Finding Peace Journalism: An analysis of media discourse on Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation from Pakistan

Ayesha Jehangir

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Ayesha Jehangir

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Doctor of Philosophy

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The University of Wollongong
School of the Arts, English and Media

<<March>> <<2021>>
Abstract

Forty years ago, Afghan refugees began streaming into Pakistan, driven by the abuses of the Communist-led regime throughout the 1970s. After the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, an additional 400,000 Afghan refugees crossed borders into the neighbouring Pakistan. In the next 10 years, a massive humanitarian crisis followed and by the end of the war in 1989, some four to five million Afghans had sought refuge in Pakistan alone. The civil war (1989-1996), five years of Taliban rule (1996-2001) and the US ‘war on terror’ (2001-present) further fuelled the refugee crisis in Pakistan. To prove alliance to the US, and partly under political pressure, the Pakistani government launched a crackdown on Afghan refugees and started encouraging them to leave Pakistan and return to their homeland. The Afghan refugee crisis and their forced repatriation to an unprepared and unstable Afghanistan became a new bone of contention between the two countries and a subject of interest for media, who were not only politised but were also used by the State as a propaganda tool. Although the initial coverage of the refugee movement in the 80s and the 90s continued with the government’s optimistic framing of ‘rescuing and helping’ the neighbours, that swiftly changed from 2001-onwards. Pakistani media started to regularly blame Afghan refugees for terrorist attacks in the country and using Pakistan as their safe haven. It became an issue of national security for Pakistan and the media echoed this political stance. In this thesis I undertake a critical analysis of the media coverage of the longest ongoing conflict in the country – the forced repatriation of Afghan refugees – to examine the media framing of the conflict to answer this question: to what extent is it conflict-escalatory or peace journalism? What drives this thesis is a deep concern that the media framing may have escalated the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The roots of this research trace back to my experiences as a war journalist in Afghanistan and Pakistan during 2012-2014, where I witnessed the misrepresentation of Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in reportage affect political relations between the two countries, shape and influence public opinion and create acceptability of stringent government and military action/policy towards Afghan refugees. State and military-induced censorship and control influenced how media report certain conflicts of political importance (Carruthers 2011; Young and Jesser 1997). In my thesis, I study the coverage of the refugee conflict in four major English publications, Dawn and The Express Tribune (daily newspapers), and Newsline and Herald (news and current affairs monthly magazines) in the years 2016–2018 to analyse the presence and extent of conflict de-escalatory journalism. I utilise Johan Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model and Jake Lynch’s analytical criteria, guided by Robert M. Entman’s framing theory, to conduct the critical discourse analysis. An empirical content analysis of news stories and articles serves as the foundation of the critical discourse analysis, which finds media coverage of Afghan refugees in Pakistan to be highly dominated by war and conflict-escalatory framing, conceptualised in this thesis under the non-peace master frame. I also find nationalistic, propaganda, polarising, emotive and ethno-nationalistic language in the coverage. Only Herald demonstrates some traces of peace journalism, however they are weak and non-frequent. Peace journalism focuses on humanising the affected and marginalised groups in a conflict, and highlights peace initiatives and post-war development – if there is any. A peace journalism practice focuses on the reduction and elimination of ethnic differences and emphasises non-violent responses to conflict and war.
My analysis shows that the frequency of including and excluding peace journalism frames in the coverage is relative to the type, sensitivity and intensity of the event that is being reported. The frequency and extent of the use of peace and non-peace frames is also affected by whether the story/article appeared closer to the official repatriation deadline or not. This study argues that excluding peace journalism frames from the coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation may have led to conflict-escalatory reporting, where claims were presented as facts and vice-versa, officials’ propaganda was given credibility, ethno-nationalistic narrative was promoted, and forced repatriation was justified, despite being in violation of the non-refoulement treaty under the UN Convention on Refugees, which Pakistan is also a signatory of. I observe emerging frames in the coverage of the conflict and propose their wider, more frequent incorporation in peace journalism practice in the country/region. This thesis looks at peace journalism with a wider perspective and influence, and argues that peace journalism practice can contribute to de-escalation of a conflict, and promote official accountability and justice delivery to Afghan refugees, and other ethnic and religious minorities.
Acknowledgments

I acknowledge that I started and completed my PhD on the lands of the Dharawal people. They are the Traditional Custodians of the lands on which the University of Wollongong is situated. I pay my respects to Aboriginal Elders past and present, and acknowledge their continued spiritual and cultural connection to Country. I also acknowledge that the sovereignty of their land was never ceded.

I want to thank my son, Chengez, for the boundless patience he carries in this little, most beautiful heart of his. He was born the same year I started my PhD journey, and despite being the only child, he has always had to share my time and attention with my thesis. Che, my world, my happiness, and the light of my eyes! I want to apologise for giving my PhD the attention and love that was all yours. I want to apologise for all the days and nights that I spent on my thesis, when I should have been riding around with you, watching movies together, learning and inventing things, doing your favourite experiments, reading stories to you, and staying in bed cuddling you tightly long after you would go to sleep. I cannot turn back time or fix the things that broke in our lives in the last few years, but I promise to make it up to you. I promise that nothing will consume me again the way this PhD did. I promise to be there more. I promise I will try better. Mommy loves you!

My PhD coincides with the roughest patch in my life, so far – and hopefully stays the roughest (fingers crossed). Migration, childbirth, separation leading to divorce, PTSD – my plate is full. During this time, I was lucky to have the kindest people around me, who had an impact on me and my life in some way. I want to thank them all for their patience, non-judgmental support and most importantly understanding. My parents and siblings (overseas) for always believing in me – not matter what; my former supervisors Dr Sukhmani Khorana and Dr Tanja Dreher for guiding me, and always reassuring me that I am capable; my principal supervisor Dr Lisa Slater, who took over the supervision role in the last year of my candidature when it was all over the place like me; she is certainly the only person who could gear me up to finish my thesis in such a short span of time; my course coordinators from UOW, the University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales for giving me tutoring and research opportunities that helped me grow as an early career academic, and also survive financially as a single parent; my dearest friend and fellow HDR Nadia Al Esi for sticking with me through my highs and lows and for always listening to my endless talks; and to Abdullah Baheer – the man who showed me what true love can feel like. You have helped me restore my self-confidence and self-worth. Thank you for coming into my life (though, on a roller-coaster).

Lastly, I dedicate my thesis to all the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, past and present. I acknowledge your suffering and exploitation at the hands of the Pakistani government, the Pakistan Army, and other law enforcement agencies. May you all find peace, and home.
Certification

I, Ayesha Jehangir (formerly Ayesha Hasan), declare that this thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the conferral of the degree Doctor of Philosophy, from the University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. This document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

Ayesha Jehangir
31st March 2021
## List of Names or Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Af-Pak</td>
<td>Afghanistan–Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APAPS</td>
<td>Afghanistan–Pakistan Action Plan for Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>Army Public School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEJ</td>
<td>Center for Excellence in Journalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>Computerised National Identity Cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPJ</td>
<td>Committee to Protect Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTD</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECL</td>
<td>Exit Control List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERDT</td>
<td>Easement Rights of Divided Tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET</td>
<td>The Express Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOA</td>
<td>Heart of Asia Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMFD</td>
<td>Media Matters for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADRA</td>
<td>National Database Registration Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCOC</td>
<td>Peace/Conflict Oriented Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEOC</td>
<td>People/Elite Oriented Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoR</td>
<td>Proof of Registration</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SVOC</td>
<td>Solutions/Victory Oriented Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPOC</td>
<td>Truth/Propaganda Oriented Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
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Educate yourself, learn about what refugees face when they don't have homes, after they have lost everything.

- Khaled Hosseini (Former refugee, Afghan-American novelist, physician, humanitarian)
Chapter 1
Peace journalism – from idea to practice

1.1 Introduction

Forty years ago, Afghan refugees began streaming into Pakistan, driven by the abuses of the Communist-led regime throughout the 1970s. By the end of that decade, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, more than 400,000 refugees had crossed borders into neighbouring Pakistan, and some to other regional countries such as Iran and India. In the next 10 years, a massive humanitarian crisis followed and by the end of the war in 1988 some four to five million Afghans had sought refuge in Pakistan alone. During this period, Afghans were welcomed in Pakistan through the fluid border, known as the Durand Line, mainly due to Pakistan’s interest in gaining and holding political and military influence in Afghanistan. The Soviet–Afghan war ended in 1989 with the Soviets defeated and ousted, followed by a civil war (1989–1996) between the Afghan government and the rebels. In 1996, Taliban rule started and lasted for the next five years, backed and facilitated by the Pakistani military. The political unrest led to new waves of Afghan refugee migration to as far as Europe but primarily to Pakistan—making Pakistan the largest host of Afghan refugees in the world. According to Amnesty International, there are more than 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees and another one million unregistered Afghans in Pakistan as of 2019.

Post 2001, with the US invasion of Afghanistan and its increasing pressures on Pakistan to fight terrorism (Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban), the Pakistani State’s stance on hosting Afghan refugees also radically changed. To prove to their allegiance to the US in their ‘War on Terror’ (2001–present), the Pakistani government launched a crackdown on Afghan refugees and started encouraging them to leave Pakistan and return to their homeland. One of the steps the government took to put pressure on the Afghan government and the refugees to expedite repatriation was to restrict refugee documentation. Since 2001, any Afghan seeking refuge in Pakistan was classified as an undocumented migrant and not a refugee. The main aim behind this was to encourage voluntary repatriation back to Afghanistan. However, after pressure and assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Pakistani authorities conducted the first and only registration of Afghan refugees, a process that lasted from late 2006 to early 2007. About 2.15 million Afghans, who had previously received a legal status of “Afghan citizen temporarily residing in Pakistan” were issued with Proof of Registration (PoR) cards (Human Rights Watch 2017). With this, Afghan refugees suddenly became a dominant component of the crisis narrative in Pakistani politics as well as the media. To justify their policy and crackdown, the Pakistani government claimed that the Afghan government was supporting terrorists who infiltrated into Pakistan disguised as refugees. The Pakistani government also upheld the stance that since Afghan refugees did not have loyalty with the Pakistani government or its people, they were more likely to pose a threat to the national security.

1 The Durand Line is a 1,640-mile international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was created in the 19th century, when Pakistan was a British colony and part of the greater Indian subcontinent. The border was imposed by the British to strengthen their control over the northern parts of India. It was signed between Sir Mortimer Durand, the Indian Foreign Secretary at the time, and Afghanistan’s Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. The border runs through the Pashtun territory, dividing it into two—half on the Afghan side and the other half on Pakistani side.
of the country. All eyes were now on Afghan refugees, including those who were born and raised in Pakistan. Undocumented, traumatised by war and conflict, displaced and helpless, the refugees were now being forced by the State and harassed by police and other law enforcement agencies to pack up and leave – immediately.

During a conflict, a government’s foreign policies can become controversial. To make these policies more acceptable to the public and minimise criticism or insurgence, the State will use the media as a potentially powerful ally and capitalise on the power of the press to rally mass publics. If the media present an obstacle in State policies, the government will consider keeping the media narrative under control and even impose strict censorship through legislation. In Pakistan’s case, the already nationalistic media were very easily politicised amid the ongoing political chaos between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Taliban, cross-border terrorism and India’s involvement in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) relations. The Afghan refugee crisis and their forced repatriation to an unprepared and instable Afghanistan became a new bone of contention between the two countries and a subject of interest for the media, who not only became politicised but were also used for State propaganda. I would also argue here that the media saw the crisis coverage as a long-term investment in the human emotions of nationalism and regional neighbour rivalry – sentiments that are quite prevalent among Pakistani citizens. Though the initial coverage of the refugee movement in the ‘80s and ‘90s mirrored the government’s optimistic framing of “rescuing and helping” the neighbours, that changed swiftly from 2001 onwards. Despite receiving foreign aid to host refugees, such as from UNHCR, Pakistani media presented a picture of weak economic conditions where Afghan refugees were becoming harder to host. The media echoed the State policy and stance, and also accused the Afghan government of deliberately not taking any responsibility for its own people and refuted its claims of political/economic instability and national security challenges in the country. The 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted a renewed media interest in Afghan refugees (Wright 2002) and Afghanistan. Their images and representations as terrorists were circulating more frequently in the global media. In Pakistan, the media were also regularly blaming Afghan refugees for terrorist attacks in the country (Alimia 2019) and for using Pakistan as their safe haven. In addition to being viewed as an economic burden, Afghan refugees were now largely also represented and labelled as terrorists. The negative representation of Afghan refugees in the Pakistani media furthered after a terrorist attack on Army Public School in Peshawar in 2014, in which over 100 school children were fatally shot. The Pakistani government held Afghan terrorists responsible for the massacre, and this escalated the conflict between the two neighbours. As the nation mourned the death of over 100 young children, and the State launched an anti-Afghan refugee crackdown across the country. The media had clearly started taking a highly conflict-escalatory approach in its coverage. All this triggered antagonism and hate among Pakistani citizens for the refugees and the Afghan government.

There is no shortage of evidence for a conflict-escalatory approach in Pakistani media (see for example: Hussain, Siraj and Mahmood 2019; Hussain 2020; Iqbal and Hussain 2017; Sadiq and Hassan 2017). Studies on Pakistani media coverage of internal and regional conflicts have indicated significant variations vis-à-vis the intensity of conflict-escalatory journalism and dominant patterns of war journalism across electronic and print media. In most cases, as the studies suggest, such practice in media coverage further fuelled and escalated the conflict. This made a stronger case for analysing and identifying areas of intervention for Peace
journalism in Pakistan. For their coverage of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the Urdu and English language media are alike in their apathetic and deleterious representation of refugees and the Afghan government. This has not only added to the plight of the refugees, but also harmed the peace process between the two countries, which share mutual hostility towards each other.

Noting such significant impacts on politics and conflicts, I began wanting to understand media framing. My thesis, therefore, revolves around two central questions: 1) how are Pakistani media framing Afghan refugees and their repatriation? And 2) are they employing peace journalism in their coverage? Throughout this thesis, I want to better understand the role of peace journalism as a counter-approach to conflict-escalatory and war journalism, and if/how it can change the (negative) image of Afghan refugees. I intend to explore emerging frames in the spectrum of peace journalism indicators, especially those that are idiosyncratically contextual to refugee conflicts such as in Pakistan and Afghanistan. I also intend to analyse the interpretative repertoire – the group of words that indicate the tone or theme in a text – in the discourse, which if generated through a conflict de-escalatory approach can develop an understanding and acknowledgement of the crisis, and empathy and a sense of justice delivery among the readers towards the marginalised group (in this case, Afghan refugees). Through an analytical evaluation of the coverage of the Afghan refugee crisis and repatriation from Pakistan, I explore the framing dynamics employed in the media discourse by the seemingly progressive English-language media. I also wanted to identify the inflammatory interpretative repertoire incorporated in media texts that generates a frame/theme that hinders peace journalism practice. Through my analyses, my thesis aims at broadening the perspective on the practical implications of peace journalism and understanding why Pakistani media are so inflammatory and escalatory – if they are – in their coverage of Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation.

I also wanted to understand if media coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation was solely grounded in the notion of conflict as a news value, an aspect Lee and Maslog (2005) explored in their study of media coverage of conflicts. They argue that presenting a conflict through its identification as the ‘other’ side or the home side makes conflict a news value, since people’s sentiment of nationalism and patriotism increases during a conflict or war. This led me to wonder: what role does nationalism play in coverage of a specific conflict? Reading Knightley’s (2000) work made clear this characterisation for me. He explains that this characterisation of sides is an identification of military triumphalist language, an action orientation and a superficial narrative with little context, background, or historical perspective. Over time, scholars have found traditional/conventional ways of reporting a conflict as problematic and destructive, and have urged for contemporary ways of reporting that promote peace and stability. They have nullified the concept of objective, factual reporting. In such traditional war/conflict reporting, “factual reporting … is a chimera” (Lee & Maslog 2005, p. 312). More scholars (See for example: Carruthers 2000; Iggers 1998; Knightley 1975; Van Ginneken 1998) have argued that the ingredients of war – patriotism, national interest, anger, censorship and propaganda – have often conspired to prevent de-escalatory reporting. Pedelty (1995), for instance, specifically showed how institutional influences shaped the reporting of the civil war in El Salvador in the 1980s by comparing two reports about the shooting down of an American military helicopter. There needed to be a better way to report conflicts and war – for many scholars, peace journalism
was the answer, even though the critics of peace journalism associate notions of attachment and advocacy to it. In the last 30 years, exceptional progress has been made in peace journalism scholarship. However, little of this has been in non-Western conflicts covered by local media.

1.2 Why Peace journalism matters

By peace we mean the capacity to transform conflicts with empathy, without violence and creatively – a never-ending process: Professor Johan Galtung

In October 2012, 11 Pakistani journalists travelled to Afghanistan from Pakistan on a journalism exchange programme amid high security threats. Two weeks later, three of them were invited to be part of a talk show that was broadcast live on a private Afghan television channel. That night after the show, the three Pakistani journalists were labelled, by the local media and those who commented on the show after watching it online, as “Pakistani spies”, increasing the threats to their lives. Some even said, “Send them back to ‘porkistan’”, referring to them as pigs – an animal seen with high disgust in Islam, the country’s predominant religion. Those three journalists had to leave the country within 48 hours. Six hours after they took off from the Kabul airport, the place was struck with a bomb blast, apparently to target the Pakistani journalists. I was one of them. During our time in Afghanistan, we worked on stories ranging from the ongoing conflict between the Taliban and the government, to internal and regional political instability, and the socio-economic warfare over Afghan trade deals with India and Pakistan. Some of us also wrote about women, children and food. Most wrote about war, bloodshed, and the presence of NATO and other international forces in the country. Some also highlighted the ongoing political conflict and differences between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some of them took sides. But no one wrote about peace.

The role of journalists, editors and media organisations as propagandists has been essential to governments committing war crimes and crimes against peace, and carrying out the exploitation of weaker groups, targeted killing and genocide, among other atrocities in war and conflict (Hickman 2018). Many critical scholars of media and communication studies have argued about the destructive role of media in reporting war and conflicts (see for example: Hamelink 2008; Nohresdet 2009; Williams 2003). This phenomenon, referred to as conflict-escalatory journalism, is not new. For instance, the first modern genocide, the 1915 Armenian Genocide (of the Christian minority), was incited by Ottoman Turkish nationalist newspaper journalists (Hickman 2018). To justify violence against suspect Christian minorities, the editor of the Turkish language daily Tanin, Hüssein Cahid, propagated a description of the Muslim ethnic Turks as the millet-i hâkime or ethnic hegemon in the Ottoman Empire (Akçam 2006; Der Matossian 2014). Later, during

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2 The 2012 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's project 'Afghanistan-Pakistan Journalists Exchange Programme - Understanding the Neighbour' aimed to break down stereotypes and bring together young journalists from Pakistan and Afghanistan: http://www.fes-pakistan.org/media/pdf/af-pak-journalism-2013.pdf

3 The daily talk show, Ba Rewayate Digar, appears on Tolo TV. This episode featured a debate with journalists from Afghanistan and Pakistan on topics affecting the region, including the countries' media laws and coverage of regional issues, government foreign policy, and the strategic deal between the two nations that was expected to be signed by the end of 2013. Accessible here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UO09L5sfBpU
World War II, a German radio broadcaster was charged for his involvement in crimes against peace (Hamelink 2008). Much later, in 1994, three Rwandan journalists were imprisoned for life for inciting communal discord and genocide (Thompson 2007) through what became known as the “hate media” or “murder media”. Besides the fact that media and journalists can be politicised or pressured by governments and other authorities into specific types of coverage, another reason behind conflict-escalatory journalism is simply capitalism, or what Kempf (2002) call “the privatization of propaganda” (p. 59). Who benefits more from a conflict – the government or the media? The Gulf War and the Bosnia conflict are examples where journalists deliberately threw away their professional rules and standards of truth (MacAlthur 1992). Despite being aware of their responsibilities, they chose not to “stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor” (Bell 1997). These determinants can further amplify the news media’s penchant for violence and propaganda, reducing the role and impact of a news media organisation to a PR agency transmitting traditional state propaganda.

In the context of Pakistan, the government, the armed forces (Pakistan Army), and also some major religious institutions are the top three drivers behind conflict-escalatory journalism – using media as a mouthpiece for propaganda. Researchers (Hussain 2014, 2016; ur Rehman & Hussain 2015; Iqbal and Hussain 2017a, 2017b) have found these three institutions to have significant influence on the media and their consequent nationalistic, elitist and propagandist coverage. This is also observed in Hussain’s (2016) study, in which he finds a trend of Pakistani journalists prioritising national interests and supporting the government to be a conflict-escalatory approach. The coverage, he argues, neglects the sufferings and miseries of ordinary tribesmen and provokes a nationalistic and antagonistic response (from the readers). There are other factors that determine propagandist or escalatory journalism, particularly in societies that are involved in intractable conflicts, such as cross-border terrorism, ethnic and sectarian violence, and religious and violent extremism. These factors generate from the roots of a society such as Pakistan, whose pillars are standing on religious indoctrination of not only the people but also the government and its institutions. This religious indoctrination contributes to reportage where journalists prefer/choose war-oriented discourse, not only because they are forced by the State or military to become part of the propaganda, but also because they sometimes share the beliefs of the society to which they belong. These societal, and at times political and religious, beliefs further enable the society to make sense of these intractable conflicts, and can perpetuate the same antagonistic, reduced and distorted images of a conflict held by the political and military elites (Herman & Chomsky 1988).

News framing is a direct result of the choices that journalists and editors make. Like other choices, these choice also have consequences. If conflict-escalatory journalism leads to escalation of conflict, antagonism, hate and war, then arguably choosing and practicing peace journalism can contribute to the end of war and de-escalation of conflicts, the strengthening of peace processes and the realisation of human rights. Peace journalism requires insight into the influence of media, and the taking of responsibility. Peace journalism challenges the conventional news values that guide journalists and affect the way they select and construct their news narratives (Hackett 2011). Unlike quintessential war or conflict-escalatory journalism, peace journalism is transparent, explains the background in depth, explores all sides of a conflict, gives voice to
all parties – including rivals (Hanitzsch 2004, p. 484) – and suggests a solution to the conflict. Peace journalism has been defined and explained in many ways, but McGoldrick and Lynch’s (2000) description of peace journalism is the building block for my present study. They describe peace journalism as a form of journalism that looks “at how journalists could be part of the solution rather than part of the problem” (pp. 19–20). This explanation becomes more relevant in conflict coverage, where reporting only the numbers or a one-sided story can escalate the situation. Peace journalism goes a step further and provides some background and future implications of events/decisions/policies for the parties involved. The focus on the background provides the readers with an opportunity to understand and contextualise the conflict and the parties involved, while the suggestion of solutions and ways it can de-escalate presents the readers with a chance to infer and decide – thus presenting a complete package. Thus, as argued above, the choice(s) that journalists make at the start can lead to consequences that can create an understanding of the issue(s) and construction of new meanings and realities.

This process of framing and the consequent creation of new meanings and realities is sometimes manifest and carried out explicitly, but sometimes it may happen implicitly. For peace journalism to become a norm and part of industry practice, it will need to be taught through training or, if it’s already being practiced, then reinforced through an ethical framework. For instance, in his article, ‘Is peace journalism feasible?’, Lynch (2013) presents two inspirational anecdotes in which two journalists, one from the Philippines and the other from Lebanon, notably changed the content of their journalistic work after attending peace journalism workshops. He writes that they succeeded in promoting and practise the model, using social media and online journalism. In a separate study, Hussain and ur Rehman (2015) found that the personal views of Baluchi journalists in Pakistan had made their coverage of Baluchistan’s crisis de-escalatory. They write that these journalists were not aware of the theory and practice of the peace journalism model, but were practising it out of ethics. While the attitudes of journalists can knowingly or unknowingly enhance the practice and extent of peace journalism in their coverage, interestingly they can also raise the tendency of framing towards war journalism at the same time. During my analysis, I have been mindful of the occurrence and extent of explicit and implicit themes, also referred to as frames. Whether the media frame is explicit or implicit depends on the kind of language and interpretative repertoire used in the story. This can also help in gauging the effect the text can have on readers’ contextual understanding and interpretation of the conflict and the parties involved.

Peace journalism practice brings the implicit themes of peace, people, truth and solution to the explicit level for the broader population to comprehend easily. According to Ross (2006), media have the power to facilitate mediation, reconciliation and peacekeeping processes. They can also bring various conflicting parties into dialogue and successfully facilitate the process. Peace journalism can also disseminate information that the parties may not have been able to exchange, such as efforts by non-governmental organisations, personal stories from within both/all sides, etc. By this information becoming known to the public and the stakeholders, at times some miscommunications can be resolved. That is not the case in conflict-escalatory or war journalism, in which even when covering peace, media evidently incorporate conflict-escalatory war frames (Shinar 2004). As noted, literature in peace and war journalism studies
demonstrates that mainstream media are often propagandist and nationalistic, and side with the powerful (see for example: Knightley 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Ross 2006; Spencer 2005; Wolfsfeld 2004 as cited in Hussain 2016). Apart from State pressure and draconian regulation on media in some countries that requires the coverage to echo/reflect the government stance, most mainstream media are generally war- and conflict-centric (Wolfsfeld 2004) through their own choice. These choices include socio-cultural, religious and capitalist/economic drivers. The more we explore and understand the characteristics of peace journalism as a model and its developments, the more problems we will be able to identify in conflict-escalatory and War Journalism.

In its literal sense, the term peace journalism is quite self-explanatory – a journalism practice that calls for peace and facilitates the process at both the social and political levels. However, in the practical sense, it is a complicated process that is affected by multiple factors and has various stages of practice and extent. According to Johan Galtung (1998), considered the father of peace journalism theory, the practice is a counter narrative to war journalism. While peace journalism focuses on non-violent responses to war and conflict, war journalism legitimises violence and becomes part of it. In simpler terms, peace journalism was coined in the 1970s as a response to violence-highlighting, war-triggering and conflict-escalatory journalism. Galtung developed the Peace Journalism Model (see Table 1.1) that presents some evaluative criteria developed specifically for analysing media discourse on war and conflict.

Drawing from the practice of journalists doing follow-up stories after major event coverage, Galtung (1998) famously compared war and peace journalism to sports and health journalism, respectively. He argues that, like sports journalism, the attention in war journalism is always given to the winning side. Peace journalism, on the other hand, approximates health journalism, where a “good reporter” will not only explain the patient’s anguish, but give explanatory background information about the disease, the cure and remedies available, and possible preventive measures. War journalism, he argues, does not talk about any “preventive measures” in a war-hit, conflict-ridden zone. This element was solely delivered by peace journalism and its subsidiaries with several alternative names, including new journalism, post-realist journalism, solutions journalism, advocacy journalism, conflict-analysis journalism and constructive journalism (McGoldrick & Lynch 2000, p. 45). However, whatever its name, the advocates of this kind of journalism argue that its purpose and intention is the same: a strong commitment to the prevention of violence and war (Hanitzsch 2004, p. 485), and “de-escalation-oriented war coverage and solution-oriented conflict coverage” (Kempf 2003, pp. 9–10).
Galtung’s work, without a doubt, developed the basis for any peace journalism research, but it needs expansion of its context and scope in its application. War and conflict are two different situations with different dynamics and effects, and cannot be categorised into one group. Sometimes, a war ends but conflict remains. This change from a state of war to post-war conflict can have detrimental effects on the politics, economy and society in the country or region. A post-war conflict phase requires rebuilding, rehabilitation, reconciliation and a road to peace. In this phase, not only does the political stance needs to be changed, but the media coverage and framing also needs to aid a public debate that focuses on peace and non-violence. A shared single model cannot address the issues with media reportage in the two phases, due to the difference in intensity and causative effects of the war and conflict states – and also the varying responsibilities of the media in the two situations. Such a situation needs more conscientious media coverage of conflict, as suggested by Shinar (2007), who argues that peace journalism is a “normative mode of responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict, that aims at contributing to peace-making, peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals, and audiences towards

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.1: The original Peace and War Journalism Model table devised by Galtung (1986, 1998)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. PEACE/CONFLICT ORIENTATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General “win, win” orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making conflicts transparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving voice to all parties, empathy, understanding See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanisation of all sides; more so the worse the weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)</td>
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<tr>
<th>II. TRUTH ORIENTATED</th>
<th>II. PROPAGANDA ORIENTATED</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expose untruths on all sides / uncover all cover-ups</td>
<td>Expose “their” untruths / help “our” cover-ups/lies</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>III. PEOPLE ORIENTATED</th>
<th>III. ELITE ORIENTATED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on suffering all over: on women, aged, children, giving voice to voiceless</td>
<td>Focus on “our” suffering: on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give name to all evil-doers</td>
<td>Give name to their evil-doers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on people peace-makers</td>
<td>Focus on elite peace-makers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>IV. SOLUTION ORIENTATED</th>
<th>IV. VICTORY ORIENTATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace = non-violence + creativity</td>
<td>Peace = victory + ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war</td>
<td>Conceal peace initiatives before victory is at hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society</td>
<td>Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation</td>
<td>Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
war and peace” (pp. 2). Here, the pragmatic and contemporary work of Jake Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) on peace journalism become extremely significant, running contrary to the conventional ways of covering conflict where the focus is on winning only. They describe peace journalism as a broader, fairer and more accurate way of framing stories. According to Lynch and McGoldrick, peace journalism is practiced “when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict” (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, pp. 5). They write:

Peace journalism uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting, provides a new route map tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention – and builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting.

Lynch’s work is extensively based on Galtung’s Model of peace journalism, but applies it as a guide only. Lynch takes Galtung’s connection between peace journalism and health reporting a step further and explains that this theory may further explore the causes of the disease (the war or conflict) and highlight possible preventative and healing measures (resolving conflict and finding solutions). As an extension and development of Galtung’s four-point Peace and War Journalism Model, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) advanced the model to develop a Peace Journalism Manual (See Table 1.2). They elaborated on Galtung’s model with a 17-point plan for practical peace journalism (pp. 28–31; also see: McGoldrick & Lynch 2000). It covered many aspects of peace journalism that Galtung had not discussed in his model, such as the political context of the country and the conflict. Later, Lynch (2006) used this manual to guide research where he developed five-point coding analytical criteria for a critical discourse analysis of 211 reports on the Iran nuclear crisis in 12 publications in the UK press.

Lynch developed this analytical/evaluative criteria to identify media frames. The criteria were in the form of questions, each exclusive to the Iran nuclear crisis. He then applied them to each news story to measure the extent of peace journalism in each text. One can see his analytical criteria as a set of research questions that he answers by analysing each text. He looks at (1) if the journalist has given a relevant, accurate and complete background of the conflict, (2) if the journalist has presented a fact as “a thing known” and not as a “claim” or an opinion, (3) if the conflict is represented as open in time and space and both sides of the story is given, (4) if the element of bias has been nullified by giving an accurate picture of all developing news during the conflict, especially when that may help the audience take an informed decision about both or all parties in conflict, and finally (5) if the text frames one side as the hero and other as the enemy, the villain or the bad side.

My methodology for this thesis is derived from Lynch’s “coding analytical criteria”. I intend to build on his model, while keeping in mind the complexities of Pakistan’s history, geo-politics, culture and religion, society, language and human experiences. These factors cannot be oversimplified, and demand a region-
centric understanding of the conflict and its coverage by media. Lynch’s analytical criteria has been primarily used for the analysis of western media. I would argue that its direct application to a non-western setup or media, such as Pakistan, cannot be guaranteed to produce accurate results. The Af-Pak region has a rich colonial history, dictatorial political systems, frequent wars/conflicts, human migration, rights violation and limited freedom of speech and press. Media in such a non-western social setting/structure may carry idiosyncratic media frames and thus require the development of an exclusive analytical criteria, taking guidance from both Galtung’s and Lynch’s models.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Don’ts</th>
<th>Dos</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVOID portraying a conflict as consisting of only two parties.</td>
<td>INSTEAD try to DISAGGREGATE the two parties into many smaller groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID accepting stark distinctions between “self” and “other”.</td>
<td>INSTEAD seek the “other” in the “self” and vice versa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID treating a conflict as if it is only going on in the place and at the time that violence is occurring.</td>
<td>INSTEAD try to trace the links and consequences for people in other places now and in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID assessing the merits of a violent action or policy of violence in terms of its visible effects only.</td>
<td>INSTEAD try to find ways of reporting on the invisible effects,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID letting parties define themselves by simply quoting their leaders’ restatements of familiar demands or positions.</td>
<td>INSTEAD enquire deeper into goals: How are people on the ground affected by the conflict in everyday life?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID concentrating always on what divides the parties, the differences between what they say they want.</td>
<td>INSTEAD try asking questions which may reveal areas of common ground and leading your report with answers which suggest that some goals may be shared, or at least compatible, after all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID only reporting the violent acts and describing “the horror”.</td>
<td>INSTEAD show how people have been blocked and frustrated or deprived in everyday life as a way of explaining how the conditions for violence are being produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID blaming someone for ‘starting it’.</td>
<td>INSTEAD try looking at how shared problems and issues are leading to consequences which all the parties say they never intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID focusing exclusively on the suffering, fears and grievances of only one party.</td>
<td>INSTEAD treat as equally newsworthy the suffering, fears and grievances of all sides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID “victimising” language like “devastated”; “defenceless”; “pathetic”; “tragedy”</td>
<td>INSTEAD report on what has been done and could be done by the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID the imprecise use of emotive words to describe what has happened to people.</td>
<td>INSTEAD always be precise about what we know. Do not minimize suffering but reserve the strongest language for the gravest situations or you will beggar the language and help to justify disproportionate responses which escalate the violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID demonising adjectives like “vicious”, “cruel”, “brutal”, “barbaric”.</td>
<td>INSTEAD report what you know about the wrongdoing and give as much information as you can about the reliability of other people’s reports or descriptions of it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID demonising labels like “terrorist”; “extremist”; “fanatic” or “fundamentalist”.</td>
<td>INSTEAD try calling people by the names they give themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID focusing exclusively on the human rights abuses, misdemeanours and wrongdoings of only one side.</td>
<td>INSTEAD try to name ALL wrongdoers and treat equally seriously allegations made by all sides in a conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID making an opinion or claim seem like an established fact.</td>
<td>INSTEAD tell your readers or your audience who said what.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID greeting the signing of documents by leaders, which bring about military victory or ceasefire, as necessarily creating peace.</td>
<td>INSTEAD try to report on the issues which remain and which may still lead people to commit further acts of violence in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVOID waiting for leaders on ‘our’ side to suggest or offer solutions.</td>
<td>INSTEAD pick up and explore peace initiatives wherever they come from.</td>
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In addition to identifying media frames, a theoretical concept explained in detail in Chapter 2, my analytical criteria also measure the extent of peace journalism. The ‘extent’ of peace journalism is a concept introduced by Lee and Maslog (2005) and Lee, Maslog and Kim (2006) during their study of how much peace journalism media in various Asian countries were practicing. They call it the “peace journalism quotient”. While this concept is very important for the study of peace journalism and measuring how much of it is incorporated in media coverage, at this point it is not directly relevant to my research, since I intend to map in my thesis the presence or absence of peace journalism in the Pakistani media. The extent of this presence is the next step, and may be important to further studies of Peace journalism in Pakistan or as an extension of my current work. The extent of peace journalism’s presence also depends on the genre/type of media text. This means that if the same event is covered for a news report and a magazine article, the latter will give the journalist more time and space for investigation, explanation and context. Major peace journalism studies in Pakistan have analysed daily newspapers for conflict coverage, with little to no attention given to magazines or long-form journalism. In my thesis, I have incorporated both long-form and short-form genres to present a clearer, more accurate picture of the overall peace journalism practice in the country’s English media.

Although, I do not intend to draw any comparisons between the newspapers and the magazines, it is important to acknowledge the variations in the two reporting styles. Evidence demonstrates that long-form or “slow” journalism is the most suitable reporting style for peace-oriented conflict and crisis coverage (See for example: Boczkowski 2010; Davies 2009; Hargreaves 2003; Lewis et al. 2006; Phillips 2009). Long-form journalism is not dictated by shorter deadlines, and instead gives maximum room for investigation, the addition or exclusion of information, follow-ups and in-depth reporting. Some landmark examples of long-form journalism are John Hersey’s 31,000-word article “Hiroshima” for The New Yorker in 1946, and Katherine Boo’s 2012 “Behind the Beautiful Forevers”, based on three years of interviews in the slums of Mumbai, published in The Guardian. Despite the length of these pieces, long-form journalism does not always involve lengthy pieces of text. Instead, the stylistic focus is on investigation, narrative and storytelling (Le Masurier 2015, p. 143). Greenberg (2007, pp. 141–142) argues in favour of long-form journalism, which she writes has the potential to challenge and dominate the fast news culture. Arguing that fast, short-form journalism does nothing new, she states:

[...] in the middle is traditional print journalism, the sector that is losing readers. At the luxury end, there should be a growing market for essays, reportage and other nonfiction writing that takes its time to find things out, notice stories that others miss, and communicates it all to the highest standards: ‘slow journalism’.

Similarly, Le Masurier (2015) further adds to the long-form journalism argument, stating that slow journalism avoids sensationalism and herd reporting, and is “ethical in treatment of subjects and of producers” (pp. 143). She states that instantaneous journalism, or what she refers to as “fast journalism” (television, radio, daily newspapers, online media, blogs, etc) is speed-focused and has taken traffic and
scholarly interest away from slow journalism (magazines, investigative reports, dossiers, etc). In No Time to Think, Rosenberg and Feldman (2008) argue that short-form journalists who practice fast journalism generally use a hyperbolic style, and “media and inaccuracy, after a flirting through the ages, are now in a steamy lip lock” (Rosenberg & Feldman 2008, pp. 4). They have shorter space and deadlines, and they are always in a hurry. If we apply the above arguments to peace journalism, we can conclude that speed can create inaccuracy, which, as Galtung and Lynch state, is one of the biggest threats to coverage that escalates conflict. A further reason behind my choice of both long-form and short-form journalism for analysis is to establish the relevance of this divide between coverage by newspapers and magazines. However, irrespective of its genre and reporting styles, as mentioned above, inaccuracy is a major threat to peace journalism amid multiple other challenges.

1.3 Challenges for peace journalism

The biggest challenge for peace journalism, and the major critique it faces, is the question of whether Peace journalism is “good journalism”. This in turn begs the question, what makes journalism “good”? Lynch (2013) refers to peace journalism as “good journalism” on the basis of critical realism. Critical realism is a philosophical approach that looks at reality as stratified and a product of what we believe (the real), what we observe (the actual/event that we see) and what we experience through our senses (the empirical). In the context of peace journalism, critical realism pronounces and argues that human agency is necessary for the reproduction and transformation of social structures (belief → observation → experience). Peace journalism helps people develop a deeper understanding of issues and thus make informed choices. On the contrary, a journalism practice that obstructs human agency may generate indifference.

Sometimes, in a conflict situation, the non-emotional, detached and mechanical characteristics of some journalism can be detrimental to (conflict) resolution. Moreover, these characteristics also defy the basic rules of peace journalism. According to Lynch (2013), this form of indifferent journalism becomes traditional and mainstream “journalism-as-usual” that lacks experience and observation, and where journalists and editors can manipulate reality if one of the three layers is missing from the belief → observation → experience mix. He further writes that good journalism is easily detected as it stands out because of its unique accounts and the various distinct angles it provides for the audience. It’s these characteristics that set ‘good journalism’ apart from mainstream journalism. However, he argues that these perspectives do not necessarily need to be endorsed, instead “where they are unjustly excluded, it should enable them to be seen and heard” (Lynch 2013, p. 34). “Good journalism”, therefore, represents social truth and exposes the world as it really is in a way that usually does not come out in coverage. Lynch (2013) also proposes a list of six characteristics that he argues enable media to function responsibly. He explains that good journalism will:

1. Dissolve boundaries between “us” and “them”, including in affective public responses.
2. Devise creative ways to bring background into foreground, reach out from centre to periphery and reconfigure processes as events.
3. Include a wide range of accounts of power and political process, avoiding stenography of dualistic “jousts” between leaders of parties contesting government in its own country (who won the debate?)

4. Provide readers and audiences with cues and clues to prompt and equip them to develop critical awareness of attempts to pass off claims as facts, or “social truths” as merely interpersonal.

5. Contribute to the construction of discursive truth by explaining new phenomena with reference to underlying causes and patterns.

6. Inspire by remitting into public spheres the hopes, dreams, aspirations and actions of those experimenting with and advocating new visions. (p. 33)

Yet, the “goodness” of journalism practice is a controversial topic among media scholars, one that separates those whose work is focused on the ethics of objectivity in journalism (such as Hammond 2002; Loyn 2007) from those whose works stress the importance of “journalism of attachment” (See for example: Bell 1998; Ruigrok 2008; Ward 1998). While some media scholars argue that objectivity is essential to ethical media practices as it adds truthfulness, accuracy, neutrality and emotional detachment to the story, others, such as Bell (1998), argue that “good journalism” stems from advocacy and a type of activism that can facilitate a process for the good of the masses. According to Loyn (2007), Galtung misunderstood the role and power of journalists. He argues that journalists “are reporters, not peacemakers … we are not there to make peace” (pp. 2). On the other hand, peace journalism scholars argue that the practice does not exclusively promote peace; it gives it a chance to be considered as a possible option/response (Lynch & McGoldrick 2006; Lynch & Galtung 2010). There are also disagreements among peace journalism scholars over its advocacy roles, with one faction explaining it with an activism and advocacy lens (see for example Aslam 2016; Benn 2015; Lee 2010; Peleg 2007), and the other rejecting its reduction to advocacy (Lynch & McGoldrick 2006; Kempf 2003). To the latter, peace journalism is not advocacy, but constructive conflict coverage.

These two understandings of peace journalism, which are not far apart, need a middle ground where the gap between journalism and peace-keeping can be narrowed down. Peleg (2007) suggests peace journalism must become the third party that facilitates communication between the parties involved in a conflict, and between the unaffected people and the affected groups. A start towards establishing this middle ground could be building a consensus on the conventions of objectivity in journalism. The likes of Loyn (2007) believe that peace journalism is inconsistent with the elements of objectivity, while Lynch and Galtung argue that, in fact, “any selectivity against peace smells of bias” (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 53). But is absolute objectivity in the public interest? In this case, peace journalism can be seen as a utilitarian concept. What is better for the masses – the conventions of objectivity, or journalism of attachment and empathy?

Lynch and Galtung (2010) state that peace journalism is a matter of self-reflection or reflexivity by the journalists, who have to ask themselves: What do we want? To stimulate more violence or more peace? Therefore, peace journalism becomes a utilitarian concept as “ethics of consequences rather than the ethics of intentions” and the “ethics of action rather than the ethics of conviction” (Lynch & Galtung 2010, pp. 60). It becomes about selectivity and reflexivity, and not about objectivity. Some media scholars have even
suggested changing the name peace journalism to something that will not raise eyebrows for its suggested intersection with advocacy and activism. For instance, Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2015) suggest calling it “Consequence-Ethical Reflexivity.” For the same reason, some peace journalism initiatives in the Philippines and the UK avoided using the word “peace” in their projects, and instead used “Conflict-Sensitive Reporting” and “Reporting the World”, respectively in their titles (Lynch 2013, pp. 46). Electing ethical reflexivity over selection can sometimes put journalists in a dilemma, for instance when choosing to report on either a bullet shot or a word spoken with love. This dilemma is, as argued by Lynch and Galtung (2010), “not a problem of factual objectivity but of criteria objectivity” (p. 53). In this case, a shot may be more consequential than a word. Therefore, what is needed from the media is explicitness vis-à-vis the basis on which reporting criteria are selected and discussed – and that, as Lynch and Galtung (2010) argue, would be a working version of objectivity.

