



The New Face of People Power: An Exploratory Study on the Potential of Social Media for Combating Corruption in Indonesia

Hendi Yogi Prabowo¹, Rizki Hamdani² and Zuraidah Mohd Sanusi³

Abstract

This paper is based on the authors' study to assess the current state of anti-corruption movement in Indonesia. The main purpose of this study is to explore the potential of social media to be used as an effective tool in combating corruption in public sector. To achieve its objectives this study applies multiple behavioral perspectives in assessing the corruption problem in the Indonesian public sector. This study is of qualitative exploratory nature in which the authors utilized a mixed methods approach comprising of a systematic literature review, archival and data analysis, and case studies on corruption in the Indonesian public sector to assess the potential of social media to be used as an anti-corruption measure. This study also uses the Social Network Analysis (SNA) to illustrate the potential of social media as a means for citizens to participate in an anti-corruption movement in Indonesia. Overall, this study demonstrates that the growth and development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in Indonesia has had a profound effect on how people interact with each other by, among other things, using social media platforms. Such interaction includes discussions and dissemination of news and information related to corruption. As the conventional punishment oriented approaches have not had a lot of success in mitigating the corruption problem in Indonesia, engaging citizens to actively participate in the anti-corruption movement may increase the chance of success in eradicating corruption in the future.

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Keywords: corruption, Indonesia, fraud triangle, ICTs, social media, behavior.

¹ Hendi Yogi Prabowo is the Director of the Centre for Forensic Accounting Studies at the Islamic University of Indonesia Yogyakarta. He obtained his Masters and PhD in forensic accounting from the University of Wollongong Australia.

² Rizki Hamdani is a lecturer at the Accounting Department Faculty of Economics Islamic University of Indonesia Yogyakarta. He obtained his Masters in Accounting from the Islamic University of Indonesia Yogyakarta.

³ Zuraidah Mohd Sanusi is a senior research fellow at the Accounting Research Institute, UiTM and an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Accountancy, Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Malaysia.

Introduction

As a worldwide problem, the history of corruption is believed to be as old as human history itself, and it is growing to be more pervasive and significant by the day (Kayrak, 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Dye (1998) defined corruption as the "abuse of public power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance." The public is now aware of the fact that poor governance will eventually lead to corruption and thus many have advocated for the promotion of good governance as a key in ensuring the sustainability of economic growth and competitiveness (Clark, 2017, p. 3). Combating corruption has now become a global movement (Shah, 2007, p. 234) and countries are devoting substantial resources to ensure that their future generations will not inherit the problem. However, a major challenge in eradicating corruption is the perception that it is a "high reward, low risk" (Quah, 2017) action and thus many public officials are willing to engage in corrupt acts.

The complexity of corruption is constituted by its multi-dimensional nature which demands a multi-perspective view in understanding and solving it (Di Pietra and Melis, 2016, p. 689). Evidence suggests that the elusive nature of corruption has made it difficult for many countries to properly address the problem. Many have been focusing on areas such as weak law enforcement, inadequate legal framework, and lack of proper mechanisms for transparency and accountability when addressing corruption. In reality, various behavioral issues may become the root causes of corruption which must be addressed properly. Ignoring these issues may lead to failures in achieving the objectives of corruption eradication strategies.

Today, a large portion of people's interaction occurs within the realm of cyberspace which highlights the significance of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in shaping human behavior. Social media has been playing a significant role in modern human interaction. In Indonesia, for example, information on various issues including those related to corruption are frequently shared and discussed among social media users on a daily basis.

This paper seeks to explore the potential of social media in shaping people's attitude toward corruption, particularly in Indonesia⁴. This paper also highlights the dimensions of social media as well as how to optimize them in supporting the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia. The next section of this paper discusses how the ICTs, in particular, the internet and social media can influence the perception of costs and benefits of corruption and how anti-corruption movement in Indonesia is transforming in the digital age as well as the role of social media in its transformation. By using a sample case study on a high profile corruption case in Indonesia, this section illustrates the potential roles of social media as an anticorruption instrument. In this section, the Social Network Analysis (SNA) is used to identify multiple roles of Twitter users in disseminating information about corruption. Next, this paper discusses future directions to enhance the effectiveness of social media as an anti-corruption instrument in Indonesia. In the final section, a conclusion is drawn regarding the roles of social media in supporting the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia.

