which most people seek - a reputation. But the particular reputation which people achieve is dependent upon the course of their moral careers, that is the specific values to which people aspire and in which their individual skills allow them to excel. It is in this aspect of social interaction that dehumanization has come to characterize some within-group relations. To understand how this phenomenon not only could occur but be maintained within the dimension of human relations where it seems most paradoxical and potentially most destructive, it is necessary to
understand how social groups initially of an equalitarian nature, could develop into the highly structured, stratified societies of the present-day.

Guidance - A Value For Survival And Expansion

People are social beings. Their formation of groups has aided in their survival and in their growth and development. It can hardly be denied that as a species, human beings are successful in their capacity to adapt to changes around them, and thus able to survive. This situation suggests that one of the most important values shared by most people and most groups is their survival. Furthermore, it would seem logical that when survival is the central issue for a group, those skills and qualities of the members which help achieve that aim will be highly valued. Moreover, once the basic survival of the group is relatively ensured then the qualities and skills for survival would remain important, but other skills and qualities would also come to be valued. Those skills and qualities would be what the members could bring to the group that would reinforce and improve the life of the group members and of the group as a whole.

In the early stages of human development undoubtedly the basic aim of social groups was survival. Considering the kind of physical conditions in which these groups were trying to survive, it would lead to the suggestion that those who had the most power-to help the group in this way were those who enabled the group to have power-over those natural elements and conditions which most threatened the group. In this sense, and at this stage, having power-to and power-over were virtually undifferentiated. People's intentions it may be said, were to produce effects upon
the environment such that the ultimate effect would benefit the group and its members, which in turn would reaffirm those with such abilities as valued and worthy members of the group. Therefore to have power-to enable the group to have power-over the physical environment became highly valued in social groups.

I think it is important to note that the survival of early human groups would most probably have been an intimate and delicately balanced relationship with the environment and as the work of numerous authors suggests (e.g. Bookchin, 1982; Liedloff, 1977; Sagan, 1985; Schmookler, 1984), at this stage when social groups took the form of hunting-and-gathering bands, the relationships between group members were cooperative and based on equality. If this is so, then power in this context was the means by which was sought the survival and maintenance of the group. What is more, if we return to the notion of power as an interaction, it may be said that in early social groups, those who may be described as being powerful, as having developed a range of useful survival skills, would function as guides for the group members, enhancing the skills of the group and thus bringing some stability to the group's existence.

The establishment of the group as a stable unit would bring many changes to the social relations of the members. A number of these changes occurred I would suggest, somewhat simultaneously. Of great importance would be the development of the group's social reality which would be a constant and progressive understanding of their world due to the continual accumulation, dissemination, and inheritance of knowledge of the members. There would be an increase in the number and variety of
skills and abilities of the group members which would be considered valuable by and for the group. But perhaps of greatest significance would be the actual expansion of the group itself, the increase in population.

Expansion of the group would understandably be highly desirable to the group, but expansion entails complexity and with social complexity came changes which both directly and indirectly affected the social relations of many groups, leading to the development of hierarchies, thus affording the opportunity for the instigation and maintenance of within-group dehumanization. Sagan (1985) employs the term "complex societies" to refer to the stage of social development between that of primitive societies and archaic societies, in which kinship and nonkinship forms of social cohesion became of equal importance to the growing number of constituents.

Control - A Value For Expansion

For a group to expand and yet remain a cohesive unit certain changes would need to occur within the functioning of the group. One of the foremost issues is that of sustenance. To sufficiently sustain their members groups could not as readily rely upon successful hunts, they required the ability to also produce their own food (Schmookler, 1984). To understand and be able to control the physical environment, to be able to farm land and domesticate animals, became in many cases both desired and required. Thus people developed the power-to enable the group to have power-over the natural environment so as to bring about the intended effect of producing food. To be able to control the physical environment as such became intrinsically valuable to
many groups. Again however, it is necessary to return to the
conception of power as an interaction so as to understand the
important role which this period in human evolution had to the
instigation and maintenance of dehumanization within groups.

At the same time that the growing numbers of members were
making increasing demands upon the group's provision of the
staples for survival, the burgeoning numbers were possibly
requiring other changes to people's social existence. The unique
human capacity for reasoning and their ability for self-
monitoring meant that people could direct their actions to
increase the possibility of producing desired effects. Within the
group situation, it was undoubtedly realized that a coordinated
effort, that is focussing the members' actions in a similar
direction, would increase the capacity of the group to produce
such intended effects, the most basic now being sustaining the
group. In other words, expansion of the group increased the need
for the organization of the members' actions. As such it may be
said that the need for people to control the physical environment
also meant that the group needed to control its own actions so as
to increase the probability of their achieving this aim.

There are two main schools of theory on people's social
evolution. The first school as exampled by French (1985)
suggests people's desire to control nature preceded their desire
to control others, whereas the second school of thought as
presented by Bookchin (1982), is of the opposite opinion - that
people's desire to control others preceded their desire to control
the physical environment. Regardless of the debate as to the
particular progression of the social evolution of humankind, it is
evident that to "have control" became an integral and highly valued aspect of people's social realities and the point at which it may be said that humankind's evolution diverged from what was up until then, a development with and within nature.

As Schmookler (1984) suggests, the increase in the numbers of the groups would have warranted a similar increase in the organization of the group's activities so that the group may be able to most adequately meet the member's needs. But still the group's activities would have been a coordinated, cooperative effort in which those who guided the group would have been granted their roles on the basis of respect for their valued skills. However, to resolve the problem of natural scarcity divisions in labor were formed such that those skills which had once been the mode through which people established themselves as valued members of the group were no longer open to spontaneous expression. Rather people's skills became instruments for production, subject to imposed control and manipulation by others (Bookchin, 1982). Consequently intrasocietal values changed - people came to desire and to have power-over certain aspects of the lives of members of the group.

The Employment Of Discipline, Control And Force In The Submission Of Group Members

Considering that human activity occurs within the moral context of people's social actions in the development of their reputation as worthy members of the social group, it would seem logical that in the aim of maintaining the group, and given that people understood that the organization of the group's activities would be beneficent for this purpose, most people would be
willing to organize their individual actions in accord with the group's activities. But it is essential to remember that the most important element of social action is the acknowledgement and reaffirmation of people's sense of themselves as worthy beings - as having dignity - as being human. When placed within the context of a social milieu which is rather rapidly coming to value the conception of having control of their world, there would seem little if any differentiation between people being able to control relevant aspects of the physical world and people being able to control important aspects of their social world.

As these ever-increasing groups came into contact with other groups there ensued struggles to establish power-over the Others, and once such struggles established the physical superiority of one group, the Others - being less than the moral equals of their conquerors - were subjugated, dominated and controlled into enslavement (Schmookler, 1984). To enslave people is to dehumanize them, and enslavement may be described as the ultimate force to discipline and control the social environment. I have referred back to between-group relations to clearly illustrate a process which occurred simultaneously within groups - more gradual, but no less brutal.

With the increase in their members and the annexation of Other groups, these complex societies resorted to more violent actions to discipline and control the people (Sagan, 1985). The constituents came under the leadership of "chiefs" and often self-proclaimed "Divine Kings" with whom most had very remote if any, relationship and whom many never even saw. As Sagan (1985) suggests, this disintegration of the kinship group broke
strong emotive and communal ties fundamental to the maintenance of an equalitarian conception of community relations. Consequently the well-being of the people over whom the chief "ruled" became less important than the chief's power-over more and more people for the benefit of a few. A chief's power of control was often expressed by executions upon command for causing the least displeasure (Sagan, 1985).

These complex societies were the forerunners of early civilizations and though we pride ourselves with being "civilized" people whose lifestyles and subsequent treatment of others are boastfully assumed to have evolved beyond our brutish ancestors (often referring to our technological advancements as evidence of this claim), our "progress" has been born of the enslavement of human beings. Though less physically violent, our lifestyle still results in the subjugation, domination and control of people which moreover, is often "justified" in the name of progress.

Leiss (1972) describes how in the application of their ever increasing knowledge, people developed scientific and technological orders the reasoning behind which was to liberate humankind from what were considered the problems of hunger, disease and the exhausting exertions of physical labor. But despite what may be described as people's application of their capacity for reason, there was a tragedy to this technology which Hill (1988) describes as "the submission of human purpose to the external systematic ordering of human affairs" (p.230). Ironically, people were creating an environment alien to their need for social expression, affiliation and recognition, the
original intention of which was the betterment of their human condition.

The development of the work ethic, much of which was justifying "mindless", seemingly purposeless labor, was made comprehensible in the form of rewards which could be acquired by submitting to a work discipline (Bookchin, 1982). But as Bookchin suggests, these rewards could be defined as incentives for submission rather than the accompaniment to creativity and self-expression. In submitting themselves to the control of others, people entered an interaction which provided their "controllers" with those "infinite desires of power and glory" within their group, resulting in increased valuation of, desire for, and attempts to achieve more of the same - the effect being people's subjection of others and themselves to the effects of dehumanization.

THE ATTRACTION OF DEHUMANIZING GROUP MEMBERS

Social Stratification - The Precedent For Dehumanization Within The Group

It may be said from the discussion thus far, that as social groups expanded and people flexed their unique capacities, certain values came to prominence within the groups. One was the maintenance of the group, the other was the concept of control - the ability to guide or manage through direction or restraint, the expression of having power-over to produce intended effects. As social groups expanded, so did the efforts to maintain the unification of the groups. For this purpose, more and more the important decisions as regards the life of the groups were taken by bodies of group members, or what may be called
governing bodies, rather than the individual members in equal participation (Russell, 1938). The larger the group the greater the effort required for unification, and with these increases simultaneously came decreases in the cooperative interdependence of the individual members as the initiatives of the governing bodies were enlarged in scope (Russell, 1938). Consequently as societies became more complex, so did the organization required to achieve the desired cooperation of the members. The equality of community life was destroyed as many large-scale groups in their effort to achieve their desire for power-over their world, evolved into stratified social structures (Mumford, 1966).

Social stratification is the establishment of a hierarchy, implicit to which is the notion of there being superiors and inferiors - a group in which not all are considered moral equals. Because having and being in control is highly valued to sustain and maintain a growing social group, an achievement of control would bring glory to a person. With such glory would come an increase in the person's power-to and power-over their world. People may then decide to use this power in attempts to further increase their capacity for control and thus further increase their power and glory.

People want to achieve, strengthen and secure a desired identity but as Berger (1963) says, every identity requires specific social affiliations for its survival. From this perspective it may therefore be said that in a social hierarchy those who are considered as being morally superior to their moral inferiors will want at the very least, to maintain their
identity. Superiors want and need inferiors so as to maintain their perceived superiority. Therefore to consider others within the group as less than moral equals is to dehumanize the Others. The attraction of dehumanizing group members is that in so doing, people can maintain their superior identities within the group. Furthermore, people may then be able to treat the Others in such a way as to increasingly ensure that the Others will not displace them from their privileged positions, for to treat an inferior as an equal can mean a lowering of status in a social hierarchy to being "no better than" those considered to be inferiors.

When placed within the context of a progressive civilized society, the functioning of the resultant hierarchical relationships really leaves little mystery as to the attraction for dehumanizing those within the group. When people consider themselves forced (not necessarily by physical but possibly emotive, economic or other means) to submit to the control of others and in so doing relinquishing much of their agency, it is little wonder that such people would want to affirm their humanity by dehumanizing Others over whom they may be able to assert some capacity for control. Hence the factory worker can go home to his wife who is "just a woman", expect her to meet various needs and desires upon "request" and bemoan the present economic crisis as a result of welfare taxes used to keep the "lazy unemployed". Hence we are again met with another aspect of the paradox that is dehumanization and the paradox entailed within dehumanization.
If we consider that people's understanding of the world and of themselves as human beings is developed and sustained through their interactions with fellow group members, then the development of a hierarchical social order is not only conducive to members resorting to dehumanizing Others within their group so as to affirm their own humanity, but is also conducive to the maintenance of these relations such that dehumanization becomes an invisible yet ever-present aspect of within-group interactions.

**THE MAINTENANCE OF DEHUMANIZATION WITHIN GROUPS**

**Maintaining Dehumanization To Sustain The Human Identity Within The Group - The Irony Of A Hierarchical Society**

From this discussion it may justifiably be said that in hierarchical stratified societies the measure of people's respect is how much power-over their world they are able to display. In describing the subsequent form of social relations in stratified groups, Rüstow (1980) cites the words of Fichte:

> Each one who considers himself a lord of others, is himself a slave. If he is not really one, he nonetheless has the soul of a slave and will humbly crawl before the first man stronger than himself who subjugates him. (p.48)

Once respected and esteemed within the group, people's desire is to sustain their identity. For people in social groups who measure the worth of individuals by their ability to display power-over the social and physical world, it is evident that to sustain their identity in such a group people must at least retain their position within the hierarchy. remembering that the concept of power in reference to people is an interaction rather than a substance: for people in a hierarchical social group, this would mean that to
maintain their esteemed identity they must prevent Others within the group from gaining the same or more power than themselves for to be supplanted in a social hierarchy transforms a person's identity to that of one considered less esteemed. In other words, once the moral order of a social group becomes structured hierarchically, for people to sustain and possibly improve their reputation and character, most would come to consider the maintenance of the hierarchy and their position within the hierarchy as a necessity.

Dehumanization therefore becomes attractive both as a means by which people may affirm their humanity within the group, and as a means by which their identity as a person of worth may be sustained. If we consider that it is through their social interactions with the members of their group that people's identities are bestowed, sustained and transformed, then the irony of stratified societies is evident as is another aspect of the paradox of dehumanization, and that is the need for people to maintain their dehumanization of Others within their group so as to maintain their own human identity within the group.

Our identities, the sense of who we are as human beings is bestowed upon us through our social interactions with others in our group. We want and need to be acknowledged and recognized as worthy members of the group. This we achieve through our capacities to express ourselves in accord with the values, meanings and rules which form the moral order of the group. People do not usually defy the moral order of their group unless they are prepared to destroy the group and the bonds between themselves and the other members. Such loyalty to the moral
order may be described as upholding the honor of the group (Duncan, 1962), and the base upon which people build their reputations. If we consider that it is through their mutual acknowledgement, recognition and the sharing of their values that people originally form their groups, it may be said that what is of fundamental import to the members is their sense of equality with the others of their group which as Canetti (1960) suggests, develops through such mutuality and sharing.

Duncan (1962) says that most people have a reverence for their group which is deeply interiorized such that their cooperation, respect for, and adherence to, the rules of the group may be described as "a freely given act of the will among equals" (p.326). Moreover, he suggests that rules are possible only among equals. However, should this sense of equality dissipate or be destroyed, then people may countervail or annul the will of the Others. In such a situation if the group is maintained the actions of the group may no longer be described as a function of the cooperation, the lending of the will, of the members in adherence to their shared rules but rather the surrendering of the will of some of the members to the authoritarian commands of others (Duncan, 1962). This may be likened to the destruction of people's expressive orders.

The development of stratified societies commences with the submission of members of the group to the guidance and control of certain other members. Because of their shared value of having power-over their world, those given such a grant are esteemed members of the group, yet to maintain their positions of privilege so as to sustain their identities, they may eventually
resort to the dehumanization of the Others within their group. Consequently, rather than voluntarily submitting themselves to group activities disciplined solely for the purpose of benefitting the whole group, members may become subjugated to the commands of those to whom they have actually given the grant of power, or those who have "taken" power-over the group. Wanting to sustain their esteemed identities, those "in-power" may assert themselves as superior to the Others (who are now considered subordinate in the social hierarchy) through the very justification that they (those who have power-over Others) are adhering to the moral order of the group - the value of having power-over their world.

What may seem to potentially confound this argument are the actions of those who become subjugated yet remain within the hierarchy and as such, may be described as "allowing" themselves to be dehumanized. But this is perhaps the most potent aspect in, and an effect of, the maintenance of dehumanization within the group and that is self dehumanization - developing "the soul of a slave".

**SELF DEHUMANIZATION - THE ULTIMATE PARADOX**

Self dehumanization may seem a contradiction in terms. However, if we consider the meaning of being human, the development of people's understanding of themselves as human beings, the development of hierarchical social groups, and the functioning of people within such groups, it becomes evident that to function effectively within a hierarchical social group eventually becomes incongruous with considering oneself to be the moral equal of all others in the group. Moreover, in terms of
the psychological characterization of what it means to be a human being, it may be said that with the introduction of hierarchical forms of social organization, part of what it means to be human came to include being considered as superior to other human beings. To add to this paradoxical circumstance, to feed this "human requirement" it became necessary to assert superiority; but to be able to do so, it was necessary to define some others as inferiors and thus to dehumanize them as Others. Because people's understanding of themselves as human beings can only be bestowed through their interactions within the social group, people are required to remain within the group so as to sustain any form of identity. To break from the group would mean a total loss of identity - a situation completely incompatible with being human. It can now be seen how the development of hierarchical social organizations not only introduced the necessity for people to dehumanize Others within their social group, but also introduced another aspect of dehumanization and possibly the ultimate of paradoxes, self dehumanization.

To develop and sustain an identity as a worthy human being a person is required to be part of a group, but in hierarchical social groups the inferior Others are considered less than the moral equals of the superiors. Therefore, a person who remains in the group and is not at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, sustains an identity as less than the moral equal of certain others; but to remove oneself from the group would result in being a "non-person" for identification as a human being occurs within the social group. Therefore, to sustain some vestiges of being human,
a person needs to remain within the social hierarchy and submit to being considered less than the moral equal of certain others. If we consider that the human identity is developed and sustained within the group, then to submit to being part of a hierarchical group - what Mumford (1966) likened to being a cog in a megamachine - is conducive to developing an understanding of oneself as less than the moral equal of others within the group, which is to dehumanize oneself - self dehumanization.

It can hardly be argued that there is a diversity of social groups and an equal diversity of moral orders. Despite the vast differences that may occur between social groups and their moral orders, there are certain elements shared by all which usually form the contextual background of human conduct. These elements reflect the uniquely human characteristics of self-consciousness and self-monitoring, and are described by Harré (1983) as honor (personal standing) and will (personal power). It is through these elements Harré suggests, that people are able to reflect upon and maintain their individual identities by striving to attain both honor and autonomy - by people showing themselves through their expressive orders to be competent members of the group.

