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Sovereignty and intervention in the western Pacific

Charles M. Hawksley

University of Wollongong, charlesh@uow.edu.au

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Charles Hawksley*
University of Wollongong, Australia
charlesh@uow.edu.au

The possibility of an ‘arc of instability’ across the Western Pacific states of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji carries serious security concerns for the entire Pacific region. This paper examines Australian-led interventions in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands to analyse the effects that they are having on the concept of sovereignty, both for states in the Western Pacific region and for international relations more generally. It argues that the nation-state ideal is under severe strain and that failed states are symptomatic of a wider problem of legitimacy, caused in part by the liberal assumption underpinning the social contract that entail one the one hand protection and on the other service delivery. As many states fail in this respect of delivering the political goods — rule of law, security, infrastructure, medical care and civil and human freedom — the notion of sovereignty has now been exposed for the fiction it has essentially been for most states, at least in the 20th century. If states cannot provide then intervention and state reconstruction marks a return to the nation-building project that characterised post WWII international politics. It also invites questions of diminished sovereignty and forces a reassessment of the capacity of states to meet the expectations of their citizens. It may be that the time has come to think beyond state sovereignty as the basis of international order and to return to imperial or semi-imperial constructs, particularly forms of indirect rule, to guarantee global human security. If states are failing then sovereignty is expendable.

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The amorphous nature of Sovereignty

Since at least the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the notion of sovereignty has been central to the study of international relations. Sovereignty has generally been seen as a set of claims that politically organised groups occupying a defined territory make to other groups occupying different territories. Such claims centre on the group’s right to be regarded as self-governing, that they are capable of managing their own affairs and that others should keep out of their defined territory and their political affairs. For these claims to exist and to be recognised some form of central constituted authority, such as a government administration, is required. This power can then attempt to enforce its writ over the people who live within its boundaries, and to exclude all external influences. It becomes, in effect, the sovereign power of the state. This is a view that sees sovereignty as absolute and as a shibboleth of modern statehood. For international law to function states require the capacity to enter into treaties as equals, so by extension sovereignty implies a legal equality between the political states of the world. States would further claim to resist external influences in their decision-making processes. Even if the absolute notion of sovereignty is a fiction, it is a necessary one, as the international political system was constructed on this principle.

Rejecting the absolutist approach to sovereignty by arguing that it has been consistently undermined, Stephen Krasner has usefully picked apart the concept to suggest that there are in fact four central ideas that create sovereignty:

- **Domestic sovereignty** — the classical interpretation where the state as sovereign controls all activity within its borders.
- **Interdependence sovereignty** — the ability of a state to seal its borders to prevent the entry or exit of people or commodities.
- **International legal sovereignty** — the acceptance by other states of a state’s right to exist, and to give it recognition as a state.
- **Westphalian sovereignty** — other states refraining from interference in the domestic politics of any state.²
Krasner argues that for as long as sovereignty has been around it has been a flawed concept. It is partial and it is consistently diminished by the actions of other states. Fowler and Bunk argue a similar position, analysing legal precedents in international politics that encroach on the absolute rights of states. However as Philpott argues, neither approach actually negates either the claims that states make to hold sovereignty nor the validity of the concept itself. The decades from the 1940s to the 1970s resulted in the universalisation of the nation-state project. Claims for state sovereignty were a feature of decolonisation as peoples around the world struggled for self-determination. States and government around the world are now similar in that at the national level they all have bureaucracies and ministries and they all claim national sovereignty. Largely because of decolonisation the number of states in the international state system has also grown, from around 50 in 1900 to over 200 in 2005, yet only a handful operate according to the principles of liberalism, democracy, civil society, rule of law and free trade, the characteristics regarded as being essential to guarantee human security. As Kaplan has observed, many states are states in name only. With around 200 states, many suffer from various levels of dysfunction, and sometimes in ‘weak’ states this dysfunction becomes critical, even terminal. The spectre of the ‘failed state’ — or the even more serious ‘collapsed state’— has given rise to situations where in the partial or complete absence of legitimate state control over its own territory, the international respect for the notion of sovereignty is deemed to be of secondary importance to the possible problems that disorder will produce. The effects of state collapse are just as dangerous for those inside the state as those without. It is increasingly clear that in the post-Cold War world of increased connection through globalisation, some states are now willing to override the notion of state sovereignty for purposes of their own, or for regional or international security.

