Classification of the Deletion Correcting Capabilities of Reed–Solomon Codes of Dimension Over Prime Fields

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Abstract

Deletion correction codes have been used for transmission synchronization and, more recently, tracing pirated media. A generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) code, denoted by GRSk(l,q,alpha,v), is a code of length l over GF(q) with qk codewords. These codes have an efficient decoding algorithm and have been widely used for error correction and detection. It was recently demonstrated that GRS codes are also capable of correcting deletions. We consider a subclass of GRS codes with dimension k=2 and q prime, and study them with respect to deletion correcting capability. We give transformations that either preserve the code or maintain its deletion correction capability. We use this to define equivalent codes; and then use exhaustive and selective computer searches to find inequivalent codes with the highest deletion correcting capabilities. We show that, for the class under consideration, up to l-3 deletions may be corrected. We also show that for lles36 there exist codes with q2 codewords such that receiving only 3 out of t transmitted symbols of a codeword is enough to recover the codeword, thus meeting the bound specified above. We also specify some "nice" codes which are associated with the smallest field possible for codes of a given length and deletion correcting capability. Some of the identified codes are unique, with respect to the defined equivalence.

Keywords

Codes, deletion correction, Reed–Solomon.

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As a consequence of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we have the following.

Corollary 1: G has a vertex cover of size t if and only if G'' has a stopping set of size $t(m+1) + m$, $1 \leq t \leq n-1$. Hence $(G, t) \in$ VERTEX COVER$(=)$ if and only if $(G'', t(m+1) + m) \in$ STOPPING DISTANCE.

Corollary 2: G has a vertex cover of size at most t if and only if G'' has a stopping set of size at most $t(m+1) + m$, $t \in \{1, 2, .., n-1\}$. Hence $(G, t) \in$ VERTEX COVER if and only if $(G'', t(m+1)+m) \in$ STOPPING DISTANCE.

We are now ready to prove.

Theorem 1: STOPPING DISTANCE and STOPPING SET are NP-complete

Proof: Since G'' can be constructed from G in polynomial time ($O(mn)$ time suffices), it follows that VERTEX COVER(=) $\preceq_p$ STOPPING SET and VERTEX COVER $\preceq_p$ STOPPING DISTANCE from Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 respectively. It is easy to verify whether a given set of left vertices of a bipartite graph forms a stopping set in time linear in the size of the graph. Hence both STOPPING DISTANCE and STOPPING SET belong to the class NP. $\square$

As a consequence, we have the following corollary.

Corollary 3: There is no polynomial time algorithm for computing the stopping distance of a Tanner graph unless P = NP.

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Classification of the Deletion Correcting Capabilities of Reed–Solomon Codes of Dimension 2 Over Prime Fields

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Abstract—Deletion correction codes have been used for transmission synchronization and, more recently, tracing pirated media. A Generalized Reed–Solomon (GRS) code, denoted by $GRS_k(\ell, q, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$, is a code of length ℓ over $GF(q)$ with q^k codewords. These codes have an efficient decoding algorithm and have been widely used for error correction and detection. It was recently demonstrated that GRS codes are also capable of correcting deletions. We consider a subclass of GRS codes with dimension $k = 2$ and q prime, and study them with respect to deletion correcting capability. We give transformations that either preserve the code or maintain its deletion correction capability. We use this to define equivalent codes; and then use exhaustive and selective computer searches to find inequivalent codes with the highest deletion correcting capabilities. We show that, for the class under consideration, up to $\ell - 3$ deletions may be corrected. We also show that for $\ell \leq 36$ there exist codes with q^2 codewords such that receiving only 3 out of ℓ transmitted symbols of a codeword is enough to recover the codeword, thus meeting the bound specified above. We also specify some "nice" codes which are associated with the smallest field possible for codes of a given length and deletion correcting capability. Some of the identified codes are unique, with respect to the defined equivalence.

Index Terms—Codes, deletion correction, Reed–Solomon.

I. INTRODUCTION

Error-correcting codes are widely used to correct substitution and erasure errors. A different, less studied, class of codes are the deletion correcting (DC) codes, introduced by Levenshtein [6] to correct synchronisation errors. The applications of DC codes include packet loss in Internet transmission [13] and, more recently, tracing pirate media [11]. Various studies of DC codes have been made [1], [2], [5]–[8], [12]–[14], [17]. These studies generally consider a small number of deletions, or a specific class of combinatorial based codes, or bounds of various sorts. Perfect deletion correcting codes are codes for which every possible word of some length over the associated alphabet is a subword of exactly one codeword. It is known that perfect codes exist. For example, there are many length 6 codes (over different alphabets) capable of correcting four deletions [12]. In that case any word of length 2 is a subword of exactly one codeword.

Sloane [13] surveys single deletion correcting codes. He primarily focuses on binary codes and discusses difficulties of constructing and analysing deletion correcting codes. Sloane reports on exhaustive searches to find the largest single deletion correcting binary codes of a given length, which showed that the Varshamov–Tenengolts codes [15] are of optimal size for length up to 9. Lenveshtein [6] had shown that these codes are capable of correcting one deletion.

It was recently observed [11] that Generalized Reed–Solomon (GRS) codes, extensively studied for their error correction capability, are also capable of deletion correction. A subsequent study [16] detailed a method for obtaining length 5 codes capable of correcting one deletion. That work also gave the results of numerical experiments to investigate the deletion correction capabilities of GRS codes.

An important advantage of using GRS codes, initially noted in [11], is the existence of an efficient deletion correcting algorithm. The decoding algorithm for GRS codes can be formulated as a polynomial reconstruction problem, to which the efficient list decoding algorithm of Guruswami and Sudan [3] applies.

A $\mathrm{GRS}_k(\ell, q, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$ code is specified by the parameters $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$, $\mathbf{v}$, k, ℓ and q. We call $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ and $\mathbf{v}$ the *selector* and *multiplier*, respectively. GRS codes for which $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{1}$ is a vector of all ones, are the widely studied Reed–Solomon (RS) codes [10]. We focus on RS codes that are defined over a prime field GF(q) that have dimension $k = 2$ and so $q^k = q^2$ codewords. The choice of unit multiplier codes is because our previous computer searches [16], both exhaustive and selective, suggest that these codes appear likely to correct more deletions then nonunit multiplier codes. We also believe RS codes merit special attention because of their importance and wide application. Restricting ourselves to codes with dimension $k = 2$ allows us to exploit the linear relationship between codewords to analyze them.

We first prove an upper bound on the deletion correcting capability of the codes in this class. A follow-on question is; "When can the bound be achieved with equality?", which translates into; "What is the smallest field for which there exists a code that achieves the bound?" We use structured computer searches to obtain insight into the above questions and provide interesting results. We use properties of code classes to aid the search, hence being able to obtain insight into the above questions and produce results for larger (and so more interesting) fields. We also find codes that are the 'best', in ways that we will define.

In our computer searches we restrict our attention to finite fields of prime order to simplify our search and classification. Classification of codes over non-prime fields introduces other factors, such as the choice of primitive polynomial, that complicate the task of obtaining experimental results (some experimental results for fields of prime power size are given in [16]). The theoretical results in this correspondence, or slightly modified versions of them, are applicable to nonprime fields. In particular, we show the bound on deletion capacity is for dimension $k = 2$ RS codes, over prime and nonprime fields.

For RS codes, we show that distinct $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ can result in the same code (the same set of codewords). Indeed, an affine transformation applied to the vector $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ results in $\boldsymbol{\alpha}'$, which generates the same code in this sense. This allows us to associate each unit multiplier code with a code having a selector of the form $(0 \ 1 \ \alpha_3 \ \ldots \ \alpha_\ell)$, and hence reduce exhaustive searches of $k = 2$ unit multiplier codes to a small proportion $(1/(q^2 - q))$ of all codes in the class.

We define equivalent codes as codes that are obtained through applying a deletion correcting distance preserving transformation, preserving at the level of codeword to codeword with a map across the entire codebook.

We define equivalent codes as codes related through the application of a distance preserving (deletion correcting distance) transformation. We refer to such a transformation as a isomorphism in Section II-B, and note that the codes have the same deletion correcting capability. We

seek transformations on selectors that result in equivalent codes. Unlike error correcting codes, for which column permutations leave the codes invariant from a distance distribution view point, a general column permutation changes the deletion correcting capability of codes. We show, however, that there is a nontrivial permutation for which the deletion correcting capability will remain the same.

We enumerate inequivalent RS codes (over prime field) parameterized by q, ℓ and r, where r is the number of deletions that a code can correct. We prove that $r = \ell - 3$ is an upper bound on the deletion correcting capability, that is $r \leq \ell - 3$. We have identified examples of codes with $r = \ell - 3$ for $\ell \leq 36$. For $\ell \leq 8$ we have identified, and proven by exhaustive search, the smallest q for which such codes exist. When the number of such inequivalent codes is known and is small, we have listed the complete set in Appendix. In some cases there are very few codes with these parameters. For example, there is only one code for $q = 23$, $\ell = 6$ and $r = 3$, and there is no code with $\ell = 6$, $r = 3$ for any $q < 23$. We give explicit examples of such codes with complete codebooks.

The rest of the correspondence is structured as follows. In Section II we introduce the basics of deletion correcting codes, GRS codes and RS codes. We define the notion of equivalence of codes in this context.

In Section III, we define and discuss the affine and reversal transformations. In Section IV, we give bounds on the deletion correcting capability and enumerate the distinct codes with the same deletion correcting capabilities. Finally, Section V contains a summary of, and discussion on, our results. An Appendix contains lists of small sets of inequivalent codes for particular prime RS codes parameterized by (q, ℓ, r).

II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Deletion Correcting

Let a and b be strings over a q—ary alphabet A. We denote the length of a, that is the number of elements (letters) in it, by $|a|$. We say a string a is a *subword* of b if a can be obtained from b by only removing elements of b. For example, 2234 is a subword of 142254364, while 452 is not (since reordering is required).

A q—*ary code* is a collection of q—ary words. A linear code of dimension k is a subspace of dimension k of GF(q).

A code can *correct* r deletions if any string of length $\ell - r$ is a subword of at most one codeword. We say such a code has a deletion correcting capacity of r. For a particular code Γ we use the notation $r(\Gamma)$ to denote the deletion correcting capability.

To find the deletion correcting capability of a code we need to find the length of the longest common subwords of any pair of codewords, across all pairs of codewords in the code. Let u and v be two codewords of a code Γ and let $\rho(u, v)$ denote *a* longest common subword of u and v, of length $|\rho(u, v)|$. There may be many common subwords with this same length. We define $\mathcal{R}(\Gamma) = \max_{u,v \in \Gamma, u \neq v} |\rho(u, v)|$ and let $s = \mathcal{R}(\Gamma) + 1$. Then s is the unique subword length, that is; the length of the shortest subword that uniquely identifies a codeword. It follows that Γ is an r—deletion correcting code, where $r = (\ell - s)$.

B. Reed–Solomon (GRS) Codes

Let F_q, q prime, be a field of q elements. Let k be an integer and

$$F_q[x]_k = \{f(x) : f(x) \text{ is a polynomial over } F_q : \deg(f) < k\}.$$

Let $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_\ell \in F_q$, $\ell \leq q$ be distinct. Let $v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_\ell \in F_q$ be non-zero. Write $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_\ell)$ and $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_\ell)$. A k-dimensional prime Generalized Reed–Solomon (GRS) code of length ℓ is the set of all vectors

$$(v_1 f(\alpha_1), v_2 f(\alpha_2), \ldots, v_\ell f(\alpha_\ell)), \quad \forall f \in F_q[x]_k.$$

This code is denoted by $\text{GRS}_k(\ell, q, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$. We refer to $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ as the *selector* and $\mathbf{v}$ as the *multiplier*. We note that $\text{GRS}_k(\ell, q, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$ has q^k codewords. We say a particular vector, or codeword, in the code/set is *associated* with the polynomial $f(x)$ used to generate it.