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The “Why” Question of Corruption

Based on the Corruption Eradication Commission’s (KPK) statistics from the total of 739 investigated corruption suspects in the period of 2004 – 2017 approximately 25% were private sector professionals and around 24% were higher echelon (I, II and III) public officials which represent the two largest corruption offender groups in Indonesia. The third largest group in the commission’s database consists of members of central and regional parliaments (19%). Below figure depicts the distribution (in percentage) of corruption offenders across different professional backgrounds.




Figure 1: Corruption Offenders Investigated by the Corruption Eradication Commission (2004 – 2017, Data per 31 December 2017)

Source: Modified from Corruption Eradication Commission (2018)

Despite numerous prosecutions of public officials corruption in Indonesia seems to always able to regenerate over time. To put an end to this regeneration, the causal factors behind the pervasive corruption in Indonesia needs to be clearly identified beforehand. One of the most commonly used frameworks in explaining why people engage in fraud such as corruption is the so-called fraud triangle based on the work of criminologist Donald Ray Cressey who postulated

that in order for fraud (i.e., trust violation) to occur the elements of motivation, opportunity and rationalization must be present (Cressey, 1950).




Figure 2 Fraud Triangle

Source: Modified from Cressey (1950)

With regard to the motivation to commit fraud Cressey (1950, p. 97) was of the opinion that non-shareable problems (e.g., financial problems) may motivate an otherwise honest person to commit fraud. With this motivation when an opportunity to commit fraud presents itself, it will likely be considered by the person as a solution to his problems (Cressey, 1950, pp. 123–124). For example, Dorminey et al. (2012, p. 558) stated that control weakness is often associated with a perceived opportunity to commit fraud as the potential offender may believe that his chance of getting caught is slim. Rationalization element completes the triangle by providing means for fraud offenders to avoid guilt or self-condemnation. As argued by Ramamoorti (2008, p. 525):

Specifically, trust violators and fraud perpetrators must be able to justify their actions to themselves and others as a psychological coping mechanism to deal with the inevitable "cognitive dissonance" (that is, a lack of congruence between their own perception of being honest and the deceptive nature of their action or behavior). This explanation led to the inclusion of "rationalization" as one of the elements in the conceptual framework provided by the "Fraud Triangle"...

Cressey (1950, p. 201) believed that rationalizations are not merely *ex-post facto* justifications for conduct which have already been enacted but are pertinent and real reasons which the person has for acting. In other words, fraud offenders may prepare their rationalizations before they actually commit their fraudulent acts. Kenyon and Tilton (2006, pp. 135–136) were of the opinion that rationalization can take various form such as: "it's just temporary", "management doesn't care", "management participates in, expects and rewards this kind of behavior", "no one is hurt and the company is helped" and "I deserve this".

Regardless of its popularity among in particular anti-fraud scholar, the fraud triangle is often unable to explain why people commit or avoid corrupt acts. Some scholars argue that it is so because the fraud triangle is essentially a theory for understanding fraud but not necessarily fraud

causation⁵. For example, Lokanan (2015, p. 2), was of the opinion that the fraud triangle is an inadequate instrument for detecting fraud as it lacks the "objective criteria required to adequately address every occurrence of fraud." In reality, there have been more than a few cases of people who were continuously exposed to the three elements of the triangle but were able to maintain their integrity and accountability throughout their professional careers. For example, during the period of 1968 – 1971 Police General Hoegoeng Iman Santoso who served as the Chief of the Indonesian National Police was known for his unquestionable integrity and accountability in fulfilling his duty. Being an "anomaly" in the then corrupt regime Hoegoeng's stance against corruption had made him in conflicts with many military and political elites of the time and eventually led to his dismissal (Muradi, 2014).

Prabowo (2014) stated that corruption is essentially an outcome of a decision making process in which a potential offender takes a number of variables into consideration for deciding the best solution for his perceived problem. Generally, referring to the rational choice theory crime offenders are always seeking ways to perpetrate their offences which maximize their benefits and at the same time minimize their sacrifices. As explained by Satz and Ferejohn (1994, p. 71):

The theory of rational choice plays a central role in the social sciences. The received view among philosophers who study rational-choice theory (both proponents and critics) holds that the theory is psychological and individualistic. Rational-choice theory is taken to be a psychological theory in that it explains a person's actions in terms of his mental states. A rational choice or action is one in which the agent takes the best available action given her preferences and beliefs. The theory is also taken to be an individualistic theory in that it applies directly only to individuals (that is, only individuals have preferences).