**Sovereignty and failed states**

‘Failed state’ describes a situation in which an internationally recognised government is either unwilling or incapable of asserting control over its domestic affairs. Though
it may claim a right to sovereignty, the evidence of its demonstrable inability to restrict crime, impose centralised order or even control its own territory, indicates that it has lost legitimacy within its own borders. This is not to suggest that total anarchy reigns over a failed state, rather that forms of order may spring up with localised and often violent power structures exerting control over regions and communities. The category of the failed state thus covers a variety of situations such as complete state collapse and descent into warlordism (Somalia), civil war driven by ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Bosnia), or civil war driven by a contest for power (Cambodia).7 In these cases, the internationally recognised government (if one exists or can be identified) is not able to bring forces within the state under its control, and it cannot seem to achieve a peaceful political solution, either through intransigence or simple incapacity.

What is most apparent in the study of failed states is the geographic specificity of the phenomena. It happens most in what was the former colonial world, and mostly in the ‘new states’ created by decolonisation. The failed or failing state is prominent in Africa and parts of Asia, but the atypical example was the fracture of Yugoslavia.8 The Western Pacific’s apparent ‘arc of instability’ may indeed be evidence of this phenomenon in the antipodes.

Apart from the obvious human cost, failed states are thought to encourage trade in armaments, narcotics, people (both women and children) and wildlife. The possibility of terrorism being fostered in collapsed states has recently emerged as a significant security problem. Dupont claims criminal groups are drawn to jurisdictions where enforcement is weak or absent, for in such an environment the profits may be unchecked. Activities prohibited elsewhere can exist. The United Nations Development Program’s 1999 Human Development Report estimated profits from the activities of organised crime syndicates to total c. US$1.5 trillion dollars an amount that at the time would have ranked it about fourth in the world as a ‘national economy’. The chief revenue raising activities that may be going on in failed states are said to be:
drugs (particularly heroin, cocaine, and more recently amphetamines and ecstasy)

- corruption (kickbacks, extortion, bribes, kidnapping)
- money laundering (often from drug profits)
- people trafficking (sex trade in women and children, irregular migration)
- firearms (gun running)
- terrorism (covering both the criminal aspects and the fundraising aspects of non-state actors and other political groups).9 (Ibid, 200-205).

Failed or failing states can be havens for general lawlessness and transnational crime, and, as Alan Dupont notes, “in some states crime and politics are virtually indistinguishable, either because the state has been co-opted by criminals or because the people who run the state are themselves criminals.”10 Failing states may be lax in enforcing their own rules, or they may even have no rules, but in a collapsed state the administrative bureaucracy essentially ceases to exist. Criminal elements may come to operate and inhabit part or all of the country, but they do so without the official sanction or cooperation of the recognised government. The adherence of a collapsed state to international law is threatened as, even though the principle of pacta sunt servanda means states are bound by the international treaties they sign,11 the signature of a state on an international instrument is only as good as its will or capacity to enforce its own laws. In collapsed states, capacity is absent and failure to prevent criminal activities from occurring represents significant dangers for neighbouring states.

As failed states have become a major issue over the past decade, the study of how to prevent state failure has also become an established part of social science literature, particularly in sub-disciplines of international relations such as peace and conflict studies. The upsurge in the number of post-cold War peacekeeping missions prompted the creation in 1994 of the US State Failure Taskforce. This body attempted to analyse the phenomenon of state failure and collapse with a view to predicting its incidence and probability. Headed by then Vice-President Al Gore, the Taskforce had
The job of collecting and collating data from ‘high-risk’ countries and devising a set of warning signs and indicators for when failure was probable. It was government funded and staffed by social scientists, experts in data collection and consultants in statistical methods. This Taskforce defined state failure as comprising:

- revolutionary wars — where a group attempts to overthrow the ruling regime;
- ethnic wars — conflicts where ethnic, religious or communal minorities seek changes in status;
- genocides and politicides — state sponsored deaths of communal or minority groups;
- adverse or disruptive regime transitions — when a state becomes unstable or shifts toward authoritarian rule to prevent collapse.\(^\text{12}\)