Harré describes how value accrues to people within their group in so far as they are able to express themselves as intentional beings because in so doing they can lay claim to a place in the moral order. This is due to the respect afforded beings capable of planning and acting. But what is perhaps most important is that this respect is elicited not just because displaying these capabilities is a show of people's competence,
but because the actual act of expressing personal capacities is illustrative of people's awareness and acknowledgement of their right to do so, or what may be described as their statement of their being human. Therefore from this discussion it would seem that an element common to different moral orders is the understanding of people as agents. Moreover, it is for people to be in possession of what Harré describes as a theory about themselves as agents, a theory in terms of which people order, partition and reflect on their own experiences and thus are capable of self-monitoring and responsibility for their actions.

People's understanding of themselves as agents is according to Harré (1983), "a belief which endows the believer with certain powers of action in accordance with the interpersonal models available in the society" (p.180). In these terms, what people may be capable of is relatively dependent upon the particular form of generic self-theory they develop, because as Harré says, it is in terms of that theory that people will construe themselves as being more or less autonomous, or more or less determined. Therefore moral responsibility may be described as existing in a social group by way of the people coming to believe they are agents, that they are reasoning, moral beings. But as Bookchin (1982) says:

Reason...the great project of...speculative thought - to render humanity self-conscious - stands before a huge abyss: a yawning chasm into which the self and consciousness threaten to disappear. (p.139)

What Bookchin is alluding to is that in applying their reasoning - a characteristic which defines people as being human - people have developed, participate in, and maintain moral
orders the structures and functionings of which are actually incompatible with people's capacities to express themselves and to be acknowledged as capable agents and thus as worthy beings. In other words, although our capacity for reason may to a great extent define us, it also has the capacity to be the source of our own demise because it is our capacity to reason which has aided in our developing hierarchical social organisations. Although such social structures can increase the individual's capacity for agency, sustaining hierarchical social groups has led to dehumanization becoming a constant day-to-day occurrence of within-group relations.

**Living In A Hierarchical Society - Making Dehumanization A Day-To-Day Occurrence Of Within-Group Relations**

From the understanding of the functioning of hierarchical social groups it may be said that one of the most adverse effects upon human social relations has arisen from the organization of complex societies and advanced technologies. As social groups expanded, people's lives became increasingly subject to various forms of coordination, rationalization, control and force (Bookchin, 1982), for the sake of having power-over their world. Furthermore, as groups more actively undertook the pursuit of such power, the majority of members were likewise rendered more passive. This situation leads Leiss (1972) to suggest that the necessary correlate of civilization is the consciousness of subordination in those who submit to the management and control of others. If we consider that human activity usually occurs within a moral context of virtue and not a value free context of utility and efficiency, it seems logical that to increasingly
coordinate, rationalize and control people's power-to produce intended effects may be likened to or experienced as, their repression into obedience and self-renunciation.

As the decision-making process in moral orders became increasingly hierarchical, and as the activities of the groups became similarly structured, group members were required to submit to increasing controls upon their individual activities. Bookchin (1982) suggests that implicit to such structuring is the denial of conceiving people as being competent to deal not only with the management of their own lives, but also with its most important context, the social context. He further suggests that increasing the external structure of social interactions simultaneously increases the internal structure of these interactions, that is the understanding the interactants have of their own capacities to act.

Given that self-consciousness and agency are acknowledged in the moral orders of social groups as intrinsically valuable human characteristics, it is possible to concur with Sennett (1980) that a most likely result of hierarchical social structuring is that people may come to consider themselves as personally responsible for their place in the world - for their position in the social hierarchy. Moreover, if we consider that the concept of honor is also intrinsic to the moral orders of most social groups, and that for stratified groups honor is characterized by those most capable of having power-over their world, then it becomes increasingly evident that to strive to live up to the values of honor and will places mutually conflicting demands upon the members of hierarchical social orders. So much
so in fact, that those who are required to function increasingly lower within the hierarchical structure may come to develop a negative definition of their capacity for agency, or a negative self-theory. That is people may come to an understanding of their power-to produce intended effects, of their capacity for autonomy, as something which they do not have, or of which they have very little, or not enough. Instead of conceiving of what they are able to do, people may come to an understanding of their world as that which they cannot do - as their being more determined than autonomous. Perhaps the most important corollary of such a situation is that those who develop a negative or determined self-theory, may no longer consider themselves as responsible for their actions.

This complex situation can be clarified by distinguishing between the aims of hierarchical social organizations and their resultant reality. The aim, it may be said, is to create a determined social order where everything that happens only occurs at the will, the command, of the one at the top, the "Divine King". In an ideal-typical hierarchy the only autonomous person is the one at the top, everyone else is moved only by that person's commands. An ideal-typical hierarchy dehumanizes everyone except the Divine King, because the Divine King is the superior who has achieved the value of having control and power-over the social environment. The resultant reality is that because people remain in hierarchical, stratified groups so as to maintain something of an identity as a person of worth, they submit to the commands from the top, they relinquish their agency and thus their actions can become determined.
If we consider that people in stratified social groups are likely to develop a determined self theory, it becomes increasingly obvious that the social values of hierarchical groups place mutually conflicting demands upon the members such that for many, they are unable to "live up to" the values of the group. By not living in accord with the moral order of the group people risk losing acknowledgement of their being worthy members of the group, which is to risk the loss of honor. For people to lose the sense of their will and their honor it may be said that people have lost their dignity, lost the sense of their worth, which is tantamount to self dehumanization.

In essence, self dehumanization is the ultimate result of people living their lives in a hierarchical society. To live in a social group the moral order of which establishes relationships between the members as that of superiors to inferiors, prevents the constituents from developing a sense of themselves as being the moral equals of all others within their group. To consider oneself to be inferior to others is to consider oneself to be less than the moral equal of the others.

If people's social domains are structured such that to maintain their personal domain - who they are as individual human beings within their social community - it is seemingly necessary for them to affirm their humanity by negating the humanity of Others, it is evident that people would experience their personal domain as inadequate. This lends much credence to the words of Schmookler (1984), "Liberty, equality, and fraternity have all been scarce among civilized societies...In a complex world to stand erect like a human being ceases to be a
simple thing" (p.103). What has become frighteningly obvious is that a hierarchical moral order does not provide a social domain in which people can establish themselves as capable agents within their personal domains. A social hierarchy annuls and destroys the community network of mutuality and sharing which is fundamental to people's sense of their individual worth. Moreover, if we consider that the human identity is socially bestowed, sustained and transformed, and that social interaction occurs within the framework of the existent moral order, then a moral order in which it is necessary for people to dehumanize fellow group members makes dehumanization a hidden agenda in social interactions. Given that it is through these interactions that people need, want and try to establish and affirm their own humanity, we are met with yet another aspect of the paradox of dehumanization:

Dehumanization has developed and evolved along with the development and evolution of civilized, hierarchical societies. Consequently dehumanization appears as a virtual inevitability of human social interaction. To come to such a conclusion cannot reasonably be described as unjustified. However it may justifiably be described as prematurely pessimistic. As I described in Chapter Three, for a theory to be considered an adequate explanation of dehumanization it needs to provide insight into ways through which this paradoxical phenomenon may be lessened and possibly precluded in our world, and the remainder of this chapter is directed towards that aim.
PART 3

TO LESSEN AND PRECLUDE THE OCCURRENCE OF DEHUMANIZATION IN OUR WORLD

This work is based on the assumption that people believe they should treat others as human beings and that each and every one of us should treat each other with the respect accorded human beings. Moreover, it is also assumed that we have the capacities to do so. Dehumanization, however, contradicts these beliefs in that dehumanization is the paradox of human interaction: dehumanization is the consideration and treatment of others as if they are less than or other than human. In the theory of dehumanization thus far, I have pointed to those features of civilized life that keep people from fulfilling their intentions to live as they believe. Given that people are capable of self-consciousness, self-monitoring, and thus change, it may be suggested that once people come to recognize, acknowledge and understand dehumanization they will be able to act in such ways as to either alter or remove those conditions conducive to developing and maintaining dehumanization. As a result of such actions, dehumanization may be made largely ineffectual, maybe even impossible, in human interactions. The aim of the theory of dehumanization is to give a view of this phenomenon that will enable people to become aware of, recognize, and provide new understanding of dehumanization. In this way the theory may contribute to the lessening and preclusion of dehumanization in our world.

Dehumanization is pervasive and thoroughly enmeshed in society, and seems to be ominously self-perpetuating. People
dehumanize Others, both those of different social groups and sometimes even those of their own social group, and what is more, people may even dehumanize themselves. Kelman (1973) suggests that in the act of dehumanizing Others, dehumanizers make their own dehumanization an almost inescapable condition of their own lives because they lose the sense of community by developing a sense of detachment from Others. Similarly, Schmookler (1984) suggests that people who lose touch with their own humanity will also be estranged from the humanity of those around them. It would seem logical to suggest therefore that dehumanization is a contaminant which once in existence, may gradually yet inexorably become universal to human relations.

Kundera (1986) describes the present epoch as one of ambiguity in which decline and progress are occurring simultaneously. He makes the astute comment that people are living under conditions of "terminal paradoxes" in which many existential categories change their meaning. With dehumanization one of the most fundamental existential categories - people's identities as human beings - changes in meaning during human interaction. Therefore in Kundera's terms, dehumanization can most accurately be described as a terminal paradox. Moreover, dehumanization may be considered as a clear illustration of the ambiguity to which Kundera refers: that is the ambiguity of people trying to establish and sustain their identities as human beings when their social environment, also established and sustained through the unique characteristics of the human
participants, may actually function to transform the identities of people to that of other than human.

The paradox of dehumanization is painfully obvious, as is the irony of our situation, but the situation is not necessarily irremediable. If we follow Kundera's line of thought that "all that is human, carries the seeds of its end in its beginnings" (p.4), then the possibility for people's salvation from dehumanization is within the capacities of people themselves. As both Berger (1963) and Schmookler (1984) point out, people are capable of and have monitored their own powers for action so as to create and maintain their social systems, so it follows that people can also change those systems. Furthermore, if we accept Popper's (1945b) view that "it is necessary to recognize...everything is possible in human affairs" (p.197), then there are possibilities, maybe even probabilities, to lessen and preclude dehumanization in our world. Part 3 of the theory of dehumanization presents possible social and political activities people may adopt once they have come to recognize and understand dehumanization. It is on the basis of these indicators and guidelines that specific solutions relevant to particular social groups, communities and individuals may then be developed, so that people move towards lessening dehumanization and achieving a humanizing environment. It is important to note at this point that the ideal-typical model of a humanizing environment is just that - an ideal-type. The most that can in reality be hoped for is to move the dehumanizing environment of civilizations in the direction of the ideal-type.
MOVING TOWARDS A HUMANIZING ENVIRONMENT

From the model of an ideal-typical humanizing environment and from the account of the attraction and maintenance of dehumanization, it can be seen that human dignity is very much dependent upon the quality of people's social relations and interactions. As Bookchin (1982) so accurately says:

Only when social ties begin to decay without offering any substitutes do we become acutely aware that individuality involves not a struggle for separation but a struggle against it (albeit in a pursuit of much richer and universal arenas of consociation). (p.317)

Given our understanding of the development of the human identity, it may be said somewhat bluntly, that for people to experience themselves as "expelled" or "exiled" from their moral order and social group is tantamount to a death sentence. Not in the sense that people so exiled could be unable to physically survive, but that such individuals may experience themselves as being non-persons, as dehumanized, as well as be treated as such. In preliterate communities it was not uncommon for such circumstances to even result in psychologically induced death (Bookchin, 1982).

It is evident that to lessen and preclude dehumanization in social relations we must make efforts to move towards a humanizing environment. That is we must try to achieve a society, as described in the previous chapter, which is based on usufruct, complementarity and the irreducible minimum. But more than this, because our numbers are continuously expanding and isolation is virtually impossible if not impractical and undesirable, we need to also recognize the existence of a universal humanity along with the claims of individuality. To
achieve anything like such an harmonious society, we need to use as our guide the principle of the equality of unequals. Furthermore we need to recognize that neither the personal arena, the social, the domestic nor the public, can be ignored in such a project for the personal and social domains of people's lives are intimately interwoven. Therefore the following ameliorative suggestions shall progress from those more broad in reference to social structures, to those of more personal relevance to individuals. In this way programmes may be formed which establish specific social reforms but then are able to target particular actions and directions individuals may choose in their personal domains that would be instrumental in achieving the more broad social goals.

Dissolving Hierarchies

This theory of dehumanization presents a view of the phenomenon which shows that through the functioning of social hierarchies and the desire for domination, to have power-over Others, dehumanization has become insidious and pervasive throughout society. To invalidate these effects and thus commence to lessen dehumanization, there needs to be a commitment to dissolving hierarchical forms of power, authority, and sovereignty into an inviolate form of what Bookchin terms "personal empowerment": a society in which every person is considered capable of direct participation in the formulation of social policy.

Although hierarchy is virtually existential to present-day societies, this does not mean or necessitate, that it remain a social fact. French (1985) refers to the balance of nature as
incentive and evidence that change need not remain just a possibility, but an actual probability. As she says, domination and control are delusory, likening such actions to "laying concrete over grass...(because) nature does not meekly submit: it dies, it becomes diseased, or...it adapts to controls and confounds them" (pp.304-305). Consequently, our continuity within the balanced natural world suggests that a nonhierarchical social system may be considered as no less random than an ecosystem (Bookchin, 1982).

As I have tried to show in developing a new understanding of dehumanization, hierarchical social systems develop through the social values that these systems embody and which the group members have come to accept. Therefore it seems logical to suggest like Hill (1988), that the choice for another system is possible once different values are applied to desirable action. This means that to change the present situation so as to obtain a more desirable humanizing environment, the uniquely human characteristic of our capacity for reason needs to play an even more enlarged role in human affairs.

The social value which predominates in the moral orders of hierarchical groups is that of having power-over the world. In reference to the social aspect of this value, it is important and essential to understand that in this sense, power is not a possession for it is granted to those in-power by the other people. What is more, that grant is not unretractable, because no-one is in fact "power-less" for each person has some form of power-to produce intended effects - as in removing the keystone supporting hierarchies.
The Morality Of Obedience - Removing The Keystone Of Hierarchies

The image of the civilized modern society as an omnipresent constellation of bureaucratic and coercive institutions serves the purpose of creating a virtual awe-inspiring sense of powerlessness in the normatively integrated, especially those who see themselves as far removed from the centers of administration, policy and decision making (Kelman, 1973). The result is what Bookchin (1982) describes as "social quietism", which for those in the upper echelons of the hierarchy is most essential for their maintaining their positions of privilege.

Identification with a hierarchical social group combined with a sense of powerlessness in the morally integrated, forms the basis of a moral order the principle of which is "the duty to obey superior orders" from legitimate authorities (Kelman, 1973). A morality of obedience maintains hierarchies and perpetuates the perception of powerlessness of those who obey commands. Although civilization as we know it, has been made possible through hierarchical organization, it is a state of affairs which contradicts the fundamental principles and operations of a humanizing environment. To change this state of affairs it seems rather obvious that the basic requirement is for people to reassert themselves as conscious, autonomous beings by defying those commands which negate their status as the moral equals of others. However, as Mixon (1989) points out, a change in this way cannot readily occur because hierarchies are such a fundamental part of our civilizations that obedience has come to be considered as normal. Rather he suggests radical changes in the
organization of hierarchical societies will have to occur *before* most people can begin to realize the myth of a purely coercive, omnipresent "State" and the fiction of their own powerlessness. But Mixon does acknowledge that consistent, thoroughgoing resistance to the dehumanizing commands of the social hierarchy is possible though extremely difficult.

**Changing The "Grassroots" Of Hierarchies - Raising The Awareness Of Being Autonomous**

People are agents of their behavior, but in hierarchical social groups with moral orders that value the conception of superior and inferior beings, and which operate on the basis of obedience, people's capacity for autonomy becomes highly questionable. As Berger (1963) says, those who withdraw into reflection about their roles in doubted social activities of their group are the decided exception. To move towards a humanizing social environment what is necessary is for there to be change away from the hierarchical organization of social groups (Mixon, 1989). However such a change does not usually occur spontaneously nor is it instigated or made possible through celestial or ethereal intervention. People are the agents of such change. Moreover, Popper (1945b) specifies that "social reforms are carried out largely under the pressure of the oppressed, or...under the pressure of class struggle; that is to say, that the emancipation of the oppressed will be largely the achievement of the oppressed themselves" (p.156).

In other words, something of a lateral perspective to change needs to be adopted in which social change occurs as a result of, and which further encourages, people's awareness of their
capacity to act autonomously. As Martin (1984) illustrates quite vividly with examples and accounts of successful, practical applications of these methods and techniques, that action at the grassroots level of social organizations can be and is effective in instigating and maintaining changes in social organizations. Appealing to those with the most control and influence over the group - the elites - to relinquish their positions of privilege is likely to meet with greater resistance than to encourage those less privileged towards actions which have the possibility of improving their lot.

Removing The Need For Subordinates And Masters

The capacity of hierarchical civilizations to rule by brute force has always been limited, as is evidenced by the history of people's revolutions. It would seem from these historical accounts that a violent, oppressive regime may silence and suppress their population for long periods but when discontent becomes widespread and the majority mobilized into action, many may be killed, jailed and subdued but not all; and with those who survive, remain the ideas, the memories and the glimpses of people's capacity for action and limitations of the oppressive regime. Similarly, people have always been limited in their capacity to control nature: we are now becoming acutely aware for the sake of our own existence, of the affects of our attempted over-indulgence in this area.