We identify two particular sets of GRS codes (over prime field).

Definition 1 (GRS Classes): For fixed ℓ, q, k, let $G(\ell, q, k)$ be the collection of codes obtained by taking all $\text{GRS}_k(\ell, q, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$ codes with all possible $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ and $\mathbf{v}$.

For a particular code in $G(\ell, q, k)$, say $\text{GRS}_k(\ell, q, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$, we define $s(\ell, q, k, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v}) = \mathcal{R} + 1$, where $\mathcal{R}$ was defined in the previous section. We then define

$$\sigma(\ell, q, k) = \min_{\boldsymbol{\alpha}} \min_{\mathbf{v}} s(\ell, q, k, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v}) \tag{1}$$

to be the minimum $s(\ell, q, k, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$ for $G(\ell, q, k)$. This gives the highest deletion correcting capability for given parameters ℓ, q, k.

We are interested in a subclass where the multiplier values are all one. Such codes are Reed–Solomon codes over prime fields.

Definition 2 (RS Classes): For fixed ℓ, q, k, the subset of codes in $\text{GRS}_k(\ell, q, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$ for which $v_i = 1, 1 \leq i \leq \ell - 1$ are called RS codes and are denoted by $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, k)$.

We use $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ to denote the subset of $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, k)$ class with $k = 2$.

We note that, as specified, not all elements of $G(\ell, q, k)$ are distinct. That is two distinct $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ may result in the same set of codewords. Also two codes Γ and Γ' may have *equivalent* deletion correcting properties. Two codes are *isomorphic* if there is a one-to—one mapping T between Γ and Γ' such that for any pair of codewords u, $v \in \Gamma$ with $|\rho(u, v)| = t$, we have $|\rho(T(u), T(v))| = t$, and T is referred to as an *isomorphism*. Two codes are called *equivalent* if there is an isomorphism between them. We are interested in the enumeration of inequivalent codes and give, in Section IV, lists and counts of codes identified as inequivalent under the classes of isomorphism defined in Section III.

C. RS Codes and Deletion Correcting

The statements in this section regarding the subwords hold for non-prime RS codes also.

Let us use an example of a $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ code, for $q = 7$ and $\ell = 4$, to illustrate RS codes and deletion correcting capability. We choose the selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (1\ 3\ 0\ 4)$. The codebook for this code is shown in the expression at the bottom of the page. Each codeword is of length $\ell = 4$ and is associated with a polynomial of the form $f(x) = a_1 x + a_0$. The

ith letter in a codeword is $f(\alpha_i)$. This code is capable of correcting up to one deletion. This means there are no length three words which are subwords of two distinct codewords, but that there are words of length two which are subwords of two distinct codewords.

For any code with unit multipliers, the first q codewords, those associated with the polynomials of degree 0, are constant codewords. Thus, for any given length, there is a single subword only for each of those codewords. For example, any subword of the codeword associated with the polynomial $0x + 2$ will always be a string of 2's, of whatever length the subword is.

Each codeword is associated with a polynomial of degree 1 and so has distinct components, that is each letter in the codeword differs from each other letter. Thus two subwords, of any length, taken from different columns of a codeword are always distinct.[1] Furthermore, the length of the longest common subword between, a codeword associated with a polynomial of degree 0 and any codeword associated with a polynomial of degree 1, is at most 1. Using this property effectively means that; to find the deletion correcting capability of a code we can restrict our attention to finding the length of subwords common to two codewords, both of which are associated with polynomials of degree 1.[2]

III. EQUIVALENT CODES IN $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$

In this section we present two transformations of selector vectors that result in equivalent codes. The first transformation results in a selector vector which generates the same code; that is, a code with the same set of codewords. The second transformation results in a different code (different set of vectors) that has the same deletion correcting capabilities through the isomorphism.

For a scalar s and a vector $\mathbf{v}$ with the ith component $v_i, i = 1, \ldots, n$, we adopt the convention that $\mathbf{v} + s$, denotes a vector $\mathbf{r}$ with components $r_i = v_i + s, i = 1, \ldots, n$.

A. Affine Transformations of the Selector

Theorem 1: If two codes Γ and Γ' in $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ have respective selectors $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (\alpha_1 \ldots \alpha_\ell)$ and $\boldsymbol{\alpha}' = (\alpha_1' \ldots \alpha_\ell')$ and there is an affine transformation T such that $\alpha_i' = T(\alpha_i), i = 1, \ldots \ell$, then the two

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[1]This allows us to identify both the deleted elements and the locations from which they have been deleted.

[2]Note that in the above case the longest common subword may be longer if the multipliers differ from 1, supporting the observation that unit multiplier codes (i.e., RS codes) would have higher deletion correcting capabilities. This property probably becomes less significant for larger qs, since the proportion of codewords associated with degree 0 polynomials becomes insignificant.

$0x + 0$	0000	$0x + 1$	1111	$0x + 2$	2222	$0x + 3$	3333
$0x + 4$	4444	$0x + 5$	5555	$0x + 6$	6666	$1x + 0$	1304
$1x + 1$	2415	$1x + 2$	3526	$1x + 3$	4630	$1x + 4$	5041
$1x + 5$	6152	$1x + 6$	0263	$2x + 0$	2601	$2x + 1$	3012
$2x + 2$	4123	$2x + 3$	5234	$2x + 4$	6345	$2x + 5$	0456
$2x + 6$	1560	$3x + 0$	3205	$3x + 1$	4316	$3x + 2$	5420
$3x + 3$	6531	$3x + 4$	0642	$3x + 5$	1053	$3x + 6$	2164
$4x + 0$	4502	$4x + 1$	5613	$4x + 2$	6024	$4x + 3$	0135
$4x + 4$	1246	$4x + 5$	2350	$4x + 6$	3461	$5x + 0$	5106
$5x + 1$	6210	$5x + 2$	0321	$5x + 3$	1432	$5x + 4$	2543
$5x + 5$	3654	$5x + 6$	4065	$6x + 0$	6403	$6x + 1$	0514
$6x + 2$	1625	$6x + 3$	2036	$6x + 4$	3140	$6x + 5$	4251
$6x + 6$	5362						

codes have the same set of codewords and therefore the same deletion correcting capability.

Proof: Let Γ and Γ' have deletion correcting capabilities r and r', respectively. Let $T = aX + b$ be the affine transformation relating the selectors of Γ and Γ', that is $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = a\boldsymbol{\alpha}' + b$, $a \neq 0$, $a, b \in F_q$. For any $a_0, a_1 \in F_q$, that is any codeword $a_1\mathbf{x} + a_0$ in Γ, the codeword is $a_1(\boldsymbol{\alpha}) + a_0$. Applying the affine transformation we see the same codeword in Γ' is of the form $(a_0 + ba_1) + a_1 a(\boldsymbol{\alpha}')$. This is a codeword in Γ' since the selector is $\boldsymbol{\alpha}'$, the polynomial degree is at most 1 and both $(a_0 + ba_1)$ and $a_1 a$ are in F_q. Thus any codeword in Γ is also a codeword in Γ' (although there are different polynomials associated with the codeword in the different codes). Since the number of codewords in Γ and Γ' is equal they contain the same codewords, and thus have equal deletion correcting capabilities. $\square$

Let us consider an example of this correspondence through an affine transformation. In the previous section we considered a code with selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (1\ 3\ 0\ 4)$. Let us consider the code with selector related by the affine transformation $\boldsymbol{\alpha}' = 2\boldsymbol{\alpha} + 3 = (5\ 2\ 3\ 4)$. For each polynomial in Γ, we give the codeword and the polynomial in Γ' which has the same codeword.

Γ		Γ'	Γ		Γ'
$0x + 0$	0000	$0x + 0$	$0x + 1$	1111	$0x + 1$
$0x + 2$	2222	$0x + 2$	$0x + 3$	3333	$0x + 3$
$0x + 4$	4444	$0x + 4$	$0x + 5$	5555	$0x + 5$
$0x + 6$	6666	$0x + 6$	$1x + 0$	1304	$4x + 2$
$1x + 1$	2415	$4x + 3$	$1x + 2$	3526	$4x + 4$
$1x + 3$	4630	$4x + 5$	$1x + 4$	5041	$4x + 6$
$1x + 5$	6152	$4x + 0$	$1x + 6$	0263	$4x + 1$
$2x + 0$	2601	$1x + 4$	$2x + 1$	3012	$1x + 5$
$2x + 2$	4123	$1x + 6$	$2x + 3$	5234	$1x + 0$
$2x + 4$	6345	$1x + 1$	$2x + 5$	0456	$1x + 2$
$2x + 6$	1560	$1x + 3$	$3x + 0$	3205	$5x + 6$
$3x + 1$	4316	$5x + 0$	$3x + 2$	5420	$5x + 1$
$3x + 3$	6531	$5x + 2$	$3x + 4$	0642	$5x + 3$
$3x + 5$	1053	$5x + 4$	$3x + 6$	2164	$5x + 5$
$4x + 0$	4502	$2x + 1$	$4x + 1$	5613	$2x + 2$
$4x + 2$	6024	$2x + 3$	$4x + 3$	0135	$2x + 4$
$4x + 4$	1246	$2x + 5$	$4x + 5$	2350	$2x + 6$
$4x + 6$	3461	$2x + 0$	$5x + 0$	5106	$6x + 3$
$5x + 1$	6210	$6x + 4$	$5x + 2$	0321	$6x + 5$
$5x + 3$	1432	$6x + 6$	$5x + 4$	2543	$6x + 0$
$5x + 5$	3654	$6x + 1$	$5x + 6$	4065	$6x + 2$
$6x + 0$	6403	$3x + 5$	$6x + 1$	0514	$3x + 6$
$6x + 2$	1625	$3x + 0$	$6x + 3$	2036	$3x + 1$
$6x + 4$	3140	$3x + 2$	$6x + 5$	4251	$3x + 3$
$6x + 6$	5362	$3x + 4$			

We want to count inequivalent codes. We define a standard representation for codes and use that to distinguish inequivalent codes.

Corollary 1: A code Γ represented by $\alpha_1 > 0$ and/or $\alpha_2 > 1$ can also be represented by a unique selector vector with $\alpha_1' = 0$, $\alpha_2' = 1$. We call this the *standard representation* or *standard form* of the code.

Proof: Let the code Γ have a selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$. Consider the selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha}' = \frac{\boldsymbol{\alpha} - \alpha_1}{\alpha_2 - \alpha_1}$, where $\alpha_i' = \frac{\alpha_i - \alpha_1}{\alpha_2 - \alpha_1}$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$ and α_i' and α_i denote the ith component of $\boldsymbol{\alpha}'$ and $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$, respectively. Since $\alpha_2 \neq \alpha_1$, by definition, an inverse $A = (\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)^{-1}$ exists we have $\alpha_i' = A\alpha_i - \alpha_1 A$ and since $\alpha_1 > 0$ the relationship between $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ and $\boldsymbol{\alpha}'$ is an affine transformation. Using Theorem 1, we conclude that $\boldsymbol{\alpha}'$ generates

the same code as $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$. Evaluating the first two elements of $\boldsymbol{\alpha}'$ we find $\alpha_1' = 0$ and $\alpha_2' = 1$.

The two parameters of the affine transformation are fixed by the need to fix the 0 and 1 in the first two components of the selector in standard form and so the transformation and the standard form representation of the vector are unique. $\square$

These results are especially useful for codes in $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ classes. There we only need to consider codes in the standard representation, that is with $\alpha_1 = 0$ and $\alpha_2 = 1$. This reduces the search space by a factor of $1/(q^2 - q)$.

B. Selector Reversal

Here we show that the deletion correcting capabilities of $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, k)$ codes is invariant under reversal of the selector, for arbitrary k.[3]

For error correcting codes the error correcting capability is invariant under *any permutation* of the columns of the code. This is not the case for deletion correcting capability, as the following example illustrates. Consider two codewords $c_1 = (1\ 2\ 3\ 4\ 5)$ and $c_2 = (5\ 2\ 4\ 6\ 7)$. The cyclic permutation of columns $(1\ 5\ 4\ 3\ 2)$ gives the codewords $c_1' = (2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 1)$ and $c_2' = (2\ 4\ 6\ 7\ 5)$. While c_1 and c_2 have a longest common subword $(2\ 4)$ of length 2, c_1' and c_2' have a longest common subword $(2\ 4\ 5)$ of length 3.

