

1-1-2005

Nexus of Silence: A Grounded Theory of Organizational Behaviour behind the Cover-up of Deviance

Michael Gross

University of Wollongong, mgross@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: <https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers>



Part of the [Business Commons](#), and the [Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Gross, Michael: Nexus of Silence: A Grounded Theory of Organizational Behaviour behind the Cover-up of Deviance 2005, 1-15.

<https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/814>

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Nexus of Silence: A Grounded Theory of Organizational Behaviour behind the Cover-up of Deviance

Abstract

In 2002, the Boston Globe newspaper revealed the cover-up by the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston of sexual abuse of children by clergy. A grounded theory investigation to answer the question "how could authorities allow this to happen?" revealed a 'nexus of silence' as the central phenomenon that allowed the deviance to continue in Boston and throughout the wider institution of the church. Over decades, linked to avoiding scandal, a 'nexus of silence' prevented disclosure of the sexual abuse problem, understanding of the nature and scale of the deviance, and provision of controls to protect children. This paper explains the 'nexus of silence' phenomenon to assist governance bodies in avoiding scandal, economic loss and loss of public trust over cover-up of deviance.

Keywords

deviance, nexus, up, behind, organizational, grounded, silence, cover, behaviour, theory

Disciplines

Business | Social and Behavioral Sciences

Publication Details

Gross, M. (2005). Nexus of Silence: A Grounded Theory of Organizational Behaviour behind the Cover-up of Deviance. Proceedings of the Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management Conference (pp. 1-15). Canberra, Australia: Australiana and New Zealand Academy of Management.

Title for ANZAM Abstract 2005

**Nexus of Silence: A Grounded Theory of Organizational Behaviour behind the
Cover-up of Deviance**

Michael Gross MBA,
School of Management and Marketing, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia.

Email: mgross@uow.edu.au
and mikegross@bigpond.com

Refereed Paper

Stream: Ethics & Corporate Governance ECG

Nexus of Silence: A Grounded Theory of Organizational Behavior behind the Cover-up of Deviance

Abstract:

In 2002, the Boston Globe newspaper revealed the cover-up by the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston of sexual abuse of children by clergy. A grounded theory investigation to answer the question “how could authorities allow this to happen?” revealed a ‘nexus of silence’ as the central phenomenon that allowed the deviance to continue in Boston and throughout the wider institution of the church. Over decades, linked to avoiding scandal, a ‘nexus of silence’ prevented disclosure of the sexual abuse problem, understanding of the nature and scale of the deviance, and provision of controls to protect children. This paper explains the ‘nexus of silence’ phenomenon to assist governance bodies in avoiding scandal, economic loss and loss of public trust over cover-up of deviance.

Key words: corporate governance, deviance, ethics, organizational behavior, scandal, trust.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States in January 2002, the *Boston Globe* broke the story of how the Boston Archdiocese of the Catholic Church protected pedophile priests for decades triggering a major scandal for the Catholic Church during its “Long Lent of 2002” (Neuhaus, 2004). This revelation was preceded and followed by other accounts of clergy sexual abuse (Shupe, 1995, 1998; Sipe, 1995; Parkinson, 1997; Krebs, 1998; Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002; Cozzens, 2002; Berry and Renner, 2004; France, 2004) which provided a greater understanding of the deviance and its mishandling by authorities within the Catholic Church. The *Boston Globe* stories led the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of the Attorney-General to conduct an official investigation in July 2003. In what he described as a tragedy of unimaginable dimensions, the Massachusetts Attorney-General Thomas F. Reilly reported that the Archdiocese’s own files showed 789 victims complained of sexual abuse by 250 members of the clergy for six decades under the administrations of three successive Archbishops. Those in authority tried to protect the reputation and image of their institution rather than the safety and well-being of children and believed that they were only accountable to themselves (Reilly, 2003). An Inquiry in 2004 by a National Review Board for the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, chaired by the Honorable Anne Burke, found that the response of Boston church leaders to sexual abuse by clergy was characterized by moral laxity, excessive leniency, insensitivity to victims, secrecy and neglect. (Burke et al, 2004: 92). As Burke

reported, “there were credible allegations that several thousand priests, comprising four percent of priests in ministry over the last half century, committed acts of sexual abuse of minors” (2004: 4).

