Recent writing on West Irian has described the cultural dynamics of the present conflict (Sharp, 1977) and the social origins and political development of the freedom movement (Savage 1978a, 1978b). This article describes, from the limited data available, the size and spread of the Free Papua Movement, and attempts to give some indication of the ferocity of Indonesian counter-insurgency measures.

Some Australian politicians have been quick to deny that anything of consequence is occurring in West Irian. Others, along with even fewer of their British and American colleagues, and one or two Australian newspaper editors, have waxed indignant at the impropriety of Indonesian actions in West Irian, with predictable lack of effect. As yet, no (publicly available) evaluation of the seriousness of the movement has been made. Nor has any systematic account been given of the number killed, nor of the destruction of industries and villages. It is the aim of this article to begin to remedy that lack.

Perhaps the first sign to the outside world that trouble, rather more serious than that conveniently described as "tribal fighting", was occurring in West Irian was the appointment early in July 1968, of Brigadier-General Saiwo Edhie as commander of the Province of Irian Jaya. Australian-trained Edhie had played a major role in the 1965 coup, had formerly commanded Indonesia's
elite commandos, and had led the military infiltration of Dutch New Guinea which commenced in July 1965. After one week as Provincial Commander, Edhie had begun to build up the military troop presence. By the second week of July, there were estimated to be 20,000 troops in West Irian (Sydney Morning Herald, July 14, 1968). (1)

Resistance was centred on Manokwari where John Ariks, a former seminarian, and Ludwig Mandatjan, a former officer in the Indonesian army and veteran resistance fighter from World War II, were leading the Arfak people against Indonesian military and administrative personnel. By this time, according to General Maraden Panggabean, resistance was already two years old, and 182 “tribesmen” had been killed (Canberra Times, August 14, 1968). The Indonesians claimed that a further 150-200 people armed with spears, bows and arrows and weapons dating from World War II, were involved in the uprising (Australian, July 19, 1968). By early August the 150-200 poorly armed men were holding down, in the estimate of former Bulletin editor Peter Hastings, (2) one of the three Australian reporters permitted in West Irian to cover the “Act of Free Choice”, six divisions (4,500-4,800) men) (Australian, August 6, 1968). By mid-August, the Indonesians had revised their public estimate of the freedom fighters’ strength; Edhie reported that 9,000 had surrendered, and that another 2,000 remained at large (Mercury, August 23, 1968).

Public estimates of casualties for the 1966-68 period of resistance in Manokwari remain scarce. Nicolaas Jouwe, at that time a leader of one of the 13-15 nationalist factions in West Irian, claimed in February 1969, that 3,000 West Irianese and 576 Indonesians had been killed since 1963.

Mandatjan and a large number of his followers surrendered on January 1, 1969. Resistance appeared to be spreading despite Mandatjan’s surrender, and was reported still widespread in the area in July 1969, led by Mandatjan’s second-in-command, Fritz Awom. One observer placed the strength of the freedom fighters at the time of Mandatjan’s surrender at 10,000, a significant number of a population estimated at 800,000 (Bulletin, May 17, 1969). By the middle of 1969, resistance to the Indonesians appeared to be “spontaneous and geographically spread” and had included since 1964 unrest in most urban areas (Sunday Times, May 11, 1969).

Early in 1969, resistance had emerged on Biak Island, an area which had a long tradition of indigenous participation in government through local government and district councils and in the highlands, an area in which foreign incursions had been very limited. In May 1969, freedom fighters closed down five airfields in the central highlands, in an insurrection centred on Enaratoli near the Wissell Lakes (Courier-Mail, May 13, 1969). The Indonesians claimed that only forty people were involved in the uprising and denied “unconfirmed reports” that 600 people had been killed (Canberra Times, May 19, 1969). By August, the situation in Enaratoli was “growing worse”, the freedom fighters numbering an estimated 4,000 including thirty-five policemen armed with carbines and at least one bren gun (Australian, August 21, 1969). The movement leaders requested the withdrawal of Indonesian personnel from the Paniai Province so that the people could exercise their “free choice” without pressure.