We define $\overline{x}$ for a word x where $\overline{x}_i = x_{|x|+1-i}$. That is, $\overline{x}$ is x written backwards.

Lemma 1: If a is a subword of b, than $\overline{a}$ is a subword of $\overline{b}$.

Proof: Let a_i, a_{i+1} be a subword of a. Then by definition $\overline{b}$ contains a_{i+1}, a_i. The result follows for any length subword a_i, $a_{i+1} \ldots a_{i+u}$ by noting that the subword can be written as $(((a_i, a_{i+1}), a_{i+2}) \ldots a_{i+u})$, and using recursion. $\square$

Lemma 2: For any two words c_1 and c_2, $\rho(\overline{c_1}, \overline{c_2}) = \overline{\rho(c_1, c_2)}$.

Proof: Since $\rho(c_1, c_2)$ is a subword of c_1 and c_2, Lemma 1 tells us that $\overline{\rho(c_1, c_2)}$ is a subword of $\overline{c_1}$ and $\overline{c_2}$. Assume $\rho(\overline{c_1}, \overline{c_2}) = p$ where $|p| > |\overline{\rho(c_1, c_2)}|$, i.e., that there exists a subword common to $\overline{c_1}$ and $\overline{c_2}$ which is longer than $\overline{\rho(c_1, c_2)}$. By Lemma 1, $\overline{p}$ is a subword of both c_1 and c_2, implying $|\rho(c_1, c_2)| \geq |\overline{p}| = |p|$. But since p was defined to satisfy $|p| > |\overline{\rho(c_1, c_2)}| = |\rho(c_1, c_2)|$, such a p cannot exist and therefore the longest subword common to $\overline{c_1}$ and $\overline{c_2}$ is $\overline{\rho(c_1, c_2)}$, as required. $\square$

Theorem 2: If a length ℓ code Γ with selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ has a deletion correcting capability of r, then the code specified by the selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha}' : \alpha_i' = \alpha_{\ell+1-i}$, that is $\boldsymbol{\alpha}' = \overline{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}$, also has a deletion correcting capability of r.

Proof: Since $r(\Gamma) = \ell - \mathcal{R}(\Gamma) - 1$ and $r(\Gamma') = \ell - \mathcal{R}(\Gamma') - 1$, we may equivalently demonstrate that $\mathcal{R}(\Gamma') = \mathcal{R}(\Gamma)$

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{R}(\Gamma) &= \max_{c_1, c_2 \in \Gamma, c_1 \neq c_2} |\rho(c_1, c_2)| \\
&= \max_{c_1, c_2 \in \Gamma, c_1 \neq c_2} |\overline{\rho(c_1, c_2)}| \\
&= \max_{c_1, c_2 \in \Gamma, c_1 \neq c_2} |\rho(\overline{c_1}, \overline{c_2})| \text{ by Lemma 2.} \\
&= \max_{\overline{c_1}, \overline{c_2} \in \Gamma', \overline{c_1} \neq \overline{c_2}} |\rho(\overline{c_1}, \overline{c_2})| \\
&= \mathcal{R}(\Gamma').
\end{aligned}
$$
$\square$

The above theorem shows that the code with selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha}'$, generated by the reversal transformation, is isomorphic to $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ and so they are equivalent. Consider, for example, the selectors of codes in $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ with $q = 13$, $\ell = 5$, that have deletion correcting capability of 2; that is $r = 2$. There are only two such codes, $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (0\ 1\ 7\ 6\ 2)$ and $\boldsymbol{\alpha}' = (0\ 1\ 11\ 3\ 6)$ in the standard representation. Now consider the reversal selector obtained from $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$; that is $\overline{\boldsymbol{\alpha}} = (2\ 6\ 7\ 1\ 0)$. We see that

---

[3]A similar isomorphism exists for general GRS codes if one reverses both the multiplier and the selector.

$\overline{\alpha} = 4\alpha' + 2$, that is $\overline{\alpha}$ and α' are related by an affine transformation. Thus the reversal transformation on one code gives the other code and so there is only one inequivalent code in the standard representation. Thus using either α or α' we can generate, using the affine and reversal transformations, any other selector corresponding to a $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ code with $q = 13$, $\ell = 5$ and $r = 2$.

Corollary 2: Using the reversal transformation, a code in the standard representation is isomorphic to at most one other code in the standard representation.

Proof: Consider a code with selector α in standard form $\alpha_1 = 0$ and $\alpha_2 = 1$. The reversal of α gives the selector $\overline{\alpha} = (\alpha_\ell \ \alpha_{\ell-1} \ \ldots \ \alpha_3 \ 1 \ 0)$. By Corollary 1, there is only one affine transformation which can be applied to $\overline{\alpha}$ to obtain a selector α' satisfying $\alpha'_1 = 0$ and $\alpha'_2 = 1$. The transformation (and thus selector) is specified by $\alpha' = \frac{\overline{\alpha} - (\overline{\alpha})_1}{(\overline{\alpha})_2 - (\overline{\alpha})_1} = \frac{\overline{\alpha} - \alpha_\ell}{\alpha_{\ell-1} - \alpha_\ell}$, where $(\overline{\alpha})_i$ means the ith element of $\overline{\alpha}$. It is possible for α to equal α'. It is however possible for selector reversal to result in the same code, that is, a code with the same standard representation. $\square$

C. Codes That are Invariant Under Selector Reversal

Consider a selector $\alpha = (0 \ 1 \ \alpha_3 \ \ldots \ \alpha_{\ell-1} \ \alpha_\ell)$. The reversal is $\overline{\alpha} = (\alpha_\ell \ \alpha_{\ell-1} \ \ldots \ \alpha_3 \ 1 \ 0)$. Following Theorem 1 we apply the affine transformation to obtain the selector of the new code in standard form, $\alpha' = \frac{\overline{\alpha} - \alpha_\ell}{\alpha_{\ell-1} - \alpha_\ell}$.

For the two codes to be the equivalent through the reversal transformation and affine transformation, we must have $\alpha' = \alpha$, and so

$$\alpha_i = \frac{\alpha_{\ell+1-i} - \alpha_\ell}{\alpha_{\ell-1} - \alpha_\ell} \qquad (2)$$

for all $i = 1 \ldots \ell$.

The $i = 1$ and $i = 2$ conditions imply $\alpha_1 = \frac{\alpha_\ell - \alpha_\ell}{\alpha_{\ell-1} - \alpha_\ell} = 0$ and $\alpha_2 = \frac{\alpha_{\ell-1} - \alpha_\ell}{\alpha_{\ell-1} - \alpha_\ell} = 1$. These simply represent the transformation to the standard representation. When $\ell = 2$ we only have those conditions and there is only a single selector in standard form $(0 \ 1)$, and it satisfies this condition.

The conditions for $i = \ell$ and $i = \ell - 1$ reduce to the same condition for α' and α to be equal, that is

$$\alpha_\ell - \alpha_{\ell-1} = 1 . \qquad (3)$$

Substituting this back into (2) gives the reduced condition

$$\alpha_i = \alpha_\ell - \alpha_{\ell+1-i}. \qquad (4)$$

The simplicity of this reduction means we can count the number of codes with the specified invariance. In the case $\ell = 3$ the only selector with such reversal invariance is $(0 \ 1 \ 2)$, since (3) becomes $\alpha_3 - \alpha_2 = 1$, or $\alpha_3 = 2$.

Theorem 3: The number of length $\ell \geq 4$ selectors $\alpha = (0 \ 1 \ \alpha_3 \ \ldots \ \alpha_{\ell-1} \ \alpha_\ell)$, over a prime field F_q, $q \geq \ell$, which specify a code with the same standard form before and after reversal is given by the expression

$$\frac{(q-3)!!}{\left(q - \left(2\lfloor \frac{\ell}{2} \rfloor + 1\right)\right)!!}. \qquad (5)$$

where $x!! = x(x-2)(x-4)\ldots(x \bmod 2 + 2)$.

Proof: We proceed by identifying the number of relations which restrict the values of the selector elements. From (3), we obtain the relation $\alpha_\ell - \alpha_{\ell-1} = 1$. The value of α_ℓ cannot be equal to 0 or 1 as these values already appear in the selector vector. Furthermore, setting $\alpha_\ell = 2$ gives $\alpha_{\ell-1} = 1$, which has already appeared in the selector. This relation thus allows $(q - 3)$ values to be chosen for α_ℓ, with no freedom in the subsequent choice of $\alpha_{\ell-1}$. For $\ell = 4$ we obtain only this enumeration and so we have $(q - 3)$ such selectors.

If $\ell \geq 6$ is even we obtain from (4) a list of $\ell/2 - 2$ equations $\alpha_3 + \alpha_{\ell-2} = \alpha_\ell, \ \alpha_4 + \alpha_{\ell-3} = \alpha_\ell, \ldots \alpha_{\ell/2} + \alpha_{\ell/2+1} = \alpha_\ell$. Each

equation implies we can choose one of the components other than α_ℓ independently, and obtain the other relative to α_ℓ and that choice. In making the choice we must avoid all the values already used in the selector. For the first of those equations we need to avoid 0, 1, $\alpha_{\ell-1}$ and α_ℓ. In addition we must avoid making α_3 and $\alpha_{\ell-2}$ equal to each other, that is avoid $\alpha_3 = \alpha_{\ell-2} = 2^{-1}\alpha_\ell$. We thus have $(q - 5)$ possibilities for α_3, which then fixes $\alpha_{\ell-2}$ also. Each subsequent equation is used to choose one selector component and derive a second one. The chosen selector should avoid the previous values chosen and derived for the selector values, as well as $2^{-1}\alpha_\ell$. For the jth equation then we have $q - (2j + 3)$ possible values. Each of these equations results in additional possibilities independent of the $(q - 3)$ factor from the freedom described in the first paragraph of the proof. The total number of equations is therefore

$$(q-3)\Pi_1^{\ell/2-2}q - (2j+3) = \frac{(q-3)!!}{(q-(\ell+1))!!}.$$

If ℓ is odd the selector component for $i = (\ell + 1)/2$ is evaluated through (4) as $2\alpha_{(\ell+1)/2} = \alpha_\ell$. For any of the $(q - 3)$ valid α_ℓ there is always a $\alpha_{(\ell+1)/2}$ not equal to $0, 1, \alpha_{\ell-1}$ or α_ℓ. This is also the very value avoided in the "odd" counting to ensure α_i and $\alpha_{\ell+1-i}$ are not equal, so we avoid all previously specifed selector values also. Thus the number of reversal invariant selectors for odd ℓ is equal to the number of reversal invariant selectors for the even number $\ell - 1$. This is represented by the use of the floor function in (5). $\square$

IV. DELETION CORRECTING CAPABILITY BOUNDS AND THE ENUMERATION OF INEQUIVALENT CODES FOR $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$

In this section we give a bound on the deletion correcting capability of codes and enumerate, and in some cases list, the inequivalent $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ codes.

Theorem 4: For an RS code with $k = 2$ and $\ell \geq 3$, the largest deletion correcting capability possible is $\ell - 3$.

Proof: Recall from Section II-C that the RS codewords associated with polynomials of degree 0 have constant components and so have one subword of constant component of any length t. Furthermore, codewords associated with polynomials of degree exactly 1 have all subwords distinct. For a codeword associated with a polynomial of degree 1, there are $\frac{\ell!}{(\ell-t)!t!}$ subwords of length $\ell - t$. To be able to correct t deletions these must be distinct from the subwords of every other codeword associated with a polynomial of degree 1. Thus, we need $(q^2 - q)\frac{\ell!}{(\ell-t)!t!}$ distinct words of length $\ell - t$. For a given field F_q there are $q^{\ell-t}$ words of length $\ell - t$.

