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UNIVERSITY OCCUPATION

SINCE MARCH THIS YEAR a war has been waged on the Sydney University Campus. And there have been casualties — 5 students expelled (3 of them have received "suspended expulsions"). The term "war" is applicable because of the methods employed by the university administration against the campus radicals — informers, cameramen to photograph those involved in a 24 hour occupation of the Administration offices, "strongarm men" to provoke what could be termed "student violence", Supreme Court injunctions to restrain radicals from further militancy, and expulsions for those who dared to defy the dictates of the university administrators.
The current struggle at Sydney began over an issue which challenged the validity of the university's entry standards (matriculation requirements), connected as they are with the political device of "quotas" (a tool the government employs to regulate the number of students engaged in tertiary studies, thus minimising Budget allocations to education, freeing these for more important capitalist priorities — the Vietnam war and defence for example.)

The challenge eventually manifested itself in a 24 hour occupation of the university Administration offices, and was dealt with in the manner outlined above. This rampant and savage repression points to one thing, that those who engaged in it felt that something vital was at stake. It was not merely the desire to restore "law and order" to the campus but through the restoration of this to cripple the radical movement.

On the one hand the struggle at Sydney is a power struggle. Who will control the campus and university education — the legally authorised administration (open as they are to pressures from the State and business interests), or the forces now seeking power, those who are ruled, the powerless — the students and staff?

The crippling of the radicals would ensure that power on campus remained in the hands of the administration, removing the perceived threat of it shifting into those of the students and staff. On the other hand the crippling of the radicals would remove the continual threat and presence of dissent and student unrest on campus; further it would curtail the activities of radicals in using the campus for organising against capitalist society.

The Vice-Chancellor at Sydney University is himself an ex-radical. He knows how to fight radicals — isolate them, destroy their basis for mass support, pick off the leaders. No doubt he is encouraged in his repression by the lack of support the exclusion of Albert Langer from Monash earlier this year received from the students there.

It is a safe bet that the other Australian Vice-Chancellors are sitting, watching what is happening at Sydney. For if radicalism is successfully smashed there at the current most radical Australian university, it will be the signal for the others to follow and with similar tactics to smash their campus radicals. Whatever happens at Sydney will have an effect on every other university campus in Australia.

R.J.C.
THERE ARE NO CENSUS TAKERS of the barbarism of the 20th century, and there has been far too much of it to measure. The executioners are not willing, and the victims are rarely able, to provide exact details. What is certain in Vietnam, save to those who have neither the will nor the interest to confront truth, is the general magnitude and quality of the United States' combat against the Vietnamese. This relationship necessarily has a logic and structure which leads to war crimes as the inevitable consequence of a war that is intrinsically criminal. More important, the war is the outcome of post-World War II American policy toward the world and its efforts to resolve the United States' greatest dilemma.

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This report was first presented to the Congressional Conference on "War and National Responsibility", held in Washington February 20-21, 1970. It was then presented to the Fifth Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, March 28-30.
in the second half of this century: to relate its industrial power to the political and ideological realities of popular revolutionary movements in the Third World.

After the Second World War the United States pursued its diplomacy on the traditional postulate of military power ultimately being based on physical plant, economic capacity and the ability to destroy it. This assumption was also a definition of the nature of the world conflict, which prior to 1950 had always been between industrial nations, and after 1945 designated the Soviet Union as the primary threat to American security and interests. Such a premise, which not so much discounted as ignored the mobilising potential of ideology and the capability of Third World guerrilla and liberation movements, gave the United States supreme confidence in the efficacy and strategic doctrines of its own military. This armed force was designed essentially to operate against a centralised, industrial society, a reinforcing proposition Washington thought the military and diplomatic facts, as well as its own economic priorities, warranted. Every strategy has a price tag, and strategic bombing has a predictable and relatively low cost, but it also necessitated a convenient and vulnerable industrial enemy.

The Korean war, which almost resulted in an American defeat in Korea, shattered a half-century of conventional wisdom and raised a critical dilemma. It immediately proved the limits of existing military strategy and technology against decentralised, non-industrial nations. Apart from political or humanitarian considerations, there were no decisive targets against which to employ the atomic military technology on which the US had pinned the bulk of its hopes and money.

After weakening its power everywhere else in the world, and embarking on what was to become the second most expensive war in its history, the United States waged the Korean war with "conventional" arms intended for combat between industrial nations. Fought against comparatively poorly armed peasants, it was a war unlike any in modern history, and the Korean precedent reveals the principles and tactics to emerge in Vietnam in a more intensive form. Within three months the US destroyed all usual strategic targets in North Korea and over the last two years of the war it dropped about six times the tonnage used during the first year. Camps for non-combatants contained over 400,000 persons under guard, one-eighth of whom died of disease and starvation. Half the South Korean population was homeless or refugees by early 1951, 2.5 million were refugees at war's end, twice that number were on relief, over one million South Korean civilians died, and estimates of North Korea's losses are greater yet. As Major
General Emmet O'Donnell Jnr., head of the Far Eastern Bomber Command, reported to the Senate in mid-1951: "I would say that the entire, almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess. Everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the name."1 The Korean war, in brief, became a war against an entire nation, civilians and soldiers, Communists and anti-Communists alike, with everything regarded as a legitimate target for attack. By 1953, when the US was farther from military victory or mastery than in the fall of 1950, the most important undamaged targets were the 20 irrigation dams so vital to the rice crop and civilian population of the North. Restraints operated until mid-May 1953, when five of these dams were destroyed, in one instance resulting in a flash flood that scooped clean 27 miles of valley.

For the Koreans, the war's magnitude led to vast human suffering, but the United States learned that it was unable to translate its immense firepower into military or political victory for itself or its allies. There was, in brief, no conceivable relationship between the expenditure of arms and political or military results obtained. As the official Army history relates, utilising high mobility, decentralisation and tunnel defences, the North Korean and Chinese armies greatly improved their equipment and logistics and ended the war "a formidable foe who bore little resemblance to the feeble nation of World War II."2 Massive firepower had resulted in enormous civilian casualties and barbarism, but inhumanity was not victory.

The implications of Korea to the United States' future were monumental, conjuring up the prospect of political and military defeat in Asia and vividly revealing the limits of its power. Massive land armies were both very expensive and of dubious utility, and it was in this context that John Foster Dulles attempted to break
through the enigma with his “massive retaliation” doctrine — never satisfactorily translating it into a coherent and relevant strategy. Not only did Soviet nuclear power rule out attacking Russia with impunity, but even Washington in spring 1954 doubted whether Vietnamese peasants could be made to stop fighting if Moscow were destroyed, and the debate over employing atomic bombs at Dien Bien Phu only revealed that in close combat and mixed battle lines atomic bombs indiscriminately destroy friend and foe alike.

The dilemma of relating American technology to agrarian and decentralised societies was not resolved by the time President Kennedy came to office. Without delving into the “counter-insurgency” planning and assumptions which the President immediately authorised General Maxwell Taylor to co-ordinate and study, it is sufficient to observe not only that the US began making its commitments in Vietnam keenly aware of the failures of the past, but it was still encumbered with the same limitations which might only repeat the Korean precedent of mass firepower, wholesale destruction of populations, and political-military failure. Nor is it necessary to review the familiar history of how the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations intensified their involvement in Vietnam. More relevant is the distinctive character of that war, and the assumptions and manner in which the United States has employed its military might. I propose to outline the political and environmental structure of the war and to show why the United States consciously employs a technology that is quantitatively far greater than that used in Korea but inevitably requires the same outcome in Vietnam: the destruction of untold masses of people and their society, and the concomitant moral immunisation of the American civilians and soldiers called upon to sustain and implement the Government’s grand strategy.

A War Without Fronts

One of the most significant realities of the war in Vietnam, a fact which makes “legal” combat impossible and necessitates endless crimes against civilians and combatants alike, is the absence of conventional military fronts and areas of uncontested American control. The Tet Offensive proved once again that combat can occur anywhere and that the military initiative rests with the NLF. American forces, in reality, form enclaves in a sea of hostility and instability, able temporarily to contest NLF physical control over large regions but incapable of substituting Saigon’s political infrastructure to establish durable control by winning the political and ideological loyalties of the large majority of the people. Perhaps most ironically, the NLF has been able to transform this American presence, which it has not been able to remove physically, into
a symbiotic relationship from which they extract maximum possible assets in what is intrinsically an intolerable and undesired situation. For this reason as well, they are able to endure the war the longest, prevail, and win at the end, even should they lose a great number of military encounters.

The Pentagon's statements notwithstanding, there now exists more than sufficient documentation proving that the US claims to "control" 67 per cent of the South Vietnamese population, as before Tet 1968, or 92 per cent as of late 1969, bear no relationship to reality. Suffice it to say, the Pentagon also maintains private figures, data that simply reinforces the inescapable conclusions of a logical analysis of its own releases, that a very substantial majority of the South Vietnamese are not under the physical "control" of either the Saigon regime or US forces. Apart from political loyalty, which claims on hamlet control ignore, the supreme irony of the war in Vietnam is that hamlets labelled "secure" for public purposes, such as Song My, are often the hardest hit by American arms. The reason is fundamental: areas, villages, and large population concentrations the NLF operationally controls frequently co-operate in Saigon-sponsored surveys and projects to spare themselves unnecessary conflict with US and Saigon forces. To lie about the presence of the NLF to a visiting pacification officer is a small matter in comparison to the certain military consequences the truth will invite. What the Pentagon describes as the "secure" area in Vietnam is often a staging and economic base as secure and vital to the NLF as its explicitly identified liberated zones.

Therefore we read innumerable accounts of trade and movement between Saigon-"controlled" areas and those of the NLF, and of "friendly" villagers and Saigon's Popular Forces (only one-eighth of whom are trusted with arms) who fail to report NLF combat units and infrastructures. Hence, too, the existence of at least 5,000 NLF political workers in the greater Saigon area, to use minimal American figures, and the undoubted accuracy of the NLF claim to have parallel governments in all major cities and towns. American admissions that three-quarters of the NLF budget in 1968 was raised from taxes collected from one-half the Vietnamese population, that Saigon's eight largest corporations paid an average of $100,000 each in taxes to the NLF, or that it purchases vast quantities of supplies from "secure" towns, is much more to the

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point. To some critical measure, “secure” areas are both a part of, and vital to, the NLF. And to be “secure” is not to be a continuous free-fire zone. The question is not who claims “control” but who really possesses it. For the most part, such control as the US may have is temporary and ultimately is based on its ability and willingness to apply firepower, and certainly is not a consequence of any popular support for its financed and universally corrupt regimes in Saigon.

The refugee camps and program are good examples of the NLF’s ability to turn what the US intends as adversity into a dual-edged institution from which they may gain as much as a repressive situation allows — so long as it retains the respect and political loyalties of the people. These camps were both the inevitable by-product of America’s massive firepower applied to all Vietnam and its explicit desire to reconcentrate the population so as to better control it. “You have to be able to separate the sheep from the goats,” to quote one Pentagon-sponsored analyst in 1966. “The way to do it is harsh. You would have to put all military age males in the army or in camps as you pacify the country. Anyone not in the army or in camp is a target. He’s either a Viet Cong or is helping them.”

By May 1969 the war had produced 3,153,000 refugees since 1965, 612,000 still remained in camps and with only a tiny fraction having been resettled in their original villages. The large majority of the refugees, as every objective account agrees, were seeking to escape the free-fire zones and rain of fire the Americans were showering on them. Their political loyalties were anti-Saigon in the large majority of cases, and the intense squalor, degradation, and corruption in the camps undoubtedly mitigates such small sympathy for the anti-NLF cause as may exist. No less significant about the camps is the very high percentage of old men, women, and children in them — that is, non-combatants. In this sense, by entering the American camps refugees escape the American bombs while the younger men generally remain in the combat areas. Roger Hilsman put it another way in 1967: “I think it would be a mistake to think that the refugees come toward the Government side out of sympathy. . . (They) come toward the Government side simply because the Vietcong do not bomb, and that they will not at least be bombed and shelled. I have greater

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worries that some of the refugee camps are rest areas for the Vietcong, precisely because of this."\(^6\)

Refugee camps therefore become incubators of opposition as well as potential shelters for it, just as many reported NLF defectors, very few of whom are regular combatants, are now suspected of returning to NLF ranks after a period of recuperation. Such integration of the institutional structure of “secure” areas with that which the NLF dominates, this profound lack of clear lines and commitments among the Vietnamese, attains its ultimate danger for the Americans when it is revealed that the Vietnamese support for the NLF extends to parts of the highest levels of the Saigon regime. We know little of the process by which Vu Ngoc Nha, Huynh Van Trong, and their 39 associates penetrated the intimate circle of the Thieu regime and became privy to its secrets, but it is certain that many officers, soldiers and administrators of the Saigon regime are secretly committed to the NLF cause, and it is no less certain that most other Saigon leaders are deeply dedicated to enriching themselves, even via trade with the NLF regions, and are totally unreliable for the US's ultimate purposes. Such an army of unwilling conscripts, corrupt officers and politically unreliable elements in their midst is a dubious asset to the US and alone scarcely an unmanageable threat to the NLF. Hence the chimera of “Vietnamisation”. The various Administrations have known all this, and much more.