The method utilised gathered data for the two years prior to when a state was deemed to have failed and contrasted it with control data with three instances of non-state failure in the same year. It estimated that under this classification there had been 114 instances of state failure between 1955 and 1998, in some of the 195 countries considered. It then predicted the probability of states (as a number between 0 and 1) of a state suffering the complete or partial collapse of their authority. A score of 0.5 would mean that a state had an equal chance of failing as it did of surviving; closer to 0 the state’s survival became more assured, closer to 1 the prognosis was that the state was becoming unstable and heading for collapse. On assessing their data the taskforce refined their ‘drivers’ of state failure:

- quality of life (including infant mortality);
- regime type (the level of democracy — refined further into the classifications of full democracy, partial democracy and autocracy);
- the ethnic or religious composition of the state; and
- international influences, including the degree of trade openness.

As the Taskforce saw it, the failure of states affects development and democracy, as well as the growth of individual liberty and free trade. Where states had high infant mortality, low international trade openness and two or more bordering conflicts, the
likelihood that they would fail was double. Where the regime was a partial democracy failure was up to seven times higher.\textsuperscript{13}

This is a circular argument. States with lower levels of development tend to have higher infant mortality, and are more likely to be ruled by the gun than the ballot box. They are normally colonial constructs uniting a variety of ethnic groups so they are also diverse. Placed under centralised power, and in the absence of developed civil society groups to balance state power with public freedom, conflict is perhaps inevitable, especially if the state does not perform in service delivery. It is hardly surprising that marginalised groups within states have few reasons to support centralised control and will attempt to gain power themselves to improve their conditions. The Taskforce’s methodology basically de-historicised the conditions under which states had developed and concentrated on indices and numbers as predictors. King and Zheng’s study of the Taskforce’s model and results found that it also drastically overestimated the likelihood of state failure. They argue the Taskforce’s drives are actually more likely to be indicators of state failure. Low levels of democracy, low trade openness and high infant mortality tell you more about how a failing state operates — what has already happened in a state — than why a state may later fail. In some states it may be possible that nothing works as it would in a developed state, although the state does not implode or collapse.\textsuperscript{14}

Ultimately whether a state is stable or unstable, collapsing or not collapsing, appears to be a matter mostly of international, not domestic, perception. Some weak states should probably fail but survive; other weak states appear to be failing and then suddenly collapse.\textsuperscript{15} When a state truly collapses (such as in Somalia in 1991) the international community moves, as ‘something must be done’. Debates over what to do when a state collapses return to the vexed notion of sovereignty. In the struggle to gain territory and to assert claims of internal and international legitimacy, innocent civilians, including women and children, are the main casualties. The recent refusal of the international community to allow humanitarian catastrophes to go unchecked
has prompted the solution of stopping the killing by overriding state sovereignty through armed intervention.

**Sovereignty and Intervention**

The international community does not have a specific or particular plan for responding to the failure of a state, although intervention followed by nation building is fast becoming the norm for failed states. The scope and mandate of UN and regional assistance missions has varied greatly, from tens of thousands of troops in monitoring and assistance roles in Cambodia, to similar numbers with peace enforcement responsibilities in the Congo, to a handful of observers in Bougainville. The ultimate purpose of all such interventions is to recreate a workable state of affairs through confidence and security building measures, capacity building, commerce and aid. In line with the idea that the way to ‘fix’ states is to reconstruct them, rather than to allow them to disintegrate and create wider instability, these processes are generally termed ‘nation-building’ (or more aptly ‘nation re-building’) and require a form of temporary occupation. In Berger’s wide-ranging definition, nation-building can encompass formal military occupation, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, national reconstruction, foreign aid and the use of stabilization forces.¹⁶

Fukuyama’s recent *State Building* argues that culture is the least easily adapted element essential for functioning states.¹⁷ The types of Westminster style administrative and governmental systems developed for PNG, Solomon Islands, Fiji and other Pacific states do not perhaps address the perceived needs of their people. This is complex territory; examinations of other interventions in Cambodia and East Timor assist in placing what is happening now in the Pacific in historical context. To change culture is not impossible, but it does require long term planning and the existence of institutions that function rests to a certain extent on the desire to have such institutions. At this level, it becomes a chicken and egg argument. Intervention and state re-building may create the desire for public institutions. The question is whether they are appropriate for the societies they administer. Nation building
involves a large component of outside direction in the construction of administration in a state. Sovereignty has never been absolute, but struggling states are now being subjected to renewed efforts to make them fit the liberal mould, which may or may not be appropriate for all societies and cultures.