Prabowo (2014) argued that when exposed to the fraud triangle elements before making his final decision a potential corruption offender will generally perform an assessment on the net benefits of committing or not committing a corrupt act. In the case of rampaging corruption in Indonesia Prabowo (2014) was of the opinion that it is mainly caused by public officials perceiving that the net benefits (perceived benefits deducted by perceived costs) of engaging in corrupt acts outweigh those of not doing so. For every perceived element, a potential offender will determine its weigh by assigning a subjective value that in practice may not be mathematically quantifiable.

Regardless of their law breaking activities, corrupt public officials are basically seeking for the so-called "good life," at least in the short run, which is often associated with happiness, wealth and prosperity. The concept of "good life" has been extensively studied by numerous scholars (King et al., 2012, p. 35). Rawls in his works discussed multiple philosophical dimensions of the good life (Freeman, 2007; Habermas, 2010; Rawls, 2009; Rawls and Cohen, 2010). Wolf (1997, p. 219) believed meaningfulness constitutes a major element of the good life. King et al. (2012, p. 37) viewed happiness as a major indicator of the good life. Jenkins and Curtis (2005) found that good health is paramount in achieving the good life. In his work, *Political Liberalism*, Rawls argued that in a modern society there should not be a consensus of what constitutes a good life, but instead, we must acknowledge and respect the existence and plurality of multiple contradicting doctrines (Davion and Wolf, 2000; Rawls, 2005). This paper is not in any way an attempt to propose a new doctrine of the good life. In reality, an individual's decision making

⁵ The authors would like to acknowledge one of the anonymous reviewers for this point.

process to achieve a better life is a highly complex process which is very difficult for scientists to fully understand, much less to express it in a mathematical formula. Nonetheless, for the sake of providing a simple illustration of the weighing process discussed above, we will assume that it is quantifiable despite being subjectively so. Below figure illustrates a simple example of such an assessment.

Perceived benefits of not accepting a bribe		Subjective value	Perceived benefits of accepting a bribe		Subjective value
1	Peace of mind	7	1	Extravagant life	10
2	Good reputation	8	2	Maintaining "social identity" within a group or a community (e.g., "everybody is doing it")	10
3	Satisfaction for being an accountable individual	5	3	Loyalty to peers and superiors	8
Perceived costs of not accepting a bribe			Perceived costs of accepting a bribe		
1	Potential financial difficulty (e.g. low income)	(10)	1	Negative emotions (e.g., guilt and shame)	(8)
2	Losing "social identity" within a group or community (e.g., being isolated by co-workers)	(10)	2	Being looked down upon by society	(10)
3	Intimidation from co-workers and superiors	(10)	3	Risk of detection and prosecution	(5)
Perceived net-benefits of not accepting a bribe		(12)	Perceived net-benefits of accepting a bribe		5
Final Decision		Accepting Bribe			

Figure 3. A simple illustration of subjective cost-benefit assessment to accept or to reject a bribe

Source: Modified from Prabowo (2014)

Figure 3 illustrates a simple example of how a potential corrupt offender subjectively measures his perceived net benefits from accepting a bribe. Assuming that he relies only on the given perceived cost – benefit elements, the final decision would be to accept bribe simply because the option has higher perceived net benefits compared to the alternative. It is worthy of note that in reality there are a wide variety of factors that may influence a potential offender's subjective assessment of the value of each cost – benefit element. For example, a weak anti-corruption agency and a corrupt prison system in a country will diminish the subjective value of the "risk of detection and prosecution" element. Conversely, a strong and independent anti-corruption agency together with a good prison system will increase it. In practice, there are a variety of measures which can be employed to influence potential offenders' perception of the costs and benefits of engaging in corrupt acts. These include measures for gradually changing societal and organizational culture. Prabowo et al. (2017) proposed the so-called “de-normalization” of corruption as an important step in changing organizational culture in public institutions to become more intolerant to corruption. Furthermore, to ensure the success of the de-normalization process Prabowo et al. (2018) proposed that organizational unlearning needs to be exercised by

public institutions to remove corruption related knowledge so that the new knowledge of integrity and accountability can be accepted by public officials.