It is one of the lessons of 20th century history that repression and social disintegration generate forces of opposition that otherwise would not have existed and Vietnam is no exception. No one can comprehend the development and success of the NLF without appreciating this fact. Vietnamese forced out of their villages by air and artillery strikes and into decrepit and unsanitary camps know full well that the Americans are responsible. The army of prostitutes are aware of the source of their degradation. The peasant whose crops are defoliated knows who to blame. Apart from its attractive political program and land reform policy, the NLF has successfully capitalised on the near universal Vietnamese hatred of foreign invaders, a fact that has made its political infrastructure


\(^7\) NYT, November 4, 1969; U.S. Senate, Vietnam: December 1969, p. 5 and passim; Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, p. 188; NYT, November 21, 29, 30, 1969; Wall Street Journal, November 5, 1969. (Missing in our text—Ed.).
and loyalties of the people to it increasingly durable even as
growing firepower is inflicted upon them. "They say this village
is 80 per cent VC supporters," one American officer commented
last September as his men combed a village. "By the time we
finish this it will be 95 per cent." Such insight is scarcely atypical,
but appears to be universal in the available documents on this
aspect of the war.

This realism on repression intensifying resistance, as well as
every other phase of the struggle in Vietnam I have mentioned,
sets the indispensable context in which the US applies its military
power, for it long ago abandoned operating within the acknowledged
political limits of South Vietnam. More precisely, by employing
sheer physical might, the US has sought to compensate for and
transcend its unavoidable political weaknesses in its Vietnam
adventure. The various men in the White House and Pentagon
know better than any of us that the lines are indeed everywhere,
and that the Vietnamese people are overwhelmingly real and potential
enemies. And since the Vietnamese long ceased to be promising
ideological targets, tractable to successive corrupt regimes, they
have virtually all become physical targets everywhere. Quite apart
from the results — for the United States is slowly learning that its
efforts have become both militarily insufficient and politically self-
defeating — the necessary logic of American military strategy in
Vietnam is to wage war against the entire Vietnamese people, men,
women and children alike, wherever they may be found. So long
as it remains in Vietnam, it cannot fight another kind of war
with any more hope of success.

Machines Against People: American Military Premises

The original theory of counter-insurgency in White House circles
in 1961 was that a limited number of men, wise in the ways of
guerrilla ideology and tactics, could enter the jungles with conven­
tional small arms and win. Given the political, military and ideo­
logical realities, this premise by 1964 was utterly discredited, and
there followed a major scramble to develop new "miracle" weapons
intended to overcome the NLF's clear military superiority. The
problem, however, is that it requires five to seven years to translate
a sophisticated weapons concept into adequate field deployment,
and in 1965 weapons ideas already in progress were designed over­
whelmingly for a war in Europe. A mass of exotic crash research

8 NYT, September 24, 1969. See also U.S. Senate, Civilian Casualty . . ., 90:1, p.
67; Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, pp. 68-73; U.S. House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Hearings: Chemical-Biological Warfare: U.S. Policies and
International Effects. 91:1 (Washington, 1970), pp. 97, 250-51; Buckley, New
proposals proved, on the whole, to be expensive miscarriages, and it was already commissioned projects in helicopters and gunships that were most readily transferable to the Vietnam context. The helicopter’s distinctive value pointed to the defining objective condition of the military phase of the Vietnam war: decentralisation and a lack of military targets. Without the mobility the helicopter provided, General Westmoreland has estimated, one million more troops would have been required to fight the same war on the ground.9

While the United States has sought to discover and procure weapons uniquely designed for the decentralised agrarian and jungle environment, it has also attempted to utilise existing weapons first designed for such concentrated strategic targets as industry and air-missile bases. This, by necessity, has required employing weapons, such as the B52, originally constructed for intensive, nuclear warfare against stationary targets. It has adjusted for decentralised mobile targets simply by dropping much greater quantities of explosives of immense yield on vast regions with very few permanent military installations. Militarily, the United States has therefore fought the war with whatever decentralised-style weapons it could develop as well as the sheer quantity of firepower which "conventional" weapons employ. The pre-eminent characteristic of both these approaches is that they are intrinsically utterly indiscriminate in that they strike entire populations. And while such strategy violates all international law regarding warfare, and is inherently genocidal, it also adjusts to the political reality in South Vietnam that the NLF is and can be anywhere and that virtually the entire people is Washington’s enemy.

I am not contriving something the Pentagon does not already know. “The unparalleled, lavish use of firepower as a substitute for manpower,” writes one of its analysts in an official publication, “is an outstanding characteristic of US military tactics in the Vietnam war.”10 From 315,000 tons of air ordnance dropped in Southeast Asia in 1965, the quantity by January-October 1969, the peak year of the war, reached 1,388,000 tons. Over that period, 4,580,000 tons were dropped in Southeast Asia, or six and one-half times that employed in Korea. To this we must add ground munitions, which rose from 577,000 tons in 1966 to 1,278,000 tons in the first 11 months of 1969. And to these destruction-intensive

weapons applied extensively we must also add the wide-impact decentralised weapons that are employed in ever greater quantities alone or in conjunction with traditional explosives. For the family of cluster bomb weapons and flechette rockets, which the Air Force rates as "highly successful", I have no procurement data. Suffice to say, these are exclusively anti-personnel weapons covering much wider areas than bombs. CS (a type of advanced tear gas) procurement is one example: from 1965 to 1969 the amount purchased went up 24 times. Procurement for defoliants and anti-crop chemicals is erratic because of inventory and production problems, though the Air Force’s far too conservative data on acreage sprayed has risen quite consistently from less than 100,000 acres in 1964 to an adjusted annual rate of 15 times that in 1969. Procurement in 1964 was $1.7 million and $15.9 million in 1970, with an inventory in 1970 almost equal to new purchases.\(^\text{11}\)

Translated into human terms, the US has made South Vietnam a sea of fire as a matter of policy, turning an entire nation into a target. This is not accidental but intentional and intrinsic to the US’s strategic and political premises in the Vietnam war. By necessity it destroys villages, slaughters all who are in the way, uproots families, and shatters a whole society. There is a mountain of illustrations, but let me take only one here — that of the B52 which reveals how totally conscious this strategy is.

The B52s cost about $850 million to operate in Southeast Asia in fiscal 1970, a bit less than 1969 but far more than 1968, and they drop about 43,000 tons a month. On what? The one official survey of actual hits that I have been able to locate states that “enemy camps”, often villages full of civilians, “were where intelligence said they would be” in only one-half the cases. In the other half, intelligence was faulty, and the camps were either not there or the VC had not been in the target area when the bombs fell.”\(^\text{12}\) Then on whom did the bombs fall? On Vietnamese peasants in both cases, on thousands of Song Mys.

Stated another way, in 1968-69 the US used about 7700-7800 tons of ground and air ordnance during an average day. At the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, the Pentagon estimates, NLF forces were consuming a peak of 27 tons of ammunition a day, and half that amount during an average day in April, 1969. Roughly,


this is a ratio of 250 or 500 to one. Inequalities of similar magnitude appear when one compares overall supply, including food, which for all NLF and DRV forces in the south was 7,500 tons per month at the end of 1968. At the beginning of 1968 American fuel needs alone were 14 million tons a month. Out of this staggering ratio of conspicuous consumption has come only conspicuous failure for the US, but also a level of firepower that so far exceeds distinctions between combatants and non-combatants as to be necessarily aimed at all Vietnamese.

In an air and mechanical war against an entire people, in which no fixed lines exist and high mobility and decentralisation give the NLF a decisive military advantage, barbarism can be the only consequence of the US's sledge-hammer tactics. During Tet 1968, when the US learned that the "secure" areas can become part of the front when the NLF so chooses, US air and artillery strikes destroyed half of My Tho, with a population of 70,000, four-fifths of Hue's inner city, more than one-third of Chaudoc, killed over 1,000 civilians in Ben Tre, 2,000 in Hue — to cite only the better known of many examples. But what is more significant to the ultimate outcome of the war is that such barbarism is also accompanied by an ineffectuality — entirely aside from the question of politics and economics — which makes the US's failure in Vietnam certain.

Indiscriminate firepower is likely to hit civilian targets simply because there are many more of them, and directly and indirectly that serves the US's purpose as all Administrations define them. But we know enough about mass firepower and strategic bombing to know not merely that it is counter-productive politically but also an immense waste militarily. As a land war, the Vietnam campaign for the US has been a mixture of men and mobility via helicopters, with the NLF generally free to fight at terms, places and times of its own choosing. And because of ideology and allegiance, the NLF always fills the critical organisational vacuum the Americans and their sponsored Saigon regime leave behind. But even when in the field, the US soldier lacks both motivation and a concept of the ideological and political nature of the war, which makes him tend toward terror and poor combat at one and the same time. Had he and his officers the will and knowledge to win—which, I add, would scarcely suffice to attain victory — the American army would not be repeating the tale of Song My over and over again. For Song My is simply the foot soldier's direct expression of the axiom of

14 Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, pp. 141-42; NYT, January 22, 23, 1970.
fire and terror that his superiors in Washington devise and command from behind desks. No one should expect the infantryman to comprehend the truths about the self-defeating consequences of terror and repression that have escaped the generals and politicians. The real war criminals in history never fire guns, never suffer discomfort. The fact is, as the military discussions now reveal, that morale and motivation are low among troops, not merely toward the end of tours of duty, or when combat follows no pattern and "morale goes down and down", to quote one Pentagon analyst, but also because an unwilling foreign conscript army has not and cannot in the 20th century win a colonial intervention.  

WE CAN SCARCELY COMPREHEND the war in Vietnam by concentrating on specific weapons and incidents, on Song My, B52s or defoliants. What is illegal and immoral, a crime against the Vietnamese and against civilisation as we think it should be, is the entire war and its intrinsic character. Mass bombing, the uprooting of populations, "search-and-destroy" — all of this and far more is endemic to a war that can never be "legal" or moral so long as it is fought. For what is truly exceptional and unintended in Vietnam, from the Government's viewpoint, are the B52 missions, defoliants and artillery attacks that do not ravage villages and fields. Specific weapons and incidents are deplorable, but we must see them as effects and not causes. The major undesired, accidental aspect of the entire Vietnam experience, as three Administrations planned it, was that the Vietnamese resistance, with its unshakable roots everywhere in that tortured nation, would survive and ultimately prevail rather than be destroyed by the most intense rain of fire ever inflicted on men and women. For the history of America's role in Vietnam is not one of accident but rather of the failure of policy.  

Given what is so purposeful and necessary to the United States' war in Vietnam, and the impossibility and the undesirability of America relating to that nation by other than military means, there is only one way to terminate the endless war crimes systematically and daily committed there — to end the intrinsically criminal war now, to withdraw all American forces immediately. And while the Vietnamese succor and heal their wounds, Americans must attempt to cure their own moribund social illness so that this nation will never again commit such folly and profound evil.

REVOLUTIONARIES, who aim to change society, are faced with a disturbing and puzzling contradiction in evaluating the industrial movement in Australia in 1970. On the one hand there is a clearly discernible rise in militancy and of struggle among significant and growing sections of blue and white collar workers. The eruption in the penal powers struggle and the breadth it developed are symptomatic of the processes at work. The changes in the Australian Council of Trade Unions, the replacement of Albert Monk by Bob Hawke, are an outward official reflection of the changes in the working-class movement over the last decade, the emergence of a younger, more militant, more modern leadership.

On the other hand, and alongside this growing militancy, socialist consciousness has dimmed. Socialism, the establishment of a socialist society, is not the issue among the workers that it was two or three decades ago. By and large the Australian workers accept our capitalist social system and its foundations. They are certainly not rebelling against it. They are prepared to support some reforms, but reforms to improve the system, not to destroy it. This is the reality. The workers are ready for struggle for extra money, and against the penal powers, but not for the replacement of our system by a socialist system.

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For revolutionaries whose whole work is aimed at changing society, at arousing socialist consciousness among the people, this is a painful conclusion to come to. It poses the question: where are we going in the industrial movement, what are our perspectives? Are there realistic possibilities for advancing the revolutionary movement among the workers at present and the immediate future? Is it possible to be an effective revolutionary in the industrial movement in present conditions? These questions have to be faced seriously and fearlessly.

They can only be answered on the basis of a realistic assessment of the position of the working class in our society, the changes which the Australian working class has undergone and is undergoing at present and likely future trends. Three features stand out in their effect on the Australian working class:

Firstly there has been a significant rise in the standard of living for the majority of workers, a growth of consumption of consumer goods, availability of jobs and the possibility of getting a better job — for many a “place” in this society. The greater satisfaction of material needs (both real and artificially induced “needs”) is coupled with the second notable feature of our society — mass manipulation of consciousness. This has led to the spread and acceptance of the values of our society, to apathy, to lack of concern and involvement, to a dimming of socialist consciousness. These two features, greater satisfaction of material needs and manipulation of consciousness in the interests of the ruling class, go together.

The scientific and technological revolution has made this possible. It has created the material possibilities of giving more goods to the workers whilst at the same time enormously increasing the profits of the capitalist class. It has also created the technological means of manipulating the mind far more effectively than in the past. The technology of modern communication allows the ideas and values of the ruling class to dominate the whole of society as never before. The mass media, TV, educational institutions, all help to spread these ideas and values. The ethos of the consumer society pervades all spheres of life.

Because capitalism can and does supply more goods, because in countries like ours it eases the most immediate direct pressure for physical survival for most people, the manipulation has been fairly effective. It is a modern version of the bread and circuses that the Roman slave owners provided. This situation places economic struggles into a different setting. Militancy on economic questions is essential for a better place in our capitalist society; it is for a
greater share of the benefits that this society offers — it does not necessarily challenge or threaten capitalism at all. This is considerably different from the pre-war situation where economic struggles were only a small step removed from challenging the capitalist system as such, and in some circumstances, such as the 1929-33 depression, actually did threaten the system. Today, economic demands can generally be absorbed and integrated. In fact today, unlike the past, economic militancy often goes hand in hand with support for the existing system, as the one which makes such a struggle for a greater share possible. Militancy has become quite respectable. All sorts of professional people engage in militant actions on economic demands now.