Thus there can only be enough subwords to correct deletions if

$$(q^2 - q)\frac{\ell!}{(\ell-t)!t!} \leq q^{\ell-t}.$$

Let $t = \ell - 2$. The equation reduces to $(q-1)\ell(\ell-1)/2 \leq q$. But this cannot be satisfied for $\ell \geq 3$ and so no RS code of dimension $k = 2$ is capable of correcting $(\ell - 2)$ deletions.

Let $t = (\ell - 3)$. For this case the condition above reduces to $(q-1)\ell(\ell-1)(\ell-2)/6 \leq q^2$, which can be satisfied by large enough q. $\square$

A. Experimental Results

We have performed extensive computer searches to find inequivalent codes that have the best performance, in one of two senses which we will describe. We are also interested in determining the number of codes with such properties.

We firstly consider codes that satisfy the bound in Theorem 4. In Table I we give the current state of our computer search to find codes with the highest deletion correcting capability for $\ell \leq 25$. These results are significant improvements over previously reported results [16]. We

TABLE I

A TABULATION OF EXPERIMENTAL UPPER BOUNDS ON THE VALUE OF THE $\sigma(\ell, q, 2)$ FOR PRIME q. THE HIGHEST DELETION CORRECTING CAPABILITY IS GIVEN BY $\ell - \sigma(\ell, q, 2)$. WE EMPHASIZE THESE EXHAUSTIVE AND SELECTIVE RESULTS ARE FOR CODES WITH UNIT MULTIPLIERS (I.E., FOR RS CODES). THE (ℓ, q) CLASSES MARKED WITH A $*$ HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTIVELY SURVEYED. THE ROWS AND COLUMNS LABEL THE PRIME VALUE q AND CODE LENGTH ℓ, RESPECTIVELY

$q\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	q
5	4*	4*																					5
7	3*	4*	4*	5*																			7
11	3*	4*	4*	4*	5*	5*	6*	7*															11
13	3*	3*	4*	4*	5*	5*	6*	6*	7*	7													13
17	3*	3*	4*	4*	4*	5*	5	6	6	7	7	8	8	9									17
19	3*	3*	4*	4*	4*	5*	5	6	6	7	7	8	8	8	8	9	9						19
23	3*	3*	3*	4*	4*	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	10	10	11			23
29	3*	3*	3*	4*	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	8	8	8	9	9	10	10			29
31	3*	3*	3*	4*	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	9	10	10		31
37	3*	3*	3*	4*	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	8	9	9	10		37
41	3*	3*	3*	4*	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	9		41
43	3*	3*	3*	4*	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	8	9	9		43
47	3*	3*	3*	3*	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	9	9	47
53	3*	3*	3*	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	9	9	9	53
59	3*	3*	3*	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	59
61	3*	3*	3*	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	9	61
67	3*	3*	3*	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	8	9	67
71	3*	3*	3*	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	8	8	71
73	3*	3*	3*	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	8	8	73
79	3*	3*	3*	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	8	79
83	3*	3*	3*	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	8	83
89	3*	3*	3*	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	8	89
97	3*	3*	3*	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	97
101	3*	3*	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	101
103	3*	3*	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	103
107	3*	3*	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	107
109	3*	3*	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	8	109
113	3*	3*	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	8	113
127	3*	3*	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	127
131	3*	3*	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	131
137	3*	3*	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	137
139	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	139
149	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	149
151	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	151
157	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	157
163	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	163
167	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	167
173	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	173
179	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	179
181	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	181
191	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	191
193	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	193
197	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	197
199	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	199
211	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	211
223	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	223
227	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	227
229	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	229
233	3*	3*	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	233
389	3*	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	389
683	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	683
1093	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	1093
1747	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	1747
2477	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	2477
3499	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3499
4877	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4877
6619	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	6619
8849	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	8849
11987	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	11987
15227	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	15227
18979	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	18979
23993	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	23993
29959	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	29959
36997	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	36997
	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	

also list, in Table II, examples of codes with the highest deletion correcting capability. We note that the results in Table I are obtained by a mix of exhaustive and non-exhaustive searches. The former cases are marked by '*'. The entries in the table are of $\sigma(\ell, q, 2)$, which is the length of the shortest subword that uniquely identifies codewords of codes in $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ and so $\sigma(\ell, q, 2) = 3$ means that the deletion correcting capability is $\ell - 3$, and thus the highest possible according to Theorem 4. We observe that for any ℓ in the table, the bound in The-

TABLE II
Some Examples of the Best Codes Found, in the Sense of Smallest q for Given ℓ and r. The Codes in the First Section of the Table Are Not Optimal, in the Sense $r < \ell - 3$, but Are Significant Improvements on the Results of [16]. The Codes in the Second Section of the Table Are Optimal, in the Sense $r = \ell - 3$

q	ℓ	r	α
11	9	4	(0 1 2 10 4 6 5 8 9)
13	13	6	(0 1 7 8 3 11 4 2 12 9 6 5 10)
17	12	6	(0 1 8 10 6 7 16 15 5 12 3 13)
23	11	6	(0 1 20 4 14 16 3 15 8 2 19)
23	13	7	(0 1 8 12 17 21 10 13 11 19 4 6 7)
29	9	5	(0 1 13 11 26 27 4 18 10)
41	10	6	(0 1 37 5 12 39 30 29 11 24)
59	11	7	(0 1 54 28 26 15 40 17 12 35 43)
71	8	5	(0 1 64 42 70 48 40 41)
139	9	6	(0 1 5 95 129 78 79 88 113)
233	10	7	(0 1 2 9 135 227 68 202 174 14)
389	11	8	(0 1 2 5 7 120 360 18 99 281 378)
683	12	9	(0 1 2 5 7 18 46 434 437 534 177 409)
1093	13	10	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 61 1008 807 707 1019 931)
1747	14	11	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 608 1518 692 1478 731)
2477	15	12	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 903 1839 2209 2465 1617)
3499	16	13	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 152 1272 3192 3312 143 2227)
4877	17	14	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 1931 4835 2092 4494 495)
6619	18	15	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 358 2625 4937 422 4154 6532)
8849	19	16	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 358 4815 5157 8393 3040 5265)
11987	20	17	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 225 250 357 422 1975 9561 11780 6675 6744)
15227	21	18	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 333 399 591 2402 15049 13124 6960 12509)
18979	22	19	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 410 476 729 7798 14501 1839 15348 4403)
23993	23	20	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 410 476 637 910 10845 7925 19933 16366 11382)
29959	24	21	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 440 467 570 1634 21776 25173 9744 28169 29747)
36997	25	22	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 422 467 567 570 688 1470 10747 9562 15939 20406 33155)
45497	26	23	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 410 422 471 643 781 1017 1389 13605 22405 13535 44530 27227)
56999	27	24	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 467 471 736 791 936 2580 17735 33926 13462 16727 32794)
67499	28	25	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 467 471 570 580 1572 1763 2284 51986 38417 58446 31056 60095)
86993	29	26	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 471 570 580 643 1171 1196 1363 1942 7146 30287 76088 79401 ... ... 73323)
99991	30	27	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 467 471 570 637 688 921 1356 1590 3544 7015 38270 65856 ... ... 81477 12911)
120691	31	28	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 467 471 570 580 1084 1186 1337 1750 2703 4460 6877 119243 ... ... 58051 90704 92833)
144983	32	29	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 467 471 580 786 808 908 1119 1319 1753 2012 4206 6794 55281 ... ... 78151 34019 79376)
169991	33	30	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 467 471 570 637 805 921 1048 1366 1972 2452 3450 4421 9944... ... 108285 162094 74880 109191)
189997	34	31	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 467 471 570 580 736 1084 1196 1235 1275 3014 3873 4535 5815 ... ... 21962 169804 137158 38325 118616)
239999	35	32	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 467 471 570 580 736 825 1084 1223 1257 1337 1926 1966 2288 ... ... 6228 9776 12390 79449 121080 209265)
274973	36	33	(0 1 2 5 7 18 24 44 59 67 101 218 225 279 358 422 467 471 570 580 736 825 1084 1223 1281 1763 2131 2730 2854 ... ... 4634 6954 10480 37213 73629 165748 132173)

orem 4 can be achieved with equality if q is sufficiently large (in each column there is a row with an entry equal to 3).

Second, we consider codes that satisfy a property, for example the highest deletion correction capability, over the smallest size prime field. Of particular value are the smallest fields for which codes with $r = \ell - 3$ have been found. For nonexhaustive searches the smallest field provides an upper bound on the value. In Table II we give examples of such codes, specified by the selector, for $\ell \leq 36$.

Let $\mathcal{Q}(\ell, r)$ denote the smallest prime q for which we have a code in $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ with a deletion correcting capability r. Then $\mathcal{Q}(\ell, \ell - 3)$ gives the smallest q, for a given ℓ, for which $\sigma(\ell, q, 2) = 3$, that is for which the code meets the deletion correcting bound. Using Table I we can see that $\mathcal{Q}(4, 1) = 7$ and so there is no single deletion correcting code of length 4 for $q = 3$ or $q = 5$.

Using Table I we have $\mathcal{Q}(4, 1) = 7$, $\mathcal{Q}(5, 2) = 13$, $\mathcal{Q}(6, 3) = 23$, $\mathcal{Q}(7, 4) = 47$ and $\mathcal{Q}(8, 5) = 71$, all as exhaustively tested minimums. These values suggest the smallest prime field, with the best deletion correcting capability possible, grows quickly as we increase the length. We see this is supported by the current experimental evidence in Fig. 1.

The value of the upper bound on $\mathcal{Q}(\ell, r)$ for $4 \leq \ell \leq 36$ is given in the array below and in Fig. 1. Note again that the "$*$" entries are proven, by exhaustive searches, to be minimums.

| ℓ	$\mathcal{Q}(\ell, \ell - 3)$	ℓ	$\mathcal{Q}(\ell, \ell - 3)$	ℓ	$\mathcal{Q}(\ell, \ell - 3)$
4	7*	15	2477	26	45497
5	13*	16	3499	27	56999
6	23*	17	4877	28	67499
7	47*	18	6619	29	86933
8	71*	19	8849	30	99991
9	139	20	11987	31	120691
10	233	21	15227	32	144983
11	389	22	18979	33	169991
12	683	23	23993	34	189997
13	1093	24	29959	35	239999
14	1747	25	36997	36	274973

Fig. 1. This figure illustrates the currently determined values of $\mathcal{Q}(\ell, \ell - 3)$ for ℓ from 4 to 36. We see that the size of q increases rapidly, approximately as a constant multiple of $\ell^{5.25}$.

Table II has two parts. The first part of the table gives selective examples of *the best* codes, in the sense of smallest q for a give (ℓ, r) pair. For example, for $\ell = 9$ and $r = 4$, the smallest $q = 11$. Some examples for smaller ℓ and r appear in Section IV-B, in the inequivalence sets given in Appendix, and in Tables IV–VII.

In the second part of Table II, examples of codes with $\sigma(\ell, q, 2) = 3$, the best deletion correcting capability possible, are given for $8 \leq \ell \leq 36$.

B. Tabulations of Inequivalence Set Cardinalities

In Section III, we considered two isomorphisms of selector vectors, that result in codes equivalent to the original one. We would like to enumerate inequivalent $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ codes for a given set of parameters. Let $\mathbb{P}[q, \ell]_r$ denote the set of inequivalent codes (in standard form) of length ℓ over a field of size q and with deletion correcting capability of r.

Note that $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(\ell, r), \ell]_r$ denotes the set of codes with length ℓ, deletion correcting capability r, and the smallest known q with that length and deletion correcting capability. In Table III we tabulate the cardinalities of the various inequivalent code sets, for primes from 5 to 97 and for various lengths. For $q = 5, 7$ and 11 we have completed exhaustive enumerations for lengths up to and including $\ell = q$. As the value of the field q increases, the exhaustive enumerations become increasingly time consuming; thus for $q > 11$ we do not have enumerations for all lengths up to q.