Surprisingly, Lynch and Galtung (2010) find the current version of the practice of objectivity and balance problematic – a practice that is believed to be one of the fundamentals of journalism since its beginning. This is because in the current version of how journalists practice objectivity, the conventions can lead and influence journalists, and also readers, to overvalue violent, reactive responses to conflict. This consequently creates a reality for the masses where non-violence, de-escalation, reconciliation and development are all undervalued (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). Sometimes, the imposition of balanced coverage conventions of journalism may create a bias too. Journalists are forced either by their organisation or the State to keep an equilibrium in coverage where in fact the weaker/oppressed party in a crisis may need more empathetic representations (to de-escalate a conflict situation or bring peace). This imposition, as argued by McGoldrick (2006), is also in disagreement with the liberal theory of free press and freedom of expression, as journalists lose their power to construct and shape a narrative. Instead, by trying to simplify complex issues, such as war and conflict, these conventions of objectivity end up marginalising the perspectives of others, and thus can be strongly misleading and misrepresenting (Lynch 2013). One may ask: How can media coverage be balanced when the conflict itself is imbalanced, with power unevenly distributed on both/all sides? According to Lynch and Galtung (2010), this imbalance needs to be reflected in media coverage and journalists and editors need to be mindful that such imbalances, led and fuelled by objectivity, can create or feed propagandas.

We understand that powerful people can have a strong influence on media coverage. What they say can create propaganda – the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape people’s perceptions about an event or a crisis. According to Jowett and O’Donnell (1999), these powerful elite try “to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (pp. 6). If the conventions of objectivity are applied to giving them an equal or prominent voice in media narrative, then propaganda will be generated and supported. For instance, one of the major reasons that the US media failed to report the truth about the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was the practice of objectivity that made journalists quote “men and women with high titles” (Bagdikian 2004). The elite, including the State, want to control media. They want the media to serve them and propagate on their behalf (Herman & Chomsky 2010), while the powerful elites in return finance the media.
However, it is not only the powerful elite that can control media or influence the way stories are framed and people are represented. Peace journalism is a complex practice that has its orientations towards peace, truth, people and solution. It takes into account multiple variables that affect people – both journalists and readers alike. For instance, according to Galtung (1998), peace- or conflict-orientated coverage will have to explore conflict formation; present all the different parties (not only two parties); explain goals, causes and history; give open time and space to explaining and understanding context; focus on structural and cultural aspects of a conflict; and adopt a win–win approach. The part about focusing on structural and cultural aspects of a conflict, however, lacks an important caveat. We must understand that it is not only the political structures or events that influence media content and news framing. The socio-demographic position of the reader and the reporter is equally crucial and cannot be ignored in the entire process of news framing – from development and representation to reception and inference.

Every time a war or conflict begins between parties, the reasons are different and so are the dynamics and consequences. As mentioned above, social, cultural and political factors are major influencers in not only what leads to a conflict, but also what continues to fuel it and how it is represented in the media. In addition, daily news routines and organisational imperatives play their part as second- and third-level influencers. The education and geographical background of the journalist equally and inevitably play a role in the way news is framed and people involved are represented. For instance, most Pakistani journalists are residents of a particular state/region, and have national and state-level (called provincial-level in Pakistan) affiliations and associations. They are members of certain national cultures, ethnicities, tribes, religious sects, private or public organisations and movements that are nationally based. Therefore, they are not immune to the biases of nationalism – especially when reporting on a group of people (in this case, Afghan refugees) who are already seen as foreign, the “other”, dangerous and the enemy.

To understand this better, I draw upon Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) explanation of this phenomena under the “Hierarchy of Influences” model. This model calls attention to a broader range of pressures on news content. They argue that, among many factors that appear to have a direct influence on content, socio-demographic backgrounds and personal and political beliefs indirectly shape news coverage, especially when individuals are in a position to override institutional pressures or organisational routines (Shoemaker & Reese 1996). This phenomenon may also have a role to play in how and why certain events related to Afghan refugees were framed in a specific way and may answer some questions about the representational themes incorporated in the media texts studied for this thesis. These internal social, cultural and political influences come under extra-media-level influences, which means that these are sources of influence outside the standard circle of factors such as State/establishment or organisational pressure. The extra-media influences may also include information sources, advertisers, market structures and technology. However, the strongest influence is that of ideology, as it directly shapes and reshapes values and beliefs that govern what audiences, journalists and other players in the news system see as “natural” or “obvious” (Shoemaker & Reese 1996, pp. 221). Furthermore, this serves in part to maintain the prevailing relations of power.
When discussing extra-media influences, it is important to also realise that like the coverage, “the audience” of war and conflict coverage is not a generalised, global audience. Like journalists, they also bring their own backgrounds and understanding to the interpretation and context of the news. Half a century ago, sociologist Herbert Gans (1980) had identified a number of factors that news producers take into account in framing the news. One of those, also consistent with contemporary peace journalism, is “audience considerations”, which means the story’s potential to build (more) audience based on the human interest angle it carries about peacemaking and reconciliation. This is also evident from the fact that some international media organisations – such as BBC World, CNN International and Deutsche Welle – are aimed at audiences in different countries, speaking different languages and having different political, social and cultural understandings, affiliations and ideologies. One of my concerns is also the lack of attention given to these audience considerations in Galtung’s model. But the topic and time constraints of this study limit my scope and magnitude, and keep the audience aspect of this research out of my immediate analysis.

Returning to understanding power relations, it is important to acknowledge and understand the idiosyncratic social, cultural and political dynamics in a politically complex region such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Dynamics such as nationalism, ethnicity, tradition, social hierarchies, attachment to certain image/meanings, and decryption of social and political constructs are completely different from the hegemonic western values/beliefs. These dynamics have a strong impact on shaping audience perceptions at individual levels, and have a deep-rooted influence on journalism practice vis-à-vis media framing and representation in any part of the world. The cultural and religious belief systems; the ethics, values and behaviour patterns; and also the journalistic training and education in a high-context culture (such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Japan, China, and Brazil to name a few) are completely different from a low-context culture (such as Germany, Norway, Denmark, Canada, the US and Australia). The thought processes at both the journalists’ and the readers’ ends, and the history that shapes these thoughts, also play a significant role. Unlike in most western countries, in Pakistan and other countries founded on the basis of religion, religious radicalism and ethnic/sectarian violence are a multi-dimensional construct that is taken very seriously by religious militants in order to express and exert power.

There is a high prevalence of conflicts stemming from religious, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and race-related issues and differences in Pakistan. Belligerent nationalism that runs through Pakistani society, fuelled and reinforced by State (pressure) and praetorianism, also plays a significant role in how media frame political conflicts in the region for the society. All of these conflicts have the support of the majority of the general public, and consequently the media, who wants to show the public what they want to watch and read. In her book ‘Making Sense of Pakistan’, author Farzana Shaikh explains the relationship that territorial nationalism in Pakistan has with religion (Islam), tribal/ethnic affiliations, and so on, calling it “problematic” (Shaikh 2018). For instance, the intensity of violent extremism in Pakistan increased manifold following Pakistan’s alliance with the US against Communism in South Asia and particularly in Afghanistan (Khan 2015). The Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who are seen as foreign to local social, cultural, ethnic, sectarian and political beliefs, are hence the major target for these differences and pressures that not only appear in the public debate but are also dominant in media discourse. By studying the various themes
in media coverage of the Afghan refugee conflict, I was able to identify certain themes that were exclusive to this conflict and the media practices/ethics in Pakistan. I was also able to develop a connection between the high extent of ethnocentric and parochial representations of Afghan refugees in Pakistani media and local political and cultural influence on media. Looking at peace journalism scholarship and its domination by western studies, it is evident and therefore significant to first de-westernise the peace journalism theory for a pertinent, pragmatic application of the models and their extended versions to non-western socio-political settings, such as Pakistan.

1.4 The need to de-westernise peace journalism

Peace journalism models and classifications were developed by western scholars to analyse western media coverage of deadly conflicts in non-western countries. The models are dualistic (such as peace vs. war, truth vs. propaganda, etc.). While the binaries of these models are visible in western media coverage of deadly international wars and conflicts, they become rather blurred during (coverage of) national conflicts of a high-to-low intensity nature (Hussain 2017). The ways national/local media cover these conflicts thus also change significantly. In this situation, a western classification of the model may miss out on important aspects and variables of a national conflict stemming from local or regional political crises, such as the Af–Pak conflict and other complicated, ongoing factors contributing to the conflict. According to Galtung’s classification (1998, 2007), conflict journalism is either war-oriented (focusing on violence, elites, propaganda and differences between the two warring parties), or it is peace-oriented (prioritising peace, people, truth and solution). Galtung’s revolutionary work was later extended by many researchers to adopt war and peace variables and identify and analyse the presence or absence of peace journalism in media coverage of conflicts (see for example Hussain 2015; Lee & Maslog 2005; Lynch 2013; Shinar 2009). Lynch’s work among these scholars is the most prominent. He refined the model and developed the analytical criteria to analyse media discourse. Among many of his works where he applied the analytical criteria method, one of his early studies is an analysis of the British media’s coverage of the Iran nuclear programme, and its implications on international politics/war (Lynch 2006). He later also applied the analytical criteria method to analyse media discourse in various western countries. However, since most under-developed countries, including Pakistan, are beset by national conflicts of different natures and intensities, the existing models of peace journalism cannot be exclusively or satisfactorily extended to them.

The above is evidenced by recent Pakistan-centric studies of conflict-escalatory and peace journalism. In Hussain’s and ur Rehman’s (2015) analysis of media coverage of the ongoing Balochistan conflict, where the national army has been fighting the Baloch separatists who have been demanding provincial autonomy, the researchers found that Pakistani journalists tended to tread a middle ground. While the results were slightly inclined towards conflict-escalatory coverage, the journalists were neither explicitly peace-oriented in their framing nor war/conflict-oriented. This borderline peace-oriented coverage may be the result of pressures from the Pakistani State, praetorianism or fear of dissent. However, since most liberal left-wing, centre-left and centrist Pakistanis do not consider the demands of the Baloch separatists as unfair (Hussain & ur Rehman 2015), and neither view them as the outsiders, Pakistani media did not vehemently represent
the separatists as the “other” or depict their movement as employing violent tactics (also see: Iqbal & Hussain 2017a). It is of high political importance, but not as high as the Afghan refugees, and therefore this framing will not bear negative consequences for the media organisation or the journalist. Similarly, it can be said that the State and the military allow some level of critical public opinion on this issue.

In the Afghan refugee conflict, the stakes for the State and the military are extremely high, and therefore no chances with media coverage can be taken. Due to the varying nature of the conflict and State/military interest in it, the binaries of the universal – and rather rigid – peace journalism model can be impractical. Neither Galtung nor Lynch always address these dichotomies between theory and practice in this region. Hence, Hussain (2020) argues for a more plausible classification where the conflict is graded along a continuum from high intensity to low intensity. He argues that this will account for “the variations in the content instead of treating all conflicts as static” (p. 4). This will also give room for integrating the coverage of non-western conflicts by their national media and emerging framing trends into the international scholarly debate and the overarching model of peace journalism.

As mentioned earlier, Lynch’s analytical criteria diversifies and modifies Galtung’s model to study some non-western conflicts, but only as covered by western media. However, one of the most prominent scholars arguing for such localised application of peace journalism is German media scholar Thomas Hanitzsch, who started off by criticising the dualism and binaries in Galtung’s (1998) Peace and War Journalism Model. Galtung’s model divides conflict coverage into binary oppositions of peace-orientated vs. war-orientated, truth-orientated vs. propaganda-orientated, people-orientated vs. elite-orientated, and solution-orientated vs. victory-orientated. Hanitzsch’s (2006, 2007) main objection was that while peace journalism offered significant framing distinctions, it disregarded relevant sub-distinctions, the positioning of certain elements in content and, most importantly, the interaction between these elements. Therefore, as a critical response to the dualistic approach of peace journalism, Hanitzsch and his fellow authors proposed the “actor-event framework” (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch & Nagar 2016). This aimed to comprehensively deconstruct news narratives by adding more distinctions and analysing the representations of the two pillars of any narrative – the actors and events of conflicts, both of which add context to reporting. The authors applied this framework to the Israeli coverage [Haaretz, Israel Hayom, and Ynet] of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear program, and the Syrian civil war – all occurring in de-westernised contexts. They find four types of narratives in the media coverage.

Context is crucial to the practice of peace journalism. Ignoring context not only directly affects the way a conflict is reported in media, but also how the coverage is received by readers. Context can be of two types – the context of the conflict (political) and the context of the region (historical, socio-cultural, geographical/regional and economic). Context gives a holistic picture of the conflict dynamics, one which comprises background information, history and historical development, and the perspectives, interests and goals of all involved parties, and their relationships with each other (Lynch 2007). For example, a peace journalism story about Af–Pak relations and the regional conflict around refugees will not highlight the Afghan president’s or Pakistani authorities’ negative remarks about each other. It will present them as facts,
but also focus on the context in which they were made. In addition, it will focus on the attempts made by both sides towards a peaceful resolution of the political conflict and the refugee crisis. It will not base its frame around the failures or insouciance of any/both governments in reaching mutual peace. An understanding of the history of the conflict and its recent background develops context among the readers. Without this understanding, a journalist is more likely to misrepresent and create meanings that are distorted from reality. Blasi (2004) states that journalists and other media writers should have solid knowledge of the political, economic and historical contexts of conflicts; the interests and goals of involved parties; the type of conflict; and the methods of resolution. Without background information, context and an alternative narrative/measure, there are strong chances that violence will be deemed as the easiest response to a conflict (McGoldrick 2006). She further elaborates (p. 4):

Without some exploration of underlying causes, violence can be left to appear, by default, as the only response that ‘makes sense.’ Wars remain opaque, in the sense that we are given no means to see through the violence to problems that lie beneath. It therefore makes no sense to hear from anyone wanting those problems to be addressed and set right as a contribution to ending or avoiding violence.

Fahmy and Eakin (2014) write that shallow media coverage of a conflict – where background, context and explanation of roots and causes are missing – makes it difficult to achieve a peaceful resolution. For instance, in the context of my research, if an article on Af–Pak relations and the refugee conflict deprives the readers of background information on the political and military involvement of Pakistan in Afghan politics and their (the Pakistani army’s) role in the post-Soviet War phase before the Taliban rule, the journalist may not only misinform readers, but may also create an environment that hampers informed decision-making and interpretation. In such cases, the readers’ ability to reach a balanced understanding of the conflict, and the people involved, is likely to be influenced.

The analytical criteria developed for this thesis, and discussed in the next chapter, also evaluated the presence of context in each story. Understanding and prioritising context in media coverage is significant for the decentralisation and decolonisation of ideas and concepts – such as of peace journalism. Wodak and Busch (2004) note that there has been a shift of paradigm when studying media texts to focus more on the localisation of meaning within social, political and cultural contexts in what they referred to as a “decentralisation” of media text (Wodak & Busch 2004, p. 106). The rationale for my study emerges from the need to de-colonise peace journalism studies from western scholarship, and also from western-media-centric analysis – thus a Pakistan-centric analysis of media discourse. To understand the context of the events that shaped the history and present of Pakistan, I was mindful of the socio-political history of Pakistan and the political relations it shares with Afghanistan. These factors not only continue to be strong driving forces in how the future of media, politics and society may look in the country, but also how events and crises shared by the two countries are represented in the media and how the coverage is reflected in public debate and policy.
In my study, I have based my discourse analysis on the Galtung’s model and Lynch’s analytical criteria, since these have been tried and tested and widely applied. This also allowed me to extend and adapt their work to fit the Af–Pak conflict over the repatriation of Afghan refugees. The gap in Galtung’s model and the flexibility in Lynch’s analytical criteria also gave me the freedom and opportunity to identify new, emerging frames that are exclusive to the coverage of Afghan refugees, and all under the main classification of peace journalism. For instance, I noted that a part of the coverage of the conflict over three years lies in a grey area: it is neither entirely peace-oriented, nor explicitly war-oriented. To cover this grey area I created the predominant, but more inclusive, binaries of peace framing and non-peace framing as the master frames – concepts explained and discussed in detail in Chapter 2, where I argue that all conflict coverage cannot be categorised as simply or directly peace or war journalism.

1.5 Pakistani media and peace journalism

Twenty-four hours after Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Malala Yousafzai survived a targeted attack by the Taliban in the Swat Valley of Pakistan, stories about a courageous 14-year-old girl who survived bullets to the head started flooding the media. From a “passive object of the news media” (Mufti 2014), she overnight became a hero of the nation, even a brand – the “Brand Malala” (Grayson 2013). The Pakistani mainstream English media, perceived as progressive and liberal in their ideas and framing, responded by echoing the popular western news leads. The alternative Urdu language media, however, responded on a different note. The glorification of the brave young girl who was shot on her way back from school soon changed into doubts and apprehension about her intention, agenda and backing. Soon, a large section of Pakistani populists crossed the threshold into suspecting Malala as “being used – rather, misused – in the West by portraying a wrong image of Pakistan as a violent and anti-women society” (Craig & Mehsud 2013). The entire mainstream media narrative that was applauding her for her courage to speak dissolved into the stances taken in alternative media, mostly Urdu language. For most of Pakistan, Malala soon became an “agent” of the west – a media image and a public perception that still persists.

This paradigm shift in Malala’s coverage is not exclusive to her case. The Pakistani media have previously shifted their position from a liberal stance to a conservative one on many issues of national and global importance, such as the Afghan refugee intake, the role and investment of China in Pakistan, and peace deals with India over the ongoing Kashmir conflict. The media industry plays a crucial role in influencing the Pakistani population’s perceptions on politics and many social and national issues, and inhabits an essential place in the society. Pakistan has a multi-lingual mediascape but the popular mainstream media operate in English and Urdu – the country’s national and official languages, respectively. The Urdu media enjoy a greater readership because it is the language the majority of the population speak and understand. However, the growing use of digital media and adoption of the Internet and information technology has transformed media consumption trends in the country. English media – seemingly progressive, less nationalistic and freer than alternative media – are now easier to access, and mostly free of charge or with extremely low subscription charges. Easier and more frequent access also means more reliance on English media, leading to an expanding competition between the two. Besides, the Urdu language media have a
reputation for sensationalism, which has created a clear demarcation between the two mediums (Adnan et al. 2020). Apart from wide digital access, English media also claim to be progressive and to present a tolerant view on issues such as minorities, religion and women. However, their criticism of political regimes and praetorianism has ended them in a confrontation with the State and the military establishment in the form of censorship and dissent legislation, funding cuts and, at times, attacks on journalists. In some instances, big English media organisations had to adhere to State directions and succumb to the pressure, but at other times they continued to report the truth.

My reason for selecting four English publications in Pakistan stems from my curiosity to analyse news framing in what are referred to as “progressive” media publications and that have a wide online and offline readership. I chose two daily newspapers – Dawn and The Express Tribune, referred to as ET henceforth in my thesis – and two monthly current affairs magazines – Newsline and Herald. These publications are among the top four largest publications, both online and in print, based on circulation and readership. Despite their ranking in the country, all these publications other than Dawn have not been academically analysed to this degree. I do not intend to draw any comparisons between the newspapers and the magazines. In fact, the two genres gave me an overall insight into the framing strategies incorporated in the coverage of the conflict in both long-form and short-form journalism. More importantly, I could also map a snapshot of the presence and absence of peace journalism practice and emerging frames in the coverage of Afghan refugees on both a daily and monthly basis.

In Pakistan, these four publications differ greatly in their ideological identity and readership (based on age group, education level, political dogma and religious inclinations, etc.). They also enjoy varying reputation vis-à-vis relations with the State and the military establishment. For instance, Dawn, the flagship of the Dawn Media Group, is Pakistan’s oldest (1947–present), leading and most widely read English-language newspaper, with a daily (weekday) circulation of over 138,000 copies. Seemingly very progressive, Dawn is considered the publication of the educated and the elite in Pakistan. It has been caught up in a few major controversies in the last decade. These include State-imposed censorships and circulation bans, attacks on its journalists and senior editors’ freedom of speech (including adding some names to the country’s Exit Control List⁴), and the cutting of government funds. In July 2018, BBC invited Hameed Haroon, CEO of the Dawn Media Group, to their current-affairs talk show ‘HARDtalk’ with host Stephen Sackur, a few weeks before Pakistan’s general elections. In the interview, Hameed accused the security/military establishment of interfering in politics and favouring Imran Khan – former cricketer-turned-politician and now the prime minister of Pakistan – and his political party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. Hameed, who is also the president of the All Pakistan Newspapers Society, also accused the powerful military of an “unprecedented assault” on the freedom of the press. The interview was not received well by the State or the military establishment, and the newspaper, among a few others, faced censorship and intimidation by the State. This gave a further push to Dawn’s popularity and its image as a left, liberal publication.

⁴ The Exit Control List (ECL) is a list of Pakistani citizens who are “wanted criminals and individuals under investigation”.

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Several years prior to this, in May 2011, the newspaper had caught national and global attention when the Group signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Australian editor, publisher, activist, and WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange. The MoU gave Dawn the exclusive rights in Pakistan to publish first of all the secret US diplomatic cables related to political and other developments in the country. The US diplomatic cables leak, also widely known as Cablegate, saw the release of classified cables that had been sent to the U.S. State Department by 274 of its consulates, embassies, and diplomatic missions around the world, including Pakistan. Dawn now had access to this classified information. In May 2011, freelance journalist, analyst and media development specialist Adnan Rehmat wrote for Dawn that the WikiLeaks cables revealed to the Pakistani nation a new face of the army. The leaks “confirm that the government in general and the army in particular have a formal policy of deceiving the public on national security issues. This raises the serious question of legitimacy of the security policy and foreign policies and the actions of the state” (Rehmat 2011). On 24 March 2016, Dawn became the first Pakistani newspaper to oppose the resumption of the death penalty in Pakistan, again finding itself locking horns with the State. The State and military pressure on Dawn continued and in 2019, the government revoked its advertising in the newspaper, as well as its sister TV channel, Dawn News, turning the newspaper, which had retained its reputation as one of the country’s independent and progressive media outlets, into the face of a national crisis (Ali 2019).

Unlike Dawn, ET is only 10 years old. It is the first internationally affiliated newspaper in Pakistan, a flagship of The International Herald Tribune and partners with The International New York Times as their global edition. ET is owned by its mother company, Lakson Group of companies, and is a flagship publication of the Daily Express Media Group. According to its publisher, Bilal Lakhani, as of 2012 it had the widest online readership in the country, both nationally and internationally. The About Us section on its website reads “… our mission is to defend the liberal values and egalitarian traditions we believe in, and which deserve to be upheld in writing that is both informative and insightful.” Its former editor, Kamal Siddiqi, told me that the newspaper’s editorial stance identifies with social liberalism, and its readership is generally on the mainstream left of Pakistani political and social opinion. He said it catered to the “modern face” of Pakistan, where it was time that people started discussing ideas from the relentless rise of religious extremism to gay rights (personal communication, July 2017). The newspaper has been a target of criticism by the right-wing in Pakistan, who see its policies and language as very progressive and liberal – in other words, detrimental to the conservative culture of Pakistan. In August and December 2013, its head office in Karachi was attacked by militant terrorists, believed to be the Pakistani Taliban, who used improvised bombs and heavy, indiscriminate firing. Several employees were injured in two attacks, four months apart. In December 2015, the newspaper’s regional office in Sargodha city was attacked with an improvised explosive device. According to Boone (2014), it was the newspaper’s liberal-mindedness in a market dominated by conservative-inclined papers that became the cause of a blatant display of power by the Pakistani Taliban.

Given the liberal and progressive reputation of the two newspapers vis-à-vis human rights, security issues in the country and freedom of speech, I wanted to explore if the newspapers also adhered to this public image in coverage of the Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation from Pakistan. In addition to the
two newspapers, I also analysed articles in *Herald* and *Newsline* magazines. Among the two monthly current affairs magazines, *Herald* (1970–present), also owned by Dawn Media Group and identifies itself as a left-of-centre, progressive publication that is published for the educated middle to upper classes. According to one of its senior editors, with whom I exchanged emails in 2018, the magazine has an independent political position that favours no political party or group. *Herald* has an official circulation of 48,000 copies a month and is read by a broad audience, primarily students, academics, policymakers, not-for-profit organisations and civil society members, political party leadership, diplomats and foreigners. In short, the editor said, “anyone wanting to read about Pakistan’s socio-political landscape through the lens of long-form journalism” (personal communication, October 2018). It is, however, pro-democracy, pro-women, pro-religious freedom, and so on. According to *Herald*’s editor (personal communication, October 2018), the publication has focused on covering war and conflict through the perspective of human rights, highlighting the plight of victims and displaced persons:

We have never advocated any unconditional military operation, have always condemned violence in any form – whether by the state or non-state elements – and called for upholding constitutional values and freedoms even in special circumstances … *Herald* prides itself on freedom of speech. We do not ever ask or imply to any writer to self-censor. Article 19 of the Constitution grants “complete” freedom of speech subject to “reasonable restrictions”. *Herald* understands these reasonable restrictions and interprets them independently without any direction and imposition from authorities, within or outside the Dawn Media Group … *Herald* is completely independent of the Dawn newspaper. It is not bound to follow any editorial line that *Dawn* might be taking, neither is it bound to repeat or remove topics that *Dawn* may be covering.

*Herald* has never been at the centre of any controversy with the State, but since it shared its mother company with *Dawn*, the magazine has had to bear the brunt of the many conflicts between the State/military and *Dawn* newspaper. In July 2019, *Herald* went completely online and stopped its print publications after government funding cuts to the Group.

*Newsline* was launched in 1989 and has since been covering a myriad of issues from powerful business groups to corrupt politicians, from extremist religious groups to ruthless mafias. Run on what its editor-in-chief, Rehana Hakim, calls a “shoestring budget” by a journalists’ cooperative, the magazine’s About Us section states the desire “to present the truth of Pakistan” as its core value. According to Rehana Hakim, the magazine gives voice to the voiceless, speaks for the oppressed and the suppressed, looks ‘sacred cows’ in the eye, writes without fear or favour, stands steadfast in the face of threat and adversity, and has braved many a storm. Like *Herald*, *Newsline* has not been part of any political or social controversy, but has lately found itself in ‘financial constraints’ due to budget and funding cuts. *Newsline* has published articles by some of the most senior journalists and analysts in Pakistan – including those who have been very vocal in their criticism of the Pakistani military establishment, such as scholar of war and military studies Ayesha Siddiqa, and Pakistani peace and human rights advocate, and veteran communist, Ibn Abdur Rehman, famously known as I.A. Rehman.
My decision to select these four major English-language publications in Pakistan was based on four criteria: that they must cover the dynamics of English media, and be independent, widely-read (print and online) and established. However, since my main objective is to evaluate the coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation conflict on indicators of War and Peace journalism, I ensured that the four publications were regularly published news and current affairs publications that largely cover politics and society. I was curious to explore how their values were demonstrated in their coverage of this specific conflict, and if these publications were as democratic, progressive, tolerant and liberal in their representation and framing when it comes to a politically sensitive issue such as the Afghan refugee repatriation and its impact on the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Though created as a democratic state, Pakistan grew into a security state due to the direct and indirect influence of its military in the country’s politics (Haqqani 2005; Siddiqa 2006). Pakistan is a transitional democracy whose media system reflects many aspects of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Polarized Pluralism Model. In this model, media are integrated into party politics, but there remains a strong role for the state amid a weak history of commercial media development (Hallin & Mancini 2004). To further understand the dynamics and the political economy of Pakistani media and their relationship with peace journalism, understanding the influence of and Pakistan’s relation with praetorianism is crucial. Pakistani media have been a prime casualty of nationalism and attacks on freedom of speech, where the military establishment has clearly demarcated no-go areas for journalists and no one can violate these guidelines (Rehman 2020).

Recent studies of ongoing conflicts in the region show that the military establishment in Pakistan is unwelcoming of any critical coverage of its role and influence in the conflicts with India, Afghanistan and Taliban, and in Balochistan (see for example: Hussain & Lynch 2019; Iqbal & Hussain 2018; Hussain 2015). In these cases, the media become more of a mouthpiece of either the State or the military and mostly reproduce information rather than investigating. In other conflicts, such as the ethnic conflict in Karachi, sectarian violence or religious extremism against minorities, where the military is not involved directly or at all, there has been relatively free and open coverage that can be categorised as Peace journalism (See for example: Agha & Hussain 2017; Hussain & ur Rehman 2015; Rawan & Hussain 2017).

Yet, despite multiple studies on conflict-escalatory and de-escalatory journalism in Pakistan over the last decade, mostly using a preliminary peace journalism classification framework (See for example: Hussain 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017; Hussain & Lynch 2019; Hussain & Munawar 2017; Iqbal & Hussain 2017, 2018; Rawan & Hussain 2017; Siraj & Hussain 2012), the Afghan refugee conflict remains unexamined despite its length, intensity and impact. Besides, current work does not categorise conflicts according to their intensity and impact – a gap first identified by Hussain (2020).

Conflict-centric/conflict-relevant coverage keeps the various levels of escalatory and de-escalatory attributes in mind and will result in a more effective application of the peace journalism model and an exclusively developed analytical criteria. In addition to this, my personal experience as a journalist, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, also helped me significantly to identify the gaps in contemporary research and
develop a pragmatic conflict-centric/conflict-relevant approach to peace journalism in Pakistan. My aim is also to contribute to the pool of scholarship that is more open towards and accepting of emerging trends and frames in media coverage in Pakistan – a country marred by deadly conflicts where peace-oriented media is needed the most (Iqbal & Hussain 2017a, 2018). Hussain’s proposed approach for a conflict-centric/conflict-relevant framework is crucial to peace journalism in Pakistan, both for its analysis and practice. After reading his proposal (Hussain 2020), it can be argued that three variables are crucial to the analysis and practice of peace journalism: 1) the understanding of the nature and intensity of the conflict, 2) the parties involved and active in the conflict at that time, and 3) the phase the conflict is in at the time of the analysis or coverage. As I applied these three arguments to my research, I began to see how it changed the dynamics of my analysis and helped me develop a methodology that best suited my case studies.

To put this into context: we understand that although Pakistan is part of multiple ongoing conflicts with three of its four neighbouring countries (Afghanistan over Afghan refugees and cross-border terrorism; Iran over sectarian tensions around Sunni and Shia Muslims since the 1980s; and India over the disputed territory of Kashmir), it is not in a state of war. Therefore, there are some aspects of the Galtung’s model that cannot be applied to media coverage of a conflict in Pakistan, for instance the model’s ‘win-win’ orientation. Unlike a war, a conflict can last for decades, such as the Afghan refugee conflict. Another example is the pro-democracy movement in Senegal, West Africa that started in 1974 against the post-colonial elite forces. On one side are the opposition political groups, religious and community leaders, journalists and media organisations and students, and the otherside is the Socialist Party (PS) that rules the country on the colonial model. Civic mobilisation fuelled by growing dissatisfaction led to a conflict that has been ongoing for over 40 years now. Such ongoing situations may have no winners or losers – only parties/sides that become active or passive during different phases of the conflict. Some armed conflicts are violent, such as the ongoing Afghanistan conflict where the Afghan government and the US military are fighting against Taliban insurgents and Islamic State (IS) militants.

However, not every conflict is a violent conflict. There have been many long civil resistance and rights movements across the world that were non-violent. For example, the US Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s, the pro-democracy movement in Zimbabwe led by opposition parties and civil society since 1998 and still ongoing, and Egypt’s “Facebook Revolution”, called the Kefaya, and the struggle for democracy and good governance from 2008 to 2011. Nonetheless, they are still conflicts that affect people economically and socially.

It is understandable that national media report non-violent conflicts differently than mainstream violent conflicts or wars. When the conflict is in its passive phase, which means there is temporary silence from both or all parties, the media coverage can become passive or repetitive vis-à-vis updates, information, etc. Such a temporary situation, which can last for years, creates what Martin Luther King Jr. referred to as a state of negative peace – a state where there is an absence of war or a manifest/active conflict, but continued exploitation, injustices, inequalities and discrimination against weaker groups impede the peace and rehabilitation process. In one of the letters that Martin Luther King Jr. wrote to his fellow clergymen from
the Birmingham City Jail, dated 16 April 1963, he mentioned negative and positive peace, describing a “negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice” (King 1986, p. 296). One can then argue that a state of negative peace is the time that Peace journalism is most needed.

Robert Malley (2019), president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, writes that there is always a window between intense flare-ups to set in motion a peace process aimed at ending a decades-long war or conflict. During my analysis, I also noted the type and extent of media framing in the “quiet” phases of the conflict as I intended to also document any changes in the interpretative repertoire during that time. In addition to the type of framing in quiet phases, I also noted the consistency and frequency of coverage to see if there were important events that were ignored or under-reported. I borrow this angle of analysis from Galtung’s and Ruge’s (1965) historic work in which they stress the need for reform to violence-escalatory narratives in media through a peace journalism orientation. Through their 12-point ‘policy implications’, they propose a framework focused on the background and context of the conflict and call for the deconstruction of complex and ambiguous events for the news readers. However, among many other points that later developed into Galtung’s Model of Peace and War Journalism, one point that they stressed – and I found very important – was the “continuity factor” by writing follow-up reports on the conflict. These follow-ups continue the information dissemination and keep the readers involved and updated on any de-escalatory development that might aid peace and dialogue, or an escalation that needs attention.

1.6 Conclusion

Alongside shifts in world politics, public law and policy, and society and cultures, and the advent and mass use of technology, the general public’s understanding of how these work, individually or together, is also shifting. Likewise, media practices have evolved over time. Peace journalism is also ever evolving. New concepts have emerged and different angles have developed as offshoots of the original. For instance, citizen journalism – where the power to report and make news “go viral” has been transferred from organisations into the hands of citizens – now shares the information-dissemination role and power to bring change, alongside mainstream media. Citizen journalism puts public interest in the hands of the public but, like many other forms of journalism, it is not necessarily always ethical. Peace journalism is unarguably an ethical form of media practice and in the public interest. By identifying and proposing new/emerging frames that are relevant to the conflict and Pakistani socio-political setup, my thesis fills the gap that is created by the need for the growth of peace journalism classifications and definitions in the Pakistani context – both in practice and research.

The need for peace reporting in a conflict is crucial and places a lot of responsibility on the journalists. Kempf (2002) writes that if journalists claim to be aware of their responsibilities and are aware of the power and influence they have, “they must not continue to paint the world in the same colors of black and white as the warlords do” (p. 71). However, the step from conflict-escalatory or war journalism to peace journalism is not a rapid one. Taking journalistic responsibility does not automatically mean replacing one form of
propaganda (conflict-based) with another (peace propaganda). Peace journalism in conflict coverage is a strategy and implies dispelling antagonisms between the binary constructs “good” and “evil”, “us” and “them” or “other”. Especially in the context of Pakistan, peace journalism can be seen as focusing on finding the middle ground – meeting half-way between the dualism of the conventional models – not in the sense of neutrality, but rather inclusivity. In order to counterbalance the dynamics of conflict escalation and to add to the constructive transformation of conflicts, more than “being neutral” is required – it further needs the abandonment of a military and war-like framework in media coverage. Kempf (2002) argues that journalists can only take responsibility when they have a better understanding of the conflict and that none of the parties involved is the source of ultimate truth. In other words, this can be read as: peace journalism.
Chapter 2
Theoretical frameworks and methodology

2.1 Media and representation: Understanding frames and framing

On 6 January 2021, a violent mob stormed the Capitol in Washington and vandalised the government building. Angry at the election being ‘stolen’, these pro-Trump supporters wanted to overturn his 2020 US presidential election results. World media, and more specifically the US media, were quick to report the Capitol attack by a ‘pro-Trump mob’, ‘Trump supporters’, and ‘pro-Trump rioters’. However, not a single media organisation referred to them as terrorists, radicals, extremists or white supremacists. Many of these attackers were armed, some were arrested and some even died in the violent commotion. However, media organisations steered away from using the words ‘political violence’ or ‘violent rioting’ for the attack. The two improvised explosive devices that were found in the building were continuously referred to as ‘suspicious packages’ The closest any local media organisation got was to indirectly refer to them as traitors, as American constitutional law and Anglo-American legal history scholar Carlton F.W. Larson wrote for The Washington Post, “So what would our nation’s founders have thought about this conduct? The answer is pretty clear – they would have denounced it as treason.” Larson’s was an opinion piece, which means that the writer held the sole responsibility of the words he used for the event or any person involved in the attack – an attack referred by global media as an attack on American democracy.

While observing the coverage, mainly by the US media, two questions came to my mind: 1) How would the Western media framed the storming of the Capitol had it happened in another country? And 2) what is it that the US media are implying vis-à-vis the attackers? I concluded that the way the attack was framed in local media focused only on the disgruntled Trump supporters, who were incited by Trump – who eventually faced a suspension of his Twitter and Facebook social media accounts for provoking and inciting the mob to take to the roads. Clearly, there was some information that was intentionally selected for inclusion in coverage, and some for omission. This process is called media framing (Gitlin 1980, 2003), and is based on the idea that media present/frame events and people in a specific way that is determined by several organisational and external factors. The concept was coined in the 1980s and later developed as framing theory, and forms the core theoretical framework of my thesis.

Media frames can be explored through two angles: what they are and what they do. To understand the process of framing better, it is important to first explore what frames are. In the simplest terms, frames are tools within the texts used to portray events, people, situations, etc. These frames are generated by the absence or presence of certain elements that indicate some form of representation or portrayal. The elements can be visual, verbal or textual. They can be present as certain words, groups of words, or expressions, also called the interpretative repertoire – patterned features of discourse. They are a unit of analysis that allows researchers to identify themes, patterns and consistencies in text and begin to connect these with wider contexts and social formations (Gill 2009; Wetherell 1998; Wetherell & Potter 1988). It is common for these elements to be present as either stereotypes (in the form of images or use of language) or simple facts.
They may be are explicit in the [news] text or implicit, hidden frames in the form of indicative terms. Another significant angle from which to look at frames is through what they do. We understand that journalists and editors use or incorporate certain frames in the text (the process of media framing) in multiple ways. However, irrespective of how they are present in the text, frames can thematically create and reinforce the imagined or constructed social realities in the minds of the audiences. Among the earliest scholars who defined frames in the context of what they do is Todd Gitlin (1980), who writes that news media use frames to be “replete with metaphors, catchphrases, and other symbolic devices that provide a shorthand way of suggesting the underlying story line” (p. 158). Thus, he argues that the interpretative commentary that surrounds the text is more important that the informational content in the text.

The execution of these hidden frames is called media framing. Gitlin (1980) refers to this as “principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens and what matters” (p. 6). His work focused on news coverage of political radicals during the 1960s. He argues that the representation of their ideas and activities was systematically demeaning, and further that these representations made it almost impossible for them to achieve their objectives. Gitlin’s work was later extended by William A. Gamson (1989), who redefined frames as central organizing ideas, an approach similar to his predecessor Gaye Tuchman (1978). Gamson argues that facts have no intrinsic meaning and that they “take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence” (p. 157). He suggests that journalists intentionally select certain ideas for emphasis while ignoring others – an idea that was later reintroduced by Entman (1993), who highlighted the operationalisation aspect of frames. This is where he extended the understanding of “what they do” to the already established discussion and literature on “what they are”. Entman argues that though not directly measurable, frames can be used to define problems, make moral judgements and support remedies. He states that selection and salience happen at conscious levels (see also: Liebler and Bendix 1996; Chyi & McCombs 2004), as frames help us “select some aspects of a perceived reality” before we use them in our communicating texts “in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993, p. 52).

Reese (2001, 2007) agrees with Entman on the organising aspect of frames and writes that framing is an organising principle or overarching way of understanding social reality. However, Entman’s theory of selection and salience at conscious levels attracted some criticism from scholars who objected to the element of bias in such conscious-level framing. One of them was Lakoff (2010), who extended the definition and understanding of frames to a process that happens in unconscious structures, which he claims are “physically realized in neural circuits in the brain” (p. 71). He argues that frames are activated on an unconscious level, since people’s reasoning is also developed on an unconscious level, socio-culturally.

Like peace journalism, issues such as bias and objectivity also divided the scholars of framing theory, with one side defining framing as an unconscious decision and the other referring to the process that happens at a conscious level. However, it is important to note that framing has been described as a “bridging concept” between cognition and culture (Gamson et al. 1992, p. 384). I find myself partially inclined towards both,
but agreeing more with the latter group – framing is conscious, but fed overtime by politics and culture. This is not only because of my 10 years of experience in field and desk journalism, but also because of the evidence in scholarship that shows that framing is a result of the choices journalists and editors make consciously.

All news stories have a certain approach (to framing). Journalists begin to conceptualise frames as soon as they decide what to write on, and thus complete objectivity is not possible. Further additions are often made by the editors before the story gets published. Although this may not be true for every story ever reported, overall a journalist’s choice of topic, political affiliation and ideological background is significantly reflected in their selection of news subject (Aalberg et al. 2013; Soroka et al. 2013). This is also evidenced in some other studies, where scholars have established a connection between reporters and some factors that may influence their choice of sources (see for example: Armstrong 2004; Berkowitz 2009; Owens 2008). These studies also explain why and how reporters choose certain sources for a particular story. He writes that the choices the reporters make have implications because these choices largely influence a story’s frames, which build its content and message. These frames, as discussed in the previous chapter, are understandably generated and affected by socio-political, cultural, economic and religious determinants. These factors may increase the complexities for journalists, especially when they have to frame a conflict, and represent the involved parties in a certain way. These determinants, together with other editorial denominators, directly influence journalists’ process of conceptualising frames (see for example: Cooper 2002; Gans 1979; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Snow and Benford 1992; Tuchman 1978).

Recently, scholars have added a fourth denominating factor to the list – journalism training. Training journalists for peace reporting will best bridge the cognitive, constructivist, and critical aspects of this framing paradigm. In addition to the conceptualisation and decision-making process, journalists’ training is a crucial part of not only their professional development, but also of their understanding and practicing of the emerging trends in contemporary conflict de-escalatory journalism, such as peace journalism. Journalism training shapes how they understand an event in a conflict or the conflict itself, how they frame their stories through certain lexical choices and what sources they use. It also comprises how they refer to the subject(s) and object(s) in their stories, what approach they take to presenting the entire event and what suggestions they make. Aslam (2010) has written extensively about media perspectives in conflict resolution and has developed a strong case for the integration of conflict resolution in journalistic training. These factors, individually or altogether, may have radical impacts on readers, especially those who are not familiar with the background of the conflict or the event that is being covered in the story. For a reader to take an informed decision on an issue or a conflict, it should be mandatory for journalists to practice what I call informed journalism. This means being well informed on all aspects of the conflict they are covering and the implications of their stories on the readers.

Frames also shape the messages that are conveyed to the readers (Nelson et al. 1997). For this reason, political leaders also invest a great deal of time and resources to promote official frames to media (Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy 2008). In the case of war or conflict coverage, journalists and media
organisations are either given frames by the political establishment or they generate and use their own special frames, mostly exclusive to the situation, to shape people’s reasoning, construct opinion and, in other cases, raise awareness and develop understanding around issues in distinct ways (Gamson 1992; Iyengar 1991; Nelson and Kinder 1996). This is evidenced by how the Israeli and Palestinian media covered the terrorist attack at Pat Junction, in which 19 people were killed. Media on both sides reinforced national hatred for the other side, placing the other country’s leadership on the defensive. Researchers studied how the media in both countries framed the attack, and found high indicators concerning the level of emotionalism associated with the broadcasts (Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy 2008, p. 407). They argue that these framing routines are permanent and influence every news story that is constructed. Separately, Boesman et al. (2005), who studied the journalist-centred approach to the frame-building process of Belgian Syria fighters, argue that frames are activated in the journalist’s mind to “define the situation, to indicate what the problem is, and to allocate roles to the main actors in the story, as the victim, hero, or villain” (p. 303). They concluded that frame-building is a dynamic process, solely driven by the journalistic dealings with sources and news values. The examples above help provide a better understanding of how journalists construct culturally acceptable news of violent conflict.