What are the perspectives in Australia? With the economic expansion, with the mineral discoveries, the ability of the ruling class to absorb economic demands is likely to grow. The position in the United States should serve as a warning. There militancy often goes hand in hand with extremely reactionary political attitudes. This makes it necessary for revolutionaries to take a different attitude to economic militancy in present conditions than they did in the past.

Fortunately the scientific and technological revolution has not only produced more goods and more effective manipulation, things which the capitalist class likes and uses to its own advantage. It is also creating other things which they don’t like and which set into motion anti-capitalist forces. This is the third big change: Modern technology needs skilled, highly trained people, it needs armies of skilled craftsmen, of technologists and of scientifically trained people. This has ushered in the education explosion — more schools, more and larger universities and other educational institutions, many more skilled workers with higher levels of education. The ruling class needs them to develop and make use of modern technology, to increase its profits.

So we get the strange situation where on the one hand the ruling class has the most developed means of dulling people’s minds, of filling them with a false consciousness, yet at the same time educates vast numbers of people, opening their minds, widening their horizon and developing their critical faculties. It is proving very difficult to educate people without increasing their capacity for independent judgment, though of course that is what the ruling class strives to do (see “Statement for the Seventies” in this issue). Moreover these people are no longer almost exclusively the sons and daughters of the rich, as in the past. The children of working people are better educated and better trained today.
In addition, the development of modern “mass” society, its big and impersonal bureaucratic structures, its remote decision making and lack of mass participation processes, all create a reaction, particularly among people who have been freed from the worries of direct physical survival and who are better educated — a demand for a voice, a say. It creates a revulsion against the irrationality of the system. This is a mass phenomenon today. It will grow, it will spread, especially among the young, including the young workers. It arises from the nature of capitalist society, from the direction of the scientific and technological revolution. It creates a demand or a striving for more democracy, for greater freedom, for human dignity, however incoherently this is expressed at times. And it touches the most vital spots of the capitalist system, because capitalism cannot satisfy this demand without giving up control and domination, its class rule. This is unlike many economic demands which it can satisfy if it has to.

Because the scientific and technological revolution is carried out under the direction of and in the interests of the economically powerful classes, a growing gap arises between the advanced countries and the so-called under-developed countries. The benefits in the shape of more consumer goods in the advanced Western countries are in growing contrast with the poverty and stagnation of the third world. This increases the social problems; for the people in the Western countries it also creates moral dilemmas, since it shows up the irrationality and brutality of the capitalist system. The war in Vietnam is the most glaring expression of this irrationality and brutality. All this highlights the gap between what the scientific and technological revolution does and what it could do, if directed socially, by society and not in the interests of the ruling class. The scientific and technological revolution and the changes that it is bringing into our world create more and more questioning, frustration, opposition and resistance.

It has fed the resistance in the third world and in the last few years it has brought growing questioning of capitalism and opposition to it in the Western countries. It manifested itself in the sixties, at first in the student movement in the USA, in West Germany, in France and Italy. But in 1968 it involved the working class in France in their millions, and in one fell swoop shattered the theories that claimed the “end” of the working class as a potentially revolutionary force and the “end of ideology”.

What does this analysis mean for the work of revolutionaries in the industrial movement? Of the three trends which are in evidence in the Australian working class, the last, the growing militancy, questioning and resistance is the most significant. It
has a revolutionary potential. It will grow and spread. But it depends on the work, the tactics of revolutionary activists, in which direction it will develop — whether it will simply lead to greater militancy on economic questions or whether it will be given a revolutionary direction and serve to activise the revolutionary potential of the Australian working class.

Certainly the work of revolutionaries in the industrial movement at present is not consciously and purposefully directed towards that aim. Among the obstacles preventing such a re-orientation of revolutionaries is the carrying over of attitudes and tactics from a different, past period. Policies and tactics which are correct at one period can be quite incorrect and harmful in a different period. What is correct for the ebb is not correct for the flow of the revolutionary movement.

We have had an ebb in the revolutionary movement in our country for a long time, perhaps 15 to 20 years. Revolutionaries have got into adaptive habits and defensive attitudes. This tends to happen when certain tactics are applied for a long period; they become fixed. It is affecting the work of revolutionaries in many areas. Many carry on as if we were still in the difficult fifties and in the early sixties. But so much has changed and is changing, calling for reassessment, for different attitudes, for new perspectives. What is new today is the upsurge of the movement. It is quite true that this by no means embraces all or the majority of the workers, as one can point to a great deal of apathy and inactivity which it would be foolish and dangerous to ignore. But what trends should a revolutionary party looking to the future base itself on? It should value and nurture this rising, growing trend.

Tactics which are sectarian in one situation and which isolate the vanguard can have the opposite effect in a different situation when the movement is rising. The adjustment is not automatic. When people get steeped in a certain way it is easy to go on, but difficult to change. Tactics harden into principles. An example is the attitude to "unity" by some militants. Unity is not an aim, it is a means to an aim. We oppose unity for unity's sake. But unity has tended to become an end in itself for many militant activists.

The upsurge of militancy is at present reflected to a large extent on economic questions, partly because there is no adequate provision for other expressions which are present and which need to be given scope. Revolutionaries should work in such a way as to give this militancy a direction that will lead the workers to a
revolutionary position. That is why it is necessary to extend the scope of industrial activities and raise such questions and demands as will bring the workers up against the system, that can't be absorbed or fully absorbed, that involve them, develop their initiative and awaken their revolutionary potential. This is possible today, and will increasingly become possible. Hence the accent needs to be on workers' control demands, on job involvement, on job organisation, on industrial unionism, on involving the workers directly rather than doing things from on top, on breaking out of the confines of economic demands.

In Australia, due in no small measure to the work and influence of revolutionaries in the trade union movement, we have favorable conditions for developing the revolutionary trends in the industrial movement with a good deal of co-operation and assistance from some trade unions. It depends on the willingness and capacity of the revolutionaries, on how they are able to make use of the existing possibilities, whether the growing militancy, which will develop anyway, is channelled into areas that can be absorbed or whether it leads to a revolutionary upsurge of the Australian working class.
Rebirth of the Filipino Revolution

THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN MANILA over recent months mark the re-awakening of the liberation movement in a country where it has been twice cruelly robbed of victory just when it seemed on the brink of achieving it. In 1898 the Filipino Revolutionary Government controlled the whole country, confining their former Spanish colonial masters to the walled citadel inside the capital when the Spanish-American War broke. After a lightning victory over the Spanish the United States claimed the Philippines as its booty, although it took five long and bitter years and 70,000 US troops to make good this claim. In 1945 the Huks (Anti-Japanese Liberation Army) had succeeded in liberating nearly the whole of Luzon, the largest island which contains over half the population, when again the US army arrived to frustrate it; this time it was not until 1954 that a pro-American government could claim to have established a precarious social peace.

President Marcos was no doubt uneasily aware of this tradition when he branded the capture of a slice of his Malacanang Palace last January 30th as an ‘attempt to seize power’ by ‘Maoist elements’. Troops were ordered to fire on the demonstrators (six deaths and many hundreds of other casualties resulted) and two frigates were ordered to the Palace sea-front to rescue the President and his staff. Today a force of 5,000 soldiers has been permanently stationed within the Palace grounds. Despite the evident exaggeration in Marcos’ description of this particular incident it is certainly part of a new revolutionary attempt to smash the neo-colonial state in the Philippines.

As Marcos is aware, this State is a very strange, and far from invulnerable, historical excrescence. It seems to have been designed to violate every generalisation the sociologists and political scientists have made about the modern state. Weber, for example,
defined the state as the body which exercised the monopoly of legitimate force over a given area. In the Philippines the state does not any longer even seek to challenge the multiplication of armed groups which together exceed in size (and often the quality of their equipment) that of its own armed forces. Every political leader, every large landowner, every major company has its retinue of armed men quite apart from the private armies which hire themselves out to the highest bidder. It is this which provides the substance of the formal, Western-style, two-party bourgeois democracy which has prevailed since 'independence' was granted in 1946. It has ensured the continued rule of the possessing class and its foreign masters—but it has also ensured a genuine pluralism within the ruling group such that no faction (army, Sugar Block etc) has so far been able to monopolise effective political power. The two political parties, the ruling Nacionalistas and the opposition Liberals, are loose coalitions uniting the brokers of financial corruption and political violence. Both the present President and his predecessor, Macapagal, adroitly switched parties in order to aggregate a decisive force and win 'election'. At every level this exchange of party loyalties occurs with any change in the ruling party. In Filipino political lingo this is known as acting 'patriotically' by 'placing the interests of the nation above those of Party.' As in many neo-colonial societies access to Government with its limitless opportunities for financial gain, is the chief source of capital accumulation since most other sources are foreign-owned.

Elections

The official Comelec (Commission on Elections) reports that "rampant over-spending, fraud and terrorism marked the last elections" held in November 1969. President Marcos spent over $50 million on his campaign and 72 political murders were officially recorded during the election period. It added that although "terrorism was the most brazen and scandalous method employed by political warlords to subvert the people's mandate, the Comelec cannot do much to prevent it because it lacks ample power over the law-enforcement agencies acting as its deputies". Indeed it confessed that "the conduct of Comelec personnel contributed to the disruption of orderly elections". In one constituency in Southern Cebu the Liberals controlled one polling station, the Nacionalistas the other. The Liberals announced that every single one of the 9,400 registered voters had opted for their man; their timidity was rebuked when the Nacionalistas won with a vote for their candidate some 2,000 greater than the registered total. This was tame compared with the goings-on in the Northern Island of Batanes where an armed band known as the Suzuki Boys took over
the whole island for election time, murdering the local Public Prosecutor, closing the airport, occupying the radio and telegraph offices as well as the polling stations to ensure the harmonious elevation of their elected patron Congressman Rufino Antonio Jnr. They secured the co-operation of the local police and armed forces by dressing themselves up as government Special Forces and it was this imposture rather than anything else which provoked scandal. The Comelec comments: “During all these election years, the dice have been loaded in favour of the affluent, the rich and powerful, rather than the generality of our people . . . Indeed this is one of the primary causes of the youth unrest and the student demonstrations that we witness today.”

However the students are well aware that Filipino politics simply reflect the underlying pattern of the society as a whole. Added to the normal dimensions of capitalist exploitation are a swarm of special tolls, tithes, protection money (known as ‘tong’) kickbacks, and undercover payments exacted alike by the police and the private armies and gangs. Some of the gangs, such as Sigue-Sigue and OXO, are regarded by the masses as providing a measure of genuine protection against the brutal and arbitrary power of the rich. However the corruption of the social order does not alone explain the reverberations of the demonstrations.

The System Shaken

Two factors have combined to upset the Filipino political system which in its own way has worked well enough for twenty years or more. Firstly there is the acute economic crisis which is focussed on the problem of the International Monetary Fund special additional loan of $27 million. This is required to ‘roll over’ previous loans, that is pay the interest due on them. As a condition the IMF insisted in late February on a ‘floating exchange rate’ for the Filipino peso which has so far resulted in a 50 per cent devaluation. The sharp rise of living costs for the masses this entails is aggravated by the second IMF condition that there should be drastic cuts in Government expenditure with a consequent rise in unemployment from its present level of 17 per cent of the labour force. However all this does not just affect the masses (who usually suffer whatever happens) but it also threatens to deprive the political machine of its necessary lubricant. Even scraping the pork-barrel will not ensure the adequate flow of patronage.

The second factor to disturb the usual balance of forces is that in the November elections Marcos became the first Filipino President to be elected for a second term. The usual circulation of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ ensures the underlying loyalty of all to the system.
Hence the disruptive effects of Marcos' continued control of the public purse. Most powerful of the 'outs' is Vice President Lopez whose office entails only limited access to the Government machine and treasury. He is backed by the Sugar Block (sugar is the main export) and himself controls two TV channels, three radio stations and two of the largest newspapers. This media-barrage has been providing an enthusiastic chorus to the student agitations in so far as they are anti-Marcos. Indeed Marcos himself has tried to use the students and the red bogey to extract better terms in the loan negotiations with the United States. Police turned up thirty minutes too late to defend the US embassy from the ravages of the demonstrators on February 18th.

But though, as ever, ready to turn any situation to profit Marcos has good reason to be most anxious about the cumulative impact of mounting economic crisis, embittered political rivalries, and now the re-emergence of a revolutionary challenge to the social order itself. He has himself spoken on the danger of a military coup. Indeed one certainly cannot discount this as a possibility though so far it has been held in check by the diffusion of different armed groups.

In addition to the private armies there is a profusion of paramilitary forces loosely dependent on the State: Special Forces, Barrio Defence Units, Riot Squads, local police, etc. For example a report in the Manila Chronicle for March 1st began as follows: "Eleven heavily armed members of the mobile patrol division of the local police force raided the police department early this morning to rescue a policeman arrested for allegedly violating the anti-graft law." It is such incidents that give a special meaning to the declaration on March 1 of General Yan, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces: "Let me assure our people, at this stage, there should be no cause for alarm. The security forces of our government, especially those under my command, have the situation well under control." (emphasis added). Even within the Army there are strong factions based on region (many officers come, as does Marcos, from Ilocos in Northern Luzon and are fiercely loyal to him) and also on education (between graduates of the Philippine Military Academy and those who entered from ordinary universities). A factor which so far has united the army behind Marcos is the support of the US military. Ninety per cent of the officers above the rank of captain have attended training courses in the US; General Yan is a Westpointer himself. So long as the US government is prepared to tolerate Marcos he is safe from a military coup. Despite his talk of coups Marcos is really frightened of the people, nothing else.
Despite a partial bourgeois Agrarian Reform opposition continues to smoulder in the countryside — indeed the independent peasant is a more sturdy opponent of the money-lenders and tax officials than are the share-croppers. And now the towns and cities where a third of the population live have exploded.

