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The Legendary Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army in the Defence of Singapore during the Japanese Invasion of February 1942

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Known as the Overseas Anti-Japanese Army by the Chinese in Singapore but officially as Dalforce by the British, this was a Chinese militia unit formed to defend Singapore Island during the Japanese invasion in 1942. Its unit history written by its deputy commander Major Hu Tie Jun suggests that the Overseas Anti-Japanese Army was a heroic and patriotic army. The legendary exploits of the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army has since been picked up by Singaporean journalist writer Foong Choon Hon and made into a popular wartime narrative in Singapore in his best seller war narrative The Price of Peace. Since its publication in 1995, Singaporeans have regarded Foong’s work as an authority on Singapore’s war history. However, popular war narratives like the ones found in The Price of Peace are not necessarily history; Foong’s re-interpretation of Dalforce contains many errors, inconsistencies and embellishments. At best Foong’s The Price of Peace can only qualify as popular war literature. The many problems found in Foong’s work on Singapore Overseas Anti-Japanese Army, however, points to larger issues on writing war history in Singapore. What The Price of Peace represents is a way of writing and presenting history that is both accommodating and comfortable to Singaporeans. It is a fine example of a nation’s search for identity separate from its colonial past.

The Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army was formed during the Japanese invasion of Malaya. Many Chinese who had settled in Malaya and Singapore joined the ranks of this army with the desire to fight the Japanese and to defend their property and family. Many from all walks of life came forward to be part of the Volunteer Army (VA). Dressed in their Chinese Nationalist-inspired blue uniforms and armed with any available weapons they could find, they marched bravely to the front to confront the enemy. These volunteers held Singapore’s western sector and when the Japanese crossed the Straits of Johore into Singapore, they put up a brave and stubborn defence. On the night of 6 February 1942, the VA, supported by the Australians, sank and killed a large Japanese patrol that was crossing the Straits. It was a spectacular but short-lived victory. The Japanese pressed on with their attack and when the Japanese finally established a beachhead in Singapore, volunteers of the VA fought courageously for hours, determined to hold back the Japanese horde. When the Allied lines of defence began to falter, the VA continued to hold the front until they too were forced to retreat, but only when their food and ammunition had run out. In nearly every battle, the VA was determined to hold the ground against the Japanese but was let down time and again by the Allied forces who kept on retreating. Each time the Japanese advanced, the Allied forces retreated and the volunteers had to reluctantly follow suit. In the end, it was all too little too late; on 13 February the decision was made to disband the VA. After the Allies surrendered on 15 February 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) immediately launched a mopping up operation, singling out members of the VA because they had fought courageously against the Japanese. Many volunteers either
fled Singapore or were forced into hiding as the Japanese regarded them as dangerous elements. In the process of persecuting volunteers of the VA, the IJA carried out a bloody massacre of the population in Singapore known later as the Sook Ching Massacre.

That is the history of the VA according to Singaporean sources, particularly in a popular publication on the war titled, *The Price of Peace*. Subtitled *True Accounts of the Japanese Occupation*, it is a collection of narratives that attempts to document anti-Japanese activities carried out by the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya during the Second World War. Amongst all the anti-Japanese organisations of the time, the VA is prominently, even passionately, featured. The principal editor of the book, Foong Choon Hon, is a journalist and trained broadcaster, and well positioned in the media industry. Since its publication, *The Price of Peace* has proved to be immensely popular. It inspired the creation of a top-rating Chinese drama series shown on Singapore television in 1997 titled *He Ping de Dai Jia* (*Price of Peace*). At Singapore’s prestigious media industry awards, the Star Awards, *He Ping de Dai Jia* won the award for best drama series. Ten years later it was re-screened on television in Singapore and again it was popularly received.

The success of *The Price of Peace* demonstrates the community’s thirst for popular local historical war narratives, perhaps like the popular narratives about Gallipoli or Kokoda within an Australian context. Yet, its widespread popularity deserves closer analysis because popular wartime narratives are not necessarily history. This is especially important because institutions in Singapore have gone one step further by making *The Price of Peace* an authority on the war in Singapore. The book is listed in the National University of Singapore Library’s collection, ‘A Sense of History: A Select Bibliography in the History of Singapore’, a list that also included works by notable historians. In 2002, the Singapore Nanyang University of Technology placed it in a public book display with works that were regarded as important to Singapore’s National Education policy. The Singapore Ministry of Defence also cites material from the book in its official versions of Singapore’s military history. Indeed, the book’s influence is clearly seen in the remarks made by Singapore’s Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, at the book launch of the English edition in 1997 when he affirmed that the book was ‘very important for national education’, because it was a ‘major contribution to the study of our history’.