Frames help journalists organise their facts and opinions in articles and news stories. However, they are not always explicit or, as Entman argues, easily measurable. A story can have one frame or a schemata of interpretation, and may stress specific elements of the event or conflict that is being covered. For instance, poverty may be framed in a way that either makes the poor responsible for their state or holds the authorities and government responsible (Iyengar 1991). Frames change the meaning of the entire message. Without understanding the theoretical concept of framing, media text cannot be interpreted or analysed. The contextual understanding of the way journalists frame their stories in conflict coverage is crucial to my research, as it identifies their choices in telling people’s stories, representing groups, taking sides, selecting information and making suggestions for non-violent responses to war and conflict.

2.2 Conducting frame analysis – two models

Frame analysis is both a theoretical paradigm and a methodological process. In my research, it informed the analytical criteria I developed – guided by Jake Lynch’s frame analysis method, I demarcated a line between peace-oriented and conflict-escalatory media coverage. Frames serve multiple objectives – they are neither uni-purpose nor one-directional. D’Angelo (2002) lists four objectives of frame analysis that suggest framing studies is both cognitive and discursive: to identify themes, investigate conditions, examine how frames interact with prior knowledge and examine how news frames social-level processes (p. 873).

The application of frame analysis in my research served more than one purpose. First, it helped me with the identification of themes in news stories and articles, and second, it showed me how frames interact with prior knowledge to create new knowledge (emerging frames).

As noted earlier, I analysed the frames in media text through Entman’s framing theory – a deliberate, considered and conscious process of selecting and highlighting certain information, and ignoring or
omitting other information. However, Entman’s theory finds its roots in Canadian-American sociologist Erving Goffman’s (1974) model of framing, in which he explains the deconstruction of the rhetorical and ideological underpinnings of news. Considered as the original formulation of frame analysis, Goffman’s work is widely quoted by media and social scientists studying media texts and the use of language with an interpretivist approach. His definition of frames focuses on the organisational side, as he explains in his book *Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience* (Goffman 1974). He argues that the definitions of a situation “are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events […] and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify” (p. 10). However, unlike Entman’s theory, Goffman’s frames work at an unconscious level, where they are adopted by writers and journalists as a set of organisational principles. For Goffman, frames are not manufactured consciously during a communicative process, rather unconsciously adopted during the processes (also see: Koenig 2004).

For almost two decades, Goffman’s ideas and explanation of frames remained the most dominant in media research until Entman (1993) expanded the idea, arguing that the “fractured paradigm” (p. 51) needed to be clarified and synthesised. Entman redefined frames as the central single theme (or multiple themes) within a media text. He argues that the study of frames can be an incoherent process due to the complexities of news, especially in war and conflict coverage. He classifies frames as procedural and substantive (Entman 2004, p. 5), with procedural frames having a narrow focus, while substantive frames 1) define effects or conditions as problematic, 2) identify causes, 3) convey a moral judgement, and 4) endorse remedies or improvements. With these characteristics in mind, it is justified to argue that peace journalism requires journalists to largely incorporate substantive frames in their stories. However, since brief news stories may not always allow a journalist to incorporate substantive frames due to time limitations (such as the urgency to break news) and word count, it may be present more frequently in long-form journalism. This gives long-form journalism an added advantage over short-form, as journalists can capitalise on the flexibilities around word count and deadlines, and thus frames can be better incorporated in such texts. This may add clarity to the meaning and interpretation of the texts.

Frames are created and facilitated by (conscious) language use. The lexical choices that reporters and writers make are indicative of the ideas that are packed into the story as information packages. These ideas contribute to news narratives and the construction of social realities, representations, images and identities. Therefore, one can argue that the potential of effective framing lies in an effective communicative processes. Communication, as we know, is not static, but rather a dynamic process that involves frame-building (how frames emerge) and frame-setting (the interplay between media frames and audience predispositions). As information packages, if they are to remain viable, frames have the task of constructing meaning over time by incorporating new events into their interpretation (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Therefore, I adopted Entman’s theory as the fundamental framework for this thesis to analyse the themes that journalists use in their work. In peace Journalism these themes need not only to identify the causes of the conflict, but also to endorse remedies and improvements for conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and to facilitate justice delivery. However, as mentioned earlier, at the start of this complex process is a simple
thing: language choice. To understand and analyse discourse is to infer meaning from the language used. It is not only meaning that develops through certain language use; language also adds context to the text. Thus, the two factors in language – meaning and context – help analyse discourse.

2.3 Understanding and analysing discourse through frames

Analysing discourse through frames incorporates the intent of the “sender” of the message (Gitlin 1980, p.158). From the headline, the lead and the sources quoted in the text, to any interviews featured, all suggest a storyline that the journalist or editor may have meant to take. In many texts, there is more than one frame suggested. In those cases, one needs to ask the question about the prominence of certain frames – also called dominant frames – in media text. When Johan Galtung was asked to define peace Journalism in the shortest, simplest form, he said it was “to ask two questions: what is the conflict about, and what could be the solutions?” (Fischer 2008). Adding to this definition, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) write that peace journalism is about choices that editors and reporters make. These choices, together with description of the conflict and suggested solutions, make up the frames in a story. Frames that appear frequently become dominant frames, studied and analysed extensively by media discourse scholars. This also helps us understand the function of frames in discourse, which itself serves a function.

In media, discourse is manufactured (O’Keeffe 2011) and its function is to develop/construct meaning, context and interactions between the text and an audience. This function-construction paradigm can have a continuum from interpersonal to broader levels (Wetherell & Potter 1988) based on the interpretative repertoire, also called the analytical unit of discourse, and defined by Potter and Wetherell (1995) as “discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech” (p. 89). For example, explaining ethnic stereotypes and how they are a threat to harmony is the function of discourse at the interpersonal level, while arguing for a systematic social integration of diverse ethnicities in the community under a fair system of political governance is its function at the broader level.

According to Wetherell and Potter (1988), discourse can be analysed better once the following four interconnected concepts are understood: function, construction, variation and the analytical unit. An analyst must seek what the frame does (function), how it has been generated (construction), how many different types there are (variation) and what it is made of (analytical unit). According to Talja (1999), ‘analytical unit’ is a term synonymous with interpretative repertoire and serves as the basis for the construction of social realities.

Social realities are constructed through utterances, which form the analytical unit of a frame. Utterances carry subtle messages that are not always explicit and require interpretation. As mentioned earlier, the cues are sometimes easy to identify as they “emerge as explicitly meant speech acts” (Wetherell and Potter 1988, p. 169), but sometimes they may be ambiguous and inexplicit or implicit. Wetherell and Potter (1988) argue that the meaning of an utterance is “not a straightforward matter of external reference but depends on the local and broader discursive systems in which the utterance is embedded” (p. 169).
When speakers speak or writers write, it is common that they have a certain desired response they hope to get from their listeners or readers. Their objective then becomes more than simple information transfer (locution). In this state, their desired intention might be to make the listener/reader act in a certain way (illocution). The more important or controversial the message is, the more strategically journalists will word their articles. The language and references they use are shaped by their cultural and social experiences, and the context they are used in. It is important not to underestimate the lexical choices that journalists make, as these choices are more strategic than accidental. Journalism is a deliberate process that facilitates the social construction of meanings. This function becomes even more vital and impactful in coverage of conflict, especially in terms of the selection, linking and ordering of terms that in return develop a discourse.

To analyse discourse is to develop a hypothesis about the purpose and consequence of language (Wetherell and Potter 1988). Through my examination of the presence of peace journalism in Pakistani English media, I aimed to identify the purpose and consequence of language used to report on Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the process of their forced repatriation from Pakistan. I unpacked the ideological underpinnings in the analytical unit, which were socially constituted and had direct interrelations with socio-cultural and political forces (Fairclough 1992; Teo 2000). In simpler terms, unpacking the analytical unit, or the interpretative repertoire, helped me construe meanings from the text by interpreting the writer’s selection of lexicons. This consequently brought clarity vis-a-vis the purpose, function, construction and variation of discourse.

The four concepts discussed above help discourse analysts identify and critically analyse media frames used in the text, by paying attention to the elements (indicators and descriptors) that are used and reused. In addition to this, it also helps identify any new expressions or terms (or frames) that are introduced to the readers as either a counter-narrative or an extension of the dominant narrative in media discourse. This thesis incorporates framing theory and the critical discourse analysis (CDA) – a combination of theoretical approaches used frequently by scholars to develop a research methodology to study media text. My research is a CDA of media coverage through an examination of dominant frames.

Analysis of media frames in discourse focuses on four empirical goals: 1) to identify thematic units in text; 2) to investigate the antecedent conditions that produce frames; 3) to examine how news frames activate, and interact with, an individual’s prior knowledge to affect interpretations, recall of information, decision making, and evaluations; and 4) to examine how news frames shape social-level processes, such as public opinion and policy issue debates (D’Angelo 2002, p. 873). My main focus was to identify the thematic units in each media text; however, I also partially covered the other three goals. I examined the causes that lead to journalists framing their stories in a certain way; I also highlighted the journalist’s prior knowledge and its effect on information/end-influence on public opinion. This was an interpretative approach – an approach that examines certain aspects of an issue or an event and looks deeply at the text by “exploring images, stereotypes, metaphors, actors and messages” (Matthes 2009, p. 349).
Frame analysis is a multimodal research process with three distinct approaches used frequently by analysts of media discourse, all three rooted in the qualitative methodological paradigm. One is the linguistic approach that looks at thematic units by analysing the selection, placement, and structure of specific words and sentences in a text (see for example: Entman 1991; Esser and D’Angelo 2003; Pan and Kosicki 1993). Instead of looking at the tone or theme in the entire article, each paragraph is treated as the analytical unit and, through specific words, the basic idea is identified as the building block of the frame (Entman 1993). A major advantage of this approach is the systematic and thorough analysis of news texts. However, the inordinate complexity of this method (Esser and D’Angelo 2003, p. 624) makes a standardised frame analysis with large text samples rather difficult to accomplish.

The second is the hermeneutic approach, which identifies frames by linking them to broader cultural elements (Boni 2002; Coleman and Dysart 2005; Downs 2002; Haller and Ralph 2001; Hanson 1995; Tucker 1998). In the hermeneutic approach, though it is difficult to tell how the analyst extracted the frame from the material, frames are described in depth. Scholars have expressed their concern about the inherent subjectivity of the hermeneutic approach (Simon 2001; Tankard 2001). Nonetheless, studies based on this approach are exceptionally thorough in their discussion of media frames and also inform readers of any emergent frames (Mathes and Kohring 2008).

The third is the manual holistic approach. A merger of the linguistic and hermeneutic approaches, the manual holistic approach is based on generating a number of working frames through manual content analysis of media text. They are then coded as holistic variables (see for example: Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad 1998; Meyer 1995; Simon and Xenos 2000; Segvic 2005). Once the frames are defined, they are coded in the analysis. However, as with the hermeneutic approach, it remains unclear how researchers extract these frame definitions. Like most studies mentioned above, there is no criterion for what and how many frames are found. Mathes and Kohring (2008) have a solution for this problem. According to them, the assessment of frames will fall into a methodological ‘black box’ without naming a criteria for their identification. Therefore, considering the complexities of certain issues, such as terrorism or health care, allowing the researcher to observe the emergence of new frames requires a new coder schema to be generated for every research undertaking. The solution lies in the development of an exclusive analytical criteria, which for my thesis was developed using Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model (explained in detail below).

The manual holistic approach allowed me to undertake analysis of thematic units and identify a link between cultural elements and frames. The analytical criteria supported this identification process. I studied the structure and nature of frames, devoting myself to their assessment and description (see for example: D’Angelo 2002; Entman 1993; McCombs, Lopez-Escobar and Llamas 2000; Reese 2007; Scheufele 1999; Weaver 2007), and also paid attention to the general news content (Greenberg 2000; Weaver 2007). This combination is a common methodological trend in frames analysis in both inductive and deductive studies. For instance, D’Angelo et al. (2005) conducted a content analysis of 267 campaign articles published between Labor Day and Election Day in The New York Times. They categorised articles by identifying them
as using either a strategy frame or an issue frame, and discovered that the stories that contained a salient "Policy Issues" topic tended to be issue framed, while those with significant "Politics and Process" topic tended to be strategy framed. On the other hand, Greenberg (2000) based his study on how frames are constructed and projected overall. In one of the very few studies conducted around opinion discourse (editorials, op-ed articles and guest columns), Greenberg tried to develop a theoretical understanding around what is written on opinion pages about the arrivals of "illegal" Chinese migrants to Canada by boats in 1999. Using this as a case study for his research, Greenberg conducted a critical analysis of the importance of opinion discourse and its contribution to the social construction of the concept of “other”. Both these methods dominate the area of media representations of refugees. Hence, in my thesis, I combined their standardisation analysis of structure, nature and overall tone to identify the orientation of the text (towards or away from peace).

In war and conflict coverage, scholars operationalise frame analysis in two ways. They either study frames individually as unit of analysis, or they study frames as a discourse unit with multiple frames in one text (see for example: Carpenter 2007; Dimitrova and Strömåker 2005; Kerbel, Apee & Ross 2000). Among these, I found Dimitrova’s and Strömåker’s study particularly relevant to my study. They conducted a content analysis of newspaper articles to categorise them into military conflict frames and anti-war or peace-oriented frames. Their study investigates the framing of the 2003 Iraq War in two elite newspapers in Sweden and the US. They discovered that military conflict frames were more common in the US war coverage while the responsibility and anti-war protest frames were more common in the Swedish war coverage. A similar analysis of media discourse was conducted by Winter (2010), who examined coverage of Afghanistan in Canada’s largest and seemingly most progressive daily newspaper. His case study was an eight-part special report published in March 2006, in which he analysed the frames, language and background information provided in the series. Because of the complexities of media coverage in war and conflict, and the abstract attribute of frames (as argued by Entman), the approach of studying frames as units was best suited to my case study. This allowed me an in-depth observation of the function-construction element of each frame, and also the context it was used in, since some articles had more than one frame.

### 2.4 Putting peace in the frame: framing theory and peace journalism

Theoretically, peace journalism is supported by framing theory (Lee and Maslog 2005). They are both grounded in the argument that every news story or an article has a specific frame that represents or constructs some form of reality for the readers. If we remind ourselves of the various definitions of framing, we can clearly see that the nature and function of frames and framing well suit peace journalism, chiefly because of their overlapping ideas of social construction and the representation of (social) realities. Peace journalism’s agenda is to provide context and background development, fair representations, equity in offering a platform for voice, de-escalation of conflict, and non-violent solutions to war and conflict. In the last two decades, framing theory has replaced the agenda-setting theory and become the most applied research approach in the field of media and communication (see for example: Bryant and Miron 2004; Schweinsberg, Darcy and Cheng 2017). The concept of framing has been referred to as second-level agenda
setting (see for example: Jasperson et al. 1998; McCombs 1994; McCombs and Bell 1996; Shaw, Weaver & McCombs 1997). At this level, as Lee and Maslog (2005) argue, framing illustrates how the media tell us how to think about something. Framing activates specific thoughts and ideas among news audiences (see for example: Iyengar 1991; McLeod and Detenber 1999; Price, Tewksbury and Powers 1997; Sotirovic 2000), and peace journalism depends on framing to pass on ideas fundamental to its practice, such as peace, conflict de-escalation, non-violence, humanity, and justice and solutions.

Several studies have incorporated framing theory into their analysis of war reporting, identified dominant frames and proposed emerging frames. Most of these studies are informed by Galtung’s (1986, 1998) Peace and War Journalism Model, in which he views peace and war as two competing frames in the coverage of a conflict. For instance, Gamson (1992) identified four frames used in the framing of the Arab–Israeli conflict: strategic interests, feuding neighbours, Arab intransigence, and Israeli expansionism. Wolfsfeld (1997a) found drama frames in media’s coverage of the Middle East conflict, and concluded that these frames accorded the extremists from both sides more than their due share of airtime, while drowning out voices calling for peace. In a study of state and military censorship during conflict coverage, Carruthers (2011) suggested that mass media become willing accomplices in wartime propaganda and may even play a role in instigating the conflict. Pfau et al. (2004) found that the coverage of the 2003 war on Iraq was framed more favourably towards the US military. Richardson (2005) also used framing theory in his study exploring the influence newspaper editorial framing can have on a reader. He concluded that the way editors are framed can activate distinct social identities and perceptions among readers, in a politically meaningful way, “priming their applicability to the task at hand” (p. 503). Additionally, Fong (2009) also used the approach for content analysis of news items from Sin Chew Daily – a highly circulated Chinese newspaper in Malaysia – to investigate the coverage of the keris wielding incident of 2007, seen as a racial controversy of the time by media and the government. She found that the newspaper had framed the incident in a way that the wielding incident was not given much publicity and thus might not be viewed as important by readers.

Aslam (2010) argues along the same lines and notes that the way journalists cover and frame stories can have a considerable impact on how a conflict plays out. If, through conflict-escalatory journalism, media frames can serve the interests of warmongers, disseminate disinformation and manipulate public sentiment (Aslam 2010), then through peace journalism, media frames can bridge differences, promote peace and harmony, and reflect diversity. The frame(s) journalists choose to adopt in their stories and the way these frames are presented to the reader with a specific lexical selection can define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies (Entman 1993). Along the same lines, Fong (2009) maintains that a peace journalist concentrates on peace initiatives by taking the advocacy interpretive approach, which means toning down ethnic and religious differences; suggesting conflict resolution and reconstruction; preventing further conflict; and creating empathy and understanding. When applied together, peace

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5 The *keris* is a Malay/Indonesian dagger and symbolises Malay tradition. Wielding the *keris*, which includes unsheathing and kissing it, is a means to motivate Malays and was introduced by the United Malays National Organisation Youth general assembly in 2005. In 2007, Education Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein wielded the *keris* at the start of the assembly, and faced backlash from members for promoting violence.
journalism focuses on accuracy and fairness in the way stories are framed, drawing insights into conflict analysis, while framing theory critically and theoretically supports any critical analysis of media discourse.

Understandably, discourse shapes social perceptions. The complexity of discourse requires an in-depth process of analysis to deduce meaning and effect. Unlike a quantitative content analysis that reflects the apparent meanings in communicative texts (see for example: Berelson 1952; Deacon 2007), CDA works on an interpretative level and helps researchers deduce meanings, tones, indications and constructed social realities (Brown et al. 1983; Van Dijk 1997a, 1997b; Cameron 2001). My research incorporates the CDA approach, varying by van Dijk and Fairclough, because it is more than an investigation of semiotic data. It is an interpretative study of context in language use, the framing of messages and ideas, and the construction of social realities and representations. As a methodological process, CDA plays an important role in the “relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power-relations” (Titscher et al. 2000, p. 146).

2.5 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis is a more refined form of content analysis. It helps researchers understand text linguistically and analytically. As Wood and Kroger (2000) suggest, it is an inductive process that “involves moving from the concrete to the abstract” (p. 34). This means that in addition to the “what” of content analysis, it answers the “why” and “how”, thus unpacking the wider context. CDA emerged as one of the dominant methodologies in the study of text in the 1990s, after a collective effort and individual contributions by scholars Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak. These scholars argue that CDA becomes relevant for the analysis of the social dimension of discourse, “namely socially situated interactions, and more global, societal structures,” (Van Dijk 1999, p. 460). Van Dijk (1988, p. 25) presents two dimensions to CDA – a textual one and a contextual one. He explains that:

Textual dimensions account for the structures of discourse at various levels of description. Contextual dimensions relate these structural descriptions to various properties of the context, such as cognitive processes and representations or sociocultural factors.

Applying CDA to media coverage of Afghan refugees not only facilitated my identifying the structure, combination and sequence of frames in the text, it also helped me identify the components of frames. It allowed me to unpack the underlying conceptions or propositions that informed each text, and how multiple frames in a story were interconnected.

To study media discourse, or any other data corpus, from a CDA perspective it is important to keep the concepts of rhetoric, language and context in mind. These develop a link between the explained and the understood/interpreted. Wodak (2006) argues that without context, a study of language would fail to develop insight into a social process. I would argue that any analytical study that includes an interpretive
approach, such as CDA, has its roots in the interlinking concepts of explanation and understanding – what is being explained and what is being understood/interpreted.

This contemplative theoretical attitude towards the connection between explanation and understanding has had been a normative one from antiquity to the current times. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is probably one of the most influential philosophical works of the century that reiterates the difference between this theoretical attitude (the explaining) and a “relative-natural Weltanschauung”, which literally means “worldview” or understanding. Though Husserl’s work on phenomenology is ground-breaking and exceptionally respected, my methodology is primarily based on van Dijk’s approach to CDA. I also take notes from Fairclough’s and Wodak’s works on CDA. Their approach is essentially based on “critical-dialectical concept” (Weiss and Wodak 2003, p. 2), which is the ability to critically interpret the same idea or discourse from different points of view and perspectives by two or more than two people. The term “critical thinking” has itself been interpreted in different ways. As a dialectic it is in particular a Hegelian-Marxist approach, which involves perceiving things as developing and changing. Pavlidis (2010) writes that it was the critical-dialectic approach that Karl Marx applied in his study of capitalist society, “which allowed him to discover real - concrete social contradictions, and to use them and the prospect of their resolution as the foundations of his communist social ideal” (Pavlidis 2010, p. 85). Fairclough and Wodak (1997, p. 258) refer to this as dialectics, and argue that CDA treats language as a social practice, where context has special and crucial value. They write:

Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it. The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge and the social identities of relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people.

This applies particularly to the context of my research study, where reporting (the discursive event) is highly influenced and framed by situations (such as in war, conflict or peace), institutions (such as media organisations, government, establishment authorities, political power structures) and social structures (such as religion and beliefs, social values and ethics, ethnicity, language, traditions and family structures). The discourse that is produced and reproduced consequently has what Fairclough and Wodak refer to as “major ideological effects”. To understand the cause and development of these ideological effects that produce power relations, it is necessary to study and analyse the discourses that represent those affected and involved in the conflict. For instance, in my case study, the way media coverage aids, affects or influences Pakistan’s
– and its public’s – developing social apprehensions regarding Afghan refugees is reflective of the power relations between the refugees, the Pakistani citizens and the government.

There are various strategies of text interpretation and analysis. One of them is “playing with text” (Wood and Kroger 2000). This includes replacing some words in the story or changing the sequence of some words to see if this changes the meaning. For example, if “a compliment comes after rather than before a request” (p. 93). As media stories are influenced by the journalist’s contextual understanding, socio-cultural and political knowledge, and other associations, similarly CDA is relative to the researcher’s background, understanding, and stance. Therefore, no one text can be analysed or interpreted identically by two researchers. Wood and Kroger (2000) explain this phenomenon as drawing on one’s knowledge. The first step, they state, is the process of generating patterns, interpretations, and so forth. However, the critical feature of CDA is how analysts justify their identification of patterns and how they ground their interpretations.

Since the start of the twenty-first century, media practices and content have become increasingly diverse and prolific, transcending their conventional primary function of disseminating news and information. The ecology of world media has been revolutionised, creating a diverse and complex mediasphere (Hartley 1996; Hartley and McKee 2000). Where once it was relatively easy to differentiate news, politics, entertainment and marketing, content has now undergone a “discursive integration” (Baym 2005), meaning “discourses of news, politics, entertainment, and marketing have grown deeply inseparable; the languages and practices of each have lost their distinctiveness and are being melded into previously unimagined combinations” (p. 262). News categories and functions have thus become more complex and harder to isolate, and readers may now need more clarification of what a reporter is talking about (Reese and Lee 2012). Similarly, studying content is not as simple as it was in the pre-digital era. Since CDA can take various forms to explore the meaning and interpretation of media content, it can create a “symbolic environment, with its own internal coherence as a system of representation” (Reese and Lee 2012, p. 20).

2.6 Theory meets method: developing the analytical criteria

Entman’s framing theory informed the CDA in this thesis. As noted above, I used the manual holistic approach to framing analysis to develop an analytical criteria – a set of questions – for each of the four orientations in Galtung’s model of Peace and War Journalism. Through the analytical criteria, I identified the dominant frame in each media text and categorised it as either peace-oriented or war-oriented according to Galtung’s model. However, as discussed earlier, because of the duality in the model (either peace or war journalism), I ran the risk of wrongly categorising a large number of texts that contained either both or neither of the orientations, or an alternative, emerging frame.

To avoid this problem I grouped the frames on the basis of frame elements – a process widely followed in cluster analysis. A cluster analysis of these elements revealed the frame (Kohring and Matthes 2002). The aim of this “clustering” was to group articles and news stories on the basis of the orientation patterns they
carry. There will always be a huge difference between two clusters, but very low differences within a cluster (Matthes and Kohring 2008). These clusters, interpreted as media frames, became my master-frames – that is, frames with a wider cultural resonance than issue-specific frames – and I call them peace frames and non-peace frames, based on Martin Luther King Jr.’s concept of positive and negative peace. Master frames are “flexible and inclusive collective action frames” (Stevens, Aarts and Dewulf 2019).

The idea behind master frames finds its roots in research into social movements. Snow and Benford (1992) define master frames as a function of linguistic codes that “punctuates and syntactically connects patterns or happenings in the world” (p. 138). A news story can have more than one frame embedded in it. These distinct dominant themes, or issue-specific frames, can be traced to a generic, collective frame called a master frame (also referred to as parent frame in some framing studies). Issue-specific dominant frames are an accenting device within the master frames. The master frames serve the same purpose as any frames but at a macro level and comprise the dominant, issue-specific frames. I developed several dominant and emerging frames from these master frames (discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5).

I established the two clusters because the absence of war is not peace, and vice-versa. A text that is not highlighting peace was not necessarily propagating war. Similarly, any media text that could not be categorised as war journalism or having war or conflict-escalatory orientation in coverage could not be was grouped as peace journalism. Clustering texts under master frames provided flexibility to the process of identifying dominant frames – something not provided by Galtung’s model. Many scholars have previously used master frames in their study of media discourse, especially those focused on contemporary global issues, such as war and conflict or environment journalism (see for example: Conrad and Olear 2017; Coticchia and Catanzaro 2020; Polina et al. 2020).

I began the clustering of texts under the master frames by developing a matrix for the initial selection or rejection of news stories and articles. All the articles and news stories were published between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2018. I chose 2016 because it was the year the Pakistani government announced the first official deadline for repatriation. I extended the analysis over three years to reduce margins of error in interpreting media discourse and to analyse what I would call the “bigger and wider picture” for greater accuracy in findings. The four publications that I study in my thesis are available both in print and online. To avoid risk of human error in accessing all relevant news stories and article in the four publications, I accessed the content through the Factiva online database using the keywords “Afghan*” and “Afghan refugees*”. After trying multiple other keywords, such as Af-Pak, Pak-Afghan, and repatriation, I noted that some of the stories were not relevant to my topic. Using “Afghan*” and “Afghan refugees*” as keywords provided access to all the stories and articles that had been published that year and that were directly covering the Afghan refugee conflict. A total of 1,489 news stories (626 in 2016, 419 in 2017 and 444 in 2018), and 61 magazine articles (35 in 2016, 15 in 2017 and 11 in 2018) met the search criteria (See Appendix 1 shows a sample of the media corpus inventory). I have interchangeably used the words ‘the journalist’, ‘the story/article’ and/or ‘the publication’ when referring to the texts in the analysis, since it
varies who makes the ultimate decision on the news copy – either individual journalists, or their editors, or in case of highly sensitive reports, their bosses/media owner.

These news stories and articles became the final media corpus for my thesis. After the initial selection was complete and I had a complete list of all media text, I started the process of identifying the dominant frame in each text by passing it through the analytical criteria. The analytical criteria were a set of questions/elements under each of the four peace orientations in Galtung’s model – peace, truth, people and solution – also referred to as dominant frames. For each element present, I marked the text as Y (yes). If the element was missing, the text was marked as N (no) (See: Appendix 2). The more the Ys a text contained, the clearer the dominant frame was and the more peace-oriented it was identified as, since it meant and thus clustered as a peace frame. On the other hand, more Ns qualified the text as a non-peace frame. In other words, the dominant frames were measured based on the presence and absence of a certain criterion. Where an additional frame was identified that did not fall under any of the four major orientations, the text was marked as A (alternative frame). These alternative frames have been proposed as emerging frames and discussed in the Discussion chapter (chapter 5). The number of Ys and Ns also determined the extent of peace and non-peace framing in the text.

The elements/questions (See: Appendix 1) of the analytical criteria were developed individually for each of the four contrasting orientations/dominant frames, according to Galtung’s (1986, 1998) classification of Peace and War Journalism: peace/war (PCOC), truth/propaganda (TPOC), people/elites (PEOC) and solutions/victory (SVOC) (See Table 1.1 in Chapter 1).

The peace-oriented frame investigates the reasons for and formation of the conflict. The history, background and causes of the conflict are central to this frame and play an important role in the audience’s understanding of the issue, and the construction of meanings and new realities. This frame makes conflicts transparent and ensures all sides of the stories are included in the coverage to allow readers to make informed decision about the conflict. It is preventative and focuses on the invisible effects of violence that can be long-term; for instance trauma, and emotional, social and cultural damage.

The truth-oriented frame focuses on truth and accuracy. Central to this frame is a focus on exposing the truth from all sides so that no information is left hidden, covered up or tampered with. It also attempts to disclose any present political or bureaucratic cover-ups that may influence truthful reporting and coverage of a conflict and its impact.

The people-oriented frame focuses on the humanisation of the oppressed and marginalised classes/groups. It not only tells the stories of those affected by the conflict, but also of those who are working to make peace and help those suffering in the conflict. This frame gives voice to the voiceless and those who are seldom or rarely heard in the media. The people-oriented frame presents the readers the stories of those who lack representations, and focuses on women, children, senior citizens and people with disabilities or those needing care in any form, irrespective of their religious beliefs and state or cultural belonging. It also
names the wrongdoers and those fuelling a conflict. It challenges the status quo and elitist supremacy, and focuses on the “common people”.

The solutions-oriented frame, as the name suggests, focuses on non-violent solutions to a conflict. It suggests resolution and also strategies to stop a conflict from further escalating. It focuses on freedom and non-violence, and building a society for peace. It not only suggests initiatives for freedom, but also post-war and post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation. Over the last decade, scholars of media framing and peace journalism have used these frame orientations and applied a combination of framing theory and the Peace and War Journalism Model to distinguish various forms of peace journalism and war journalism frames (see for example: Lee et al. 2006; Lee and Maslog 2005; Lynch 2008; Siraj and Hussain 2012; Hussain and Munawar 2017).

The central question here is what informs these frames? Frames in a news story can be effectively determined with the help of an evaluative or analytical criteria, based on questions or frame elements. The answers to the questions in the analytical criteria will inform the frame(s), which in turn will inform the CDA process. An analytical criteria can be applied collectively or individually to the media corpus. This means either a common analytical criterion for all frames (such as a simple presence or absence evaluation of the frame), or a separate analytical criterion for each frame (such as developing questions that are idiosyncratic to the elements of each frame). I used the latter approach as this guaranteed a more thorough and in-depth analysis of the text, and more accurate findings. The analytical criteria approach was first operationalised by Lynch (2006), who applied the Peace Journalism Manual (Lynch and McGoldrick 2000) to guide his research. He developed a five-point coding analytical criteria for a CDA of 211 media reports on the Iran nuclear crisis from 12 publications in the UK press. He developed the criteria in the form of questions, based on the elements of each frame. These questions were exclusive to the Iran nuclear crisis. Lynch refers to this method of incorporating the framing theory and CDA as the “coding analytical criteria” or frame analysis method. Each question in the criteria is answered after analysing the text. In this particular study, he sets out five questions:

1) Has the journalist given a relevant, accurate and complete background of the conflict?
2) Has the journalist presented a fact as “a thing known” and not as a “claim” or an opinion?
3) Has the conflict been represented as open in time and space and both sides of the story given?
4) Has the element of bias been nullified by giving an accurate picture of all developing news during the conflict, especially news that may help the audience make an informed decision about both or all parties in conflict?
5) Do the text frames present one side as the hero and other as the enemy, the villain or the bad side?

Taking guidance from Lynch’s (2006) approach, I developed a multiple-point coding analytical criteria separately for each dominant frame/orientation. The analytical criteria offered a significant step towards understanding the context in which the news story and article had been framed. The questions for each frame are guided equally by Galtung’s classic Peace and War Journalism Model, and the major research
question of my thesis: What is the Pakistani media’s orientation in the coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan? In addition to the main question for this thesis, the following supporting research questions also informed the analysis and the findings:

1. How is this conflict, and any substitute issues arising from the conflict, represented and reported?
2. How are the affected people represented/referred to in the text? Are the people suffering in the conflict humanised (through storytelling)?
3. Is the text suggesting peaceful and non-violent solutions to the conflict between the parties, the contrary or nothing at all?
4. Is the focus of media coverage on justice (peace journalism) or on provoking insecurities and hate among the host society for the refugees, further fuelling the conflict (war and conflict journalism)?

The analytical criteria comprised 12 questions altogether for the four frames/classifications in Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model. Due to overlapping elements in some frames, I initially struggled with generating questions that were distinct and would represent each frame individually. However, after consulting studies that had applied this method (Abdul-Nabi 2017; Galava 2018; Hackett 2017; Lynch 2014) for frame analysis, I developed a thorough analytical criteria that ensured that all parts of the model and the Afghan refugee conflict were covered.

The first frame is the peace-orientation frame (PCOC) and has four points/questions for evaluation. According to Galtung, and later in the extension and development of his work by Jake Lynch, one of the fundamental elements of peace-oriented coverage is reporting not only the “now” but also the “past” of the event: the circumstances leading to the conflict and/or leading to the escalation of the conflict. The peace-orientation frame reports the history/culture that made the conflict, and its root cause(s) – it also gives context. To understand the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, readers require information on the history of the relationship and factors that have affected bilateral relationships. Significantly, readers need to be aware of the role of the Pakistani government, its army and the intelligence in the ouster of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1979, and Pakistani support for the American and Afghan governments in the training and growth of the Islamic jihadists (freedom fighters), who later became the Taliban. Thus, the first analytical criterion in measuring the extent of the Peace/Conflict frame is:

1. Does the story/article give background information on the Af–Pak conflict, their historical and current political relationship, and also (briefly) the reasons behind the Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan?

Beyond this background, another important element of peace journalism is that there is equal representation of all sides. This means that all parties in the conflict are given a voice. This becomes even more significant in war and conflict coverage where an imbalance can not only lead to social injustices and propaganda, but also strip a weaker party of their right to be represented and heard. For instance, a study of the coverage by the BBC and ITV of the different periods of the Second Intifada revealed that Israeli views and perspectives dominated the coverage of the event on British TV news (Philo and Berry 2004), fuelling the conflict by
reinforcing hate and shaping viewer perceptions against the Palestinians. Conversely, Al Jazeera was proactive in keeping balance in its coverage of the Afghan war. Miles (2010) writes that when the US administration asked Sheikh Hamad, the Emir of Qatar, to “tone down Al Jazeera reporting” during the war in Afghanistan, he said that Qatar did not intervene in the channel, and that the network had given both US and Afghan officials equal airtime since the attacks. The Qatari Emir said:

We are balanced and objective and never interfere in the news. We give all opposing views. Bin Laden is a party to the conflict, and his opinions must be heard (Miles 2010).

A balanced coverage can generate empathy for the marginalised, only possible if the people in need of empathy are heard. Galtung’s Peace and War Model also emphasises how central empathy and understanding are to peace journalism. Thus, the second analytical criterion in measuring the extent of implementing the Peace/Conflict frame was:

2- Does the story/article give voice to both the Pakistani and Afghan people/refugees and authorities, providing a more balanced coverage?

Proactive reporting in terms of avoiding a situation that could fuel the conflict is crucial to peace journalism and is also emphasised in Galtung’s model (under the peace-orientation classification). It is important to ensure that further conflict is not triggered and that non-violent and peaceful solutions to conflicts are suggested in media coverage. In his ‘10 Commandments of Peace Journalism’, Tehranian (2002) argues that it is possible for media representation of conflict to become part of the solution if “they employ the creative tensions in any human conflict to seek common ground and nonviolent solutions” (p. 80). Thus, the third analytical criterion in assessing the Peace/Conflict frame was:

3- Is the news report/article suggesting peaceful and non-violent solutions to the conflict between the two countries over repatriation of Afghan refugees (plausible regional peace and harmony between the governments and the people of the two countries), the contrary, or nothing at all?

War, conflict and other violence has both visible and invisible effects on the society involved. While media are quick to report the visible effects, the invisible effects of violence, such as trauma, and damage to social structure or culture are often ignored in coverage. The fourth and final criterion for this frame was hence based on the invisible effects of the refugee conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Living as a refugee in a developing country with multiple internal conflicts and economic crisis poses multiple layers of danger and threat, lack of government support, and social and physical vulnerability. The fourth criterion was developed to examine the function of invisibility and the coordinated avoidance by media of giving attention and representation to vulnerable groups. Through this, I noted suggestions for the facilitation and rehabilitation of the Afghan refugees in the host country.

4- How are the issues of Afghan refugees in Pakistan – vis-à-vis arrival, challenges, settlement and repatriation – framed in the text? Does it urge for their facilitation and rehabilitation, or instead stress their forced and quick repatriation on set deadlines?
The second frame/classification in Galtung’s model is truth-orientation. I developed a three-point criteria for this frame based on the elements of “facts and figures”, “propaganda busting” and “human rights violation”. The way media frame an event during a conflict can significantly affect the capacity of a social movement to mobilise the people (Fadaee 2020). During conflicts, information can change in terms of facts and intensity during communication transfer, causing misinformation or propaganda. The concept of propaganda cannot be easily defined, but for some time, most scholars agree on the point that propaganda is not necessarily true or false (see for example: Becker 1949; Bernays 1972; Cunningham 1992, 2002). After all, there is a tendency for truth to also be used for unethical ends (Cunningham 1992) and for true information to be propagandised. Media have the potential to manipulate reality that “extends beyond the content itself into perceptions of resonance and the provenance of the propaganda” (Milton 2020, p. 2).

It is vital to ensure that readers are presented with a true, unexaggerated picture of reality, and that propaganda and any information fabrication are dispelled. Truth is one of the basic elements of peace journalism. It is the readers’ right to receive accurate information that enables them to decode propaganda and distinguish between “facts and claims” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, 2013, 2016; Lynch 2013, 2014). In order to examine whether media and authorities (using media) were reporting only part of the information, distorting facts, and/or manipulating reality for propaganda, it was important to evaluate the element of truth in the framing. Hence the first and second analytical criteria for the truth-orientated frame were:

1. Does the news report/article demonstrate evidence about any of the sides in the conflict with facts and figures, where needed?

2. Does the news report/article generate or dispel propaganda around Afghan refugees or the Afghan government?

In addition to distorted or exaggerated reporting, propaganda also amplifies uncertainty, which is already prevalent in a war and conflict situation. Propaganda also generates ambiguity about the role of the elite, and the future of peace and resolution process. This idea is referred to as “fog and friction” and is reflected in media coverage of sensitive and controversial issues such as refugees and repatriation. The legendary war correspondent Marie Colvin, who lost an eye during the Sri Lankan war, says it’s like “trying to find the truth in a sandstorm of propaganda” (Colvin 2010). In her Remembrance Day keynote speech, she said, “Mutilated bodies. Women weeping for children and husbands. Men for their wives, mothers, children … Our mission is to report these horrors of war with accuracy and without prejudice” (Colvin 2010).

Downman and Ubayasiri (2017) state that the “fog and friction” of war is not confined to the battlefield only, but also often permeates into a wide range of humanitarian crises, including refugee migration out of war zones. Therefore, the third analytical criteria for the truth-orientated frame was based on the reporting of human rights violations in the conflict. For instance, in February 2017, the serving Interior Minister of Pakistan announced in a press conference that it had been “established that Afghan refugees had been used as facilitators” in recent terrorist attacks in two big cities of Pakistan. His statement was not well received by the Afghan government and Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It also raised doubts about refugees in
Pakistan, where the public and media raised questions on the government’s plan to continue hosting them rather than forcing them back to Afghanistan. Such information, even if factual or an unverified claim, can raise the likelihood of human rights violations in the handling and treatment of vulnerable groups. Hence, the third analytical criteria for the truth-orientated frame was:

3- Does the news report/article mention any human rights violations committed by the Pakistani authorities or by the border forces against Afghan refugees in Pakistan or those crossing the border?

This leads to the third classification, people-oriented coverage, which assesses media focus on the vulnerable in the conflict. It requires journalists to tell people’s stories, humanising them as subjects, and bring them to the reader’s attention. It highlights their emotions and situations, their unions and separations, and their gains and losses. It also tells happy stories, where they are represented as people with families and loved ones, and can share stories of their achievements and dreams. They must not be framed as objects of political conflicts.

Humanising refugees can be seen as the opposite of “othering” – a postcolonial concept based on Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1979). Said describes “othering” as a western practice where certain people and groups of people, mostly non-western, are marginalised, made into stereotypes and stripped of agency by the west. One of the ways journalism can bring the social existence of marginalised groups into the limelight is by humanising them. This can be done by putting names to their faces and telling their stories. Considerable recent research has focused on the humanitarian discourse and the discourses of suffering within the political domain (see for example: Gale 2004; Spencer 2015; Waters 2015). Likewise, my research also focuses on humanitarian discourse by analysing media discourse and treating it as a social/structural institution of ideological formation. Ruiz and Emery (2001) write that Afghan refugees have experienced harassment and violence in Pakistan primarily at the hands of the authorities, further marginalising them. People-oriented coverage in peace journalism does not marginalise the voices of vulnerable groups (Abdul-Nabi 2017). Rather it ensures that media coverage includes some aspect of people-oriented reporting, such as a focus on their suffering and challenges. Hence, the first analytical criterion for people-orientated frame was:

1- Does the news report/article report the marginalisation of the Afghan refugee groups: their sufferings, challenges and the atrocities they face?

A people-oriented frame will highlight the suffering of people of all ages and focus on the ills directed towards them. It will also mention any peacemakers working towards peacebuilding and the rehabilitation, facilitation and support of these vulnerable, marginalised groups of ordinary people. Fekete (2010) looks at dehumanisation from a race-related angle. He argues that dehumanisation reinforces xenocentric discourses that are likely to justify their prosecution, just as black people were enslaved and dehumanised under colonialism. Such a journalism of dehumanisation creates an environment that escalates conflicts and causes apathy. Fekete (2010) argues that negative portrayal of refugees and asylum seekers gives rise to xenocentric sentiments and anti-refugee discourse. If we believe that the opposite of this may have the
opposite effect in the long term, then there is a strong case for humanising the coverage of refugees and conflict. My second analytical criterion for the people-orientated frame stemmed from Fekete’s argument, and was:

2- Does the news report/article mention any racist/ethnocentric statements/comments about the Afghan refugees in Pakistan?