Based on the above cost-benefit model, generally preventing corruption from occurring can be done by making it an irrational choice of action. In other words, a potential offender will refrain himself from committing a corrupt act if he perceives the net benefits thereof to be lower than those of not committing the act. Making corruption an irrational choice of action can be achieved by:

- Increasing the net benefits of not committing corruption (e.g., increasing the perceived value of good reputation)
- Increasing the perceived costs of committing corruption (e.g., increasing the likelihood of detection and prosecution)
- Decreasing the perceived benefits of committing corruption (e.g., decreasing the perceived value of blind loyalty to superiors)
- Decreasing the perceived costs of not committing corruption (e.g., increasing protection for staffs who do not engage in corrupt acts)

In addition to increasing the likelihood of detection and prosecution another example of ways to increase potential offenders' perceived costs of engaging in corrupt acts is increasing the likelihood of naming and shaming in particular by the public. As will be discussed in the following sections in this paper naming and shaming is among the roles social media can take in combatting corruption in a country. As described by Prabowo and Cooper (2016), corruption is so culturally entrenched in Indonesia that many people accept it as a norm. Furthermore, Prabowo et al. (2017, p. 552) argued that:

The normalized corruption in Indonesia is a legacy of the New Order regime that shaped societal, organizational and individual schemata in Indonesia. The patrimonial style of leadership in particular within the regional governments resulted in increasing rent seeking activities within the decentralized system. The leadership style is also believed to have been supporting the normalization of corruption within the public sector since the New Order era.

This condition requires the use of multiple approaches to diminish the threats of corruption by all means possible with people's support (Prabowo et al., 2017, p. 552). This is to say that everybody has their share of roles in combating corruption in the country. The authors believe that social media can be a powerful means for people to participate more actively in the anti-corruption movement. Through interactions with each other social media users can raise their awareness on various issues pertaining to corruption. In the long run, with their increasing awareness, they will gradually change their attitude toward corruption and become intolerant to it.

The Rising Power of Social Media and the Anti-Corruption Movement in the Digital Age

Since its inception in 1983 the internet has been playing a significant role in Indonesia as a vital communication instrument and is continuously growing in popularity (Hui, 2010, p. 171). According to a survey by the Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APJII), in 2016,

51.8% of the nation's population (approximately 256.2 million) were internet users (Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association, 2016, p. 6). In terms of the internet market, according to a study by Google and Temasek (2016, p. 7), by 2020 Indonesia could become the fastest growing nation in the world.

The use of mobile devices to access the internet has been growing rapidly in Indonesia over the past few years and is now one of the most common ways information is disseminated in the society. For example, based on APJII's survey 47.6% of users use a mobile phone to access the internet (Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association, 2016, p. 16). According to comScore's 2016 survey, mobile devices are currently dominating online activities worldwide, and Indonesia is not an exception. In fact, the survey also revealed that Indonesian internet users spend 91% of their online time on their mobile devices (comScore, 2017, p. 4).

In terms of online activities, according to APJII's (2016, p. 22) survey, 97.4% of internet users in the country are social media users. Other popular contents accessed by users include entertainment (96.8%), news (96.4%), education (93.8%), commercial (93.1%), and public service (91.6%) (Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association, 2016, p. 22). With regard to social media, Indonesia is considered one of the largest Facebook users as well as the most Twitter addicted nation in the world (Sidner, 2010). Another survey by comScore (2010) on the top world markets by Twitter penetration put Indonesia on the top of the list with 20.8 % penetration (in June 2010).

The advancement of ICTs has been transforming how information is disseminated to and responded by the society. Evidence suggests that ICTs have been playing an essential role in fighting corruption by empowering citizens, upholding good governance, and promoting transparency (Kanyam et al., 2017, p. 1). Gazali (2014, p. 426) inferred that Indonesia is a fascinating "live laboratory" for studying how ICTs especially the internet plays a crucial role in the democratization process. For example, the internet was believed to have facilitated people's movement to bring down the corrupt New Order regime in May 1998 (Gazali, 2014, p. 426).

Social Media vs. Corruption: A Case Study of Indonesia

On 20 June 2017 the then Governor of Bengkulu Province was arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in a sting operation, and soon after, the public expressed their reactions on various social media platforms. According to a Deputy Chairman of KPK, Alexander Marwata, the governor allegedly rigged the tender for two road development projects in Rejang Lebong Regency Bengkulu in exchange for Rp 1 billion (US\$ 75,000) in bribes (The Jakarta Post, 2017). The authors analyzed a dataset of 300 tweets and retweets on 20 and 21 June 2017 obtained through the NCapture tool in NVivo 11 (using "*OTT KPK Bengkulu*" or "*KPK's sting operation in Bengkulu*" as keywords) to identify the most highlighted issues in the case. The dataset was analyzed using, among other things, the word frequency query tool in NVivo 11 software with several irrelevant words (e.g., stop words) being excluded from the analysis. Below figure is a "word cloud" representation of the query results.