*The Price of Peace* has come to encapsulate the Singaporean memory and experience of the Battle of Singapore because it departs from the dominant Western narratives of the war in Singapore. Such narratives are often preoccupied with the Battle and Fall of Singapore, generally ignoring the period of the Japanese Occupation unless they are examining the experience of specific groups like Australian prisoners of war or unit battle honours. In narratives such as those, the voices of the locals are sidelined, if not ignored. Foong’s *The Price of Peace* is an attempt to rewrite the Battle, Fall and Occupation of Singapore without relying extensively on Western sources. It is an attempt to reclaim a series of past events and reinterpret it as indigenous or local history, a Singaporean history. Put in another way, it presents a challenge to Western colonial history.

The reorientation of Singapore’s war past is necessary but Foong’s work has fallen short as a serious challenge to the dominant Western perspective and narratives of the war. The history of VA in *The Price of Peace* is based on the unit war history written by its deputy commander, Hu Tie Jun. Hu wrote three essays based on the unit history which were then compiled into a book called *War History of the Singapore Overseas*
The Legendary Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army. Written after the war, Foong claimed Hu’s work offered ‘an insight into the defence war the volunteer army fought in the front line against the Japanese’. Yet, Hu’s account and Foong’s reinterpretation suggest that both authors were more interested in what they wished the Overseas Chinese Volunteer Army could have achieved rather than what it actually did. When cross-referencing popular accounts of the VA with non-Singaporean sources, a different picture emerges. Frequently garnished with embellishments, the narratives in The Price of Peace are difficult to corroborate with non-Singaporean sources of the time. And while the narratives presented in The Price of Peace appeal to the local communities in Singapore, they will not be taken seriously elsewhere, not because Western research and historiography are superior in some sense, but because Foong’s work with The Price of Peace is more akin to fiction than it is history.

The official name of the VA was Dalforce, named after its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel John Dally, the former Superintendent of the Malayan Police Special Branch. Its deputy commander was a Chinese national, Major Hu Tie Jun. With the exception of Hu, command down to company level was exclusively British. The Chinese provided the non-commissioned officers and the rank and file. In an attempt to ignore its colonial origins and British links, The Price of Peace does not refer to this Chinese militia as Dalforce. It prefers to call it the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, or just the VA. The choice of name of the volunteer force is significant because it has bearing on the representation and interpretation of the unit’s history.

The Price of Peace suggests that the VA was an independent army and claims that on 1 February 1942, ‘the British authorities … brought the Volunteer Army (VA) under its command’. Dalforce, however, had always been under British command. It was raised by British as a militia force with British trainers, weapons and leaders, and was originally allocated to the III Indian Corps of the British Indian Army. However, in the days leading up to the main Japanese invasion of Singapore, the plan was revised and instead Dalforce Companies were distributed to various Allied units ‘to be the eyes and ears of the main forces on the perimeter of the island facing Johore … they were just a fringe, part of a defence arrangement’. Dalforce was at best a screening force in a reconnaissance role for the main British and Commonwealth forces in Singapore.

The use of the noun ‘army’ in the ‘Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army’ is also rather misleading. The Price of Peace suggests that the VA was organised into battalions, with eight battalions which would have made it nearly 4,800-men strong. If accurate, this would have made the VA a brigade-size force, two rungs away from what would qualify as an army. But it was, in fact, far smaller than that. According to one British trainer of Dalforce, Frank Brewer, Dalforce was made up of five companies which would have given it an active strength of 750. The numbers who actually fought could have been lower. Brewer suggested that ‘some of them probably never went up at all’.