In cases where there are only a small number of distinct codes for given small q and small ℓ, we explicitly give the codes, in terms of the selectors, in Section IV-D and in Tables IV–VII. The $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(\ell, r), \ell]_r$ of small cardinality are listed in Appendix.

An interesting result of our search is the explicit construction of a code whose parameters achieve a bound, proposed elsewhere, with

equality. In particular, for $q = 7$, $\ell = 7$, it has been proven in [4], [9] that codes with deletion correcting capability greater than two cannot exist. We have found a code with $q = 7$, $\ell = 7$ and $r = 2$, thus providing an explicit construction for that bound.

C. The Distribution of Deletion Correcting Capabilities

In cases where we have undertaken exhaustive enumerations the pro-portion of codes with particular deletion correcting capabilities is of interest. We can compare this with results in [16, Table 1]. For example, in [16] it was noted that 1% of all $\mathrm{GRS}_k(\ell, q, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$ codes with $k = 2$, $q = 7$, $\ell = 4$ are capable of correcting 1 deletion. We have found that 45% of all $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ codes with $q = 7$ and $\ell = 4$ are capable of correcting 1 deletion. The relative proportion of codes with higher deletion correcting capabilities supports the emphasis placed on RS codes. Similarly with $k = 2$, $q = 7$, $\ell = 5$ 60%[4] of $\mathrm{GRS}_k(\ell, q, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \mathbf{v})$ codes can correct one deletion, against 88% of $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, k)$ codes.

D. Some "Nice" Codes

In this section, and in Appendix, we give the explicit codebooks for some of the smaller RS codes capable of correcting deletions, that is some of the $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(\ell, r), \ell]_r$ codes (see Section IV-B). The codes are labelled in terms of q, ℓ, r and the selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$. In Appendix we use capitalized Latin letters to denote the numbers from $10(A)$ to $22(M)$, allowing us to more compactly represent the codewords for $q \geq 11$.

[4]The 60% and 40% in the second to last column of Table I of [16] should each be one row higher. That is for $q = 7$, $\ell = 5$, we have 60% with $s = 4$ $(r = 1)$ and 40% with $s = 5$ $(r = 0)$.

We note that the codes of interest over GF(q) have q^2 codewords. The first two examples are listed in the text below, the remaining examples can be found in Tables IV–VII.

0 0 0 0 0 0	1 1 1 1 1 1	2 2 2 2 2 2	3 3 3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4 4 4	5 5 5 5 5 5	6 6 6 6 6 6	0 1 6 5 3 4
1 2 0 6 4 5	2 3 1 0 5 6	3 4 2 1 6 0	4 5 3 2 0 1
5 6 4 3 1 2	6 0 5 4 2 3	0 2 5 3 6 1	1 3 6 4 0 2
2 4 0 5 1 3	3 5 1 6 2 4	4 6 2 0 3 5	5 0 3 1 4 6
6 1 4 2 5 0	0 3 4 1 2 5	1 4 5 2 3 6	2 5 6 3 4 0
3 6 0 4 5 1	4 0 1 5 6 2	5 1 2 6 0 3	6 2 3 0 1 4
0 4 3 6 5 2	1 5 4 0 6 3	2 6 5 1 0 4	3 0 6 2 1 5
4 1 0 3 2 6	5 2 1 4 3 0	6 3 2 5 4 1	0 5 2 4 1 6
1 6 3 5 2 0	2 0 4 6 3 1	3 1 5 0 4 2	4 2 6 1 5 3
5 3 0 2 6 4	6 4 1 3 0 5	0 6 1 2 4 3	1 0 2 3 5 4
2 1 3 4 6 5	3 2 4 5 0 6	4 3 5 6 1 0	5 4 6 0 2 1
6 5 0 1 3 2			

There is a single code in $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(5,1) = 5,5]_1$. It is specified by the selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (0\ 1\ 4\ 2\ 3)$ as shown in the first table at the bottom of the page.

There is a single code in $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(6,2) = 7,6]_2$. It is specified by the selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (0\ 1\ 6\ 5\ 3\ 4)$ as shown in the second table at the bottom of the page.

Another nice code, worthy of mention here, is the lone member of $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(8,5) = 71,8]_5$, specified by the selector $\alpha = (0\ 1\ 64\ 42\ 70\ 48\ 40\ 41)$. Not only is this the only code in this equivalence set, there exist no GRS codes of this length with the same deletion correcting capability and a shorter length.

V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

We have presented an investigation into the classification of the deletion correcting capabilities of prime RS codes with dimension $k = 2$.

We have proven that the deletion correcting capability is invariant under affine transformations and reversal of the selector. Using these isomorphisms we have focused on inequivalent codes and enumerated $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ classes with small parameter values. We have listed the inequivalent codes in cases where the sets are themselves small, and in some cases given the codebooks too.

We have proven that for $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ codes $r \leq \ell - 3$. We have identified examples of codes meeting this bound for $\ell \leq 36$. For example, in Table II we give a length $\ell = 36$ code capable of correcting 33 deletions. This code is over a F_{274973}, with about 7.55×10^{10} codewords.

Let us conclude with some open questions for consideration. Firstly, How do we design codes with a particular deletion correcting capability? For the class of codes considered in this correspondence, the code is defined by a selector, and the question becomes; How do we choose a selector to provide a particular deletion correcting capability? Another related question is; Given a selector, how can we determine the deletion correcting capability of the code generated by the selector?

We note that the question; What is the deletion correcting capability of a code with specified q, ℓ and selector $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$?; can be closely related to the problem of decoding. This will be discussed in future work.

Closer to the direction of our work here, we would like to be able to answer, for a given $\tilde{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ class, Does there exist a selector specifying a code capable of correcting r deletions? Thus we want to more precisely determine the values of $\mathcal{Q}(\ell, r)$, that is the smallest q for which we have a code of length ℓ capable of correcting r deletions. This question is somewhat complicated by an unresolved proposition [16];

0 0 0 0 0	1 1 1 1 1	2 2 2 2 2	3 3 3 3 3	4 4 4 4 4
0 1 4 2 3	1 2 0 3 4	2 3 1 4 0	3 4 2 0 1	4 0 3 1 2
0 2 3 4 1	1 3 4 0 2	2 4 0 1 3	3 0 1 2 4	4 1 2 3 0
0 3 2 1 4	1 4 3 2 0	2 0 4 3 1	3 1 0 4 2	4 2 1 0 3
0 4 1 3 2	1 0 2 4 3	2 1 3 0 4	3 2 4 1 0	4 3 0 2 1

TABLE III
THE CARDINALITIES OF INEQUIVALENCE SETS, FOR PRIMES FROM 5 TO 97 AND FOR VARIOUS LENGTHS

$q = 5$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5
0	4	3
1		1

$q = 7$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7
0	6	4	4	3
1	6	28	59	49
2			1	12

$q = 11$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
0	13	13	11	7	7	7	7	5
1	27	243	883	1235	1270	1094	793	363
2			642	6340	22938	32414	25478	10491
3				2	6121	57298	145440	106689
4						3	9914	64084

$q = 13$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
0	15	12	10	9	7	7	7	7	7
1	45	487	1488	1773	1813	1732	1544	1307	934
2		1	2502	25465	81044	110215	109713	89581	56822
3				513	83696	708752	2056085	2458946	1692824
4						11136	1160012	7375726	14179669
5								54593	4030064

$q = 17$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7	8	9
0	22	21	19	19	19	17
1	90	1277	3631	4812	5689	6374
2		74	12814	147578	402158	609757
3				27855	1394663	11969412
4					111	3631480

$q = 19$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7	8	9
0	24	22	22	21	19	19
1	120	1834	4717	6210	7535	8668
2		192	23933	269117	656491	993236
3				96044	3788517	29200726
4					4142	18807655

$q = 23$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7	8
0	31	31	31	31	31
1	189	3280	8191	11374	14508
2		689	63777	693327	1611112
3			1	516388	17613045
4					299224

$q = 29$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7
0	40	39	37	37
1	324	6298	14346	19599
2		2451	196480	1885334
3			67	2939142

$q = 31$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7
0	42	40	38	33
1	378	7430	16380	22050
2		3506	268715	2431981
3			243	4671600

$q = 37$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7
0	51	48	46	45
1	561	11836	24606	33228
2		7768	601467	4791257
3			2746	14653934

$q = 41$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7
0	58	57	53	49
1	702	15302	31989	43932
2		12077	946172	7094296
3			9482	27407827

$q = 43$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7
0	60	58	58	57
1	780	17065	34879	48323
2		14877	1164889	8322899
3			16174	36593361

$q = 47$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6	7
0	67	67	67	67
1	945	21298	43641	61519
2		21227	1706722	11583603
3			38434	61661271
4			4	

$q = 53$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	76	75	73
1	1224	28445	56550
2		33980	2831202
3			112175

$q = 59$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	85	85	85
1	1539	36509	71647
2		51214	4398356
3			271544

$q = 61$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	87	84	80
1	1653	39151	75387
2		58321	5030813
3			356856

$q = 67$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	96	94	94
1	2016	48350	92751
2		82528	7314081
3			719538

$q = 71$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	103	103	101
1	2277	55389	106688
2		101724	9192352
3			1077115

$q = 73$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	105	102	100
1	2415	58915	111166
2		112483	10243309
3			1307425

$q = 79$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	114	112	112
1	2850	70051	131978
2		149325	13884981
3			2225041

$q = 83$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	121	121	121
1	3159	78751	148602
2		177128	16789206
3			3030071

$q = 89$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	130	129	127
1	3654	91811	171674
2		226088	21846501
3			4696050

$q = 97$

$r\backslash\ell$	4	5	6
0	141	138	136
1	4371	110529	203372
2		304625	30051926
3			7951430

If $q_1 < q_2$ are prime powers then $\sigma(\ell, q_1, k) \geq \sigma(\ell, q_2, k)$.

That is, the deletion correction capability of codes does not decrease as q increases with fixed ℓ and k. In generating Table I we have not assumed this proposition to be true, we have explicitly identified codes in every case. The identification of codes in $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(\ell, r), \ell]_r$ is also important.