Figure 5. Network of interactions in Twitter (20 and 21 June 2017) related to the alleged corruption case involving the former Governor of Bengkulu

Source: Authors' analysis using NVivo 11

In the above figure, the vertices (i.e., the dots) represent Twitter usernames who make tweets, retweets and mentions on a given topic (QSR International, 2018a). User interactions (retweets and mentions) in the network are depicted by edges (lines) (QSR International, 2018a).

With regard to the above graphical representation of Twitter network using Social Network Analysis (SNA), further examination can be performed to identify the most important vertices to identify the most influential people in the network. Three important questions regarding the “central figures” from the above Twitter network are (QSR International, 2018b):

- How fast can this person reach everyone in the network?
- Which person is most likely to have the most information flowing through them?
- How many people can this person reach directly?

The three questions can be answered using centrality measures (i.e., vertex metrics) such as “closeness centrality,” “betweenness centrality,” and “degree centrality” respectively.

Closeness centrality was defined by Freeman (1979) as the sum of distances of one node from all other nodes in a network graph. It depicts how fast information can move to other points from a given starting point (QSR International, 2017). In other words, it indicates people with the easiest and quickest access to information in a given network (QSR International, 2017). Generally, information coming from a person with the most central position (i.e., with the highest closeness centrality score) can be disseminated throughout the network more time efficiently (Bavelas, 1948). Based on authors' analysis there are twenty six usernames some of which are personal accounts with the closeness centrality of 1, the highest score in the dataset. These personal accounts also represent citizens' role in the rapid distribution of information about corruption within a social network. The KPK's Twitter account is only ranked 46th with the score of 0.125. Again, the authors believe that KPK's lower score is primarily attributed to their limited activities on Twitter to maintain their independence⁷.

In a social network a person can be considered as a central figure if he is strategically located on the communication paths connecting pairs of others and thus is able to influence his network (e.g., by withholding or distorting the flow of information) (Bavelas, 1948; Freeman, 1979; Shaw, 1954). In the science of Social Network Analysis (SNA) this role is represented by a measure known as "betweenness centrality." Freeman (1979, p. 221) explained that this type of centrality measure is calculated based on the numeration of incidents where a point "falls between pairs of other points on the shortest geodesic paths connecting them." In a social network like Twitter, users with high betweenness centrality scores essentially "provide the shortest paths between other users within the network" (Riddell et al., 2017, p. 282).

From the authors' analysis (from a total of 193 Twitter accounts) using NVivo 11, the account @Ronin1948, has the betweenness centrality score of 4,098 which is the highest in the dataset. On the other hand, the official account of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), @KPK_RI, only scores 12 and is ranked ninth. This illustrates a role that Twitter users can play in the anti-corruption movement by becoming active disseminators of information on corruption. However, the authors also believe that the KPK's lower rank may have been attributed to the fact that the agency has always been very careful when making statements regarding its corruption investigations and thus it often keeps its Twitter activities to a minimum. With this limitation, the commission needs citizens' support in disseminating news and information about anti-corruption activities to promote public awareness and to stimulate constructive discussions.

Degree centrality represents the number of ties incident on a node (Borgatti, 2005, p. 62) which, in a network like Twitter, translates into "popularity" (in-degree) and "influence" (out-degree) (Gruzd and Haythornthwaite, 2013, p. 6). In Twitter in-degree centrality can be associated with the number of times a user is mentioned or replied to (Gruzd and Haythornthwaite, 2013, p. 6). On the other hand, the number of times a user mentions or replies to others represents out-degree centrality (Gruzd and Haythornthwaite, 2013, p. 6). Based on authors' analysis, the account

⁷ Regardless of its limited resources the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has been known for its uncompromised independence in investigating even corruption cases involving high ranking government officials (Prabowo, 2014). At the time of writing in addition to being an academic at the Islamic University of Indonesia, the first author also serves as a managing editor at the KPK's *Jurnal Integritas* (Journal of Integrity). The first author has also been involved in a number of anti-corruption activities and events organized by the commission.