The predicament in which people now find themselves is described ironically by Kundera (1986), "if God is gone and man is no longer master, then who is the master? The planet is moving through the void without any master. There it is, the unbearable
lightness of being" (p.41). The issue which Kundera raises in his work is the uncertain nature of the self and its identity and how, because of apparent discomfort with uncertainty, people have resorted and subjected themselves to spurious rules, laws, and controls in what Kundera sees as the false notion that certainty of self and identity may be achieved through unanimity of thought and action. He continues in the same vein, suggesting that many people (especially those lacking a sense of humor) are convinced that truth is obvious, that all people necessarily think the same thing, and that they themselves are exactly what they think they are. This leads Kundera to what is perhaps the most sagacious and eloquent of his accounts of understanding the human identity:

it is precisely in losing the certainty of truth and the unanimous agreement of others that man becomes an individual...(the) paradise of individuals...is the territory where no one possesses the truth,...but where everyone has the right to be understood. (p.159)

The capacity for reason is possibly one of the most definitive characteristics of human beings, and reason grows by way of mutual criticism. But what is perhaps most important in understanding the human capacity for reason is that, as Popper (1945b) says, people can never excel others in their reasonableness in a way that establishes a claim to authority because the two cannot be reconciled. Criticism - a basic aspect of reasoning - and authoritarianism are virtually mutually exclusive. Therefore what is important in efforts to lessen and preclude dehumanization in our world is the development and encouragement of criticism or what may be termed the "freedom of thought". As the model of a humanizing environment shows, intellectual modesty is people's awareness of their limitations:
an acknowledgement and acceptance of the fact that we are "only human", that we can and often do make mistakes. But what is more, that we are dependent on others for our ability to learn and understand more clearly, each learning from the other.

Given the human capacity for reason, it may be said that people have by nature a tendency towards curiosity and inquisitiveness, a desire to understand. Education can encourage curiosity by introducing new uncertainties and new possibilities into human life, which can make predictability more problematic (Scheibe, 1979). Scheibe warns however, that privileged access to education can be a means of gaining and holding an advantage of being able to predict and thus possibly encouraging attempts at controlling certain events and aspects of social life without consideration of others. Similarly, Russell (1938) warns against an authoritative education producing a governmental mentality of masters towards dependents.

Therefore to effectively remove what seems to be many people's "need" for subordinates and masters, what is required is an active encouragement of people's natural curiosity. To encourage curiosity is conducive to increasing people's need to understand and thus, concomitantly, their acceptance of and tolerance for uncertainty. When referring to people's social world curiosity, understanding and an acceptance and tolerance for uncertainty would mean that people came understand that differences between people can and do exist. Moreover, people's curiosity and tolerance would enable their acceptance of those differences. As Schmookler (1984) says, differences between people reveal fuller dimensions of each person's humanity which
we can recognize in ourselves, enriching our own self-consciousness.

**Changing The Valuations Of Superiority And Inferiority To An Appreciation Of "Uniqueness"**

The model of a humanizing environment shows that a social group of this type has an intense solidarity both internally and with the natural world. To move towards the achievement of such a solidarity, the thinking of the group members would need to occur in a cultural context that is fundamentally different from one that views these relations from a hierarchical perspective. Moreover, what is required is not so much a structural change in people's formal, logical operations, but rather a qualitative change in their values. That is, to move towards a humanizing environment people need to adopt an outlook towards life that, as Bookchin (1982) suggests, considers people, things and relations in terms of their uniqueness rather than superiority or inferiority. In other words, viewing individuals, relations, and things as not necessarily better or worse than each other, but that they are simply dissimilar, each having value by and for themselves. Moreover, what is required is for people to perceive their worlds as being a composite of many different parts each indispensable to the unification of the community and the survival of all (Bookchin, 1982). Autonomy therefore needs to become more a matter of interdependence rather than independence and variety a valuable ingredient for communal unity.

Promotion of the necessity of a community orientation and unification towards living may encourage the perception and
understanding of both the need and value of interdependence. But perhaps more importantly, such a perception may discourage the development of hierarchies. This may be achieved through people coming to realize that the propriety of hierarchies is the insistence on what are in fact, as Harré (1979) describes, the ephemeral properties of the power rankings of people. These power rankings are developed so as to induce in many the belief that it is necessary to accept the rule of a few.

Moreover, unified equalitarian communities have a great capacity to defend themselves against any attempts by other groups to dominate them. As Martin (1984) shows, a unified community in which all constituents are considered capable of taking on a multiplicity of responsible roles in the functioning of community services, denies beligerents the opportunity to "divide and conquer". A unified community of people capable of asserting their right of citizenship cannot be subdued like a hierarchy, through the destruction or change of the leaders who give the commands.

Equality And Social Order - Asserting The Right Of Citizenship

For social groups to exist there must be some formation of rules, and acknowledgement and cooperation of the members to honor those rules - the moral order of the group. Considering that most people have a deeply interiorized reverence for their social bonds with and within the group, then as said earlier, adherence to the rules of the group may be described as a freely given act of the will among equals. Duncan (1962) suggests that the test for rules is the effects they have on the general welfare of the community. But what is perhaps most important in understanding
the functioning of rules and their effects on social life is that rules are created and sustained by the group members themselves. In other words, the people are responsible for the working of the rules. However, as I have tried to show previously, should people lose their capacity for agency - surrendering their will - their actions become obedience to commands and no longer a cooperation or common will of equal individuals.

The rules of a group are made by the members of the group and they can be changed by the members' decisions to observe the rules or alter them. Consequently it may be said that people are morally responsible for the rules of the group. This notion however requires some qualification for as Popper (1945a) suggests, people may be considered as not entirely responsible for rules they find to exist in the group when they commence to reflect upon their social situations, but people may be considered responsible for rules they are prepared to tolerate once they have realized that they can do otherwise. As Popper (1945a) says, "our fear of admitting to ourselves that the responsibility for our ethical decisions is entirely our own and cannot be shifted to anybody else...we cannot shirk this responsibility. Whatever authority we accept, it is we who accept it" (p.73). Therefore to be a group member who is the moral equal of the other members is to reserve the right to question and criticize the rules of the group and for differences to be resolved through negotiation. That is to reserve the right of citizenship.

In a humanizing social environment citizenship is the understanding that people have a capacity to manage social affairs in a direct, ethical and rational manner. To move away
from a dehumanizing environment toward an environment in which all the members are considered citizens may require direct action on the part of the members themselves - for them to assert their right of citizenship. There are many ways through which people may express their claims for their right of citizenship. Bookchin (1982) cites the examples of sit-ins, strikes and nuclear-plant occupations; and Martin (1984) details strategies which have been successful in gaining recognition of the protestors' claims and subsequent instigation of appropriate ameliorative actions.

In **authentic** direct action (it need be noted that the term "direct action" can be degraded to justify dehumanizing acts of aggression, terrorism and arrogance) people are expressing their capacity to be autonomous and self-managing. Furthermore, to exercise their power-to produce intended effects (which in this situation is recognition of the individuals' rights of citizenship), people also establish, reinforce and sustain their sense of themselves, their reputations and their characters as that of active, ethical, rational citizens. Essentially, direct action needs to be viewed as more than a "strategy" or "tactic", but rather as Bookchin (1982) says, people's reclamation of the public sphere of their social world, which culminates in their development as active participants within a community framework.

**Encouraging People's Agency - A Focus On Responsibility**

Throughout this work there has been the continuous theme of people's capacity to be agents - a characteristic intrinsic to being human. Given this unique characteristic, and its fundamental role in the attraction and maintenance of
dehumanization, it is evident that an essential goal in efforts to lessen and preclude dehumanization in social relations is, as Shotter (1984) suggests, to increase people's awareness of and thus their capacity for responsible action. An increase in capacity for responsible action does not mean to increase people's mastery over others but rather to increase people's capacity to manage what Shotter refers to as their own possibilities and options for different ways of life.

Given that being human entails the capacity for agency, it may be said that people only qualify to be considered as such if it is possible for others to treat them as being responsible for their actions (Shotter, 1984). It is apparent therefore that dehumanization may be lessened and precluded in our world if people, through their expressive order, actively present as worthy beings. As Goffman (1959) and Sabini and Silver (1982) show, the presentation of a worthy self exerts a direct and powerful demand for treatment in kind. Furthermore, it is only through their public expression that people's consideration of themselves and others as moral beings can function as the basis of their behavior. But people's capacity for such self-expression is dependant on circumstances, as the theory of dehumanization has shown. The question therefore becomes: how can people take responsibility for their actions and assert their right of citizenship, under circumstances opposed to such efforts? Russell (1938), Bergmann (1977) and Levi (1958) present the most logical and simple answer which Levi and Bergmann found to also be most effective in practise, and that is for people to defend their sense of themselves as responsible agents by
expressing their power-to refuse their consent, by withdrawing their participation and thereby refusing to submit to compelling forces.

In the account thus far of the possibilities and probabilities of lessening and precluding dehumanization in social relations, there has been an emphasis upon remedial methods with particular attention to the role of the individual. It is evident that within social hierarchies dehumanization of those lower in the hierarchy is an attractive means by which people may affirm their own humanity. Consequently, we cannot in all common-sense, depend upon elites within the hierarchies to instigate social changes which may remove them from their positions of privilege. Assuming successful attempts are made by which changes are instigated, and there are indications of ameliorative effects upon dehumanization, it is necessary to also identify general ways by which to prevent a disintegration of the remedial efforts which may result in a return to dehumanization, or contamination from social orders maintaining a dehumanizing social system. The actual preclusion of dehumanization itself would occur with the achievement and maintenance of a humanizing environment.

To Prevent A Disintegration Of Remedial Efforts

I think most would agree that the ultimate purpose of the remedial efforts which have been described thus far would be to establish methods, both social and political, which will offer the most promise of achieving the ethical social goal of a humanizing environment. Considering that these efforts are directed towards making changes within the moral orders of social groups,
particularly a reconception, revaluation and redistribution of people's personal powers, then these efforts and the intrinsic morality may legitimately be described as revolutionary.

Revolutions - the type with which most people are familiar - have not been successful and have often resulted in a return to a system and structure similar to that which the revolution had been instigated to change. To possibly prevent such a return to pre-revolutionary social conditions, Russell (1938) presents certain suggestions which, as regards efforts to lessen dehumanization, are most applicable because they emphasize the role and value of power in social relations.

Russell's work suggests that for social efforts to be truly beneficent, such as those to lessen dehumanization, they need to have a purpose which, if achieved, will help to satisfy the needs and desires of others. Furthermore, the means of realizing the given purpose must avoid having incidentally bad effects that may outweigh the excellence of the end to be achieved. It is particularly for the latter reason that non-violent social defence and civil disobedience are often presented as most viable remedial actions. Russell particularly emphasizes the need to promote, reinforce and to constantly remember that the ultimate aim of these remedial efforts is for social cooperation between and within groups and not the superiority of the moral "revolutionaries" - thus avoiding a return to the desire for power-over Others considered morally inferior.

Popper (1945a,b) in his examination of efforts to achieve and maintain an open society, adopts a conservative view of remedial social efforts which as regards the phenomenon of
dehumanization, provides quite an effective guide by which to prevent a disintegration of the effects of remedial efforts. Popper (1945b) is of the opinion that all social measures should be planned to fight what he calls "concrete evils" rather than to establish some "ideal good". It is on the basis of this argument that Popper presents his concept of "practical piecemeal social engineering" which he describes as a rational social method of planning for freedom based on Socratic reason which is aware of its limitations. Popper (1945a) describes the rationale of piecemeal social engineering as follows:

The politician who adopts this method...will be aware that perfection, if at all attainable, is far distant, and that every generation of men...have a claim, perhaps not so much a claim to be made happy, but a claim not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided. They have a claim to be given all possible help if they suffer. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for its ultimate good. (p.158)

He criticizes Utopian methods which recommend the reconstruction of society as a whole: that is very sweeping changes practical consequences of which are virtually impossible to foresee due to our limited experiences. Popper warns that Utopian plans can never actually be realized in the way they are conceived, citing the example that the results of people's social actions rarely meet their expectations.

Popper's alternative of piecemeal social engineering recommends the alteration of one social institution at a time. This way he suggests, affords people the best opportunity of learning how to fit institutions into the framework of other institutions - which is especially relevant to the dissolution of
hierarchies and the changing of social values - and how to adjust social institutions so that they work more in accord with the intentions of the remedial efforts. Popper's concept of piecemeal social engineering is a most viable method for preventing a disintegration of the effects of remedial efforts. In reference to changing a dehumanizing environment, piecemeal social engineering would insure something of a "cushioning effect" against possible set-backs, frustrations and obstacles. Mistakes may be made in efforts to change, but in adopting a piecemeal approach people may learn without risking too great repercussions which could weaken people's resolve, will and energy for other remedial efforts.

IN CONCLUSION - IS THERE HOPE FOR THE FUTURE?

From the description of dehumanization and the understanding of its dynamic dimensions and insidious nature, it may seem quite a daunting task to remove the conditions conducive to dehumanization such that it is impossible for this phenomenon to be maintained or to even occur in our world. It cannot be denied that the suggestions presented to change the present situation requires nothing less than a moral enterprise, a crusade for a society in which each and every person is considered and acknowledged as the moral equal of all others - that is as a human being.

The changes that will restore dignity to people's sense of themselves and their sense of others as being human have been shown basically to lie within the province of people themselves. What is necessary is for people to become aware of this fact and thus be roused to action. Gergen (1973) suggests that
psychological theory can play an important social role as a "sensitizing device" producing what he calls "enlightenment effects". These enlightenment effects refer to increasing people's awareness of the range of factors potentially influencing their behavior under various circumstances. One of my aims and hopes is that this work - Dehumanization: Understanding the Paradox of Human Interaction - will have such enlightenment effects by providing understanding and knowledge to increase people's options for action, particularly in moving towards a humanizing environment.

Empirical work that would help in an effort for change could be of an ethogenic form, examining the functioning of groups to reveal the particular roles, rules, conventions, the specific moral orders, that form social domains conducive to making dehumanization a constant occurrence in social relations. It is important to note that this sort of empirical work is of a different type to that which psychologists are accustomed. The questions generated by this theory of dehumanization requires that psychologists, who usually define themselves as people engaged in research, direct their work to understanding the enabling and constraining factors in people's capacity for agency. To perform such work adequately requires a transactional approach rather than working from a causalist perspective of human interaction. In adopting a transactional approach to any subsequent research on dehumanization, the resultant knowledge may help people come to an awareness and understanding of dehumanization as it relates to their own situation so that
alternatives to dehumanizing social interactions may be realized as desirable and also viable possibilities.

A reasonable hope for the future is that in becoming aware of possibilities for lessening dehumanization in our world, people may move ever closer to the realization of a humanizing environment and the understanding of what it means to be a human being in a humane world. As Liedloff (1977) says:

> Once we fully recognize the consequences of our treatment of...one another, and ourselves, and learn to respect the real character of our species, we cannot fail to discover a great deal more of our potential for joy. (p.164)

But given that creating inferiors and the action of dehumanization has been shown to have psychological advantages, the question may be asked - what in the future can move people to get rid of dehumanization and hierarchies in general? Such a question is extremely difficult to answer. Since the development of civilization, hierarchies have become thoroughly entrenched in our social relations; yet hierarchies are incompatible with our values of treating each other as human beings, as moral equals. Because dehumanization has become a seemingly invisible, constant occurrence in our social relations, the first step in moving people towards change is to enable them to recognize and become aware of the problem. As such, I think this work - *Dehumanization: Understanding the Paradox of Human Interaction* - can be considered as beginning the development of an answer to the paradox of dehumanization.

What now follows in Part Three is the application of the theory of dehumanization to three Case Studies, showing how the theory provides understanding of dehumanization.
PART 3

CASE STUDIES
APPLYING THE THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION
INTRODUCTION

In this part of the work, I shall apply the theory of dehumanization to three different cases of dehumanization. In so doing, my aim is two-fold: firstly to show how an understanding of dehumanization can provide clarification and insight into human social interactions which contradict people's morality as regards the treatment of their fellow human beings; and secondly, to illustrate the explanatory capacity of the theory of dehumanization. Moreover, these Case Studies move the theory of dehumanization from the abstract to the concrete because our beliefs about how we should behave often blind us to what is, and so it takes something extraordinary such as these Case Studies, to raise our awareness of contradictions between our beliefs about how we should act and the reality of what we actually do.

Each Case Study will be presented in two parts: the first being descriptive, in which shall be given an account of those facts and important events that provide as clear an illustration of the particular case of dehumanization as is possible; the second will be interpretive, that is showing how the theory of dehumanization highlights and clarifies and brings a new understanding to the specific case. It is important to acknowledge before examining the Case Studies, that the events described present only a brief account of the stories. These events were selected from the perspective of their demonstration of the phenomenon of dehumanization, so as to make the interpretation more straightforward.

The reason for choosing these particular historical and social events - the genocide of Australia's Tasmanian Aborigines;
the life of Joseph Merrick - "The Elephant Man"; and sanctioned massacres as an effect of war - is that each case displays a different aspect of the dimensions and dynamics of dehumanization. Thus examining these Case Studies from a perspective of understanding dehumanization will illustrate the spectrum of dehumanization in social relations and some of the effects of dehumanization in particular social relations. But more than this, these Case Studies will also emphasize the importance, need, and possibilities for actions to be taken which may lessen and possibly preclude the phenomenon of dehumanization in our social interactions.
CASE STUDY 1

THE GENOCIDE OF AUSTRALIA'S TASMANIAN ABORIGINES

The English invasion of Australia's Van Dieman's Land (Tasmania) in the 19th Century may be described as a "muddled and squalid affair" (Hughes, 1987), for it produced no setpiece battles, no benevolent occupation, no heroes, profits or cultural loot. However the invasion is significant for it managed to swallow up more than 65,000 men and women convicts - four out of every ten people transported to Australia. What is more, the Tasmanian Aborigines having existed for 30,000 years before the invasion, were completely wiped out - a genocide which took a relatively brief period of 75 years and which was the only true genocide in English colonial history. Despite the small number of victims in comparison to those who fell under Pol Pot, Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler, the effect of what may be described as a "slaughter" was devastating for the Tasmanians. It was not only the result of the treatment which the beleagured native people of Tasmania received at the hands of the English invaders which draws attention to this most bloody period in Australia's history, but it is also the ways in which they were treated and the justifications and reasons given for this treatment. As Robert Hughes (1987) describes the genocide of the Tasmanians:

"die they did - shot like kangaroos and poisoned like dogs, ravaged by European diseases and addictions, hunted by laymen and pestered by missionaries, "brought in" from their ancestral territories to languish in camps. (p.120)

I shall describe the social and moral order of the Aborigines which, given the differences with the social and moral order of the White settlers, made the extinction of the Aborigines a
virtual inevitability which can be deduced from even their earliest contacts. This discussion will be followed by a description of the ways in which the Aborigines were systematically wiped out which were initially through the effects of disease and displacement. However the Whites resorted to more violent military-like assaults upon the natives which induced retaliatory attacks - the results being likened to that of a guerrilla war. The ravages which these "Black Wars" made upon the Aborigine population was so great that the Aborigines who remained were able to be rounded-up and removed from their homeland Tasmania to the place of their eventual destruction - Flinders Island. The account will follow the decline of the Aborigine people until the death of the last full-blood Tasmanian Aborigine in the 19th Century.