TABLE IV
THERE ARE TWO CODES IN $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(7,3) = 11,7]_3$. ONE IS SPECIFIED BY THE SELECTOR $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (0\ 1\ 2\ 8\ A\ 3\ 5)$

0000000	1111111	2222222	3333333	4444444	5555555	6666666	7777777
8888888	9999999	AAAAAAA	0128A35	1239046	234A157	3450268	4561379
567248A	6783590	78946A1	89A5702	9A06813	A017924	024596A	1356A70
2467081	3578192	46892A3	579A304	68A0415	7901526	8A12637	9023748
A134859	0362894	14739A5	2584A06	3695017	47A6128	5807239	691834A
7A29450	803A561	9140672	A251783	048A719	159082A	26A1930	3702A41
4813052	5924163	6A35274	7046385	8157496	92685A7	A379608	05A7643
1608754	2719865	382A976	4930A87	5A41098	60521A9	716320A	8274310
9385421	A496532	0614578	1725689	283679A	39478A0	4A58901	5069A12
617A023	7280134	8391245	94A2356	A503467	07314A2	1842503	2953614
3A64725	4075836	5186947	6297A58	73A8069	840917A	951A280	A620391
0859327	196A438	2A70549	308165A	4192760	52A3871	6304982	7415A93
85260A4	9637105	A748216	0976251	1A87362	2098473	31A9584	420A695
53107A6	6421807	7532918	8643A29	975403A	A865140	0A93186	10A4297
21053A8	3216409	432751A	5438620	6549731	765A842	8760953	9871A64
A982075							

TABLE V
THERE ARE THREE CODES IN $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(9,4) = 11,9]_4$. ONE IS SPECIFIED BY THE SELECTOR $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (0\ 1\ 2\ A\ 4\ 6\ 5\ 8\ 9)$

000000000	111111111	222222222	333333333	444444444	555555555
666666666	777777777	888888888	999999999	AAAAAAAAA	012A46589
12305769A	2341687A0	345279801	45638A912	567490A23	6785A1034
789602145	89A713256	9A0824367	A01935478	024981A57	135A92068
2460A3179	35710428A	468215390	5793264A1	68A437502	790548613
8A1659724	90276A835	A13870946	036817425	147928536	258A39647
36904A758	47A150869	58026197A	691372A80	7A2483091	8035941A2
9146A5203	A25706314	0487529A3	159863A04	26A974015	370A85126
481096237	5921A7348	6A3208459	70431956A	81542A670	926530781
A37641892	05A698371	1607A9482	27180A593	3829106A4	493A21705
5A4032816	605143927	716254A38	827365049	93847615A	A49587260
06152384A	172634950	283745A61	394856072	4A5967183	506A78294
6170893A5	72819A406	8392A0517	94A301628	A50412739	073469218
18457A329	29568043A	3A6791540	4078A2651	518903762	629A14873
73A025984	840136A95	9512470A6	A62358107	0853A4796	1964058A7
2A7516908	308627A19	41973802A	52A849130	63095A241	741A60352
852071463	963182574	A74293685	09723A164	1A8340275	209451386
31A562497	4206735A8	531784609	64289571A	7539A6820	864A07931
975018A42	A86129053	0A9175632	10A286743	210397854	3214A8965
432509A76	54361A087	654720198	7658312A9	87694230A	987A53410
A98064521					

TABLE VI
THERE IS ONE CODE IN $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(5,2) = 13,5]_2$. IT IS SPECIFIED BY THE SELECTOR $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (0\ 1\ 7\ 6\ 2)$. A DELETION CORRECTING CAPABILITY OF TWO IS THE MAXIMUM ACHIEVABLE BY $\bar{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ CODES OF LENGTH 5 (SEE THEOREM 4)

00000	11111	22222	33333	44444	55555	66666	77777	88888	99999
AAAAA	BBBBB	CCCCC	01762	12873	23984	34A95	45BA6	56CB7	670C8
78109	8921A	9A32B	AB43C	BC540	C0651	021C4	13205	24316	35427
46538	57649	6875A	7986B	8A97C	9BA80	ACB91	B0CA2	C10B3	03856
14967	25A78	36B89	47C9A	580AB	691BC	7A2C0	8B301	9C412	A0523
B1634	C2745	042B8	153C9	2640A	3751B	4862C	59730	6A841	7B952
8CA63	90B74	A1C85	B2096	C31A7	0594A	16A5B	27B6C	38C70	49081
5A192	6B2A3	7C3B4	804C5	91506	A2617	B3728	C4839	063AC	174B0
285C1	39602	4A713	5B824	6C935	70A46	81B57	92C68	A3079	B418A
C529B	07A31	18B42	29C53	3A064	4B175	5C286	60397	714A8	825B9
936CA	A470B	B581C	C6920	08493	195A4	2A6B5	3B7C6	4C807	50918
61A29	72B3A	83C4B	9405C	A5160	B6271	C7382	09B25	1AC36	2B047
3C158	40269	5137A	6248B	7359C	846A0	957B1	A68C2	B7903	C8A14
0A587	1B698	2C7A9	308BA	419CB	52A0C	63B10	74C21	85032	96143
A7254	B8365	C9476	0BC19	1C02A	2013B	3124C	42350	53461	64572
75683	86794	978A5	A89B6	B9AC7	CAB08	0C67B	1078C	21890	329A1
43AB2	54BC3	65C04	76015	87126	98237	A9348	BA459	CB56A	

A further question requiring resolution is; Can arbitrary multiplier (GRS) codes provide better deletion correcting capabilities than unit multiplier (RS) codes?

In this correspondence, we have only considered $k = 2$, higher dimension codes need to be considered also. Some experimental results were given in [16]. It was also proven therein that the shortest subword

TABLE VII

THERE IS ONE CODE IN $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{Q}(6,3) = 23, 6]_3$. IT IS SPECIFIED BY THE SELECTOR $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (0\ 1\ G\ C\ 4\ 5)$. A DELETION CORRECTING CAPABILITY OF THREE IS THE MAXIMUM ACHIEVABLE BY $\bar{G}(\ell, q, 2)$ CODES OF LENGTH 6 (SEE THEOREM 4)

000000	111111	222222	333333	444444	555555	666666	777777
888888	999999	AAAAAA	BBBBBB	CCCCCC	DDDDDD	EEEEEE	FFFFFF
GGGGGG	HHHHHH	IIIIII	JJJJJJ	KKKKKK	LLLLLL	MMMMMM	01GC45
12HD56	23IE67	34JF78	45KG89	56LH9A	67MIAB	780JBC	891KCD
9A2LDE	AB3MEF	BC40FG	CD51GH	DE62HI	EF73IJ	FG84JK	GH95KL
HIA6LM	IJB7M0	JKC801	KLD912	LMEA23	M0FB34	02918A	13A29B
24B3AC	35C4BD	46D5CE	57E6DF	68F7EG	79G8FH	8AH9GI	9BIAHJ
ACJBIK	BDKCJL	CELDKM	DFMEL0	EG0FM1	FH1G02	GI2H13	HJ3I24
IK4J35	JL5K46	KM6L57	L07M68	M18079	032DCF	143EDG	254FEH
365GFI	476HGJ	587IHK	698JIL	7A9KJM	8BALK0	9CBML1	ADC0M2
BED103	CFE214	DGF325	EHG436	FIH547	GJI658	HKJ769	ILK87A
JML98B	K0MA9C	L10BAD	M21CBE	0412GK	15J3HL	26K4IM	37L5J0
48M6K1	5907L2	6A18M3	7B2904	8C3A15	9D4B26	AE5C37	BF6D48
CG7E59	DH8F6A	EI9G7B	FJAH8C	GKBI9D	HLCJAE	IMDKBF	J0ELCG
K1FMDH	L2G0EI	M3H1FJ	05BEK2	16CFL3	27DGM4	38EH05	49FI16
5AGJ27	6BHK38	7CIL49	8DJM5A	9EK06B	AFL17C	BGM28D	CH039E
DI14AF	EJ25BG	FK36CH	GL47DI	HM58EJ	I069FK	J17AGL	K28BHM
L39CI0	M4ADJ1	064317	175248	286539	39764A	4A875B	5B986C
6CA97D	7DBA8E	8ECB9F	9FDCAG	AGEDBH	BHFECI	CIGFDJ	DJHGEK
EKIHFL	FLJIGM	GMKJH0	H0LKI1	I1MLJ2	J20MK3	K310L4	L421M5
M53206	07KF5C	18LG6D	29MH7E	3A0I8F	4B1J9G	5C2KAH	6D3LBI
7E4MCJ	8F50DK	9G61EL	AH72FM	BI83G0	CJ94H1	DKA5I2	ELB6J3
FMC7K4	G0D8L5	H1E9M6	I2FA07	J3GB18	K4HC29	L5ID3A	M6JE4B
08D49H	19E5AI	2AF6BJ	3BG7CK	4CH8DL	5DI9EM	6EJAF0	7FKBG1
8GLCH2	9HMDI3	AI0EJ4	BJ1FK5	CK2GL6	DL3HM7	EM4I08	F05J19
G16K2A	H27L3B	I38M4C	J4905D	K5A16E	L6B27F	M7C38G	096GDM
1A7HE0	2B8IF1	3C9JG2	4DAKH3	5EBLI4	6FCMJ5	7GD0K6	8HE1L7
9IF2M8	AJG309	BKH41A	CLI52B	DMJ63C	E0K74D	F1L85E	G2M96F
H30A7G	I41B8H	J52C9I	K63DAJ	L74EBK	M85FCL	0AM5H4	1B06I5
2C17J6	3D28K7	4E39L8	5F4AM9	6G5B0A	7H6C1B	8I7D2C	9J8E3D
AK9F4E	BLAG5F	CMBH6G	D0CI7H	E1DJ8I	F2EK9J	G3FLAK	H4GMBL
I5H0CM	J6I1D0	K7J2E1	L8K3F2	M9L4G3	0BFHL9	1CGIMA	2DHJ0B
3EIK1C	4FJL2D	5GKM3E	6HL04F	7IM15G	8J026H	9K137I	AL248J
BM359K	C046AL	D157BM	E268C0	F379D1	G48AE2	H59BF3	I6ACG4
J7BDH5	K8CEI6	L9DFJ7	0C862E	1D973F	9LHFB0	2EA84G	3FB95H
4GCA6I	5HDB7J	6IEC8K	7JFD9L	8KGEAM	9LHFB0	AMIGC1	B0JHD2
C1KIE3	D2LJF4	E3MKG5	F40LH6	G51MI7	H620J8	I731K9	J842LA
K953MB	LA640C	MB751D	0D1I6J	1E2J7K	2F3K8L	3G4L9M	4H5MA0
5I60B1	6J71C2	7K82D3	8L93E4	9MA4F5	A0B5G6	B1C6H7	C2D7I8
D3E8J9	E4F9KA	F5GALB	G6HBMC	H7IC0D	I8JD1E	J9KE2F	KALF3G
LBMG4H	MC0H5I	0EH7A1	1FI8B2	2GJ9C3	3HKAD4	4ILBE5	5JMCF6
6K0DG7	7L1EH8	8M2FI9	903GJA	A14HKB	B25ILC	C36JMD	D47K0E
E58L1F	F69M2G	G7A03H	H8B14I	I9C25J	JAD36K	KBE47L	LCF58M
MDG690	0FAJE6	1GBKF7	2HCLG8	3IDMH9	4JE0IA	5KF1JB	6LG2KC
7MH3LD	80I4ME	91J50F	A2K61G	B3L72H	C4M83I	D5094J	E61A5K
F72B6L	G83C7M	H94D80	IA5E91	JB6FA2	KC7GB3	LD8HC4	ME9ID5
0G38IB	1H49JC	2I5AKD	3J6BLE	4K7CMF	5L8D0G	6M9E1H	70AF2I
81BG3J	92CH4K	A3DI5L	B4EJ6M	C5FK70	D6GL81	E7HM92	F8I0A3
G9J1B4	HAK2C5	IBL3D6	JCM4E7	KD05F8	LE16G9	MF27HA	0HJKMG
1IKL0H	2JLM1I	3KM02J	4L013K	5M124L	60235M	713460	824571
935682	A46793	B578A4	C689B5	D79AC6	E8ABD7	F9BCE8	GACDF9
HBDEGA	ICEFHB	JDFGIC	KEGHJD	LFHIKE	MGIJLF	01C93L	1JDA4M
2KEB50	3LFC61	4MGD72	50HE83	61IF94	72JGA5	83KHB6	94LIC7
A5MJD8	B60KE9	C71LFA	D82MGB	E930HC	FA41ID	GB52JE	HC63KF
ID74LG	JE85MH	KF960I	LGA71J	MHB82K	0J5L73	1K6M84	2L7095
3M81A6	4092B7	51A3C8	62B4D9	73C5EA	84D6FB	95E7GC	A6F8HD
B7G9IE	C8HAJF	D9IBKG	EAJCLH	FBKDMI	GCLE0J	HDMF1K	IE0G2L
JF1H3M	KG2I40	LH3J51	MI4K62	0KLAB8	1LMBC9	2M0CDA	301DEB
412EFC	523FGD	634GHE	745HIF	856IJG	967JKH	A78KLI	B89LMJ
C9AM0K	DAB01L	EBC12M	FCD230	GDE341	HEF452	IFG563	JGH674
KHI785	LIJ896	MJK9A7	0LEMFD	1MF0GE	20G1HF	31H2IG	42I3JH
53J4KI	64K5LJ	75L6MK	86M70L	97081M	A81920	B92A31	CA3B42
DB4C53	EC5D64	FD6E75	GE7F86	HF8G97	IG9HA8	JHAIB9	KIBJCA
LJCKDB	MKDLEC	0M7BJI	108CKJ	219DLK	32AEML	43BF0M	54CG10
65DH21	76EI32	87FJ43	98GK54	A9HL65	BAIM76	CBJ087	DCK198
EDL2A9	FEM3BA	GF04CB	HG15DC	IH26ED	JI37FE	KJ48GF	LK59HG
ML6AIH							

length cannot become smaller if k is increased for fixed q and ℓ. Having identified optimal $k = 2$ codes it will be useful to check the deletion correcting capability of those codes obtained with the same parameters other than higher values of k.