Sexual abuse refers to the sexual exploitation in some form (verbal or physical, consensual or non-consensual) between an adult person and an adult or child who is either submissive or vulnerable. When perpetrated by authoritative figures in professional settings, such as medical practitioners, counselors, therapists or religious clergy, it involves a sexual boundary violation (Blaszczynski, 1996). This scandal and similar ones involving cover up by authorities of member deviance raises the question – “How can authorities allow this to happen?”

This question is relevant to fields of management including ethics and social responsibility, organization governance, control of deviance, organizational behaviour, scandal and trust. As part of a doctoral thesis-in-progress, the scope of the paper is limited to description of the phenomenon, its context, causes, intervening conditions, interactive strategies and consequences. It does not provide a detailed literature review, nor attempt to provide solutions or implications for management.


METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Grounded theory methodology developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), and more recently shown to be a pragmatic method for research in management, business, and organizational studies (Creswell, 1994, 1998; Remenyi et al, 1998; Locke, 2001; Goulding, 2002), has been used to present a model based on empirical data. Documents providing evidence of investigations of the deviance and governance performance provided the data. In addition to data, insight proved to be a helpful resource for theory development where the researcher was able to “cultivate crucial insights from personal experiences” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 252). From personal experience, the phenomenon of a ‘nexus of silence’ resonates with the researcher, whose “...mental and emotional experiences [have been] carefully used in interpreting the emerging story” (Goulding, 2002: 63).

MODEL OF A NEXUS OF SILENCE

Grounded theorists suggest models and frameworks can be useful for illustrating complex phenomena (Goulding, 2002: 83-86; Locke, 2002: 74-78). Figure 1 indicates the coding framework involved in the creation and maintenance of a 'nexus of silence'.

Figure 1
Framework for describing a Nexus of Silence



In the following description, the elements of this framework are described.

The Context Of The Catholic Church In 1960-2002 In Which Sexual Abuse By Clergy And A 'Nexus Of Silence' Occurred

Context is "...important ... because particular phenomena occur in dynamic, complex social milieu" (Snook, 2000: 26). In this case, where we argue a 'nexus of silence' occurred, the context factors of significance were - a) limited knowledge of pedophilia existed in the church and society, where it is now seen as a criminal as well as a pathological and moral issue; b) decline in vocations to the priesthood which saw lack of screening of priesthood candidates, resulting in many unsuitable persons being admitted; c) cultural beliefs and practices in the church which featured - i) tolerance of deviance, where sexual abuse was seen as "a human condition which is to be expected; a sin which can be forgiven"; ii) preferential treatment of clergy and religious as elites, compared with laity; iii) organizational silence (Morrison and Milliken, 2000; Millekin and Morrison, 2003; Millekin, Morrison and Hewlin, 2003), a collective-level phenomenon where powerful forces cause widespread withholding of information about potential embarrassing problems; d) power struggle between conservative and progressive forces in the

church, the former seeking unquestioning acceptance of church authority, the latter seeking participation in decisions in related issues around sexuality. This struggle is an ongoing issue for church authorities who want the church to be seen as united (Reece, 1996; Collins, 2001; Cozzens, 2004); e) concern about scandal, defined as “outrage and gossip arising from actions seen as wrong and unacceptable” (Oxford Dictionary: 799), and, in the Catholic Church, as “cause of moral stumbling” (Thompson, 1997: 37), and “cause of ruin and loss of faith” (Soukop, 1997: 223). Indicative of an early concern about scandal was a 1962 Vatican document (Holy Office, 1962) leaked to media in 2002 on the church crime of solicitation, which is related to sexual abuse, spelling out a highly secret process for dealing with accusations of such behaviour; f) weak control policies and practices where, in the church structure, it is evident in strong authority and weak control vertically, and weak authority and weak control horizontally, and where there are “no police powers over clergy” (Boston Globe, quoting Cardinal Law, 25 January 2002: 4); and g) lack of accountability, where certain institutions, including religious institutions, are trusted to be self-governing. The Boston crisis saw this ecclesiastical immunity erode, largely due to the outcome of common law decisions about some malpractice in various institutions (Dane, 2004; Lupu and Tuttle, 2004), including court decisions about release of documents in this case.