Interventions are justified by a report by the Canadian government-sponsored initiative, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that claims there now exists not so much the ‘right to intervene’ but a wider ‘responsibility to protect’. Governments have a duty to care for their populations, but when they are either unwilling or unable to do so, then “… interventionary measures by other members of the broader community of states may be required”. The total respect for sovereignty has now become partial. The new doctrines of peacekeeping involve intervention and deployments of advisers, aid workers, police and troops. This shift from ‘first’ to ‘second’ generation peacekeeping was a move from a relatively simple role of entering a conflict with the consent of parties to monitor ceasefires, to the more complex role of multifunction operations, many of which suffer from ‘mission creep’ and expanding mandates. The activities taken on by intervening forces have also been transformed, due to more complex mandates and more challenging circumstances. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor was effectively operating as a ‘state-in-waiting’; the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo has created an international protectorate zone within the sovereign state of Serbia.

Because of the inability to get UN missions on the ground quickly, even despite high levels of violence and widespread deaths, interventions are often perceived as occurring ‘too little too late’. By the time the UN or another force actually goes into a state to prevent humanitarian catastrophe, many people have already been killed or displaced, and damage to people and property is often widespread. Episodes such as Rwanda, where the Security Council scaled down the UN’s commitment due to the apparent dangers (only to result in one of the centuries worst genocides) pointed to a need to redefine the peacekeeping mission. The ‘Brahimi report’ of 2000...
recommended, among other things, the formation of an international UN standing force.\textsuperscript{19} Recent international relations literature is studded with such references to ‘the right to intervene’ and ‘the responsibility to protect’ but due to the costs of long term commitments states are often unwilling to lend forces to the UN until an appropriate exit strategy has been formulated.\textsuperscript{20}

Regional organizations have emerged as alternatives to UN interventions and may be, in some cases, more appropriate or more effective. They have the benefit of understanding the context and of de-politicising the problems as they may avoid the obligatory references to be US, French or British neo-colonialism. In Africa the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have authorised missions to, amongst other states, Cote d’Ivoire\textsuperscript{21} while the African Union has been present in Darfur in Sudan. These aim to separate parties and build peace; with Africans policing other Africans, there is a greater degree of ownership over the peace process. In the Pacific however the asymmetries of state power make intervention even more asymmetrical.

Sovereignty and Intervention in the Western Pacific

In the Western Pacific the past decade has proved increasingly difficult for small island states, and to some extent their much larger neighbours such as Fiji and PNG. Economic difficulties have added to the pressure to downsize administrations and led to a crisis in governance in some states. The situation in the Western Pacific has deteriorated to the point where Australia has altered its previous respect for the sovereignty of Pacific states and is now choosing to intervene where it perceives problems exist, or may exist in the future. This has been done through the Pacific Islands Forum in the Case of the Solomon Islands, but unilaterally in the case of Papua New Guinea.

In the Pacific the viability of small states remains as problematic now as when independence was first gained in the 1960s and 1970s. Size of domestic markets,
small populations, high unemployment, high migration, high transport costs and a lack of infrastructure mean that many Island states compete against each other for a limited share of the import market to Australia and New Zealand. Economic problems compound the absence of effective governance and allegations of corruption in Pacific governments abound. Tuvalu is the exception to the rule, mostly through the good fortune of being allocated the abbreviation ‘tv’ when the internet domain names for countries were allocated. Despite having large phosphate reserves Nauru has squandered its fortunes through a series of poor investment decisions. Financial problems compound the likelihood of perversion of proper governmental process. In 2001 Australia purchased the compliance of Nauru and PNG in housing asylum seekers for a reported AUD$20 million each. By any measure, the ‘Pacific solution’ indicated the asymmetry of power in the Pacific. As the regional superpower, Australia had of course been the dominant power in the Western pacific. The difference now was that Australia was becoming less interested in respecting the sovereignty of Pacific States and more interested in fixing perceived problems of non-compliance and instability.