The Left

This brings us to a discussion of the forces of the Filipino left. In the decade or so following the defeat of the armed uprising of 1949-54 the revolutionary left in the Philippines was reduced to a vestigial force. The entire Politburo of the Communist Party was in prison and the Commander of the People's Liberation Army, Luis Taruc surrendered first to the Government and later in prison, to the Christian Social Movement. An armed force claiming to represent the Party continued to operate in two provinces of Central Luzon but mainly by assimilating itself to the local power structure and becoming increasingly like any of the other private armies. During this time the only opposition to imperialism and its attendant regime in the Philippines came from bourgeois nationalists like Senator Claro M. Recto. Although he died in 1962 it was his ideas which inspired the foundation in 1964 of the KM (Kabataang Makabayan or Nationalist Youth) which quickly became a powerful force among the more than half million Filipino students. This organisation developed in an atmosphere in which the Communist Party was illegal and expression of even mildly socialistic views was liable to lead to summary imprisonment under the Anti-Subversion Law. If there were any revolutionary socialists in the student movement they were forced to adopt an Aesopian language made up of one part appeals to ‘social justice and human dignity’ and two parts nationalism of the Recto variety. The establishment of a Filipino branch of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF) in 1965 allowed anti-imperialist sentiments to be more openly expressed.

Under the impact of events like the Vietnam war, the development of guerrilla struggles in Latin America and the Cultural Revolution in China the perspectives of Filipino students radicalised. The reflections of these struggles in the US news media, as well as the rise of a new left in the United States itself considerably contributed to this development. As a consequence of its colonial past and neo-colonial present English is almost as widely spoken as Tagalog, the national Filipino language (there are many other dialects in addition to Tagalog). Ironically Time and Newsweek reports of the Vietnam war and student struggle have done more to radicalise Filipino youth than Peking Review which is of course...
banned. From 1966 there was mass student agitation against Filipino participation in the Vietnam war and from 1968 for 'student power' on the campus. In 1967 the KM split into three. The majority which retained the name KM were increasingly attracted by the ideas of Mao Tse-tung as were another splinter group SDK (Union of Democratic Youth). The BRPF and a new grouping the MPKP (Free Association of Filipino Youth) drew closer to more orthodox ideas within the international movement.

All these groups now sought to expand their membership and activities outside the student sector. The KM developed worker and peasant sections and co-operated with NATU (National Association of Trade Unions) a 200,000 strong trade union group with considerable white collar support, which had always opposed the main CIA-sponsored Labour organisation. The national membership of KM is now around 12,000 and includes young textile workers, car assembly workers and some peasants as well as students. The SDK which is not divided from the KM on any fundamental question has a membership of 1,500 mainly drawn from the universities. Membership of the MPKP is around 5,000 and 80 per cent of these are young peasants or rural workers. The MPKP co-operates with MASAKA, a peasant organisation of some 45,000 members which is successful in the areas where the old revolutionary movement used to be strongest. All these forces combined to form the Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP) in November last year. This umbrella organisation co-ordinated the mammoth demonstrations of January 26th, January 30th, February 12th, February 18th and February 26th. The ostensible object of the first demonstration held outside the Congress building on January 26th was to discuss the forthcoming Constitutional Convention which it was predicted would be dominated by the vested interests of the prevailing order. This was ruthlessly dispersed by the Manila Police despite the participation in it of moderate groups such as the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP).

A curious feature of the system of political violence in the Philippines is that it usually operates with a certain restraint in Manila itself where the great bulk of the middle class is to be found; in the rest of the country where the other 35 million Filipinos live it is less inhibited. The unleashing of open repression in the capital itself (public beatings, tear gas and then troops firing on crowds) helped to alienate middle class opinion from the Government. The apparent effectiveness of the student demonstrators also impressed itself on less privileged social strata. Strikes broke out in a number of assembly plants and the jeep drivers who provide the city's main transport began a campaign against the 'tong' which
they have to pay to the police and the gangs. Despite the lively fear of further repression the MDP was able to attract over 60,000 to a “People’s Congress” on February 12th and 18th. Attempts to stem this tide of demonstrations led to further clashes with the police in February and March in which a further four demonstrators were killed.

The MDP has always sought to make it clear that its target was the whole prevailing order and its subordination to US imperialism, not just the Marcos Presidency. It proclaims its ultimate goal to be a “National Democratic revolution” in which the broad masses of peasants, workers, petit-bourgeois, students and “national bourgeois” will combine to defeat imperialism, feudalism and fascism.

Inside and Outside the Institutions

It should be remembered that for a long time Filipino politics have been totally dominated by the violence and corruption of neo-colonial politicking. Even the armed class struggle of 1949-54 was not accompanied by much mass political agitation in the towns, or in the islands other than Luzon. The historic significance of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines is that for the first time the Filipino people have been exposed to politics and offered the alternative of non-institutional political activity. So far this impact has been greatest in the urban areas where politics used to be least developed. Of course the leaders of the MDP are aware that their objectives cannot be achieved simply by demonstrations any more than by elections. They envisage a protracted struggle with its main force in the countryside. It is at this stage that a discussion of the rival Communist Parties becomes necessary.

The New People’s Army has experimented with Vietnamese style tunnel warfare which provides one solution to the problem of the absence of cover on the Luzon plain. After the shooting of demonstrators on January 30th Commander Dante sent a letter to President saying that the New People’s Army would exact reprisals from senior Government agents for incidents of this type. Supplies entering the Clark airbase now have to arrive under heavy escort as a number of lorries were captured by the NPA and their contents distributed to the local inhabitants.

In 1967 the remnant of the illegal Communist Party split. Both sections repudiated the leaders of the armed force which claimed to be Communist. This force under the leadership of Commander Sumulong controls the area around the city of Angeles, right next to the Clark air-base. Political cover is provided by Pedro Taruc,
nephew of Luis, who was appointed General Secretary of the Party in 1962 but has never convened any meeting or congress of the Party he claims to lead—indeed it is alleged that he is the semi-captive of Sumulong who otherwise operates much like any other Filipino warlord hiring out his "protection" to local big-wigs, suborning the local police, teaming up with the Nacionalistas at election time and drawing a 'tong' from everything that moves in Angeles including the brothels which service the US air-base. Sumulong's men are now generally known as the 'Beatles' while the hated Government para-military force created to suppress them is known as the 'Monkees'.

It is unlikely that any genuine Communists are still involved with Sumulong. In 1967 the pro-Chinese section of the Party succeeded in winning the support of Sumulong's former No. 3, Commander Dante, a young and brilliant guerrilla leader who now commands the New People's Army. Although this new Huk force is small, numbering not more than five hundred effectives at the present time, it maintains a steady pressure on landlords, government and local goons. Not a week passes without a report of some daring exploit conducted by Commander Dante's Men—a raid on the Clark base, an ambush of police, the execution of some detested landlord or Government agent. Most of these actions are concentrated in Central Luzon in the provinces of Tarlac and Pampanga. Less is heard of the armed force of the other Party which calls itself by the old Huk name, People's Liberation Army. This is led by Commander Diwar and is strongest in Nueva Ecija and neighboring provinces. It lends muscle to the agitation of the peasants in these regions as well as curbing the activities of cattle-rustlers, bandits and government agents. The best way to estimate the character of the two forces is to give an account of the two Parties on which they depend.

The 're-constructed' Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist) founded on Chairman Mao's 75th birthday, December 26th, 1968, is led by Amado Guerrero. Filipino newspapers say this is the nom de guerre of Jose Maria Sison, an outstanding young intellectual educated at the elite Jesuit Ateneo College, former founder and National Chairman of KM and author of Struggle for National Democracy which is the bible of most young Filipino revolutionaries. The reconstructed CPP (M-L) was established after searching and uninhibited criticism of the old Party. It was criticised for its right opportunism in 1945 when it disbanded the popular Anti-Japanese Army that controlled a large part of Luzon; and for commandism and military adventurism for attempting to re-start armed struggle in 1949 without basing
itself on the principles of people's war. These switches were strongly influenced by Cominform directives: see for example the parallel experience of the Greek CP recounted in C. Tsoucalas *The Greek Tragedy* (Penguin). The old Party leadership was also criticised for violating democratic centralism and for being regarded as a personal property of the Lava family which supplied over the years four of the General Secretaries.

The CCP (M-L) accuses the Party from which it split off of being subordinate to bourgeois nationalism and of carrying the sedan chair for bourgeois personalities who do not even have any definite mass following. It criticises the leadership of the rival Party for treating the affairs of the Party as merely a side interest, a weekend hobby to be attended to by bourgeois academic experts and high bureaucrats who actually give their best hours and efforts in the service of the bourgeois reactionary Government. Finally this Party, the "heavy baggage of the Filipino liberation movement" has "sinister links" with revisionism internationally.

The rival Communist Party denies this and accuses the CPP (M-L) of applying the thought of Mao mechanically to Filipino conditions — some even add "What is the thought of Mao anyway?" though the Education Secretary told me that Mao's writings are used in the training of cadres. The Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army told me that the CPP defines itself in fighting feudalism and imperialism in the Philippines and has criticisms of both the Russians and the Chinese on international questions. As an example of such criticisms he said that the Soviet Union emphasised peaceful co-existence too much in Khrushchev's time and that China should not have boycotted the recent Moscow meeting. Although the CPP endorsed the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia they generally prefer to remain agnostic on such international issues, saying that they feel closest to the positions of the Cubans, Vietnamese and Koreans.

Inasmuch as they will defend its history and past leadership the CPP is the most authentic continuation of the traditions of the old Party and in fact they inherit a significant mass peasant base from this source. The veteran leadership has however been strengthened by an infusion of young blood including some of the most able leaders of the student movement. It insists that the working class must develop its own independent organisations within the National United Front against feudalism and imperialism, and that victory will only come through armed struggle. They accuse the CPP (M-L) of having only obtained any influence within the working class by collusion with opportunist and rightist
elements. They feel that the mass peasant base which they can still command will provide the surest base from which to relaunch armed struggle — the CPP (M-L) refer to this as the “souvenir of a defeated struggle”.

At the moment the People’s Liberation Army is contending for control of Mt. Arayat, the spectacular, cloud-capped lone mountain which dominates the Central Luzon plain because as they say, “Whoever controls Mt. Arayat controls Luzon”. This ‘mountain stronghold’ approach is criticised as a militarist deviation by the CPP (M-L). The polemics between the two parties have not been much changed by the release of the former Politburo from prison in January this year. Though they endorse one side or the other they do not seem to be integrated into the organisation of either. Though the conflict sometimes generates a virulent sectarianism, so far it has probably been a positive factor in the development of the movement. It has ventilated many formerly taboo questions and it has not impeded co-operation within the mass movement. Indeed the present division is relatively recent and further rearrangements should not be ruled out. A leading member of the CPP (M-L) told me he envisaged future close collaboration of the youth groups of the two Parties.

**Revolutionary Perspectives**

On some key questions of strategy there is remarkable unanimity. Both for example see the ‘national bourgeoisie’ as a potential ally in the struggle for ‘national democracy’ though the proneness to vacillation of this social class is acknowledged by both. Both insist that the social formation prevailing in the Philippines should be described as ‘semi-feudal and semi-colonial’. From a scientific point of view it makes little sense to claim that ‘feudalism’ in any meaningful sense survives in the Philippines where commodity production and even wage labor are very prevalent in the countryside and are becoming more so in the wake of the bourgeois Agrarian Reform.

It is also very unlikely that an authentic national bourgeoisie can be said to exist, that is, a section of the bourgeoisie economically opposed to imperialism, given the latter’s long hegemony over the Filipino economy. Among the few enterprises to be wholly Filipino-owned is, for example, the Manila Hilton, and it is difficult to see its owners becoming even a vacillating anti-imperialist force. The limits of bourgeois nationalism are usually provided by its underlying loyalty to its own bourgeois state which in turn is usually in fief to imperialism. The Latin American experience suggests that bourgeois nationalism only allows itself to be anti-imperialist when
the revolutionary left has been defeated (Peru, Bolivia); in other circumstances it is infinitely more hostile to the masses than to imperialism.

Do such considerations have implications for political practice? An increasing number of militants in both parties believe they do. Too much obeisance to bourgeois nationalism limits the development of the movement. Petit-bourgeois nationalism of the sort represented by such leaders as Nkrumah, Soekarno and Nasser leads the movement to defeat because it can only manipulate the masses, not mobilise them for their own emancipation. If the working class is to become a vital force in the Philippines then uninhibited appeals to class struggle must be made whether this alarms the ‘national bourgeoisie’ or not. It is also obvious that national minorities like the Moslems in Mindanao cannot be appealed to in terms of Filipino nationalism, however radical. As all recognise that spreading the base of revolution outside Luzon is an urgent task this point is of great importance. This said, nobody questions that the democratic and nationalist aspirations of the numerous petit-bourgeois, of many school teachers, lesser government bureaucrats, etc., can become a significant revolutionary force if it has a strong proletarian leadership.

Another question which has not been theoretically resolved is that of the relation between mass mobilisation and armed struggle, between legal and illegal work, between work in the countryside and work in the towns. The demonstrations of January and February go a long way towards indicating a practical solution to this. One reason the armed struggle of 1949-54 was defeated was the absence of any support coming from the cities. Today it is the Manila bourgeoisie which fears for its control of the urban areas. Security guards throughout Manila have now been doubled and many houses are up for sale in the insolently luxurious Forbes Park suburb with its heart shaped swimming pools and air-conditioned stables. Class pride in conspicuous consumption has been rapidly displaced by fear.