Nexus of Silence as the central phenomenon faced by participants

Within the above context, sexual abuse of children by clergy occurred in many countries. The institutional defensive response in Boston, and in other dioceses and religious institutions, to the signs, buzz, rumors and allegations of deviance was silence within communication networks at individual, group, organization and institution levels, a phenomenon I name as a ‘nexus of silence’. The ‘nexus of silence’ describes the communication network dynamics in which many people, connected and bound together, are unwilling to communicate publicly about a particular issue in their individual, group, organization or institution settings.

Causes of the Nexus of Silence

Other researchers have discussed silence in organizations at individual level (for example, Hirschman, 1970; Morrison and Milliken, 2000, 2002; Millekin and Morrison, 2003; Millekin, Morrison and Hewlin,

2003). Analysis of this case suggests that causes of a 'nexus of silence' at individual, group and organizational / institutional levels.

At individual level

i) Sense-making by individuals influences their comprehension of the deviance (Weick, 1998). Without education on how recidivist perpetrators construct their pedophilia activities behind an image of benevolence and playfulness, despite signs that "something is not right", but aware of "buzz" in the form of stories, grapevine talk and rumors, many bystanders remained silent in the midst of fragmented information flows. Victims, because of their powerlessness, are often silent until their family discerns the problem, or their understanding of the abuse on them and their courage to go public, enables them to break their silence, often years later.

ii) "Capture" by the culture sees many institutional stakeholders, including staff of the organizations, professional support and specialist media, become "bystanders" (Bansai and Kandola, 2004) and follow its rules and norms resulting in silence about signs, buzz, rumors, allegations of deviance and deviance control. Staff addressing or knowing of allegations, follow the proscribed bureaucratic approaches, become whistleblowers, or exit the organization (Hirschman, 1970).

iii) Fear of whistle-blowing consequences: As Miceli and Near (1992) have shown, potential whistleblowers are reluctant to speak out because of threats to their own personal, social and economic wellbeing by those who want to maintain silence. Father Thomas Doyle, Vatican Embassy Official in the US, was punished for his knowledgeable whistle-blowing of inaction by Catholic Bishops between 1984 and 1990 (Berry, 2002; France; 2004), so few clergy spoke out.

iv) Ambivalence: Psychological and sociological ambivalence (Merton, 1976; Baumann, 1991; Smelser, 1998) can be a cause of silence. Ambivalence occurs when two strong and opposing feelings prevent a person being resolute about a course of action. It is probable that families of victims and peers of clergy who become aware of signs of the abuse may have been caught between wanting action against the perpetrator, but constrained by the desire to protect the child, themselves and the organization from

scandal. Persons with individual authority may have been inactive, because of ambivalence about their dual roles of supporting colleagues and exercising control over their deviant behavior.

At group level

i) Loyalty norms lead to silence where a 'code of silence' operates, as cases of the handling of allegations of deviance in sporting teams, police, and boarding schools have shown. As Bishop Oscar Rodriguez, Salesian Cardinal stated in regard to alleged failure in controlling his Salesian order clergy involved in similar deviance, "...for me it would be a tragedy to reduce the role of a pastor to that of a cop. I'd be prepared to go to jail rather than harm one of my priests." (Callinan and Hoare, 2004).