If Dalforce was not an army, where did it sit in the British Army’s order of battle? The ranks of its senior command staff, John Dalley, a Lieutenant-Colonel and Hu Tie Jun, a Major, would suggest that the Chinese volunteer force was, at best, the equivalent of a battalion, the basic combat unit in the British Army during the war. The Price of Peace mentions their ranks but it also made an unusual claim with regards to Dalforce’s Chinese deputy commander: the rank of Major was ‘not recognised by the British Army’. Either the book’s editor is suggesting that Hu’s appointment by the British as deputy commander was not officially recognised or that it was rejected by
Foong in his attempt to maintain the notion that the Chinese volunteer force was an ‘army’. The latter seems to have been his intention.

Finally, by presenting the VA as an army, *The Price of Peace* suggests that the VA was the mainstay of Singapore’s defences rather than Malaya Command. In fact, it reverses the roles of the VA and Malaya Command. Hence, during the Battle of Singapore, the VA in *The Price of Peace* is presented as an army that was ‘flanked by soldiers from Allied Forces, [whilst] our comrades took on the enemy’.12 For example, at Jurong Road, the book records that the VA was ‘flanked by the Australian Brigade on the right’.13 And at Lim Chu Kang, the VA ‘combined forces with the 300-strong Australian brigade … this greatly boosted our strength’.14 Here Foong is clearly manipulating the figures in suggesting that a 300-strong Australian Brigade augmented the larger Chinese Volunteer ‘army’. Australian sources, however, indicate that the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade at Lim Chu Kang, comprising the 2/18, 2/19 and 2/20 Australian Infantry Battalions had a total reported strength of 107 officers and 2,365 other ranks. Furthermore, the unit war diary of the 2/20 Australian Infantry Battalion also clearly indicates that the Dalforce company at Lim Chu Kang came under its battalion strength along with detachments from the 2/15 Australian Field Regiment, 15th Australian Anti-Tank Regiment and the 2/4 Australian Machine Gun Battalion.15 With Dalforce Companies scattered throughout the larger Allied army defending Singapore, it would be more accurate to claim that a company sized Dalforce unit was supporting a much larger brigade-sized force on its flanks.16

Battle accounts of the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army in *The Price of Peace* are equally problematic. They range from the improbable to the impossible. The description of a battle involving one Dalforce company at Lim Chu Kang Road on 8 February during the Japanese main assault on Singapore is an example of the improbable. Foong wrote:

[A] fierce battle soon took its toll on us as people and the Allied soldiers began to retreat. Those [volunteers] in the frontline continued to resist the enemy. As the battle dragged on, the VA ran out of food and ammunition.17

The Australian unit war diaries, written close to the events recorded the sequence of events very differently. On the night of 8 February 1942, the war diary of the 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade recorded:

Enemy landings and attempted landings: on 2/20 Bn front … estimated strength one coy came in contact with Dalforce and then moved at jog trot towards area 6824 … overran one tp of 4.5 Howitzers in area 6825.18

If the Australian source is to be trusted, there was no determined resistance, no retreat on their part, nor even a battle as described in *The Price of Peace*.

The training of Dalforce volunteers and weapons they received also suggest that the achievements of the VA promoted in *The Price of Peace* are also questionable, not because the volunteers may have lacked courage or commitment, but because they were under-trained and under-equipped. The decision to raise a local Chinese militia force was made in December 1941 but by the time the volunteers were assembled for training, there was little opportunity: it was a matter of days rather than weeks.19 Dalforce trainer Frank Brewer described the type of training and instruction the volunteers received as ‘a little bit of parade ground drill and shouting, so they got used to taking orders’, and ‘how not to shoot or blow oneself up with their weapons’.20 This was far from basic military training. For weapons, Brewer recalled that they were issued with ‘shotguns, seven round of ammunition and two grenades each’.21
Australian Infantry Battalion’s official war history corroborates Brewer: the Dalforce volunteers under its command were ‘armed with parangs, shot-guns and a variety of firearms’. The Price of Peace also acknowledges the ‘old-fashioned’ and ‘outdated’ variety of shotguns and hunting rifles handed to the volunteers. Given the state of training and weapons of Dalforce, it is unlikely that a company of lightly armed, hastily trained and untested Chinese volunteers could have engaged the well-trained and equipped Imperial Japanese Army in pitched battles that raged for hours until the volunteers were forced to retreat only when they had exhausted their food and ammunition. Even better-trained and equipped troops could not withstand the Japanese assault: when two Japanese divisions attacked the defensive positions held by 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade on the night of 8 February, the brigade was badly mauled.