Under Galtung’s model, humanisation is another important element of the people-oriented criteria. It stems from empathy and offers a promising route towards justice delivery. Humanisation of refugees does not only mean telling their stories (such as under the “suffering and challenges” criteria in the people-oriented frame). It extends further, to personalising and individualising their stories and calling for justice. It looks at how the story/article has built or developed a connection between the reader and the subject. For instance, according to the Constitution of Pakistan, a 1951 law gives children born to refugees in Pakistan the right to citizenship – a law that is largely unknown to the public and almost never raised in the media discourse. Speaking from my personal experience as a journalist in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, I was unaware of this law until I reviewed academic literature and Pakistani refugee law documents for this research. Thus it became even more important for me to note if the news stories or articles mentioned this law, especially if discussing the granting of citizenship to the Pakistani-born children of Afghan refugees. The third analytical criterion in measuring the extent of implementing a people-oriented frame was:

3- How are Afghan refugees referred to/represented in the text? Could the way they are framed trigger empathy/sympathy and thoughtfulness among the readers for the people suffering in the conflict?

The fourth dominant frame stems from Galtung’s fourth and final classification: a solution-orientated frame. Incorporating this frame in coverage means that the journalist does not stop reporting the related events in the post-conflict phase. Rather, with follow-up reporting, the media must highlight resolution and solutions in the hope of contributing to a peaceful future. This is particularly important in long conflicts and those which have remerged over time, such as the Afghan refugee conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This conflict has two major underlying causes that serve as fuel. First is the political competition on both sides, where one country is trying to win against the other and emerge as the stronger country in the region and closer to the US. Second is the economic marginalisation that Pakistan faces in terms of trade with India, who is now favouring Afghanistan over Pakistan for import and export. Pakistan, in return, keeps Afghan refugees economically deprived, stating the country’s poor economy as one of the reasons.

Demarest and Langer (2018) argue that when conflicts have factors such as these as their underlying root causes, it can create or fuel a further divide on the basis of ethnic and/or religious identities. When politicians and the media don’t educate people on the differences in ethnicity and religion, but rather represent them as the cause of the conflict, this has serious implications for people’s perceptions of the possibility and feasibility of peaceful conflict resolution and coexistence. In ethnically diverse societies, such as Pakistan, media may contribute to exacerbating inter-group tensions and violent conflict, as well as promote national unity and stability. For example, in Nigeria, newspapers helped to shape public opinion
towards independence in 1960, and played a powerful role in criticizing authoritarianism and corruption under previous civilian as well as military regimes (Adebanwi 2002; Ekweie 1979, 1986). Though Nigerian media often demonstrate themselves to be strong supporters of democracy and accountability, they have also played a more dubious role in the country by reinforcing ethnic and religious divisions (Demarest and Langer 2018), further escalating crises. The solution-oriented frame avoids reinforcement of conflict-escalatory ideas or divisions. Since it is focused on finding a solution and on post-conflict developments, it “dedicates particular attention to peace initiatives and reports on post-war developments” (Hanitzsch 2004, p. 487). Keeping this knowledge at the forefront and applying it to my case study, my first analytical criterion for the solution-orientated frame was:

1- Does the news report/article mention any attempts/successes at peacemaking and reconciliation between the two countries?

This criterion also stemmed from the important role of media as a watchdog of society and politics, and has the power to make suggestions for solutions, peacemaking and non-violent responses to war and conflict. Wolfsfeld (1997) claims that media played a significant role in changing Israeli people’s perception of the 1993 peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine. Israel had recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and had agreed to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho. Many Israelis were opposed to giving back sections of the West Bank, which they considered integral parts of the Land of Israel. The peace deal was very important for Israel as the PLO had agreed to halt all terrorist activities against Israel. The Rabin government did not want opposition from the people and thus capitalised on news media, using it as a crucial tool for mobilising Israeli public opinion in favour of the peace process (Wolfsfeld 1997).

Unfortunately, what the government did not realise was that the press had often served as a significant obstacle to the promotion of peace within Israel, because of the contradiction between the logic of a peace process and the professional routines of journalists (Wolfsfeld 1997, p. 53). The media environment is as crucial for de-escalating a conflict as is the political environment; most of the time they are inter-dependent. Wolfsfeld (2004) argues that the media environment could change their reporting style from victory-oriented to solution-oriented if the political environment also demands peace. Several studies have shown how political elites have influenced the media (see for example: Mandelzis 2007; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Wolfsfeld, Khouri and Peri 2002; Gans 2004; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Wolfsfeld 1997; Lynch 2003). I discuss the politicisation of media and the role of Pakistani state and military establishment in detail later in this thesis. Keeping this in mind, I generated my second analytical criterion for the solution-orientated frame around the aspect of government’s influence on people, and its interest in shaping or controlling a media narrative. I wanted to explore the extent of the politicisation of local media in the Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict, and whether media were playing a part in suggesting peacemaking both to the people and to government. Since the conflict is ongoing, the coverage could not be treated as post-conflict, and thus the focus of this criterion was on identifying any suggestions for ending the conflict through peace:

2- Does the news report/article suggest resolution and reconstruction strategies, independent of the State and military, for a peaceful end to the refugee conflict?
I found that selecting one criterion and measuring the difference in its frequency during the three years under study was more practical than measuring the whole frame. Every frame was measured through its own analytical criteria. An analytical criterion could be mentioned once or multiple times in one news story/article. The most mentioned analytical criterion in each frame was selected to represent that frame. For instance, assuming that “violations committed by the Pakistani border force” was the most mentioned criterion among the analytical criteria of the truth-orientated frame, then this criterion represented the Truth frame itself. The frame with the most criteria mentions became the dominant frame for that text, and later categorised as one of the master frames.

2.7 Conclusion

As noted, the components of my analytical criteria were derived from 1) Galtung’s peace journalism orientations: peace, truth, people and solution, and 2) the socio-political context of the conflict. Unlike the conventional coverage of what, where, when, who, why and how, referred to as “the 5Ws and 1H” in journalism practice, peace journalism depends on the insights of conflict analysis and transformation. For peace journalism, the “conflict dynamics” – the context, background, history and perspectives of all involved parties, their interests, goals and relationships – are significant. (Lynch 2007). For instance, while reporting a bomb blast or a suicide bombing, a peace journalism news story would not focus specifically on the death and destruction caused by the incident. It would not blame parties without investigation or even mention names that may have nothing to do with the event. It would instead, “probe why the bombers did it, what was the process leading up to it, what were their grievances and motivations” (Lynch 2008).

There are multiple factors that contributed to developing this specific methodology for my thesis. In addition to an impressive body of theoretical justifications and empirical studies on media representations that emerged in the last decade and demonstrated the success of this method in the CDA of conflict coverage, some factors exclusive to war and conflict coverage also became the foundation of my research. These include the complexities of framing war and conflict that Entman mentions in his works, multiple causal interpretations (Entman 1993; Galtung 1986, 1998), personal agendas through the promotion and imposition of specific solutions by journalists (Kempf 2016), the specifications of story type/genre (Lee and Maslog 2005), and the governmental influence and politicisation of journalists in conflicts (Lynch 2003a, 2003b). Considering all these factors, a qualitative, critical analysis of media discourse was best suited to my case study.
Chapter 3
Critical Discourse Analysis (I): Unpacking frames in the coverage of Dawn and ET

3.1 Introduction

In September 2018, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan announced that he would grant citizenship to Afghan refugees and their children who were born and raised in Pakistan. According to the UN statistics, this meant that around 1.5 million Afghan refugees, stranded stateless in a host country for over 40 years, were going to get Pakistani citizenship. The Guardian’s Islamabad correspondent, Memphis Barker (2018), reported that the pledge could have marked a reversal of decades of hostility towards Afghan refugees in particular, who were often blamed for producing or shielding terrorists and living on the margins of Pakistani society. Barker (2018) reports that Imran Khan made the pledge at a public event, saying:

Afghans whose children have been raised and born in Pakistan will be granted citizenship inshallah (God willing) because this is the established practice in countries around the world. They are humans. How come we have deprived them and have not arranged for offering them a national identification card and passport for 30 years, 40 years?

However, within a few days Imran Khan backtracked, dropping his promise to grant Afghan refugees citizenship, and the debate that never started, ended. In the few days between the announcement and the reversal, there was an increase in tension-intensifying and conflict-escalatory media reporting. Media coverage of the announcement and what the decision could mean for Pakistani citizens was charged with nationalism and antagonism. Media across the country opposed the PM’s proposal and highlighted an “untrustworthy” and “enemy” image of Afghan refugees. In the Pakistani public discourse, Afghan refugees are often linked to terrorism, Islamist extremism, narcotics, crime, smuggling and counterfeiting (Gul 2019). In the few days between the proposal to grant citizenships and the prime minister’s reversal, Pakistani media reflected the general public sentiments, and reinforced the negative representations attached to Afghan refugees.

This is just one example. Pakistani media overall is heavily dominated by conflict-escalatory framing in their coverage of Afghan refugees and their ongoing forced repatriation to Afghanistan. I applied the analytical criteria, developed from Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model, to 1,489 news stories about Afghan refugees that were published in Dawn and ET during the years 2016, 2017 and 2018. I distilled three recurrent themes under the dominant classifications in Galtung’s model. I call them frames, too, since these were recurrent patterns of representation that dominated the coverage. These three patterns appeared more often than just passing references or as interpretative repertoire, and contributed significantly to more than a single criterion, thus emerging as three dominant frames in their own right. These frames are: the terrorist frame (Afghan refugee as the terrorist or facilitating terrorism indirectly), the enemy frame (Afghan refugee as the enemy of the State and a threat to national security), and the blame frame (Afghanistan as
the bad neighbour causing a standoff between the two countries over the peace process). All three of these dominant frames fall under the Galtunic classifications of war and/or peace orientations in media coverage. They emerge from the socio-political context in coverage and are, therefore, exclusively applicable to the conflict of the Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan and the consequent conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I found Pakistani media to be highly politicised. Though the government is democratically elected, there is significant interference and control by the military establishment. After former president General Pervez Musharraf’s government ended in 2008, the military establishment had been infiltrating into media houses. The military has been primarily counter-arguing that democracy has given nothing to the country (Farooq 2018). In the context of my case study, the media echo the ideological stance of the Pakistani State and its military establishment regarding 1) the Taliban, 2) hosting three million Afghan refugees since the ’90s, and 3) Pakistan’s role as an ally to US in the War on Terror. This politicisation of Pakistani media contributes to the conflict-escalatory media framing of the refugee conflict. Since media are a significant arbitrator of what constitutes debate in the public sphere (Borquez 1993) and can influence the flow and content of public discourse, the varying conflict-escalatory framing affects Pakistani reader sentiment towards Afghan refugees, and their perception of the refugee crisis, its origins and its implications. A 2012 study of the role of current affairs media in influencing public political opinion and awareness in Pakistan reveals that 96% of viewers use information from the media to increase their political knowledge, shape their opinion and generate awareness (Yousuf 2012). Non-peace framing in the media has adverse impacts on the peace dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and a (possible) mutual solution to the refugee crisis.

The forced repatriation of Afghan refugees has been a key irritant between the two neighbouring countries and a reason for their failure to reach stable relations since the end of the Soviet–Afghan War in 1989 and the start of the Taliban government in the mid-1990s (Akbar 2015; Weinbaum & Harder 2008). For nearly 40 years, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have been in an ongoing conflict with each other over the movement, resettlement, rehabilitation and now (forced) repatriation of nearly three million documented and undocumented Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The two countries have come to a political standoff over this issue multiple times in the last four decades. Afghanistan has blamed Pakistan for pushing refugees back into a politically and economically unstable Afghanistan, while Pakistan has accused Afghanistan for not taking responsibility for its own people despite billions of dollars in international aid. Pakistan has also accused Afghanistan of failing to control terrorist movement into Pakistan from Afghanistan. The political misunderstandings and accusations have greatly affected their relationship.

They have also consequently demonstrated a ripple effect on the geo-politics and economic trade in the South Asian region, especially with India recently becoming a major trade partner with Afghanistan, pushing Pakistan into the background. Sethi (2020) examines this relationship between Pakistan, Afghanistan and India through the metaphor of a see-saw, “where an improvement in the relationship with one of them comes with a trade-off with the other” (p. 1). The 18th-century Prussian military strategist,
Carl von Clausewitz, observed that “war is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means” (Brown 2003). Today, this war is fought through media, and as Hussain and Munawar (2017, p. 38) observe, this puts media in a central position in a conflict, between conflicting parties. They state:

In today’s world, the media hold a central position in the overall outcome of a conflict given its power to shape public opinion and steer policy support for humanitarian crises. When faced with a conflict, either the media take a side with the conflicting parties and contribute to escalation, or the media stay neutral and independent and contribute to a peaceful resolution of a conflict by not alleviating possible violence.

In the context of my case study, the conflicting parties are the Pakistani State and the military establishment on one side, with Afghanistan and Afghan refugees on the other. In Pakistan, media coverage of the conflict between these parties has been significantly controlled by the military. Though the Pakistani military and the State have always cited security as the reason for media regulation and control, it is their strategic interests in Afghanistan and close ties with the Taliban (Hasnat 2009) that lead them to control the media discourse, and consequently the public narrative.

Media in Pakistan are highly politicised. Over time, politicisation has added a nationalistic angle to media coverage, especially of Afghan refugees. This has also affected the way news has been framed, with certain claims presented as facts and certain facts as claims. Changing the nature of information from claims to facts and vice-versa is a characteristic of conflict-escalatory journalism (Lynch 2014a). This has led to the creation of problematic and inaccurate discursive practices in media discourse that present and represent Afghan refugees, and Afghanistan in general, as the “enemy” that cannot be made peace with. Based on the media framing of Afghan refugees in *Dawn* and *ET*, I make four arguments: 1) all Afghan refugees in Pakistan are incorporated, regardless of their residency status, gender, age or vulnerability, into (media) discourses of deviancy that stem from and are based on notions of the “other”; 2) these (mis)representations, stemming from the conflict-escalatory framing in Pakistani media, actively contribute to the production, reinforcement and reshaping of structural and systemic anti-Afghan sentiments; 3) the problematised framing of the Afghan refugees and the issues around their arrival, (forced) repatriation and settlement in Pakistan is legitimising the collective insecurities and uncertainties of the host country and increasing anxiety around the free movement of Afghan refugees; and 4) media are politicised and anti-Afghan-refugee nationalistic coverage is frequent, thus escalating the crisis within Pakistan and the conflict over refugees with Afghanistan.

When the Taliban took over the Afghan government in the 1990s, the Pakistani media regularly and widely covered the Pak–Afghan political conflict. One of the major reasons for this wide coverage was Pakistan’s strategic interest in gaining political influence in Afghanistan. In the ’80s, the Pakistani government, headed by a military dictator at the time, had trained the Taliban for the US to fight the Soviets. When the Taliban took power, the affected Afghans saw Pakistan as their nearest safe haven, as they knew that Taliban would never fight their “old friend”. The 1990s saw a huge refugee movement into Pakistan, making Afghan
refugees a hot topic in media narratives. However, after some time, these narratives started to change against the refugees.

The way Pakistani media have reported the Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan has contributed to the political escalations between Islamabad and Kabul over the last two decades. Pakistani media have often used an overly patriotic and, at times, aggressive tone when reporting the perceived national interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, the inflammatory reporting also constructed negative images of the refugees, and led to their association with terrorism. I wanted to explore if there was a consistency in these negative images in the reportage, or if they were episodic. Therefore, I included all newspaper stories about Afghan refugees published in the two newspapers in the three years (2016 to 2018). These stories also covered their repatriation and the related conflict caused between the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Analysing reportage over three years not only allowed me to identify framing patterns over a longer period of time, but also helped me identify their frequency and extent. I was also able to identify some emerging frames, which were used infrequently but show promising effects as counter-narrative to conflict-escalatory framing (discussed in detail in Chapter 5).

In this chapter, I have categorised all three dominant frames distilled during the CDA under the non-peace master frame. Despite finding some peace framing in news stories, there was not enough to counter the dominant non-peace, conflict-escalatory and war-oriented narrative in the coverage of Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation from Pakistan. As noted in the previous chapter, this framework allowed me to undertake an in-depth critical analysis to understand reportage as a political and communicative action, which results in negative or positive changes in media representations, public perceptions, treatment and socio-political relationships. Negative changes result from conflict-escalatory framing and include dangerous effects such as pro-war attitudes, conflict, anti-Afghan refugee sentiments, stereotypical labelling, marginalisation and stigmatisation, and lack of/difficult access to health, education and other public facilities.

This can also affect the general public attitude and behaviour towards refugees, especially from sections of the populace who are nationalists and become emotionally engaged with inflammatory media content. Readers can become selective in their engagement with media text that exclusively conforms to their political and social beliefs. Positive changes include anti-war (conflict de-escalatory) proposals, such as petitioning the government to extend repatriation deadlines or offer residence or citizenship opportunities to Pakistani-born Afghan refugees, to lobby for making residence status and other documentation processes accessible and harassment-free, to advocate for better living conditions at refugee camps, access to health and education facilities, and to humanise refugee issues by calling for rehabilitation and resettlement.

3.2 The Afghan refugee as “terrorist”

One of the dominant frames in media coverage was the terrorist frame. This frame directly labelled Afghan refugees as “terrorists” or as indirectly facilitating terrorism in Pakistan. I categorised this frame under the
“truth vs. propaganda” classification in the Peace and War Journalism Model (See Table 1.1), falling under propaganda-oriented coverage. Pakistani media have no shortage of propaganda-based claims about the terrorist image of Afghan refugees and Afghans in general. These claims are often based on unverified prerogatives, and are fed by either the State or the military establishment, or both. It is thus plausible to argue that the reinforcement of the “terrorist” image by the media further feeds propaganda. These images, when established, serve as a barrier in associating new, harmless images with the Afghan refugees, or as van Selm (2003) states, an image of “people just like us” (p. 266).

Positive media images of Afghan refugees are a rarity, not only in Pakistan, but also in global media. Ironically, Steve McCurry’s globally famous 1985 portrait of a young, green-eyed girl, ‘The Afghan Girl’, is the only positive image that comes to mind. Yet, in Pakistan, even The Afghan Girl is highly ostracised in the public and media sphere, because of the short-lived espionage allegations Pakistani authorities had put against her. In 2016, she was arrested from a refugee camp in Pakistan over possessing fake identity documents. The arrest and the consequent espionage allegations clouded the Pakistani media for weeks after her arrest. Although the spying allegations were soon dismissed, the way media had framed her arrest created an image of Afghan refugees that was linked with espionage, lying, cheating and danger. The media were politicised once again, resulting in propagandist framing that spoke for the government and the military. The Afghan Girl was repatriated to Afghanistan without delay.

The terrorist frame is one way of “othering” and dehumanising Afghan refugees in Pakistan and includes a subtle but significant re-casting of Afghan refugee identity. It is evident, for example, in news stories calling Afghan refugees suspected of terrorist activities “home-born terrorists”, “Afghani traitors”, or “illegal refugees” rather than simply “Afghan refugees” or “terrorism suspects”. This labelling, repeatedly using certain words, implies that Afghan refugees are not authentic refuge seekers or temporary residents, but a dangerous threat. Analysis of selected media texts revealed that both the studied newspapers had repeatedly used the words “terrorists”, “dangerous” and “security threat” for Afghan refugees. These representations emerge from “non-peace”, conflict-escalatory framing and also contribute to inaccuracy in journalism, where some claims are promoted as facts, such the reputation of the Afghan refugee as terrorist.

Within the terrorist frame, I found three major ways that Afghan refugees were directly or indirectly referred to as terrorists. First, through a recurrent coverage and highlighting of their alleged recruitment by the Islamic State (IS) global militant group to conduct terrorist activities in Pakistan. Second, by taking an ultra-sceptical angle in reporting the refugees’ use of the Torkham Border (one of the two major checkpoints on the Durand Line), by repeatedly calling it “porous”, a “terrorist entry point” and “dangerous”. A large number of stories referred to the inward movement of refugees at the Torkham border as a “potential threat to national security” and called either for its episodic closure or for further tightening of security through the deployment of more security personnel. The third way the terrorist frame was incorporated in the stories was by not providing sources of information about Afghan refugees when suggesting their connection with terrorism. While the third angle is not necessarily a framing angle, it creates a propaganda-oriented frame that lacks or misses credible sources of information, and by journalists instead making claims in their
coverage that reinforces the terrorist image of refugees. As Galtung’s model demonstrates, peace journalism gives high importance to sources of truth-oriented coverage of a war/conflict. —The use of the terrorist angle in framing feeds the non-peace master frame against the spirit of peace journalism.

3.2.1 Islamic State “recruiting” Afghan refugees

In January 2016, Pakistani security agencies launched a crackdown against IS terrorist organisations operating in Pakistan. Afghan refugees had been repeatedly linked to IS by both Dawn and ET. Over the three years under study, both referred to Afghan refugees’ alleged recruitment by IS. For instance, a Dawn news story, titled “Agencies hunt brothers ‘recruiting for IS’ in Islamabad” (Dawn, 5 January 2016) reported on the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) statement that IS was trying to recruit from Afghan refugee camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to take part in jihad in Pakistan. While the recruitment warning mentioned both Afghan refugees and FATA residents, the Dawn story only noted CTD’s directions to law enforcement agencies to “keep an eye on Afghan refugees”. In another news story, Sheerazi (Dawn, 12 February 2017) wrote about the “IS threat in Afghanistan”, stating that militant IS groups and other elements had their eyes on Afghan refugees in Pakistan, in addition to benefiting from “poppy cultivation and narcotics business”. In a story, “Avenging terror”, Akram (Dawn, 19 February 2017) stated, “What Pakistan continues to face today are externally supported terrorists,” and “recent terrorist acts are being executed on directions from hostile powers and from sanctuaries in Afghanistan. We shall defend and respond.” Multiple stories suggested that the solution was in speedy repatriation of the millions of Afghan refugees as “a component of ‘defensive’ measures” (see for example: Akram 2017, Haider 2017; ET, 2 April 2018).

By May 2017, IS was increasing its foothold in Afghanistan and was a common threat for both countries (Mehmood 2017), but my analysis shows that any references to IS recruiting Pakistani nationals were missing from the corpus, focusing readers’ attention on Afghan refugees only. In fact, there were stories rejecting any IS presence in Pakistan or the recruiting Pakistani citizens, as evidenced in Zafar (2017, 2018). This selective reporting is yet again demonstrating Entman’s theory in which he discusses the selection, salience and omission aspects of framing. According to Entman (1993), frames “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (p. 52) — for instance, by omitting Fata residents from the CTD’s warning in the story “Agencies hunt brothers ‘recruiting for IS’ in Islamabad” (Dawn, 5 January 2016) and reports on (any) involvement of Pakistani citizens in IS-led terrorist activities or recruitment. Instead, the news stories directed and maintained the readers’ attention towards Afghan refugees and their possible recruitment by IS. This could increase the uncertainty around their presence in the country because, at the same time, US allies in the Middle East were facing IS disruptions and attacks in Syria and neighbouring countries. In many stories, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan have been compared to Syrian rebels, backed by an array of anti-government proxies, posing a security threat to Israel and other US allies in the region (for example: “The shadowy world of proxy wars”

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6 FATA is a semi-autonomous tribal region in north-western Pakistan that was merged with neighbouring province KP in 2018 and came under direct control of the Federal government.
Such framing falls under “truth/propaganda-oriented coverage” (TPOC) in Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model, and demonstrates characteristics of propaganda-oriented framing where the focus is on “exposing” and exaggerating the other side’s story, while covering up one’s own lies and actions.

Such framing is incomplete, misinformed and based on unbalanced reporting in which the narrative of the minority group is excluded to give space to “realities” constructed on information provided by/aligned with the State and military establishment. Entman’s argument about the selection and omission process in text is also reflected in Machin and Mayr’s (2012) work in which they argue that media choices aim to suppress certain meanings and focus on others. They argue that these choices are never “neutral” as journalists select them based on the way they wish to signpost what kind of person they are representing and the person’s connection to an action. Since “language is an available set of options” (Machin and Mayr 2012, p. 32), describing refugees as “terrorists” while excluding their refuge and rehabilitation demands reflects a lexical choice made by journalists and editors. Such selections can implicitly legitimise and delegitimise social actors, participants or actions. Machin and Mayr (2012) contend that using functional terms can make these groups appear more “legitimate” than using generic terms. For instance, in this context, using Afghan refugees or asylum seekers will be considered functional, while generic terms are, for example, undocumented/illegal Afghan refugees, Afghan terrorists, IS-backed Afghan refugees, etc. Therefore, given the context of Af–Pak rivalry and conflict (especially after the Soviet–Afghan war and Taliban rule in Afghanistan), referring to Afghan refugees as terrorists or IS-backed without highlighting their legitimate demands and rights under the United Nations (UN) Refugee Convention gives the impression that they and their cross-border movement are causing a threat to national and public security in Pakistan. Such framing also demonstrated depersonalisation and collectivism. I observed words and phrases that gave more importance to certain elements/statements than others, concealed important issues for the Pakistani side, reduced empathy from the refugees and dehumanised them as large groups. These words and phrases attached fear, insecurity and illegitimacy to refugee representations.

The media’s association of refugees with illegitimacy, fear, danger and insecurity can be traced back to their historical image and reputation as warriors and fighters. I found that a large number of news stories (71%) politicised Afghan refugees as the “other” under the terrorist frame. These stories legitimised the public fear and insecurity associated with the refugees’ alleged involvement in terrorist activities in Pakistan. I noted that this type of framing was based on an established image of Afghans as dangerous, evidenced for instance in cases where they were referred to as “warriors, terrorists, gun-toting, trigger-happy people” (for example in “Redrawing of Durand Line to be catastrophic” – Dawn, 21 April 2016). These words and phrases also echoed their international image, where they are seen as a security concern, dangerous, and “dusty desert fighters” (van Selm 2003, p. 268).

According to Pakistani historian Razia Sultana (“Redrawing of Durand Line to be catastrophic” – Dawn, 21 April 2016), this “tough” image of the Pashtun or the Afghan, and their reputation as warriors and martial people, is not new to the world. It was adopted by and used as part of journalistic coverage and academic
scholarship first during The Great Game\(^7\), and later during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US between 1979 and 1989. For instance, David Kilcullen (2009), considered to be one of the most influential theorists behind the counterinsurgency doctrine on the Iraq and Afghan Wars, argues that Afghans are “certainly not averse to killing, but what they really love is the fight” (p. 235). Narratives such as Sultana’s and Kilcullen’s reinforce the image of Afghans as a lawless and unruly people who like to fight, kill and terrorise. This is further fuelled by the fact that most Afghan insurgents fled to the Pakistani highlands and mountainous regions to build themselves sanctuaries from where they have been reported to control movements of their people in Pakistan and across the Durand Line. The border is already disregarded by militants and religious activists, making this region a refuge and safe-haven for members of Al-Qaeda and its Pakistani offshoots after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Existing literature demonstrates that the media can either lead or follow public opinion (See for example Shanahan et al. 2008; Soroka & Wlezien 2010). For instance, in the time of the 2015 Paris Massacre, where three suicide bombers struck outside a concert hall, a major football stadium, and restaurants and bars simultaneously, uncertainty about the involvement of Syrian and other Middle-Eastern refugees in terrorism in the US was on the rise. This uncertainty further intensified when two years later three French National Police officers were shot on the Champs-Élysées. Some American politician tried to assuage these fears and convince the public that Syrian refugees were safe to let in to the country (Ginesta, Ordeix and Rom 2017), but other leaders chose to play on these fears, issuing Islamophobic statements.

Wing and McGonigal (2015) acknowledge the impact such statements had on members of society, noting that this broad-brush Islamophobia was intended to shape people’s view of Syrian refugees as “enemies at the gate”. The authors argue there were many other steps IS would have to take to infiltrate the country. Likewise, IS would have to do a lot more than “recruiting” Afghan refugees to create political and social instability in the region. Afghan refugees have been living in Pakistan since the early 90s after fleeing the war and post-war conflicts under the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. A majority sought refuge in Pakistan for their own and their families’ survival. Going into IS employment in another country would not be any different or less painful than working for the Taliban in their own country, which they had refused to accept already. However, fear-mongering and inflammatory coverage of the Afghan refugee conflict by Pakistani media deprives readers of any non-judgmental inference, and can have the effect of turning public opinion against them. In my case study, problematic preconceived notions about refugees have contributed to media coverage that represents them as terrorists or allegedly recruited by IS. This has established them as a group that Pakistanis (should) fear and feel threatened by.

Incomplete coverage of important issues or events in multiple stories resulted in Afghan refugees being referred to as “terrorists” or their allies. Expecting the pure and complete truth from media would be naive (Kempf 2007), and this isn’t what Galtung (2002) or Lynch (2007) are arguing. In fact, according to Kempf (2007), what peace journalism criticises about the media is their systematic concealment of specific facts.

\(^7\) The Great Game was a political and diplomatic confrontation between the United Kingdom and the Russian Empire over Afghanistan and neighbouring territories for most of the 19th century.
When this happens, the construction of reality on a factual foundation always remains incomplete. For example, for at least a week after former American president Barack Obama forecasted decades of instability and turmoil for both Pakistan and Afghanistan, front page news stories in both *Dawn* and *ET* mentioned the alleged IS recruitments of Afghan refugees in Pakistan (for example: “Pakistan among states that will face turmoil for decades: Obama” – *Dawn*, 14 January 2016; “Obama’s reminder” – *Dawn*, 16 January 2016; “Aziz hits back at Obama over negative Pakistan forecast” – *ET*, 19 January 2016). The journalists not only derived their own conclusions from a presidential address, reflecting incomplete and inaccurate coverage, their stories also had the potential to sow panic and uncertainty among Pakistani readers, and also the refugees. The placement of the stories on the front page also indicates the journalists’ interpretation of the importance of Obama’s address.

I would argue that this adds to the degree of insecurity in accepting the refugees into the host country, especially because most still visit home and have connections in Afghanistan that most Pakistani citizens are unaware of, thus triggering suspicion. A large number of refugees continue to cross the Durand Line frequently for trade, business and/or meeting family members stuck/separated in Afghanistan. To make matters worse, the chief of the Haqqani Network – the deadliest of all Afghan Taliban factions – announced in early April 2016 that the Network was instrumental in winning the allegiance of top (Afghan) dissidents in Pakistan for Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, former head of the Afghan Taliban. This news was covered by media across Pakistan, creating a panic among locals about the potential hiring of Afghan refugees by the Network. The national media had received an audio recording of the speech by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the head of the Haqqani Network and second-in-command in the Taliban hierarchy. *ET* covered Sirajuddin’s speech extensively in a front page report (“Haqqanis helped Taliban chief win back dissidents” – *ET*, 11 April 2016), stating that the Taliban leader was dog whistling to the Afghan refugees to join jihad. The news story quoted Sirajuddin as saying: “If we are waging jihad for martyrdom and can live as refugees, we should also accept leadership. There were some misunderstandings, but all leaders are loyal to the system”. The story continues: “… He [Sirajuddin] did not mention peace talks and only emphasised unity and fighting”. This, coupled with Obama’s unsettling statement about the political turmoil in Pakistan and Afghanistan, further triggered the already tense environment between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

During this time, the two countries were already experiencing unstable relations in the aftermath of two terrorist attacks – one on Bacha Khan University in Charsadda, KP in January 2016, and the other in December 2014 on schoolchildren at the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar. The Bacha Khan University attack left 21 students dead, while the APS massacre killed at point-blank over a hundred young children and several school teachers. The images of blood-soaked classroom floors and piles of young bodies had left the nation shaken and mourning for months. The onus of both these major terrorist attacks was partially put on Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan, accusing them of facilitating the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (“A shift from hard to soft targets” – *ET*, 22 February 2016). In the story, the journalist Sohail Tajik calls Afghan refugees “grasshoppers”, who were “roaming … and facilitating the attackers”.
The maltreatment of Afghan refugees peaked following the APS attack (Zaidi 2015). Given the way the attack was framed by the media, I would argue that the major reason behind the mistreatment was the use of the terrorist frame at a time of such high sensitivity, when the nation was still mourning the merciless killing of so many young children. In contrast, peace journalism adapts its coverage to the stages of conflict, and this was a time when media coverage needed the most careful use of frames. In times of conflict, it is dangerous for audiences to be hardened in their positions, especially those that can lead to violent responses. However, the media coverage of this event activated the opposite reaction from the people and the State. A special crackdown was launched by the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz government under the National Action Plan (NAP) to arrest the perpetrators. Though the plan was presented as counterterrorism, some political analysts argued it targeted Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Within the first few months after its launch, around 100,216 Afghan refugees in the Punjab province along were geo-tagged and biometrically verified (“Biometric registration of over 100,216 Afghan refugees carried out” – Dawn, 1 October 2016). While TTP had taken responsibility for the attack, media across the country reported that Afghanistan was providing safe haven to the TTP terrorists, and that was bringing Afghanistan’s war to Pakistan (“Who wants peace in Pakistan?” – Dawn, 24 January 2016). Sympathetic views towards refugees soon shifted, with possible consequences for ongoing attempts at promoting reconciliation between Pakistan and Afghanistan or a mutual action to eliminate TTP cross-border infiltration. The story also noted that “terrorist and criminal violence has been dramatically reduced” in Pakistan after the implementation of NAP – a subtle hint in favour of the operation against Afghan refugees, and its results.

When media have vested interest in a conflict (Putnam and Shoemaker 2007), then fear-mongering becomes inevitable. Due to this targeted coverage, media consumers start developing a collective “othering” – in this case of Afghan refugees – Ain solidarity with the media. As argued by Praxmarer (2016), solidarity with media can be very selective, and in the face of a conflict, it can lean towards the State. Media, once again, tend to become politicised and take up a nationalistic approach. In analysing the reportage for this thesis, including follow-up reporting, I observed that the one-sided coverage by both newspapers intensified the opposition to and othering of Afghan refugees by the general public. For instance, a large number of news stories (36%) posed the rhetorical question of whether Afghan refugees were innocent bystanders or terrorists. Almost half of the stories demanded that the government block the entry of potential terrorists (46%).

On 22 September 2018, ET published a story quoting analysts and university professors in the country’s capital stating that issuing passports to Afghans born in Pakistan posed “threats to Pakistan’s national security” (“For many Afghan refugees ‘home’ is an unfamiliar land” – ET, 22 September 2018). The story also stated that some of the refugees fell into the trap of terrorist elements or may “get involved into anti-Pakistan activities”. Unsurprisingly, this report corroborated a 2016 Gallup opinion poll, which revealed that 90% of Pakistani citizens supported blocking Afghans without visas from entering the country in order to help counterterrorism efforts. The Gallup survey was also extensively covered by all major English language print, online and TV media in Pakistan. As a result, in less than a year, Pakistan deployed 180,000 troops on its western borders (“Who wants peace in Pakistan?” – Dawn, 24 January 2016) to chase out any
TTP movement into the country, and news media framed it as a decisive operation. Pakistan-based Afghan diplomats expressed their concerns over such misrepresentations and accusations and started pushing for peace between the two countries before matters escalated in the aftermath of the two terrorist attacks in KP. However, despite a call for peace negotiations and Pakistan’s better treatment of Afghan refugees by then newly appointed Afghan Consul General, Dr Abdullah Waheed Poyan, my analysis of media texts (2016) show there was no decrease in representing Afghan refugees as terrorists. Instead, within a week of Poyan’s friendly press statement, over 40,000 security personnel were deployed across KP for local by-elections with a special ban on the entry of Afghan refugees into the provincial capital (“40,000 personnel to ensure security in KP local govt by-polls” – Dawn 20 February 2016), despite the fact that the city serves as home to the majority of Afghan refugees.

The representation of Afghan refugees as “dangerous” reinforced their image as terrorist just as the public were already bombarded with anti-Afghan framing in media. When manifested in daily media coverage, these representations become part of the readers’ collective idea of an Afghan refugee, who is now to be feared, avoided and gotten rid of. However, almost none of the news stories had any (solid) evidence that Afghan refugees were promoting or facilitating terrorism or unrest in their host country. This, according to Lynch (2013), is not a characteristic of “good” journalism. He argues that responsible journalism provides its readers and audiences “with cues and clues to prompt and equip them to develop critical awareness of attempts to pass off claims as facts, or ‘social truths’ as merely interpersonal” (Lynch 2013, p. 34). With both ET and Dawn failing to offer these cues and clues, any sympathies from the readers for Afghan refugees could be hard to elicit, especially with the constant and frequent reinforcement of their image in a negative light.

An example is the coverage by the media of the repatriation deadline extension of May 2016. Just a month before the June 2016 repatriation deadline, the Afghan government officially requested Pakistan to give a four-year extension to 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees to legalise their stay in Pakistan. The government of Pakistan, lacking a clear policy and strategy, agreed to a six-month extension only under the anti-terrorism NAP (which also deals with the issue of Afghan refugees). Media reported this in a tone of fear and panic-mongering, highlighting security threats and potential “costs” of letting the refugees overstay, one more time.

In addition to the KP province, news stories also blamed Afghan refugees for terrorist activities in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. For instance, a story titled, “Six Afghan ‘spies’ nabbed from Balochistan, says home minister” (ET, 26 May 2016) stated, “People of Balochistan are paying the price of sheltering Afghan refugees … We can’t tolerate this hospitality as Afghan migrants are now involved in killing innocent Baloch people”. A Dawn story on the next day called Afgans in Pakistan “Afghan spies involved in subversive activities” (“Six Afghan spy agency men held in Balochistan” – Dawn, 27 May 2016). It stated that these “spies were paid Rs80,000 per bombing, and received a much higher sum of Rs250,000 for carrying out a targeted attack on an individual” (as of January 2020, 80,000 and 250,000 Pakistani rupees are equal to about A$600 and A$2,000, respectively). In both stories, attention is diverted from a
fact (six men arrested) to a claim (Afghan refugees need to leave). When reporters/editors attach a statement or a demand to a fact, the attention of the reader is consciously redirected from the centre to the margins or from one element to another – an idea I borrowed from Entman’s (1993) work on media framing. According to Entman, the presence of some aspects of a reality is as significant as the absence of it, especially in political communication, as frames can draw attention to some elements and obscure others. In other news stories on the same event and those like it, the attention of the readers and audience is drawn from the Taliban presence in Pakistan to the illegitimacy of US drone attacks on Pakistani soil and its potential impact on the Afghan peace process, and to the costs of sheltering Afghan refugees.

3.2.2 The “porous” Torkham border dilemma

On 1 June 2016, overnight, the Pakistani authorities imposed a stringent new restriction that required everyone entering Pakistan from Afghanistan at the Torkham crossing to hold a valid passport and a Pakistani visa. According to the BBC’s Ilyas Khan (BBC, 2 June 2016), many at the border were unaware of the change and were only informed on arrival. According to the Pakistani authorities, the new rule, later applied to other crossing points as well, aimed to limit the movement of militants. However, those most affected by this sudden new restriction were an estimated one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who had undocumented status and were too poor to afford a passport or a visa.

The Torkham border is the main border point between Pakistan and Afghanistan used for cross-border movement. At least 10,000 to 15,000 people cross the border at this checkpoint every day for trade, medical and personal reasons (with and without permits). Altogether, Pakistan has 535 border posts on the Durand Line. The Chaman border and the Kurram Agency border are the second- and third-largest checkpoints respectively, and are used for cross-border movement. The long and porous border is already a notorious source of tension between the two countries. The new travel restriction on Torkham saw further deterioration in relations between Islamabad and Kabul (Yar 2019).

Media coverage of the new border restrictions also reflected this political tension. There were frequent mentions of the Torkham border in news stories, in particular about a growing perception in Pakistan that terrorists were infiltrating into the country from Afghanistan in the guise of refugees. Both Dawn and ET justified the government’s decision and I found recurrent references to the use of the border by “Afghan terrorists”, “dangerous elements” and “miscreants”. Both newspapers suggested that Afghan “terrorists” used the Torkham border as a safe route to enter Pakistan – a cost Pakistan was bearing to let refugees move freely across borders. A majority of the news stories stating that most terrorists were Afghan refugees or had disguised as refugees and were living in refugee camps also stated that these groups were making their way into Pakistan mainly through Torkham border. Over half of the stories in the corpus (56%) suggested that Pakistan needed to urgently stop all movement into the country at the Torkham border. Pakistan closed the borders many times in 2016 and 2017 to control security situations that would get worse every time there was a major refugee movement into Pakistan. A number of news stories highlighted the link between Afghan refugees, terrorism and cross-border movement and how barricading the border was “in the national
interest”. The reader is constantly reminded that unregulated cross-border movements provide opportunity for terrorists and militants to infiltrate (“Afghan refugees may be allowed to stay on till 2018” – ET, 4 December 2016), and that terrorists in the subcontinent, including those associated with the Al Qaeda, usually use this route to enter and exit Pakistan (Baloch 2016). Some news stories also remind the readers of the cost of not closing the border, for example, “Pakistan has paid a heavy cost for being neighbour of Afghanistan ... Now the terrorists take advantage of the porous border, use the Afghan soil and conduct attacks on Pakistan (Bajaur 2017).

I noted that most news stories (67%) that reported the Torkham border restrictions or cross-border movement used the word “porous” for the check point. The porosity of the border due to the limited presence of law-enforcement personnel has been an established fact on both sides of the Durand Line (Safi 2016; Brookes 2017; Yar 2019) since its demarcation in 1893. However, the way the word “porous” has been used in the stories implies its misuse by Afghan terrorists and the threat this porosity causes to the national security of Pakistan. There were more mentions of its porosity in the two newspapers in 2016 than in 2017 or 2018. In 2017, one of the main tasks that Pakistan took on was to make the porous Pak-Afghan border secure by installing a 2,450-kilometre barbed-wire border at Torkham. Though the decision was political and had been under consideration for a few years, the government’s public announcement was accelerated by the negative media framing of the use of the border, the consequent rise in anti-Afghan refugee sentiments across the country, and pressure from the military establishment on the State. Dawn reported that the fenced border would not only regulate the movement of people, it “will also check infiltration of militants from across the border” (Khan G.Q 2017).

Within the first few days, the installation of the fenced border caused several disputes at the border point where border management was failing. It also received the disapproval of Afghan authorities because, theoretically, the installation violated the Easement Rights of Divided Tribes (ERDT) along the Durand Line, an understanding that had been reached between the British Raj and Afghanistan that allowed tribes straddling the border to move freely. After the barbed wire was installed, the Pakistani government extended the ERDT to the Shinwari tribe, which is settled on both sides of the border, but only to within 20 kilometres of the border. This made the crisis even more convoluted as the refugee status of an individual ceases if they cross into their country of nationality. This only added to the complications as Afghan refugees in Pakistan hold a PoR card, which loses authenticity upon return if taken across the border. Many Afghan refugees are separated from their families, who are forced to live in Afghanistan. Most of these travel across the border to temporarily unite with their families, sometimes for as long as a few hours, and on other instances people living near the borders access medical facilities in Pakistani cities near the border. A huge number of Afghan nationals also make trips to and from Pakistan for trade and small business. However, it was found in this analysis that media coverage did not include these human-angle stories, and thus was incomplete reporting. This created a social debate in Pakistan, where anti-Afghan groups started expressing their security concerns and blamed the government for allowing cross-border movement and not pushing for permanent repatriation.
The media and government’s main attention in the three years under my study remained on the Torkham border. However, after some news reports also mentioned skirmishes on the Chaman and Kuram Agency borders between Pakistani security officers and Afghan refugees, the Pakistani government was quick to close the other two border points to block cross-border movement. Media later reported this step as “necessary border management” and “cross-border management” (Khan G.Q. 2017; Khan I.A 2017). Around the same time, the National Security Committee (NSC), the apex body for civil–military coordination on national security, also announced a review of developments related to border management and the repatriation of Afghan refugees (“Top security body alarmed at LoC violations by India” – Dawn, 30 September 2017). This was covered by both the newspapers as feature stories. The incessant reference to the border being used by Afghan terrorists and refugees increased in the coverage at this time. Such over-referencing is problematic as it has the tendency to create inaccurate images of innocent people, grouped under the blanket definition of “terrorists”, saturated with negative connotations and language. This also triggered the “coerced exodus” (Human Rights Watch 2017) of a large number of Afghan refugees who were forced to leave Pakistan unprepared – some given only two days or a week’s notice (Bjelica 2016). The Pakistani government was very clear about its harsh policy vis-à-vis movement on Torkham border and its plans on tightening border security (Farmer & Mehsud 2020).