The Social And Moral Order Of The Aborigines

A common belief about Australia's Aborigines is that they are a static culture frozen in primitivism. This idea was promulgated by the first visitors to the Australian shores, inherited from the early settlers, and reinforced throughout the 19th Century. William Dampier, the Dutch navigator, landed on the north-west coast of Western Australia in 1688. His remarks are the first recorded description of the indigenous people of Australia:

The inhabitants of this country are the miserablest people in the world...setting aside their human shape, they differ but little from brutes...They are...of very unpleasing aspect, having no one graceful feature in their faces. (cited in Berney, 1965, p.27-28)

This "lowest of the low" image of the natives of Australia was propagated by the First Fleet when they sailed into what they considered to be an "empty continent" speckled with "primitive
animals" and "hardly less primitive people". It seemed evident to the invaders that the "fittest" would inevitably triumph, and thus the destruction of the Australian Aborigines was rationalized as natural law, reflected in this remark by a settler in 1849:

Nothing can stay the dying away of the Aboriginal race, which Providence has only allowed to hold the land until replaced by a finer race. (cited in Hughes, 1987, p.7)

However if we consider that the Aborigines had peopled the continent of Australia for 30,000 years, then it may be said that such remarks reflect both the ignorance of the capabilities of the native Australians, and the attitude of the English that the Aborigines - these Others - were less than their moral equals, and thus less than human.

When the First Fleet arrived, there were approximately 300,000 Aborigines in the whole of the continent (Hughes, 1987). Their culture was tribal based with no notion of private property but with an intense territoriality linked to the ancestral area by hunting customs and totemism. The Aborigine tribe did not have a king, a charismatic leader, or a formal council. Aborigines were linked together by a common religion, language, and by a complex web of family relationships - an intricate kinship system. Tribes had no writing as we know it, but instead a complex structure of spoken, sung and painted myth whose arcana were passed on to younger generations by the elders of the tribe.

Aborigines were not familiar with the practices of agriculture, their lifestyle being described as a state approaching that of "primitive communism" (Hughes, 1987). In the Aboriginal culture there was no property, no money or any other visible medium of exchange; no surplus or means of storage,
therefore no notion of capital; no outside trade, no farming, no domestic animals, except half-wild dingoes; no houses, clothes, property of the personal kind, or metal; and no division between leisure and labor. What is more, they appeared not to have social divisions and the idea of hereditary castes was inconceivable to them. From this description, it may be said that the social and moral order of the Aborigines may be likened to what was termed in Chapter 4 as an organic culture.

The first White invaders were unaware that the Aborigines carried the concept of the sacred, of mythic time and ancestral origins, with them as they walked. For the Aborigines, their territory was the embodiment of their personal and cultural history. All the landscape and the flora and fauna therein had its place in a systematic unwritten locus of myth that was their "dreaming" (Hughes, 1987). Furthermore, this symbolism and value could not simply be gathered up and conferred upon another tract of land by an act of will. Therefore to deprive the Aborigines of their territory would be experienced by them as a form of spiritual death.

Another feature of the Aboriginal social order was the peaceful nature of the indigenous people - they were not at all war-like. Skirmishing within clans, or with foreign tribes along the frontier between territories was a fact of life but, as Berney (1965) found, these confrontations more resembled international football matches than what Europeans would think of as "warfare". In fact, there has been no evidence that any Aborigine tribe ever set out to exterminate or enslave another, or to annex all or part of another's tribal territory, and many of the earliest
travellers who arrived closely after Cook's discovery voyage, described the indigenous people of Australia as cheerful, friendly and one of the gentlest, most maligned and unwarlike of people (Berney, 1965). It was not until the First Fleet arrived in its entirety that the Aborigines showed the first signs of displeasure at the presence of the Whites. The arrival of the last convict ship The Sirius in Botany Bay, was met by Aborigines flourishing spears and crying "Warra, warra!". These words - the first recorded of a Black to a White in Australia, meant "Go away!" (Hughes, 1987).

The Aborigines of Tasmania varied little from those on the mainland. Tasmania itself measures 67,870 square kilometres (approximate in size to Ireland); the Aborigines first reached this place more than 20,000 years ago when a land bridge existed between the island and the mainland. The hunter-gatherers of Tasmania became separated from the mainland 10,000 years ago by sea (Ryan, 1981). Just how many Aborigines inhabited Tasmania upon the arrival of White settlers is not known, with estimates varying from as large as 8,000 to as low as 700. However, the number which many authors seem to agree with is an Aborigine population of approximately 3,000-4,000. The Tasmanian Aborigines were divided into four main groups of tribes: 1. South; 2. West and North-West; 3. Central and East; 4. North and North-East (Walker, 1902). These tribal groups were divided by differences in language and within the groups each tribe occupied special territory. Although each tribe held differences with the others after the European occupation, the tribes became unified against the Whites.
The Social And Moral Order Of The Early Settlers

Australia in the early days was for the White settlers, a frontier society based on slave labor, run by the threat of extreme violence and laced with rigid social divisions (Hughes, 1987). The British decided to occupy Van Dieman's Land to forestall the French who had been infiltrating into the ill-chartered waters of south-eastern Australia. The colonists arrived at Port Phillip on the 7th and 9th October 1803 and established a settlement near the river Derwent (Turnbull, 1948).

Life in the colony was hard for all colonists at first, bond and free. In convict lore, Van Dieman's Land was to develop the worst reputation for severity. It was used as the dumping ground for the most violent of convicts - some having been transported for cannibalism. The environment both physical and social, was coarse, dangerous, and plagued by shortages. The earliest mistakes of the Sydney settlement - isolation, torpor and semi-starvation - repeated themselves in Van Dieman's Land. What is more, the difficulties experienced within the settlement were aggravated by the fact that administratively, Tasmania was an appendage of New South Wales (N.S.W.), that is Tasmania was not recognized as a separate colony. Consequently any administrative decisions regarding Tasmania could not be made independently, but had to be authorized by the Governor on the mainland who was Lachlan Macquarie in the early years of the Tasmanian colony. The obvious delay of communications between the two colonies made for great difficulties in the economy and the judicial system of Tasmania as to result in unmanageability such that during the early years of the settlement there was administrative chaos, a
lack of records, and the prevalence of embezzlement (Hughes, 1987).

The answer the authorities presented to the problem of starvation was to send all able-bodied men on kangaroo shoots (an animal found in great abundance around the coast of Tasmania), for kangaroo meat had become the staff of life. This reliance on hunting brought about some rather prompt and significant social results. The gun rather than the plough became installed as the totem of survival. Hunting favored a mood of opportunism, consequently settlers tended to neglect the long range pursuits of farming and soon the kangaroos around the area were hunted out which meant that men and dogs had to push further into the bush, competing against the Aborigines for game (Hughes, 1987). Hunger in the colony prompted the administrators to also put guns in the hands of the convicts which created a fringe class of armed, uncontrollable bushmen.

The Lieutenant-Governor at the time of the initial settlement of Tasmania was David Collins, but it was under the rule of William Sorrell that the free population of Van Dieman's Land (including Emancipists) rose from 2,546 in 1817 to 6,525 in 1824; and the total population from 3,114 to 12,464. This meant an enormous proportional increase in the convict population from being not quite 18% of the White population to 58%.

When Sir George Arthur was chosen as Sorrell's successor, he insisted on running Van Dieman's Land as a separate colony and having the effective powers of Governor. The Colonial Office framed his commission so that he could draft laws, make land grants to settlers, directly control government money, extend
pardons, remit sentences, appoint his own staff and report directly to Downing Street. By 1825 the Government went further and turned Van Dieman's Land into a separate colony of N.S.W. with its own legislative council.

The Initial Meeting Of The Different Social Orders In Tasmania

When the military settlement arrived at Port Phillip on the 7th October 1803, followed by a second group of settlers on the 9th, their opinions and attitudes towards the Blacks were well developed - primed through contact between the two groups on the mainland.

The arrival of the settlers drew a crowd of curious Aborigines including both women and children (which according to Aboriginal culture would not have been a warring party). This crowd was reported by a J.P. Fawkner, aged 11 at the time, to be upwards of 200 natives (Turnbull, 1948). Their assembly around the surveying boats was defined by the military command as having "obviously violent intentions" (despite contradictory reports that the Aborigines were without weapons and were singing), which resulted in the soldiers being ordered to resort to the application of firearms to repel them. One Aborigine was killed and two or three wounded. Such was the beginning of the intercourse with the natives, an intercourse which was to be continued in Van Dieman's Land on much the same lines until all the Tasmanian Aborigines were killed.

Establishing A Hierarchy Between The Social Orders

The White settlement of Australia began with Royal instructions to every Governor - instructions which were frequently repeated - that the Aborigines must not be molested
and anyone who "wantonly" killed them or unnecessarily interrupted their lifestyle was to be punished (Hughes, 1987). Despite this apparent official benevolence towards the Aborigines, contradictions arose in both policy and practise.

The Australian natives presented quite an unprecedented situation for the British invaders because unlike the previously "conquered" Amerindians or Maoris who understood and defended the concept of property, the Aborigines were not warlike. Consequently the British never made an official and consistent recognition of a war of conquest (Ryan, 1981). No treaties concerning the Aborigines' land were ever signed, nor were they recognized as and subsequently given the rights of a conquered nation (Rowley, 1970). Moreover, the British government did not consider the Aborigines to be a civilized people, rather their community was viewed as a static society, which according to the British government of the day, eliminated the Aborigines from any claims they might have had to prior ownership of the land of Australia. As a result, the British government proclaimed that the Aborigines were now British subjects; however they were without the rights of British citizenship - that is the Aborigines were seen as having no rights to original land ownership, and thus any attempts to defend their land could be defined by British law as criminal in intent (Ryan, 1981).

Although the Aborigines were seen as having no claim to the land of Australia, the government authorities of the day were at least aware of their need to "appear" considerate of the situation of the indigenous people who now, with the settlement, came under Britain's "legal care". The government's benevolence
towards the Aborigines was perceived by the convicts as privileges they did not deserve, whilst the convicts considered their own treatment by the government to be far worse than that received by the "barbarian" Aborigines. The following account by a Scottish youth is an example of the sentiment of the time (cited in Hughes, 1987):

Many of these savages are allowed what is termed a freeman's ratio of provisions for their idleness. They are bedecked at times with dress which they make away with (at) the first opportunity, preferring the originality of naked nature; and they are treated with the most singular tenderness. This you will suppose is not more than laudable; but is there one spark of humanity exhibited to poor wretches, who are at least denominated Christians? No, they are frequently denied the common necessaries of life! - wrought to death under the oppressive heat of a burning sun; or barbarously afflicted with often little-merited secondary punishment - this may be philosophy, according to the calculation of our rigid dictators; but I think it is the falsest species of it I have ever known or heard of. (p.93; italics in the original document)

According to the convicts, the tribesmen had only one use: they made tools and weapons and left them lying around, unattended, so that they could be stolen and sold to the free settlers and sailors. As regards the free settlers, most considered the Aborigines as "vermin" (Hughes, 1987). One of the many reasons for this schism between the Blacks and the Whites was the differences of labor value between the convicts and the natives. The Aborigines were hunter-gatherers, unfamiliar and unaccustomed to the ways of farming; they were of no value as a possible source of cheap labor. The colonists could not conceive of the Aborigines becoming a part of their social order, consequently a distinct social hierarchy was established between
the social orders of the new settlers and the Aborigines. The free settlers considered themselves superior to the convicts who were looked down upon as "scum" (Hughes, 1987); but the convicts at least held some value in their potential as workers in comparison to the Aborigines who clearly had no value to either the free settlers or the convicts. Therefore the Aborigines came to be considered as inferior to the convicts - the lowest of the low.

Contact between the settlers and the Aborigines on the mainland meant that the settlers of Tasmania had well established attitudes towards the natives prior to their arrival, which most probably influenced their treatment of the Aborigines, and was one of the major factors in the eventual destruction of the Tasmanian Aborigines.

The Tasmanian Affair

The first 50 years of Van Dieman's Land settlement presents official proclamations and orders which claim apparently consistent care for the Aborigines. They are promised White justice, the people are exhorted to live in amnity with them and the wrongs they suffer are deplored (Turnbull, 1948). The impression given is that of wise and benevolent administrators, yet this 50 years is described by Turnbull as a record of cruelty and ineptitude which eventually brought Tasmanian Aborigines, as a culture, to an end.

Like many people who are invaded, the Tasmanian Aborigines became victims of the "alien" culture that came to their shore. Their numbers were first decreased by strange illnesses. Cholera and influenza germs from the ships began the work - epidemics
which certainly were never meant to happen, took their toll on
the Aborigines (Hughes, 1987). The Tasmanians were victims of a
foreign culture, but their destruction came about through the
application of a government policy which made use of arms and
expatriation as methods for controlling the relations between the
settlers and the Aborigines.

Although Aborigines were generally acknowledged to be
harmless, the killing of the natives of Tasmania occurred from
the beginning of settlement. The first death came early in 1804
and relations deteriorated into what Turnbull (1948) describes as
a constant warring by the colonists against the Blacks and
retaliatory actions by the Aborigines that continued for the next
20 years - a time in history and social relations which is
sometimes referred to as the "Black Wars".

The "Black Wars"

At the beginning of 1805 the colonists were settling down.
Food was becoming scarce so they turned to the natives' hunting
grounds. However the situation did not improve, so in 1806
prisoners were turned loose to forage for food themselves. These
prisoners never returned, many becoming "bushrangers". The
inability of the new settlers to adjust quickly to their physical
environment meant long periods of unproductive farming and the
resultant onslaughts upon native game began to deprive the
Aborigines of their natural foods, and the convicts did not stop at
hunting kangaroos - they turned their guns on the natives.
Turnbull (1948) reports that this new-found "occupation" and
"sport" was shared with the sealers upon the islands in Bass
Strait. They were subsequently joined by stock keepers of the settlers in outlying districts and by settlers themselves.

During the warring years many atrocities were inflicted upon the Aborigines. Turnbull describes how the women were sometimes raped and he tells of reports of women being flogged, burnt with brands and even being roasted alive. Men and children were enslaved, emasculated and mutilated, or the men were sometimes just shot outright whilst youngsters and babies were destroyed by dashing out their brains. Other atrocities reported to have been committed by the Whites upon the Aborigines included Blacks being killed as dog meat and the reported chasing, butchering and murdering of native women far advanced in pregnancy. When deprived of their natural food by the Europeans, the Aborigines ventured to taking food from the settlement, but were curtailed by guns and man-traps. The Whites even resorted to the deployment of "hunting parties" that went out at night, tracked down encampments of Aborigines and slaughtered them in cold blood (such a tactic could be employed as the Aborigines never moved at night).

A few years after the colony of Tasmania was established, the Aborigines were overcoming their initial fear of firearms and began to fight the settlers (Hughes, 1987). The natives showed a pattern of tenacious and often well organized resistance, ranging from massed frontal attacks to the carefully plotted tracking and revenge-murder of individual Whites for crimes against tribespeople. The Aborigines' tactical superiority was generally admitted by the Whites, for they would undercut the economic basis of White settlement by attacking sheep and cattle, killing
horses and burning homesteads. Such attacks were usually revenge-based, for tales of unprovoked aggression by Aborigines were rarely born out.

The Governor of the day, Lieutenant Collins, was well aware of the violence directed towards the natives. He reiterated the message the Blacks had legal rights, although these rights were seldom respected. Collins died March 1810. Davey was appointed second Governor of Van Dieman’s Land February 1813. During Davey’s rule, a number of Aborigines were executed for killing Europeans, but no Europeans were ever executed for killing Aborigines. April 1817 Davey was succeeded by Sorell, who was in turn succeeded by Lieutenant Col. George Arthur in May 1824. Throughout this time there was little if any abatement in the attacks upon the natives (Hughes, 1987). However, not a single individual was brought to a Court of Justice for offences committed against the natives, even though outrages were still committed both by the settlers and by the sealers of Bass Strait (Ryan, 1981), a state of affairs in stark contrast to the actions taken against Aborigines upon reports of natives attacking settlers.

Arthur sent forth a Government Notice on 29th November 1826 which proclaimed the Whites had permission to chase, apprehend and even use force "when necessary" against natives they perceive as being of some form of threat - such as brandishing weapons, gathering in unusual numbers, and committing, having committed, about to commit, or assembled for the purpose of committing, a felony (Turnbull, 1948).
Furthermore the idea of expatriating the Aborigines began to take form amongst the settlers and Administrators.

**Developing A Plan Of Expatriation**

The expatriation of the Aborigines was suggested in the *Colonial Times* of 1826 as an alternative to what seemed at the time, the inevitable slaughter of the Aborigines. The newspaper report, cited in Turnbull (1948) stated:

> SELF DEFENCE IS THE FIRST LAW OF NATURE. THE GOVERNMENT MUST REMOVE THE NATIVES - IF NOT, THEY WILL BE HUNTED DOWN LIKE WILD BEASTS AND DESTROYED! (p.76)

In 1828 expatriation was being considered by the Administrators, as can be seen from a personal communication by Governor Arthur in January of that year (cited in Turnbull, 1948):

> The measure which I rather incline to attempt, is to settle the Aborigines in some remote quarter of the island, which should be strictly reserved for them,...on condition of their confining themselves peaceably to certain limits, beyond which, if they pass, they should be made to understand they will cease to be protected. (p.83)

In mid-April Arthur brought forward the Demarcation proclamation - that it was desirable to restrict the Aborigines to certain areas by establishing a line of military posts along the confines of the settled districts - the proclamation ordered that all natives immediately retire and depart from such settled districts. When persuasion failed Aborigines were to be captured without force; if force was required it was to be employed with the greatest caution and forbearance. The proclamation declared however, that the Aborigines may still travel annually according to their custom, through the settled parts to the coast for shell fish, providing their respective leaders have a general passport
under the Attorney-General's hand and seal. It may be said therefore that a system of apartheid was to be established - but how could this be communicated to the Aborigines?