The conquests of the ‘generation of 1970’ promise to be a deliverance from the long frustration of revolutionary hopes in the Philippines. The original feature of this movement seems to be that in the countryside it is learning from Mao and the Vietnamese, in the towns from the Black Panthers and the student movements of the imperialist countries themselves. However, given the quality of the new leaderships that have been tested in these recent struggles we need have no doubt that soon it will be the Filipinos who will be offering lessons for other revolutionaries to follow.
THE WORK of the Hungarian Georg Lukacs is a major contribution to the Marxism of this century. As an independent thinker, he has at various times come under fire both from fellow communists and from anti-communists. At the age of 85 he has just completed his two-volume *Aesthetics* and is presently at work on his new book: *Ontology*.

Odd though it may seem some of his most important ideas have been attacked by Stalinist dogmatists and academic critics in the West on very similar grounds. Lukacs takes issue with the Stalin-Zhdanov notion of Marxism as a "great leap":

> Thought was arranged as if there had been pre-Marxist thought, then a huge jump, and lo and behold Marxism was there. But the essential plus of Marxism is that it made everything in 2,000 years of European development its own — I did not say this, Lenin said it.

Lukacs postulates the continuity of human culture. Marxism for him developed from a culture stock which had itself been revolutionised by Aristotle, Epicurus, Bacon, Hobbes, Diderot, Goethe,

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This article is an extended review of the book *George Lukacs, the man his work and ideas*, edited by G. H. R. Parkinson. Published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson; 254 pp., $9.35.
Hegel and other creators of human culture, and Lukacs himself has steadfastly continued this cultural tradition of Marxism. The differing attitudes to his work reveal the trend to polarisation within Marxism today.

This is not, of course, to suggest the acceptance of Lukacs’ thought in all its articulations. Nor is the alternative an equally complete rejection; yet this dichotomous thumbs-up - thumbs-down response to Lukacs is frequent, and comes from surprisingly different kinds of people. Lukacs himself leaves no doubt about where he stands on this matter:

I would be the first to protest if my views were turned into some sort of official doctrine . . . let them recognise my position as one particular opinion within Marxism . . . which of these theories (of Marxism) will prove to be satisfactory and which won't, well, none of us know of any criterion to establish this other than mutual criticism. But there is no tribunal of last resort which can declare that X is right, nor can it possibly exist . . . We need sharp discussions, discussions which have no administrative ends.

Lukacs’ contribution is to philosophy and aesthetics, and through these fields to politics. It is not really useful to speculate (as do some of the contributors to this collection of essays) about how Lukacs might have developed had the Stalinist ascendancy not excluded him from a directly party-political career. For Lukacs, as a continuer of Marx’s humanism, man’s human fate, the human development of the personality, are central concerns in all his work. His Marxist humanism inevitably brought him into conflict with the bureaucratic dogmatists. But it would be wrong to assume that exclusion from direct party-political activity (apart from the 1919 Hungarian revolution and his role in the Imre Nagy government of 1956) made Lukacs politically ineffective. The influence of his ideas is growing on a world-wide scale.

Lukacs’ work illuminates the connection between the philosophic-humanist development of aesthetic theory and politics. One side of the medal reveals the official doctrine of “socialist realism” which reduces the human dimension by subordinating art and literature to party-political expediency. The obverse side shows Lukacs’ constant preoccupation with the free and human development of the personality, with methods which may help to arouse the dormant forces in each individual to fruitful activity, to the kind of understanding of and grappling with reality which the total development of the personality requires.

In this collection the essay by Istvan Meszaros, a former assistant of Lukacs’ and now Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Sussex, seeks to give a picture of Lukacs’ thought from his
youth to his old age. Meszaros traces the main (Germanic) intellectual influences on Lukacs and shows that Lukacs nevertheless developed the most radical critique of German thought and literature. The notion that Lukacs, with his concern for "great realism", is unable to appreciate lyric poetry, is shown to be false. While his contemporaries were at odds with the intricately mediated meaning of the symbolic poetry of the Hungarian poet Ady, whom they saw only as a formal-linguistic innovator, the young Lukacs was the first to focus attention on the organising core of this poetry: the elemental passion of a democratic revolutionary. In an article written when he was well past 80 years of age Lukacs describes Ady as:

the greatest lyric poet of this age, both humanly and poetically. I have no fear of being branded a chauvinist for expressing this opinion.

Lukacs believes that literature and art are formative elements for the human personality, enlarging man so that he gathers the means to master himself and his milieu. This conviction leads him into an impatience with modern experimental work, and obscures for him the new insights, the new artistic tools and techniques which have resulted from the works of the best of the moderns. These are matters of judgement which do not call into question the strengths of his aesthetic theory so much as his own use of it on occasions. In this he is not essentially different from other original thinkers who tend to see their significant new thinking as universal answers at last discovered.

It is mistaken to think that because Lukacs is a Marxist he therefore is limited to a sociological approach to the study of literature and art; or that he has a simplistic, mechanistic theory of reflection. Lukacs' aesthetic theory of realism involves his concept of totality — the artistic portrayal of individual characters so that they embody that which is humanly and socially essential in the given historical epoch. This ideal of great realism Lukacs derives from the literature and art of three main periods — the classical Greek, the renaissance, and the thirty years that followed the French revolution. With Lukacs this does not provide an arbitrary prescription to be imposed by critics on works of art, it provides a tool which enables the critic to investigate the given work of art, its genesis, its human and social meanings.

For Lukacs the work of art is always a "world-in-itself" which becomes a "world-for-us" through its evocative impact on the recipient: but it is able to do this only because as a "being-in-itself", it carries latent within it its quality of "being-for-us". The artist does not attain objectivity by mechanically copying reality. If he is to attain the highest objectivity the artist has to be concentrated
as an individual into the sole task of creation, and what is needed at this point is the acutest subjectivity which can chart the movement in consciousness, his own and that which represents "the spirit of the times". Subjectivity in this sense is not identical with that of the individual artist alone, but is the concentration of the subjectivity of significant sections of the human species.

Every work of art, Lukacs says, is historical in its "just-so-ness". Each work has its own genesis in and grows out of the everyday life of the given age. With Lukacs, however, the genesis itself is merely the indispensable condition for the understanding of art and literature, it is never an explanation of art or of a specific work of art. The work of art cannot be understood without its genesis, but this genesis can only be approached and uncovered through the particular work of art itself, and not by attempting to impose some external category as a label on the particular work.

The aesthetic doctrine of Northrop Frye: "Literature makes literature which makes literature", a prevailing academic fashion in the USA, occupies the opposite pole of dogmatism to the theorists of "socialist realism". Lukacs' aesthetic is directed against both. Susan Sontag, with her stress on the need to approach works of art with open senses, sensitivity and feeling, her call to us to experience "the luminousness of the thing-in-itself", provides many stimulating insights; but her prescriptions in Against Interpretation would rob aesthetics of many of the tools of reason which Lukacs makes available. Here I do not suggest the literary historian or critic be an adherent of this or that theory (the history of literary study is also in many ways a history of intellectual and political fashion). What I suggest is understanding that one line of investigation, pursued to its end, may produce fruitful results while in no way closing the field to other lines of investigation.

Meszaros sees two fatal flaws in the work of Lukacs: first what he describes as a dualism in his philosophical position, and second, a loss of mediations in his total position. The basis for the first flaw he finds in Lukacs' statement that:

I come now to another basic ontological problem of social development, which is linked with the fact that society is an extraordinarily complicated complex of complexes, in which there are two opposite poles. On the one hand there is the totality of society, which ultimately determines the interactions of the individual complexes, and on the other there is the complex individual man, who constitutes an irreducible minimal unity within the process. In this process, man finally becomes man . . . the aspect of freedom acquires a significance which is ever greater, ever more comprehensive, embracing the whole of humanity . . . I assert, therefore, that however much all these problems have been made possible by economic factors, they can be translated into reality only through man's decisions between alternatives.
Far from being dualist, this is a philosophical reflection of the dialectical unity and conflict at work in contemporary society. This position of Lukacs contrasts with the deterministic “monism” of Louis Althusser and similar trends in Marxism. The work of Lukacs is full of combat against this economic determinist reductionism; it grows out of the real tension and conflict at the heart of modern society, and from this dialectical view of society it follows that it is real men who have to decide between real alternatives.

Nor can it be established that Lukacs lacks mediations. The argument here runs mainly on the lines of party-political mediations. Yet the experience of Lukacs in finding alternative forms of mediation is not only characteristic of him, it is a world-wide phenomenon of contemporary life. The increasing relevance of Lukacs — an example of his relevance is the book now under review — is proof of how intellectual effort, provided it has real depth, integrity and persistence, finds its own mediations, or creates such mediations. The tendency persists of seeing the problem of mediations in terms of the working class as it was fifty years ago, but that position is being radically changed under the impact of the scientific—technological revolution and the consequent changing structure of the workforce. The humanism in the aesthetic developed by Lukacs has a powerful impact in the political sphere (even if this influence is still, so to speak, subterranean). Lukacs’ stress on the role of the intellectuals, far from being erroneous, is timely. There is ample evidence of this in both the socialist and capitalist countries. In this sense the work of Lukacs acts against the Soviet party practice which closed off one channel of mediation for its own independent and creative intellectuals, and by doing so impoverished Soviet politics.

This collection of essays is to be welcomed because it provides useful information on the life-work of Lukacs and critical assessments of some of his theories, but it does not succeed in giving a total picture of the man and his position. The eight essays suffer from the failings often associated with such collections: there is inevitably a certain arbitrariness in the division of the subject matter, each contributor feels obliged to elaborate his positive estimations and balance these with a piece of criticism. Apart from the somewhat piecemeal treatment of Lukacs’ work this also involves undue repetition. We are fortunate that in addition to the two further books in English on Lukacs promised this year, English publishers have promised to provide us with good translations of a number of the main works of the man himself.
Statement for the Seventies

IN THE FIFTIES capitalism was still able to give the illusion of stability, to strut as though it and its imperialist world system could live forever. In the sixties the illusion was shattered into pieces — on the one hand by the Vietnamese people, who proved they could defend their revolution against the worst onslaughts of imperialism, and on the other hand by momentous upsurges in the very heart of one capitalist homeland after another.

Less than ever do socialists need any eye of faith to see that this outmoded system can be overthrown; the problem is rather to elaborate a way to do it in the shortest time and at the smallest cost to humanity.

It is now apparent that capitalism must regard its educational institutions, and in particular the universities, as permanent centres of disaffection and upheaval. When the revolutionary student movement breaks through its manufactured isolation from the tremendous forces of the working class, as it partially did in France in 1968, the shape of final catastrophe for capitalism can be clearly seen. Socialists thus have a special responsibility to work out an adequate program for their political activity in universities.

This document, in the form of preliminary notes, was written by Dr. Allan Roberts and others in January 1970. It later drew attention at Sydney University when it was distributed by some of those involved in the 24-hour occupation of the Administration offices at that university.
The perspective we propose here rejects the concept that the struggle can concern only a vanguard minority of students. Modern capitalism is riven by a contradiction it cannot wish away, one that lies at the very core of its educational policies. On the one hand, it is a system whose profit-seeking goals and militarist brutality offer people a stunted, alienated life and the threat of ever more horrible forms of death; thus its overall achievements and pattern cannot be justified by any criteria of rationality. On the other hand, this irrational system develops its technology in such a way as to need ever larger masses of highly skilled workers, who must be trained to the use of rational thought. It is this contradiction which capitalism tries to “solve” by cramping education into constricting channels of specialised “courses”, aimed at producing a chemical engineer, a market economist, even a “sociologist”, who will confine the use of his reason within such a narrow framework that he fulfills technological needs without scrutinising and condemning their context.

This contradiction did not pose a serious problem for capitalism as long as the cadres concerned were few in number, since they could be drawn mainly from a narrow upper circle and have their loyalty further ensured by disproportionate material rewards and social proximity to the ruling class. But today a numerically significant section of youth must be drawn into tertiary education — instead of the 14,236 Australian students of 1939, there will be 120,000 in 1972 — one in every seven from their age groups.

The socialist exposure of capitalism finds a wide echo among this new social stratum, many of whom adopt the revolutionary Marxist critique and wage a conscious struggle against capitalism. But it has been shown that wider layers still will struggle against the manifestations of capitalist repression that they experience in their lives as students, where they are regulated at every step by traditional hierarchies lacking any rational justification. Because of the universities’ function to serve capitalist society, to contest this oppressive rule involves contesting its purpose and thus the society itself.

Rejecting at once both the concept of a closed enclave producing the specialists capitalism needs, and the authoritarian control needed to discipline them, there emerges the project of the open, self-managed, critical university — the theme of the program that follows.

1. By 1972, one Australian in seven from the appropriate age group will be undergoing tertiary education. A degree or diploma now does not imply automatic entry into the ruling elite, but in
general characterises a certain kind of skilled worker with specialised knowledge. This applies even more strongly to graduates of the technical institutes or "colleges", whose role in tertiary education is being consciously fostered.

2. The intense specialisation of degree or diploma courses today is harmful in major respects. The types of skill required for modern technological society are more inter-disciplinary, requiring attitudes of mind, particularly in teaching, research and development, which can benefit from the achievements and methodology of many varied fields. Even more importantly, there can be no justification at our present level of technology for cramming the minds of increasing numbers of youth into restricted channels, to the neglect of their proper development as socially aware human beings.