Other battle accounts of the Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army found in The Price of Peace verge on the impossible. The Price of Peace claims that on 6 February 1942 the VA, stationed at Jurong Road, was hit by machinegun fire and ‘a fierce battle erupted as Japanese troops charged towards us … both sides suffered casualties’. Apparently the Japanese were repulsed because the next day, Jurong Road came under enemy artillery attack before the Japanese re-commenced their attack and ‘in the intense fighting that followed, both sides suffered heavy casualties’. On 9 February, after the initial Japanese assault, the VA and the Australians had regrouped and launched a combined counter-offensive that broke the Japanese morale and chased the enemy back ‘for a good five miles’. The problem with this account is that no Japanese troops could have been on Singapore Island on 6 February for they were still in the stages of preparation: they landed on 8 February. And when the Japanese main assault commenced on the night of 8 February it took place at Lim Chu Kang Road, well away from Jurong Road. As for the combined VA-Australian counter-offensive that took place on 9 February, Australian unit war diaries record that the Diggers were re-establishing a new line of defence after withdrawing from the initial main Japanese assault. None spoke of a counter-offensive that chased the Japanese five miles back to the coastline.

It is clear then, that the history of Dalforce presented in The Price of Peace is seriously flawed. But it begs the question, why did Foong offer a history that is so easily challenged? Why are the local war narratives presented in The Price of Peace problematic? The answer lies in two powerful Chinese war literature genres, Kuomintang (KMT) literary works and ‘Resistance Literature’. Historians Kevin Blackburn and Daniel Chew in Singapore have specifically identified Singaporean Dalforce narratives as following a style of writing that was typical of China’s Kuomintang literary works. It was a style that fashioned heroic legends by exaggerating and embellishing local narratives of the war. In Blackburn and Chew’s reappraisal of Dalforce’s history, they described the Dalforce narratives during the war in Singapore as ‘A heroic legend … written into the history books by an Overseas Chinese Community in Singapore that desired to see itself as united in the struggle against Japan’.

The Price of Peace was a product of its times from the Chinese community whose historiography reflects the powerful tradition of Chinese nationalist-styled writing. There are others, and these narratives became a product and reflection of the Chinese community’s way of interpreting Singapore’s history that saw the war against Japan ‘through nationalist glasses … in the struggle with their comrades in China against an aggressive and belligerent Japan.’
Events unfolding in the conflict between China and Japan were closely monitored by the Chinese diaspora in Singapore. When Japan invaded China in 1937, the Chinese community in Singapore rallied and established relief organisations to aid China. The largest of such organisations was the China Relief Fund, established by an influential Chinese businessman, Tan Kah Kee. It not only raised a considerable sum of money, but also recruited volunteers to serve as truck drivers along the Burma Road, a vital supply route for the KMT Chinese in the war against Japan. After war had broken out in Europe in 1939, the British in Malaya attempted to ride on the wave of established Chinese patriotism and anti-Japanese sentiments in the local Chinese community. To rally Chinese support for their war in Europe, they put up posters that read ‘Help Britain and you help China’.

The close affinity between the Chinese in Singapore and China is also illustrated in the Chinese volunteers’ choice of colour for their uniforms. To differentiate themselves from the regular forces in Singapore they chose blue. Blue as a colour had its roots in the formation of the National Revolutionary Army of China, an uneasy alliance formed between the Communist Party of China and the KMT Nationalist Army to fight the Japanese under one banner. The winter uniforms of the KMT were blue and, with no official uniforms of their own, it was not uncommon for Communist soldiers to don KMT uniforms. The majority of Singapore’s Chinese migrant population hails from the southern provinces of China, a region that was not only a KMT stronghold but also where its seat of power was located. Dalforce was raised in the winter of 1941 and its volunteers adopted the same colours as their brethren in Southern China to present a united regional front against the invading Japanese.