Over one-third of the news stories (38%) echoed the Pakistani government’s stance on stricter border restrictions and building a fence – most of these stories were from the 2016 corpus (19%). There is reason to believe that a pro-fence media framing may have led to the installation of the fence at the border – a project that started in 2017. As of July 2020, the Pakistani military’s information wing revealed that 800 miles of the $450 million fence had been completed and more than 1,000 border forts built – a project that has been taken much more seriously by the Pakistani government than resettling its internally displaced people (IDPs), who have been displaced by the violent conflict and Pakistani military operations in KP since 2009.

The frequent references to the Torkham border as a safe route for terrorists from Afghanistan and/or disguised as Afghan refugees further contributes to their representation as terrorists and dangerous. These labels contribute to a culture of dehumanisation and demonisation. For instance, Bjelica (2016) writes that amid the border restrictions and forced repatriation conflict, more and more Pakistani security forces personnel and local citizens had started calling Afghan refugees “sons of Hindus” (p. 7), referring to them being allegedly funded and facilitated by Indian intelligence agencies to spread terrorism in Pakistan. These labels were then picked up by media and either reinforced or made into new tags.

To understand the deep impact of this type of framing that creates labels or tags, I refer to Sheehan’s (2013) work on challenging the terrorist tag in the media. He writes that terrorism, like other policy issues, could

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8 As part of its alliance with the US-led “War on Terror”, the Pakistani military carried out two major military operations – Operation Black Thunderstorm in 2009 and Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014 – against various militant groups, including the TTP in the northern tribal areas of KP. According to the UN, the insurgency and the security operations displaced over 2.5 million nationals.
be said to have a culture, evoking a belief set and packages such as “security and terrorist designation” (p. 233). While media can potentially draw on more than one package/frame (Gamson & Modigliani 1989), in the case of Afghan refugees they stuck to only a few (such as terrorist, dangerous, threat). The culture of labelling, if reinforced, can be detrimental to not only the refugees, but also to the overall political conflict between the two countries. The media’s persistent reference to terrorist movement into Pakistan through the Torkham border stigmatises Afghan refugees as dangerous groups or terrorists and makes it hard for them to be accepted as harmless and genuine refuge seekers in the host country. If this continues, it will create more obstacles for Afghan refugees and make it harder for future Pakistani governments and generations to remove this tag, as argued by Sheehan (2013), who states that “for a group tagged with the label of terrorist, the obstacles to gaining what they might consider adequate or appropriate coverage would be further magnified by the stigma of the terrorist label” (p. 235).

I found that neither Dawn nor ET used any positive language in the coverage of the Torkham border restrictions or the fence. There is no coverage that highlights the safety, security and economic needs of Afghan refugees connected to the Torkham border, such as crossing for safety, trading needs for small businesses, reunion with family. Instead, the coverage treats militants and refugees alike, and presents the fence as a projection of hard power by the Pakistani government—a reporting style that is disadvantageous to diplomacy with Afghanistan. It also ignores the lives of Pashtun tribes who have functionally lived near the border for generations and treated it as fluid. The newspapers could have taken a peace-oriented approach in some stories by stressing the importance of and need for facilitated and regulated cross-border movement instead of calling for temporary/permanent closures or aggressive border-management strategies. This approach to framing could have been conflict de-escalatory, but is entirely missing from the coverage. By focusing only on the terrorism angle of the border, both newspapers take a subjective predisposition. Like Galtung, Lynch, Shabbir and other proponents of peace journalism, I also see peace framing as the solution to this problematic framing of the Torkham border reporting, and the discourses of exaggeration, labelling and stereotyping that it has generated.

3.2.3 Missing/elite sources for terrorism claims

In March 2016, a bomb blast ripped through a bus carrying government employees in KP’s provincial capital, Peshawar. The special assistant to the chief minister was quick to hold a press conference and put the blame on Afghan refugees. The Pakistani readers were most likely still registering media narratives on the alleged recruitment of Afghan refugees by IS and their alleged facilitation of TTP-led attack on Bacha Khan University, when they were hit with more news of a terrorist attack. Yet again, it was linked to “Afghan perpetrators”. ET’s front page story the following day reported that “all masterminds [of these attacks] were in Afghanistan” (“Bloodied Peshawar turns into battleground of blame” – ET, 17 March 2016). What is common in the coverage of the incident by both newspapers is that sources were either missing or political and military elite were quoted as the primary or only source(s). My analysis revealed that just over half of the stories (51%) lacked solid evidence of Afghan (refugee) involvement in the bombing, while almost half of them (46%) drew heavily on elites as their sources, such as politicians,
opposition leaders and military establishment. The use of political and military elite as sources became more evident in follow-up stories of terrorist attacks where the allegations were explicitly directed towards Afghan refugees. This reveals the strange, unexplored dynamics of the relationships between the media, public opinion, and political discourse in Pakistan. Carmichael and Brulle (2017) argue that political discourse and the focus on elites are believed to impact public opinion via their influence on the media. By using political or military elites as their primary sources, media are progressing the political agenda, either by choice or through being forced to do so. In both cases, one thing is happening: the politicisation of media coverage.

Hackett (2011) argues that depending on authorities and elites as the main sources of “facts” could sideline millions of people who are suffering from poverty, labour exploitation and private-sector corruption. Moreover, it encourages unauthorised groups to use “disruptive tactics in order to attract media attention” (Bagdikian 2014). As observed in my analysis, giving prominence to political leaders makes it easy for media to undermine their rivals, as was the case of the Pakistani authorities against Afghan refugees. The news stories frequently quoted government officials, especially from the Interior Ministry, which is responsible for internal affairs, public security, emergency management and civil registration. An example is a story that quoted the ministry saying:

Pakistan could not be expected to certify who among the 3m Afghan refugees were peaceful or involved in cross-border terrorism ... Pakistan could only guarantee having no terrorists on its soil when it did not have to look after foreign refugees who also had relationships across the border (“Pakistan seeks US aid for refugees' return, says Ahsan Iqbal” – Dawn, 20 January 2018).

When information sources are credited to political and military elite, there is a strong tendency for audiences to give credence to that information as it comes from a place of authority. Simultaneously, it may take away credibility from the other side, in this case refugees. In such circumstances, there is a high likelihood of creating propaganda and concealing the truth, because it then becomes the powerful vs. the powerless in the conflict.

We saw this happen in the war in Ukraine in 2014, where the local mainstream media took a patriotic stance and were accused of spreading disinformation and government/military propaganda (see for example: Boyd-Barrett 2017; Khalidarova & Pantti 2016; Nygren et al. 2018). The “enemy” was almost invisible, and only a few articles mentioned the rebels in eastern Ukraine (Nygren et al. 2018). Hackett (2011) further argues that elites can utilise their space in media coverage to deflect and distract the audience from their violations and the deadly implications of their policies. This can manipulate and misinform the readers, who start giving credibility only to officials’ claims (Lynch 2013). Both Dawn and ET reported extensively on the KP bus bomb attack, consistently highlighting elite sources from the Pakistani government linking Afghan refugees with terrorism in Pakistan. One of the most commonly quoted officials was KP’s chief minister Pervez Khattak, who had been vocal against settlement and rehabilitation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and had been pushing for their early repatriation. A Dawn news story focused on his statements,
alleging that “funding of terrorists from across the border was the basic cause of terrorism [in Pakistan]” (“Traders, govt vow to jointly fight terrorism” – *Dawn*, 19 March 2016).

The widespread references, without legitimate sources, to Afghan refugees as terrorists or as facilitating terrorism creates a (non) reality that I see as beyond bland stereotyping. In Pakistan, Afghan refugees inarguably constitute the most marginalised groups of the population – both financially and due to the lack of access to public services, including housing, health and education. It would take a lot more effort, mobilisation, coordination and intelligence for vulnerable groups such as Afghan refugees to create terrorism in the host country, an argument Wing and McGonigal (2015) also make for Syrian refugees accused of terrorism in Europe. However, my analysis suggests that framing Afghan refugees as terrorists or potential terrorists could make them terrorists in the minds of the readers. This is also evident from the post-APS attack arrests across Pakistan. The CTD had arrested 480 men (criminals and militants) during 2014 and 2015 and processed their data under a new system called Evidence-Based Policing. The results showed that of these men, 437 were locals (Pakistani citizens) and only 23 were Afghan refugees. Among all these men, 35 had received formal jihad training to become militants. Only one of them was a militant trained in Afghanistan. This information was largely missing from coverage, thus distorting the perception of Afghan refugees for the Pakistani reader, especially when there is such a huge discrepancy in the proportion of reality and representation that informs perceptions and then action.

Lynch and Galtung (2010) argue that peace-orientation in framing stems from a balanced coverage, and can be accomplished by a) focusing on all conflict phases (before, during and after), b) explaining the background of why a conflict was formed in the first place, and c) giving voice to ordinary people as well as elites. However, instead of this approach, the two publications – in particular *Dawn* – took the position that it was because of Afghan refugees that terrorism in Pakistan was impossible to eliminate (“'Negligence of Pakhtuns led to murder of Dr Najib' – *Dawn*, 27 September 2016). This was further reinforced by the choice of sources quoted in their stories. Journalists often marginalise activists whose opinions are outside the mainstream (Hooks 1992; Van Dijk 1996) or against the interest of political elites and policy makers, as media tend to favour elites over political challengers or weaker groups (Reese 1991). I noted that quotes from rights activists were generally missing from the coverage. In this respect, journalists play a particularly strong role, as they need sources “to fill news holes, meet deadlines, provide drama and add issue balance” (Terkildsen et al. 1998, p. 48) but they also have the unique ability to “choose who speaks (or does not speak) in news coverage” enabling them “to frame news without appearing to do so” (Schneider 2012, p. 72).

### 3.3 Afghan refugee as the “enemy” of the State

In January 2018, the curriculum taught to Afghan children at refugee camps in Pakistan became the centre of a regional controversy after the Pakistani government accused the UNHCR of teaching anti-Pakistan curriculum to grade 1–6 students. The government stated that the UNHCR had made some changes to the English language and Social Studies curriculum without any approval from the provincial and federal
education departments. The UNHCR refuted the accusations and stated that the syllabi were being taught at schools across Afghanistan, and that teaching the same curriculum at refugee camps would help prepare pupils for their integration into the schooling system in Afghanistan, when or if they decided to return. Pakistani government’s “great concern” was about the visibility of the Afghan flag on every page of the English books, India being presented as a friendly country (to Afghanistan), disputed Kashmir being shown as part of India, and the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan being referred to as the Durand Line (Siddiqui 2018). The dispute was picked up by all Pakistani media, including Dawn and ET, who reported the changes as “anti-state propaganda”, “anti-Pakistan” and an “agenda of anti-state elements” (Liaquat 2018; Siddiqui 2018). Instead of clarifying that the children were being taught the same curriculum as those at schools in Afghanistan, the media reported that these changes were for an “enemy in the making”. As ET reported, “Following the appearance of anti-Pakistan posters on public transport buses in London, this is another instance where education has been used to promote the agenda of enemy elements” (Liaquat 2018), referring to Afghanistan.

The enemy frame emerged as the second most prominent frame in my analysis of media coverage. As the name suggests, this frame represents Afghan refugees as the “enemy” of the State and of the Pakistani nation at large. This political stance is common across the country and already a cause of collective uncertainty among Pakistani citizens regarding Afghan refugees, who are seen as a potential threat. It is also evident from my analysis: 36% of the news stories used the word “enemy” or “anti-state” for Afghan refugees, directly framing them in a negative light. Concurrently, over half of the news stories (57%) made indirect references to Afghan refugees using terms such as “enemy”, “threat”, “alien”, “illegal”, “uncertainty”, “suspicious”, “snake(s)”, and “friends with the enemy” (referring to Afghanistan’s growing friendly terms with India). Additionally, a large number of news stories (56%) that primarily referred to Afghan refugees as terrorists also referred to them as the enemy of Pakistan, indicating multiple non-peace frames in a single story. Such targeted, frequent and, at times, saturated media framing represented Afghan refugees as the “enemy” can cause Pakistan citizens to be suspicious about refugees, in particular developing a suspicion about their presence and movement inside Pakistan. This type of framing highlights refugees as a potential threat, and becomes one of the main ways through which media dehumanise refugees (Esses, Medianu & Lawson 2013; Henry & Tator 2002).

The enemy frame dehumanises refugees and draws upon existing stereotypes that are embedded within a society about individuals associated with an “out-group” (“them” or “other”). According to Halpern and Weinstein (2004), out-groups often lose their identity and come to represent mere categories. This is evidenced in the use of the words “illegal aliens” for Afghan refugees (“Murad voices concern over PM's plan to grant nationality to ‘aliens’” – Dawn, 19 September 2018), noted 14 times in the corpus, and Sheikh’s (2018) repeated reference to Afghan refugees as “dubious” and a “major security threat”. The enemy framing occurs first on an individual level, where individual members of the Afghan refugee community are singled out in reportage, and later shifts to a collective negative identity, which is part of the dehumanisation process. According to Bahador (2012), the “us vs. them” discourse prevents members of the in-group (“us” and “we”) from associating with the out-group. As a result, negatively perceived
actions by an out-group, even if conducted by a few, are projected to the entire population, and this further delegitimises all members, who thus become the enemy.

The process of “becoming the enemy” through negative media representations takes place over time and may stretch from the pre-violent phase of the conflict to the post-conflict or cold war phase. Media can be independently and deliberately biased, or politically motivated with added pressures from the State or military establishment to align with State policy towards a particular group or event. This is where the State enters the war/conflict using soft power. The biggest proof of a State entering a war/conflict or committing atrocities against a marginalised group lies in its use of media to mobilise the public to stand with the government and amplify its stance (Bahador 2012). This process includes creating images through media framing. For instance, during the pre-violent phase, enemy images created and reinforced with the help of framing, metaphors, narratives, ideas, myths and images in reporting can delegitimise a particular group for political purposes. This process of creating enemy images of the target groups can strip them off “their human qualities so that their destruction becomes justifiable and even desirable” (Bahador 2012, p. 195) both in the pre-violent phase and during the conflict.

In 2015 and 2016, public attitudes towards Afghan refugees deteriorated dramatically as a result of the government crackdown against Afghans, in which 350,000 refugees were forcibly repatriated in 2016 alone (HRW 2017). Simultaneously, negative media coverage that resonated the political stance and dehumanised the refugees was on the rise. Discourses that dehumanise or demonise subjects make certain policy options more, or less, appropriate for the public and the government, such as policies on refugee settlement or humanised voluntary repatriation. These discourses narrow down the possibilities for peace, resettlement and integration, while making other policies feasible (Jackson 2019), such as the State-led forced exodus of Afghan refugees from Pakistan.

Stories with the enemy frame generally featured a protagonist, who represented “the enemy”, but lacked quotes from the affected people. One of the major stories in ET reported the induction of an Afghan refugee into the National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) as a data-entry operator (Shehzad 2016) and used the enemy frame. The story covered the alleged involvement of two local KP parliamentarians who facilitated the hiring. According to the story, an Afghan refugee named Roohullah obtained a domicile certificate by the “misrepresentation and concealment of facts and also managed to get a computerised national identity card for himself and his family members” (Shehzad 2016). The news story notes that Roohullah’s father had migrated from Afghanistan in the ’80s, and focuses on the “forgery” accusation. However, it fails to mention why Roohullah still had refugee status, decades after his family had arrived in Pakistan and sought refuge and PoR cards. In fact, the story does not mention whether Roohullah also arrived in Pakistan with his parents as a child or was born there. This is crucial information that, if included, would have challenged authority’s treatment of the Afghan refugee’s pending residency status, and could have caused an investigation to be initiated.
The journalist omits this angle, consequently removing the opportunity for readers to comprehend and reflect, and thus for it to be included in the mainstream narrative. In doing so, the journalist is limiting the readers’ interpretation options to refugees being “unfaithful”, “liars”, “cheats”, “frauds”, and thus the “enemy”. The story also states, “it had emerged that some top officers of the NADRA helped terrorists and other miscreants in obtaining fake national identity cards,” though no background evidence on the source of this information is given (note the casual and unrelated reference to terrorism). The story does not quote Roohullah; rather, it marginalises him, and deprives him of a voice. Several other arrests of Afghan refugees over obtaining fake Pakistani passports were also reported, for instance by ET (“Afghan national arrested with fake Pakistani passport” – ET, 10 April 2016). The news story, yet again, lacked any background information, any details of how NADRA officials were involved in the issuance of fake documents or if any officials’ arrests were made. The incomplete coverage of 137-words leaves the readers with only one piece of information: Afghan refugees are illegal and illegal residents are the enemy of the State and its people. This is a trait of conflict-oriented and elite-oriented journalism.

According to veteran American political scientist Harold Lasswell, presenting the “enemy” as the troublemaker is crucial for generating hate against them, and the best tool for this mass mobilisation is the media. He states, “For mobilization of national hatred the enemy must be represented as a menacing, murderous aggressor, a satanic violator of the moral and conventional standards, an obstacle to the cherished aims and ideals to the nation as a whole and of each constituent part” (cited in Merskin 2004, p. 162). The use of such problematic interpretative repertoire in framing misrepresents the image of the group in question and triggers a collective hostility and uncertainty towards them from the host country (Merskin 2004), potentially breeding anger, hatred, and resentment toward them (Rodriguez 2000). I noted that the vocabulary used to describe Afghan refugees adopted the language of panic and uncertainty, coupled with a sense of invasion by a foreign enemy (see also: Esses et al. 2013; Fleras 2011; Hier & Greenberg 2002). This is evidenced in Akram’s (2018) story for Dawn where he states, “Pakistan’s agencies must be equipped with the most advanced surveillance and data collection techniques to detect future Jadhevs or Osamas and neutralise any ‘black ops’, ‘false-flag’ or infiltration operations planned by enemy agencies”, referring to India, Afghanistan and the growing partnership between the two countries.

Due to the fear and threats from the “enemy”, there was an increase in a public demand for stern scrutiny of Afghan refugees by police throughout the year. I noted that a small portion of news stories (7%) reported the people’s demand for extreme vetting procedures for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. An ET news story that covered a protest reported the demonstrators demanded a set timeframe for the return of Afghan refugees living in different parts the country “instead of initiating a long process of rechecking and blocking Computerised National Identity Cards” (“Protesting traders demand expulsion of Afghans”, 2016). By March 2016, in addition to KP, the Sindh and Balochistan provinces had also started making similar demands for early repatriation of Afghan refugees. However, what most journalists did not report was that

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9 Osama here refers to Al Qaeda’s former leader, Osama bin Laden, while Kulbhushan Jadhev is an Indian national who was convicted for espionage by a Pakistani military court in 2017. At the time of this research, he is currently on a death row in a Pakistani prison.
most of these demands were coming from the business sector, who said their businesses had been affected by Afghan traders. Since narratives that represent Afghan refugees as “terrorists” dominate the media, such incomplete reporting can only leave readers to rely on their preconceived notions and believe that these demands may be connected to terrorism-related insecurities rather than economic impacts. These representational forces were also starkly demonstrated in the aftermath of the delay in the national census in 2016, reportedly because of the “presence of Afghan refugees” (Shah and Rizvi 2016). The political quandaries thrown up due to what was actually an official delay were smoothed over by placing the onus on to the presence of Afghan refugees in the country, which further fuelled the calls for swift repatriation in the name of a nationalist cause.

With increasing demands across the country for their early repatriation, the first repatriation deadline of 2016 was set to be 30 June. As the date drew closer, framing patterns in both Dawn and ET highlighted Pakistan’s positive role in the process but reported “no reciprocity from the Afghan side”. In July, another campaign was launched in KP called Go Afghani Go (“Go Afghani Go’ campaign launched in Haripur”, 2016). Within hours, it was top of the Twitter trending list in the country (Ali 2017). A digital mob emerged in support of a slew of xenophobic hashtags. This concerted effort on social media can be seen as part of the feedback loop caused by anti-Afghan-refugee coverage in mainstream media that has been part of such media discourse in Pakistan, and emerged especially after the 2014 terrorist attack on APS (Ali 2017).

In my analysis I made three major observations: 1) from 2016–2018, there was a visible increase in the frequency of news stories that referred to Afghan refugees as enemies or anti-State and linked them with terrorism and militancy, among other crimes, thus reinforcing the public’s perception of them as a threat; 2) Pakistani government officials, including the military establishment, were heavily quoted and were very clear on the need for a reverse mass exodus of Afghan refugees by the end of 2020 for “security” reasons; and 3) the framing of the coverage and the high frequency of news stories on the Afghan refugee crisis amplified the level and scale of the conflict in the mind of the reader. Thiel and Kempf (2014) argue that escalatory and de-escalatory frames can directly affect the way the recipients understand the content and their prior position towards the conflict. Thus these three factors could strongly influence audience responses to Afghan refugees as the “enemy”. The creation and maintenance of the enemy images, such as those of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, are used to justify and in some cases even encourage aggression, hate and violence against groups identified as the enemy.

### 3.4 Afghanistan as the “bad neighbour”

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a history of incalculably hostile relations. Both sides have often accused the other of non-cooperation in the peace process and facilitating, protecting or providing safe haven to Taliban groups and other terrorist groups. The Afghan refugee crisis further increased political tensions, human suffering due to conflict, and the political blame-game. My analysis revealed that the blame frame, as I refer to it, was very common in the media coverage. In 61% of the news stories, Afghan refugees and the Afghan government were blamed for non-cooperation or situational escalation. Journalists in these
stories blamed Afghanistan for hampering the peace process in the region, referring to their attitude as “child-like”, “immature” and “unpredictable”. The stories framed Afghan refugees as the “burden” from the “bad” neighbour, who is “thankless”, a “user” and a “traitor”.

Three accusations against the Afghan government were recurrent in the coverage. First that the Afghan government was deliberately not taking back Afghan refugees, despite peace in their home country and Pakistan having hosted over three million Afghan refugees for over four decades. The second most common way the blame frame was used in coverage was by accusing Afghanistan of aligning with India against Pakistan. Stories that incorporated this focused on the growing relations between Afghanistan and India and how the Indian government and intelligence services were using Afghan refugees in Pakistan for spying, terrorism and other criminal activities in Pakistan. Thirdly, stories claimed that the Afghan government was insecure about Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban and wanted Pakistan out of the Taliban–Afghan peace process. These stories focused on how peace in the region was impossible without including Pakistan in the process and blamed Afghanistan for delaying the process and consequently the complete repatriation of Afghan refugees.

Like the terrorist frame and the enemy frame, I noted that the blame frame is also commonly employed in nationalistic media coverage. The blame frame is also triggered mostly by blatant propaganda, bias and selectivity. This is an ideal application of what Herman and Chomsky (2010) call “dual standard” or propaganda-orientated coverage. Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) define propaganda as “the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (as cited in Lynch 2010, p. 72). Lynch’s (2010) study also adopts Herman and Chomsky’s explanation of propaganda in which “the media serve, and propagandise on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them” (p.72). For instance, both Dawn and ET were remarkably critical of Kabul’s disapproval of Pakistan’s contacts with the Afghan Taliban, but also mentioned the silence of President Ghani’s administration over the Iranian ambassador’s visit to Kabul in December 2016, knowing that Iran had contacts with the Taliban. Similarly, both Dawn and ET also mentioned the Afghan government’s silence when Russia admitted their contacts with the Taliban, stating “that did not enrage the Afghan government” even after Amir Kabulov, Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan stated, “Taliban interests objectively coincide with ours” (Khan, T 2016). A few months later, both newspapers also mentioned the American “duplicity” in dealing with the Afghan Taliban, stating “they directly contact/deal with the Afghan Taliban in times of need, whereas they continuously pressure Pakistan to take punitive actions against the Afghan Taliban” (Jaspal 2017). These are examples of media coverage where political statements have been framed as a tug-of-war between countries (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, US, and so on) and their hypocrisy in terms of accepting certain situations for themselves but blaming the other country for being in the same situation. These are negative connotations that a common citizen may miss, but a reader may not. By employing the blame frame with such high frequency, journalists are creating propaganda by using their influence over the reader. In such a hostile environment, peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution becomes difficult or nearly impossible.
Dawn and ET were also quick to criticise the Afghan president’s dealing with Pakistan and present him in a negative light, accusing him of showing disinterest in resolving the Afghan refugee crisis and leaving refugees as a “burden” on Pakistan. This is demonstrated in the way the Heart of Asia conference was covered, for instance the following story opener: “You rarely get to see a participating country being humiliated at a multilateral conference like what happened” during this conference where “Afghan President Ashraf Ghani embarrassed our foreign policy adviser” (Mohammad 2016). The news story also stated:

The Afghan president has perhaps forgotten which neighbouring country helped the Afghans during the Soviet occupation and which neighbour supported the Soviets. Mr Ghani has also forgotten that Pakistanis opened their hearts and homes to give shelter to more than three million Afghan refugees for more than three decades which led to the “terrorism” he mentioned.

What this story and other coverage of the conference (see for example: Akram 2016) omits is that it was President Ghani who first reached out to Pakistan, which suffered a huge setback when the Murree talks in July earlier that year failed. Pakistan had promised the Afghan president that it would bring the Taliban leaders to the negotiating table, but the last-minute confirmation of the death of Haqqani/Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansoor not only derailed the talks but raised serious doubts about Pakistan’s intentions. The Haqqani/Taliban leader was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan’s Balochistan province on 21 May 2016. Pakistan took days to confirm his death, bringing the country under international fire for serving as a safe haven for Taliban and other militants – a concern the Afghan government demonstrated when a Taliban delegation visited Pakistan in April 2016. However, instead of including the background and formation of this conflict in their coverage, Dawn and ET deviated their framing focus to the US drone attack “undermining the Afghan peace process” (Yousuf 2016). Instead, the news story mentioned how this use of force by the US “will further destabilise Afghanistan, which will have negative implications on the region, especially due to the presence of large numbers of terrorist groups in the country”. Mullah Mansour’s body was sent to Afghanistan on 30 May. Because he had been focusing on Afghan refugees in his speeches and using them as a reason behind making frequent visits to Pakistan, Afghan refugees naturally bore the brunt of his killing and were once again targeted in media coverage.

After the withdrawal of the Taliban from the Murree Peace Talks in July 2015, the 2016 conference gave both Pakistan and Afghanistan an opportunity to work out their differences and negotiate a settlement on Afghan refugees. However, President Ghani’s political affiliation soon started tilting towards India, triggering unhappiness from Pakistan that was visibly represented in media coverage. The coverage began to employ more blame framing after President Ghani refused the 500 million USD financial assistance Pakistan offered at the conference to expedite refugee repatriation. Instead, he inaugurated the Salma Dam, a hydro-power station in Herat province, along with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Pakistan’s unhappiness was translated into open hostility towards Afghan refugees, and the media reflected this. A sharp rise in refugee returns was seen in the second half of the year. Bjelica (2016) states that as “returning Afghan refugees traced the upsurge in enmity to the inauguration of the Salma Dam; after that, they said
Pakistani police started to insult them, calling them ‘sons of Hindus’ and ‘nieces of Narendra Modi’” (Bjelica 2016, p. 7). Both newspapers reported the refusal as an insult to Pakistan. I found that for the next six months, both *Dawn* and *ET* actively referred to this as a “humiliation” and blamed the Afghan government for their “immaturity” and “non-seriousness” in resolving the Afghan refugee conflict. When President Ghani refused the offer of financial help he suggested the Pakistani government should spend the money eradicating terrorism from their own country. *Dawn* and *ET* were quick to frame this as President Ghani mocking Pakistan and highlighting its failure to curb terrorism. Furthermore, media coverage suggested that Afghanistan had refused the offer on India’s behest. An implication of such lexical choices in framing can be that readers get angry and blame Afghanistan – and Afghan refugees – for their ingratitude and for the humiliation on an international stage. As Akram (2016) reported for *ET*:

> It was sad to witness the humiliation of Pakistan’s adviser on foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, by his Indian hosts and the Afghan president in Amritsar… The conference was misused by India, the rotational host, to promote its single agenda of portraying Pakistan as a “terrorist” state in order to “isolate” it…The hostility and insults which should have been expected from India and Afghanistan’s president… Mr Aziz’s display of self-restraint is no doubt admirable. But the Indian and Afghan insults were not merely to his person; these were insults to the national dignity of Pakistan and, as such, they ought not to have been tolerated.

These negative sentiments were also indirectly legitimised by the widespread coverage of an Afghan Taliban delegation’s visit to Pakistan in April 2016 to “discuss the Afghan refugee crisis”. Instead of reporting the subject or outcome of the talks between the Taliban delegation and the Pakistani government, there was an unusual emphasis on the unrelated news of President Ghani’s recent refusal to accept “any help” from Pakistan (in Af-Pak peace talks). I understand this detour from a very important meeting between the Pakistani officials and the Taliban as a demonstration of what Gamson (1992) refers to as the *feuding neighbours* frame. A few days after the Taliban delegation left Pakistan, Kabul suffered a deadly attack leaving 64 people dead. In the aftermath of the attack, President Ghani said his country will no longer seek Pakistan’s help for peace talks.

Over the next few weeks, Ghani and his spokesmen continued to express their disappointment with the Pakistani government for letting terrorists into Pakistan, referring to the Taliban delegation. At this time, there were intelligence reports in Afghanistan that insurgents from the Haqqani and Taliban networks were planning attacks on the Afghan people in the northeast provinces of Parwan, Kabul, Logar, Khost, Paktia, and Paktika (greater Paktia region) (Gul 2016). *ET*’s Tahir Khan (2016) referred to President Ghani’s statement as “anger” and that dismissing Pakistan’s help was his response to the talks between the Taliban delegation and Pakistani government. However, inviting the Taliban delegation was a step Pakistan had taken without taking the Afghan government in confidence or on board – a move expected from Pakistan in matters of mutual concern to the governments in both countries, especially after a recent speech by the Haqqani leader hinting towards jihad against the Afghan government. Readers are deprived of this piece of crucial information; instead, the news story frames President Ghani’s response as angrily denouncing...
Pakistan for failing to rein in the Taliban and sheltering terrorists – an allegation that, according to the news story, “Pakistan rubbished”. The omission of background information and context can generate hate and hostility for Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who are at the mercy of Pakistan’s government and people. Instead of focusing on de-escalating the conflict, the framing and lexical choices draw the readers’ attention to Afghanistan’s allegations against Pakistan making alliance with the Taliban, thus presenting the other as the “bad” neighbour.

Many other stories presented the Afghan government in a negative light. By using words such as “angrily denounced” and “Pakistan rubbishes the allegations”, the reporter/editor creates a narrative that lacks context and strengthens stereotypes. Youngblood (2017) states that framing and word choice are the key elements of peace journalism. He explains that traditional journalists often carelessly use many words that add emotion but no substance. He further explains: “framing theory is significant for all journalists, but especially so for peace journalists, who often speak of narratives, which can be defined as the interpretation and presentation of a story” (Youngblood 2017, p. 10). Conversely, peace journalism “seeks to offer counter-narratives, and to frame stories in such a way as to encourage a more nuanced, thorough, and constructive societal conversation” (Youngblood 2017, p. 10). As per the tenets of peace journalism, it is not appropriate to use anger-inducing, misleading or divisive words that put the blame on the other party/weaker group, which can further escalate the conflict.

Both newspapers continued to employ the blame frame in their coverage of the Afghan Taliban delegation’s visit throughout the rest of the year. News stories highlighted the Afghan government’s “ire” and their messages to Islamabad “warning” the Pakistani government to stay away from the reconciliation process and possibilities between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and to not use Afghan refugees as a weapon. The stories also focused on the Afghan government’s insecurity about Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban. While there wasn’t a single story that mentioned the Taliban’s refusal to sit with the Afghan government for peace talks, calling the government a puppet government (Khan, I 2016), the newspapers noticeably reported how an Afghan delegation walked out of the UN General Assembly after a Pakistani delegate began his speech (Khan, T 2016). Ghani’s frustration was genuine because Pakistani political leadership has a limited role over Afghan policy. This is a fact that the Pakistani government and its media, which mostly speaks for the government, are omitting.

In 2017, when the conflict seemed to be escalating beyond normalcy and causing ripple effects on the way Afghan refugees were represented in media and treated by the government, the US Defence Secretary at the time, James Mattis, visited Pakistan to find “common ground” in promoting peace in the region. During the trip, Pakistani government officials told Mattis that Pakistan had been prepared to look into the possibility of “miscreants” exploiting Islamabad’s hospitality to Afghan refugees. On his part, Mattis agreed to look into Pakistan’s “legitimate concerns”, including India’s growing footprint in Afghanistan (Dagia 2017). However, only the Pakistani government’s concern was reported in the media.
By the end of the year, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to have a comprehensive bilateral engagement agenda, and the Afghanistan–Pakistan Action Plan for Solidarity (APAPS) was created for constructive and meaningful bilateral engagement in political, economic, military, intelligence domains through working groups. The plan put resolving the Afghan refugee crisis as the priority. A front-page Dawn story that reported on the APAPS at length presented the engagement plan as “Pakistan’s initiative”, stating, “Pakistan shares plan but nothing happens as the fate of the refugees hangs in balance” (Syed 2017), suggesting non-cooperation from the Afghan government. This framing is a binary coverage of the good and bad, where the blame for any conflict escalation, political misunderstanding or failure to make peace deals was attributed to the Afghan government, while the credit for initiatives was given to Pakistan. This is also evident from statements such as “Pakistan was the only country to have an interest in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan” (“Pakistan lacks policy guideline to respond to US”, 2018). This type of negative coverage saturated with blame frame can translate into the exclusion and marginalisation of Afghan refugees, and generate a national-level resentment towards them.

News stories containing the blame frame also included propaganda-oriented framing that falls under the truth/propaganda orientation (TPOC) in Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model. The blame frame falls under both the classifications because this type of framing primarily focuses on exposing propaganda and the “untruths” of all sides, not only the “other” side. A propaganda-oriented approach to framing presents claims as facts and labels parties involved in the conflict as either “good” or “bad”. This labelling, as Lynch (2008) argues, demonstrates partisan, emotive and demonising language. It was evident that the Pakistani government and its military establishment used both the newspapers as a conduit to its own policies, politics and propaganda, framing Afghan refugees and the Afghan government as the “bad” side/neighbour. To make Afghan refugees and the Afghan government look “bad”, some facts had to be concealed. This, along with negative propagation of their image, becomes central to propaganda-oriented coverage, which excludes certain facts from media reportage. As argued by Nash (2016), the production of silence through presenting claims as facts makes reporting vulnerable to propaganda. My analysis found that the incorporation of the blame frame in media coverage and the Pakistani nationalism directed at Afghan refugees (and Afghans in general) are interconnected. This frame also plays an effective role in presenting Afghan refugees and the Afghan government as the “bad” neighbour.

Despite the largely non-peace framing, some coverage did focus on the two countries’ efforts to set and reset mutual relations, especially after Mullah Mansour’s death and the political misunderstandings that emerged from it. However, those stories also reported that all attempts failed and directed the blame for this towards Afghanistan/Afghan refugees. The Pakistani government was, however, presented in a positive light. For example, ET reported that one of the major reasons for these failures was that Afghan government “always was and still is an island of the Afghan elite” (Qadir 2016). The news story made subtle hints towards the Afghan government’s “disinterest in finding a solution to the refugee crisis” or taking them back because of this elitism in the ruling party. Once again, I found that the trend of blame diversion was more frequent in stories that had quoted the political or military elite.
This is evident from how both *Dawn* and *ET* responded to a press statement by the Afghan consul general, who was appointed in Pakistan in February 2016. The new consul general had expressed interest in quadrilateral talks and suggested taking China and America on board to end terrorism in the region. However, his press statement was responded to by *Dawn* and *ET* with scepticism that questioned the motives behind his appointment by the Afghan government and his “so-called” interest in peace talks. One of the major stories in *Dawn* on the appointment and press statement was an interview with a former Pakistani ambassador to the US. She was quoted as saying, “I hope a political settlement for Afghanistan is not just a bumper sticker, and that Pakistan will not be left with the fallout of this long war next door again” (“Pakistan is fighting terror war alone, says Ms Rehman”, 2016). Not only is the choice of a former Pakistani diplomat as the major source inappropriate here (as an elite), but also highlighting such provocative statements in the media can be detrimental to the peace process and slow down conflict de-escalation. They reflect an element of distrust, uncertainty and, most importantly, nationalism. The recurrent representation of Afghan refugees and the Afghan government in this untrustworthy light may have a direct connection with the type of source quoted in the story.

I also observed that stories that had employed the blame frame were highly nationalistic and had heavily quoted political and military elite sources. This overlap of non-peace orientations in framing can impact the readers’ perception of the conflict, especially readers who take official sources more seriously than unofficial sources. As noted above, sources play an important role in determining frames. In addition to the presence (as well as the absence) of certain facts, keywords, phrases, ideas, context and sentences, sources “provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman 1993, p. 52). News stories that were dominated by government officials and other elite sources used certain terminologies drawn from nationalistic narratives, such as blaming the Afghan government for not wanting to take the refugees back or for showing a lack of seriousness towards a peace process. These conventions could produce “a bias in favour of official sources, a bias in favour of event over process and a bias in favour of dualism in reporting conflicts” (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, p. 209). McGoldrick (2006) takes a different angle on elite-focused sources in media coverage. According to her, these particular practices are in disagreement with the liberal theory of press freedom in which media should act as a “civic tool” that is supposed to shed light on problems and report “facts” without “fear or favour” (p. 4). After a bomb blast in KP’s capital city of Peshawar in March 2016, I observed that as the use of elite sources increased across the coverage in both the newspapers, the blame-oriented coverage also further intensified. Anti-Afghan coverage increased, and stories accused Afghan refugees of facilitating terrorism in Pakistan. The traditional media’s systematic practice of denying and covering-up was likely giving way to escalatory reactions and anti-Afghan sentiments across the country. As usual, the onus of the attack was swiftly and very clearly put on Kabul’s alleged disinterest and possible facilitation of illegal cross-border movement and terrorism in Pakistan. A *Dawn* story (Akram 2016) reported:

> While Pakistan has offered to help in promoting reconciliation between Kabul and the Afghan Taliban, there is little evidence of reciprocal action by Kabul to eliminate the TTP safe havens or
to control cross-border infiltration. Kabul has refused to even revive the coordination mechanisms for border monitoring that were created with the US-Nato command.

Ersoy (2016) calls this win–lose framing. In his examination of Turkish newspaper coverage of Syria’s downing of a Turkish jet in 2012 and Turkey’s downing of a Syrian jet in 2014, he found that a significant proportion of the coverage accused, blamed and suspected the “other side” (Ersoy 2016). My analysis draws on Ersoy’s attribution of win–lose framing to political pressure on journalists. In the context of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, such framing is one reason why media become a propaganda tool or a mouthpiece of the government and the military establishment. After every terrorist attack or busting of a narcotics operation, I noted that both Dawn and ET were quick to blame the Afghan refugees and remind readers of the consequences of letting them stay for long. Dawn (“Khattak asks Nawaz to call APC on fresh wave of terrorism”, 2016) reported:

The province was badly affected by the ongoing terrorist activities. The UN agencies, federal government and government should fix [a] time for repatriation of Afghan refugees … [they were] a burden on the province and [the] security condition was becoming worse owing to their presence.

Additionally, in another major story on repatriation that was published in Dawn, Pakistan was referred to as the side/neighbour that “was trying to ensure implementation of international border laws at the Pak–Afghan border” (“Govt plans to repatriate 3m Afghan refugees”, 2016). The same news story frames Afghanistan as the side that focused on the blame game instead of abiding by international laws. What I find problematic here is the long-term impact of such conflict-escalatory coverage. Pakistanis are now displaying the same xenophobic tendencies towards Afghan refugees that many in the West display towards refugees from the Middle East (see for example: Holzberg, Kolbe & Zaborowski 2018; Hovden, Mjelde & Gripsrud 2018). This was evident after the Torkham border crossfire between Pakistani and Afghan soldiers in June 2016 that was followed by a Twitter campaign with the hashtag #KickOutAllAfghans. This conflict-escalatory journalism not only translated into a hate and smear campaign online, but also triggered an increase in the harassment of Afghan refugees by Pakistani police (Borthakur 2017; Human Rights Watch 2015; Najafizada and Maroof 2015).

The Taliban, who are supported by Pakistan but also have a constituency among Afghan refugees, also issued statements on 21 and 29 July 2016. They underlined that the Pakistani authorities should not treat the Afghan refugees in a political way and that ordinary Afghan refugees should not become victims of politics (Bjelic 2016). Calls for return from Kabul also started in mid-2016. In an interview with Pajhwok, Ghani’s Special Envoy and Ambassador to Pakistan, Omar Zahelwal, said that the “newly launched project ‘Khpal Watan Gul Watan’ aimed at encouraging refugees to repatriate had [yielded] positive results” and that, “earlier the Afghani [sic] migrants in Pakistan did not feel for the country, but now they had realised that they should live in dignity in their own country” (Hikmat 2016).
While the ‘Khpal Watan Gul Watan’ (translated from Pashto language as: one’s own country is the most beautiful and the dearest) campaign was a national-level initiative, it is rather surprising that neither Dawn nor ET reported it once in their coverage throughout 2016 or 2017. Instead, there was an increase in coverage that reminded the reader of Pakistan’s “greatness” and Afghanistan’s “thanklessness”, where the refugees were blamed for draining the country’s funds, for taking over jobs, for an increase in crime, and for terrorism (“Xenophobia towards refugees”, 2016). During this time (mid-2016 onwards) there were more references to Afghan refugees’ involvement in the illegal drug trade, accusing them of bringing a drug culture and Kalashnikov culture to the “already ailing economy” of Pakistan. Meanwhile, other news stories framed Pakistan as helpless and reflected Pakistan’s nationalistic sentiments regarding Afghanistan and India’s growing relations. For instance, (“Afghan refugees”, 2016):

The refugees’ stay in Pakistan will propagate the blame game and it is not in the supreme interest of both countries. India is trying to fill the vacuum in Pak–Afghan relations, which is not in the best interest of either country. It is brotherly advice to our Afghan brethren that Pakistan is not in a position to serve you anymore. We have our own problems. We need space and time to solve them. Our tolerance level should not be provoked anymore and it is time you respected our sovereignty.

The most evident aspect of the blame frame was the removal of responsibility for certain actions from Pakistan and explicitly shifting it towards Afghanistan. For instance, in August 2016, the US Department of Defence stopped $300 million of military assistance to Pakistan because of its alleged failure to prevent the Haqqani network from using its land for cross-border attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, blamed Afghanistan for its lack of intelligence cooperation with Pakistan to thwart cross-border attacks. In return, Afghanistan blamed Islamabad’s poor plan to repatriate Afghan refugees.