At one time an argument might have been made out for such a mutilation of the human personality: society's cultural development requires a high level of goods and services, and to maintain this level men must be shaped to fit the processes of production — however regrettable this necessity might be. But this (always dubious) argument lost any shred of validity long before we reached the present era, in which the benefits of science already achieved can provide the age of plenty.

Only the distortions and wasted potential inherent in the social system of capitalism, geared to private profit and the repression needed to maintain it, prevent the attainment of a fully human society. It is this social system, and not the requirements of technology, which demands that skilled workers trained to tertiary level should be over-specialised and under-educated.

3. The need for humanised education has important implications for the structure of tertiary institutions, which are today shaped predominantly by what is seen as their essential function: the production of certified specialists. It is from this ceremony of certification that there stems the present pre-occupation with examinations, as the crucial pivots around which the whole system revolves, along with the necessity for entrants to be subsequently sorted out into "passed sheep" and "failed goats". Undoubtedly, a university can see certification as one of its functions (medical practitioners, for example) but what is quite monstrous is that the form and content of education — at a level which must in the foreseeable future involve the bulk of the population — should be deformed by this one-sided and crippling perspective.

This fetish of specialisation in turn creates the further "specialisation" of people into such absolutely separate categories as
"students" (here) and "workers" (there). The absoluteness of this division must go. On one hand, courses must be re-shaped in light of the educational needs of people generally, not just the needs of the economy for animated raw material. Increased flexibility and scope of courses would then allow a vast expansion of the university population. On the other hand, the educational experience of students should not be confined to the lecture room and laboratory, but needs to be supplemented by the irreplaceable education of actual social experience in productive work.

It is only in this way that the universities can transform themselves from the privileged enclaves that they appear to be at present, into valuable and valued institutions serving all the people. In particular, it is only genuine moves in this direction that can erode the real present grounds for division between the working class and the academic community, with all its harmful political and social effects, particularly on joint efforts for social change.

4. If courses are to be re-shaped to fit humanity's needs, we must first recognise the extent to which they are applied to the requirements of capitalist society.

This adaption is most evident in the humanities, where such studies as politics, sociology and "economics" minimise or flatly omit the critical approach essential to revealing the truth about the society we inhabit. This evasion of critical theory is managed by such devices as pre-occupation with the "micro" approach, ignoring the framework (social and conceptual) in which the detailed phenomena are embedded; a crushing emphasis on positivist schools of thought which implicitly accept the given system and thus protect it from criticism; an artificial division into allegedly non-overlapping disciplines, so that some of the most important failures of capitalist society apparently disappear, being irrelevant to any particular single discipline (much of political economy, for example, can be studied in neither "politics" nor "economics").

In the natural sciences and technologies narrow skills are inculcated with no attention paid to their future and application. This of course fits in well with capitalism's desire for specialists who will serve the profit system with mutually rewarding efficiency, and never question the purpose or rationale of their work. To appreciate the dangers to humanity inherent here, we need only recognise that the specialists concerned have the skills needed to devise computer systems for an all-embracing "security" apparatus, to design a city-destroying bomb, to cultivate a deadly virus, to pollute the environment.
Such considerations as these emphasise the primary need for a struggle around the content of courses, for the incorporation of critical theory and socially-responsible studies. In the consideration of capitalist reality, and of their relation to it, the future skilled workers in tertiary institutes can come to see both the need to reject this outmoded social system, and also their common interest with the industrial working class in overthrowing it.

5. The special problems of tertiary institutions, not least among them being the necessary re-orientation towards a fully human education as opposed to mass production of "specialists", cannot be solved by the governing bodies of Australian universities today. The people most entitled to tackle these questions, as well as to make the decisions on the everyday affairs of their own institutions are the staff (academic and non-academic) and students themselves. The representatives of "business-men" or the business man's governments have values and interests which set them diametrically against any progress towards such humanist goals, and automatically exclude them from contributing to this re-orientation.

6. The need for university autonomy, with essentially staff/student governing bodies, increases daily as the conflict sharpens between the needs of human education, and the narrow grasp of the present conservative controllers. There is a crying need for self-management of the university by those who work within it.

7. Autonomy of the university is a hollow phrase, unless it implies financial autonomy. Nor can a single university standing alone hope to maintain its independence. Tertiary institutions as a whole must be granted adequate sums, and their united demand for this must replace the present servile competition which atomises them into small, impotent units. The Budget must provide for an adequate living wage for all intellectual workers employed in their apprenticeships at universities — i.e. for all students.

8. It must be recognised that, in any campaign for self-management the question is one of power. It is not just that the present hierarchical "rulers" within the universities can be expected in the main to resist moves for a real shift in power to the staff/student community. More fundamentally, a real encroachment on the power of the State and Federal governments is implied.

This consideration does not in any way weaken the rational arguments for the objectives outlined, but it does reveal as illusory any idea that simply the rationality of the case, once expounded, will ensure its general acceptance. Questions of the transfer of power on so important a scale are simply not decided "on the debate" in capitalist society. They rather hinge on the degree of
conviction of the people seeking the change, and the extent to
which they show themselves prepared for it.

An essential element in this preparation is contributed by such
actions as opposition to particularly flagrant abuses of power by
the present holders, or the claiming in practice of valid rights not
at present accorded. It is only when seen in this context that
"confrontation" policies can achieve a real sense of direction.

9. How should this struggle for power be conducted? It is the
students who can be expected to take the lead. Given, for example,
their dependence for promotion and advancement on the existing
power structure, the academic staff in general are tied more closely
to that structure; they are less inclined towards oppositional
initiatives, and more inclined towards dubious compromises.
Nevertheless, experience has shown that militant student action
with a clear perspective can win some staff support, particularly
from junior members.

In order to involve the mass of students and to guarantee their
control over the conduct of the struggle, mass meetings should
be constantly convened in the course of the struggle.

These mass meetings can be developed as the expression of the
students' will in place of the Students' Representative Councils.
Set up as toy parliaments, the SRC's consist of a small elite who,
once elected, are out of the control of their electors. The student
representatives on university senates and councils are in the
same position. In order to put power permanently in the hands
of those who are the members of student unions, we must work
to abolish or transform the SRC's and create new, independent stu-
dent unions in which all power and decision-making is placed in the
hands of general assemblies.

It can be argued that while the mass meeting and the general
assembly are democratically superior to the SRC's, they would
inhibit many students and staff from speaking and limit their
participation to voting. It is therefore necessary to develop
democracy based on departments and smaller units, which will
allow and encourage the direct, personal involvement of each
student (and staff member) in the control of his affairs. Such small
units would be the base of a co-ordinating, overall university
council of student/staff representatives. The mass meeting and
general assembly is a bridge to this.

Out of a situation in which mass meetings or a network of elected
departmental committee "check" the administration's exercise of its
power, deny it new powers, challenge and defy its decisions, and
make demands on it, dual power will develop. Such a situation is unstable and cannot last for long. Sooner or later an issue will arise which will pose the question of which is the superior force. A contest of wills, a struggle for power will ensue to decide which is the superior. In such a situation, students and staff must be prepared to occupy and run the university themselves. That is the logic of the struggle.

The involvement of the State on the side of the administration is inevitable and poses the necessity for students to seek alliance with and aid from the working class.

10. Resistance to the demand for self-management of the staff/student community can take different forms. A particularly dangerous response, which can be expected when the movement achieves success in popularisation or consequent activity, is the offer of some form of "co-participation". This can vary from admitting a few representatives to governing bodies, to surrender on issues which do not vitally affect the existing power structures. The key words here are "the improvement of communications", "consultation", "participation". Any such developments must be seen for what they are: attempts to side-track and "buy off" the movement; and the need for full self-management must be emphasised, contrasting its implications in detail to the inadequacies of the sops conceded.

If, however, students or staff temporarily accept "co-participation schemes", after a policy of boycott has been advocated by militants, it is then appropriate to convince the majority that representatives on the "co-participation" bodies be elected by general assemblies of voters, that their mandates be constantly renewable and revocable, that they report back to general assemblies, that there be no secrecy of information and meetings of "co-participation" bodies be open "to the public", except in exceptional circumstances. As well, these representatives must carry demands from the general assembly into "co-participation" bodies. In this way representatives will not be cut off from those they are supposed to represent, will not be co-opted into the administration, and the "containment" purpose of these schemes can be exposed.

11. The campaign for university self-management cannot be properly conceived just as an isolated change in the functioning of capitalist society. This would envisage, in effect, the creation of a new kind of privileged-enclave position for academics, while the rest of the population remained helpless to control the most vital features of their daily work and lives.

Rather, it must be seen as part of a general movement to extend
the principle of self-management throughout society, the most important feature of which would be the development of "workers' control" in all work places. It is obvious that such democratic control can only be a farce if the owners of industry retain their present legal privilege to dominate and dictate to their employees. Thus, if it is not to be a hollow sham, a general movement for self-management must be also a socialist movement seeking to end the private ownership of capital.

The opening up of universities, and their re-casting into a truly universal role, is of vital importance if society is to develop towards socialism along a path free from the domination of bureaucrats. For the real self-management of enterprises and the whole of society in conditions of advanced technology, it is essential that all workers have a permanent access to higher education, without suffering a cut-off at an arbitrary age, or upon achieving a narrow skill of the kind so readily outmoded by technological advance. Acquiring the education needed to play a competent role in self-managed industry must be seen as a normal part of everyone's working life and paid accordingly.
The Congress and After

Eric Aarons

THE UNUSUALLY WIDE and sustained interest in its 22nd Congress shows that the Communist Party of Australia still forms a reference point for the different parts of the Australian Left, however they assess its past, its present and its future prospects. Many claim that the Congress reveals the Party to be in a state of confusion. The planners of and participants in it would be the last to deny its limitations and the existence of unresolved and knotty problems of theory and organisation, let alone the great difficulties still in the way of advance and renewal. They would accept, indeed affirm, the description of the Congress as being a transitional one. Nevertheless, the main characteristic of the Congress was precisely that it did, within the above limits, decisively resolve on a distinctive course which has been endorsed with no little enthusiasm, and will be resolutely pushed ahead by a large proportion of the rank-and-file and by committees with a significantly lower average age.

It is the friendly, and not so friendly, critics who display far more confusion as to what the Congress actually accomplished, the real meaning of the strategy decided on, and the degree of commitment to change in the indicated direction of the members of the new National Committee. Some claim the decisions represent a softer line, others equally vehemently see it as a harder line, while yet others have come up with profundities such as "the child may live or the child may die".¹ Probably the most generous non-Party comments were from outside Australia, a section of the British

¹ See for example the concluding paragraph of Rex Mortimer's review of Davidson's The Communist Party of Australia, Nation, March 21, 1970.

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Left publishing in pamphlet form the Congress documents as exemplifying the “exciting ideas currently circulating in the Australian Left".  

The main effort in the period immediately ahead will be to use the degree of clarity and unity of purpose achieved in the many practical tasks arising. Already, to a significant degree, this has been tested in the great Vietnam Moratorium movement, both as regards approach and practical participation. Thankfully, this movement proved to be far too big and genuine a mass movement for any trend to establish hegemony over it. Even the Government does not believe its own propaganda about communist manipulation, nor could this have been effected even if desired. In fact the communists on principle abstained from any attempt at this and advocated actions and forms of organisation which hampered the attempts of others to that end. In the practical field the number of CP members in the localities breaking out of their previous isolation greatly increased, while in the factories and work places they were very influential in the (far too few, be it frankly said, but still significant) actions of support and participation.

Measures of reorganisation and changes in Tribune are already “in the pipeline” and will be given some practical shape at the National Committee meeting to be held just before this issue of ALR appears, while others, including the census of members and associated measures will take somewhat longer. All this involves further theoretical and practical tackling of the problem “what sort of organisation is most appropriate in today’s conditions”, a problem which was not taken very far at the Congress itself, mainly because significant ideas on the subject had not crystallised by then, but also partly because, when something began to get going as the Congress itself proceeded, there was insufficient flexibility in thought and procedures to grasp and realise some of the possibilities which presented themselves.

Any “reorganisation” will be linked up with the “opposition” in the Party. What will they do now? Nobody knows precisely, and of course the “opposition” is by no means homogeneous. But some aspects of the line of main leading figures is clear. Generally speaking they will not co-operate in carrying out the decisions of Congress. Some are already acting to restrict the sale of Tribune, collection of money, absenting themselves from discussions about

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2 The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation reproduced the “Statement of Aim’s, Methods and Organisation” of the CPA, and “Modern Unionism and the Workers’ Movement.”

3 The same stand has been taken by the CPA for some time in regard to international organisations.
practical work in the industrial field, on the Moratorium, etc. This was quite predictable; but what will they actually do? Will they get out some sort of a paper (there have been rumors, and there has been an unnatural lull from the “Marxist Publication Centre” at Oyster Bay). Are they concentrating their forces for the next Congress in 1972 in the hope that the “new line” — with some help from them — will discredit itself? Perhaps; but it is hard to see that they could have any real expectations of succeeding in the future when they failed so signally on this occasion. Will they set up a new Party? De facto there is already another leading centre, but there are many difficulties in the way of formally completing the process. Some of these are practical, and these are formidable enough. But perhaps the greatest difficulty lies outside Australia, in that such a step might take more explaining away than is convenient in a still far from tranquil “international communist movement”.

But in any case all the options do not lie with rabid opponents of the Congress, and adherents of its decisions, and many others who may still have considerable reservations would firmly rebuff splitting moves which would expose the hypocrisies of the repeated protestations by the main opponents of the present policy of their “loyalty to the Party”. There is a growing understanding of and support for the position taken up by Congress that:

The Communist Party, in seeking to add to its members and influence, welcomes into its ranks all socialists who share its basic ideas, even though they may differ on some points, provided they are prepared to act in support of these basic ideas, and accept the rules and constitution of the Party. These conditions are necessary to enable the organisation to take concerted and effective action, and would be impossible if differences of view were regarded as more important than unity round basic ideas.