Resistance was also crushed by detention. Prior to the “Act of Free Choice” there were “several hundred” political detainees in West Irian, “most of whom advocated Papuan Nationalism” (West Australian, August 18, 1968). These detainees included the Governor of West Irian, Elizer Bonay, who was imprisoned and replaced by Franz Kaisiepo, for allegedly being sympathetic with the freedom movement. (3)

As resistance intensified so the number of people fleeing to the eastern side of the island, administered by Australia, grew steadily throughout 1968 and skyrocketed in 1969. In December 1968. about a thousand West Irianese nationalists were living in “refugee villages” bordering the West Sepik District of Australian New Guinea (South Pacific Post, December 6, 1968). Later, two hundred were granted “permissive residence” in Australian New Guinea, but 1,000 applicants were refused. Freedom fighters claimed that refugees were being “chased away like animals” by Australian patrol officers, and a number of refugees turned back by them were killed by Indonesians. (4)

Despite this, 80 more fled in June, and in
July, 380 refugees crossed into the Bosset area of Western Province (Post-Courier, August 20, 1969). By the end of October, the Post-Courier estimated that there were 306 permissive residents and 1,168 refugees without permissive residence in the Territory. The Mercury (October 31, 1969) claimed that there were more than 1,500 refugees in the Territory and Hastings, writing in the Australian (October 31, 1969), estimated that 4,000 refugees had crossed since 1963, 1,700 of them crossing between January and August 1969.

As criticism mounted in the Australian press, and leading Papuan and New Guinea politicians such as Ebia Olewale (South Pacific Post, May 28, 1969) and Michael Somare (South Pacific Post, December 6, 1968) (see also National Times, February 23-28. 1976) began to add their voices to the growing tide of concern, Indonesian incursions over the border into Australian territory began to occur. Towards the end of April 1969, the Indonesians attacked a refugee camp on the West Irian side of the border, chasing the occupants across the border into the Patrol Post of Watung, where they fired on the Assistant District officer and his two assistants, who all promptly also fled). The Administration despatched 53 policemen and some army personnel to the border, but on May 15, Indonesian soldiers attacked and shot up a refugee village of 250 refugees twelve miles inside the border (South Pacific Post, May 28, 1969). This was followed less than two weeks later by an attack on an Australian Administration Patrol six miles inside the border. Four West Irianese carriers were killed (Australian, June 6, 1969). The Australian Administration’s response to this provocation was to attempt to “desensitise” the border area. A refugee camp was established on Manus Island, and the refugees were gradually shipped out.

With the withdrawal of the foreign press after the “Act of Free Choice” little was heard of the freedom movement until early in 1976 when the Indonesians, perhaps because of the situation in East Timor, made a concerted effort to smash the freedom fighters once and for all. The resistance movement had been reasonably active politically in the intervening years, formally declaring independence on July 1, 1971, and establishing a Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) containing both interior and exterior elements. It was the PRG’s Foreign Minister in Dakar, Senegal, Ben Tanggahma, who broke the news of the heavy offensive in January and February 1976. Tanggahma claimed that the Indonesian airforce and 16,000 Indonesian troops were involved in a massive operation carried on close to the PNG border in the south-eastern corner of the Jayapura Province. 1,605 villagers were reported killed. Le Monde (March 18-24, 1976) which covered the Dakar report noted “the fact that the names of prisoners were published makes one think that the engagements did take place”. Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, suggested that the PRG “could be remnants of a rebel group from the South Moluccas” (Post-Courier, February 19, 1976), and towards the end of the month an Indonesian military spokesman claimed “... that it is well known that the Irianese rebels are finished”.

In mid-1976 the freedom movement was again declared finished. Brigadier Imam Munander, Commander of the Province of Irian Jaya, announced that twenty members of the OPM (Organasi Papua Merdeka — Free Papua Movement) had surrendered and that 50 more had crossed in Papua New Guinea. Munander said that the movement was “reduced to scattered remnants and did not constitute a military threat” (Post-Courier, July 13, 1976). By January the following year, Munander reported that “1,400 rebels and their followers had given themselves up” during 1976 (Post-Courier, January 10, 1977). The Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott, inspected the border area in the same month and reported “that all was quiet” and that there were “not more than twenty rebels” left. Resistance, however, continued in the cities and most noticeably in the central highlands.