Despite the termination of military assistance from the US, there was a constant denial from Pakistani government that Pakistan facilitated the Haqqani/Taliban networks in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The Pakistani media not only reported this denial, framing it as a clarification of the “truth” by the government, but in doing so they also served as a propaganda tool in the hands of the State and military. There was a clear lack, – and at many points, absence – of background and historical information to help the reader understand the context of the conflict and be aware of both sides. Dawn reported, “Kabul showed ‘keen interest’ in the proposal but later backed out when ‘elements within the Afghan government argued that it would weaken their stance on the Durand Line’” and that the two countries also came close to an agreement on intelligence cooperation “but similar political considerations in Kabul failed this effort too” (“More US lawmakers likely to visit North Waziristan”, 2016). The Afghan refugees in Pakistan, however, argued that they were not yet ready for such a large-scale repatriation, and Kabul feared that militants would also return with the refugees.
3.5 Conclusion

Pakistani media have explicitly taken a political and nationalistic stance in their framing of Afghan refugees and Af–Pak political relations. The way media covered the refugee conflict between 2016 and 2018 further escalated political misunderstandings between the two countries. It has also had a significant influence on Pakistan’s stern policy on Afghan refugee repatriation, and contributed to the reservations around how safe these refugees are for Pakistan. In my case study, Pakistani media can no longer be interpreted via the framework of a simple “stimulus–response model” (Lynch 2013). Both newspapers studies have served an inflammatory role, especially in a crisis situation, such as after a terrorist attack, a cross-border skirmish, an unsuccessful regional peace dialogue or a Taliban visit to Pakistan. Lynch (2013) further argues that media must play the role of a mediator in war and conflict. To play the role of a mediator, it becomes important for media not to distort reality, and instead to present real facts, and not claims in the guise of facts. In this chapter, I have examined coverage by the two most-read English newspapers in Pakistan to identify their role as either mediators or agents of conflict escalation.

I observed that the explicit and implicit use of non-peace framing in the representation of Afghan refugees dehumanised and demonised them. To prevent conflicts from escalating, especially in a humanitarian crisis, the media need to avoid unsubstantiated and damaging representations. Frames based on the dehumanisation and demonisation of refugees as enemies were very common — a central element of conflict-escalatory journalism. Dehumanisation can vary from animal metaphors to object metaphors (objectification); for example, the use of the words “dogs” and “traitors”, respectively. These words, consistently employed in the media narrative, could become part of general public speech about the enemy-others. The use of such language presents the victim as the “enemy” or the “other”, based on characteristics or behaviours that are 1) foreign (for instance, language and lifestyle), 2) socially unacceptable or negatively associated with in the host country (for instance, education, work, public dealings), and 3) illegal or detrimental to the national security (for instance, rogue/terrorists, as discussed in the preceding section).

Perhaps the most surprising interpretative repertoire was the use of analogy that referred to Afghan refugees as animals (such as “dogs”) or non-believers/infidels (such as “sons of Hindus”) – both considered impure in Islam. Steuter and Wills’ (2009) work on metaphors of the “war on terror” notes the tendency to represent the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq through the metaphor of “the hunt”, through expressions such as “lairs”, “nests” and “swamps”, all connoting an animal’s life (p. 14). Similar animal metaphors were also noted in media framing of the Rwandan genocide (1994), where the Tutsi ethnic community was widely referred to as serpents and cockroaches (Kagwi-Ndungu 2007). Under the Nazi regime, Jews were dehumanised in propaganda films with interspersed scenes of Jewish immigration with shots of teeming rats. Though less frequent in framing by the two newspapers I studied for my research, the enemy-as-pest theme has the tendency to emerge as a dominant frame of its own.

All these negative implicit and explicit representations in framing collectively construct the refugee image as the “terrorist”, the “enemy” and the “bad neighbour”. The studies of such misrepresentations of refugees
are not new to media scholarship. For instance, d’Haenens and de Lange (2001), who studied the depiction of immigrants and refugees in Dutch newspapers, questioned if these depictions were aligned with who these migrants were outside of the media. The authors found that the “dissatisfaction and negative attitude was depersonalized, dramatized and emotionalized” (d’Haenens & de Lange 2001, p. 856). They also found that a newspaper that was published in a borough where there was a negative response to the arrival of an asylum seekers’ centre made more use of a human-interest frame than expected. I would argue that their findings suggest that peace-oriented reporting becomes even more necessary when negative sentiments about refugees already prevail in the host society. However, the complete opposite was observed in the case of Dawn’s and ET’s coverage of Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation from Pakistan. Both newspapers demonstrated non-peace and conflict-escalatory coverage in the aftermath of the APS and Bacha Khan University attacks, the alleged IS recruitments, Obama’s provocative statement about regional instability, Mullah Mansour’s death, and so on. All of these were instances when peace-reporting was even more essential to de-escalate the conflict. However, the saturation of these non-peace frames in media reporting has resulted in the dominance of a narrative that’s oppressive, racist, and detrimental to the peace process. Most importantly, it obscures public awareness about the conflict and its repercussions for Afghan refugees and for one of Pakistan’s most geo-strategically, politically, economically and socio-culturally important neighbours.
Chapter 4
Critical Discourse Analysis: Unpacking Frames in Coverage of Herald and Newsline Magazines

4.1 Introduction

On the surface, magazines and newspapers are distinct journalism types with different reporting and writing styles. There is a difference in their publication frequency, topical and lexical choices, formatting and sometimes genres. However, my analysis of the coverage in two Pakistani magazines of Afghan refugees and their repatriation from Pakistan reveals a commonality with newspapers in their lack of adoption of peace journalism frames.

In this chapter, I turn my analytical attention from newspapers to the way the two current affair magazines, Herald and Newsline, framed the Afghan refugee conflict from 2016–2018 – the same three years as the newspaper stories analysed in the previous chapter. This chapter is an extension of the media discourse analysis I conducted in the preceding chapter. I argue that by employing more peace-oriented framing, both magazines could have improved their coverage of the refugee conflict and the forced exodus. I do not intend to draw a comparison between newspaper and magazine coverage of the conflict. Instead, by also including magazine articles in my media corpus, I can map a wider and more accurate picture of peace journalism practice – or lack thereof – in mainstream Pakistani English media.

The magazine corpus comprises 61 articles (35 in 2016, 15 in 2017 and 11 in 2018). The average length of the articles is 620 words. I identified two dominant frames on the basis of their frequent recurrence in the coverage – the ethno-nationalist frame, and the blame frame, also dominant in newspaper coverage (as discussed in Chapter 3). I classified the ethno-nationalist frame as elite-oriented coverage (PEOC), and the blame frame primarily as conflict-oriented coverage (under PCOC) and secondarily as propaganda-oriented coverage (under TPOC). Both the magazines employed the ethno-nationalist frame even when reporting/investigating the terrorism aspect attached to the Afghan refugee identity in Pakistan. The articles on terrorism focused more on the ethnicity of the refugees than on the event, the threat or the security measures taken by law enforcement agencies. Thus, the emphasis was on the link between terrorism and refugees.

Unlike the daily newspaper stories analysed, I found that magazine articles commonly carried more than one frame. This could be due to the longer word count, which provides journalists with an opportunity to explore either one topic from multiple angles, or more than one topic in an article. This also adds value to the investigative and interpretative characteristics of magazine articles, which demonstrate a strong voice/opinion of the journalist. Articles that did not meet the peace-orientation analytical criteria largely employed the two dominant frames – the ethno-nationalist frame and/or the blame frame. However, articles that were identified as peace-oriented under the analytical criteria had employed multiple frames. The adoption of multiple frames was common in articles that covered varied social and political aspects of the
conflict and highlighted different ideas at once. Such articles largely reported the challenges faced by these refugees, and their discrimination and harassment by Pakistani State and/or law enforcement agencies. These articles narrated personal stories of the affected refugees as a representation of what it is like being an Afghan refugee in Pakistan, and what the implications of forced repatriation can be on their lives. However, such articles were very rare, and those found in the corpus were published primarily in Herald magazine. In these instances, I initially found it challenging to classify the text exclusively under one frame. For instance, some articles incorporated the terrorist frame, the enemy frame, and the ethno-nationalist frame. In those cases, I classified the article according to the dominant frame employed in the text. Additionally, where needed, I also stated the secondary frame if it was incorporated more explicitly than the rest of the frames in the same text.

4.2 Losing the “race” against Pakistani media

There are two distinct schools-of-thought in scholarship that study media representation of refugees. One common idea is that refugees are misrepresented and portrayed through war-oriented framing, which generates their alienation and “othering” by the host society (see for example: Abid et al. 2017; Chouliaraki and Stolic 2017; Eastmond 1998; Kaye 1994; Shaw 2000). The other group, although rare, finds positive media representations of refugees and asylum seekers, principally drawn on a victimisation frame in their coverage (see for example: Al Dabagh and Amro 2020; Sunata and Yildiz 2018; Venir 2016). The latter body of work on positive media representations is infrequent, yet largely recent, possibly indicating a slow positive change in media framing of refugees and asylum seekers. However, that is a hypothesis that will require separate substantiation. My findings for this chapter align with the deductions of the former group of studies – refugees as the “other”. I would argue that even if the Pakistani public is considerably aware of the challenges of displacement and refugee life, Afghan refugees are generally not welcome in Pakistani society, and their media representation is frequently drawn on the ethno-nationalist frame, encapsulating the “terrorist” and “enemy” images.

Refugees have traditionally been framed negatively in media and are often represented as a threat (see for example: Chavez 2008; Farris and Silber 2018; Gonzalez O’Brien 2018; Gonzalez O’Brien et al. 2019; Parker 2017; Santa 2002). These representations further the marginalisation of various minority groups as the “other”. By clearly defining the “other”, countries develop and understand national identities. Dhamoon (2009) argues that it is one way of national “meaning-making” (p. 69). The use of the ethno-nationalist frame in coverage of Afghan refugees by the two magazines confirms many of the findings of earlier research in the field. It can be argued that by “othering” refugees, Pakistani media exercise their power and form a general public understanding of the dichotomies between the self and the “other”. The media “othering” then contributes to the public justification of ethnocentric and racist attitudes towards refugees. Borrowing from Fekete (2010), a large number of articles demonstrated “xenophobic sentiments” in framing (discussed in Chapter 2). This type of framing responds to the second analytical criterion under the people/elite-oriented frame, concerned with identifying themes of ethno-nationalism in the coverage of Afghan refugees.
Tribalism and ethno-nationalism are deeply rooted in Pakistani society. For most Pakistani citizens, their tribal and ethnic identity gives them a sense of belonging to the country, serving as a collective social identification. As a shared value, this identification involves emphasising “similarity” or commonality within a group, and “differentiation” from others outside the group (Jenkins 2008). This furthers the exclusion or inclusion of certain groups of people from the collective identification. Jenkins (2008) argues that the process of “us vs. them” is so deeply entrenched in human existence, that “even when the matter is expressed as superficially as this, it is possible to see an internal–external dialectic of identification at work collectively” (p. 105). In countries such as Pakistan, which was founded on the basis on ethnicities, tribes and religion, the internal–external belongingness is easily politicised. Tribalists and ethno-nationalists are in a constant competition with Islamists to establish their social and political autonomy in the country (Kfir 2007). Even within various provinces, there is a strong tribal affinity among citizens.

My analysis exposes the ordinariness of ethno-nationalism and tribalism, even in the very limited coverage of Afghan refugees by the two magazines in the three years (2016–2018). In the November 2018 edition of Newsline, the journalist went to the extent of presenting Afghan refugees as a threat to the identity of the Pakistani Pashtun. According to the article, “Should Afghan and Bengali refugees be given citizenship status?” (Newsline, November 2018), claiming granting Afghan refugees Pakistani citizenship would make Pakistani Pashtuns weak in Pashtun-dominated areas, such as KP province. The article suggests an overpopulation of Afghan Pashtuns will trigger ethnic rivalry in the country. This type of inflammatory framing can generate a sense of hyped insecurity and social anxiety among the Pakistani audience. The article is asking readers to view refugees as not only an economic threat, but also a threat to their tribal/ethnic survival. What the journalist ignores is that a generation of Afghan refugees have been born in Pakistan, and may have never visited their home country. By exaggerating the imagined consequences, media are reflecting the State’s apathy towards refugees, who are largely living below the poverty line in Pakistan. The article demonstrates the media’s propagandist coverage, where they are playing on public emotions concerning their national and ethnic ideologies.

Media can appropriate ethnic ideologies and construct negative social representations of refugees through certain repertoire. According to Van Dijk (2006), “ideologies consist of social representations that define the social identity of a group, that is, its shared beliefs about its fundamental conditions and ways of existence” (p. 116). He further argues that these ideologies and social representations serve as a guide for social practices and how various groups interact with each other. Therefore, the way media frame a conflict or a group of people can define, legitimise and manufacture consensus about them and how to interact with them. Through ethnocentric framing, media can articulate ideologies of the “other”, which can directly or indirectly contribute to the dominance of one group and the subordination of the other (Van Dijk 1993). Through a conflict-escalatory approach in framing, the journalist becomes a contributor to the escalation of the conflict. There is a significant probability that these frames may also represent a journalist’s ideology (I have discussed the influence of journalists’ cultural background and political affiliation on their reporting in Chapter 2). When these ideas are passed on to the readers, an “ideological square” is created. Inside the “ideological square”, a term introduced by Van Dijk (1998), stories are characterised by a “Positive Self-
Presentation” and a simultaneous “Negative Other-Presentation”, emphasising the positive characteristics of “us” and negative characteristics of the “other”. When journalists frame refugees as the “other” on the basis of ethnicity, such as in the case of Afghan refugees, they reinforce and legitimise their “Negative Other-Presentation” image as the outsider, who may pose a threat to the country – a theme explicitly recurrent across both the magazines and the two newspapers.

The anti-Afghan narrative that was reused over the three years highlights the differences between Pakistanis and Afghans on the basis of ethnicity and nationality. The reinforcement of these differences can widen the divide between refugees and the host society. While there are various reasons for repetition in media coverage, some scholars believe it is due to a lack of investigation, resources and/or outreach. Neuendorf, Armstrong and Brentar (1992) argue that the fact that there is generally a limited framing repertoire when it comes to the debate about refugees and migration is perhaps due to time and resource constraints that result in reporting that consciously or unconsciously reproduces and reinforces dominant frames. They argue that since refugees are mostly covered through negative frames, the dominant narrative is consequently negative too. This also risks perpetuating very similar and simplified storytelling about refugees, asylum seekers, and immigration in general (Hooper 2014). Therefore, news stories will often focus on existing myths, differences, and dissimilarities, potentially legitimising ethnocentric and nationalist rhetoric. This may also undermine any policy efforts concerning rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees (Grobet 2014; Staglianó 2014).

I found multiple examples of articles where the ethno-national differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan were further amplified. These examples may not be targeting Afghan refugees directly; however, they encourage a parochial perspective towards their acceptance and integration into the host society. The reader is reminded that Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns do not belong in the same place, despite having thousands of years of shared history, culture and language. For example, in July 2016, a Newsline article, “Now Friend, Now Enemy: Pak–Afghan Relations” (Newsline July 2016), reports the Afghan president as telling a BBC interviewer that Pakistan and Afghanistan were not brotherly nations. Five months later, in another Newsline article titled “Partners with Purpose” (Newsline December 2016), journalist Kunwar Khuldune Shahid reminds the readers about the president’s remark. Shahid reports, “The Afghan president said that Pakistan and Afghanistan ‘weren’t brothers,’ but two states with ties dictated by respective self-interests” (Newsline December 2016). Neither article provides any context for the president’s remark – instead they highlight the political instability between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Passing references to the same remark by the Afghan president also appeared in a few other articles over the next year.

To appreciate the impact of these words, and then their repetition in two major cover stories a few months apart, it is crucial to first understand the concept of brotherhood in the Pak–Afghan shared cultural setup. Calling a man “brother” in the Pashtun culture means that the relationship is unbreakable and that the “brothers” will and must stand up for each other and have each other’s backs forever. Writing about the Pashtun tribal culture, Rzehak (2011) explains that the idea of brotherhood is a consequence of the
genealogical pyramid, leading back to a common ancestor that forms the tribal structure (p. 12; also see: Karrer 2012). By saying that Pakistan and Afghanistan are not “brothers”, first the president and then the journalist are implying that Afghanistan has “unbrotherly” sentiments for Pakistan, which can be inferred as a threat to peace and clearly inciting hatred. In the context of this article, by highlighting the president’s quote, the reader is interpellated into viewing Afghanistan as the “other”. On the other hand, Afghanistan is also represented as viewing Pakistan as the “other” – thus reinforcing mutual hate for each other, when in fact the Afghan president’s quote is taken out of context. The President had remarked that Pakistan and Afghanistan were not two young brothers, but two states facing political and security challenges. He had asked Pakistani government to maintain a consistent stance on terrorism to help Afghanistan achieve regional peace. The President’s full remark was omitted from coverage and most newspapers, including *Dawn* and *ET* only published part of it. “Pakistan, Afghanistan are not brothers: Ashraf Ghani” (*Nation* 28 September 2015), and “Afghanistan and Pakistan are not brothers, says Ghani” (*Pakistan Today* 28 September 2015) are some examples of the headlines on the front pages of some of Pakistan’s major English newspapers the day after the interview. Both *Newsline* articles (*Newsline* July 2016; *Newsline* December 2016) mention President Ghani’s remarks months after they were made. Whether the inclusion of the remarks in these articles is conscious or incidental, only part of the reality is presented to the readers. In both cases reality is distorted by providing only a limited view of the statement. It can be argues that the reminder primarily serves to further an “us vs them” interpretation.

As a whole, the media corpus reflects how acutely Pakistan mistrusts Afghan refugees. Media predominantly speak for the government, who uses Afghan refugees to bear the brunt of political misunderstandings and hostility between the two governments. It is a vicious cycle. A public suspicion about refugees and other minorities can lead to their social isolation, legitimise their suffering and encourage their marginalisation.

This is demonstrated in a *Newsline* article, “Identity crisis: NADRA under fire”, (*Newsline* July 2016). The article reports the problems faced by NADRA in issuing computerised national identity cards (CNICs) to citizens of the northern Pakistani province KP. As mentioned earlier, this Pashtun province not only shares its western border with Afghanistan, it also shares hundreds of years of Pashtun cultural history, language and lifestyle with the Afghan Pashtuns. The article heavily incorporates the *ethno-nationalist* frame and is conflict-escalatory. It highlights how many local Pashtuns are mistaken for Afghan refugees and their identity documents withheld or cancelled. While the article begins with a legitimate concern about the mistaken identities of Pakistani Pashtun citizens and Afghan Pashtun refugees, it quickly moves to the assumption that Afghan refugees are allegedly benefiting from this mistake to undertake illegal smuggling and narcotics into Pakistan. The journalist aims, without evidence, that a Pakistani CNIC helps Afghan refugees integrate into Pakistan. He reports, “It also helps human traffickers in getting people from Afghanistan and Iran to enter Karachi, some of whom remain here in the city working petty jobs and joining the narcotics or smuggling trade” (*Newsline* July 2016). The article, however, provides no evidence or background information to support the claim that these refugees were joining the illegal narcotics trade.
Nonetheless, the readers’ distrust is triggered, and omitting or underemphasising key facts creates further distrust of the refugees.

Both magazines continue to demonise, vilify and diabolise Afghan refugees in their coverage. The two newspapers also demonstrate this trend, as observed in the previous chapter. Comparing the two magazines, *Newsline* incorporates the ethno-nationalist approach more than *Herald*. Rehana Hakim’s article for *Newsline* (June 2016) is one of the many examples of escalation-oriented coverage by the magazine. In the article, Hakim, the magazine’s editor-in-chief, consistently refers to Afghan refugees as “illegal settlers”. She writes that Afghan refugees have taken Pakistan for granted for years. She also writes that because Pakistan provided them with safety and security, they are free to settle anywhere in the country. She further writes:

> Additionally, we played the perfect host to three million plus Afghan refugees who crossed the border. Instead of registering them at the entry point and confining them to special camps like Iran did, we allowed them to spread their wings, set up businesses and acquire Pakistani passports and ID cards … And now, 40 years later, Balochistan’s Home Minister Sarfaraz Bugti threatens to throw out all illegal Afghan refugees. One is not quite sure how he proposes to do that.

Through a sarcastic tone for the government’s “mismanagement” of refugees, Hakim is presenting refugees as a group of people that the Pakistani government should have controlled since their arrival. She also suggests that the “problem” has gotten out of hand. The strong opinions in Hakim’s article stem from a non-peace approach, and can be seen as mongering hate for refugees. She is clearly isolating refugees as a separate, “other” group. She claims that Pakistan had to “pay a hefty price” for hosting the refugees, but does not explain or clearly suggest what she means by “a hefty price”. In failing to clearly explain what hefty price Pakistan had to pay for hosting the refugees, Hakim is leaving the interpretation of the word to the readers. However, the interpretative options that are available to the readers are largely drawn from the dominant anti-Afghan media frames based on their representations as aliens/“other” and terrorists.

Hakim’s article was published in the same edition that carried a feature story on the killing of the Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Mansour. He was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Hours after his killing, Pakistani and Afghan TV screens flashed pages of Mansour’s Pakistani passport. This was followed by the Pakistani interior minister’s press conference, in which he denied that Mansour was ever granted Pakistani citizenship. This was years after the killing of Osama bin Ladin on Pakistani soil in 2011 – an incident that Pakistan takes as an embarrassment. Yet again, it was Mansour’s presence in Pakistan, and not his killing, that raised questions about Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban and allegedly providing safe haven for Afghan militant groups and individuals. The news sabotaged the ongoing peace talks between the two countries. Pakistani and Afghan governments and media blamed the other side for their failure to have detected Mansour’s cross-border movements and hiding earlier. Including these two articles in the same edition promotes an inference that this was the “hefty price” that Hakim was referring to in her article.
Such framing in national media can further aggravate the socio-political complexities between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Media-fuelled negative images can be long-lasting and can change the ways people and groups are viewed. People with less knowledge about an issue are more likely to be influenced by negative media coverage than people who are well informed (Schemer 2012). In this case study, an ethnocentric interpretation is very likely to command broad consensus due to two factors: first, because people lack knowledge of the fundamental realities of the conflict, the refugee crisis, and the role of the Pakistani State/military in Afghanistan’s political instability; second, because of the anti-Afghan sentiments embedded in Pakistani society. Amidst this, Pakistani media play a catalytic role. Many scholars believe that racial stereotypes that are created by the media last longer in the public narrative than those created by unrelated media events (see for example: Devine 1989; Power, Murphy and Coover 1996). These negative stereotypes not only form and change the ways people view a certain group, they also have a tendency to become deeply cultivated in people’s minds over time. Similarly, the overuse of the ethno-nationalist frame can encourage the acceptance of the prototypical Afghan refugee as a terrorist, and the prototypical terrorist as an Afghan refugee.

The representation of refugees as responsible for certain social and political problems in Pakistan creates negative perceptions and controversies about them. Controversies are a part of the media cycle. They not only evoke attention and emotions, they also sell. Gordon et al. (2011) argue that most media content is generated, and sometimes reinforced, with an intention to manipulate the audience. In both the magazines in this study, certain controversies around Afghan refugees are prevalent. Most of the controversies surrounding Afghan refugees are related to their non-native identity – the “other” – and their alleged involvement in terrorism. A strong reason for the recurrence of these controversies in media narratives could be the journalists’ imitation of dominant framing patterns that were well-received by the public during earlier reportage. Since representations inform perceptions, framing refugees as the “other” encourages antagonistic public attitudes.

Media-generated controversies and constructed realities have a “contagion effect” – a term I borrow from Midlarsky et al. (1980). The authors use this term to explain that when certain ideas remain in the public narrative over a long periods, systematic patterns of recurrence are generated. They analyse worldwide instances of terrorism and argue that some types of terrorism are more susceptible to imitation, and are thus “contagious”. They further state that the “contagion effect” can explain the regional and global spread in terrorism. The idea of the “contagion effect” was later developed by Norris et al. (2003), who extends its application to the role of journalists in encouraging certain ideas or incidents. They argue that journalists can lend legitimacy or credibility to different parties in a conflict depending on who they rely on for information sources; in any case, this can trigger a “contagion effect”. On one hand, over-reliance on public officials and government press statements can lead to further misrepresentations of Afghan refugees. On the other hand, empathising with the refugees can also generate a “contagion effect” that can challenge negative stereotypes and promote positive, harmless images of Afghan refugees. The concept of the contagion effect
further strengthens the argument that dominant media frames are not just generated and then forgotten. Instead, they can be powerful enough to influence public opinion when reinforced in coverage in different contexts over longer periods.

The dominant narrative about Afghan refugees in the magazines is ill-informed and misleading. Both Herald and Newsline largely omit important background information about the refugee conflict from their coverage. If readers are under-informed, they are more likely to be misled. Misleading representation is not only inaccurate but also highly subjective, and can create mis- and/or disinformation. Inaccurate information generates and fuels controversies, and thus media can influence readers’ appetite for political controversies through a frequent employment of the ethno-nationalistic frame.

In such a media environment, it becomes less likely that a counter-stereotype will emerge among readers. An example of this is a special report published in Herald in April 2018 on Afghan refugees living in Sohrab Goth, an old suburb at the entrance of the southern port city of Karachi. The article focuses on the love stories of three Afghan refugees, each of whom had married a Pakistani woman after meeting her in the refugee camp. It also highlights the social challenges the couples faced because of their inter-national marriages – a rare union in Pakistan. Zehra Nawab, one of the three journalists who worked on the special report, and a friend, later told me (personal communication, 22 December 2020) that minutes after the article was published online, the comments had to be turned off because of the significant anti-Afghan refugee sentiments. The comments largely questioned the intentions, belongingness and political allegiances of the Afghan refugee men who married the Pakistani women. Some readers demanded that the refugees be forced to return to Afghanistan. Most comments contained hate, and reflected a lack of empathy for the plight of the three couples or Afghan refugees in general.

I later read the comments, and wondered if hate, ethno-nationalism and security issues were the only reasons behind such negative sentiments shared by these Pakistani citizens for the refugees. I found most comments to be ill-informed. I was confronted with an ethno-nationalist populist outrage that primarily blamed Afghan refugees for terrorism in Pakistan, and doubted their genuine need for refuge. Overall, the comments clearly reflected propagandist political ideas. I found nothing in the article that could have prompted this antagonism and condemnation of refugees. However, I observed that like many other articles discussed earlier, this article also did not present any information about the political and historical background of the conflict that had driven the Pakistani–Afghan couples into such precarious situations. Again, this could leave the reader uninformed about the causes behind the crisis situation, and encourage them to maintain their preconceived ideas of Afghan refugees, driven and shaped by a dominant anti-Afghan media narrative and a lack of issue-specific knowledge. Scherer (2012) argues that issue-specific knowledge can moderate media effects; for example, poorly informed individuals are more likely to rely on stereotypes activated by media coverage. Similarly, in the case of Afghan refugees, the omission of background information creates the potential for stereotypes to foster and for blame to be tossed around. Given the flexibility of word-count,

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10 The suburb was not originally part of the metropolitan area, but became one of its major suburbs through illegal settlement on encroached public land built in 1970s. As of 2020, it is also home to nearly 250,000 Afghan refugees.
relaxed deadlines and a chance for more investigative reporting, journalists can utilise magazine articles to undertake detailed coverage of any issue. Magazines give journalists room to include background information, which is one of the basic characteristics of peace journalism and crucial to the contextual understanding of a topic.

A number of articles in the two magazines studied provide important information without sources or evidence. This raises a question on the trustworthiness of the source, and also the validity of the journalist’s statements. However, when certain narratives become dominant in media and reinforced more often, there is a chance these ideas are less frequently contested – they are believed to be true because of their recurrence and reuse. Koch and Peter (2017) argue that negatively framed media statements are often perceived as more trustworthy than formally equivalent, positively framed statements (also see: Hilbig 2009, 2012). The authors studied the framing effects of political communication on public opinion and found two dominant frames: the emphasis framing (accentuation or concealment of facts), and the equivalence framing (equivalent information) – positive and negative framing, respectively. They found that the effect of both media messages and their sources on the recipient’s “truth rating” could be enhanced by framing a certain situation/event negatively. The effect was further heightened if the statement was linked to a well-known politician commenting on an issue of political importance. I found more unnamed sources in Newsline than in Herald. Where sources are named, journalists are depending heavily on the political and/or military elite as their major information source. Journalists can increase the news and truth values of their article by attributing statements to elites, such as well-known politicians. Even if a source is presented without a name, overall, a reader is less likely to question supporting facts as long as they are attributed to an authority. It is plausible that by doing so, a journalist may be consciously omitting/concealing certain information from the text without the readers noticing. Moreover, in many articles, the information is incomplete or scattered throughout the text. This can disrupt the flow of information, especially facts, and affect a reader’s general or accumulated interpretation.

The dominant patterns of ethno-nationalist framing in both Newsline and Herald contradict their image as progressive publications. Their coverage primarily presents the State policies on forced repatriation as legitimate and necessary for national security. Both magazines normalised reporting of the “other”. The coverage not only omits the refugee narrative to a great extent, it also avoids reportage or opinion on suggestions for refugee settlement, or deadline waivers.

4.3 Too “crook” to be true

The Pakistani media seems to be at war with the Afghan refugees. The antagonistic framing of refugees continues its dominance in magazine coverage. According to Newsline, Afghanistan is nasty”, “irresponsible” and “non-serious”, while the refugees are a “burden”, “traitors” and a “threat”. Both the Afghan government and Afghan refugees are thus susceptible to blame and denunciation. Although the coverage in Herald is also primarily non-peace, there is some relief in several articles (discussed in Chapter 5). Overall, the dominance of the blame frame in both magazines repeats similar framing patterns found in
the two newspapers in the previous chapter.

The blame frame emerges from the narratives of the “other”. This othering of the refugees makes them more vulnerable to blame and responsibility. Hanson and Hanson (2006) argue that the blame frame is a way of justifying inequalities across groups. In their study of racial injustices in America, they explain that inequalities are legitimised through the presumptions of “choicism”, in which “the victims are blamed and non-victims are excused” (p. 447). They divide the dominant blame frame into three dichotomous categories – god vs. devil, evolution vs. nature, and markets vs. personality. These categories are exclusive to the American context. However, the authors use the following illustration to explain what a blame frame generally manifests as, especially in reportage (p. 426):

“We,” who should be advantaged, are acting, if at all, through good intentions, exemplary dispositions, and in accordance with situational forces larger than us. “They,” because of their aberrant dispositions interacting with or resulting from those same forces, should suffer or be further disadvantaged or separated from us and should not receive our assistance.

The frequent employment of the blame frame in the two magazines suggests negative “choicism” on the part of Pakistani journalists and editors. However, “choicism” can be challenged if journalists ensure that the powerful interests have no influence over how oppressed groups are represented in media coverage.

The magazines also oversimplified the underlying causes of the Afghan refugee repatriation crisis and the conflict with Afghanistan. Articles largely lacked background information of the humanitarian crisis and the political conflict. Where present, some details were highly sensationalised. A lot of scholarly criticism has been directed towards the ways journalists can create a limited or distorted view of a conflict, sensationalise coverage, and misrepresent the oppressed groups (Carruthers 2011; Lynch and Galtung 2010; Rodny-Gumede 2015). With limited prior knowledge or exposure to sensational coverage, readers become more prone to adopting the frames offered by journalists (Rodny-Gumede 2015) and think along the same lines as the journalist. The incorporation of the blame frame thus becomes easier. Rodny-Gumede (2015), who studied South African news media coverage of the fatal violence against miners in Marikana, found dominant blame-oriented framing patterns in the coverage. She argues that the media sensationalised the violence instead of focusing on the fundamental problems of the mining community. Her analysis shows that the media not only lacked a proper understanding of the background of the conflict, they also neglected the basic journalistic principles of fairness, balance, truth and ethics.

This is demonstrated by the Newsline article “Still in the Anger Mode” (Newsline, December 2016), in which the journalist lists several reasons behind the failure of peace negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was one of the many articles in the magazine where Afghan refugees were directly or indirectly blamed for the failure of peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In perpetuating this idea, the media are not only making the already vulnerable refugees responsible for political diplomacy, but also relieving Pakistan of any responsibility. He writes, “Peace in Afghanistan would immensely benefit
Pakistan, but it cannot make it happen alone. The Afghan government has the primary responsibility on this score” (Newsline, December 2016). Pakistan and Afghanistan have been in a political conflict over the last 40 years. During this time, the Pakistani military first trained the Taliban to fight the Soviet army, and later gave safe haven to militants who fled the country after the US announced the “war on terror”. However, the journalist’s use of the word “primary” in the article implies that Afghanistan alone is responsible for the conflict and must resolve it alone. In an attempt to oversimplify the conflict, the journalist is removing the causal and problem-solving responsibilities from Pakistan and attributing them to Afghanistan. Ideally, journalists must question and criticise oppressive State policies, report accurately without bias, highlight injustices, inform and educate the public, and advocate peace when needed. An ethical media would ask the government to do more, instead of brushing away problems. In democratic countries, media are expected to represent the people, rather than the political/military elite. However, Newsline seems to highlight non-issues or less-important issues rather than highlighting the fundamental concerns of the Afghan refugees and of other parties involved in the conflict.

Another example is also a Newsline article. “Parked for Good? Afghan Repatriation” (Newsline August 2016) was the only report of the year that exclusively covered the refugee repatriation conflict. At the beginning of the article, journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai makes some passing references to the vulnerability of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and their harassment at the hands of the Pakistani law enforcement agencies. However, the tone quickly changes to a blame orientation. The journalist criticises the Afghan government for their non-cooperation in resolving the refugee conflict. He shifts from, “In fact, they [refugees] are also the most vulnerable to harassment and abuse at the hands of unscrupulous personnel of the law-enforcement agencies”, to “[Pakistan] is still doubtful of Kabul taking any real initiative to bring back its citizens from Pakistan”. He then adds an ultimatum, “[Pakistan] has done enough to host them since 1979”.

The article fails to make a single point that could contribute towards breaking down stereotypes against Afghan refugees, or counter-propaganda. In fact, even though it was a cover story, it omits many fundamental issues that were causing and further instigating the conflict at the time. For instance, there is no mention of the skirmishes between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s armed forces on the Durand Line that occurred in June 2016 – at least two months before the edition was published. The online version also contained no updates on the clashes that continued for three days. Security forces on both sides exchanged gunfire. Artillery and heavy weaponry were still moving into position at the time the edition came out. The border skirmishes had been widely reported in media around the world; however, the Newsline cover story ignored it entirely. Global media, including The Diplomat, The New York Times, and Al Jazeera referred to the time as the lowest point in the relationship between the two countries, where soldiers were dying on both sides. Border tensions had led to the explosion of hostilities.

Remarkably, the cover story (and the rest of the edition) also omitted any coverage of the June 2016 Warsaw Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was also widely covered by global media. The summit discussions had focused on peace and stability in conflict zones in the East and South, and on Afghanistan. The Afghan president had addressed the summit, where he was reported to have singled
out Pakistan as obstructing regional progress. President Ghani remarked that Pakistan’s dangerous distinction between “good and bad terrorists” was being maintained in practice. Yusufzai acknowledges the state of political and social turmoil in Afghanistan and an increase in frequent attacks by Daesh (ISIS) and the Taliban. It also reminds the readers that most refugees were choosing to stay in Pakistan, instead of returning to Afghanistan. Despite this, Yusufzai’s suggestion for quicker refugee repatriation demonstrates apathy, dehumanisation of refugees and indifference to their genuine challenges and, most importantly, an over-simplification of a major regional conflict.

Additionally, the way media frame a refugee crisis can affect public attitude towards their integration. A positive frame will lead to more acceptance, while blame-oriented coverage will prompt racist, ethno-nationalist sentiments towards refugees. Harteveld et al. (2018), who studied the European media’s coverage of the refugee crisis, argues that public attitude towards refugee integration changed dramatically due to the way the crisis was framed. They found that media were fuelling the public’s fear and anxiety around refugees and asylum seekers, thus encouraging their alienation. A similar trend was also observed after the 2015–2016 New Year’s Eve sexual attacks on non-migrant women in several German cities. The accused were identified as male migrants from the North African region. The events, and then the way German and other European media covered them, served as a turning point in the refugee debate across Europe. Major magazines capitalised on the story with an “unambiguous imagery” (Boulila and Carri 2017). For instance, the Süddeutsche Zeitung cover carried a white female silhouette and a black arm groping for the pubic region. Focus magazine used a photograph of a faceless naked white woman, with black handprints plastering her body. The general coverage echoed an institutional anti-Muslim racist framing that largely signified a moral panic. Scholars who studied the media coverage of the attacks found an increased racialising of Muslim men, especially those of Middle Eastern descent (Vieten 2018).

The examples above demonstrate that media can assist the public in comprehending the saliency or insignificance of events and the role of various parties in a conflict. According to Hobolt (2014), citizens decide who to blame in a crisis or a conflict based on who is generally held accountable. She argues that the task of assigning responsibility to a party in a conflict can be complicated, because “citizens have to navigate a system with multiple levels” (p. 3). In Pakistan, Afghan refugees and the Afghan government are an easy target because the explicit conflict-escalatory and blame-orientated media framing makes the task straightforward. For example, a Herald article, “How death stalks policemen in Quetta” (Herald April 2018), investigates the cross-border movement of outlawed militant organisations across the Durand Line, and the consequent security issues. According to the article, militants are primarily taking shelter in KP and Balochistan – the two provinces with the largest Afghan refugee population. It reports, “There are possibilities that terrorists are finding help from some of the refugees,” and “terrorist organisations are running their camps in Afghan areas close to the Pakistan border. The Afghan government has no writ in these areas.” When media recurrently holds Afghan refugees and the Afghan government responsible for the conflict and worsening security issues in Pakistan, a collective public attitude is generated where blame is instinctively directed at refugees and the Afghan government.
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is a constant target of the Pakistani media’s blame-oriented framing. The way the magazines have largely portrayed Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is not only negative, but also dismissive of his efforts towards peace initiatives. Despite the international media’s appreciation of him for adopting a rapprochement policy towards Pakistan (Sial 2016), *Newsline* portrays him in a negative light. Political analysts have made clear distinctions between Ghani and his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, whose policies were referred to as weak and conflict-escalatory. Since coming to power in 2014, Ghani not only delayed the implementation of the strategic partnership agreement with India to keep Pakistan happy, he also sought close ties with Pakistan’s security establishment. He instituted specific initiatives to alleviate Pakistani concerns over cross-border terrorism. But *Newsline*’s coverage continues to applaud Pakistan for its “genuine” efforts, and attribute problems to the other side of the Durand Line. Despite international recognition of Ghani for working towards peace in the region, *Newsline* wrongly reports the Afghan president as one “who had been very critical of Islamabad” and calls Pakistan the “perfect host” for Afghan refugees (*Newsline* January 2016) – a claim the UNHCR openly challenges. The negative portrayal of President Ghani has also furthered Afghan distrust of Pakistan and its media.

The Pakistani media’s frequent blaming of the Afghan government and refugees has caused acute distrust between the two countries. These accusations have been made primarily through the national media, and are worsening the already strained relationship between the two countries. Both magazines have used a certain interpretative repertoire for Afghan refugees and the government to such an extent that it has become obvious over time. The application of certain concepts to a group of people or nations in general allocates the group/nation with negative qualities, leading to suspicion and paranoia about them (Hopcke 1989, cited in Merskin 2004). When reinforced, these suspicions and distrust can become part of the collective unconscious mind (Spillmann and Spillmann 1997), and can manifest as viewing other groups as either enemies or the “other”, both of whom are untrustworthy.

This is demonstrated in the article “Now Friend, Now Enemy: Pak–Afghan Relations” (*Newsline* July 2016), which I also discussed earlier for its employment of the ethno-nationalist frame. The article also employs the blame frame to report the long-unresolved conflict and the failing peace process between the two countries. The article seems to be a deliberate attempt to highlight the distrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It raises suspicion and scepticism about Afghanistan’s intent and role in the failure of the two countries to reach political peace, or a mutual consensus over the refugee crisis. Despite presenting some historical background of the Pak–Afghan conflict, and the consequences of the conflict for both countries, the article primarily employs the blame frame with a conflict-escalatory and hatred-inciting tone. For instance, at one point, the journalist reports, “Pakistan is seen as an enemy in Afghanistan, particularly by the Afghan ruling elite” (*Newsline* July 2016). At another point, the journalist claims that the credit for “subsequent elaborate border management measures” goes to Pakistan, suggesting Afghanistan’s inefficiency or lack of interest in managing cross-border terrorism and illegal refugee movement. He reports on a cross-border firing at one of the checkpoints at the Durand Line and writes, “when the firing stopped, Pakistan had lost Major Ali Jawad Changezi and Afghanistan counted a soldier and a civilian dead” – note here, the certainty for the Pakistani loss (*lost*) and doubt over the Afghan losses (*counted*). Furthermore,
the journalist not only presents the Afghan government as inept, he also directly accuses them of sending bombers to Pakistan. The article (Newsline July 2016) states:

One of the major challenges would be to stop infiltration from Afghanistan, where the militants seem to be having a free run due to the unwillingness or inability of the thinly stretched and beleaguered Afghan security forces to monitor the long and porous Pak–Afghan border.

The words “unwillingness or inability” and “thinly stretched and beleaguered” demonstrate a conflict-escalatory approach at two levels. First, these words present the Afghan security forces as incompetent or inefficient. Second, they imply that the Afghan government is disinterested in investing time and money in resolving cross-border terrorism and unmonitored refugee movement. The journalist frames the issue in a way that blames the Afghan government for the turbulence on the border, and inside Pakistan. The journalist reinforces the blame frame by bringing the readers’ attention to Afghanistan again by writing, “[Afghanistan] continues to pose a threat to Pakistan”. He also writes (Newsline March 2016):

The ability of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its splinter groups to send young men on suicide missions to strike at both hard and soft targets in Pakistan is a matter of concern and not easy to fully counter unless the Afghan government agrees to take action against them and gathers the strength to do this.

The journalist also suggests that the Afghan media run a state-managed narrative that blames Pakistan for the Afghans’ woes. He writes that Afghanistan’s carelessness will “widen the gulf between the two countries”. Just as the article (Newsline July 2016) starts with a negative reminder about the Afghan President’s remark, it also ends with a non-peace tone that is sarcastic and contemptuous:

The unusually tougher line on the question of the repatriation of Afghan refugees could be Islamabad’s answer to the Afghan President’s stance, as Pakistan was no longer a brotherly country and, therefore, under no compulsion to behave as a brother to Afghanistan.

Frequent media reference to the Afghan government’s “disinterest” in securing the Durand Line, and conflict-escalatory coverage of border clashes between security forces, prompted a public debate about the safety of Pakistani citizens. This may have led to Pakistan’s unilateral construction of a fence along the border – a decision the Afghan government did not take well. Through the blame frame, Pakistan media thus preserves the country’s favourable self-image, while projecting a negative image of Afghanistan.

Another example of framing that can contribute to the distrust between two countries is a Newsline cover story, “Heart of Darkness” (Newsline January 2016). The article covers the Heart of Asia Conference (HOA)\(^\text{[11]}\), one of the major political events of the year. The conference was held in the Pakistani capital in

\(^{[11]}\) The HOA Conference started in 2011. It was formed to enhance cooperation between Asian countries in order to counter security threats in the region and promote connectivity among members.
December 2015. The article headline demonstrates the journalist’s play with words to represent the distrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He frames Pakistan as the peace initiator, and Afghanistan as the one hampering the peace process. The cover story opens with the notion that Pakistan had been initiating and remaking efforts to make Afghanistan a peaceful country; however, Afghanistan had resorted to anti-Pakistan sentiments full of “distrust”. The journalist implies that Afghanistan needs Pakistan to “facilitate” peace in the region, and writes, “President Ashraf Ghani’s willingness to again seek Pakistan’s support to facilitate peace talks with the Afghan Taliban.” The use of the word “again” when referring to the Afghan president’s need to seek Pakistan support highlights Pakistan’s authority (as the facilitator) and the Afghan government’s dependence and failure – suggesting Pakistan is the good neighbour. Pakistan’s role in the Soviet War (1970–1989) can explain the interpretation of the word “again” in the article. Pakistan was one of America’s major allies in the Soviet–Afghan War. The Pakistani army recruited and trained the mujahideen (freedom fighters), and later also served as a base for the Saudi-American alliance in the 1980s. Today, Pakistan serves as a safe haven for the Taliban and other militants, who were earlier recruited to oust the Soviet army. The journalist further claims that President Ghani “didn’t have much of a choice except seeking Pakistan’s help to persuade the inflexible Afghan Taliban” to join the peace and reconciliation process. By using such an inflammatory interpretative repertoire, he frames Afghanistan as weak and helpless. This can be interpreted as implying that the country is in need of another intervention, and is blatantly propagandist.