Although putting into effect Congress decisions and giving some reality to the desired “reorganisation” will be the focus of attention for some time to come, a parallel task is the giving of greater and wider theoretical and ideological substance to the new orientation. This is of course a much longer-range affair, depending more and more (for the Party and for everybody else on the Left) on conscientious and fearless re-working of the existing theoretical legacy and parallel integration of the mounting volume of new thought and scholarship now coming from Australian as well as overseas sources. In a period of upheaval and rapid change many on the Left seek to recapture or reinforce the “stability” of their old frameworks, perhaps revamped and made more sophisticated,

4 Just after the foregoing was written a circular appeared under the names of A. Watt and E. Ross, announcing the launching of “Socialist Publications” and appealing for financial support to publish a newspaper, journal, pamphlets, etc.
but such temptations to adopt a New Orthodoxy will not produce solutions.

In general Congress, in its preparation and level of debate as well as in the subjects discussed, left a lot to be desired. But this recognition needs to be tempered by realisation—especially by those who did not participate in the process and, perhaps because of this, display little consciousness of such an elementary fact—that the CPA is a real organisation with a real history made up of real people; that it was this organisation and these people who had to adopt a new course, not some other or ideal organisation (where?) or people (where?) who could start from the beginning again armed with the sum total of extant political wisdom. Thus there was criticism of the fact that the meaning of being "anti-Soviet" received great attention in the course of preparation for Congress. But could it have been otherwise? And some observers who gave some recognition to the historical legacy even claimed that this was the main framework of Congress discussion, though no objective perusal of the sum of speeches could possibly support such a contention.

In this connection too, claims that an equivocating attitude was taken up towards the socialist countries, and the Soviet Union in particular, hardly bear examination. This was in fact one of the liveliest debates of the Congress, and while there were different ideas originally as to how to arrive at the best results, none of the critics has made any attempt to analyse the actual resolution that was carried. If they still nevertheless feel that the Congress decisions display a hankering for the former relations, they should at least note the fact that the parties and people most directly concerned have, correctly, no illusions whatever on that score.

There has also been a good deal of head-shaking and tut-tutting over the fact that the "new course" originated from the leadership rather than from a rank and file revolt against the leadership. These remonstrations sound faintly ridiculous in view of the fact that on previous occasions they have been uttered over the fact that the leadership did not initiate moves; and more so given the changes in the final document, from the original draft, on the question of the socialist countries. Actually, of course, the leadership acted on the basis of its own beliefs as they had evolved as a consequence of past experiences, painful and otherwise, and grappling with the new situation. But neither were the rank-and-file passive, or blind acceptors in the main of the leadership's views. On the contrary, the response both in voting and expression of opinion showed that the move was a mutual one. True, the "theoretical level" of the whole CPA membership — partly a self-inflicted

5 "Whither the Party", issued by Warren Osmond and Kelvin Rowley towards the end of the Congress.
wound, this — leaves a good deal to be desired. But an elitist estimate dismissing the genuine feeling and understanding contained in many rank and file contributions as "blind following" is quite far from the truth.

The real substance of the Congress decisions however — the outlining of a strategy for the achievement of socialism in modern Australia — has received disappointingly scant attention. There has been little analysis of the validity or otherwise of the concepts advanced, and many critics whether friendly or hostile, or of the "loving-hating" variety, have taken the way of concentrating on such aspects as "Will they do what they say?" "Can they do what they say?" "What will the opposition do?" "What will the Russians do?" "The students won't flock into the Party anyway, so it's a dead duck", etc. It is not that these are not valid questions to pose, or that they are resented. But the issues of strategy themselves are the most important for serious-minded revolutionaries, and won't go away even in the event that some happy pestilence (as some would see it) or sheer inability of communists to "measure up" were to obliterate the CPA today or in ten years time. It is therefore worthwhile to examine some of these issues of strategy and such comments as there have been on them (not necessarily in order of importance).

Few seem to realise the actual significance of the debate over "the leading role of the Party". In most socialist-based countries this "principle", whatever its historical origins, has been a major ideological underpinning for the exercise of a monopoly of power and restrictions on democracy — witnessed in especially sharp form in regard to Czechoslovakia. In countries like Australia it has been a major source of support for a self-imposed ghetto in which to one degree or another most communists placed themselves. They felt internally justified or comforted on the basis that even if the Party's views were not accepted now, this was more the misfortune or foolishness of those who rejected them, and that they would be vindicated in the end because people would eventually be forced by circumstances to conclude the communists had been always right, and come to them for leadership. This has been decisively rejected ideologically and (gradually) is being replaced in practice with the idea of "mixing it" with others on equal terms on the basis of individually and collectively making whatever contribution can be made in revolutionary activism and on the theoretical front, coupled with a real open-mindedness to the ideas of others, of being ready to debate and change their own ideas if rational argument and/or experience point in that direction. Thus the CPA, in its thinking and practice is looking at itself as it is in reality in the community and within the Left, and is not adopting a posture of asserting a
claim to be something it is not. There is no problem here except a psychological one, and any increase in following and influence will come naturally, on the basis of performance.

It is wryly amusing to see others now wrestling with this tattered "leading role" banner. In addition to the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) which has been in this field for some time, we have the "group of revolutionary Marxists, supporters of the Fourth International" who have recently issued No. 1 of Socialist Review. This contains an article by Ernest Mandel on the Lenin Centenary, which concludes: "The future belongs to Leninism. That's why it belongs to the Fourth International". That sort of declamation the CPA has had enough of. We'll make them a present if they wish of all the old banners on which we have inscribed similar empty declarations. It is an interesting sidelight, too, that all the Australian contributors in Socialist Review write under pseudonyms — the better, one supposes, to exercise their "leading role".

In related vein is the comment of another FI tendency "The Revolutionary Marxist Tendency" in opposition to the stand of Denis Freney in joining the CPA after the Congress. They say:

We consider that a cadre force of even as few as 500 revolutionary Marxists, uncompromising towards Stalinism and reformism and fully committed to revolutionary strategies, tactics and methods of organisation, would be inestimably more valuable to the Australian workers than the present CPA. Perhaps it would; but such pronouncements, while not perhaps intrinsically absurd, become so when those so declaring have not "as few as 500", but fewer than a score, and no apparent plan or strategy to build a party at all, nor even a formula so that one might choose the "right" 500.

The struggle for the "hegemony" of the ideas in which one believes is of course more or less inevitable and necessary, but the spirit in which that struggle is waged is of particular importance today, in view of the continuing fragmentation of the Left. The Congress documents say:

The complexity of modern society, the great variety of social forces entering on social action, the multiplicity of issues moving them, the considerable degree of spontaneity displayed, and the reactions against negative experiences of the past, such as over-centralisation and theoretical conformity, have made it clear that organisation for social change must be such as suits today's conditions.

Australian communists advance the idea of a "coalition of the left" for revolutionary social change." This recognises that there are now and are likely to be in the future a number of trends agreeing on a general perspective of socialist transformation of existing society, but differing in important respects

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in ideology, program and organisation. And
Communists seek to contribute their utmost to such a leadership by their activity, the force of their ideas, and their organisation.

Many are at pains to claim that the CPA has been of negligible account in the political and ideological field for at least 15 years (since 1956, say). If they take their own assertions seriously they should see that other Left groups cannot at the same time blame the CP for having been in a position to stop them from showing “how it is done”. Whether they are political parties or semi-parties such as the M-L’s or FI groups, those gathering around journals such as Outlook or Arena, or more recent organisations of the type of the Revolutionary Socialist Alliance, Resistance, The Queensland RSA, various student bodies, etc., the same sorts of questions must be faced. But there seems to be a marked reluctance to do so. This is said not as a debating point, but in earnest, because it is hard to see how the development of revolution can be approached seriously unless all ask themselves and frankly discuss why they have not succeeded, even if the CPA has failed.

The CPA has been accused of pre-occupation with “organisation building”, but its main purpose in preparation for the Congress (in fact since the previous Congress) has been to elaborate a strategy both to guide its own work and also to serve the movement as a whole even if only by providing a battleground on which rival strategies could contend to the benefit of all. It seems rather elementary that one socialist strategy can be adequately assessed only by reference to an alternative strategy (supplemented, of course, by criticism or contrary analysis of individual aspects).

But what is the strategy of the projected FI “party” for example? One searches in vain for anything coherent, and the only thing that stands out is the continued consideration of “entrism”, but exactly what this involves remains unexplained, while its failure to produce significant results over a period of thirty years is not analysed. The fact that there has been some success in achieving high positions in the Labor Party only pin-points the question: what is the strategy; what has been achieved by it; what is the perspective for future success; and where are the experiences illustrating its reality?

Then take the M-L’s. What precisely is their revolutionary strategy? They don’t proclaim one in any integrated way. They seem to be making something of a new turn now in practice, and possibly have a strategy that they prefer not to disclose, for some reason or other. In this connection too, while Arena, for example, could validly claim it is not the sort of institution that needs or should have a strategy, its pages have recorded, not for the first time, some vague sympathetic noises towards the M-L’s. Says Doug White of their past dogmatic and unanalytic attitudes
"those who formed the CPA (M/L) have done a lot of re-thinking since". One awaits the inner evolution of this intriguing reference.

But there are a number of the new Left apparently embracing the idea of a "Leninist Party", and criticising the CPA for not coming up to scratch by this criterion. But the main criticisms actually raised are not on the main concepts concerning strategy, but on other questions, including and in particular organisational ones. But who ever heard of a leninist party without a strategy? Or without that strategy, based as it must be on social conditions, being the key factor in determining what sort of organisation need be built? In earlier exchanges some of those now calling for a "Leninist Party" implied that a strategy was not necessary, and even that lack of one was a virtue. This may be a legitimate point of view, but it has to be argued. And even if some case is made out for this point of view, it is hard to embrace it in the concept Leninism, however defined.

To take another question; it is easy to chide the CPA with not attracting large numbers of new young forces, particularly students; but if the same criterion is applied to other definable political trends have they been more than marginally more successful? As indicated earlier, one outstanding characteristic of the new Left in Australia, America, Britain and elsewhere has been the fact that, beneath the umbrella term there exists extensive fragmentation, and there is no sign yet of any reverse trend. This is worrying for the revolutionary movement as a whole (or should be), because as the US in particular shows, the great potential of revolt and the growing difficulties of the ruling class are to a marked degree negatived by this fragmentation of the revolutionary forces. Naturally, the CPA feels keenly its inability to "do better" in this field. But some advance is being made, we are not Robinson Crusoe in experiencing such difficulties, and we feel that conceptions of how things might develop regarding the political affiliations of the students (especially) concerning both ourselves and others should not be too rigid or fixed in past patterns. Perhaps other forms may emerge in practice, given genuine application of some of the approaches previously outlined.

Less important perhaps, but still significant, is the fact that it often remains more "convenient" to be a non-CP revolutionary and say so. And it should be clear from past experience that political,

7 From Doug White's review of Alastair Davidson's *Communist Party of Australia, Arena* No. 21, p. 76. It would be interesting to know whether this rethinking involves the three fundamentals of the M-L's position: (i) "Marxism is a set of propositions, you either accept them or you don't"; (ii) the first and fundamental task of communists is to support and accept the leadership of the Communist Party of China; (iii) acceptance of "the leader" principle locally. Or is it only tactical? See *ALR* No. 5, 1969, p. 25.

8 Osmond & Rowley, "Whither the Party."
economic and academic discrimination still finds a way even in such cases, and that anti-communist ideology affects adversely the Left as a whole, not only the Communist Party.

The attitude of the CPA to the Labor Party is another question on which the whole possible spectrum of positions is adopted by one or another trend in the Left, without any detailed attempt at either an over-all estimate of the Labor Party, or still less any effort to fit such an analysis into an over-all strategy for socialism. It is hard to call "a plague on the ALP" either an estimate or a strategy. Ironically it is in effect a partial return to the discredited "social-fascist" condemnation (and a call on the CPA to abandon its now supposedly "soft" line to the ALP in favor of this).

Then there is the opposite reaction, of a section of the ALP Left and others that the Congress decisions represent a return to a "hard" line by the CPA. Seemingly they do not see that a greater emphasis on developing and expounding an independent position — certainly involving more consistent criticism and contest of ideas — does not of itself imply a turning away from co-operation where this is possible, or any playing down of the mass influence of the ALP and therefore the vital importance of the ALP to the mass movement and its development (or retardation). Anyone inclined to adopt such a view has only to review the course and success of the Vietnam Moratorium to find antidotes to this.

The CP attitude to the Labor Party is a complex one — inevitably, one would argue, because of the complexity of the reality with which it deals — and the considerations involved are set out at some length in the Congress document. In view of this it is depressing, though not unexpected, to find that one FI "theoretician", amid a whole number of quotes from the document, omits the following key section dealing with the question as to how the Labor Party could become a very important part of a future "coalition of the Left".¹⁰

Such changes in the Labor Party cannot be expected to occur simply or easily. They would require much experience by Labor Party members and supporter in political upheavals. They would require increased understanding by committed socialists within the Labor Party organisation and sustained efforts by them to expose the contradictions of capitalist society. They would entail the rejection of rightwing views and the reform of the party organisation to allow the active participation of members, trade union affiliates and supporters in formulating and deciding policies.

A Labor Party developing in this way could become a very important part of a future "coalition of the left" for radical social change and socialism.