Migrant Chinese writers and journalists in Singapore before the war were a product of their times. They had been inspired by the rich harvest of Chinese literary works from China which were characteristically nationalistic and stridently anti-Japanese. For instance, an article published in Chungking in 1939 titled ‘They Fight with Paper Bullets’ referred in glowing terms to the ‘army of Chinese journalists’ who ‘are fighting Japan with their pens and brushes no less earnestly than their comrades at the front’. Similarly, in Malaya and Singapore prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, Chinese intellectuals were producing popular literature to express their patriotic sentiments and to rally popular support for China’s war against Japan. The Chinese diaspora in Singapore, then, was just as keen to promote anti-Japanese sentiments, nationalist sentiment and patriotism in defending the homeland. Dubbed collectively as ‘Resistance Literature’, the tradition of these literary works would prove to have a longstanding legacy in Singapore.

After the war, independence movements across the Southeast Asian region saw the rise of a new type of literature in Singapore and Malaya that reflected the new concerns of a postwar world. In the mid-1950s, new literary genres called ‘popular patriotic literature’ and ‘patriotic literature’ emerged in Singapore and Malaya; patriotism was defined as anti-colonialism. Not only was it anti-colonial, it was also characterised by the desire to create a distinct local literary culture in Singapore and Malaysia. The genre was popular especially within the local born Straits Chinese intellectual circles in Singapore and Malaya who saw themselves as part of a uniquely Singapore and Malayan Chinese literature in the making. Yet, the publication of The Price of Peace in 1997 demonstrates that the ‘Resistance Literature’ genre still has a strong hold. Its interpretation of the history of Dalforce harks back to the earlier style of writing and expression that is distinctively nationalistic and well within the genre of ‘Resistance Literature'.
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Literature’. This is because Chinese nationalism in Singapore, despite attempts to create a unique local literary culture, has persisted since 1945.

In 1946, the British Military Administration (BMA) in Singapore proposed that a war memorial be constructed and dedicated to the civilian war dead of Singapore. But this ran contrary to sentiment in Singapore’s Chinese community which actively sought to enshrine the patriotism and sacrifices of their war dead. Tan Kah Kee, who formerly led the China Relief Fund efforts, proposed a special shrine for Chinese civilians who were massacred during the Japanese Occupation. Tan ardently insisted that there should be ‘a separate memorial for the Chinese’ rather than a community memorial, maintaining that the ‘Chinese victims were more numerous during the occupation’.

The BMA’s plan for a community memorial never materialised due to mismanagement and dwindling popular support. Twenty years later however, when numerous human remains of the Sook Ching Massacre were discovered, leaders of the Singapore Chinese community again lobbied for a memorial to honour their war dead, spearheaded this time by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCCI).

Their efforts eventually led to the construction of Singapore’s official civilian war memorial, but it was not one dedicated to the Chinese alone. The newly elected independent government of Singapore led by the People’s Action Party (PAP) intervened and insisted that if a war memorial was to be constructed it would have to honour all civilians who lost their lives during the war, not just those of the Chinese.

The PAP’s insistent stance was due largely to the concern at the time that the Chinese majority might come to determine government policy in Singapore if left unchecked. This was a particular concern for the PAP because it was implementing a multi-racial ‘Singaporean Singapore’ policy in Singapore after being elected into government following the 1959 national elections. The SCCCI finally relented on its plans for a Chinese memorial and erected, with the support from the PAP government, Singapore’s official Second World War civilian war memorial.

On the anniversary of the fall of Singapore in 1967, the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation was unveiled. Its design was based on the traditional one pillar Chinese memorials commonly found in the region but instead of one it has four raised pillars to represent each of the four ethnic groups in Singapore. Each pillar is 67 meters tall, symbolising the year that it was erected. During the unveiling ceremony the SCCCI also announced that management and ownership of the war memorial would be passed over to the Singapore government. The SCCCI has, however, continued to use the war memorial for its own commemoration services on every anniversary of the Fall of Singapore.

Its annual memorial services honour the dead and incorporate Chinese customs of ancestor worship into its rituals. The SCCCI’s memorial service also pays tribute to the efforts of its committee members who made the creation of the memorial possible. Although the memorial exists in name as Singapore’s official civilian war memorial it functions essentially as a de facto Chinese war memorial. Without the motivation and efforts of the SCCCI and the Chinese community in Singapore, a war memorial of this sort and scale might not have materialised. But it also demonstrates the power and influence of Chinese nationalism in postwar Singapore.