With very small Western Pacific states, aid and economic pressure are used to force changes to policies and behaviour. When implicated in money laundering to the tune of $80bn, Nauru was placed on the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) list of non-compliant countries and territories. In under-funded states that lack the capacity to combat new forms of economic or security threat, such as money laundering and terrorism, Australia assists by providing ready-made criminal legislation to strengthen the capacity of a government to combat crime. The Australian Federal Police work to support governance and law with all Pacific states through the Law Enforcement Cooperation Program. The effectiveness of any such measures depend on the existence of an functional state structure and government that is considered to be legitimate.

Sometimes further steps are required, and higher degrees of intervention are contemplated. In the case of RAMSI, a parlous state of affairs in the Solomon Islands
had existed since 1999. There was an attempt in 2000 to establish a regional policing force (the International Peace Monitoring Team) to observe the fragile peace created by the Honiara Peace Accord and the Panatina Agreement (both of 1999), and the Buala Peace Conference and the Auki Peace talks of May 2000. In January 2003 Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer had claimed “Australia is not about to recolonise the south Pacific, nor should it. These are independent sovereign countries with their own constitutions”. By May 2003, the idea for an armed intervention force took hold. The Department of Foreign Affairs has stated that the main factor in the intervention was the degree of willingness of other Pacific states to override the notion of state sovereignty; the Solomon Islands government also wanted an intervention force and neighbouring Pacific islands agreed to it.

Ostensibly a multi-country taskforce, RAMSI is Australian dominated and Australian-led. The idea that through intervention the sovereignty of the Solomon Islands state can be restored is clearly problematic; sovereign states do not normally allow armed foreign troops to deploy on their territory, unless under visiting forces agreements. There are exceptions to this, including the Vanuatu government in 1979 permitting PNG troops to assist it in putting down an insurrection, however the idea that a state requires others to guarantee law and order goes to the heart of the problem. The results in the Solomon Islands appear impressive, and from its initial deployment in May and June 2003 the security situation has certainly stabilised. The Australian police (Federal and State) and their Pacific counterparts, both Solomon islanders and those from other countries such as New Zealand, Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu, have collected a large number of improvised and manufactured weapons and arrested people on charges of murder. Arguably this sort of intervention was effective as the force deployed was overwhelming both in terms of numbers and firepower, and once the weapons collection was mostly complete, the community policing has re-established trust in institutions as a basis of civil society. RAMSI was required because of the total breakdown of administration in the islands, a situation where nobody accepted the right of the government to govern. How long it will stay is not known, although the ‘whole of government’ approach requires a comprehensive
rebuilding of institutions so it may be the next generation of Solomon Islands leaders who bid farewell to RAMSI.30

Where RAMSI had regional support, even through an Australian led Pacific islands forum, the case for PNG is quite different. The Enhanced Cooperation Program (enshrined as the Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation of 13 August 2004) was designed to assist the capacities of the Papua New Guinea State. Clearly, Australia fears state collapse in PNG and the ECP has been Australia’s initiative. Mike Manning claims it was PNG’s idea, but the offers no actual evidence and the historical record suggests otherwise.31 In December 2003, the governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea concluded the Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) agreement that aims, amongst other things, to increase the capacity of the PNG state to develop something called good governance. This term is bandied about with monotonous regularity as if its meaning is clearly understood. It can describe anything from public sector ‘reform’, downsizing/’rightsizing’ of government bureaucracies and the abolition or creation of administrative practices.

For PNG the ECP meant accepting over 200 Australian Federal Police (AFP) and other officers as assisting police personnel, along with some 64 other advisers, to act in bureaucratic managerial and actual policing roles (DFAT 2004). While Australia has historically provided legal officers and key advisors to PNG as part of the general aid programme, this is the most ‘hands-on’ approach by Australia to perceived failures in PNG governance since PNG became independent in 1975. The idea of Australian bureaucrats and police was strongly resisted by elements within the PNG government during early 2004 and the agreement was not finalised until July of that year. Ultimately PNG accepted the ECP because it had no choice to refuse. But there is still a sovereign state and the sting in the tail for Australia was when the PNG supreme court ruled the provision of sovereign immunity to police personnel contravened the country’s constitution. Australia insists on immunity for its officers, PNG will not accept it. At the time of writing no solution has been found, but the advisers, a term reminiscent of colonial advisers in protectorates who managed the
affairs of state, remain. They exercise control over spending and budgetary processes.\textsuperscript{32}