Secretary Sir George Murray gave official acknowledgement on behalf of His Majesty, of the proclamation stating:

I am aware of the extremely difficult task of inducing ignorant beings...to acknowledge any authority short of absolute force, particularly when possessed with the idea which they appear to entertain in regard to their own rights over the country in comparison with those of the colonists. (cited in Turnbull, 1948, p.87)

The proclamation which followed the Executive Council's meeting on 31st October declared that martial law should operate against the Aborigines in all settled districts and the areas in their vicinity. All citizens were commanded to obey the magistrates in such matters as they might think fit - bloodshed was to be checked as much as possible, prisoners were to be treated with humanity, and women and children were to be spared.

Turnbull (1948) describes the plans instigated for the expatriation of the Aborigines as commencing with attempts to capture the elders of the tribes. The Civil authorities, aided by a few military and an occasional Aborigine, scoured the bush and when they found a band, it was dependant upon the orders given by the leaders of the party as to what manner the natives were treated. Occasionally all were shot, or had their brains butted out by muskets. Other leaders would capture them and take them to Hobart to await the destination the Executive Council thought proper to award them. Within 12 months of the proclamation of martial law, more than two thirds of the remaining Tasmanian Aborigines were destroyed, and throughout the whole bloody
period of history, there were four times as many natives killed by Whites as Whites by Aborigines (Ryan, 1981).

Early in 1830 a five pound reward was posted for every adult native and two pounds for every child captured unhurt (Turnbull, 1948). The rewards remained in force until June 1832. In March of 1830 the Executive Council released a report which stated:

it was the decided opinion of the council that the recommendations of the committee so far as they advised still more energetic measures should be forthwith carried into effect, but that no prospect of conciliation, however desirable conciliation was, should induce the least abatement of the most active operations. (cited in Turnbull, 1948, pp.107-108)

It is evident from this report that the notion of conciliation was disagreeable to both the settlers and the Executive Council. Eventually, Arthur decided the best to be done was to capture all the Aborigines or drive them into the Tasman Peninsula. This project was called "The Black Line" (Turnbull, 1948).

"The Black Line"

On 9th September 1830 the Colonial Secretary's Office issued a vast plan of military operations calling upon the community to act en masse to capture the Aborigines. 7th October there was a general movement to begin by soldiers, police, free settlers, and assorted convicts. Turnbull (1948) says upwards of 3,000 people were in the field. At this time Arthur issued another proclamation declaring martial law to be in operation against all Aborigines throughout the island. Exception was to be granted to those Aborigines considered to be pacifically inclined. The reason Arthur stated for the law - the Aborigines' indiscriminate,
unequivocal determination to destroy the Whites. Operations began on 4th October and lasted three months.

The scheme was a complete failure, four fifths of the troops who died were killed by accident and the solitary prisoner who was brought into town later escaped. A government order was issued on 26th November which admitted "The Black Line" was not a full success but claimed that it had resulted in many benefits, even though the expedition cost more than 35,000 Pounds. Some months later it was discovered that the formidable force opposed to the 3,000 men of the line was considerably less than 100 natives (Walker, 1902).

Expatriation Of The Aborigines

Aborigines continued to carry out revenge-attacks upon the Europeans. Consequently the Aborigines' committee recommended that all the Aborigines who had voluntarily sought the protection of settlements, be re-established upon an island (Turnbull, 1948): 34 natives were placed on Swan Island but due to a lack of water the committee recommended a further transfer to an island in Bass Strait. First choice was Clarke's Island, if this was found to be undesirable, then Gun Carriage Island was to be the Aborigines' new home.

Upon the decision to relocate the Aborigines, it was evident a conciliator was needed to convince many of the natives to surrender and to cooperate with the Administration. This conciliator was found in the form of a Presbyterian missionary, George Augustus Robinson (Stone, 1974). With Robinson's help, efforts were made to capture, either by persuasion or force, the Aborigines who were scattered over the island. By the end of
1830 Robinson had brought in 56 natives, upon finding Gun Carriage Island also an unsuitable haven, they were finally transferred in 1832 to Flinders Island (Walker, 1902).

March 1831 saw the colonists claiming the Aborigines as the aggressors in the whole affair, and it was acknowledged that if the Aborigines were not expatriated they would be destroyed - their extinction coming to be viewed by those in power as to be expected (Turnbull, 1948). September 1831 the Aborigines' Committee announced the decision to place the Aborigines on Flinder's Island. Their reasons for the choice of Flinder's: escape by the Aborigines was impossible as was their being kidnapped by sealers; there was plenty of game, water, shell fish, mutton birds and a large expanse of land (Tasmania is approximately 33X larger than Flinders); although it was deemed possible the natives may pine to return to their native land, the Committee imagined the amusement available on Flinder's would occupy their minds more than any other island; and communication from George Town in Tasmania was easier and anchorage for boats was very good.

The place of settlement of the Aborigines on Flinder's was called "The Lagoons". There, on 25th January 1832, 13 females, 26 males and one infant were brought from Gun Carriage Island (Turnbull, 1948). This lone band of natives were placed on the unsheltered side of the island where there were violent, cold winds, rain and sleet. They were already suffering from chills, rhuematism and consumption which had diminished their numbers on Gun Carriage. "Old Sergeant Wight" and his soldiers were in charge of this new settlement. Wight (66) was unable to control
contending events around him - the Aborigines had begun to quarrel amongst themselves, he had bad supplies, and continual but gradual increases in the number of his charges (Turnbull, 1948). Wight claimed he discovered freshly made spears, waddies and a plot by the Blacks to kill the Whites and escape to their native land. The sergeant became infamous for exploiting starvation and death by thirst as methods of controlling Aborigines he considered to be rebellious.

Robinson learned of these proceedings and in February he went to Flinders to find everything in great disorder and confusion (Turnbull, 1948). Arthur had thought the position was satisfactory and had already dispatched to Flinders a commandant proper, Lieutenant Darling of the 63rd regiment. Darling arrived March 1832 and reported that several of the Aborigines had died although health generally was satisfactory and by European standards the Aborigines were becoming more "civilized" in their habits. A catechist had been appointed, and the Commandant was instructing the natives in modes of cultivation.

April 1832 the Courier reported that Robinson had conciliated 23 other Aborigines who had been placed temporarily on Hunter's Island. By their removal, the territory of Van Dieman's Land was "claimed" to be left free to the Whites (Turnbull, 1948). George Washington Walker and James Backhouse of the Society of Friends inspected the settlement on Flinder's Island to report on the arrangements for the Aborigines (Turnbull, 1948). They cited health problems amongst the natives as originating from the Aborigines not being used to housing or clothing, as well as poor diet and a lack of exertion. These health problems saw the
numbers of natives dwindling. Only four tribes remained which according to Robinson, included no more than 100 individuals. Altogether, the number of Aborigines now in existence in Tasmania and at the Aborigine settlement was estimated as 220. Meanwhile, Robinson kept gathering all the natives that remained.

By 1834 there were 30 Whites employed on Flinders to "look after" 130 Blacks (Hughes, 1987). From 1830-31 Robinson brought in 54 natives; 1832 - 63; 1833 - 42 - all others who remained at large surrendered in 1834, with the exception of seven natives who appeared unexpectedly in 1842 and were deported to Flinders immediately. The number of Aborigines placed on the island in all was stated to have been 203. The number of deaths in the corresponding years were as follows: 1832 - 5; 1833 - 40; 1834 - 14; 1835 - 14. In 1836 123 Aborigines were reported as the number of survivors on Flinders. The Aborigines were often ill in batches of six or eight and there was an excessive mortality rate. Many of the deaths were attributed to chest complaints.

By 1835 Governor Arthur was wanting to transport the Tasmanian Aborigines to the mainland of Australia but the Governor of South Australia rejected Arthur's proposal of sending the Aborigines to his new settlement with Robinson, so as to open communication with the Aborigines there (Turnbull, 1948). Robinson had conciliated all the Aborigines thought to be left in Tasmania, so in November 1835 Arthur sent him to take charge of Flinders.

When Robinson arrived for his new posting there were approximately 200 surviving Tasmanians (Turnbull, 1948).
Robinson immediately banished tribal ceremonies and corroborees, to be replaced by money, a sense of property, and the literal word of the Old Testament. The Aborigines were not allowed to dance and sing and were compelled to wear clothes and to learn the business of shop-keeping. They were often ill and their birth rate was greatly diminished. Robinson however, did not believe that the deplorable state of the Tasmanians was in any way attributed to their removal from their homeland. Instead, he was of the opinion that given their "barbaric" way of life and "ignorance of God", their depletion of numbers and decline of health was inevitable, even if they had remained on the homeland (Stone, 1974). For Robinson the only answer to the situation was for the natives to be transferred to the mainland, so he pressed for the proposal of their moving to Port Phillip (Turnbull, 1948). Robinson encountered strong opposition to his idea both in Tasmania and N.S.W.. By now only 81 Aborigines remained and the expense of maintaining the establishment was about 3,000 Pounds a year. Despite the small number of natives, N.S.W. quickly and flatly rejected the proposal for transfer to their settlement; the same proposal was also rejected by the Committee.

It was at this time - early 1836 - that the government declared all Australian land to be Crown land (Hughes, 1987). What is more, the idea that Aborigines might have some territorial rights due to prior occupation was settled by a N.S.W. court decision declaring that the Australian natives were too few and too unorganized to be considered "free and independent tribes" who owned the land they lived on - reinforcing and further justifying the actions of the Tasmanian Administrators.
The Final Decline Of The Tasmanian Aborigines

Robinson eventually departed from Flinders in 1839 when he was appointed as Chief Protector of the Blacks in N.S.W. (Hughes, 1987). Mr Smith was then put in charge of Flinders and his successor was a Mr Fisher. In 1842 when Dr. Jeanneret became superintendent only 50 Aborigines were left. Dr. Jeanneret expressed shock at the state of the island's affairs. A small military contingent remained on the island, considered necessary for the safety of the settlement, and these soldiers Jeanneret accused of both cruel treatment of the Aborigines and of tampering with the stocks of food, resulting in inadequate rations. Jeanneret also accused the catechist of malpractice, cruel treatment and neglect of the Aborigines.

In October 1847 the remaining Aborigines were returned to Tasmania and located at Oyster Bay. Turnbull (1948) describes how this move was unacceptable to the colonists. There were 44 natives in total, half of whom were half-castes. The settlement soon decayed - the Aborigines were dying away, and by the end of 1854 there remained of those 44 only 3 men, 11 women and 2 boys.

William Lanney "King Billy" was the last full-blood male Tasmanian Aborigine. He died 2nd March 1869; his body was stolen from the grave and mutilated the day after burial. No-one was ever punished (Hughes, 1987). The celebrated "Last Tasmanian" Truganini, died 8th May 1876. She was buried in Hobart with great precautions against body-snatchers. Her body was eventually exhumed and her skeleton stored at the Tasmanian Museum, but after long legal battles her skeleton was cremated.
30th April 1976 and her ashes scattered on D'Entrecasteaux Channel.

The deaths of Lanney and Truganini are not the end of the story of the Tasmanians for Truganini was not, in fact, the last full-blood Tasmanian although she has been symbolized as such. Suke, a woman on Kangaroo Island living with the sealing community, was the last Tasmanian full-blood and she died in 1888 (Ryan, 1981).

The extinction of the full-blooded Aborigines of Van Dieman's Land was foreseen from the earliest years of the European settlement, but that did not in any way dissuade the government from its course. Furthermore, there is what may be described as a continuation of the genocidal process because like the Aborigines of Tasmania, the Aborigines of Victoria are steadily declining in number along with other tribes throughout Australia. The decline in the Aborigine population is of such gravity as to lead Turnbull (1948) to suggest that by the early part of the 20th Century there will probably be an end of the Aborigines in Victoria, and indeed of those over a large portion of the continent of Australia. Efforts are being made to preserve the tribes of upper Australia, but it is evident such efforts need to be of a very different character from those of the past if these people are to survive. Even so, many claim today, especially the Aborigines themselves, that the system presently in force merely postpones the end.

**APPLYING THE THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION**

The genocide of Australia's Tasmanian Aborigines is an interesting case in point in illustrating the applicability of the
theory of dehumanization. This Case Study is a clear example of the dimension of dehumanization between groups and the theory of dehumanization provides both understanding and insight into the inhumane treatment of one social group by another.

From the account of the social and moral orders of the Aborigines and the settlers, it is evident that, as was described in the theory, the two social orders had distinctively different social realities. Their understanding of the world was developed quite separately from each other. Consequently their moral orders were vastly dissimilar - from their within-group relations to their relationship with the natural environment. The Aborigines could quite easily be described as having the moral order of what has been termed previously an organic community - with relations based on equalitarianism and usufruct. In comparison, the settlers clearly had a moral order based on hierarchy, consisting of the superior administrators and the free settlers, then the inferior military, after which was the extremely large class of the sub-inferior convicts. From the written records we can see the immediate and clear boundaries that existed, certainly for the settlers, between the settlers ("us") as real people, and the Aborigines ("them") as Others. Unfortunately records do not provide us with any insight as to whether or not the Aborigines defined the settlers in the same way, but given that the Aborigines soon came to act united against the settlers without differentiation, it seems logical to suggest that the Aborigines acknowledged the settlers as undesirable different Others.
Within the context of the theory of dehumanization, the genocide of the Tasmanian Aborigines illustrates the effect of the meeting of different moral orders. To the settlers, the Aborigines not only looked different, but their way of life, their intimate relationship with the natural environment, was completely incomprehensible to the Whites whose estimation of people's worth was measured both in terms of possessions and in terms of status - of having influence and power-over others. To each other, these two social groups would have seemed to have little in common. According to the settlers, the Aborigines lived in blatant disregard of their civilized moral order therefore the Whites could consider the natives as "savages" and "brutes", as less than their moral equals. For the settlers, the Aborigines were less than human. Furthermore, the genocide of the Tasmanian Aborigines is a clear demonstration of contradictions between people's actions and their beliefs regarding their treatment of people.

Throughout the whole Tasmanian affair, from the earliest government policies to the removal of the last Aborigines from Flinders, the White authorities intended to treat the Aborigines in what the settlers considered a humane manner - the settlers were instructed not to "wantonly kill" the natives. However, because the main aim and purpose of the authorities was to establish a safe and thriving colony for "their people", actions which the colonists considered necessary for their own survival, such as taking possession of increasing amounts of land and hunting kangaroos, were simply incompatible with what would have been humane treatment of the Aborigines. Such humane
treatment would have taken the form of actions which also took into accord the needs and the moral order of the Aborigines. To take the Aborigines and teach them the Christian faith, make them wear clothes and to stop them performing "Pagan" rituals was to treat the Aborigines humanely - according to the colonists. The end results however show just how necessary and fundamental is the maintenance of the moral order of a group to the actual survival of the individual group members. Moreover, because the Aborigines did not respond to the "benevolent", humane treatment of the settlers by accepting the Whites and their way of life, this only confirmed for the settlers that the Aborigines were less than their moral equals.

It is necessary in trying to understand the dehumanization of the Tasmanian Aborigines, to examine the extraordinary nature of the colonial hierarchy and the effect of such a moral order upon relations with the different moral order of the Aborigines.

The moral order of the settlers was of an extraordinary hierarchical nature. There were the clearly superior governing authorities to whom the inferior free settlers relied upon for their safety and well-being, and from who the lowly ranked soldiers had to take their commands, but there was also the sub-inferior convicts, who were actually in the majority, and were no less than slaves to all above them. When a group functions on the basis of such a hierarchy it is little wonder that when given the opportunity, the convicts should affirm their own humanity through their capacity to have power-over the Aborigines. The convicts were considered the "scum" of the colony and suffered torturous punishments - lashes and placement in stocks -
sometimes for the slightest misdemeanor such as stealing bread (Hughes, 1987). Therefore the inhumane violence perpetrated upon the Aborigines, most often by the soldiers and convicts, may be considered to directly reflect the beliefs of these lowest of the lowly Whites, that the natives were even less than their moral equals, less than human, and could be treated as such - no better than a wild animal that could be hunted down and slaughtered.

The theory of dehumanization provides understanding of the genocide of Australia's Tasmanian Aborigines as a function of what may be described as a collision of different moral orders - an organic moral order and a hierarchical moral order. Moreover, in explaining people's perceived need to have power-over others in a hierarchical moral order so as to assert their own humanity, the theory of dehumanization lends understanding as to how the collision of these moral orders - the settlers and the Aborigines - resulted in the destruction of the non-hierarchical group of the Aborigines.
CASE STUDY 2

JOSEPH MERRICK - "THE ELEPHANT MAN"

Joseph Carey Merrick, more widely known as "The Elephant Man", came to public attention first as an exhibit in a "freak" show and second, as the subject of a public appeal for compensation for his future care in the London hospital. So public is Joseph Merrick's life with attention from academia and the media, that he may justifiably be described as the most famous and topical freak of recent times. I shall give an account of Merrick's life, his physical disability and the dehumanizing treatment to which he was subjected within society. I shall then show how the theory of dehumanization provides understanding and insight into this particular case of dehumanization.

Joseph's Physical Condition

Joseph Carey Merrick was born in Leicester England. The date of his birth is uncertain, having been reported as 5th August 1862 (Howell & Ford, 1980) and 15th February 1853 (Montagu, 1972). Given that Howell and Ford's investigations involved birth records of the Merrick family, this would suggest that the most accurate date of Merrick's birth is 5th August 1862. He was born into a working class family, his father Joseph Rockley Merrick being a warehouseman and his mother Mary Jane not bringing any income into the family at the time of their marriage 29th December 1861. According to an anonymous article on Joseph Merrick in the Illustrated Leicester Chronicle 27th December 1930, which Howell and Ford describe as based upon detailed knowledge of the Merricks' circumstances, Mary was herself a "cripple". The form and degree of Mary's disability is never reported. Her condition
may have related to the aetiology of Joseph's unusual physical condition.

At his birth, the article in the Leicester Chronicle states that Merrick's relatives declare he was born a "perfect" baby (Howell & Ford, 1980). Medical reports dispute this point, claiming Joseph would have been born with enlarged bones of the skull and arm, and possibly legs (Report on Death of the "Elephant Man", British Medical Journal, 1890). Throughout his childhood, Joseph would have experienced increased deformity, distortion and affliction with each year of his life. His condition apparently at no time abated, progressing eventually until his death. The medical term given to Joseph's condition is neurofibromatosis, multiple neurofibromatosis or von Recklinghausen's disease, the cause - genetic mutation (Howell & Ford, 1980). The full complexity of Merrick's condition was not known to the medical world at the time of his life and only partial diagnosis was possible, although recently questions have been raised as to whether Merrick actually suffered from neurofibromatosis, or another disfiguring disease known as Proteus Syndrome (Juan, 1990). Either way, to understand the effects of his disability in reference to his social interactions, it is necessary to provide some description of Joseph's physical appearance.