Is The Price of Peace a piece of popular wartime literature written in the tradition of Kuomintang literary works, or anti-Japanese ‘Resistance Literature’, or a reflection of an Overseas Chinese nationalist history in Singapore? Perhaps it lies somewhere in between the three but it is far from history. In trying to write a history that is non-Western and non-Eurocentric, has Foong instead come up with a local and Sino-centric
version of Singapore’s wartime past? Foong’s work on Dalforce in *The Price of Peace* illuminates the mindset of the overseas Chinese in Singapore who strongly identified with China in its struggle with Japan. Therefore, when the Japanese threatened Malaya and Singapore, the overseas Chinese saw it as a continuation of the struggle in the homeland where the Chinese were already resisting Japanese occupation. This is a marked departure from traditional Western perspectives on Singapore that attributes the capitulation of Singapore largely to London’s failure to prepare for the war in the Far East. For Foong, the Fall of Singapore is an extension of Japan’s war of aggression stemming from the Sino-Japanese War. While Foong’s work on Dalforce does show another side to the war not often seen elsewhere, the success of the *Price of Peace* at both the public and official levels begs one basic question. Does a comfortable and comforting Sino-centric, anti-Japanese popular and nativist narrative of the defence of Singapore constitute history? As long as it ignores other voices evident in historical sources, the answer must be in the negative. *The Price of Peace* is by far the most popular literary work devoted to Singapore’s wartime past but at the same time it encapsulates the many problems facing any war historian interested in any postcolonial nation’s search for historical identity.

2. Speech by George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts and Second Minister for Trade and Industry at the launch of *The Price Of Peace* on Saturday, 21 June 1997, National Archives of Singapore.
6. J. Davis, Transcript of Interview, Accession no. 405, National Archives of Singapore.
7. F. Brewer, Transcript of Interview, Accession no. 407, National Archives of Singapore.
8. F. Brewer was educated at Oxford University and in the two years he spent in Amoy, present-day Xiamen, he learnt to speak Hokkien, a Chinese dialect from China’s southern region and widely spoken in Singapore to this day. Before becoming a trainer, he was a volunteer with the rank of Private in the Penang and Province Wellesley Volunteer Force, an organisation similar to theTerritorials in the UK.
9. F. Brewer, Transcript of Interview, National Archives of Singapore.
12. Ibid.
15. War Diary Australian 2/20 Infantry Battalion, AWM52-8-3-20-011, Australian War Memorial.
16. In the Australian army infantry command structure during the Second World War, four companies made up one battalion and three battalions were formed under one brigade.
18 War Diary Australian 22nd Infantry Brigade, AWM52-8-2-22-009, Australian War Memorial; ‘tp’ in military terms is short for ‘troop’.
19 F. Brewer, Transcript of Interview, National Archives of Singapore.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 D. Wall, Singapore and Beyond, 2/20 Battalion Association Secretary, James Keady, Cowra NSW, 1985, p. 61.
23 Foong, The Price of Peace, pp. 264-281. The accounts of Hu Tie Jun, Deputy Commander of Dalforce were presented in three chapters in Foong’s book.
28 War Diary Australian 2/29 Infantry Battalion, AWM52-8-3-29-007, Australian War Memorial.
29 Blackburn & Chew, ‘Dalforce at the Fall of Singapore’, p. 234.
30 Ibid., p. 237.
31 Ibid., p. 256.
32 Ibid., p. 235.
33 Lee, The Syonan Years, p. 209.
34 Ibid., p. 209.
36 Descriptions of Dalforce’s blue uniforms were described in F. Brewer’s interview and in Hu, ‘A Letter to the British Advisor of Malaya Affairs’, p. 283.
41 Ibid., p. 115.
42 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
43 Ibid., pp. 116.
44 BMA/CA/81/45, British Military Administration Records, National Archives of Singapore.
45 Ibid.
46 BMA/CA/81/45, Annex A, British Military Administration Records, National Archives of Singapore.
47 Not coincidently, the SCCCI was also the publisher for The Price of Peace. At the time when the book was first published, its principal editor, Foong, was the SCCCI’s Senior Director of Cultural and Community Affairs.
49 Ibid., p. 85.
50 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
51 Ibid., p. 87.
52 Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation, Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Program pamphlet for the 41st War Memorial Service for Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation, p. 2.