Early in March, 30 West Irianese students were dismissed from the University of Cenderawasih after boycotting classes protesting the “indonesianisation” of courses (Socialist Action, April 8, 1977; Pacific Islands Monthly, June 1977), and tensions mounted as the Indonesian elections approached. April saw an attack on a police patrol post in the Baliem Valley leaving fifteen Indonesian police dead (Tribune, May 18, 1977). It was announced
shortly after that the parliamentary elections had been postponed indefinitely in some inland areas “for security reasons” (Post-Courier, May 20, 1977). What these security reasons were became clearer later in the month. Early in April, fighting had broken out in Arso, 18 kms. south of the capital Jayapura, and in Paget, 112 kms. to the south-west. Later in the month, fighting erupted in the central highlands at Kabokma, Pyramid, Wamemna, Magi, Kelila, and Maki (Canberra Times, May 28, 1977). Risings also occurred closer to Jayapura in Magio, Epmy, Skotiaho, Waris and Namola. The PRG claimed 15,000 highlanders were involved in the actions, with another 2,000 people involved in anti-Indonesian activities in Merauke (Tribune, June 22, 1977). During the month of May “the Baliem Valley was flowing with bodies and for six weeks many local people lost their appetite for fish” according to the Indonesian newspaper Kompass (Sydney Morning Herald, December 2, 1977). Denis Reinhardt who visited West Irian in August for the Nation Review reported further risings in the highlands in June, at Kelila, Bokondini and Wamena. Reinhardt noted that “half the villages in the Baliem Valley had been burned to the ground” (Nation Review, September 15-21, 1977).

Fighting continued throughout the year, particularly in the central highlands. “Intelligence sources” claimed in October that the freedom fighters controlled six districts encompassing seventy villages (Melbourne Herald, October 19, 1977), and even in December, eight months after the first disturbances in the highlands, Bokondini and Kelila were still critical. Uprisings also occurred toward the end of the year in Manokwari. The Indonesians transferred a battalion of the Dipenogora Division from East Timor to deal with the increasing unrest (Sydney Morning Herald, December 11, 1977).

Both sides claim that the number of Irianese who have died in the highlands rebellion has been substantial. Indonesian officials informed Reinhardt that 800-900 “rebels” had been killed in the highlands between April and August (Nation Review, September 15-21, 1977). Jacob Prai, until recently the leader of the main interior faction of the freedom movement, claimed in October that 198 freedom fighters had been killed in the fighting around Wamena and that two thousand villagers had died (Bulletin, November 12, 1977). Indonesian casualties remain undisclosed, with Prai claiming “several hundred” Indonesian troops dead.

By any standards and on the admission of both sides, the slaughter has been considerable. The foreign press, however, gave more attention in 1977 to two rather more spectacular events, the downing of an RAAF helicopter and the closing down of one of the largest copper mines in the world.

On July 29, an Australian helicopter crashed in West Irian killing the pilot, one of the Australian military personnel in West Irian engaged in mapping the Province for the Indonesian government. The 145 Australian soldiers were made up of 2 Field Survey Squadron assisted by elements of 2 Squadron (Canberra), 9 Squadron (Iroquois), 38 Squadron (Caribou), the Air Transportable Telecommunications Unit, 36 and 37 Squadrons (Hercules) (RAAF News, September 1977). A very large amount of extremely sophisticated material was involved in the mapping operation. Eighteen
Hercules sorties and one Navy LCH were required to position the requisite stores at the old US airforce base on Biak Island. Less than two weeks after the helicopter crash, a RAAF Pilatus Porter was hit at Warok, 50 kms north of Wamena in the Baliem Valley. The Defence Minister denied claims that these events were attributable to the activity of the freedom fighters. The Iroquois crashed, he said, through a combination of bad weather and altitude, and the shell that holed the plane came from sources unknown. Shortly after these two incidents, the Australian contingent was withdrawn, returning only in March 1978 (Adelaide Advertiser, August 7; 15, 1977).

The Sydney Morning Herald correspondent in Jakarta reported on August 13 that a series of explosions on July 23 had damaged the installations of the US-owned Freeport copper mine at Mt. Ertzberg in the Carstenz Range in the province of Fakfak. Extensive exploration of the rich ore body had begun in 1967, and the deposit was estimated to contain 30 million tonnes of high grade ore. Construction took place between 1970-72 at the cost of US $160 million. The Amume people (who form part of the Damal population) received compensation only for food gardens directly disrupted by the mine's activity. The people of Waa village, close to the proposed town site were the only group thus affected and were accorded minor compensation. In December 1972, the first cargo of concentrate was shipped to Japan, and the mine was officially opened by President Suharto in March 1973 (R. Mitton, 1977: 365-371).