At organizational and even wider institutional levels

i) Sense-making processes see individuals, based on their priorities at the time and information available, make decisions in complex situations that, in retrospect, proved to be incorrect (Weick, 1998; Snook, 2000). In January 2002, Law admitted that "judgments made in good faith were tragically wrong" (Boston Globe 26 January, 2002), and Burke reported that "church leaders failed to appreciate the harm to victims, the seriousness and frequency of the abuse, and so failed to act or to report to civic authorities" (2004: 93-95). Pedophilia was treated morally as sin and medically as an illness, but not as a crime. Allegations were treated as sporadic and isolated, with failure to comprehend the suffering of victims and their families. Institutional concerns of their local church were placed above the concerns of the universal church. (2004: 8-10)

ii) Avoidance of scandal was given priority, resulting in secrecy in order to protect the reputation of the organization. Burke (2004: 8-10) concluded that fear of scandal caused the authorities to practice secrecy and concealment about sexual abuse, while giving greater attention to allegations that one of the known deviant clerics was espousing views publicly on sexual behaviour contrary to the church (Deposition: Bishop Daily 21 August 2002: 33).

iii) Apathy results in failure of governance to act to energetically, responsibly and effectively. Reilly concluded that the Boston Archdiocese, even in 2002, had still to demonstrate an appropriate sense of urgency for attacking the problem, showing insufficient commitment to determining the systemic causes

of clergy sexual abuse, removing offenders and holding them accountable, and full information sharing and cooperation with state law enforcement authorities concerning suspicions or allegations. (2002: 16)

iv) Elitism saw authorities support and “coddle” accused and proven deviant clergy by use of medical “treatment”, sick leave, lend lease to other dioceses or reassignment, rather than laicization (removal of priestly office), despite danger to children. Burke believed that ‘clericalism’ could be blamed “...for the bishops and other church leaders engaging in massive denial, and [failure] to acknowledge that a priest could be engaged in the horrific acts...” (2004: 105).

v) Tolerance of deviance by the Boston Cardinal to sexual abuse by clergy saw him ignore professional medical advice and his appointed committee’s broader advice not to reassign certain clergy known to have been deviant.

vi) Failure to control deviant members. Instead, there was a reliance on a “benevolent authority” leadership style with a lack of policies and practices that allowed deviance to continue. Burke expressed the view that lack of controls for “fraternal correction” of errant clergy to prevent further deviance, and failure of Bishops to use their authority to protect children from offending clergy, were also causes of the scandal.

vii) Organizational defensive routines prevent identification and correction of errors which can threaten the organization to prevent embarrassment and threat, and to prevent any accountability or discussion on the problem (Argyris, 1990: xiii). According to Argyris, “what is undiscussible, becomes undiscussible” (1990: xii). Boston church authorities adopted defensive routines to keep the deviance internal including a) refusal to obtain external advice which, as Janis (1982) showed, leads to decisions which can cause or fail to cure problems; b) refusal to report deviance to external authorities, where by keeping the problem from government authorities, civil law enforcement and other child protection assistance was not obtained; c) denial of and minimizing deviance, where authorities publicly denied or minimized the deviance as a response to public allegations; and d) blaming the media about coverage of alleged deviance activities, and treating the outcry over one case as “moral panic”, while failing to disclose, in the Boston case, over 100 more cases which had been reported to the church.

viii) A legalistic approach to dealing with allegations (Sitkin and Bies, 1994) is preferred over an ethical approach, where a litigation rather than negotiation mentality is used in conflict or where there are perceived threats (Stutman and Putman, 1994; Randall and Baker, 1994). Burke found that the legalistic approach saw i) the use of out-of-court settlements tied to silencing tactics such as confidentiality agreements, and the use of statutes of limitations laws to reduce claims, ii) lawyers paid “to limit fiscal liability but create greater anger by compounding clerical abuse with institutional abuse and the priority to secrecy, iii) authorities disregard their pastoral role and adopt an adversarial stance to victims in the face of threat (2004: 8-10). All these strategies restrict organizational learning (Argyris, 1994: 347-358).