@Ronin1948 has the highest degree centrality of 48 which represents the highest popularity and influence in the network whereas the Corruption Eradication Commission's (KPK) official account, @KPK_RI, is only ranked 19th with the score of 2.

A central issue in the discussions on the roles of the internet and social media in anti-corruption movement is the effect of rapid information dissemination to public awareness on corruption (DiRienzo et al., 2007). Jha and Sarangi (2017) were of the opinion that the large number of social media users also represents the large number of audience who may share views, experiences, and opinions related to corruption. Therefore, social media may serve as a low cost means for disseminating information to a larger audience to trigger a public reaction against corrupt acts (Jha and Sarangi, 2017). The dissemination of information on corruption over social media platforms will increase citizens' awareness on the true extent of corruption in the country. Upon realizing the true damages from corrupt acts (e.g., substandard public facilities) and how they may have affected their wellbeing citizens will be motivated to voice their concerns and to condemn the offenders.

An example of the success of social media movement in supporting anti-corruption is that of the alleged criminalization of the then KPK Deputy Commissioners Bibit Samad Riyanto and Muhammad Chandra Hamzah (Beyerle, 2014; Molaei, 2015). The two were (wrongfully) arrested on 29 October 2009 by the police on suspicion of power abuse and bribery (The Jakarta Globe, 2009a, 2009b). Soon after the arrest anti-corruption supporters reacted by voicing their protests through social media. For example, the "1,000,000 facebookers supporting Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Riyanto" movement (*Gerakan 1,000,000 Facebookers Dukung Chandra Hamzah dan Bibit Samad Riyanto*) was started by an anti-corruption activist, Usman Yasin, on the same day (Gazali, 2014, p. 429; Molaei, 2015, p. 99). Shortly after, chain messages were accumulating in social media and rallies were taking place across a number of areas including campuses and the KPK's office (Gazali, 2014, p. 429). The online movement also attracted a lot of attention from various media in the country and garnered over a million online supports just within a few days (Molaei, 2015, p. 99; The Jakarta Globe, 2009c). In response to the mounting pressure to resolve the case President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono eventually established a fact-finding team known as Team Eight on 2 November 2009 (The Economist, 2009). This finally led to charges against the two deputy commissioners being dropped in December 2009 (Lim, 2013, p. 6).

In practice, in addition to discussions and debates, shaming offenders is a common response from social media users when they receive news and information about newly uncovered corruption cases. Shame along with other negative emotions is often considered as part of the perceived costs of committing corruption. Ausubel (1955, p. 382) defined shame as:

...an unpleasant emotional reaction by an individual to an actual or presumed negative judgment of himself by others resulting in self-depreciation vis-à-vis the group.

Breggin (2015, p. 21) was of the opinion that shame is correlated with how others judge us as well as how we judge our relationship to others. Bedford and Hwang (2003, p. 128) argued that shame is "the feeling of loss of standing in the eyes of oneself or significant others and can occur as the result of a failure to live up to expectations for a person of one's role or status." Evidence

suggests that shame can be a powerful means to control people's behavior in the society. However, it is worthy of note that although negative emotions such as shame and guilt are universally recognized, and experienced culture plays a significant role in how they are experienced by different individuals places (Furukawa et al., 2012, p. 90). For example, in his study in Bengkulu (Indonesia) and California (United States) Fessler (2004) concluded that shame is more intensely experienced by people in Bengkulu than those in California. This is so as generally people from collectivistic cultures (e.g., Asian countries) tend to be more prone to shame than those from individualistic cultures (e.g., American and European countries) (Fessler, 2004). Breugelman and Poortinga (2006), by comparing Rarámuri Indians (Mexico) with rural Javanese (Indonesia), established that very often emotions such as guilt and shame are communicated differently across cultures.

Evidence suggests that shame (*malu*) has been playing an important role in the Indonesian governance system especially in the New Order regime during which it was misused as a means to preserve the regime's power (Collins and Bahar, 2000; Prabowo and Cooper, 2016). Prabowo and Suherita (Forthcoming) proposed that shame can be "re-invented" to fight corruption in Indonesia by repositioning it as a social control mechanism. Silfver (2007, p. 169) believed that guilt and shame play an important role in the development of moral behavior. As people are generally trying to avoid experiencing them by behaving according to known personal or social standard guilt and shame can become a means for social control by maintaining a sense of personal identity (Creighton, 1990; Hultberg, 1988; Scheff, 1988). Social media such as Twitter, when properly used, can be an effective instrument to induce shame in those who have committed corruption and thus deterring others from choosing the same path in the future. Together with other measures, the existence of shame can add to the existing perceived costs of corruption.