The full extent of the damage inflicted in July 1977 was revealed by Nation Review reporter Reinhardt in the second week of September. The July blasts had caused more than A $1 million worth of damage, and the export of copper concentrate worth A $7.7 million per month was still being held up in September by the continual sabotage of the 10 cm. diameter concentrate pipeline running 120 kms. from the crushing mill to the port of Amamapere. Three settlements close to the mine, the squatter settlements at Tembagapura (“Copper Town”), the village at Waa and the village at Timika, were levelled to the ground by Indonesian troops following the sabotage. The Indonesian military had been using Freeport's jet airstrip at Timika to bomb and strafe Ilaga and Akimuga in the highlands.

Resistance in the highlands appears to have continued at least until the end of 1977, and possibly into 1978. Kompas reported on November 28 that parts of the Baliem Valley had still not returned to Indonesian control, and “informed sources” in Jakarta claimed 200 villagers killed in an army sweep through the Baliem starting in December. All in all, 20,000 people are said to have been affected by the highland uprisings (Melbourne Age, April 25, 1978). The Indonesians also reported significant defection by West Irianese freedom fighters. Defence Minister General Maraden Panggabean claimed that 750 “rebels” and their families had given themselves up at Urania village in the central highlands and had admitted to the Indonesian authorities that they had been “deceived by separatist elements” (Post-Courier, February 13, 1978).

Heavy fighting erupted along the border following the kidnapping of seven senior military and administrative officials by West Irianese guerrillas in May 1978. For the first time Papua New Guinean troops were sent to the border “to arrest or assist in the arrest of an OPM supporters they encounter; and to attempt to free the hostages if possible” (Melbourne Age, June 13, 1978). Papua New Guinean police and military strength on the border peaked at about 500 in June (Post-Courier, June 21, 1978). The border operation, utilising five Bronco OV-10 counter-insurgency aircraft and six helicopters, involved, OPM sources claimed, 15,000 Indonesian troops. The Indonesians admitted to have 700-800 men in action on the border, with 3,000 on standby in Jayapura (Post-Courier, July 7, 1978; Melbourne Age, August 15, 1978; Sydney Morning Herald, July 29, 1978). No estimates have been made of the number of casualties incurred by the border operation, but at least one hundred West Irianese were killed (Melbourne Age, August 31, 1978). It is likely that the death-toll among West Irianese was high, and that in the short-term the Indonesians succeeded in their objective of routing the guerrillas and punishing those who supported them, for at the end of September, Jacob Prai and Otto Ondowame, the two most senior leaders in the largest guerrilla group, were arrested in Papua New Guinea by PNG police while waiting to meet
with Prime Minister Somare who was attending a cabinet meeting being held at the border town of Vanimo.

Since the arrest of Prai and Ondowame, guerrilla activity has declined along the border. A number of estimates of the OPM strength prior to the June-August Indonesian offensive, are available. The Indonesian ambassador to Papua New Guinea, Brigadier-General Roedjito, estimated their strength at 1,800, two hundred more than Australian intelligence in Port Moresby (Nation Review, September 1-7, 1977). This tallies closely with the figure of 2,000 supplied by Jacob Prai himself (Melbourne Age, April 27, 1978), and the 1,800 of the Australian Foreign Affairs Department (Melbourne Age, April 24, 1978).

As the struggle escalated, Indonesian, Australian and Papua New Guinean public estimates of the number of West Irianese under arms, fell. Indonesian estimates dropped by 100-150 (Sydney Morning Herald, July 29; September 27, 1978), Australian and Papua New Guinean to 200 (Australian, June 13, 1978).

One thing is clear, the resistance was geographically widespread, and what is surprising in a country where ethnic divisions are so strong, the guerrillas in a particular unit seem to have come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds (Geoff Herriot, A.M., ABC Radio, April 24, 1978). In terms of casualties, Jacob Prai claimed that 5,000 West Irianese and 3,500 Indonesians had died between 1976-78. A "senior P.N.G. security official" suggested that the true death-toll may be even higher than 9,000 (Geoff Herriot, ABC Radio News, April 24, 1978). Australian military personnel involved in the border mapping operation complained of "indiscriminate shooting of the local population". The soldiers, from a service not generally noted for a tradition of humanitarianism, claimed that Indonesian troops were "gun happy" and that it was common practice for Indonesian troops "to jump from helicopters or transport planes outside villages and open up with automatic weapons fire in every direction". The disquiet of the Australian troops was expressed overtly in a stoppage held to discuss whether or not the mapping team should continue to co-operate with their Indonesian counterparts (Australian Financial Review, July 25, 1978). Nicolaas Jouwe, presently leading a small faction of West Irianese emigres in Holland, claimed that "leaders of the underground movements in West Papua New Guinea estimate that Indonesian forces have eliminated more than 155,000 Melanesians" between May 1963 and May 1977 (Pacific Islands Monthly, April 1978).