It would also be useful to extend the results of [16] for RS codes fields of prime characteristic, in particular with prime characteristic 2. Codes over such fields have been previously found to have more practical application than those over prime fields.

VI. A NOTE ON THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The tables in this correspondence do not present all our selective and exhaustive results. Experimental results will occasionally be updated at http://www.uow.edu.au/~lukemc/expt.html.

APPENDIX
LISTINGS OF INEQUIVALENCE SETS

In this Appendix, we list the inequivalence sets of Section IV-B with cardinalities of length than about 40. The codes are identified by the standard form selectors, which are listed without the first two elements since they are always 0 and 1.

In general a selector α is related to a selector α' under the combined reversal and affine transformation. If α and α' are equal, we mark the selector with a $*$. Otherwise, we list only the smaller of α and α', in the sense of α being smaller than α' if $\alpha_j < \alpha'_j$ for some j such that $\alpha_i = \alpha'_i, \forall\, i < j$.

$$\mathbb{P}[5,4]_0 = \{(2\ 3)*, (2\ 4), (3\ 2), (3\ 4)*\}.$$
$$\mathbb{P}[5,5]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4)*, (2\ 4\ 3), (3\ 2\ 4)\}.$$
$$\mathbb{P}[5,5]_1 = \{(4\ 2\ 3)*\}.$$
$$\mathbb{P}[7,4]_0 = \{(2\ 3)*, (2\ 4), (3\ 2), (3\ 6), (4\ 3), (4\ 6)\}.$$
$$\mathbb{P}[7,4]_1 = \{(2\ 5), (2\ 6), (3\ 4)*, (4\ 5)*, (5\ 3), (5\ 6)*\}.$$
$$\mathbb{P}[7,5]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4)*, (3\ 2\ 6), (4\ 6\ 3), (4\ 6\ 5)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[7,5]_1 = \{(2\ 3\ 5), (2\ 3\ 6), (2\ 4\ 3), (2\ 4\ 5), (2\ 4\ 6), (2\ 5\ 3)$$
$$(2\ 5\ 4), (2\ 5\ 6), (2\ 6\ 4), (2\ 6\ 5), (3\ 2\ 4), (3\ 2\ 5)$$
$$(3\ 4\ 2), (3\ 4\ 6), (3\ 5\ 2), (3\ 5\ 4), (3\ 5\ 6)*, (3\ 6\ 5)$$
$$(4\ 2\ 3), (4\ 2\ 5), (4\ 2\ 6), (4\ 5\ 3), (5\ 2\ 3)*, (5\ 3\ 4)$$
$$(5\ 3\ 6), (5\ 6\ 2), (6\ 2\ 4), (6\ 4\ 5)*\}.$$
$$\mathbb{P}[7,6]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5)*, (3\ 2\ 6\ 4), (4\ 6\ 5\ 2), (4\ 6\ 5\ 3)\}.$$
$$\mathbb{P}[7,6]_2 = \{(6\ 5\ 3\ 4)*\}.$$
$$\mathbb{P}[7,7]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6)*, (3\ 2\ 6\ 4\ 5), (4\ 6\ 5\ 2\ 3)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[7,7]_2 = \{(2\ 3\ 5\ 6\ 4), (2\ 5\ 4\ 6\ 3), (2\ 5\ 6\ 3\ 4), (2\ 6\ 5\ 3\ 4)$$
$$(3\ 4\ 5\ 6\ 2), (3\ 5\ 6\ 2\ 4), (4\ 3\ 2\ 6\ 5), (4\ 3\ 5\ 6\ 2)$$
$$(4\ 5\ 2\ 3\ 6), (4\ 5\ 3\ 2\ 6), (5\ 3\ 6\ 2\ 4), (6\ 2\ 5\ 3\ 4)*\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,4]_0 = \{(2\ 3)*, (2\ 4), (3\ 7), (3\ 9), (3\ 10), (4\ 2), (4\ 5)*$$
$$(5\ 3), (6\ 8), (6\ 9), (7\ 5), (8\ 2), (8\ 9)*\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,4]_1 = \{(2\ 5), (2\ 6), (2\ 7), (2\ 8), (2\ 9), (2\ 10), (3\ 2)$$
$$(3\ 4)*, (3\ 6), (3\ 8), (4\ 3), (4\ 6), (4\ 8), (4\ 9)$$
$$(4\ 10), (5\ 2), (5\ 4), (5\ 6)*, (5\ 8), (6\ 2), (6\ 5)$$
$$(6\ 7)*, (7\ 4), (7\ 8)*, (8\ 10), (9\ 5), (9\ 10)*\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,5]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4)*, (2\ 4\ 8), (3\ 7\ 4), (3\ 7\ 10), (3\ 9\ 5)$$
$$(4\ 2\ 5), (4\ 2\ 7), (5\ 3\ 4), (6\ 9\ 2), (6\ 9\ 8)$$
$$(7\ 5\ 2), (8\ 2\ 4), (8\ 2\ 9)\}.$$
$$\mathbb{P}[11,6]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 5), (3\ 7\ 4\ 9), (3\ 7\ 4\ 10)$$
$$(3\ 9\ 5\ 4), (4\ 2\ 7\ 5), (5\ 3\ 4\ 9), (6\ 9\ 2\ 8)$$
$$(7\ 5\ 2\ 3), (8\ 2\ 4\ 7), (8\ 2\ 4\ 9)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,7]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 5\ 10), (3\ 7\ 4\ 9\ 8)$$

$$(3\ 7\ 4\ 9\ 10).(7\ 5\ 2\ 3\ 10), (8\ 2\ 4\ 7\ 6)$$
$$(8\ 2\ 4\ 7\ 9)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,7]_3 = \{(2\ 8\ 10\ 3\ 5), (7\ 8\ 4\ 3\ 9)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,8]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6\ 7)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 5\ 10\ 9), (3\ 7\ 4\ 9\ 8\ 6)$$
$$(3\ 7\ 4\ 9\ 8\ 10), (7\ 5\ 2\ 3\ 10\ 4), (8\ 2\ 4\ 7\ 6\ 9)$$
$$(8\ 2\ 4\ 7\ 6\ 10)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,9]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6\ 7\ 8)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 5\ 10\ 9\ 7), (3\ 7\ 4\ 9\ 8\ 6\ 2)$$
$$(3\ 7\ 4\ 9\ 8\ 6\ 10), (7\ 5\ 2\ 3\ 10\ 4\ 6), (8\ 2\ 4\ 7\ 6\ 10\ 5)$$
$$(8\ 2\ 4\ 7\ 6\ 10\ 9)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,9]_4 = \{(2\ 10\ 4\ 6\ 5\ 8\ 9), (2\ 10\ 8\ 5\ 6\ 4\ 9), (6\ 7\ 3\ 2\ 8\ 9\ 5)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,10]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6\ 7\ 8\ 9)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 5\ 10\ 9\ 7\ 3)$$
$$(3\ 7\ 4\ 9\ 8\ 6\ 2\ 5), (3\ 7\ 4\ 9\ 8\ 6\ 2\ 10)$$
$$(7\ 5\ 2\ 3\ 10\ 4\ 6\ 9), (8\ 2\ 4\ 7\ 6\ 10\ 5\ 3)$$
$$(8\ 2\ 4\ 7\ 6\ 10\ 5\ 9)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[11,11]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6\ 7\ 8\ 9\ 10)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 5\ 10\ 9\ 7\ 3\ 6)$$
$$(3\ 7\ 4\ 9\ 8\ 6\ 2\ 5\ 10), (7\ 5\ 2\ 3\ 10\ 4\ 6\ 9\ 8)$$
$$(8\ 2\ 4\ 7\ 6\ 10\ 5\ 3\ 9)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[13,4]_0 = \{(2\ 3)*, (2\ 4), (3\ 7), (3\ 9), (3\ 12), (4\ 3), (4\ 6), (5\ 4)$$
$$(5\ 8), (5\ 12), (6\ 3), (6\ 5), (6\ 10), (7\ 4), (7\ 5)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[13,5]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4)*, (2\ 4\ 8), (3\ 7\ 2), (3\ 7\ 12), (4\ 3\ 12)$$
$$(5\ 8\ 4), (5\ 8\ 7), (5\ 12\ 8), (6\ 5\ 3), (6\ 10\ 8)$$
$$(7\ 4\ 5), (7\ 4\ 12)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[13,5]_2 = \{(7\ 6\ 2)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[13,6]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 3), (3\ 7\ 2\ 5), (3\ 7\ 2\ 12)$$
$$(4\ 3\ 12\ 9), (5\ 8\ 7\ 3), (5\ 8\ 7\ 4), (6\ 10\ 8\ 9)$$
$$(7\ 4\ 12\ 5), (7\ 4\ 12\ 8)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[13,7]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 3\ 6), (3\ 7\ 2\ 5\ 11)$$
$$(3\ 7\ 2\ 5\ 12), (4\ 3\ 12\ 9\ 10), (5\ 8\ 7\ 3\ 4)$$
$$(6\ 10\ 8\ 9\ 2), (7\ 4\ 12\ 8\ 5), (7\ 4\ 12\ 8\ 10)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[13,8]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6\ 7)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 3\ 6\ 12), (3\ 7\ 2\ 5\ 11\ 10)$$
$$(3\ 7\ 2\ 5\ 11\ 12), (6\ 10\ 8\ 9\ 2\ 12), (7\ 4\ 12\ 8\ 10\ 5)$$
$$(7\ 4\ 12\ 8\ 10\ 9)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[13,9]_0 = \{(2\ 3\ 4\ 5\ 6\ 7\ 8)*, (2\ 4\ 8\ 3\ 6\ 12\ 11)$$
$$(3\ 7\ 2\ 5\ 11\ 10\ 8), (3\ 7\ 2\ 5\ 11\ 10\ 12)$$
$$(6\ 10\ 8\ 9\ 2\ 12\ 7), (7\ 4\ 12\ 8\ 10\ 9\ 3)$$
$$(7\ 4\ 12\ 8\ 10\ 9\ 5)\}.$$

$$\mathbb{P}[17,4]_0 = \{(2\ 3)*, (2\ 4), (3\ 7), (3\ 9), (3\ 16), (4\ 8), (4\ 13)$$
$$(4\ 16), (5\ 4), (5\ 8), (5\ 11), (6\ 4), (6\ 14), (8\ 13)$$

