of production - it is rather a dialectic between social beings as mediated by a culture (or cultures) shaped in part by the material circumstances of production. Bowles and Gintis are strong on the former; but, in our opinion, their argument is deeply marked by what amounts to a neglect of the latter.

Another way of making our points is to say that we suspect Bowles and Gintis of being a-historical at crucial points in their analysis, and rather neglectful of the power of capitalist culture. If we're right about this, we can expect that some important parts of their analysis would be up for revision - their discussion of divisions in the working class, of skills, and of the way education institutions related to these, for example. We can't hope to suggest what these modifications might look like, but we can see that they would produce a less optimistic, we might almost say, voluntaristic, political perspective.

Finally, what are the implications for research in Australia? The usefulness of Bowles' and Gintis' work to us flows from the similarities between the US and Australia. Both are industrialised capitalist formations, with similar distributions of production among different sectors, and with economies divided in roughly the same way between corporate, state, and small capital areas. Neither society has a feudal past. Both have experienced large-scale, ethnically-diverse migration, although there are of course differences in the pattern and timing of migration. Both bourgeoises enjoy a well-established hegemony, and achieve it through similar institutions (such as the education system) and ideologies (such as individualism and meritocracy).

But the analysis of education in Australia must take account of some important differences. Perhaps the most important of these is the peculiar relationship which Australia has had with the British metropolitan and imperial economy, and the way this relationship has permeated the form and timing of the growth of social institutions such as schooling. Linked with this is the much more developed and interventionist Australian state, which has played a much larger role in the production of education than has the American. Important differences have arisen since the second world war, with the growth of the imperial economy of the US (on the one hand) and the impact of US and Japanese capital which have relocated Australia within world capital (on the other). The Australian working class is better organised than the American, but faces the particular problem of social democracy. It is less weighed down by racial cleavages than the American working class.

Our system is more centralised; bureaucratic methods of control play a larger part, ideological methods a correspondingly lower one. The Australian education system has been less divided than the minutely-graded American one. The hierarchy of tertiary institutions is shorter here, but more exclusive.

The role of the state is much more apparent here. The Australian schooling system is less well integrated into the economy and society, despite its current re-adjustment.

The work towards a political economy of Australian education has hardly begun, but it will proceed more quickly if it takes _Schooling in Capitalist America_ as its point of departure.

**FOOTNOTES**

3. See the article by Gero Lenhardt in _Kapitalistate_ No. 3, Spring 1975; and the work by Altvater and others which Lenhardt cites.

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of Communist Parties to think and act creatively and concretely in the specific conditions and forms of revolutionary change in their own countries. All the basic questions of revolutionary strategy had been settled by the Soviet experience.

As a result "everything done by the USSR in its internal and external policies was declared to be absolutely and permanently identical with the interest of the revolutionary struggle considered internationally or in any part of the world. There could be no contradiction between the former and the latter. Any claim that there could, became sacrilege for Communists." (Claudin - The Communist Movement Part 1, p.77).

Claudin was a member of the Political Committee of the Communist Party of Spain from 1947 to 1965, when after sharp divisions in the leadership on policy, he was expelled. Writing as an independent Marxist, he confronts his own past as an integral part of that of the communist movement and makes a critical evaluation of the theory and practice of the communist movement since 1917.

Claudin believes that the errors and contradictions which developed reached a climax in 1956 when Krushchov's report (to the 20th Congress, CPSU) begins the stage of the general crisis in the communist movement (Vol. II, p.644). The inability or unwillingness of the movement to undertake a real analysis of the phenomenon of "stalinism" was, he believes, a measure of the depth of the crisis.

The book commences with an analysis of the United Front and Popular front movements in Germany, France and Spain. In all cases the author believes that the effectiveness was destroyed by the dogmatic method and opportunist style of United Front and Popular Front activity. On the one hand he claims that in both France and Spain in the 1930's, the United and Popular Fronts were designed to keep the popular movement within bounds acceptable to the western bourgeois democracies with whom an alliance of the Soviet against the fascist powers was the main objective. In this way the revolutionary potential of the mass movement was dissipated.

On the other hand, the movement took a left sectarian form as exemplified by the position taken by Thorez whom he quotes: "There is only one method of seizing power... the method of the Bolsheviks, the victorious insurrection of the proletariat; the exercise of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power."