The Indonesian "scorched earth" reprisals in the Baliem Valley brought in their wake a flood of refugees across the Papua New Guinea border. About 290 refugees crossed in the second week of May, from Irambi village into the Western Province about 250 kms. north-west of Daru. A further 200 crossed soon after from Pou village into Wawol village in the Western Province. A further 200 may have crossed in the last week of May (Post-Courier, May 20, 25, 31, 1977). The significance of the May crossings lies not only in that a large number (540-740) crossed in such a short period of time (less than one month), but in the distance travelled by the refugees from the Baliem Valley to the border, through some of the most inhospitable country in the world.

The June-August 1978 Indonesian offensive, which was carried out right on (and sometimes across) the border caused an even larger number of refugees. In the first week of July about 400 refugees crossed into the West Sepik Province. A large number of them were from Waris and Kenandega, two villages close to the border which had been subject to ground and air attacks (Post-Courier, July 11, 12, 1978). The attacks on Waris and Kenandega had begun with strafing by Indonesian aircraft. Troops had subsequently moved in, burned down houses and uprooted gardens. As the people fled, they were fired on by Indonesian troops (Melbourne Age, July 26, 1978). By the third week of July, the number of refugees had risen to 650 with an additional 350 reportedly on the way. The head of the Papua New Guinea medical team treating the refugees reported that more than half of them were children under five, and virtually all of them had become sick in the trek to the border. Many of the children were suffering from malnutrition as well as malaria, tropical ulcers, scabies, pneumonia and grille (a skin fungus) (Melbourne Age, July 26, 1978).

This influx of refugees placed a heavy strain on existing refugee-coping
institutions, and in August the United Nations High Commission for Refugees contributed US $100,000 for the construction of a camp at Oksapmin in the West Sepik Province, 145 kms. east of the border (Post-Courier, August 23, 1978). By October, Prime Minister Michael Somare claimed that refugees were costing his government K2,000 per day (Nation Review, October 6-12, 1978).

As with the Indonesian offensives of almost a decade before, the 1977 and 1978 clashes involved the violation of Papua New Guinean sovereignty by the Indonesian military. The first major violations occurred at the end of May 1977, when Indonesian soldiers crossed into the West Sepik and entered the village of Wainda, 5 kms. from the border. A Papua New Guinean villager was killed in the incident (Post-Courier, May 30, 1977).

The Indonesians again crossed about 5 kms. into the West Sepik Province on July 17, 1978. This time about 100 infantry soldiers occupied Mamabra village, about 50 kms. south of the north coast. The same day a helicopter landed in Amanab, 20 kms. from the border (Melbourne Age, June 22, 23, 1978). The P.N.G. Defence Force rushed a contingent of 100 men to the Kamberatoro area (around Mamabra village) on June 21. The Indonesian troops withdrew on the 21st or 22nd (Post-Courier, June 22, 23, 1978; Melbourne Age, June 23, 1978).

In July the Indonesians commenced bombing raids along the border. Despite a request from the P.N.G. government that the Indonesians restrict their bombing to within five miles of the border, reports reached Port Moresby that Indonesian aircraft had bombed the area around New Sekoutiaho village, 5 kms. inside the border. 200 Indonesian troops are reported to have crossed following the bombing (Post-Courier, July 7, 1978).

On July 29, the Indonesian ambassador explained over the national radio in Papua New Guinea that (presumably in June) Indonesian troops had “mistakenly landed at the Seram area ..... due to bad weather conditions” (Melbourne Age, July 21, 1978). One week later, an eyewitness report appeared as a letter to the editor of the Post-Courier written by “a pure citizen of Papua New Guinea ..... to say that this (what the...
Indonesian ambassador had admitted) is not true”. The villager who signed the letter claimed that, in perfect weather, the village of Seram was reconnoitred by a small Indonesian helicopter. This was followed by a larger helicopter which in three trips off-loaded 45 soldiers, who pitched six tents and camped in the village for three days, returning across the border on June 17. He claimed that this exercise was watched “from the bush” by Papua New Guinea Defence Force soldiers (*Post-Courier*, July 28, 1978).