Future Directions

Generally, just like in any other countries, the growth of ICTs in Indonesia comes with all kinds of risk which must be managed in particular by the government. Although technology can be threatening to have a comprehensive system that provides sufficient protection for both users and information will enable it to benefit the society (Nugraha and Putri, 2016, p. 8). Furthermore, the benefits of ICTs can spread across multiple areas including those of anti-corruption. For example, Bertot et al. (2010) were of the opinion that among the benefits of ICTs is the promotion of openness and transparency which will reduce corruption within public institutions.

Although not the primary focus of this paper it is worthy of note that legal instruments are essential to ensure that ICTs, in particular, the internet will not be misused for unlawful purposes. However, such instruments should not be established at the expense of people's freedom of speech. In practice, this is easier said than done as there is always the big question of who should govern the cyber world and how they should do it (Nugraha and Putri, 2016, p. 8). Governing the cyber world is a new and challenging task for the Indonesian government.

A major step by the government in mitigating the threats from the development of ICTs was the passing of the Law Number 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic Transaction (UU ITE) in April 2008. The law generally covers various aspects of ICTs in Indonesia including those related to crime (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of Indonesia, 2008, p. v). Among the important matters regulated by this law is the use of electronic information and/or electronic documents as legitimate legal evidence as the expansion of legitimate legal evidence pursuant to the Law of Procedure (article 5) (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of Indonesia, 2008, p. 7). Essentially, in addition to offences such as online pornography, fraud and money laundering the law also covers online defamation, online blasphemy and online threats (SAFEnet, 2016). Nevertheless, Nugraha and Putri (2016, p. 9) were of the opinion that the law has been perceived as being ambiguous in preserving people's freedom of expression within the corridors of ethics and tolerance as evidenced by, among other things, the rising number of defamation cases prosecuted under the law in the past few years. Finally, on 27 October 2016, the House of Representatives (DPR) passed the draft revision of the Law No.11/2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions (UU ITE) (The Jakarta Post, 2016). A month later the revision of the Law finally came into effect on 28 November 2016 (Parlina, 2016). Despite the long process of the revision, many still argue that the law still does not provide enough protection to people's freedom of speech. For example, as illustrated by Syahayani (2016):

Although ITE Law has been revised, it still invites criticisms, which are mainly concerned with the article on insults and/or defamation; that is, Article 27 Paragraph (3) of ITE Law. In general, both before and after the revision, Article 27 Paragraph (3) of UU ITE is still considered by people could restrict or hamper the freedom of speech or expression. In other words, the article is considered contrary to the essence of freedom of expression guaranteed in Article 28 UUD 1945 (the Constitution of Indonesia).

Clearly, the Indonesian government still has much to do to find the right balance between regulating the cyber world and preserving the freedom of speech for its citizens as measures that were meant to reduce the negative effects of the internet ended up undermining internet freedom even more (Freedom House, 2017).

Nevertheless, based on authors' observation such drawbacks do not seem to discourage citizens especially the young people from actively expressing their thoughts on social media including criticizing the government. Warren et al. (2016) in their study revealed that young internet users in Indonesia are promoting dialogue and debate on Facebook primarily through the publication of information and sharing of links. Furthermore, Warren et al. (2016) also concluded that in

comparison to Malaysia Indonesian youth are “more apprehensive about using Facebook for lobbying, such as petitions.”

Recently, the world has witnessed the growing power of social media as part of the e-government initiatives to increase transparency and to reduce corrupt practices in the public sector (Ali, 2011; Carlo Bertot et al., 2012). When effectively used social media may contribute to the promotion of openness and accountability in the public sector and in turn reducing the risk of corruption (Stamati et al., 2015). As noted by Meijer et al. (2012, p. 11) openness within a government is concerning both the availability of information and interactions between government and citizens. The development ICTs has to some extent influence the notion of open government by emphasizing on providing citizens with opportunities to participate in the procedures of government (Lathrop and Ruma, 2010, p. xix).