Joseph Merrick was first introduced to the British Medical world in 1884 by Mr. Treves, a gentleman who was to figure prominently in Joseph's life. At the December 1884 meeting of the Pathological Society of London it was reported, under the heading "Congenital Deformity":

Mr. Treves showed a man who presented an extraordinary appearance, owing to severe deformities, some congenital
exostoses of the skull, extensive papillomatous growths and large pendulous masses in connection with the skin; great enlargement of the upper right limb, involving all the bones. From the massive distortion of the head, and the extensive areas covered by the papillomatous growth, the patient had been called "the elephant man". (British Medical Journal, 1884, p.1140)

In later presentations to the Pathological Society of London, as reported by Howell and Ford (1980), Treves was able to provide more detail of Joseph's disability. Merrick stood a little below average height at 5 feet 2 inches (157.5cms). Joseph's head circumference measured 36 inches (91cms) and was completely irregular in shape, covered by huge rounded embosses of bone. Due to the bulbous protrusion of the right side of his skull, forehead and right cheek, Joseph's facial features, his nose and mouth, were pushed to the left side of his face and his lips were very prominent. Joseph also had a growth from his upper jaw which protruded through his mouth. This was eventually surgically removed. His right arm was two or three times larger than the left. Distortion almost crippled the right arm which had fairly free movement at the shoulder and elbow, but the wrist and fingers were so enlarged and stiff as to make the hand useless and caused partial dislocation of the joints due to crowding from the deformity. Joseph's left arm was completely unaffected, being described as delicate and neat. His feet were both deformed, with the bones uniformly enlarged and toes malformed and enormous. A hip disease contracted in childhood left Joseph lame with his left leg always stiff and held forward away from his body. Joseph also had curvature of the spine.

Joseph was afflicted by a two fold abnormality of the skin. One type of abnormality was of the soft subcutaneous tissue
which lies immediately beneath the skin, causing the skin to be very loose upon Joseph's body so that it could slide about or be grasped and drawn away from the deeper tissue in folds. In three areas of Joseph's body these changes were so marked that the weight of the skin drew the tissue down into pendulous folds. The second type of skin abnormality was the presence of numerous warty growths or papillomata, which varied in size from small pimple-like roughenings of the skin to huge, cauliflowered-textured masses, the size and number also varying between the different areas of Joseph's body. Over the chest and abdomen the warts were small and sparse, but over the back of the head and from between the shoulder blades down to the lower back and buttocks, they spread out as exuberant growths of dusky purplish skin, deeply cleft, and fissured.

Treves (1885) reports how the whole integument of Joseph's body was deformed in one way or another, with the exception of his left upper torso and arm and his genitalia. Despite the degree of Joseph's deformities, Treves describes how Joseph presented no evidence of epilepsy or other cerebral disturbance, never suffered headache and "his intelligence was by no means of a lower order" (p.497). Even though it was evident to Treves that Joseph's condition was extending rapidly, at the time of his examination in 1885, Joseph was in general good health, even possessing an appreciative amount of muscular strength, and could dress and feed himself without assistance.

It is evident from this description that Joseph Merrick was grossly deformed in the sense of appearing very different to the average person. The degree to which Joseph's physical appearance
affected his functioning within society can probably best be measured by an account of Joseph's life history.

The life of Joseph Merrick has over the years attracted great attention. Many works have discussed his physical condition and his life. Most of this literature has been based upon second and third hand versions of the official hospital reports from Joseph's final place of abode. One work however, that of Howell and Ford (1980), has sought original and authentic documents relating to the private life of the very public "Elephant Man", so it is upon their work that I shall rely for information on Joseph's early years, prior to his coming into the care of Mr. Treves.

Joseph's Early Years

Merrick was born in the year 1862. The anonymous letter in the **Illustrated Leicester Chronicle** claims that Joseph's disability began to be evident when, at 21 months, there presented a firm swelling in his lower lip which grew in size and spread as a tumor into his right cheek, after which the protuberance of bone on Joseph's forehead increased perceptibly in size and his skin began to grow loose and rough in texture. Joseph's little body was changing and becoming misproportioned with the enlargement of his right arm and both feet. Later, at a meeting of the London Pathological Society (**British Medical Journal**, 1885), it is reported that Joseph experienced bone disfigurement for as long as he could remember and that to him the papillomatous growth was trifling in degree during childhood. In 1870, Joseph had a heavy fall which resulted in his developing a disease in the damaged hip joint and subsequent disability of that joint.
Throughout his childhood, despite his increasing disability, Joseph attended school daily. After the death of Mary, the Merrick family became lodgers of the widow Emma Wood Antill who Joseph's father married in 1874. In his autobiography (cited in Howell & Ford, 1980), Joseph tells how he never gained the affection of his stepmother so ran away on a number of occasions always being retrieved by his father. Joseph did however, develop something of an affectionate relationship with his father's younger brother Charles.

**Seeking A Place In The Community**

Upon completing his schooling at the age of 12 (the statutory leaving age as prescribed in the Education Act of 1870), Joseph found employment at Messrs Freeman's Cigar Manufacturer's. He was in their gainful employment for two years until the age of 15 when apparently the ever increasing disability to Joseph's right arm made it too difficult to hand-roll cigars. What followed for Joseph was a period of long unemployment, which was to cause friction in the Merrick home. Possibly to alleviate this situation, Joseph Merrick Snr. obtained a hawker's license for his son from the Commissioners of Hackney Carriages. Joseph became a peddlar of Haberdashery. Eventually, this line of employment was found to be inappropriate for Joseph with the continuous amplification of his deformities.

In the peddling business of that time, the peddlar was expected to sell a definite quota of goods each day. Unfortunately for Joseph the day came when he could not meet his quota. In his autobiography, this day was to bring for Joseph the greatest thrashing he ever received at home, which broke both skin and
family ties. Joseph left home and hawked the streets. Living in the lowest of common lodging houses, he was on the verge of destitution and little more than a vagrant.

Joseph was not completely disowned by his family because Charles, Joseph's uncle, searched for him and upon finding Joseph in a destitute condition, took him into his home with his own wife and child. Joseph remained a hawker during the two years he was to spend with his uncle. After this time, the Commissioners for Hackney Carriages did not renew Joseph's license as they were "acting in the public good" for his appearance had begun to attract too much comment and attention. Joseph then sought the cooperation of the Poor Law authorities and applied for admission to the Leicester Union Workhouse. He entered the workhouse on the first Monday after Christmas, 29 December 1879. After 12 weeks records show that Joseph signed himself out under his own volition on 22 March 1880. It can only be assumed that he must have failed at what may have been an attempt to seek work for he returned on the evening of the second day and being accepted once again, Joseph moved back to the workhouse the next morning and remained there for four years.

Howell and Ford (1980) suggest that it was sometime during this four year period, probably in 1882, that Joseph was referred to surgeons of the Leicester Infirmary regarding the growth from his upper jaw which by that time was reported as measuring 8-9 inches (20-23cms). This growth caused Joseph to lose food whilst eating and was forcing back his lips.
Joseph Becomes A "Freak"

Joseph was always reported as recounting his days at the workhouse with much fear and trepidation as he did in his autobiography. It was towards the end of Joseph's fourth year at the workhouse that he wrote to Sam Torr (a local music hall celebrity) regarding Torr's publicly expressed interest in exhibiting specialties and novelties. Members of Torr's entourage included fat ladies, giant babies, dwarfs and giants.

Joseph offered himself to be exhibited as a freak. Torr visited Joseph at the workhouse and on Sunday 29 August 1885 Joseph Merrick left the workhouse forever to embark on a new career as a professional freak. Joseph was to be managed by a syndicate consisting of Torr, Sam Roper, J. Ellis, G. Hitchcock, and Tom Norman. Directly upon his release from the workhouse Joseph was under the care of Torr and Ellis. It was these gentlemen who coined the term "The Elephant Man" and at Nottingham in "The Living", Mr. Ellis' music hall, Joseph Merrick made his debut under his new stage name. With autumn advancing, fair grounds were closing, so the exhibition was moved south to London, Joseph being in the care of Norman.

In answer to criticisms that Norman exploited his employees' unfortunate situation, Norman in a letter in the World’s Fair (1923; cited in Howell & Ford, 1980), defended his actions by claiming his freaks were earning more than by any other means available and that under his care, they were no longer burdens upon their families or society. Furthermore, in his letter in the World’s Fair, Norman protested against claims of ill treatment of Joseph whilst under his management, claiming that Joseph was
never treated like a beast (Howell & Ford, 1980). Such arguments were not heeded by the British police who constantly shutdown the show, making the proprietors move the show elsewhere, claiming the exhibition was an affront to public decency. It was three months after Joseph's release from the workhouse that the show arrived in London, where Joseph was to meet Frederick Treves. This was a meeting that was to change Joseph's life, and marked the beginning of what was to become a concerted effort by many to change the social status of the disabled.

Meeting Doctor Treves

Treves (1923) describes how he was drawn to the freak show by a report of an especially disturbing exhibition by London hospital surgeon Dr. Reginald Tuckett. Treves arranged to have a private viewing of "The Elephant Man", for which he paid a special price of 1 Shilling. Upon entering the abandoned shop that contained the exhibit, Treves saw a bent figure crouched on a stool, covered by a brown blanket and being warmed by a heated brick. Treves' own impressions of that figure were that:

It never moved when the curtain was drawn back. Locked up in an empty shop and lit by the faint blue light of the gas jet, this hunched up figure was the embodiment of loneliness...The thing arose slowly...There stood the most disgusting specimen of humanity that I have ever seen...at no time had I met with such a degraded or perverted version of a human figure. (1923, p.3)

On this first encounter Treves arranged for Joseph (whom Treves always mistakenly called John) to be brought to his private rooms in the London hospital. This second encounter between Joseph and Treves was to be a detailed medical examination at the end of which Treves supposed:
that Merrick was imbecile and had been imbecile from birth. The fact that his face was incapable of expression, that his speech was a mere spluttering and his attitude that of one whose mind was void of all emotions and concerns gave grounds for this belief. The conviction was no doubt encouraged by the hope his intellect was the blank I imagined it to be. That he could appreciate his position was unthinkable...It was not until I came to know that Merrick was highly intelligent, that he possessed an acute sensibility and - worse of all - a romantic imagination that I realized the overwhelming tragedy of his life. (1923, pp. 8-9)

Treves presented Joseph in person before the Pathology Society in December. After which he was to lose contact with Joseph for almost 12 months.

**Social Reactions To "The Elephant Man"**

The police were constantly moving Norman's exhibition on, the result of a growing social attitude of the indecency and impropriety of such shows. By 1888 all freak shows were closed down by the Local Government Act (Howell & Ford, 1980). Therefore the syndicate was having difficulties getting a profit from the exhibition, so the decision was made to tour Joseph on the Continent. Joseph was taken to Belgium under the care of an Austrian manager. The tour however, was a failure from the beginning, for the police were as resistant to such public showings as they were in England. Early in June 1886, after only a number of months, the Austrian abandoned Joseph in Brussels having stolen the 50 Pounds Joseph had saved as his portion of the profits. Joseph had to pawn the remainder of his possessions to raise the fare for passage home. At Ostend Joseph was refused travel on the cross-channel ferry because of the affront his physical state would have been to the other passengers. He was then befriended by Wardell Cardew, a gentleman with medical
connections, who helped Joseph go north to the Belgian port of Antwerp from where he crossed the channel at night, finally arriving in London by train at 6:50 a.m..

Upon his arrival at London station Joseph's appearance attracted a crowd which grew in size and intensity to a point at which Joseph had to be saved by the police and protected in a waiting-room. Joseph was still in possession of Treves' card given to him at their first meeting. Consequently Treves was called to the station. Upon his arrival, the doctor had difficulty getting through the crowd which had congregated at the door of the waiting room. Once inside, Treves found Joseph "nearly done", huddled up, helpless in a heap in a corner on the floor (Treves, 1923).

Once back at the London hospital, Treves deposited Joseph in a private ward where he was cleaned and fed. Then began the problem of Joseph's residence in the hospital, for Treves' act of admitting Joseph was a technical breach of hospital regulations (Treves, 1923). But the most immediate problem however, was the deterioration of Joseph's health, for he had an increase in deformity (disabling effects were more general), bronchitis, and the suggestion of a heart disorder in an early stage. Joseph's life expectancy Treves estimated to be not more than a few years at the most. His condition remained poor for several days. With time, Treves found himself gradually adjusting to Joseph's speech but, apart from Treves, Joseph showed great suspicion towards anyone who approached him.
Appealing To The Public

Joseph remained at the hospital. He was refused admission to the two hospitals for the chronically ill, so five months after his admission to the London hospital a vigorous publicity campaign was set in motion on Joseph's behalf. A "Letter of Appeal" from Carr Gomm, Chairman of the London hospital appeared in The Times (December, 1886) telling of Joseph's story and appealing to the public for any form of help. In his letter Gomm refers to the sermon given on Advent Sunday by the Master of the Temple:

our Master's answer to the question, "Who did sin, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?" showing how one of the Creator's objects in permitting men to be born to a life of hopelessness and miserable disability was that the works of God should be manifested in working the sympathy and kindly aid of those on whom such a heavy cross is not laid. (1886, p.6)

The appeal had the desired effect, for Treves (1923) estimates that within a week enough money was forthcoming to maintain Joseph for his life without there being any drain upon the hospital's funds. In December 1886 Joseph moved into rooms in the hospital which were converted for his needs. Treves saw Joseph daily. Joseph was found to have a passion for conversation, was remarkably intelligent, a most voracious reader, and delighted in romance (Treves, 1923). In his description of Joseph, Treves can find nothing but praise:

He showed himself to be a gentle, affectionate creature,...free from any trace of cynicism or resentment, without a grievance and without an unkind word for anyone. I never heard him complain. I have never heard him deplore his ruined life or resent the treatment he had received at the hands of callous keepers. (1923, p.17)
Indeed these were characteristics of Joseph to which others referred (e.g. Carr Gomm, 1886).

**Humanizing "The Elephant Man"**

Treves (1923) said that what he wanted for Joseph was "to get accustomed to his fellow men, to become a human being himself and to be admitted to the communion of his kind" (p.20). To this end, Treves instructed that no mirrors were to be allowed into Joseph's rooms and that the house surgeons visit him daily. Treves also arranged for a pretty widow to visit Joseph, requesting that she smile and take his hand and chat with him briefly. Joseph's reaction to this incident was to break into uncontrollable sobbing, stating that no woman, since his mother, had treated him with such kindness. From that point onwards Treves describes Joseph as going through a transformation into being less frightened, less self-conscious, loosing his shyness and improving his speech.

Joseph began to attract the attention of people in positions to bring their social influence to focus on Joseph's behalf: for example, Mrs. Madge Kendall, a well known actress of the day (Howell & Ford, 1980). One year after entering the hospital Joseph was paid a visit by the Prince and Princess of Wales, who remained in contact throughout Joseph's life (Treves, 1923).

Despite the steady flow of gifts and photographs from the socially prominent, theatre trips, and a six week holiday in the country (Carr Gomm, 1890), which helped to make Joseph, as he was reported to have said, "happy every hour of the day" (Treves, 1923, p.25), nothing could stem his continuous and now more rapid physical deterioration. Joseph turned to religion, becoming
confirmed into the Anglican Church and attending service regularly in the hospital chapel (Carr Gomm, 1890). Although his life became more restricted, having to stay in bed until noon and prematurely ageing, his spirits remained good (Howell & Ford, 1980). In fact even on the day he died, nurses reported that Joseph's good manner did not alter.

The Lasting Memory Of Joseph

Joseph Carey Merrick died Friday 11th April 1890. The inquest report states that the cause of death was "suffocation from the weight of the head pressing on the windpipe" (1890, The Times, p.6), the result of Joseph trying to sleep lying down. His normal sleeping position was sitting with his knees tucked up and his head supported on his knees (Treves, 1923). Treves puts forward a different cause of death which was the result of the same action. Treves claims that Joseph died from the dislocation of his neck, citing the fact that Joseph was found with no evidence of a struggle - not even the coverlet was disturbed. Howell and Ford (1980) support this latter suggestion given that it was Treves himself who performed the autopsy. The report on the death of "The Elephant Man" in the British Medical Journal (1890) also cites the cause of death as dislocation of the neck. The lasting memory which Joseph left on Treves was that:

As a specimen of humanity, Merrick was ignoble and repulsive; but the spirit of Merrick, if it could be seen in the form of the living, would assume the figure of an upstanding and heroic man, smooth browed and clean of limb, and with eyes that flashed undaunted courage. (1923, p.37)
APPLYING THE THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION

The life of Joseph Merrick is a clear, some may say poignant, illustration of how a person's identity as a human being is, as described earlier, a matter of social permission. That is, the life of Joseph Merrick shows how a person's identity is socially bestowed, socially sustained, and socially transformed. Moreover, the transformation witnessed in this particular case is one of that from being less than human to one of dignity - of being the moral equal of others.

In reference to the phenomenon and the theory of dehumanization, Merrick's life as "The Elephant Man" is an example of within-group dehumanization. Joseph's early attempts to become an accepted member of the community were thwarted by people's reactions to his disability. Joseph was considered beyond the boundaries of a real person - he was less than human - as the animal association "The Elephant Man" quite bluntly states.

I think it would be hard to deny that much of the treatment Joseph received prior to and during his time as a side-show freak is illustrative of the functioning and maintenance of a social hierarchy. As regards his time in the side-show, Joseph was virtually advertised as "a perverted version of a human figure". He was denied access to many aspects of community life such as travel and being free of degradation, which is not in keeping with treatment befitting a person acknowledged as being human, as being a worthy member of the group. What is of particular interest in this case though, is Joseph's reactions to his situation: that is Joseph's power-to express his sense of himself
as being human, his self-worth, and how that in turn affected the social situation.