On July 17, Indonesian troops again crossed the border and destroyed a village of 10-20 houses variously reported as being 1-4 kms. inside Papua New Guinea. The village of Sawan was in the centre of a sago growing area and was not permanently occupied (*Post-Courier*, July 25; 26, 1978; *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 25, 1978). This report was followed by news of “at least three sightings ..... of unidentified gunboats on the P.N.G. side of the border” (*Post-Courier*, July 25, 1978). Official government concern reached a peak on July 26, when Patrol Officers and government employees near the border were assured by the Prime Minister that their lives and safety were assured, and that “if the worst comes to the worst” they would be advised well in advance and arrangements would be made for them to be removed (*Melbourne Age*, July 26, 1978).

Indonesian activities in the border area continued through August, with the systematic destruction of those villages which were suspected of supplying food to the guerrillas. One report from refugees detailed the total destruction of Wambis village, about 50 kms. on the Indonesian side of the border and the slaughter of all but two of about 100 inhabitants (*Melbourne Age*, August 31, 1978).
Although these limited reports outline a degree of Indonesian intrusion not generally appreciated, it is likely that they understate the extent and brutality of the penetration. An Australian eyewitness resident in the area stated that atrocities were far worse than those reported by the media and the P.N.G. government (Nation Review, August 4-10, 1978).

The peoples of the Pacific greeted the invasion of East Timor with disbelief and apprehension, an attitude not so much appropriate to the events as indicative of a short memory. Seven years previously, in the name of decolonisation and in the interests of "regional stability", West Irian was incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia. That the incorporation proceeded under a thin veil of legality and before the gaze of a powerless and generally indifferent United Nations, did not conceal what subsequent events have made even clearer, West Papuans do not wish to be part of Indonesia.

The tragic history of West Irian has been one of constant betrayal in which the interests of a small Melanesian population have been sacrificed to those of its larger neighbors, proximately Indonesia and Australia and ultimately the United States and Japan. Most recently, Australian-dominated Papua New Guinea has attempted to buy its own security at the expense of those once referred to by its leaders as "our Melanesian brothers". The arrest of Jacob Prai and Otto Ondowame and the subsequent insistence by the P.N.G. government that the duo leave the Pacific area entirely, plus the threats to and intimidation of West Papuans living in P.N.G. are but the latest in a series of cynical acts suffered by West Papuans over the last fifteen years.

The exigencies of "realpolitik" and the weakness of the smaller Pacific nations in the face of its logic, make it clear that in a Pacific dominated by the needs of international capital there can be no such thing as a "Melanesian way" much less a "Pacific way". Pacific Islanders attempts to shape the Pacific are overwhelmingly constrained by the needs of US, Japanese and Australian capital. Capital's prerequisite need is for an untroubled Pacific. Pacific peoples like, perhaps, the Kanaks and Vanuaakuans who may disturb that stability can expect a fate similar to that being suffered by East Timor and West Irian albeit at the hands of a different power. They can also anticipate from the other large Pacific powers the same tacit approval, the same wall of silence.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Canberra Times (July 23, 1968), noting that "some estimates put army strength at a much higher figure", settled on a much more conservative estimate of 9,000.
2. Peter Hastings has a long and interesting career involving close connections with Australia's Joint Intelligence Organisation. A close personal friend of Gordon Jockel, former Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and founding father of JIO, Hastings was initiated into intelligence in World War II. Not only has Hastings taken a keen interest in events in West Irian, but also in pre-independence Papua New Guinea. He has lectured JIO analysts on Timor and other questions at the Defence and Strategic Studies Centre at the Australian National University. Since the Timor invasion, Hastings has visited Papua New Guinea and the Solomons. He had been described as "one of JIO's main advisers" and "something of an intellectual trouble-shooter for JIO". (Freney, 1977: 41.)
3. Bonay crossed the border on August 23, 1979, seeking political asylum from the P.N.G. government. At the time of writing there is no information on whether he will be granted it or not (Sydney Morning Herald, August 30, 1979).
4. Twenty-eight refugees were reported killed in two separate incidents. There were probably others (Courier-Mail, November 20, 1968; South Pacific Post, June 11, 1969).
5. The Post-Courier report and the Melbourne Age report were contradictory, the Post-Courier suggesting that the Defence Force troops were much quicker to the scene and that the Indonesians had crossed into P.N.G. later.

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