"Thorez", Claudin comments, "could have pursued a different approach, seeking unity with other progressive forces, in the following terms: "In Russia, a backward country, (the communists) proceeded in a certain way, and established a ruling authority in which power is exercised by a single party. France is a quite different sort of country, industrialised and with other traditions and other forms of the working class movement; it may be therefore that there is another road open to us."

Such a position, comments Claudin, was impossible for Thorez to take in view of the monolithic structure of the movement. "To do so he would have had to be a revolutionary Marxist, who, like Lenin, was seeking the particular path to be followed by the revolution in his country."

The subordination to the dogmatism and opportunism of the Comintern line was disastrous, he claims, both in France and Spain, leading to the defeat of the progressive movement in both countries and objectively assisting the Nazis.

In China, the Comintern's United Front policy persisted until 1946 when Stalin, still seeking to maintain an entente with the USA, was urging the Communist Party of China to seek an agreement with Chiang Kai Shek, which would involve disbanding the Red Army and dismantling their quasi-state apparatus.

In Germany, the possibility of a united working class opposition to Nazism was rendered impossible by continuing to categorise the Social Democratic leaders as "Social Fascists" and presenting social democracy as the left-wing of Nazism. Not until the mid 1930's, when it was already too late, did the Comintern reverse this divisive policy which had been seen at its worst when the "social fascism" thesis led the Communist Party of Germany to participate alongside the Nazis and the Stahlhelm in the referendum of August 1931 against the Social Democratic government of Prussia.

The result which was welcomed by Pravda, 1st August 1931, as "the greatest blow that the working class has yet dealt to Social Democracy", in fact "made it possible to present the Communists as being "allies of the Fascists", in the eyes of a large part of the working class". (Part 1, p.163).

Passing to the post-war period Claudin deals at length with the "Tito heresy" of a different path in the building of socialism and the policy of maintaining a degree of independence of the monolith. The economic blockade of Yugoslavia, the vilification of the "Tito clique" and the judicial murders of Rajk, Kostov, Clementis, Slansky and others as part of the campaign against "nationalist deviations", did incalculable harm to the communist cause, that was not really mitigated by the subsequent posthumous rehabilitation of the victims, and was reinforced by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Seeking for the fundamental causes of the departures from Marxist principles Claudin finds them in the failure of the C.P.S.U., the Comintern and Cominform to recognise that their "schema" of world revolution was in some respects in conflict with reality.

The failure to appreciate the depth of national feeling and the deep roots of reformism amongst the masses and the continuing affirmation of the approaching internal collapse of capitalism despite
its obvious recovery in the 1920s, and its subsequent restructuring along lines of state monopoly capitalism, led to policies that isolated the communists in the working class movement and eroded their mass position.

However the central issue to which the principal argument of the book is directed is that of "Socialism in one country" which appeared only after Lenin's death and became the mainspring of Communist activity for succeeding decades. The subordination of the needs of the world revolution, as Claudin sees it, to the state requirements of the U.S.S.R. had a number of consequences to some of which reference has already been made. The assumed universality of the Soviet model, the need for unquestioned acceptance of Soviet policy and the resulting conformism, theoretical submission and sterility of other parties with different backgrounds and experience to the C.P.S.U., especially in the developed countries, reduced most communist parties to positions of relative insignificance.

Furthermore, the theory of revolution did not adequately encompass the colonial and semi-colonial world. Although Lenin had given some thought to the question and, in his usual observant and flexible manner was beginning to recognise in the period before his death that the whole issue of colonial revolution in relation to the world revolution generally, needed re-assessment (Better Fewer but Better), the approach of the Comintern and Cominform was bedevilled by two assumptions that proved erroneous:

(a) that a successful colonial liberation movement could result only from revolution in the developed countries;
(b) that socialist transformation involved "Europeanisation" and would necessarily be based on the Soviet model.

Stalin and the Comintern adhered to these concepts as both Stalin and Trotsky had done in their polemical dispute on the Chinese revolution.

In the event, the Chinese proved both of them to be wrong and established a theory and practice of revolution that became a new "heresy" in Moscow.

The other major issue dealt with by Claudin is the alleged betrayal by Stalin of the revolutionary possibilities inherent in the situation in 1944-5 immediately following the second World War.

He argues that Stalin subordinated everything to his project of reaching an agreement with the United States in particular, to dividing the world into Soviet and United States spheres of influence, and that he used the enormous authority he was now able to wield, to induce or coerce the Communist parties to accede to the restoration of bourgeois power in France and Italy, to allow the British and Americans to crush the revolutionary uprising in Greece, and to attempt, as has been already said, to press the Communist Party of China to accept a settlement that could have been acceptable to the U.S.A.