England in the 1880's could hardly be described as a welfare state. If people found themselves in a position of monetary hardship, and if their families were unable or unwilling to provide support, people's options were the workhouse or the streets (Howell & Ford, 1980). In seeking out Torr, it may be said that Joseph was trying to change his situation by making what was a liability (his disability), an asset (a means by which he could have a life off the streets and outside of the workhouse). Joseph's choosing to enter the freak show rather than remain in the workhouse, suggests that the status of being a freak was preferable to that of being unemployed, emphasizing the social hierarchy existent in Victorian England. Those who had to place themselves "at the mercy of the parish" (Howell & Ford, 1980), were at the bottom of the hierarchy. There was little sympathy for the poor; their fate was considered to be deserved due to their moral impoverishment. Those who were unable to support themselves, who were unable to find work, were less than the moral equals of those who were gainfully employed, despite the nature of the work.

Although it may be said that Joseph improved his social and moral worth from the dehumanization of being unemployed - at least there was some sympathy for the plight of the "victims" of disability - Joseph's entering the freak show did not make him the moral equal of those whose physical acceptability equated with their moral acceptability. The dehumanization of the disabled is reflected in the social climate of Victorian England,
one that enabled the use of disabilities for entertainment and profit. Viewing the freak show, people could titillate their morbid curiosity and in the process, affirm their own humanity by a clear comparison of their having achieved a "normal" human physical form to those who could only ever present as that which was "not normal" and thus by corollary, not human.

It may be said that in joining the freak show and living outside of the workhouse, Joseph was trying to preserve something of his self-worth. However, it may also be said that in publicly acknowledging his physical inferiority, Joseph's actions were an expression of a loss of dignity - his self dehumanization. Regardless of whether Joseph's actions reflect an attempt to express his worth as a member of the social group given the extreme social constraints upon his capacities to do so, or whether his actions reflect his self dehumanization, what resulted was a change in the social environment that could more enable disabled people to express their uniquely human capacities - to express themselves as being human.

The actions of Mr. Treves and Carr Gomm in their public appeal for help with Joseph's welfare, drew upon the sympathy of the people. Gradually, as Joseph became less constrained in his capacities to express his uniquely human characteristics, the social environment became increasingly less constraining and more enabling for Joseph and others with disabilities, to express themselves and be identified as worthy human beings. There is a clear transaction between the capacities of people's agency and the enabling and constraining aspects of the social environment in the establishment and maintenance of humane social relations.
From the framework of present Western morality regarding the treatment of people with disabilities, it is relatively easy to recognize the dehumanization in the life of Joseph Merrick. This is so because in some aspects our social environment is more open and less constrained, thus enabling us to more readily see the dehumanization than it was for Merrick's contemporaries. Therefore like the Case Study of the genocide of Australia's Tasmanian Aborigines, the Case Study of Joseph Merrick - "The Elephant Man", emphasizes the need for people to become aware of, to be able to recognize, to become sensitive to and thus be able to "see" dehumanization so that ameliorative changes may be made to the process of dehumanization.
CASE STUDY 3
SANCTIONED MASSACRES - AN EFFECT OF WAR

Sanctioned massacres are described by Kelman (1973) as "indiscriminate, ruthless, and often systematic mass violence, carried out by military or paramilitary personnel while engaged in officially sanctioned campaigns, and directed at defenceless and unresisting civilians, including old men, women, and children" (p.29). Even though these massacres occur within the context and in the course of officially sanctioned activities, the massacres themselves may or may not be specifically sanctioned.

Sanctioned massacres usually occur though not necessarily, within the larger context of an international or civil war, a revolutionary or secessionist struggle, a colonial or ethnic conflict, or a change or consolidation of political power. What is of particular interest and relevance of the sanctioned massacres I shall be examining, is that even though they occurred during wars and an effect of war is to lay a blanket of immunity over many actions considered criminal and immoral at other times (e.g. killing and the taking of another's property), these massacres have produced international condemnation as regards the apparent lack of any moral restraint on the part of the perpetrators. I will be examining three such massacres - the holocaust of the Jews, the bombing of Hiroshima, and the massacre at My Lai - showing how the theory of dehumanization provides understanding and insight to these events, all of which are quite blatant negations of people's morality as to the treatment of other human beings.
The Holocaust: Genocide Of The Jews

In 1933 the Nazis came to power in Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. Their rise to power resulted from calls for the unification of Germany on a National Socialist Platform which advocated the development of a healthy and vigorous "master race" - the Aryan race - of which the Germanic peoples were considered the personification.

The achievement of this goal meant the destruction of both the enemies of the state and those who were considered to be "undesirables", or non-Aryans. The implementation of Hitler's doctrine of genocide became the responsibility of a minority of the SA who constituted the Party's fighting mass formations (Dicks, 1972). This specialist group became the SS (Schutzstaffeln or protection squads). Himmler was their commandant.

Dicks describes how when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, the SS was ready to bring to fruition their leader's doctrines. In the wake of the armies followed the Einsatzgruppen, subdivided into a number of Kommandos. These were mobile units mainly composed of SS men but invariably headed by SS generals whose functions consisted of counter-intelligence and policing but their main and secret mission was to round up and kill all potential leaders or intellectuals who might create a Polish resurgence. As Hitler's dream of German supremacy grew into his central war aim in the East, so the transfer and decimation of whole populations now living there became a central aim.

The methods employed by the SS at this time in performing their duties were those of mass shootings in remote spots over
open trenches which the victims had to dig themselves (Dicks, 1972). These patterns of Einsatzgruppen killings were repeated in the West, the Balkans and Russia. Instead of ethnic Germans, local fascist groups played the role of auxiliaries to the SS, denouncing political opponents and especially Jews, once Hitler's decision was made to speed the extermination of the Jews.

Hitler targeted the Jews as the great usurpers of Germany's achievement of racial purification and world domination. So Hitler, in his bid to rid Germany of this internal enemy, developed the "Final Solution" to the Jewish problem - a euphemism he employed for the genocide of the Jewish people.

Until 1938-39 Hitler's hatred of Jews, shared by many of his followers, had been limited to economic and legal deprivations. He introduced a programme of displacement whereby many Jews emigrated to other parts of the world and violence had mainly been in sporadic outbursts. Many Jews had suffered KZ (Concentration Camp) treatment since 1933, but they were confined under various statuses, e.g. Marxists, liberals, "degenerate" artists, etc., rather than qua Jews. Dicks (1972) states it was not until 1941 that Hitler personally gave the secret order to include the Jews in the categories of "undesirables" who were to be killed in the name of racial purification. Thus began the holocaust.

The operation of exterminating Jewry was entrusted to Heydrich as head of the State Security (RSHA) office in 1941. For some years previous the preparatory work was performed under the command of SS Colonel Adolf Eichmann. From 1939 Heydrich had directed the Einsatzgruppen to round up and confine Jews in
what were to become known as the "ghettos", all under the name of "resettlement of aliens". Dicks tells how it was with greatest security that Himmler's HSSPF's (Chief, SS and police) in Poland created a series of Concentration Camps which were the real destination of those in the ghettos. The concentration camps were - Majdanek, Buchenwald, Treblinka, Chelmno, Sobibor - and the largest - Oswiecim (Auschwitz).

The mass shooting over trenches of the Polish campaign was superseded by a well-planned military operation. It involved, besides the various SS/Gestapo units to carry out the tracing and arrests of the victims, the cooperation of many civil officials at ministerial and local authority level; transport staffs; scientists to devise more effective ways of killing; and architects to design giant crematoria.

It is estimated that in all the camps of Nazi Germany and its occupied territories, 18,000,000 to 26,000,000 people of various prisoner status were put to death through hunger, cold, pestilence, torture, medical experimentation, and other means of extermination such as gas chambers. During the war the camp inmates were used as a supplementary labor supply. The inmates were required to work for their wages in food; those unable to work usually died of starvation, and those who did not starve often died from overwork. Auschwitz, Majdanek, Treblinka and Buchenwald were developed purely as camps for "extermination". It was in Buchenwald particularly, where medical experimentation was conducted. New toxins and anti-toxins were tried, new surgical techniques devised, and studies made of the
effects of artificially induced diseases, all with living human beings as subjects (Dicks, 1972).

Through the extermination policy of the Nazis and the subsequent operations of the death camps and concentration camps, Chorover (1979) states that 6,000,000 (1/3 - 1/4 of the total number of those killed) were Jews, 1,500,000 of whom were children.

The Bombing Of Hiroshima

The events leading up to and the details of the bombing of Hiroshima have been extensively researched by Knebel and Bailey (1960). Their work provides insight to both the human tragedy of this event of war and the amount of human energy required to culminate in one of the greatest sanctioned massacres to occur from a single war action. It is the work of Knebel and Bailey to which I refer in recounting the bombing of Hiroshima.

August 5th 1945 the American President Harry S. Truman was quoted as claiming that the U.S. had a new weapon so powerful that just one of these weapons was equal to 20,000 tons of TNT, that two billion Dollars had been spent on its development and production, and that its effectiveness would be displayed shortly. On August 6th 1945 the U.S. dropped a single atomic bomb on the Japanese town of Hiroshima.

Up to this date the U.S. offensive against Japan had been unceasing and seemingly quite effective. In July alone, Major-General LeMay's B-29 bombers had unloaded 40,000 tons of bombs on Japanese cities and on Thursday August 2nd, his pilots had dropped a single-day record total of 6,632 tons. The consistency of such assaults may explain why radiomen in Tokyo whose job it
was to detect and record all radio signals emanating from U.S.
transmitters, did not react to a call sign they picked up on August
6th. They had first heard that same call sign almost three weeks
earlier and the monitors had located it on the island of Tinian. It
was tagged "New Task Company" and it was heard daily during
late July. The Japanese did not know the "New Task Company" was
the highly secret 509th Composite Group whose mission was to
drop the first atomic bomb.

At this point of the conflict the Japanese cabinet had been
hoping to persuade the U.S.S.R., still neutral in the Pacific war, to
act as intermediary in arranging a peace agreement. On July 1st
the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow received no cooperation for
this proposal so he advised his government to end the war in any
way possible, even unconditional surrender. However, an internal
power struggle in Japan's Supreme War Council produced a
stalemate on the decision to surrender.

In the U.S. the Under Secretary of State supported the U.S.
Secretary of War in a proposal to the President suggesting that
offering Japan the chance to keep the Emperor if they capitulated
would greatly facilitate the surrender. Truman decided not to
implement the idea immediately but to wait until the Allies
meeting at Potsdam. In Potsdam on July 24th the ultimatum was
approved by Truman and Churchill. However it was decided not to
mention the Emperor specifically in the ultimatum but to merely
state that the final form of government in Japan was to be left up
to the people.

One day later Truman approved an order to use the atomic
bomb if the Japanese should refuse the Potsdam ultimatum. On
July 26th the U.S. and Great Britain, with China as a co-signer and Soviet Russia approving, issued the Potsdam Declaration. Because the ultimatum made no mention of the future status of the Emperor, the Japanese Cabinet decided to disregard the declaration.

Truman was informed by Stalin that the Russians considered the Japanese proposals for mediation as "too vague". Armed with this knowledge, combined with the report of the Japanese decision to ignore the Potsdam ultimatum, the President decided to leave his order of July 25th standing.

At the peak of the project of developing the bomb, the number of people involved from researchers to allied workers, reached 539,000. The Manhattan Project (as it was known) became the melting pot of science involving American and English physicists with refugee scientists from Italy, Germany and Hungary. The security regulations were rigid as evidenced by the fact that no German or Japanese agent ever acquired significant atomic intelligence and very few of the American people were aware of their country's activities in this line.

Although the A-bomb was the major instrument in the operation its "success" was very much dependant upon the safety of its delivery and accuracy of its drop on the choice of target. This was the job for which the Air Force brought together 1,500 carefully hand-picked officers and men to form the 509th Composite Group. Col. Paul W. Tibbets Jr. was chosen as the top bomber pilot for the mission.

Harry S. Truman had succeeded Roosevelt in the Presidency upon the latter's death in April 1945. Possibly as a result of
petitions and protests from many of the scientists and some war leaders against the employment of the bomb (these ethical doubts becoming louder after the successful test drop which estimated the bomb's power as equalling 20,000 tons of TNT), Secretary Stimson urged the new president to appoint a committee on certain phases of atomic policy. The "Interim Committee", consisting of eight men and a four-man panel of scientific advisers, recommended in their report to the White House that the bomb be dropped on Japan as soon as possible without specific warning. Truman had come to the same conclusion independently, and so it was decided that America would use the bomb against the Japanese unless the Japanese surrendered first.

Japan was chosen over Germany because at the time of the bomb's completion the Nazi regime was already near collapse. So as to make an even greater impact upon the war, it was also decided to explode the new weapon over a city as yet relatively untouched by bombing. Hiroshima, an urban industrial area, became the primary target. The city held only one division of troops which, including support troops, numbered 24,000 - all preparing for defense, not attack. At the time of America's attack Hiroshima's population numbered approximately 290,000.

On August 4th the seven crews chosen to carry out the mission were briefed by U.S. Navy Capt. William S. Parsons, who was to arm the A-bomb. Monday August 6th 1945, an air-raid alert sounded in Hiroshima at 7:09 a.m.. A single B-29, flying very high, crossed the city twice and at 7:25 flew out to sea, the warning system sounded the all-clear at 7:31 a.m.. At 7:25 the pilot of this plane scouting the weather conditions, radioed the
report - Hiroshima was a clear target. Tibbet's plane the Enola Gay, with its 10,000 pound cargo and all intercom conversation being recorded, had first view of Hiroshima at 8:09. At 8:15 plus 17 seconds the bomb was dropped. 42 seconds later came the explosion.

Survivors recall the first instant of the atomic explosion as being pure light, the sole impression was visual - there was no sound. Thousands were incinerated where they stood by the radiant heat. Thousands of others were shredded or crushed by debris produced by the blast waves. The resultant fireball produced the force of a 500-mile-an-hour wind. Between them, blast and fire destroyed every single building within an area of almost five square miles. A few minutes after the explosion a black rain began to fall, followed by a wind that blew so hard it uprooted huge trees. Within minutes of the blast the cloud mushroom pushed upwards almost four miles.

Capt. Robert A. Lewis, Tibbet's co-pilot was one of the first to speak on the Enola Gay after the bomb drop. His recorded words - "My God, what have we done?" (cited in Knebel & Bailey, 1970, p.507). It had been assumed by America that most people would be in air-raid shelters and the casualties were estimated to reach 20,000. But there had been no specific alert, and most people were on their way to work. Thus there were more than 70,000 casualties.

The My Lai Massacre

In 1974 the four volume Report of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident was released. The chairman of the inquiry was W.R. Peers and the report came
to be known as *The Peers Report*. Goldstein, Marshall and Schwartz (1976) give a comprehensive account of the report and its findings and is the work to which I refer for information on the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam war.

The principal units involved in the Son My (or My Lai) operation were B/4-3 Infantry and C/1-20 Infantry Brigade, which upon its deployment to Vietnam, was attached to the Americal Division. The inquiry found that regarding the operations in and around My Lai, there had been the possible commission of war crimes, inadequacy in the reporting and investigation of events, and attempts to suppress information:

A part of the crimes visited on the inhabitants [of My Lai] included individual and group acts of murder, rape, sodomy, maiming, and assault on noncombatants and the mistreatment and killing of detainees. They further included the killing of livestock, destruction of crops, closing of wells and the burning of dwellings within several subhamlets. (Goldstein et. al., 1976, p.315)

My aim in this section is to provide an overview of the preparations for and conduct of the Son My operation conducted by TF Barker during the period 16th-19th March 1968.

LTC Frank A. Barker, Commanding Officer of Task Force (TF) Barker, conceived and planned the Son My operation along with his immediate staff. The concept of the operation was that TF Barker would conduct a search and destroy operation in the Son My area beginning on 16th March 1968. Search and destroy operations were defined as operations conducted "for the purpose of seeking out and destroying enemy force, installations, resources, and base areas" (p.88). Moreover, TF Barker's objective was the entrapment and elimination of the 48th Viet Cong (VC) Local
Force (LF) Batallion and two separate local force companies, along with the destruction of their logistical support base and staging area. It had been established that the 48th possessed heavy weapons and had inflicted casualties on TF elements during previous operations.

The order of the Son My operations was issued orally by LTC Barker at Landing Zone (LZ) Dotties, TF Barker's command post, on the afternoon of 15th March 1968. Col. Henderson, in his address to the Leaders of TF Barker, emphasized the necessity and advantages of establishing and maintaining close and aggressive contact with the enemy. He also alluded to the elimination of the 48th "once and for all".

The civilian population within the Son My area was characterized as "active sympathizers with the VC". It was stated in the intelligence briefing that at the appointed time of the operation, 7:00 a.m. 16th March 1968, that most of the civilian inhabitants would be out of the hamlets and on their way to local markets. There was no evidence of there having been any prior warning given to the inhabitants to evacuate, as is the prescribed conduct prior to such operations. It was also apparent from the evidence that in delivering his orders, LTC Barker gave minimal or nonexistent instructions concerning the handling of noncombatants.

Testimony by some of the men of TF Barker indicates the nature of their commands and the troops' reactions (Goldstein et. al., 1976):

When we left the briefing we felt we were going to have a lot of resistance and we knew we were supposed to kill
everyone in the village. - W.C. Lloyd, 1st Plt, C/1-20 Inf (p.99)
People were talking about killing everything that moved. - R.W. Pendleton, 3d Plt, C/1-20 Inf (p.99)
Although CPT Medina didn't say to kill everyone in the village, I heard guys talking and were of the opinion that everyone in the village was to be killed. - J.R. Bergthold, 1st Plt, C/1-20 Inf (p.100)

By the evening of 16th March 1968, TF Barker reported that as a result of their first day's actions in Son My there were a total of 128 VC killed, 3 weapons captured, assorted mines, booby traps and equipment captured and destroyed, and friendly casualties of 2 killed and 11 wounded. None of the TF Barker casualties, with the possible exception of the slight wounding of 1 man, was inflicted by direct enemy fire. I shall now detail the conditions which resulted in these statistics.

Between 7:50 a.m. and 8:45 a.m. the 1st Platoon section of Company C, 1st Battalion of TF Barker performed their initial actions inside My Lai. As they moved into the hamlet, the soldiers placed heavy fire on fleeing Vietnamese, threw grenades into houses and bunkers, slaughtered livestock and destroyed foodstuffs. "Mercy" killings were also performed on badly wounded Vietnamese as the platoon advanced. The 1st Platoon detained 60-70 people primarily women and children with a few elderly males. The detainees were rounded up and herded into a nearby ditch. A second group of villagers numbering between 20 and 50 were moved into the rice paddies.