$(9\,5), (9\,12), (10\,15), (11\,2), (11\,9), (11\,15)$
$(12\,5), (12\,14)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[17,5]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4)*, (2\,4\,8), (3\,7\,15), (3\,7\,16), (3\,9\,10)$
$(4\,13\,6), (4\,13\,8), (4\,16\,13), (5\,4\,11), (5\,8\,6)$
$(6\,14\,3), (6\,14\,4), (8\,13\,2), (9\,5\,7), (9\,5\,12)$
$(10\,15\,14), (11\,2\,5), (11\,9\,6), (11\,9\,15), (12\,14\,2)$
$(12\,14\,5)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[17,6]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4\,5)*, (2\,4\,8\,16), (3\,7\,15\,14), (3\,7\,15\,16)$
$(3\,9\,10\,13), (4\,13\,6\,2), (4\,13\,6\,8), (5\,8\,6\,13)$
$(6\,14\,3\,4), (6\,14\,3\,16), (8\,13\,2\,16), (9\,5\,7\,6)$
$(9\,5\,7\,12), (10\,15\,14\,4), (11\,2\,5\,4), (11\,9\,6\,10)$
$(11\,9\,6\,15), (12\,14\,2\,5), (12\,14\,2\,6)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[17,7]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4\,5\,6)*, (2\,4\,8\,16\,15), (3\,7\,15\,14\,12)$
$(3\,7\,15\,14\,16), (3\,9\,10\,13\,5), (4\,13\,6\,2\,7)$
$(4\,13\,6\,2\,8), (5\,8\,6\,13\,14), (6\,14\,3\,16\,4)$
$(6\,14\,3\,16\,13), (8\,13\,2\,16\,9), (9\,5\,7\,6\,12)$
$(9\,5\,7\,6\,15), (10\,15\,14\,4\,6), (11\,2\,5\,4\,10)$
$(11\,9\,6\,10\,15), (11\,9\,6\,10\,16), (12\,14\,2\,6\,5)$
$(12\,14\,2\,6\,16)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[19,4]_0 = \{(2\,3)*, (2\,4), (3\,7), (3\,9), (3\,18), (4\,9), (4\,13)$
$(4\,16), (5\,2), (5\,6)*, (6\,17), (7\,5), (7\,11), (7\,15)$
$(8\,3), (8\,7), (9\,5), (9\,8), (9\,16), (10\,7), (10\,15)$
$(14\,6), (15\,2), (15\,16)*\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[19,5]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4)*, (2\,4\,8), (3\,7\,15), (3\,7\,18), (3\,9\,8)$
$(4\,13\,2), (4\,13\,9), (4\,16\,7), (5\,2\,6), (5\,2\,9)$
$(6\,17\,7), (7\,5\,12), (7\,5\,15), (8\,7\,18), (9\,5\,7)$
$(9\,16\,8), (9\,16\,15), (10\,15\,3), (10\,15\,7), (14\,6\,8)$
$(15\,2\,10), (15\,2\,16)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[19,7]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4\,5\,6)*, (2\,4\,8\,16\,13), (3\,7\,15\,12\,6)$
$(3\,7\,15\,12\,18), (3\,9\,8\,5\,15), (4\,13\,2\,7\,3)$
$(4\,13\,2\,7\,9), (4\,16\,7\,9\,17), (5\,2\,9\,18\,6)$
$(5\,2\,9\,18\,16), (6\,17\,7\,4\,5), (7\,5\,12\,16\,2)$
$(7\,5\,12\,16\,15), (8\,7\,18\,11\,12), (9\,5\,7\,6\,16)$
$(9\,16\,15\,7\,8), (10\,15\,3\,9\,6), (10\,15\,3\,9\,7)$
$(14\,6\,8\,17\,10), (15\,2\,10\,8\,16), (15\,2\,10\,8\,18)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[23,4]_0 = \{(2\,3)*, (2\,4), (3\,7), (3\,9), (3\,22), (4\,11), (4\,13)$
$(4\,16), (5\,2), (5\,15), (5\,21), (6\,8), (6\,17), (7\,3)$
$(8\,11), (8\,19), (9\,12), (10\,20), (10\,22), (11\,6)$
$(12\,16), (12\,18), (13\,8), (14\,21), (14\,22), (15\,18)$
$(16\,11), (16\,18), (17\,13), (18\,8), (18\,10)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[23,5]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4)*, (2\,4\,8), (3\,7\,15), (3\,7\,22), (3\,9\,4)$
$(4\,13\,11), (4\,13\,17), (4\,16\,18), (5\,2\,10), (5\,21\,15)$

$(5\,21\,16), (6\,8\,17), (6\,8\,18), (7\,3\,21), (8\,11\,9)$
$(8\,11\,19), (9\,12\,16), (10\,22\,15), (10\,22\,20)$
$(11\,6\,20), (12\,18\,15), (12\,18\,16), (13\,8\,12)$
$(14\,22\,11), (14\,22\,21), (15\,18\,17), (16\,11\,5)$
$(16\,11\,18), (17\,13\,14), (18\,8\,10), (18\,8\,22)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[23,6]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4\,5)*, (2\,4\,8\,16), (3\,7\,15\,8), (3\,7\,15\,22)$
$(3\,9\,4\,12), (4\,13\,17\,6), (4\,13\,17\,11), (4\,16\,18\,3)$
$(5\,2\,10\,4), (5\,21\,16\,15), (5\,21\,16\,19), (6\,8\,18\,17)$
$(6\,8\,18\,22), (7\,3\,21\,9), (8\,11\,9\,18), (8\,11\,9\,19)$
$(9\,12\,16\,6), (10\,22\,15\,20), (10\,22\,15\,21)$
$(11\,6\,20\,13), (12\,18\,15\,5), (12\,18\,15\,16)$
$(13\,8\,12\,18), (14\,22\,11\,6), (14\,22\,11\,21)$
$(15\,18\,17\,2), (16\,11\,5\,7), (16\,11\,5\,18)$
$(17\,13\,14\,8), (18\,8\,22\,7), (18\,8\,22\,10)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[23,6]_3 = \{(16\,12\,4\,5)*\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[23,7]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4\,5\,6)*, (2\,4\,8\,16\,9), (3\,7\,15\,8\,17)$
$(3\,7\,15\,8\,22), (3\,9\,4\,12\,13), (4\,13\,17\,6\,11)$
$(4\,13\,17\,6\,19), (4\,16\,18\,3\,12), (5\,2\,10\,4\,20)$
$(5\,21\,16\,19\,8), (5\,21\,16\,19\,15), (6\,8\,18\,22\,17)$
$(6\,8\,18\,22\,19), (7\,3\,21\,9\,17), (8\,11\,9\,18\,12)$
$(8\,11\,9\,18\,19), (9\,12\,16\,6\,8), (10\,22\,15\,21\,6)$
$(10\,22\,15\,21\,20), (11\,6\,20\,13\,5), (12\,18\,15\,5\,10)$
$(12\,18\,15\,5\,16), (13\,8\,12\,18\,4), (14\,22\,11\,6\,10)$
$(14\,22\,11\,6\,21), (15\,18\,17\,2\,7), (16\,11\,5\,7\,14)$
$(16\,11\,5\,7\,18), (17\,13\,14\,8\,21), (18\,8\,22\,7\,5)$
$(18\,8\,22\,7\,10)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[29,4]_0 = \{(2\,3)*, (2\,4), (3\,7), (3\,9), (3\,28), (4\,13), (4\,14)$
$(4\,16), (5\,19), (5\,21), (5\,25), (6\,2), (6\,7)*, (7\,20)$
$(8\,6), (8\,24), (8\,28), (9\,4), (9\,15), (9\,23), (10\,4)$
$(10\,18), (12\,28), (13\,12), (13\,21), (14\,22), (15\,8)$
$(15\,20), (16\,24), (17\,12), (17\,27), (18\,5), (19\,13)$
$(19\,17), (19\,24), (20\,4), (20\,8), (23\,7), (24\,2)$
$(24\,25)*\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[29,5]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4)*, (2\,4\,8), (3\,7\,15), (3\,7\,28), (3\,9\,27)$
$(4\,13\,11), (4\,13\,14), (4\,16\,6), (5\,21\,19), (5\,21\,27)$
$(5\,25\,9), (6\,2\,7), (6\,2\,11), (7\,20\,24), (8\,6\,19)$
$(8\,28\,23), (8\,28\,24), (9\,15\,4), (9\,15\,5), (9\,23\,4)$
$(10\,4\,8), (10\,4\,18), (12\,28\,17), (13\,12\,21)$
$(14\,22\,18), (15\,8\,20), (15\,8\,26), (16\,24\,7)$
$(17\,12\,19), (17\,12\,27), (18\,5\,3), (19\,13\,15)$
$(19\,24\,17), (19\,24\,27), (20\,4\,8), (20\,4\,19)$
$(23\,7\,16), (24\,2\,18), (24\,2\,25)\}.$

$\mathbb{P}[29,6]_0 = \{(2\,3\,4\,5)*, (2\,4\,8\,16), (3\,7\,15\,2), (3\,7\,15\,28)$
$(3\,9\,27\,23), (4\,13\,11\,5), (4\,13\,11\,14), (4\,16\,6\,24)$
$(5\,21\,27\,19), (5\,21\,27\,22), (5\,25\,9\,16), (6\,2\,11\,7)$
$(6\,2\,11\,27), (7\,20\,24\,23), (8\,6\,19\,7), (8\,28\,23\,17)$
$(8\,28\,23\,24), (9\,15\,5\,4), (9\,15\,5\,12), (9\,23\,4\,7)$

$(10\ 4\ 8\ 15), (10\ 4\ 8\ 18), (14\ 22\ 18\ 20)$

$(15\ 8\ 26\ 17), (15\ 8\ 26\ 20), (16\ 24\ 7\ 25)$

$(17\ 12\ 19\ 15), (17\ 12\ 19\ 27), (18\ 5\ 3\ 25)$

$(19\ 13\ 15\ 24), (19\ 24\ 27\ 17), (19\ 24\ 27\ 23)$

$(20\ 4\ 19\ 8), (20\ 4\ 19\ 14), (23\ 7\ 16\ 20)$

$(24\ 2\ 18\ 9), (24\ 2\ 18\ 25)\}.$

$$\mathbb{P}[47, 7]_4 = \{(8\ 23\ 42\ 16\ 18), (15\ 46\ 28\ 14\ 41)$$
$$(16\ 27\ 42\ 26\ 29), (27\ 2\ 40\ 22\ 35))\}.$$

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Bounds on Key Appearance Equivocation for Substitution Ciphers

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Abstract—The average conditional entropy of the key given the message and its corresponding cryptogram, $H(\mathbf{K}|\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{C})$, which is refer as a key appearance equivocation, was proposed as a theoretical measure of the strength of the cipher system under a known plaintext attack by Dunham in 1980. In the same work (among other things), lower and upper bounds for $H(\mathcal{S}_\mathcal{M}|\mathbf{M}^L \mathbf{C}^L)$ are found and its asymptotic behavior as a function of cryptogram length L is described for simple substitution ciphers, i.e., when the key space $\mathcal{S}_\mathcal{M}$ is the symmetric group acting on a discrete alphabet $\mathcal{M}$. In the present paper we consider the same problem when the key space is an arbitrary subgroup $\mathcal{K} \triangleleft \mathcal{S}_\mathcal{M}$ and generalize Dunham's result.

Index Terms—Key equivocation, known plaintext attack, memoryless message source, message equivocation, simple substitution ciphers.

I. INTRODUCTION

Shannon, in his seminal paper [2], showed that the conditional entropies of the key and message given the cryptogram can be used as a theoretical measure of strength of the cipher system when assuming unlimited cryptanalytic computational capabilities. These conditional entropies are called the key and message equivocation, respectively.

In general it is difficult to calculate these equivocations explicitly. For that Shannon established in [2] a general lower bound and introduced a random cipher model which would approximate the behavior of complex practical ciphers. Afterward, Hellman [3] reviewed and extended Shannon's information-theoretic approach and showed that random cipher model is conservative in that a randomly chosen cipher is essentially the worst possible. Later on Blom [5] obtained exponentially tight bounds on the key equivocation for simple substitution ciphers. In [1] to derive bounds for simple substitution ciphers on the message equivocation in terms of the key equivocation, Dunham derived such bounds for so-called key appearance equivocation. This author pointed out also, that it can be considered as a theoretical measure of the strength of the cipher system under known plaintext attack. Another contribution of this subject is the Sgarro's work [7].

In this paper we consider a situation where the key space is confined to a subgroup $\mathcal{K}$ of the group $\mathcal{S}_\mathcal{M}$ of all permutations acting on a discrete alphabet $\mathcal{M}$. Apart from simple substitution ciphers, some other classical cipher systems (e.g., transposition cipher with fixed period, matrix system from [2, Example 4.6, p. 667], etc.) can be studied in this model. Other examples are given in [4] and [6].

The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the assumptions and background of substitution ciphers and key appearance equivocation. In Section III, we state a theorem which gives the