In addition to the explicit blame orientation in framing, there is also a significant factual problem in this statement – President Ghani had never asked Pakistan to “facilitate” the talks. Instead, he had been asking Pakistan to stay out of Afghanistan’s internal issues (see for example: AP 2015; Reuters 2016). However, the Newsline article frames Pakistan as the only saviour of Afghanistan and regional peace. The HOA Conference was an opportunity for Pakistan and Afghanistan to reduce political friction, and move towards regional peace and stability. The way it was going to be framed in the media for the general public could have largely responded to the trust issues between the two countries and their citizens. However, when one of the major current affairs magazines in the country reports an international event with a conflict-escalatory approach, by calling it ‘heart of darkness’, it reinforces the hostility and suspicion already prevalent in the country. The article (Newsline January 2016) ends with a strongly opinionated statement that explicitly employs the blame frame:

The so-called unity government headed by President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Dr Abdullah Abdullah believe Pakistan is responsible for all the troubles Afghanistan is facing and is therefore an enemy.

The death of the Afghan Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar in Pakistan already served as a catalyst for the deteriorating relations between the two countries. The escalatory coverage of the HOA Conference furthered the mutual distrust. Ghani went ahead with the inauguration of the Salma Dam, officially declaring Afghan–India friendship and sidelining Pakistan. India announced it would stay committed to the Afghan
Moreover, at the conference, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the US and China also formed the Quadrilateral Monitoring Committee with the purpose of facilitating and supporting the Afghan reconciliation process. The formation of the committee indicated a form of agreement among these countries on the roadmap for peace talks. The first meeting of the committee was held in Islamabad on 11 January 2016, during which representatives of the four member nations stressed the need for an immediate resumption of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Despite its high importance for Pak–Afghan relations and the refugee conflict, this information is missing from Newsline’s and Herald’s coverage of the HOA Conference. In fact, there is no mention of the refugee crisis that has been central to the Af–Pak political conflict of over 40 years.

This combination of limited coverage and misinformation by the magazine implies two possible meanings. First, that media are oversimplifying a major conflict by presenting it as a non-issue and omitting fundamental problems. It is demonstrated that the more the media highlight an issue, the more importance audiences attach to it (Harteveld et al. 2014). Similarly, whether Pakistani citizens will see the refugee issue as a security threat or a humanitarian crisis may depend on how media represent it, and to what extent. Second, that blame-oriented coverage justifies intervention. By taking the focus away from refugees and putting it on the “follies” of Afghanistan, media are reinvigorating the State/military establishment’s stance that is fixed on finding excuses to hold a share of power in Afghanistan.

The coverage puts Pakistan in a safe position, suggesting two important things: first, that when no one else could, Pakistan acted and took responsibility for bringing peace in the region. Second, that Pakistan is only party to the conflict and the future of the peace process is dependent on Afghanistan. This demonstrates the employment of the “good/bad” neighbour duality, discussed in Chapter 3. It is important to remember that the two countries have had multiple instances where one accused the other of non-cooperation and/or lack of interest in taking the initiative to resolve conflicts and political misunderstandings (Gul 2018; S. Khan 2018; Schmitt 2018). The recurrent narrative from 2016–2018 was that Pakistan does all the strenuous work of negotiating with the Taliban, while Afghanistan ruins the process. Geo-political motives of both the countries are at the forefront of this historical blame-game. However, framing the article in a way that makes only one country look interested in the peace initiative can be detrimental to a peace process that is already referred to as “phony” and “fruitless” (The Diplomat, 6 December 2016).

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has five key findings: 1) the debate about the settlement and repatriation of Afghan refugees is broadly missing from the two magazines. The overall coverage in the three-year period I studied ignores the need for reform and peaceful resolution of the conflict; 2) the coverage repeatedly suggests that Pakistan has made endless efforts to resolve the refugee crisis and the political conflict stemming from it, while
Afghanistan’s reciprocal efforts are missing or inadequate. Arguably, the reinforcement of such a narrative may have created a general acceptance for the forced and speedy repatriation of refugees; 3) there is a substantial marginalisation of refugee voices, more specifically in Newsline. It also omits information that is fundamental to understanding the conflict, and how forced repatriation to an unprepared Afghanistan will impact the refugees; 4) both magazines frequently use Pakistani political elites and other authorities as their major information sources. I found that 88% of the time, journalists quoted Pakistani political elites and other authorities, including security agencies; and 5) the Afghan refugee crisis and political misunderstandings between Pakistan and Afghanistan are generally represented as a national security issue.

Frames help journalists and editors organise the presentation of facts and opinion (Nelson, Clawson & Odey 1997). By incorporating the ethno-nationalist and blame frames so explicitly in media coverage, it is plausible that both magazines organised and compiled the projected threats and doubts, and presented them as facts under security issues. According to Hussain (2016), Pakistani media predominantly report Taliban, terrorism and other related issues in escalatory terms with a high preponderance of war journalism. He finds that the coverage also lacks independent sources, and categorises the form of framing that heavily relies on elite sources under the “securitisation” aspect of conflict-escalatory reporting. According to Husain (2016), it is a way of framing where conflicts are only presented through the security lens, highlighting threats and dangers to the host nation. He explains (p. 36):

Conflicts are securitized; they are discussed in terms of threats, dangers and occupations. Police force, army personnel and elites get the limelight. Conspiracies, issues of national sovereignty, independence and patriotism are related with the conflict. The system, culture and social values are securitized and feared to be lost if the enemy prevails.

Most of the coverage in the magazines is done from a national security perspective. The “securitisation” element can amplify patriotism and nationalism among readers, reducing the possibility of the acceptance and integration of Afghan refugees. The ethno-nationalist frame is explicitly dominant in articles that link the refugee repatriation or the conflict with Afghanistan to national security issues. The frame can further the dehumanisation of the “enemy”.

Hussain (2016) goes on to suggest “humanisation” as an alternative under “conflict de-escalating reporting”. Under the humanisation frame, he argues (p. 36):

Conflicts are humanized, individual sufferings are highlighted and trials and tribulation of common people get maximum coverage. The plight of women and children and other vulnerable groups is discussed. Conflict is covered from the perspective of common people. Loss to the social institutions and local culture is counted and steps urged for their recovery.

Security issues are at the centre of the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, the solution equally involves peace with the Taliban, and bringing an end to terrorism, for which refugees are mostly
blamed. However, sustaining a peace initiative and peacemaking process in Pakistan has its own challenges. There is historical evidence that shows resuming peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan can take time. In 2014, Mullah Omar’s death in Pakistan halted the peace talks between the two governments and the Taliban. Mullah Omar’s son, Mullah Yaqoob, was inducted into the new leadership council, but the Taliban demanded more time to complete the transition. While the Taliban were busy recruiting their new head, the relationship between the two governments deteriorated, as Afghanistan believed that Pakistan was providing safe haven to the Taliban. Peace talks could not go ahead without a representative from each side. It took two years of cold silence and fruitless international and national efforts to bring the parties back to the table for peace talks. Reuters reported that although the planned leadership meeting was made possible after two years of political efforts from both Pakistan and Afghanistan, the prospects for peace were “cloudy” because of the public sentiments for Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in Pakistan. However, as the analysis demonstrates, the Pakistani media consider Afghan refugees insignificant in terms of the resolution of the conflict with Afghanistan. Throughout 2016–2018, Newsline presented Afghan refugees more as a nuisance than a vulnerable group, selecting certain aspects of information about them over others.

The omission of important information from reportage leads to the marginalisation of certain people or issues. On the other hand, emphasis on certain people or issues may also affect balanced reporting. Both can equally downgrade the structural and systemic discrimination and abuse of refugees, depending on the context in which they are practiced. Those willing to return to their home country are equally affected. Lynch and Galtung (2010) argue that conscious omission or emphasis creates imbalance. They suggest that any imbalances in the conflict between the powerful group and the weaker group must be reported by the media, instead of pointing fingers at either side. Word choices and the interpretative repertoire in coverage represent which side the magazine is inclining towards; for example, word choices such as “cloudy” and “hefty price” used to describe the peace process and repatriation of Afghan refugees, respectively. These words, in this context, demonstrate a subtle reference to bland optimism for non-violent solutions to the conflict. They imply that the peace-process is “stalled” because its future is unclear and uncertain, and hence it is not a working solution. Such framing echoes Machin’s and Mayr’s (2012) argument that the choices media make are primarily to suppress certain meanings and focus on others. They write that journalists’ choices are never neutral as they would mostly like readers and viewers to believe a certain truth. Journalists, they argue, select lexicons based on “the way they wish to signpost what kind of person they are representing, or how they wish to represent them as social actors engaged in action” (Machin & Mayr 2012, p. 103). By using suggestive adjectives, journalists may take the reader on a single-lane path, blinded to other options.

Frames in conflict coverage speak differently to people from varied political ideologies. In Pakistan, the ethno-nationalist and blame frames in the coverage of Afghanistan and Afghan refugees speak to the general population. These frames are more relatable to readers with anti-Afghan, extremist/right-wing political beliefs, as they conform to their ideas and sentiments. Additionally, the Pakistani media narrative also reflects the State and the military stance on the refugee crisis. These frames suggest the political conflict will resolve itself once the refugees are repatriated to Afghanistan. However, by becoming a mouthpiece for
State propaganda, the media are ignoring that Pakistan’s forced exodus of Afghan refugees and the consequent tensions “are symptoms, rather than root causes” (Asian Foundation 2016, p. 16) of the conflict between the two countries. Conflicts create refugees, not the other way round. My analysis has shown what non-peace framing looks like in media narrative, and what detrimental effects and consequences it can have for resolution of a conflict. In the next chapter, I highlight and discuss what peace framing looks like. I also discuss the significance of peace journalism in providing journalists with options for framing a counter narrative to the dominant escalatory discourse in the Pakistani English media.
Chapter 5
Discussion – The road to peace journalism

5.1 Introduction

Johan Galtung introduced the idea of peace journalism in the 1970s as a counter-narrative to the war and conflict-escalatory journalism that was given more preference by mainstream media around the world at the time (Galtung 2000; Shinar 2009). Though not a lot has changed in the way media cover war and conflict, in the last two decades peace journalism studies have advocated a change in attitudes and behaviours in the way journalists and editors frame war and peace (see for example: Lee & Maslog 2005; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Tehranian 2009; Hussain 2014, 2015, 2017). Studies have shown that peace journalism can contain an escalation process, lead audiences to think and feel differently, consider and value nonviolent responses to war and conflict, and empathise with the personal stories of the affected people (McGoldrick 2014; Peleg 2007). In this chapter, I reflect on whether the four publications that I studied for my thesis employed peace frames during the three years under study, and if they did, then what extent. I pay particular attention to emerging frames, even if used rarely in the coverage of Afghan refugees and their ongoing repatriation from Pakistan. I distil three emerging frames: the justice delivery frame, the admission/confession frame, and the empathy-sympathy frame. However, before discussing them, I draw on an instructive international example to emphasise the power and impact of peace journalism. This example will help demonstrate the role peace-oriented coverage can play in stimulating audience attention towards human rights violations, oppression and social injustices, and at the same time maximising their prudence and judgement ability in challenging inflammatory and conflict-escalatory coverage.

In September 2015, Turkish photojournalist Nilüfer Demir immortalised the tragedy of the refugee crisis by tweeting a photo of Aylan Kurdi, a Syrian toddler who drowned crossing the Mediterranean to Turkey, alongside the hashtag #KiyiyaVuranInsanlik, which translates into English as “humanity was washed ashore” (Reuters, 3 September 2015). The photo went viral and media around the world emphasised Europe’s poor treatment of Syrian refugees and mishandling of the crisis. International media and the UNHCR referred to 2015 as “the year of Europe’s refugee crisis”. Journalists around the world presented the harrowing image of the toddler’s body as the epitome of human vulnerability and western shame, and called for the need to address the humanitarian crisis where millions of people were displaced by war and in search of a new home. Though the publishing of the photograph received some criticism (see for example: Kjeldsen 2017; Mortensen, Allan & Peters 2017) over media ethics and morality, and whether the photograph represented the reality of all refugees, nonetheless, the overall media coverage of the crisis suddenly became global, and universalised the refugee experience. The photograph triggered empathy and solidarity with refugees as media consumers imagined the toddler as their son or brother (see for example: Langdon 2018; Smith, McGarty & Thomas 2018). A Google news search for “Syrian child beach body” produced 1.8 million hits within the 24 hours after the photo went viral. The same search three months later produced over 8 million hits. Observing the framing in the coverage and the international debate that it generated about humanising the refugee crisis, I do believe that this is the power of peace journalism and
demonstrates the political and ethical choices journalists and editors can make to represent a humanitarian crisis.

Aylan Kurdi’s photo drew both political and public attention to the crisis. It is argued that his image triggered empathetic emotions on a global scale and caused a discursive shift (Sunata & Yildiz 2018) in the way refugees were situated and depicted in global media coverage and among societies around the world. However, his drowning was not the only death at sea that year. In the summer of 2015, hundreds of Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan refugees drowned in the Aegean Sea. All of these refugees were making an attempt to get to Turkey and then onto Europe, fleeing militant terrorist control back home. However, in the case of Baby Aylan – the name later used to refer to the little boy – he became a phenomenon because of widespread media coverage (New York Daily News, Metro Toronto, Buenos Aires Herald, Haber Express Turkey, The Washington Post to name a few). Peace journalism asks that a voice be given to the voiceless in our societies, and Baby Aylan’s image did that. The photograph of his little body washed ashore and the consequent media coverage of the 3,695 refugee deaths on the sea in 2015 alone not only spoke for the people affected by the conflicts, but also spoke to the people more broadly. The effects of this media coverage demonstrates that the way messages are framed can orientate the public’s emotional responses, fan public debates (Thussu and Freedman 2003) and sway public opinion, eventually turning into a new culture of journalism (Peleg 2007). Furthermore, peace journalism asks media to consider the consequences of their reporting (Youngblood 2017, p. 153), and consider what impacts their stories can have, especially on refugees and asylum seekers who are at the centre of the media coverage.

As mentioned earlier, the photograph also generated some academic critique by scholars who disapprove of media’s ‘humanitarian’ role in coverage of the vulnerable. For instance, Anna Szorenyi (2018), discusses the publishing of the photograph under colonial structures of representation. She argues that media have an ethics of responsibility towards distant suffering, which was missing in the coverage of Aylan Kurdi’s case. Choulia Raki and Stolic (2017) also examine the publishing of the photograph through ethics and morality. They argue that media have a certain moral responsibility towards the sufferings of refugees and other migrants. They call for a radical transformation in media’s understanding and responsibility towards vulnerable groups.

Baby Aylan’s photo also generated an ethical divide among journalists over the decision to publish his photograph. After the UK’s Independent newspaper decided to go ahead with publication, their editorial reminded the audience of the significance and consequence of telling his story to the world. The editorial (Independent, 3 September 2015) stated:

They are extraordinary images and serve as a stark reminder that, as European leaders increasingly try to prevent refugees from settling in the continent, more and more refugees are dying in their desperation to flee persecution and reach safety. The Independent has taken the decision to publish these images because, among the often glib words about the “ongoing migrant crisis”, it is all too easy to forget the reality of the desperate situation
facing many refugees.

The overall evidence leads our understating towards the positive influence of the photograph on the ways refugees were framed in media at the time, and the public debate it generated across the world. Therefore, it can be argued that the publishing of the toddler’s photograph and the resulting peace-oriented coverage of thousands of refugee deaths at sea may have humanised the media’s representation of the crisis for the rest of the world. It not only reminded readers and viewers about the need for non-violent responses to the conflict and delivery of justice, but also this peace-oriented coverage also turned numbers back into humans – children, fathers and mothers.

5.2 Fragmented peace

In Pakistan, peace journalism lies somewhere between the dormant and emerging stages. I use the word “emerging” consciously as the overall results from my analysis reveal a sporadic application of peace-oriented framing in the three years of coverage. My analysis and existing research demonstrate that Pakistani media predominantly serve national interests, and are highly nationalistic when covering cross-border conflicts, terrorism and security issues (see also: Hussain 2016; Hussain & Munawar 2017; Hussain, Siraj & Mahmood 2019; Zaheer 2020). Peace journalism is an emerging concept and approach in Pakistan – one that has not fully become part of the multiple ways conflicts are covered by the national media. Likewise, emerging frames, as the name suggests, are frames that have not yet become part of a dominant media narrative. Nonetheless, these frames carry the potential to be widely applied in media coverage. According to Hellsten et al. (2010), when certain issues are frequently and widely reported in a certain way, over time they become media frames. These frames are not only recurrently applied in reportage, they can also construct and feed dominant narratives and discourses about specific groups: their ethics, morality, race, and intentions. More so, these frames can become modes of representation not only in the media environment, but also in the social and political environment.

It is promising that despite the conflict-escalatory approach dominating media framing in Pakistan, I found traces of peace journalism dispersed across the media texts; however, based on the findings of my discourse analysis, this presence could make little to no effective contribution to the overall peace-orientation of the coverage of the conflict. Similarly, the low presence of peace-orientation in the coverage can easily go unnoticed by readers, and mean it is ineffective in changing the Pakistani public perception of Afghan refugees. Nonetheless, however discreet, these peace journalism traces enabled me identify some embryonic orientations in framing, which I propose as three emerging peace frames. While these emerging frames were implicit in some news stories and articles in the four publications, the findings of my analysis develop a strong case for more recurrent and explicit use of these frames in Pakistani journalism practice. These frames are exclusive to the coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation conflict in Pakistan but could be applied, with some modification, to the coverage of other similar conflicts. All three frames are based on the interpretive repertoires of equity, sentiments of harmony, inclusion, acceptance and association. I categorise the three frames under their master frame – the peace frame.
My analysis of the four publications indicates that overall, *Herald* (53%) used *peace frames* more than *Newsline* (21%), *Dawn* (21%), and *ET* (22%) (See Table 5.1). Yet, *Herald*’s coverage cannot be exclusively classified as peace journalism due to the implicit and sporadic use of these *peace frames*. *Herald*’s coverage included more stories where Afghan refugees were identified by their names, and the focus remained on their suffering (64% people-oriented coverage). There were more instances where *Herald* had used individual stories to represent the plight of Afghan refugees at large. The issues that were most highlighted included the challenges of family separation across the border, lack of access to health and education, infant mortality in refugee camps, harassment at border crossings, and illegal detention. There were happy stories of love and union across the border as well. These stories tend to give the reader a different view of Afghan refugees – a perspective that contrasts with the otherwise dominant representation of them as terrorists or the enemy. For a moment, the Afghan refugee is not a threat, but a vulnerable individual who is separated from family, exploited by security agencies, police, and the State, and misrepresented by the mainstream nationalistic media. The refugee is humanised. While it is evident from my analysis that, among the four publications, *Herald* humanised the refugees to a larger extent, it was still not enough to challenge or influence the dominant conflict-escalatory narrative in the media in general.

**Table 5.1: Percentage of peace journalism frames in Newsline, Herald, Dawn and ET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peace-oriented coverage</th>
<th>Truth-oriented coverage</th>
<th>People-oriented coverage</th>
<th>Solution-oriented coverage</th>
<th>Peace Journalism framing</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newsline</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Herald* and *Dawn* are both widely read in Pakistan, and appreciated for their “fearless and investigative reporting” (Hussain J. 2020), but my findings raise concerns about their progressive and inclusive image. In fact, my findings not only challenge the mainstream public image of these publications as progressive, they also diverge from some recent studies that found some of these publications to be peace-oriented (see for example: Memon et al. 2020; Qazi and Shah 2018). Memon et al. (2020) studied the coverage of various global conflicts by two major Pakistani English newspapers, one of which was *Dawn*. The conflicts included the 2019 Hong Kong protests, the Israel–Palestine Conflict, and the Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India. They found *Dawn*’s peace-oriented coverage to be on the higher end (55%), arguing that the framing was people-oriented and favourable towards the protesters and the affected parties in the conflict. In another study, Qazi and Shah (2018) also found that *Dawn* employed more *peace frames* in its coverage of the aftermath of a Taliban attack on Malala Yousafzai, who later became world’s youngest Nobel laureate. The researchers found that *Dawn* was unequivocally sympathetic to Malala and opposed the Taliban. I found that the coverage in all four publications, primarily *Dawn*, *ET* and *Newsline*, was
dominated by conflict-escalatory framing.

Arguably it could be the difference in the ways media cover high-intensity conflicts (such as Taliban or terrorism) versus low-intensity conflicts (such as internal displacement or missing persons in Pakistan). I observed that Pakistani media tend to employ conflict-escalatory frames more often when covering high-intensity conflicts. In this type of coverage, the framing is highly inflammatory and nationalistic (see for example: Hussain 2014; Iqbal and Hussain 2017). The Afghan refugee repatriation conflict is one of the high-intensity conflicts Pakistan is engaged in with a neighbouring country. This conflict has had an augmented attention from the State and military establishment, both of whom are interested in regional political power. Consequently, they put pressure on the media to align their narrative with the government and the military. In addition to this, most journalists also depend on security forces for information through press releases (Jan & Hussain 2020), which links back to an excessive and recurrent use of political and military elites as sources in reporting. Therefore, while these publications may have demonstrated peace-oriented framing in some low-intensity national conflicts, their coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation was highly conflict-escalatory.

Arguably, the Herald scoring relatively high on peace-orientation in framing compared to the other three publications could also be due to the limited number of articles published on the conflict – 36 articles in three years. Though this makes a story per month on average, it is important to note that there were some consecutive months in the three years where the magazine did not feature the refugee repatriation or the overall conflict with Afghanistan (over refugees). This is less coverage compared to a daily newspaper, but for a monthly magazine it means that the conflict remained part of the narrative throughout the year. During the same period, Dawn and ET both published 1,489 news stories about the conflict. On average, that is 11 stories a week and more than one story a day. This demonstrates that Pakistani news readers were bombarded with stories about Afghan refugees on almost a daily basis. Most of this coverage was dominated by non-peace, highly escalatory framing. Only 22% of these stories had some element of peace journalism. Those that applied peace-orientation did so sporadically, which means that while it was present to an extent, it was still not prevalent enough to challenge the dominant anti-Afghan narrative in the media and the public debate. In other words, peace framing was fragmented to an extent that it was negligible.

5.3 Emerging frames

Although rare in frequency, the news stories and articles that demonstrated a strong peace journalism approach used justice and accountability as their predominant themes. While media attention towards justice and accountability was largely absent, some stories and articles used these themes implicitly. In this section, I explore two of the three emerging frames that emphasise the aspects of justice and accountability.

The justice delivery frame addresses a broad spectrum of peace journalism properties. Justice as a frame has previously been used by many scholars who have used the nexus between media and justice as an analytical framework to study media representations in varied cases (see for example: Austin and Farrell 2017; Askanius and Hartley 2019; Čapek 1993; Dreher and Voyer 2015). For instance, Austin and Farrell
(2017), who studied the American media’s framing of human trafficking, argue that policymakers and legislators are less likely to adopt helpful anti-trafficking responses due to the incorrect framing of human trafficking in popular media. They proposed the use of criminal justice frame in media representation of traffickers, whom they argued were mostly depicted as male and part of larger organised criminal cells, when in fact they were not necessarily that. The scholars argue that this incorrect framing encouraged specific interpretations to an issue and reinforced cultural stereotypes and beliefs.

In 2017, Askanius and Hartley (2019) conducted a qualitative framing analysis of 109 news articles published in Danish and Swedish newspapers. Focusing on gender (in)justice and the role of media, they identified multiple dominant frames that either legitimised or de-legitimised the #metoo campaign. In another example, scholars such as Čapek (1993) and Dreher and Voyer (2015) have studied justice-oriented framing in the context of environment and climate change. Dreher and Voyer (2015), for instance, found that climate justice frames were rarely used in Australian mainstream media coverage of climate change issues. They proposed alternative frames that look at climate change as a social justice and human rights issue. Čapek (1993) draws from a social constructionist perspective, arguing that an environmental justice frame was linked to the social change mobilisation of a local community that had been struggling over toxic contamination in the United States. In addition to climate, crime and gender, justice orientation in media coverage has been studied with links to politics, democracy, and refugees, but rarely as an emerging or dominant frame. In the context of peace journalism, justice orientation in framing has been largely analysed under (de)humanisation frames. In my thesis, I treat justice as an independent frame and discuss its use in coverage in relation to empathy, impartiality, complexity of the conflict, and human suffering.

The justice delivery frame speaks for refugees who are victims of oppression, exploitation, and human rights abuse and violation. Reporters and editors who employ this frame focus on balance and accuracy, human-angle stories, non-violence, rehabilitation and facilitation and, most importantly, delivery of justice. The frame indicates a push for peace dialogue for the resolution of the conflict, which has left millions deprived of their rights. The justice delivery frame simultaneously falls under each of the four major classifications of Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model (See Table 1.1), selecting peace over conflict, truth over propaganda, people over the elite and solutions over victory. By employing the justice delivery frame in conflict coverage, journalists contribute to a public debate about the injustices and the role of media in advocating for the marginalised and oppressed, and those exploited by the system. This frame is based on Galtung’s notion of positive peace, “the integration of human society” and the “prevalence of justice, harmony and equality” (Galtung 1964, p. 2). As an analytical frame, justice delivery refers to greater equality in both the resettlement and rehabilitation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and immunity from forced repatriation.

The absence of violence does not automatically deliver justice. Awareness-led action is crucial to the prevalence of peace and justice in a non-violent conflict. Callaghan and Martin (2004) argue that while injustices in a non-violent conflict do not always backfire, if publicised widely and audience support is gathered they can sometime backfire on the perpetrators. To generate audience attention on justice, they
argue that journalists must expose official cover-ups, the devaluation of the target, mis- and reinterpretation of the action (by the perpetrators), and intimidation and bribery. In Pakistan, the treatment of Afghan refugees is an obvious injustice that warrants action. Drawing on Callaghan and Martin’s (2004) study of refugee injustice and the role of the media, I would argue that through the use of the justice delivery frame in their coverage, journalists in Pakistan can prompt official action, and audience attention and interest in the repatriation conflict. If peace journalists want to generate a debate on justice, they must highlight the “cooperation and integration between human groups, with less emphasis on the absence of violence” (Galtung 1967, p. 14).

Justice delivery equates to positive peace, which Galtung associates with the existence of positive relations at both a national and international level. This includes cooperation, freedom from fear, freedom from want, economic growth and development, equality, freedom of action, pluralism, dynamism, and the absence of exploitation (Galtung 1967, p. 14). The justice delivery frame responds to Galtung’s call for justice and positive peace, and does more than simply humanise the victims. By employing this frame, journalists can not only bring, what some scholars refer to as “Galtunic” values of positive relations into journalism practice, they can also contribute to the discussion on the unfair treatment of victims – in this case the Afghan refugees. The justice delivery frame positions conflict-preventive measures and social reforms together with an emphasis on humans, not State powers.

Examples of justice-oriented framing include a 2016 Herald article, “Closing the gates of Lahore” (Herald 18 August 2016), uncovering the unfair treatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The way the article has been framed not only humanises the refugees, the journalist also highlights the State’s ethnocentric and prejudiced treatment of the Afghan refugees. The primary source in the article is an employee of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, who is quoted as saying: “there is a word in the dictionary to describe the treatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and that word is ‘xenophobia’.” The article indicates the Pakistani State’s animosity towards the refugees, and draws audience attention towards the impact of such treatment on the conflict. It also addresses the State-driven ethnocentricity as a humanitarian and social justice concern. Taking guidance from Fekete’s (2010) research on media portrayal of refugees and asylum seekers, and Shabbir Hussain’s argument about media coverage of high and low-intensity conflicts (discussed in previous chapters), I would argue that the irregular/ episodic use of the justice delivery frame in media coverage may have generated the xenophobic and antagonistic public sentiment against Afghan refugees. Media attention to justice delivery and humanisation of these people, therefore, is a vital counteractive peace journalism practice compared to dominant parochial, ethno-nationalist narratives.

One of the ways that the justice delivery frame in the coverage humanised refugees was by giving prominence to stories of refugees’ struggles that had directly affected their intimate lives. For example, in 2016 a news story appeared in ET under the title “Call for justice: Pakistani women married to Afghan men protest” (ET 5 September 2016). The story detailed the challenges facing Pakistani women who had married Afghan men from among the refugees and were asking the government to stop forcefully repatriating the Afghan refugees. It quoted one of the women saying: “Our families have divided … They have sent my
husband to Afghanistan, who has also taken my sons along with him.” Portraying the women’s struggles through their vulnerability and concerns for their relationships individualises them as a casualty of State policy on forced repatriation, and may provoke compassion among the audience. It also draws attention to the repercussions of repatriation on helpless families, stranded on both sides of the Durand Line. The news story also triggers empathy, which is a significant characteristic of a society where justice prevails.

Peace journalism instils an empathetic conception of the moral responsibility of humanity (Langdon 2018). It is inclusive and serves as a counter-narrative to media frames that are based on “othering” of the marginalised. It focuses on solidarity rather than apathy and distance. Moral ethics demand transparency and self-accountability from both the government and the public. For justice to prevail, authorities must admit their mistakes and ensure transparency and safety of the public, including migrants and refugees. Accountability becomes even more crucial to justice in rehabilitating and resettlement in post-war and post-conflict phases, and equally important in ongoing cold conflicts, such as the one between Pakistan and Afghanistan. A journalism practice that contributes to peace and dialogue by highlighting issues of social and human rights injustices, and questions the authorities through evidence (stories of victims and other affected groups), is more likely to promote empathy and a culture of accountability among State officials than a coverage that is focused on conflict escalation.

One way in which the four publications were practicing this form of journalism was by employing frames that can foster the admission and confession of human rights violations by the State and other law enforcement agencies. I identified this type of framing as the admission/confession frame. Though present in only three per cent of the news stories and magazine articles in the three years under study, this frame illustrated the oppressive and exploitative treatment of Afghan refugees by the Pakistani government. The admission/confession frame creates a narrative in which the democratised media make the government accountable for decisions that affect marginalised groups, especially refugees and other migrants. Through calls for transparency and accountability, the media must not only ask ‘who is responsible?’, but also answer the question. Taking an agentive role, the media indexes the power relations between the weak and the powerful by raising important issues around State accountability for exploiting and manipulating the refugee crisis. By employing the admission/confession frame, media not only ask questions and find answers, but also exercise their independence and power in democracies (Bennett et al. 2007). The truth-and solution-oriented framing in the Galtung Peace and War Journalism Model focus on exposing “untruths and cover-ups”, and supporting “resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation” respectively. Although, the model does not explicitly mention admission and confession as criteria for peace-oriented coverage, I place the admission/confession frame under the two orientations because of its focus on transparency and non-violent responses to a conflict. This frame was used rarely not only in the corpus I studied, but I also observed that this theme has received nominal attention in scholarly research on media framing of global political conflicts.

Governments often suppress media and public debates in the name of national security, peace and democracy, causing an ideological polarisation (Payne 2008). The admission/confession frame highlights
such attempts by the State and/or military establishment and aims to make authorities take responsibility for their policy decisions and actions. It starts by exposing cover-ups about human rights violations, and dispelling propaganda. One prominent example of the admission/confession frame is a 2016 Herald article with the title “Why should I care about Afghan refugees?” (Herald 20 August 2016). The article is highly opinionated, and commences with an account of what the journalist saw on the streets of Kabul. The journalist reports:

We – the citizens of a state which collaborated with the Central Intelligence Agency to destroy their country – enjoyed the ethnic jewelry and antique fabrics which were sold across the country in expensive boutiques – the last bits of an old life sold off to finance another life in the misery of refugee camps huddled amidst dust and despair.

It is a strongly written article in which the journalist provides three important reasons behind the Af–Pak political conflict, and the deteriorating refugee crisis situation: 1) Pakistan’s military assistance to America to create the Taliban, 2) the plundering of Afghan land, culture and resources by Pakistan, and 3) the mistreatment and exploitation of Afghan refugees in camps in Pakistan, referring to the exodus as “largely forcible repatriation”. She also reminds the readers about the Naturalization Act of 1926, under which the Pakistani State grants citizenship to those born in the country. She writes, “a birthright enshrined in the Naturalization Act of 1926 – that citizenship cannot be denied.” In doing so, while she makes a strong case for the Pakistani government to consider granting citizenship to refugees born in Pakistan, she is also educating the readers about a law that is missing from mainstream public debate and knowledge. The Naturalization Act of 1926 grants citizenship to babies born in Pakistan after 1926. To confirm how many people around me knew about this Act, I asked a few friends in Pakistan, during personal communication in 2019, if they were familiar with it. Unsurprisingly, only one of them knew about the Act. By bringing the readers’ attention to the law, the journalist is highlighting what has been widely missing from media and public narrative.

Besides other rights, citizenship can also provide stateless refugees with a sense of belonging to the country that they have been living in most of their lives without agency. The article incorporates a solution-oriented and truth-oriented framing to a large extent by suggesting peace and conflict resolution. She poses a series of rhetorical questions, such as “Why don’t you care?”, “Why do I care about this midnight movement of people I may have never met, never chanced to know?”, and “Why is it important that the political, humanitarian, and legal aspects of this new executive order be deconstructed?” While she later follows up with strong historical evidence of Pakistani State’s and military involvement in Afghan politics, she leaves the interpretation of these questions to the reader, who – if well-informed – will take notice of the points she is making. The following excerpt from the article (Herald 20 August 2016) demonstrates an explicit employment of the admission/confession frame:

Because the involvement of Pakistan’s agencies in the 10-year war to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan cannot be denied. Because the aggrandisement of Pakistan’s generals
through the sharing of billions of US dollars cannot be denied. Because the movement of thousands of tons of armaments through the National Logistics Cell cannot be denied. Because the victims of the blast that destroyed evidence of the sale of missiles from Ojhri Camp cannot be denied. Because the human tragedy of those who own little and are forced to give up their homes, their fields, their livestock because of global agendas, cannot be denied. Because the loss of dignity when forced to live in a refugee camp, living on handouts cannot be denied. Because the sheer strength of will it takes to rebuild lives in a strange land cannot be denied.

Not every journalist used the admission/confession frame as overtly as observed in the example above. Most stories and articles employed the frame through a latent manifestation, which may make it difficult for readers to infer its meaning (Baran 2001, p.10). A newspaper story or a magazine article is a “media package” of metaphors, and defines the master frame in the text. According to Baran (2001), the dominant frame is sometimes hard to detect in the interpretative repertoire, especially because of the implicit language and tone used in the text. While the text is open to readers’ interpretation and perception, the implicit application of frame(s) or constant switching between frames can result in the meaning and context of the interpretative repertoire not reaching the readers.

I observed that the implicit application of frame(s) and constant switching between frames was common in stories and articles in which the journalist had suggested that States must be held accountable for their actions, as evidenced by Mohsin Hamid’s article for Herald. In the article “What is wrong with repatriating Afghan refugees?” (Herald 1 February 2017), Hamid highlights Pakistan and Afghanistan’s handling of the refugee crisis and the consequent political conflict between the two countries. Throughout the article, he shifts his stance from a pro-Pakistan one to a pro-Afghanistan, and back. The article begins with Hamid subtly criticising Pakistan for creating and supporting conditions that led to so many people fleeing Afghanistan. He then suddenly shifts to applauding Pakistan’s morality in treating these refugees. He writes, “In its acceptance of refugees, Pakistan has behaved morally.” However, a few sentences later, he again shifts and writes that the step to repatriate Afghan refugees was a “misguided one”, arguing that it will create a narrative that will be detrimental to Pakistan’s future humanitarian image. He also suggests that Pakistan must find other ways to improve its internal security and needs to open its mind and “behave decently” by letting refugees stay. He writes: “We must let them stay not only for their sake, but for ours, because in letting them stay we are staking a claim to the kind of country we rightly dream that Pakistan becomes”.

Hamid seems to be making an attempt to broaden the reader’s understanding of the pros and cons of the process of immediate repatriation, asking them to measure both sides and all angles of Pakistan’s decision to repatriate refugees. He adds that “catastrophic harm threatens to befall these three million refugees”, once again sketching their plight. He uses words such as “suspicion, “antipathy” and “condemnation” for Pakistan’s treatment of Afghan refugees, and implicitly focuses on solution-oriented framing. He also
subtly discusses the need for Pakistan to admit its wrongdoings of the past and to now rethink by “beginning to march in a different direction” (a trace of admission/confession frame).

Observing the constant frame switching, I’d argue that Hamid’s article is either a victim of the dogma of neutrality, or intermittent self-correction due to fear of State censorship. Since every frame has its own theme, it is interpreted differently as well. The biggest disadvantage of frequent shifts in stance within one text is that the common reader, who is bombarded with multiple ideas, may as a result be left confused over which side to take. The readers are also switching their interpretation with every frame. For example, I noted that when Hamid (Herald 1 February 2017) takes the pro-Afghanistan stance, he does it very cautiously, and immediately proceeds with a stronger pro-Pakistan statement, highlighting the favours it has done for Afghan refugees in the past 40 years. For instance, “We have backed insurgencies in neighbouring countries, harboured terrorists and extremists, allowed sectarian killers to slaughter our fellow citizens, refused to embrace the principle that all are equal before the law”, but followed by “Pakistan has also performed a deeply decent act on the world stage. For decades, it has provided a haven to some three million Afghan refugees”. Such shifts are not incidental, and as mentioned above, I would argue that they could be curated to avoid State censorship. In Pakistan, the State and the military establishment control media (and the Internet) through “draconian” laws (Khilji 2020; Uddin 2017), that have “gradually and systematically strengthened a tyrannical grip over freedom of expression” (Uddin 2017). Due to the deteriorating situation of journalists’ safety in Pakistan12, increased military control of free speech, and low State tolerance towards dissent, journalists sometimes choose to tone down framing in the coverage of regional political conflicts, especially those with direct military involvement, such as the one with Afghanistan.

5.4 The line of fire

A pro-Afghan stance in the Pakistani media can be detrimental to a journalist’s career, and also to their lives. It is the line of fire that many journalists work close to, but not many are willing to cross. This is probably one of the strongest findings of my analysis: the tendency towards cautious peace journalism. The military establishment perceives any coverage that questions Pakistan’s policy on the refugee conflict as dissenting and treasonous, and a threat to safety and security of the country. Due to this, many Pakistani journalists face security threats by powerful but corrupt state institutions, dictatorial government, a fragile democracy and powerful religious extremist groups (Mahmood 2020). One such journalist is Taha Siddiqi, a close friend of mine and an award-winning journalist who is currently living in exile in France. Siddiqi is a vocal critic of the Pakistani military establishment and their interference in the democratic political system (Abbass and Safi 2018). He was beaten and threatened with death by at least 10 armed men who belonged to the military establishment. Siddiqi argues that his work can easily be classified as peace journalism (personal communication), as he had been uncovering the army-induced forced disappearances in Balochistan and KP, and criticising heavy fund allocations from the federal budget to defence and army

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12 The 2017 World Press Freedom Index placed Pakistan among the most dangerous countries for journalists. Pakistan was ranked 139th out of 180 countries on the list.
In Pakistan, peace journalists who question the Pakistani military’s role in regional and internal conflicts are likely to meet the same fate as Siddiqi. Questioning the military establishment’s role in Afghanistan and the State’s mishandling of the Afghan refugee crisis can be dangerous for the journalist. It can be argued that journalists’ fears for their safety may be contributing to such a limited and sporadic application of the admission/confession frame, and the overall infrequent practice of peace journalism in the Pakistani media.

Pakistan is one of 12 countries on the Global Impunity Index 2020 with a high number of journalist killings that were never investigated by the authorities. The report, which is published by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), found that one of the main reasons the Pakistani government did not order a police investigation into these murders was a lack of political will. As of 2020, there are 15 unsolved murder cases of journalists in Pakistan. The most recent is the killing of Pakistani journalist Sajid Hussain, whose body was discovered in a river in Sweden in 2020. Hussain had fled Pakistan in 2012 after getting in trouble with the military establishment and the State over his reporting on forced disappearances and human rights violations in the Balochistan region (Ellis-Peterson 2020). He had been active on social media and had been receiving death threats. Other journalists who have been arrested over criticising the military include Bilal Farooqi, Matiullah Jan and Gul Bukhari, among others. Pakistan is ranked 139th on the list of 180 countries where freedom of press exists. In an article written for the Washington Post, Hameed Haroon, the chief executive of the Dawn Media Group and president of the All Pakistan Newspapers Society, wrote that journalists in Pakistan were facing a “dirty war on the freedom of the press” (Haroon 2018). At the forefront of the journalists’ safety situation in Pakistan, Haroon seems to be self-censoring, arguably playing it safe by presenting conflicting arguments in subsequent paragraphs. Even when writing for an international publication, he is very careful with his words. He makes a ‘confession’ on behalf of the Pakistan for their contribution to regional conflicts, internal political instability and attacks on free speech. However, he immediately aligns his association with the Pakistani State and the military by propagating national interest as the reason behind the State control of media. Such fear-related concerns from journalists and editors explains a limited use of the admission/confession frame in the coverage of the conflict by the four publications – in turn making media a less democratised industry in Pakistan.

The democratisation of media is an important aspect of its political economy, and primarily deals with power relations between politics and media in the communication of information to the public. Free speech is crucial to the democratisation of media, and for journalists to safely practice peace journalism, especially in war and conflict. As noted earlier, public narrative can inform media frames and vice-versa. Both can be shaped by politics (See Figure: 5.2.1 on page 124). Transparency, accountability, truth and an equitable distribution of power is central to a democratic system or process. Therefore, the democratisation of media can make coverage less constrained, and journalists freer to make lexical choices in the interpretative repertoire. This means that media would not be forcibly politicised by the status quo or the State, and would not be used as a propaganda tool or mouthpiece for government or the military establishment.
Ideally, an unpoliticised media must inform public narrative through peace journalism practice. A well-informed public narrative should contribute to political policies in a democratic system (Figure: 5.2.1). In Pakistan, I argue that the lack of media democratisation may have been the reason behind: 1) the very low extent of the use of the admission/confession frame in coverage of Afghan refugees and the repatriation conflict, and 2) the highly nationalistic framing incorporated through a propagandist and elitist approach. In turn, these two factors also reduced the truth orientation in coverage as recorded in my findings.

![Diagram](image)

**Table 5.2:** Non-linear power relations between a politicised media and uninformed public narrative in a controlled system.

![Diagram](image)

**Table 5.2.1:** Linear power relations: An unpoliticised media must inform public narrative through Peace Journalism practice. A well-informed public narrative should contribute to political policies in a democratic system.