**Conclusions: unequal sovereignty**

Both of these Pacific interventions have occurred because Australia fears for its own security and because of Australian understandings that others outside of the region, principally the US, expect it to be a serious contributor to world order.\textsuperscript{33} Token deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan help, but to be viewed as a serious contributor to the Western alliance Australia has to be seen to promote stability in its own sphere of influence. Australia’s capacity to contribute to a coalition of international powers rests on its ability to enforce the rule of law in the relatively small countries of the Pacific. These concerns about state stability and the supremacy of law reflect the 1904 Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe doctrine which argued that civilised states need to intervene in situations of general concern. In its own return to the Roosevelt corollary, the US has adopted the role of state conqueror and re-builder in Afghanistan and Iraq. The neo-conservative administration argues that its unchallenged power should be used to construct ‘just’ states — those that will respect the civilisation norms of international law. In the Western Pacific the US clearly sees the compliance of states with the rule of law as case Australia’s responsibility. As a part of the Western alliance Australia must do its bit for stability in the Pacific.

The two Pacific cases mirror events elsewhere in the world and call into question the equality of sovereign states in international relations. It may well be that the nation-state project has failed in many parts of the world, including in the Pacific, but nation-states remain. The critical test of state viability appears to be a state’s capacity to deliver political goods in return for obedience and order. When the state reneges on its half of the bargain, it becomes irrelevant to its own citizens; if it then turns coercive to enforce compliance they have every right to resist. We may be shifting to a ‘post-sovereignty’ world as the importance of sovereignty as an organising principle in international relations is under severe challenge though interventions that vary in
scope and intensity. Those states that invite intervention or have intervention thrust upon them are clearly struggling to be effectively sovereign. If they cannot control their own territory they are less than equal to states that can. They remain states in the sense that the international community accepts a patch of territory has a name but the new interventionism has important consequences for international relations. If, following realism, the ability to project power decides the standards of justice that exists within societies, then Australia’s economic, military and political power will create justice in the Pacific. If however, in the process of intervening, Australia approaches the Pacific with heavy-handed dealings in supposedly independent states then it diminishes its effectiveness and capacity to create viable institutions. The difficulty lies in being effective without looking like interfering or being ‘imperial’.

The two Pacific cases demonstrate emerging norms of intervention: they are unilateral or regional rather than (multilateral in the sense of the UN); they aim to build or rebuild the state; they are armed; and they are there for the long term. While the RAMSI commitment has been spoken about in terms of ten years, the ECP funding was for five years. If PNG’s problems are as severe as many commentators seem to think, the ECP appears to be a band aid solution. In any case, it may not now go ahead, or certainly not in the same form. Neither intervention has a clear criteria for success, and thus no clear exit strategy can be deduced. Perhaps Australia, like the US, now considers that temporary occupation or ‘empire lite’ is a necessary evil if national security, and to an extent regional security, is to be maintained. Interventions of this sort herald the death of the concept of sovereignty for nations experiencing difficulty, especially those thought to be potentially collapsing states. Aid and interference in administration re-creates the indirect rule of the colonial period. Indirect rule or even empire lite is clearly a more realistic response to the possibility of state collapse than observing sovereignty as the reconstruction of state authority requires long-term capacity building. If the security of larger nations is perceived to be at risk they will act to intervene and create solutions that are more suitable. In the words of Teddy Roosevelt

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Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and ... may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.35

One hundred years later the new muscular Australian policy is neither reluctant nor apologetic. The results of these Pacific interventions are important for Australia’s position in the world, but for the peoples of the Pacific Islands, mending their states, through whatever means, is vital as it will enable them to regain ownership over their lives and their countries. In the modern world of human security, sovereignty is no longer the shibboleth of statehood it once was.
References


26 AFP International Operations http://www.afpa.org.au/international.html. The AFP’s LECP has 40 officers in 24 posts in 23 countries.
32 For a recent review of the ECP see C. Hawksley, “‘The intervention you have when you’re not having an intervention”: Australia, PNG and the Enhanced Cooperation Program’, Social Alternatives, August 2005 (forthcoming).

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