Social media such as blogs, wikis, social networks, microblogs, just to name a few, can be optimized as means for citizens to receive information about government activities as well as to express their opinions (Carlo Bertot et al., 2012). As demonstrated by Carlo Bertot et al. (2012, p. 86) with regard to transparency and anti-corruption social media can be used to⁸:

1. Expose government processes, including bidding, contracting, and processing of forms;
2. Public monitoring of activities of government officials and their activities;
3. Speed processing of government forms;
4. Limit direct contact between members of the public and government officials;
5. Establish channels for information dissemination from government agencies to members of the public, particularly through media that members of the public prefer using;
6. Provide outlets for public suggestions for improving government openness; and
7. Allow members of the public to track the progress of their own interactions with government.

In Indonesia, socializing anti-corruption is a highly challenging task despite the efforts of various institutions especially the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Therefore, empowering citizens to shift potential offenders’ cost – benefit perception may offer a long term solution for anti-corruption movement. The high level of penetration of social media in Indonesia means that more social interactions will be done in cyberspace and thus there will need to be a concerted effort to optimize social media to attract citizens to discuss and share issues about corruption in Indonesia.

In a discussion with the first author, a coordinator of the KPK’s Korsupgah (coordination, supervision and prevention) initiative, Mr. Najib Wahito, it appears that in comparison with those of investigation and prosecution events pertaining to corruption prevention do not seem to attract much attention from social media users (Wahito, 2017). This is evidenced by the fact that

⁸ As discussed previously, the ITE Law has been considered by many international observers as curbing the freedom of speech on the internet in Indonesia. Interestingly such limitation does not seem to affect citizens’ motivation to actively engage in discussions and debates on various sensitive topics. This could be explained by the fact that the country’s population is dominated by young people (Belot, 2013) who, according to a study by Warren et al. (2016), are more apprehensive on social media and are willing to take the risk in voicing their thoughts. According to the data from IndexMundi (2018) around 42% of Indonesia’s population is under the age of 25 making it a very youth oriented country (Warren et al., 2016).

only a few if not none of tweets and retweets are made on Twitter in relation to news on corruption prevention activities (e.g., public lecturers, workshops, seminars, etc.) as opposed to hundreds or sometimes even thousands from news on corrupt public officials' arrests. As such, there need to be further studies on how to optimize social media to support the existing anti-corruption initiatives. Studies also need to be conducted on how to design more pro-active approaches to educating citizens about anti-corruption through social media. Kietzmann et al. (2011, 2012) postulated that social media consists of seven functional building blocks known as the "honeycomb" of social media: identity, conversations, sharing, presence, relationships, reputation, and groups. These building blocks depict the dimensions and dynamics of social media including the interactions among users. Future studies need to explore the potential of each building block in strengthening the anti-corruption regime in Indonesia by making corruption an irrational choice of action for potential offenders.

With regard to future studies on anti-corruption a number of questions that warrant further inquiries include:

- How can we measure the success of social media movement in supporting anti-corruption initiatives?
- How can the anti-corruption agency take full advantage of the growing social media usage in Indonesia to support the anti-corruption movement?
- How can we attract more social media users to participate in anti-corruption movements?
- What is the most suitable legal framework to regulate the use of social media is supporting anti-corruption movements?

Concluding Remarks

This paper explores the potential of social media in supporting the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia. Several important issues are highlighted in this paper with regard to the dynamics and social interactions in social media platforms with a special reference to Twitter. By utilizing Social Network Analysis (SNA) this paper highlights the various roles an internet user can assume within a network in a social media platform in supporting the anti-corruption movement. The analysis presented in this paper illustrate the potential power of citizen journalism through social media in sending messages about corruption to the public. This paper demonstrates how social media can contribute to anti-corruption movement in Indonesia in particular as a means for communicating anti-corruption information to raise public awareness. Social media can also function as a monitoring tool for diminishing the opportunity for public officials to misuse state resources for their own benefits. Cases discussed in this paper have demonstrated how powerful social media can be in uniting anti-corruption supporters to put pressure on the government to support anti-corruption agenda. Together with other measures, social can media can contribute to anti-corruption movement by creating a hostile environment for corrupt offenders by increasing the risk of detection and prosecution and eventually making corruption an irrational choice of action.

Nevertheless, future studies are still needed to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how to optimize the growing power of social media as a supporting measure for combating corruption in Indonesia. Anti-corruption scholars need to develop their understanding of how each element of social media can be optimized to support the anti-corruption movement based on which a better anti-corruption strategy can be formulated.

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