Intervening conditions affecting the phenomenon

Intervening conditions are variables that link causes to consequences (Glaser, 1992: 66) and have the effect of varying the sound level in the nexus. In our case, the intervening conditions that affect the causes and consequences of a “nexus of silence” are a) the degree of individual courage of individual whistleblowers in going public; b) the extent to which institutional politics prevents collaboration in resolving embarrassing problems; and c) the extent to which “moral disengagement” by subordinates and bystanders (Beu and Buckley, 2004) continues, where those who are aware of the deviance follow informal policies and procedures regarding allegation handling, aimed at silence, without raising a dissenting voice.

Inter-action strategies to ensure silence

Strategies are planned inter-actions consciously used by participants (Glaser, 1992: 66) aimed at achieving silence.

At individual and group levels

i) private communications, at individual level by a) individual deviants in the form of privileged admissions to lawyers and confessions to fellow priests under seal of confession, and b) through verbal or written communications between individual victims and the church authority aimed at processing allegations and claims while allowing the public silence to continue; at group level by c) gossip and rumor

(“buzz”) in groups under “cones of silence”, allowing concern to be voiced privately and informally, as bystanders.

At organizational level

i) communication approaches limiting information about the deviance, including euphemistic language, and use of confidential or obscure document filing systems; ii) support of participants to ensure silence, in the case of deviant clergy by provision of pastoral support, medical assessment, leave, financial support, and consideration for reassignment; in the case of victims by provision of support and counseling and “urging them to keep silent” (Boston Globe - 24 January 2002: 3); in the case of aggrieved families by promises of effective action and ignoring emotional public allegations against individual clergy or the authority itself (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2004); iii) distancing by the responsible authority creating space between themselves and the handling of the deviance, where they avoided a) direct contact with deviant, b) personally calling deviants to account, and c) direct contact with victims by sidestepping face-to-face or telephonic conversations; and by d) delegating the detail to loyal others, e) treating the issue as just one among many and the responsibility of the delegated person, and f) failing to obtain regular reports on control of deviants. As a consequence, the responsible authority could plead difficulty in memory recall and denial of detailed knowledge when called to account, and could enjoy “ethical distance” between themselves and the state of affairs (Mellema, 2003); d) fragmenting the problem where, by treating cases separately rather than accumulatively, authorities prevented pervasive deviance being understood by participants as a pattern, thereby reducing likelihood of a large scandal in the short term; e) establishing confidential legal settlements, using “hush money” to which confidentiality clauses were attached (Robinson, 2003); f) punishing whistleblowers as a warning to others for breaching the “code” of silence of the affected group, carried by a range of methods, often around career outcomes (Miceli and Near, 1990) as in the case of Fr. Thomas Doyle; g) legal measures to prevent state intervention where, by blocking state public access to church files and obfuscation, efforts were made to ensure evidence was unavailable; h) opposing organizing by members, to avoid collective activity around providing voice to victims and dissidents, where after the *Boston Globe* stories, “Cardinal Law in April 2002 ordered priests

in his diocese not to cooperate with active groups within parishes, but groups countered citing Canon Law” (Boston Globe, 27 November 2002).