At the same time, members of the 2d Platoon began killing inhabitants as soon as they entered the western edge of My Lai. Evidently they neither sought to take nor did they retain any prisoners, suspects or detainees. They destroyed bunkers and
bomb shelters, killing the occupants as they exited the bunkers upon the soldiers' commands. Witnesses also testified to the shooting of at least three groups of 5-10 Vietnamese who had been rounded up. These villagers were all ages - women, children and small babies. There were at least two rapes and most of the livestock and fowl were slaughtered. The evidence indicates that at least 50 and perhaps as many as 100 inhabitants, almost exclusively old men, women, children and babies were killed. During this time the 2d Platoon received no enemy fire.

Between 8:45-9:45 a.m., the villagers who were held under guard in the rice paddies were shot down by members of the platoon upon the command of 2LT William L. Calley. These soldiers were then sent through the southeastern portion of the hamlet to round up additional prisoners and move them to the ditch, approximately 10 villagers were found. Vietnamese witnesses also testified that another 50 or more villagers were either brought to the ditch from neighbouring subhamlets or sought refuge in the ditch from the army action. At approximately 9:00-9:15 a.m. Calley gave the command for members of the 1st Platoon to shoot down the Vietnamese in the ditch.

Inside the subhamlet of Binh Tay, the 2d Platoon continued the pattern of burning, killings and rapes which it had followed in My Lai. The 3d Platoon followed behind the 1st and 2d completing the destruction of crops, burning of houses and slaughter of livestock.

At approximately 9:15-9:30 a.m. LT Brooks received an order from CPT Medina to "cease fire" or "stop the killing", which evidence indicates continued until at least 10:15 a.m..
By the time C Company was prepared to depart My Lai on 16th March U.S. personnel testified to the killing of no less than 175-200 Vietnamese men, women, and children. The evidence indicates that of the Vietnamese killed only three or four were confirmed VC with the possibility of there being several unarmed VC and many more who may have been active or passive supporters and sympathizers. There is no substantiated evidence to suggest the company received any enemy fire or any other form of resistance during the operation.

The Vietnamese casualty figures given above were shown to be highly conservative. The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) in a separate study, estimates that 347 Vietnamese residents of My Lai were killed on 16th March. This estimate does not include those who were killed in neighbouring subhamlets (such as Binh Tay) or those who may have come to My Lai from surrounding subhamlets on the morning of the operation.

During the investigation of TF Barker's operations in Son My village, evidence was received of the possible commission of war crimes and violations of regulations by members of B Company, 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry (B/4-3 Inf) and the U.S. and Vietnamese personnel working with the company. There are no indications that any of these activities were either reported or investigated by higher headquarters. Despite considerable evidence supporting the allegation, the Peers investigation was unable to establish either the full circumstances or the number of the victims of the incident. The following account are some of the findings of the Peers Inquiry:

During the period 16-19 March 1968 U.S. Army troops of TF Barker, 11th Brigade, Americal Division, massacred a large
number of noncombatants in two subhamlets of Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. The precise number of Vietnamese killed cannot be determined but was at least 175 and may exceed 400. (Goldstein et. al., 1976, p.314)

As regards individuals involved in the massacre at My Lai, Lt Calley has become the most prominent figure known to the public because of his trial and sentencing subsequent to the findings of the Peers Inquiry that:

a. He ordered the execution by his platoon of an unlawful operation against the inhabited hamlets in Son My Village...and expressly ordered the killing of persons found there.
b. He directed and supervised the men of his platoon in the systematic killing of many noncombatants...
c. He personally participated in the killing of some noncombatants...
d. He failed to report the killings of noncombatants in and around My Lai (4) as a possible war crime... (Goldstein et. al., 1976, p.342)

APPLYING THE THEORY OF DEHUMANIZATION

Apart from large-scale death and destruction, a prominent and what is for many the most horrifying aspect of these sanctioned massacres, is the way these actions seem to have been meticulously and precisely planned, involving great numbers of people in their performance. Such careful planning in the killing of other people completely contradicts the morality of people's treatment of others as human beings. It is evident that for such destructive goals to be achieved, dehumanization has to be in operation: that is, the dehumanization of both the victims and those who may be described as their "victimizers". The theory of dehumanization, when applied to these examples of sanctioned massacres, lends clarification and understanding of how so many
people can be treated as less than human by so many others over such lengthy time periods.

Firstly, the victims: it can be seen from these examples, that a "required" and "expected" behavior of combatants during war is for them to kill. To do so to the extent required to achieve the aims of war (to have power-over the "enemy"), the governments must try to awaken in their own people the consideration that the enemy - the Others - are not human. There is emphasis upon the Others' differentness, establishing clear and distinct boundaries between the Others and the combatants who are "real" people.

Hitler had to convince the German people that Jews were firstly not-Aryan before their genocide could even commence. As Duncan (1962) shows, it was necessary for Jews to be presented as "strong and cunning enemies" with "secret and terrible powers" so that the German army would be the "majestic, valiant warriors" in their actions against the Jews. Therefore the progressive demotion of the Jew from being human to being other than human saw the Jews first become "different", then "peculiar", and finally, "strange and alien". Their accent, gestures, food, dress, face, everything about the Jews was exaggerated into caricature. The Jews could not be Aryan, so neither could they be German. In fact they were not even heretics for they could not recant and become German.

In reference to the massacre at My Lai and the subsequent trials for war crimes, Taylor (1970) states that the expression of "the mere gook rule" had been adopted facetiously by some Army legal officers who believed that military courts were lenient to Americans who killed Vietnamese civilians, because
the Vietnamese were regarded as somehow second-class human beings or "mere gooks" who were of little if any intrinsic worth. This was certainly the stark reality for many combatants as evidenced by the trial statement of a Texas private, "The trouble is no one sees the Vietnamese as people. They're not people. Therefore it doesn't matter what you do to them" (cited in Taylor, 1970, p.171).

Secondly the victimizers: for which the demands of war by their very nature, make their dehumanization almost inevitable. Combatants in their role of soldier, pilot, gunner, etc., have as their "duty" - their moral career - the "defense" of their country (people, property, country and ideals), which is presented to the people as the imperative of war. Combatants are obligated in the pursuit of their moral career to act in the most effective form of defense. Therefore if the most effective form of defense is presented as involving killing and destruction, then such actions become the duty of the combatant: but it is in the enactment of their role, in their killing of the Others - of the enemy - that the victimizer develops a sense of detachment. The victimizers "lose" their sense of themselves as moral beings - a form of self dehumanization (it need be noted that military training is in fact deliberately designed to "take" from combatants their moral sensitivity). This is illustrated in the following personal accounts of Vietnam veterans which were collected by Brende (1984):

T. : Death and life didn't have any meaning over there. Seeing enemy bodies had no meaning...We would do things to the bodies and laugh about it...After awhile, killing was nothing to me...people had no meaning...I became a violent man in the
service and I was violent for a long time afterwards. Most of my anger was about not being recognized. (p.129-130)

S. : What I left behind was a large part of my value system and my capacity to care about others. I lost my sensitivity and I became cold and dehumanized. (p.133)

E. : I left behind part of my moral values...I left behind most of my feelings and my memories. (p.133)

L. : I lost my feelings. I lost an ability to care about people...People have reached out to me, but I couldn't respond. I couldn't be human...there's a coldness in me...I try to feel but I don't feel anything. (p.133)

Although this self dehumanization is an effect of war it is also instrumental in maintaining the war effort. Self dehumanization is fundamental in the functioning of the "war bureaucracy", the hierarchies established by the warring parties in their efforts to have power-over their enemy.

War bureaucracies are the hierarchically structured order of command in the various military forces. As evidenced from these sanctioned massacres, the combatants are products of their military training. The main function of this training and the main function of the war bureaucracy is to dehumanize the recruits so that they no longer consider themselves moral agents responsible for their actions, so that the combatants in their turn, readily become obedient dehumanizers capable of committing or condoning acts of violence. It may be said that the focus of military training is the dehumanization of the combatants so that the duty to obey superior orders becomes their guiding moral principle. In this way, when the superiors in the hierarchy of command explicitly order, implicitly encourage, tacitly approve, or at least permit violent acts (Kelman, 1973), the combatants - the victimizers - no longer see themselves as responsible for the consequences of their actions because they are merely pawns of their commanders. The combatants no longer consider themselves
as fully responsible for their own actions during war because their role is to act both in cooperation with their comrades and in obedience to their orders from their superiors. As Duncan (1962) says, in obedience to authoritarian command (as in the functioning military) people "surrender" their will. Through the combatants' obedient, unquestioning submission to the military hierarchy and the routinization of their role - their "job" as a combatant - they gradually lose the sense of their capacity for agency, their sense of being responsible for their actions, their sense of being moral beings. Because the military is a highly stratified, hierarchical institution it may now be seen how, when the orders of such a "legitimate" authority contradict the ordinary moral principles of social relations, people's perception of right and wrong may be subverted.

In examining these sanctioned massacres during war it is also important to take account of the social context in which such events occur. During war, apart from the functioning of the military hierarchy, the moral justifications for violence are presented to the people of the warring countries by those in the upper strata of the social hierarchy as necessary in the pursuit of larger policies formed through "the interests of the Nation". When placed in the context of the theory of dehumanization, during war between groups, the interests and the aims of each group it may be said, is to be dominant, superior, and to have power-over the Other group. The significance and the contradictory nature of the role of the social context in justifying violent actions is illustrated through the application of the concept of the "Laws of War" to sanctioned massacres. Certain participants in the My Lai
Massacre were judged to have committed "War Crimes"; the Holocaust was a "Crime Against Humanity"; but the highly destructive act of the bombing of Hiroshima which targeted civilians, was judged in accordance with the Charter of the International Tribunal from Nuremberg, to be lawful and necessary in its role of ending Japan's war effort (Taylor, 1970). As Taylor says, "no rules to restrain the conduct of war will ever be observed if victory seems to depend upon the breach of them" (p.33). In other words, when relations between and within groups are based upon a hierarchy the aim of which is to establish superiority by having power-over the Others, there seems little if any hope of people acknowledging each other and treating each other as human beings.

Like the previous Case Studies, the seemingly apparent ease with which dehumanization can be recognized and its functioning understood in sanctioned massacres can be directly related to the effect which the social domain has upon the personal domain. People participating in these examples of sanctioned massacres developed their understanding of the world within a dehumanizing social context (dehumanizing of themselves and of Others); therefore they were not aware, they could not see, that their actions were in contradiction to fundamental morals regarding the treatment of people as human beings for their actions were in accord with their maintaining their identities within the group, which it may be said quite broadly meant their having power-over people.
TO CONCLUDE:
In concluding the theory of dehumanization I spoke of "hope for the future" as regards the possibilities and probabilities of lessening or precluding dehumanization. It was evident, given the effects of enlightenment that would come with an increased understanding of dehumanization, that there were possibilities of lessening this paradox of human interaction. Such a conclusion was of course drawn from a theoretical perspective. However, when dehumanization is examined in more concrete terms as in the Case Studies, there seems in fact and reality to be little hope of lessening and precluding dehumanization from our world.

Most people today assume that great progress has been made in our social relations - the way we treat each other. People express horror, anger and sadness at cases of blatant inhumane treatment of others: but it need be remembered that in the Case Studies there were occasions in which given the existent social context, the dehumanizers could be considered by themselves and by others at the time, to be treating the victims of their dehumanization in a humane fashion. In other words, the dehumanization that was obvious when examined from an assumed enlightened perspective, could not be seen by those involved. Therefore it may be suggested that although many things have changed for the better some things are clearly worse, as evidenced by our increasing capacity for mass-scale dehumanization. Regardless of what some may consider to be improved social relations, that which has not significantly changed is a fundamental blindness and lack of awareness of our own and our nation's dehumanizing actions. How often do we still
treat people from different groups and people within our own
group as less than our moral equals?

Given the fact that our civilizations are structured
hierarchically and that hierarchical social relations are
irreconcilable with treating people as moral equals, then it may
be said that we are living in and perpetuating a dehumanizing
social environment. Like our forbears, we too may be blind to how
we treat people as being less than human. It would seem that to
get rid of dehumanization we need to quite literally get rid of
civilization in its present form, that is to completely change and
restructure our social domain. Given this apparently formidable
requirement, some may think that in reality there is absolutely
no hope for the future. However such a consideration is not
correct because there are possibilities for change.

The most essential and practical step towards a positive
change is beginning to see more clearly the ways in which our
social domains have been structured such that dehumanization
has become an ever-present but unconscious part of our personal
domains. It cannot be denied that what is required is an
extremely daunting and difficult task, but one of the most
practical ways in which we can progress is to continue to develop
an understanding of dehumanization.

When I commenced this work on dehumanization I had a
number of questions, ideas and aims of which I have already
spoken. Now that I have come to a point of completion, I think it
is perhaps an appropriate time to reflect upon those original
questions and aims and consider what has been achieved with this
work and where further studies may progress from this point.
The question to which I have sought an answer virtually since childhood, is why do people treat others inhumanely? Moreover, why do people treat others as less than human which is seemingly in complete contradiction to what most people are taught and how most people believe they should behave? Early in my academic search for an answer I examined the phenomena of prejudice, racism and stigmatization. Though social psychology provided what I considered the fundamental and most relevant work on the issue of people's inhumane treatment of other people, the work seemed to only approximate an appropriate answer. The problem was far more dynamic.

Part 1 of this work presents the conceptual clarification that was required before an adequate understanding of people's treatment of others as less than human could even begin to be developed. I found that dehumanization was the concept which most accurately portrayed the paradoxical dynamics of this social phenomenon.

Once conceptual clarification had been achieved, it was then possible to begin to develop a theory to provide adequate understanding and insight to the phenomenon of dehumanization. Part 2 of this work shows the process for achieving that aim. The initial step was to establish the desiderata for an adequate theory of dehumanization. In other words, what the theory was required to explain. These desiderata were presented in Chapter 3. In particular, it was found that a theory would need to account for the different dimensions of the problem, that is dehumanization between groups and within groups. Furthermore, because of the dynamics of the phenomenon between and within
groups, the theory would need to provide understanding of the attraction and maintenance of dehumanization. What is more, the theory would need to indicate ways in which dehumanization may be lessened and precluded from human interactions. Apart from these desiderata that specifically referred to a theory of dehumanization, it was also suggested in Chapter 3 that given the understanding of what it means to be a human being and the functioning of humane relationships, the most appropriate explanatory principle upon which to base a theory of dehumanization would be a model of an ideal-typical humanizing environment. In such an environment people would be conceived as having the capacity for agency within the context of enabling and constraining internal and external structures. Moreover, one of the reasons for constructing such a model was to make it possible to identify where given social environments depart from the ideal-type.

Having identified these desiderata for an adequate theory of dehumanization, I found that the psychological literature did not provide an established model to function as the explanatory principle of such a theory. Most psychological literature is based on the explanatory principle of causalism and given the concept of human agency is fundamental to understanding human interaction, it became evident there were no clear models upon which to base a theory of dehumanization for the concept of human agency is in direct opposition to the basic premises of causalism. Therefore so as to develop an adequate understanding of this paradoxical phenomenon, it was necessary to form a model of an ideal-typical humanizing environment which was presented
in Chapter 4. Completion of this task meant it was then possible to develop a theory of dehumanization.

The question which initiated my study of social psychology was why do people treat others inhumanely? The question to which I sought an answer in this work was why do people dehumanize other people? The subsequent theory of dehumanization presented in Chapter 5 is for me, an answer to both these questions. Even if some people disagree with the theory, it may be said that given I have developed a possible answer to my questions, I have achieved that which I had originally set out to do: to increase understanding of the paradox of human interaction. However, like my ideas and analytical and theorizing capabilities, although the question had remained the same, some of my aims developed and changed.

As I gradually formed an understanding of dehumanization I came to realize that finding an answer, developing a theory, was really only part of the problem for it is important that the theory can be and is tested, and the suggestions for lessening and precluding dehumanization in social interactions be put into practise. In Part 3 of this work I commenced such a process through examining three Case Studies which were presented as different examples of dehumanization.

In applying the theory to the genocide of Australia's Tasmanian Aborigines, the life of Joseph Merrick - "The Elephant Man", and to sanctioned massacres as an effect of war, it was possible to come to a new understanding of these concrete examples of dehumanization. Furthermore, through examining these Case Studies it became evident that what is required for
there to be a lessening of dehumanization is for people to adopt a different perspective of looking at their own social situations. The Case Studies showed that people's beliefs about how they should behave can blind them as to the actuality of their actions. Moreover, though we may assume we have improved upon dehumanizing relationships of the past, we may ourselves be blind to the ways in which dehumanization has become an ever-present part of our interactions. As such, it may be said that the conclusion of *Dehumanization: Understanding the Paradox of Human Interaction* is by its very nature not complete, because it is as yet not possible to present specific prescriptions for lessening dehumanization.

To lessen dehumanization it is necessary for people to be able to see and recognize the dehumanization within their own social and personal domains. People need to become aware of dehumanization, to become sensitized to recognizing dehumanizing social conditions and interactions. The theory of dehumanization can act as a sensitizing device given that the theory provides understanding and insight into how human interactions and environments can be dehumanizing. Furthermore, once people have come to an explicit awareness and understanding of dehumanization, the model of an ideal-typical humanizing environment may function as the guide for the direction and ways of change.

My hope for the future, whether it be considered realistic or otherwise, is that given people are capable of being agents, and that such work as my own functions as a sensitizing device and has enlightenment effects, that social conditions will gradually
yet inexorably be changed through people's collective actions; for it is through the collective actions of people that we may move ever closer to being able to live in a humane way in a humane world. The closer we move toward living in accord with our beliefs as to how we should treat each other, the closer we will move to achieving our potential for joy - that is, the respect and acceptance of people's expression of their humanity. Yet we must not be fooled into thinking that the attractiveness of such aims will be sufficient to instigate a process of change; I refer again to the words of Popper (1945b): "To tell men they are equal has a certain sentimental appeal. But this appeal is small compared with that made by a propaganda that tells them that they are superior, and that others are inferior to them" (p.96). Therefore, though the task of lessening and precluding dehumanization from our world in reality is enormous, it is not necessarily impossible.
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