Politisation of a conflict can cause a shift in the coverage of the crisis from a humanitarian framing to a hostile framing (Consterdine 2018). Similarly, in Pakistan, the politicisation of media by the State and military establishment may have led to the nationalistic coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation crisis. The political debate on forced repatriation of refugees back to Afghanistan started in late 2013, and intensified in 2015 and onwards after the APS terrorist attack (noted in chapter 3). A prominent Pakistani politician who favoured the forced exodus was former States and Frontier Regions minister Abdul Qadir Baloch. He was reappointed to the role in 2013, and was adamant about Pakistan’s increasing inability to afford to host Afghan refugees. Baloch had started making frequent media appearances to publicise his standpoint. He had also served as the head of the military regime in Balochistan province from 2001–2003 as the Martial Law Administrator under General Pervez Musharraf’s government. According to Baloch, Afghan refugees had cost Pakistan more than $200 billion over the last 30 years. Around 2015, the Pakistani media started reporting on the proposals to repatriate Afghan refugees, who were framed as a burden on Pakistan’s failing economy. It took the media less than a year to pick up the political stance on repatriation and adopt it in its narrative. This adoption led to the construction of frames that represented a very political view on a humanitarian crisis.
By 2016, media frames that represented Afghan refugees as a threat and an enemy of the State had become dominant in the coverage. This may have prompted a more serious concern among the nation, who were still grieving the targeted killing of over 100 school children in the APS attack, leading to anger and antagonism for the refugees. I would argue that this was an example of public debate crafted by the government and conveyed to the public by the media. The political account of forcibly repatriating Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan became a hot topic for television talk shows and opinion columns in newspapers. The public became more likely to see the political world as personally relevant (McLaughlin & Velez 2019), which was dangerous in this context given the State allegations of terrorism against Afghan refugees. This in turn made the public more likely to commit to supporting the government, who was publicising its anti-Afghan and pro-repatriation policies more frequently in 2016 and onwards.

In this way, the refugee conflict was successfully politicised throughout Pakistani society, facilitated by national and private media. Headlines such as “Pakistan looks forward to repatriation of Afghan refugees” (News 26 June 2016), and “Pakistan calls for early return of Afghan refugees” (Nation 22 April 2016) started to appear more frequently on the front pages of the top English newspapers in the country. Some government officials and parliamentarians had even proposed non-renewal of expired PoR cards, which are issued by the Pakistani government and are mandatory for Afghan refugees to live and work in the country legally. In 2016 the government first set the 31 December as an official deadline for mass exodus of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Comparing numbers at the start and end of the year, UNHCR reported an 830 per cent rise in forced repatriation. Meanwhile, a toxic combination of deportation threats and police abuses pushed out nearly 365,000 of the country’s 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees, as well as just over 200,000 of the country’s estimated 1 million undocumented Afghans (Human Rights Watch 2017).

5.5 Lack of empathy and social closeness

I found that the media coverage of Afghan refugees in the three years under my study lacked empathy, despite the common perception that media reports referring to refugees tend to be empathy-framed (Robinson 2000). Empathy-oriented framing does not necessarily imply that journalists must take an anti-State stance in their reporting. In fact, the three main elements that play an important part in the process of developing a cognitive empathy towards other people are shared values, beliefs and norms (Stephan & Finlay 1999), which were mostly missing from the coverage. Empathy-oriented coverage prompts the readers to imagine themselves in the place of the marginalised groups and perceive the situation from their point of view.

Empathy orientation in the coverage of the crisis can be seen as a conflict intervention and a powerful means of influencing community attitudes (Gitlin 2003; Entman 1993; Cottle 2000; Lester 2010). However, some scholars, such as Khorana (2018), have presented a critique of the conventional use of ‘empathy’ in media coverage of refugees, and other humanisation discourses in media. She argues that certain refugee-themed discourses in media can generate selective empathy, and is problematic. While I partly agree with Khorana’s arguments of selective empathy in media coverage, and the ethical media representation of the “distant and proximate other” (p. 143), in the context of my case study, it is noteworthy that Afghan refugees
are not a distant crisis for Pakistan and its media, and thus the need for empathy in media coverage. In fact, the rare employment of the **empathy–sympathy frame** in the coverage may explain why Pakistani community attitudes towards Afghan refugees have been antagonistic since their mass arrival into the country after the Taliban took power in Afghanistan. I found that 86 per cent of media stories lacked the *empathy–sympathy frame*, which is based on an important element of peace journalism: compassion. I see this frame as sensitising the reader to the plight of Afghan refugees. Only a limited number of news stories and features (216 out of the total 1,582) employed the *empathy–sympathy frame*. A high number of stories were framed in a way that is likely to be insensitive towards Afghan refugees and their socio-economic challenges, as well as horrors such as police harassment and threats, uncertainty of livelihood and permanent or temporary separation from family. The *empathy–sympathy frame* universalises human experience based on shared values. It falls under the *peace frame* master frame and can be grouped under people-oriented framing in Galtung’s model. Many scholars who have studied contemporary media representations of refugees have used the word “empathy” (see for example: Evans 2010; Langdon 2018; Triandafyllidou 2018). However, it was Robinson (2000) who first used the term “empathy framing” in his study of media coverage that was critical of the government in two cases: 1) the US intervention in Bosnia in 1995 in order to defend the Gorazde “safe area”, and 2) the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. He, however, exclusively used the term referring to the media’s “implicit or explicit criticism of a government opposed to [international] intervention” (Robinson 2000, p. 616).

In my present discussion, I extend Robinson’s use and meaning of the term “empathy” to media framing that generates a deeper public understanding of the issue in a way that prompts a compassionate response without politicising the crisis. The *empathy–sympathy frame* gives the reader an opportunity to view the refugee crisis as a regional conflict between two governments, and not as a personal threat. In that way, the frame helps in the depoliticisation of the public, the humanitarian crisis, and the administration of justice, thereby making coverage more pluralistic and universal. The frame has been used by some other media scholars under a different name. For instance, Langdon (2018) refers to such framing as a “cosmopolitan frame” (p. 6), which emphasises a shared understanding of morality and the universality of humanity. Rather than perceiving those displaced as a threat, the *empathy–sympathy frame* identifies with their vulnerabilities, and may also provoke calls for some form of official assistance to alleviate the suffering of the affected group. As argued by Langdon (2018), in recognising the universality of human experience, media can draw the “other” closer in our consciousness so that we are viewing from a position of morality, empathy and solidarity rather than fear, distance and apathy.

The *empathy-sympathy frame*, however, is a separate strand of humanisation and legitimisation of the group of people most affected in a conflict. In addition to humanising refugees, this frame stimulates a compassionate response and community acceptance, and is likely to garner public support. An example to demonstrate the application of the *empathy–sympathy frame* is Taimoor Khan’s article “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA’s citizens of nowhere” (Herald 26 July 2017), in which he humanises a 15-year-old unidentified Afghan refugee by sketching his daily routine to the readers. The journalist also uses the young boy’s story as a representation of the hundreds of thousands of “undocumented” children born to
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The article opens with the following sentence: “Emphasis on travel documents and the precarious law and order situation has not only restricted their mobility, but has also forced them to live with no identity” (Herald 26 July 2017). In so doing, Khan brings the reader’s attention to how the lack of identity documents in a system that already discriminates against Afghan refugees hinders their work and freedom of movement.

Khan has probably left the 15-year-old unidentified on purpose, and even avoided giving him a pseudonym to generate a sense of curiosity or frustration among the readers, as anonymity makes us uncomfortable. He may be trying to evoke a collective empathy among the readers over how it feels when people have no official “identity” or “belonging”, and end up “stateless” and “soft targets” of the system, despite living in Pakistan for years. With each paragraph, the writer humanises the boy more explicitly to the reader and, along with him, many other children born to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Khan also notes several important problems and challenges the refugees face regarding documentation, such as the blocking of identity cards by the Pakistani public authority that is in charge of issuing residence, citizenship and other identity documents. Phrases such as “unbearable winters”, “forced them to live with no identity”, “live in a squatter settlement”, and “there is no one that these people can go to for help” are significant in activating reader sentiments of closeness and association to truth and understanding, and distancing from propaganda.

Fairclough (1995) argues that language articulates a relationship between social structures and ideologies. The way refugees and other minority groups are recurrently portrayed in media texts constructs dominant representations, socially shared understandings and social and ideological structures. Thus, public sentiments and attitudes towards refugees may change depending on the language media use to represent and portray them. Peace journalism gives an opportunity to build an alternative, counter-hegemonic narrative about marginalised groups, and is selective and cautious in its language use.

An example of such peace-oriented framing is a 2017 article in Herald called “In Problems with controlling movement across the Pak–Afghan border” (Herald 5 September 2017), in which the journalist investigates the challenges around cross-border refugee movement. He presents a scene at the Torkham border post on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, where half a dozen women and some children are sitting in an office compound out in the open while it rains. He writes that the security official “wants them to move to the Afghan side of the border. They all request him to let them remain on the Pakistani side.” His use of the word want for the Pakistani security official, and the word request for the Afghan women and children refugees illustrates the use of force and oppression by the former, and submission by the latter. The use of these words demonstrates the power relationships between the Pakistani authorities and the Afghan refugees, and how the State imposes power over the powerless. The framing of the group of Afghan refugees as vulnerable and helpless contests the largely negative and hegemonic media narrative about them in the mainstream Pakistani media – both English and Urdu (Mustafa et al. 2017; Malik & Iqbal 2010; Kronenfeld 2008).
Empathy-provoking frames in media coverage can identify and fill the fissures created by a conflict-escalatory approach. These fissures manifest as the mistreatment and forced exodus of Afghan refugees by Pakistan, which has been widely covered by international media and confirmed by human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the UNHCR. Alternatively, an accurate representation of these refugees by Pakistani media could have generated positive stories, images and debates not only in Pakistan, but also globally. However, despite the conflict being almost half a century old, Pakistani media have failed to generate a national debate in favour of the refugees or create a single positive image/story from among the millions of Afghan refugees stranded in Pakistani refugee camps.

After the application of the analytical criteria (developed and explained in chapter 2) to the corpus, I found that less than five per cent of the news stories and articles were framed in a way that could prompt empathy for the Afghan refugees and generate an understanding of their struggles. In fact, the way the Pakistani media framed the Afghan refugees had instead damaged the one famous image and story that had emerged from a refugee camp in Pakistan in 2002, after National Geographic’s Steve McCurry re-photographed the famous “Afghan Girl”. McCurry had first photographed “The Afghan Girl” in 1985 in Afghanistan. The portrait of a young girl with sharp green eyes had become an iconic image of the plight of the Afghan people during the Afghan–Soviet war (1979–1989). However, her representation in the Pakistani media in 2016 was far from compassionate. “The Afghan Girl” (later identified as Sharbat Gula) made headlines in the Pakistani media in 2016 after she was arrested for illegally obtaining a Pakistani ID and accused of spying for Afghan intelligence services (Simpson 2016). The latter narrative disappeared from media within a few days after no solid evidence of espionage was found. However, when I mentioned her name in private discussions with friends and former colleagues from the media industry in Pakistan, they still attached espionage allegations with her name. Both Dawn and ET reported Gula’s arrest, focusing on her “living in the country with fraudulent identity papers” (ET 26 October 2016), and charges against her of “fraud” (Dawn 27 October 2016), and who (for the ID) “shed her burqa but didn’t change her first name” (ET 27 October 2016). All the reports highlighted the likelihood of any Afghan refugee spying for Afghan intelligence services and the threat they posed to Pakistan’s national security. Such framing of a simple arrest could result in readers perceiving every other Afghan refugee as a terrorist or spy, thus minimising their chances of developing empathy and a sense of shared values.

The lack of empathy-provoking framing was also demonstrated by the absence of important background information in most news stories. Without context, it can be hard to generate empathy among the readership. For instance, the reports gave few details of Sharbat Gula’s deceased husband and child, her other sick children, her unstable source of very low income and other challenges, and most importantly the over 35 years she has spent in a refugee camp in Pakistan. Even though this information was covered by most international media, such as the BBC, National Geographic Magazine and The New York Times. In addition to important context being absent in Sharbat Gula’s coverage, Dawn and ET’s stories did not mention how terrible life as a refugee was – even more so for women refugees, who are extremely vulnerable to sexual assault and exploitation. These women become the heads of vulnerable households when male family members are missing or dead, and they struggle with finding adequate food or healthcare for their children.
Access to adequate reproductive healthcare is minimal, especially in war zones, and being pregnant or having to give birth as a refugee is a significantly more difficult than it is for a normal citizen.

The omission of important context and background by *Dawn* and *ET*, whether it was intentional or coincidental, diminishes the chances of generating empathy towards Sharbat Gula’s plight and the miserable conditions that Afghan refugees are forced to live in. The negative representation and disinformation in Sharbat Gula’s case demonstrates how a story of global interest was highly politicised in the Pakistani media. One of the most prominent reasons behind this politicisation was the involvement of the military establishment behind her arrest, since she was initially accused of espionage. Portraying her as a victim of the State meant going against the authorities and therefore dissent, which the Pakistani government and establishment have very little tolerance for. The media are thus politicised and covered the arrests and the overall refugee crisis from a nationalistic angle, either willingly or forcibly becoming a mouthpiece for political propaganda.

5.6 In the midst of things

The three emerging *peace frames* that I have identified in this chapter employ language that has the power to develop and generate peace-oriented sentiments among the readers. As argued by Strömbäck (2001), media can change the readers’ perception of reality. However, it is not about *if*, but *to what extent* media exercise this power and how this impacts upon the realities of refugees’ lives. In my research, I found that the four major publications I examined used this power largely to provoke sentiments of antagonism and nationalism towards Afghan refugees. But what I did not understand at the start of my research was the reason behind this predominantly negative media representation of a crisis that is over four decades old now. Therefore, I also focused on identifying the possible reasons behind the lack of empathetic framing of a protracted situation that the UNHCR has described as a “humanitarian emergency” and Amnesty International as “40 years of dispossession”. I asked: Why is the Pakistani media’s coverage of the crisis and the conflict so dominantly non-peace and conflict-escalatory? To answer my own question, I draw on the work of Wright (2002), who studied refugees and their representation in the US media.

I concluded that the Afghan refugees may be the Pakistani media’s collateral damage. Refugees, who have been victims of a humanitarian crisis that has existed for years, are caught “in the midst of things” (Wright 2002, p. 2), and the negative media representation of Afghan refugees is neither entirely accidental, nor purely intentional. The recurrent framing of Afghan refugees as the enemy or the “other” by Pakistani media is a product of the ongoing Pak–Afghan political conflict, in which refugees in Pakistan are the “collateral”. The hostility between the two governments has politicised the refugee crisis and the repatriation process, where refugees are caught in the midst of two cold neighbours who have been in a conflict state intermittently throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and to the present day. The ongoing refugee conflict started during the Soviet War (1979–1989), but intensified under the Taliban rule in the mid-1990s. In turn, this has resulted in the hegemonic, negative media representation of refugees. The threat, enemy and terrorist images were thus constructed from a variety of negative portrayals, stereotypes, fallacious
attachments to acts of criminality or terrorism and a questioning of refugees’ authenticity because of the absence or scarce use of the three emerging frames identified in my analysis. Since Afghan refugees were marginalised and could easily be targeted, they became collateral damage for the State and the media in Pakistan. I would argue that they are, in fact, in most need of peace-oriented media framing to represent their suffering and challenges.

The need to rethink the media narrative in Pakistan cannot be denied. I observed that the Pakistani media coverage of Afghan refugees and the Pak–Afghan conflict explicitly denies the refugees or the Afghan authorities any voice in the discourse. Not only are their voices and perspectives missing or alarmingly underreported, there is an exaggerated level of nationalism, propaganda and conflict provocation in the interpretative repertoire. The problems related to the Afghan refugee crisis cannot be resolved unless the Afghan government and its people, including the refugees in Pakistan, are given a voice by the Pakistani media. The media have the power and ability to bring the narrative of the oppressed and the marginalised to light and become a catalyst for social and political change (see for example: Happer and Philo 2013; Joseph 2012; Wolfsfeld and Gadi 1997). However, to do that without fear of censorship and prosecution, the Pakistani media needs to be de-politicised.

The way the Pakistani media have covered the Afghan refugee crisis over the years has established their role as a catalyst for the conflict and antagonism between the two countries. Through peace journalism, media can become a facilitator and an advocate for positive change. Peace-oriented coverage is likely to help avoid further escalation of the conflict between the two neighbours and its citizens, and generate sentiments of tolerance and understanding. This could consequently open doors for peace dialogue, or at least alleviate the suffering of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, mainly due to mistreatment and ethnocentrism. This has already been proven to be true in various parts of the world in peace journalism scholarship (see for example: Keeble, Tulloch and Zollman 2010; Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; Peleg 2007), and there is no reason to believe that it will not work in Pakistan and Afghanistan’s conflict.

5.7 Conclusion

My findings sketch a gloomy overall picture of peace journalism in Pakistan, a conclusion evidenced and supported by the discourse analysis conducted in chapters 3 and 4. Galtung’s imperative for a wider and more frequent practice of peace journalism in war and conflict coverage is unlikely to translate into a peace-oriented media in Pakistan without the de-politicisation of the conflict. There is a higher probability for peace journalism to be effectively practiced in countries with less political influence on media agencies and higher levels of political and media freedoms (Atanesyan 2020). In Pakistan, due to the heavy political influence and control of the media by the State, issues that were already part of the mainstream public debate – such as refugees as a threat – gained wider prominence in the mass media than others – such as refugees as vulnerable. Pakistan has been under a military rule for over half of its existence since 1947, and there has been indirect military involvement in the democratically elected governments over this time. The
political and military influence and pressures on the media industry continue to date, which affects the capacity of the national media to employ peace journalism.

Additionally, I found few distinctions in how the conflict was covered between the magazines and the newspapers. Newspapers have a greater publication frequency than magazines and are more focused on daily news than investigative pieces. The length of stories in a newspaper is shorter, and there isn’t much room for analysis, opinion or extra background information most of the time. Although these reasons do not justify the conflict-escalatory approach in their coverage, they may have played a role in the newspapers’ contribution to the dominant non-peace media narrative. Both the magazines and newspapers sporadically employed traces of peace framing. Another significant difference between newspaper reportage and magazine coverage is that magazines target a selected audience. Therefore, the framing process (selection and omission) in magazine coverage may vary, and reflect a specific editorial perspective that appeals to the magazine’s audience. It is, therefore, plausible that with their particular target audiences and focus on special content, magazines might frame an event entirely differently to how newspapers would frame the same event to their generalised readership. Magazines represent an important niche, providing analysis of and commentary on a variety of topics to broad audiences on a weekly or monthly basis (see for example: Danesi 2009; Greenwood and Jenkins 2013). In case of Herald and Newsline, both offer investigative hard news and feature more interpretive and analytical content than daily newspapers. This not only adds to the interpretive value of their content, but also makes them more specialised, reflecting the political and cultural atmosphere in which they are created (Abrahamson 2009), and reaching out to “increasingly narrow audiences” (Sumner 2012, p. 8). Moreover, with both the news magazines turning to web-based publications in the last decade, more national and international audiences gained access to their content. The concern about their conflict-escalatory framing of the refugee conflict thus becomes even bigger.

Initially, I found myself agreeing with divergent scholarship that argued media framing is a process of either conscious or subconscious decision-making. However, after my analysis, I find myself aligned with scholarly evidence that shows that framing is a result of the conscious choices journalists and editors make. My personal experience in field reporting and desk journalism also contributed to this conceptual association. In turn, this led me to understanding the need to incorporate explicit peace-oriented framing in the Pakistani media coverage of the Afghan refugees and their repatriation. This does not mean locking horns with the military establishment and the State. In fact, it paved the way for developing an environment for a more paradigmatic practice of peace journalism – a call Jake Lynch, Shabbir Hussain and Rukhsana Amjad (2011) have also made in their work on peace journalism and journalism training. Peace journalism is a conscious practice in which peace-oriented framing serves as a counter narrative to consciously employed conflict-escalatory frames in media coverage. It needs a long-term commitment. One simple way this can be done is by following up on news stories and events for a “continuity factor” (Galtung and Ruge 1965), even if there are no significant developments. The continuity aspect of follow-up reporting can give visibility to stories that may have been missed by the public in the first instance. Moreover, it can also develop the public’s in-depth interest and understanding of the issue, event or the conflict. The news media
cycle is swift and urgency-centric. The continuity aspect keeps information in front of a reader’s mind, and may save it from obscurity. Otherwise, despite hitting eight million Google searches per day, even Baby Aylan was forgotten by the world after a few months.
Chapter 6
Conclusion – The missing “piece”

6.1 A recap

Forty years ago, Afghan refugees started fleeing war and violence in their homeland to seek shelter and safety. They mostly poured into the neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, while some made successful journeys as far as Europe. Arguably, their suffering had just began. Afghan refugees continue to seek a safe place to call home as the war, conflict and violence in their homeland continues. In 2019, Afghanistan replaced Syria as the world’s least peaceful country, according to the Global Peace Index (2020). Amnesty International (2019) states that as of 2019, there are 2.6 million registered Afghan refugees across the world. Pakistan is hosting 1.5 million, and another 1 million unregistered refugees. However, the refugees who were earlier accepted, during the Soviet War and the Taliban rule, are now being forced to return to their homeland. Pakistan is the world’s largest host country for Afghan refugees, who frequently receive hate and rejection from the host society.

In the last few years, the public sentiment towards Afghan refugees has seen a paradigm shift. While before 2014 the refugees were still largely viewed as a burden on Pakistan’s weak economy, they were not hated. However, this changed after the December 2014 APS massacre in Peshawar, where terrorists killed over 100 schoolchildren. Since then, Afghan refugees have been primarily viewed as a security threat to the country, generating antagonism towards them. The State and the media have played significant roles in this changing public perception. A few weeks after the APS massacre, Pakistani law enforcement agencies shifted the responsibility for the attack onto Afghan refugees, accusing them of providing terrorists a cover in refugee camps. In 2015, under the National Action Plan (NAP), the government launched a country-wide crackdown on Afghan refugee camps. The government also started asking Afghanistan to take back the refugees. By 2016, the Pakistani government had announced the first deadline for mass repatriation of Afghan refugees to their homeland. The general public concurred with the government, triggering a rise in the harassment, abuse and mistreatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Media representations of Afghan refugees have also played a significant role in shaping public attitude towards them. They are now primarily viewed as “terrorists” or as allegedly facilitating terrorism in Pakistan. The government, general public, and media were aligned, possibly for the first time in the history of the country, in wanting the forcible repatriation of over 2.5 million registered and unregistered Afghan refugees. Pakistan set arbitrary and unfeasible deadlines for voluntary repatriation that could not be met. Pakistan’s policies attracted much attention from international humanitarian groups, who referred to the exodus as “the world’s largest unlawful mass forced return of refugees in recent times” (Amnesty International 2019). Since 2014, Afghan refugees have been a target of Pakistani media’s hate-mongering and negative representations. One after another, print, online and television media called for a speedy repatriation of refugees and the shutting down of refugee camps. The media have largely presented Afghan refugees as the “other”, who are shown as not belonging in Pakistan. The way media have framed refugees
has arguably also affected the public’s acceptance of refugees, even on temporary basis. Pakistan’s shift from the “generous host” to the “inhumane neighbour” has been forceful, to an extent that the word “Afghani” or “refugee” has become a social slur, used in the contexts of terrorism, fraud, deception and the illegal narcotics trade.

6.2 Key findings and contribution to scholarship

Afghan refugees have been a focus of academic attention in Pakistan and internationally in the disciplines of politics, security and defence studies, refugee studies, criminology, psychology, and medicine (see for example: Grare and Maley 2011; Kronenfeld 2008; Quddus et al. 2006; Rostami-Povey 2007). Media scholars have studied representations of the overall political conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, terrorism and Taliban in Pakistan, and the army operations in conflict zones in Pakistan (see for example: Hussain & Munawar 2017; Mushtaq and Baig 2015; Rahman and Ejaz 2014). However, the media framing of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and their forced repatriation remains unexplored.

I started my research as a scholarly intervention into the role of media in the coverage of the refugee crisis post-APS. I analysed four major English-language media publications in Pakistan to identify dominant frames used in reportage between 2016 and 2018. These frames inform the media discourse – and consequently the public discourse – on Afghan refugees and the repatriation conflict with Afghanistan. The four publications serve as an illustrative sample and represent the narrative of the mainstream English media in Pakistan. My thesis is motivated by the need to articulate the role Pakistani media are playing in the coverage and representation of Afghan refugees and the Af–Pak conflict over refugee repatriation. In doing so, it also recognises the dire need for peace journalism practice in conflict coverage. Johan Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model (Table 1.1), and Jake Lynch’s analytical/evaluative criteria inform the discourse analysis of my thesis. Drawing from Lynch, I have developed an analytical criteria comprising 12 questions (see Appendix 2), all based on the four peace/war orientations in Galtung’s model – peace/conflict, truth/propaganda, people/elite, and solution/victory. I have previously discussed my reservations about the binary divisions in Galtung’s Model (Chapter 2), and its tendency to exclude some significant peace orientations in conflict coverage. Therefore, I have categorised all the dominant and emerging frames under their master frame: either the peace frame or the non-peace frame (also discussed in Chapter 2).

I have identified four dominant non-peace frames in the media corpus that demonstrate conflict-escalatory coverage – the terrorist frame, the enemy frame, the blame frame, and the ethno-nationalist frame. Chapters 3 and 4 present my analysis of the newspaper stories and magazine articles. Around 80% of the newspaper stories and over 60% of magazine articles reveal the employment of at least one of the dominant non-peace frames (see Table 5.1). Although the analysis draws a grim picture of peace journalism practice in Pakistan, there is a sporadic employment of peace frames as well. Lynch argues that “peace, therefore, cannot be the absence of conflict, but the absence of violence” (Lynch 2015, p. 29). I extend his argument to include that peace is not just the absence of violence, it is also the delivery of justice. The first step toward peace is the acknowledgement of the absence of justice, which can be initiated through journalistic coverage that
focuses on empathy and accountability. I have identified three emerging peace frames: the justice delivery frame, the admission/confession frame, and the empathy–sympathy frame (discussed in Chapter 5). All three frames are based on the interpretive repertoires of equity, sentiments of harmony, inclusion, acceptance and association. Among all the publications, only Herald represents Afghan refugees through largely peace frames (53%). However, these peace frames have been primarily employed implicitly in the coverage.

My findings align with the existing scholarship of dominant media frames in war and conflict (see for example: Ersoy and Miller; Fong 2009; Hussain 2016, 2017; Hussain and Munawar 2017; Lee and Maslog 2005; Rodny-Gumede 2015). I found that Pakistani media’s framing of Afghan refugees, their repatriation and the subsequent conflict with Afghanistan is highly conflict-escalatory. The overall coverage is nationalistic and reflects State and military establishment stance on refugees and their repatriation. The State and military establishment extensively control and influence media narrative about Afghan refugees and Afghanistan, leaving the coverage heavily politised and victory-oriented. All four publications make alarmist assertions about the “threat” refugees pose to Pakistan, and recurrently quote political and military elite. The coverage consistently portrays the Afghan government as weak, perhaps to legitimise the direct interests of Pakistani military in Afghan politics, and to justify intervention. It also portrays Afghanistan as the biggest impediment to regional peace, and Pakistan as the “peacemaker”.

Moreover, Afghan refugees are demonised and dehumanised in media coverage, which largely repeats stereotypes. In doing so, the coverage reinforces problematic, dominant media narratives that further the Pakistani public’s antagonism towards Afghan refugees. The media repeatedly represent Afghan refugees as “terrorists”, the “enemy”, and “traitors”. These representations have arguably reinforced the image of Afghan refugees as the “other”, and provoked Pakistani people’s hate and hostility, and a collective public insecurity towards Afghan refugees. The #KickOutAllAfghans and #GoAfghaniGo campaigns, which went viral on Twitter in 2016 and 2017 respectively, evidence the hatred Pakistanis share for Afghan refugees. There have been multiple other protests and online smear campaigns against Afghan refugees across Pakistan that illustrate the level of invective. The news stories and Newsline articles commonly attribute insecurity, fear, and anxiety to the general public, presenting Afghan refugees in Pakistan as the trigger. Frames are heavily rooted in judgment, dehumanisation of Afghan refugees, the “incompetence” of the Afghan government, and the “inefficiency” of Afghan border-security forces in controlling refugee movement into Pakistan.

6.3 Road to peace: limitations and the way forward

Conflict de-escalatory frames are rarely used in the coverage – their presence is insignificant. Coverage broadly lacks accuracy, rarely challenges propaganda, marginalises Afghan refugee voices and trivialises their suffering. Interpretative repertoire that counters war and conflict narratives are given too little attention. As a counter narrative, peace journalism offers solutions to all types of escalatory reporting that displays “patterns of omission and distortion” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p. 5) in conflict coverage. When journalists omit or modify important information, they not only deprive the audience of truth, they
also contribute to propaganda. This can contribute to a reporting environment where media take sides, choosing who to give voice to and who to marginalise. Peace journalism highlights truth and uncovers the lies of all sides. Galtung (2003, p. 179) argues:

> Peace journalism stands for truth as opposed to propaganda and lies, but is not “investigative journalism” in the sense of uncovering lies only on “our” side. Truth holds for all sides, just like exploration of the conflict formation and giving voice (glasnost) to all.

Peace journalism has developed a different ethos for reporting in various contexts and circumstances. As Galtung (2003) argues, the focus is not on investigation, but on empowering the readers with accurate and complete information. Therefore, peace journalism is expansive, and can be practiced in the coverage of various journalism genres, as long as journalists practice ethical reporting. Peace journalism aims to shift the emphasis from the proliferation of war propaganda and the politicisation of media to collaborative engagement, common goals, shared values, and social rehabilitation. It creates opportunities for political reconciliation, which is broadly missing from war and conflict coverage.

Since the mid-90s, peace journalism has emerged as a counter narrative to a war-escalatory approach in media coverage. In some parts of the world, it is emerging as an important journalism practice. These journalists are emphasising the need for reconciliation between conflicting groups as a long-term, non-violent solution to conflicts. Hoffman (2014) calls for post-conflict media interventions, and suggests that rather than just covering wars, the media should examine efforts at conflict resolution and find ways to support reconciliation and peace. Researchers have also frequently argued the “expansiveness” element of peace journalism (see for example: Alankuş 2018; Ersoy and Miller 2020; Shaw, Lynch and Hackett 2011) that embraces contributions made to media coverage from their perspectives. Additionally, its outreach has extended due to the opportunities the Internet has provided for peace journalists and others interested in the conflict–media nexus. Peace journalism is an intervention in some media and communication spaces that were increasingly viewed by militaries as an extension of the battleground. For example, during the world wars and the 1991 Gulf War (Lynch 2008, pp. 193), the media were extensively used for propaganda. Additionally, responsible journalism can also offer opportunities for proper victim reparation processes.

Yet despite this, there is a gap between the aims/ideals of peace journalism and its implementation. In the context of Pakistan, the wider practice of peace journalism faces some key challenges. Therefore, in this thesis, I have not only demonstrated the problem, but also developed suggestions for finding a pragmatic and long-term solution to the problem of conflict-escalatory and hate-mongering journalism. I have primarily drawn on the works of Jake Lynch and Shabbir Hussain, who have developed peace journalism strategies for the international and Pakistani media, respectively. Amid many structural limitations such as lack of journalism training, public and private funding and free access to conflict zones, the most significant factor impeding peace journalism practice in the context of my case study is the Pakistani State and military establishment’s control of the media, and their interference in how the Afghan conflict must be framed. This control has politicised a humanitarian crisis and its media coverage, creating barriers for peace
journalism implementation. In Pakistan, peace journalism is more than an ethical choice. In his book *Peace Journalism Principles and Practices*, Steven Youngblood (2017) shares an email exchange with Jake Lynch in which Lynch explains that when a country’s media align themselves with the State and the military, they become “tough nuts to crack” for peace journalism (Youngblood 2017, p. 223). In Pakistan, media are widely aligned with the State and military establishment, by choice or by force, resulting in intense politicisation of media coverage. This raises concerns about the duty of journalists, whose irresponsible journalism can turn volatile conflicts into a full-blown war (Rawan and Hussain 2017).

Additionally, the State and military establishment have also punished media organisations for employing journalists who speak against them. Most recently, this abuse of power by the State manifested in the form of a broadcast license suspension. A *Columbia Journalism Review* article (Bennett and Naim 2015) features several governments around the world who use “stealthy strategies” to manipulate the media. It states:

> In Pakistan, the state regulatory authority suspended the license of Geo TV, the most popular channel in the country, after a defamation claim against it was made by the intelligence services following a shooting of one of the station’s best-known journalists. The channel was off the air for 15 days starting in June 2014.

The lack of safety and security for journalists in Pakistan, which is an increasingly widespread problem for the media and consequently for the public as well, is another important impediment for peace journalism practice in the country. This is intertwined with the issue of State and military control, especially in Pakistan, where the two institutions have been directly attacking journalists for questioning and criticising the status quo and their misuse of power. In Pakistan, journalists covering military and political conflicts confront potentially fatal safety risks from not only the State and military establishment, but also from extremist religious groups, who have resorted to terrorist attacks on media companies in the past.

One such incident occurred in 2013, when *ET*’s headquarters in Karachi was attacked by a group of terrorists. *ET* was widely covering religious terrorists and their safe havens in Pakistan, after Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s killing in Pakistan. As part of the editorial team, I received an email from Kamal Siddiqi, the newspaper’s editor at the time. In the email, sent to all editors and reporters, Siddiqi clearly outlined the paper’s new policy on framing militant organisations and the Taliban, and their relationship with the Pakistani government. He had directed the staff to avoid any content about the attacking militant organisation and its allies (including the political party that has been in power since 2018). The staff was also strictly directed not to publish anything condemning any terrorist attack, militancy, or the military operations in KP. Siddiqi now tells me that the coverage was radically pared down to appease the military (personal communication). Since the Pakistani State and military have vested interests in political power in Afghanistan and direct relations with the Taliban, the threats to Pakistani journalists may partly explain the lack of peace journalism and the absence of academic exploration of media discourse on Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation.
Furthermore, the vernacular aspect of coverage is a research locus that has been mainly ignored in peace journalism theorisation. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Pakistan is a nation of multiple ethnic languages, including Pashto – also the native language of most Afghan refugees. This may present language barriers for non-Pashto speaking journalists and the way events are covered and framed through peace and conflict de-escalatory lens. While this may not significantly affect stories with hard facts such as terrorist activities, statistics and political events, these language barriers between the journalists and the affected people may tone down their personal anecdotes of challenges and suffering in coverage. For instance, this is also noted in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, whose coverage largely lacks human angle, and as also evident from the findings of my thesis. Moreover, journalists working for English-language media in Pakistan are mainly Western-trained or trained through Western normative frameworks of conflict reporting, and may be more likely to subscribe to Western models and values in their coverage than their vernacular counterparts.

Amidst these obstacles and limitations, the significant question here is: how then do journalists in Pakistan practice peace journalism? Or how can peace journalism be defined in the Pakistani context? The problem is a gap between the concept and the practice of peace journalism. Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model is a template for peace journalism coverage. It is a guide, but not a toolkit. Peace journalism is gradually evolving in theory to cover various aspects of the ways war, conflict and violence are covered in reportage – its practice also needs expansion to become more diverse. A case for theorisation of peace journalism in a local/regional context thus becomes stronger – almost inevitable. In arguing so, I make three suggestions for narrowing the gap between concept and practice in the Pakistani context.

First, there is a need to redefine peace journalism to make it more inclusive of countries and regions with authoritarian governments/systems and censorship. Scholars have previously argued the need to open new avenues in peace journalism and include international and intercultural understanding in its practice (see for example: Hackett 2011; Shinar 2007; Tehranian 2002). Jake Lynch tested the flexibilities of Galtung’s model and expanded it to include various war and conflict zones. Together with Annabel McGoldrick, he developed a 17-point list of the dos and don’ts of peace journalism (McGoldrick and Lynch 2000, pp. 30–33). His theoretical experiments with peace and war journalism can be extended to countries that may not have an active conflict, but have, for instance, stringent State/military control of media, such as Pakistan. To limit peace journalism to active war, conflict and violence coverage risks limiting its conceptualisation and practice. Its practice needs to be more inclusive of passive conflicts, indirect violence, and other fundamental problems in a society.

Peace journalism characteristics need to be extended to all genres and cover all forms of social and political injustices, oppression, inequality, structural abuse, and human rights exploitation and violations. In this context, I find Benn’s (2015) definitions of “active and passive” peace journalism inspiring and relevant to my argument. He argues that the current definition of peace journalism is vague. He suggests categorising it into two variants. He defines “active” peace journalism as revolutionary, interventionist, participatory and advocacy-oriented. On the other hand, he conceptualises “passive” peace journalism as implicit,
traditional (truth, objectivity, neutrality), reflective and non-interventionist. He puts the two options on the peace journalism spectrum. However, yet again, the spectrum has two extreme ends that promote an exclusion of countries and journalism genres that fall somewhere between them. Instead of narrower dualities such as peace/war, good/bad, and active/passive peace journalism, I argue for a wider, more inclusive definition along the peace and non-peace framing categories proposed in my thesis. This can then extend to cover diverse issues of human right abuse and subjects such as activism, racism, feminism, gendered violence, environment, animal rights, freedom of speech and dissent, and political extradition, to name a few.

Secondly, there is a dearth of peace journalism education and professional training opportunities in Pakistan. Some local civil society organisations have offered media training on various issues. These include Media Matters for Democracy\textsuperscript{13} (MMfD) and the Center for Excellence in Journalism\textsuperscript{14} (CEJ) in Pakistan. However, none of these have exclusively focused on peace journalism. Instead, most training focuses on objectivity, accuracy and transparency in journalism. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) argue that the characteristics of objectivity and neutrality in conventional media cannot offer young and aspiring journalists an antidote to the polarisation effect of media, especially in war and conflict zones. These conventions, though essential to overall “good” journalism, do not necessarily offer a counter narrative to war- and conflict-escalatory coverage, strengthening the case for properly designed peace journalism training. However, the authors challenge the acquisition of effective skills from training in “poor countries” unless it is combined with “western-style professional methods” (p. 229) of peace journalism.

There is no doubt that western scholarship in peace journalism has created a platform for research, and the broadening and exploration of peace journalism. However, I would argue it can genuinely benefit media in a non-western context through collaboration with local research. One of the key arguments that I made at the start of this thesis is the need to de-westernise peace journalism scholarship. The imposition of western-style methods could ignore the historical and contemporary socio-political frameworks of high-context countries such as Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, engagement with local research and case studies may promote a better understanding and a clearer pathway for the implementation of peace journalism. Peace journalism education can equip journalists with knowledge of not only how to focus on peace, truth, people and solutions, it can also prepare them to practice safe journalism in their country. This is especially useful for journalists reporting from conflict zones inside the country, to which foreign/western journalists have no or very limited access. Training will generate awareness about what is and is not included in peace journalism practice. In Pakistan, for instance, reporting on conflicts does not mean explicitly confronting the State or military establishment. Peace journalism practice does not necessarily have to be risky, anarchic or destructively critical of the authorities. Instead, it excludes escalation-oriented language, and highlights shared values and common ground – somewhere between the “active” and “passive” definitions on the spectrum.

\textsuperscript{13} According to MMfD, they are “an organisation of journalists geared towards media development, digital democracy and rights, Media and Information Literacy, and Internet governance” https://mediamatters.pk/.

\textsuperscript{14} CEJ is an initiative for the professional development, training and networking of Pakistani journalists and other media professions https://cej.iba.edu.pk/.
Finally, the expansion of the scope and definition of peace journalism, as well as professional learning opportunities, also require more peace journalism research, particularly into the ways Pakistani media frame the Afghan refugee conflict, and other ethnic and religious minorities. Such research will draw a clearer picture of peace journalism in Pakistan, and encourage improvement and an unbiased scrutiny of media practices. Research develops an understanding of loopholes and can initiate a debate for change and improvement. It can also mobilise society to demand public policy changes. Most importantly, it provides content for teaching and training purposes. Aslam (2011) argues for the incorporation of peace journalism studies in university education. She explains that studying research-based content over a longer period “can more easily develop the students’ sense of social responsibility and also help prepare them to face challenges in the field” (p. 130).

As argued earlier, normative expectations of a Western peace journalism model largely shape how journalists, covering war and conflict around the world, ask questions and frame information into answers. This has been noted to an extent where Western journalism “may even undermine the cultural code of the field” (Hanitzsch and Vos 2017, p. 117) due to the remarkable differences in socio-political and cultural contexts between Western and non-Western settings. This facilitates my arguments for a broader conceptualisation and application of peace journalism, which is the most feasible way forward, especially in countries like Pakistan, where multiple underlying factors undermine its uninterrupted practice. In addition to the feasibility of its application in the Pakistani content, the model’s ethical obligations and normative expectations by and large make its practice more viable in the coverage of war and conflict and the sufferings of oppressed and marginalised communities such as the Afghan refugees affected by the Afghan war, displaced on both sides of the border.

In a more digitally connected world, the definition of war, conflict and violence is changing. Therefore, as a counter-narrative to war, conflict and violence, peace journalism will also need to continue evolving. Peace journalism is ethical journalism that focuses on justice, and justice must speak for all kinds of oppressions, without hierarchical prioritisation between active and passive conflicts.
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Appendices

Appendix 1

Analytical criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical criteria for the analysis of media coverage of Afghan refugees and their repatriation from Pakistan – Adapted from Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model (1986, 1998, and Jake Lynch’s analytical criteria.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace/Conflict (PCOC)</strong></td>
<td>1- Does the story/article give background information on the Af-Pak conflict, their historical and current political relationship, and also (briefly) the reasons behind the Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan?</td>
<td>2- Does the story/article give voice to both the Pakistani and Afghan people/refugees and authorities, providing a more balanced coverage?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- Is the news report/article suggesting peaceful and non-violent solutions to the conflict between the two countries over repatriation of Afghan refugees (plausible regional peace and harmony between the governments and the people of the two countries), the contrary, or nothing at all?</td>
<td>4- How are the issues of Afghan refugees in Pakistan – vis-à-vis arrival, challenges, settlement and repatriation – framed in the text? Does it urge for their facilitation and rehabilitation, or instead stress their forced and quick repatriation on set deadlines?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Truth/Propaganda (TPOC)</strong></td>
<td>1- Does the news report/article demonstrate evidence about any of the sides in the conflict with facts and figures, where needed?</td>
<td>2- Does the news report/article generate or dispel propaganda around Afghan refugees or the Afghan government?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- Does the news report/article mention any human rights violations committed by the Pakistani authorities or by the border forces against Afghan refugees in Pakistan or those crossing the border?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>People/Elites (PEOC)</strong></td>
<td>1- Does the news report/article report the marginalisation of the Afghan refugee groups: their sufferings, challenges and the atrocities they face?</td>
<td>2- Does the news report/article mention any racist/ethnocentric statements/comments about the Afghan refugees in Pakistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3- How are Afghan refugees referred to/represented in the text? Could the way they are framed trigger empathy/sympathy and thoughtfulness among the readers for the people suffering in the conflict?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solutions/Victory (SVOC)</strong></td>
<td>1- Does the news report/article mention any attempts/successes at peacemaking and reconciliation between the two countries?</td>
<td>2- Does the news report/article suggest resolution and reconstruction strategies, independent of the State and military, for a peaceful end to the refugee conflict?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 2

**Analytical criteria – Frames Classification Table – Sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace/Conflict Oriented criteria (PCOC)</th>
<th>Yes (Y)</th>
<th>No (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical background</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced voices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-violent response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitation and rehabilitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Truth/Propaganda Oriented criteria (TPOC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facts and figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlights human rights violation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refutes propaganda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People/Elite Oriented criteria (PEOC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mentions refugee suffering &amp; challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlights ethno-nationalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution/Victory Oriented criteria (SVOC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focuses on peace and reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction &amp; resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice delivery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Frame</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emerging frame</th>
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