Consequences of silence

A “nexus of silence” has consequences which are “outcomes derived from what happened before, and may be deliberate and anticipated or accidental and unanticipated” (Glaser, 1992: 66). Consequences of a “nexus of silence” shown in this case were a) failure to foster greater moral responsibility in the organization (Bird and Waters, 1998) and move to better solutions by open discussion on the ethical position of the Archdiocese; b) increased incidence and likelihood of deviance which saw deviant clergy reassigned and able to continue their predatory behaviour in new locations; c) pain and suffering for stakeholders feeling betrayed by trusted authorities who failed to “protect the children” contrary to member and societal expectations; d) economic loss from civil damage suits, or loss of sponsors or financial support, civil lawsuits costing Boston Archdiocese US\$85 million in 2003, with similar amounts in other dioceses; e) scandal when the extent of deviance and cover-up is exposed, where the *Boston Globe’s* Investigation produced over 900 news stories about the widespread deviance, treatment of victim’s claims, legal proceedings to prevent the public access to documents showing the extent of deviance and cover-up, payment of “hush money”, and attempts to silence the media (Robinson, 2003), and where the scandal opened other political debates the church wanted kept quiet, such as celibacy and homosexuality of clergy; and f) loss of trust in the institution (Jenkins, 1998; Thomson, Marolli and Bromley, 1998), both short-term by those who were aware, and long-term by many church members and public after the scandal broke.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Institutions are trusted to perform their primary role in society and organization leaders entrusted with moral leadership (Springett, 2004). This case shows that, when authorities allow a “nexus of silence” to develop which hides member deviance and their own failure to deal with it to avoid short term scandal, they risk greater scandal and the loss of trust that damages all organization and institution members who

become tainted, and erodes member confidence in the organization and its leaders as well as public confidence in institutions generally.

This paper shows many features of a 'nexus of silence', a central phenomenon that may signal to governance bodies the possibility of cover-up of problems which may lead to scandal and its consequences.

Bibliography

Argyris, C (1990) *Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning* Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Argyris, C (1994) 'Litigation Mentality and Organizational Learning' in Sitkin, SB & Bies, RJ (Ed) *The Legalistic Organization* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications pp 347-358.

Bansal, P and Kandola, S (2004) 'Corporate Social Responsibility: Why good people behave badly in organizations' *London: Ivey Business Journal Online* Mar/Apr 2004 p 1.

Bauman, Z (1991) *Modernity and Ambivalence* New York: Cornell University Press.

Berry, J and Renner, G (2004) *Vows of Silence: The abuse of power in the papacy of John Paul II* Sydney: Hodder Headline Australia.

Beu, DS and Buckley, MR (2004) 'This war: How the politically astute achieve crimes of obedience through the use of moral disengagement' *Leadership Quarterly* Vol 15 Issue 4 p 551.

Bird, FB and Waters, JA (1989) 'The Moral Muteness of Managers' *California Management Review* Vol 32 No 1 pp 73-88.

Blaszczynski, A (1996) *Clinical Aspects of Sexual Offenders: A Preliminary Information and Discussion Paper - Professional Standards Research Preliminary Report* Sydney: University of NSW.

Boston Globe Investigative Staff (2002) *Betrayal: The Crisis in the Catholic Church* Boston: Little Brown and Co.

Callinan, R and Hoare, D (2004) 'Shelter for the Shamed' *The Australian* 6 July 2004 p 15.

Collins, P (2001) *From Inquisition to Freedom* Roseville: Simon and Schuster Australia.

Cozzens, D (2002) *Sacred Silence: Denial and the Crisis in the Church* Minnesota: The Liturgical Press.

Creswell, JW (1994) *Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Creswell, JW (1998) *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Traditions* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Dane, P (2004) "'Omalous" Autonomy' *Brigham Young University Law Review* Vol 5 pp 1715-1772.

- Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law transcripts (2002) viewed on 15 April 2005 at <http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse>.
- Deposition of Bishop Thomas Daily transcript (2002) viewed on 15 April 2005 at <http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse>.
- France, D (2004) *Our Fathers: The Secret Life of the Catholic Church in an Age of Scandal* New York: Broadway Books.
- Glaser, BG and Strauss, A (1967) *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* Chicago: Aldine Press.
- Glaser, B (1992) *Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis* Mill Valley: Sociology Press.
- Glaser, B (1998) *Doing Grounded Theory* Mill Valley: Sociology Press.
- Goulding, C (2002) *Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide for Management, Business and Market Researchers* London: Sage Publications
- Hirschman, AO (1970) *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Holy Office, (1962) *Instruction on the Manner of Proceeding in Cases of Solicitation* Rome: The Vatican Press.
- Janis IL (1982) *Victims of Groupthink* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Krebs, T (1998) 'Church Structures that Facilitate Pedophilia among Roman Catholic Clergy', in Shupe, A (ed) *Wolves within the Fold* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press pp 15-32.
- Locke, K (2001) *Grounded Theory in Management Research* London: Sage Publications.
- Lupu, IC and Tuttle, RW (2004) 'Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity' *Brigham Young University Law Review* Vol 5 pp 1789-1896.
- Mellema, G (2003) 'Responsibility, taint, and ethical distance in business ethics' *Journal of Business Ethics* Vol 47 No 2 p 125.
- Merton, RK (1976) *Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays* New York: The Free Press.
- Miceli, MP and Near, JP (1992) *Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees* New York: Lexington Books.
- Millekin FJ and Morrison EW (2003) 'Shades of Silence: Emerging themes and Future Directions for Research on Silence in Organisations' *Journal of Management Studies* Vol 40 Issue 6 p 1563.
- Millekin FJ, Morrison EW and Hewlin, PF (2003) 'An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees don't communicate upward and Why' *Journal of Management Studies* Vol 40 Issue 6 p 1453.

- Morrison EW and Millekin FJ (2000) 'Organizational Silence: A Barrier to Change and Development in a Pluralistic World' *Academy of Management Journal* Vol 25 No 4 pp706-725.
- National Review Board for the Protection of Children and Young People, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops - The Hon. Anne Burke 'A Report on the Crisis in the Catholic Church in the United States' Washington.
- Neuhaus, RJ (2004) 'Scandal Time III: First Things' viewed on 23 April 2004 at FirstThings.com.
- Noelle-Neumann, E (1993) *The Spiral of Silence* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Oxford Dictionary (2001) *Thesaurus and Wordpower Guide*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parkinson, P (1997) *Child Sexual Abuse and the Churches* London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Randall, DM and Baker, DD (1994) 'The Threat of Legal Liability and Managerial Decision-Making' Learning' in Sitkin, SB & Bies, RJ (eds) *The Legalistic Organization* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications pp 169-189.
- Reilly TF (2003) 'The Sexual Abuse of Children in the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston' Boston: Office of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
- Remenyi, D Williams, B Money, A Swartz, E (1998) *Doing Research in Business and Management: An Introduction to Process and Method* London: Sage Publications.
- Reese, TJ (1998) *Inside the Vatican: The Politics and Organization of the Catholic Church* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Robinson, WV (2003) 'Shining the Globe's Spotlight on the Catholic Church' *Niemann Reports* Vol 57 Issue 1 p 55.
- Shupe, A (1995) *In the Name of All that's Holy: A Theory of Clergy Malfeasance* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Shupe, A (1998) (ed) *Wolves within the Fold* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Sipe, AWR (1995) *Sex, Priests, and Power: Anatomy of a Crisis* London: Cassell.
- Sitkin, SB and Bies, RJ (1994) *The Legalistic Organization* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Smelser, NJ (1998) 'The Rational and the Ambivalent in the Social Sciences' *American Sociological Review* Vol 63 Issue 1 pp 1-15.
- Snook, SA (2000) *Friendly Fire: the Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Soukup, PA (1997) 'Church, Media and Scandal' in Lull, J & Hinerman, S (eds) *Media Scandals* New York: Columbia University Press.
- Springett, N (2004) 'Corporate purpose as the basis of moral leadership of the firm' *Strategic Change* No 13 pp 297-307.

Strauss, A and Corbin, J (1998) *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Stutman, RK Putman, LL (1994) 'The Consequences of Language: A Metaphorical Look at the Legalization of Organizations Learning' in Sitkin, SB & Bies, RJ (eds) *The Legalistic Organization* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications pp 281-302.

Thompson, JB (1997) 'Scandal and Social Theory' in Lull, J & Hinerman, S (eds) *Media Scandals* New York: Columbia University Press.

Weick, KE (1998) *Sense-making in Organizations* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.