When his plans began to miscarry because of U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons and the general offensive of imperialism in the "cold war", the Peace movement was launched, amongst other initiatives, according to Claudin, as a counter to the united front or the capitalist powers, an attempt to use the general anxiety about nuclear war to mobilise support in the capitalist world for Soviet foreign policy.

On this question Claudin makes no assessment of the position created by the exclusive U.S. possession of nuclear weapons, nor does he assess the consequences for the revolutionary movement of a possible defeat of the USSR in a war resulting from encouraging the armed resistance forces to make a bid for power in Western Europe.

The scope of Claudin's book is vast. He attempts, to deal with the theoretical and practical issues within the communist movement over the last half-century. The theme that the revolutionary movement has been diverted by subordination to the state interests of the USSR, and by a rigid and dogmatic revision of Marxism in which Stalin played the dominant role, has some similarity to Trotsky's critique.

However, whilst agreeing with some of Trotsky's criticism on specific questions, he believes that Trotsky, like Stalin and most other Marxists of the period were committed to the "schema" of world revolution that failed to correspond to the reality revealed by developments since 1917.

As a consequence, the Communist movement today is confronted with a theoretical and practical crisis, expressed in its sharpest form in the Sino-Soviet schism.

It goes without saying, in view of the above summary of his theme, that he sees the USSR not as a developed socialist country, but a state in which Communist Party power has resulted in "a new culture, conformist, petty bourgeois and merely instrumental in character", an opinion that to some extent agrees with Chinese critiques of Soviet society.

Most of the issues Claudin raises are relevant to the present debate on the future of the communist movement especially in the developed capitalist countries. As the Communist Parties of France and Italy approach state power, the revised concept of the "united front" which envisages political pluralism and a departure from the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as it operates in the USSR, are matters on which there are deep differences within the communist movement.

Claudin's critique, whilst providing valuable insights into specific issues, has a curious unreality when one observes the contemporary world.

It is true, of course, that Stalin's primary concern, at any rate after the mid 1920s, was for the interests
of the Soviet state, and that the Communist parties regarded the defence and preservation of the “fortress of socialism” as a political duty that transcended all others. In one sense this “loyalty to the USSR” helped to isolate the Communist Parties especially in the developed countries where nationalism and reformism were strong. On the other hand, the Russian Revolution had an enormous impact and the continued existence of a proletarian state however “deformed” was a new and potent influence on world affairs. It established new priorities in national and international politics which attracted the support of large sections of progressive opinion. In mobilising this support around issues of real significance in their own countries the indigenous communist parties played an essential role. It is fashionable to dismiss this long period of struggle against great odds as unprofitable and mistaken “Stalinism”, but this is only a part of the picture.

Similarly with the national liberation movement. The Russian Revolution and the existence of the Soviet state was the catalyst of the movement that has created the Third World and intensified the crisis of imperialism. In today’s world it is idle to pretend that the roles of the USSR and China in the African and Latin American countries are not of vital importance in their movement towards national independence.

It would be hard to conceive of successful revolutions and the continued existence of small states with socialist foundations as in Vietnam and Cuba, not to mention the developments in Mozambique, Angola and Southern Africa generally were this not the case.

Is the Communist movement in a state of crisis? Certainly the concept of a monolithic world soviet system based on a single model belongs to the past, even though overtones persist in the attitude of the CPSU to parties with an independent position, and the dogmatic adherence to the myth of Soviet infallibility in some parts of the communist movement. The problem of the kind of relations that need to exist among communist states and parties is still unsolved.

But the growing and deepening crisis of imperialism has already resulted in weakening its world position, of ending U.S. dominance in world politics and in strengthening the position of the communist and liberation movements.

Whilst Claudin deals with issues of real significance to the revolutionary movement, his own alternative schema must raise serious doubts. Were the conditions ripe for social revolution in Western Europe in 1945?

Was the peace movement only an extension of Soviet foreign policy? Did it divert the mass movement from the real task of revolution?

Does the fact that the USSR still falls short of being a model socialist democracy, and that this is reflected in its foreign policy and in the part it seeks to play in the world communist movement, invalidate its role in the movement towards socialism?

The fact that these questions are raised point to the principal merit of this book. It is the first attempt at a comprehensive confrontation with the past of the communist movement as a whole.

Its analysis and conclusions deserve the critical examination of Marxists.

- Bill Gollan.