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We do not suggest that here is the whole answer, but it is less than objective to claim that the attempt is not being made especially when the Congress decisions also stress that such changes in the ALP would need to be paralleled with a determined and sustained (as it will need to be) effort to change the situation in the trade union movement and the industrial working class.

Here again, speaking of the industrial working class one is struck by the variety of opinions among the Left, raising larger questions of strategy which it is seldom attempted to argue out. One view holds that theoretical considerations deriving from the progress of the scientific and technological revolution mean that the new strata will be the main actor in the future revolutionary drama. Assuming this could be established, what one fails to find is any treatment of how the industrial working class, nevertheless, is to be viewed. They won’t “die out”, even over many decades. Is the revolution to be made against them, or with their neutrality, or what? Strategy cannot ignore these questions, and strategy must be given effect in activity. In the United States a section of workers have now been mobilised to act against the anti-war movement; here a section of workers acted for it. Is the one, or the other, pre-determined? Then one finds all sections of the FI verbalising at length about the CP’s present failing among the workers, and while talking about the decisiveness of the working class unable in practice to develop significant actions or connections, and explaining their (but not our) shortcomings by reference to “objective difficulties”.

It is interesting to compare reactions about the CPA and the working class with that of the ruling class itself. The May issue of The Employers’ Review said:

Despite the fact that it is presently unpopular in some quarters to talk of the influence of communism within the Australian Trade Union Movement, and considered by some to be inappropriate for the present industrial situation to be traced back to the influence of communists within trade unions, there is, nevertheless, a need for thinking Australians to undertake a re-appraisal of the situation.

For instance, what was said and decided at the 22nd National Congress of the Communist Party of Australia over the recent Easter week-end, has a great deal of pertinence to every worker and employer in Australia — indeed to every member of our community.

Before considering an examination of events at the four-day long meeting, a myth must be disposed of. That is the constantly repeated “they have only four or five thousand members (some writers put the figure lower) — what harm can they do?” — what harm indeed!

It is clear to observers in industrial relations that a small group of determined flexible communists can cause havoc in industry.

One communist, working in a sensible manner, can completely alter the mood and aims of a work-force of about fifty within a month.

11 Rex Mortimer in “Student Action — Out of Nihilism”, A.I.R No. 24 recognises the problem but offers no solution in meaningful terms.
There are many more sympathisers with the aims and methods of the C.P.A. than there are members, and generally the C.P.A. prefers this position. Additionally, the position taken up by an estimated 200,000 ex-C.P.A. members in Australia is of importance. Only a small fraction of this number turn against the party. Some want merely to be left alone; but the majority have imbibed the theories of communism and still have some belief in them. Most of these ex-communists are just as ready for militant action as are C.P.A. members.

It may be expected of course that these statements contain an element of use of calculated anti-communist ideology. But for all that they show a more objective approach than by many on the Left.

Another oft-repeated criticism of the CPA's strategy is that it is an eclectic one, designed moreover in an opportunist way to merely "gain support" by adopting others' demands. The inconsistencies in this assertion are manifold. To mention only three: (1) the really eclectic position is one which has only individual points of reference and no developed over-all strategy — a position which has more in common with the positions of its critics in the left rather than of the CP; (2) to demonstrate the eclectic position of a strategy such as the CP's would require demonstration that the demands and principles it raises are internally inconsistent — something no-one has even attempted to do; and (3) if the CP really were adopting this or that view or demand just to win favor it would be necessary to explain why issue is taken, as in this review, with the views of others, including friends.

There is no doubt that as the CPA began to listen to its critics and fearlessly sum up its experience it began to learn, and one would hope that this will continue. And there is certainly no shortage of critics or things to criticise or experiences to be delved into. But a great deal of the post-Congress criticism displays a degree of superficiality, and in not a few cases is, we suspect, dictated by preconceived attitudes, sometimes mixed with barely concealed personal biases and pronunciamentos. Such attitudes could very well do more harm to those who adopt them than to the CP, for everything is being tested by what actually happens — and what has happened in the last three years makes a good deal of nonsense of many previous speculations and pronouncements about the evolvement of the CPA. The future is complex and opaque, but it looks like being full of activity, change and excitement — a far more favorable and interesting prospect than for many a long year for revolutionaries. All attempts to unravel the complexities of society will be tested, not just those of the CPA. How we all measure up will determine the force of our contribution.

IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS there will be a theoretical-practical crisis like nothing so far. I read an article of Robin Blackburn's from the American *Leviathan* on the rebirth of Leninist strategy in European movements, etc., but I think the only way to keep pace both theoretically and strategically with the capitalist-technological concentration-acceleration, is by exactly the antithesis of the methodology of venerating Lenin — even the "real" Lenin.

What I'm waiting for is a batch of revolutionaries that prove they are revolutionaries in thought, word and deed, that people would be hard put to show weren't revolutionaries, who read Marx and Lenin harder than most of their present so-called critical adherents, use Marx and Lenin whenever they find them relevant, and say screw Marx and Lenin when people try to turn them into demigods above history, demonic forces within history, or super-human embodiments of history. They were just a couple of men, intelligent, mostly good, quite brave, possibly over-arrogant, and an important pair of contributors to one of the main traditions we now need to continue and transform and bring into connection with other traditions, such as, for example, the incredibly important one discerned emerging from Romanticism and a whole lot of other responses to the capitalist-industrial revolution giving rise to the notion of a common culture. In itself this whole tradition is an important corrective to any single class-conflict analysis, both as to the process of which we're a part and the goals to which we hope to move, and also the strategies that will get us there.

What I'm trying to say is that we have to go on being activists, revolutionaries with the consciousness that the relations between theory and practice are possibly now specifically and irreversibly different from what they were. Before, marxism-leninism was the theory to which one converted from other traditions, if one decided one was going to become a revolutionary. But now the activism cannot, should not, will not, be contained by means of being

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directed, even guided very much by the resources of one tradition. Carl Oglesby puts the point by saying that in the advanced capitalist West our practice is far more revolutionary than our theory, and that the theory (only marxism-leninism is available as a coherent going concern) often simply hampers the revolutionary potential of the practice. Another way of coming at it would be to wonder whether we weren’t on the verge of a period of revolution so profound that many western traditions, under the pressure of new demands for sincerity in their adherents, undergo transformation to the point where their categories burst and those who live in and by them suddenly find themselves divested of them in all but habitual profession, standing in a new open space of intellectual liberation, side by side and face to face with people from other traditions, people they never expected to meet there, with whom they share sensibilities, aspirations, currents of feeling and the deeper elements of the mind for which there is no tradition.

Once there was a situation where “theory-was-put-into-practice”. That’s still done some of the time, to good effect. But often it’s to bad effect. Because in some ways it’s now true that often theorising has the function that practice formerly had and practice has the function theorising formerly had. We now could work on a theory of theory. We could also work on a theory of strategy, for it’s not enough to come up with the old syllogism of cliches: the revolutionary theory gives rise to the revolutionary analysis—gives rise to the revolutionary strategy—gives rise to the revolutionary party—gives rise to the revolutionary tactics—gives rise to the revolutionary situation—gives rise to the revolution. It’s all too linear. We need a specific theory of strategy. Even if that would only show the problematic nature of both “theory” and “strategy”.

At present the prospect for creative “strategies” has probably never been brighter in Australia. The revolution seems to be about liberating people from what Raymond Williams calls the dominative mode, and there is a sort of last bastion of this deep in the conceptual underpinnings of those revolutionary theorists whose formulas, ideologies, structures and schemes, programs and analyses are various expressions of a profound desire to master and marshall the energies that are latent in the potentially revolutionary people. It seems to me that this dominative mode of thinking, feeling and willing can be operative even in the most anti-elitist theories and strategies. Theory needs to be seen anew as a part of strategy almost, namely the most articulate form taken by the energies liberated in people by their own dialectical interplay with one another in both action and discussion, in the context of their solidarity in the struggle against the forces repressing them, both

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The forces outside them and those they have internalised. Thus the groups of revolutionaries don’t gradually appropriate the “correct” theory and then adopt the “correct” praxis. Rather, in a whole process of co-operation and interaction, individuals develop both mutually in each other and commonly in the group the theory they need to understand past action and liberate further action. Then the action liberates further intellectual-moral energies of creative self-liberation and self-redefinition that we each then go on to talk about as our latest theoretical position. Position to blazes! Things are going too fast for that, and they’re too complex and subtle for any version of correct line on however sophisticated a level of abstraction. The poor bastards who can’t see that—those people who have the enormous pretension, based on their historical ignorance, to go around regarding others as “objectively counter-revolutionary”—are going to have to catch up.

I’m getting more and more annoyed by the facile escalation of fairly abstract internationalism along with visionary-schematic notions of perfectly uniform systems of soviets, workers control in everything everywhere, brought in as soon as the workers can have the word of the new correct theory and strategy moved over their alienated spontaneity, etc., exorcising them from their racism, embourgeoisification, nationalism, etc., etc. The more grandiose and rhetorical all that gets the more I feel the need of something that’s probably anathema to the instant revolutionaries, namely a new kind of love of the country and the people of the country, a bursting out of the alienation (in the non-marxist sense) from everything in “square” Australia that’s almost become the bitter little badge by which the university leftists recognise one another. It seems to me we’ve been through the possibly necessary phase of breaking away from, repudiating a lot of the pasts out of which we’ve come, and it’s been painful enough for a lot of us, in terms of family disagreements and the rest. But that can become and has become a bit of a fetish. We’re fools if we think we can reject the past rather than totally recreate our connections with it, emergences from it and modes of repudiating it. The time has come, it seems to me, to realise the sober fact that we live and will live for some time in a nation-bloc, a historical nation-bloc, an epoch which won’t and can’t transform itself into an internationalist one until huge masses of people are prepared for such new attitudes. They’re the people who live in country towns and suburbs, and in provincial mentalities wherever they live. Gramsci talks about “passionate bonds” and it seems to me we don’t have enough passionate bonds with the country or the people. We don’t really love the people in any tough realistic sense that can survive actually meeting them, arguing with them, organising with
or against them. I'm not talking about nationalism or even about patriotism, but about something deep in the instinct for social change and in the motives for desiring social change, something that can't be organised into existence, something that exists under alienation whether in the marxist or the vaguer contemporary sense, the sort of thing that led people to feel that Lenin was somehow very Russian, very much of the Russian people; that obviously permeates the spirit of the Cuban revolution, and Mao, and quite obviously the Vietnamese revolutionaries. Perhaps in countries as corrupt as ours and America things have got to the point where the disgust with the so-called "representative" people and institutions is so profound and so subtly interpenetrated with daily life that it seeps into one's feelings about the very look, smell and feel of one's fellow countrymen and the countryside itself. But if so, this is a condition that can't simply be accepted as the state we're all in or as some kind of highly appropriate response to the situation.

The time's come to stop using our convenient abstractions for the real world in either the universities or the trade union movement. How many of us have any real sense of the social and economic topography and the institutional geography of this country, the way a country town operates in terms of its channels of power and influence, the role now played by its floating "intelligentsia" of school-teachers, radio (or TV) young-men-going-places, reporters on the country newspapers, etc., different powerful social pressure groups, exercising power almost by default (RSL's, etc.). Perhaps this kind of nation-wide infrastructure of revolution can't be built up until issues actually take lots of us into the breadth and extent of the country. It's an interesting difference between our student movement and America's that we didn't begin, as they did, with some hard facts to digest about the attitudes of provincials (voter registration, freedom rides, lunch-counter sit-ins, community organising). Not that we haven't got the sort of issues that might take us into the thick of that kind of thing both in the towns and in the country.

On the more specific issues concerning the CPA*: Maybe the major questions of strategy cut right under the present or any foreseeable organisation of the CPA. I think we ought all to restructure (and decentralise) into socialist-anarchist oriented nuclei in all the major matrices of the socio-economic and educational and communications centres, the role of which would be (i) to facilitate people's awareness of their present condition under

* Questions posed by ALR included: the main theoretical problems for marxists today; strategy, and those issues unanswered in the CPA decisions; the concept of counter-hegemony; organisation of revolutionaries in today's conditions; revolutionary responses to reformism and the united front; the political practice of the CPA, past, present and future; attitude to the opposition in the party; attitude to the USSR.
neo-capitalist industrialised nation-blocs in an increasingly economic-imperialist system (ii) to educate and learn from them as to how to liberate ourselves from the complicated involvements we all have in the present set-up (iii) to make available the theoretical and strategic resources of the whole left tradition to contest the animating ideas, habits, structures, etc., of the present order.

Things of obvious importance, especially now, are topics like dual power, the commune, democracy, recall, counter-culture, counter-institutions, etc. But these should be presented to people with more trust for what used to be called "the spontaneity of the masses". (I'm a bit unsure that "masses" is a useful concept—see concluding chapter of Raymond Williams Culture and Society.) At the very least they shouldn't be presented, as they currently are, as half-understood formulae. Much of the workers' control, self-management stuff is being presented in an incredibly boring and repellantly schematic "we'll save you with this handy ointment" kind of way.

I don't know how consistent those suggestions are with the way the CPA now works, is organised, distributes its intelligence and militants, organisational skill and physical plant. Or with the rather odd mixture now apparently emerging of electoral-suburban and "interest" regional groupings. I feel as though the CPA might be coming up to new organisational crossroads overlaying deep theoretical questions going to the root of marxism. It seems to me that up to now most left strategies have been based on the premise of a disjunction in the revolutionary forces between an elite and a mass of people who don't really have to be highly individuated or profoundly conscious of much more than the need to take part in the process leading up to and effecting "the" revolution (takes a number of days, weeks or months). After "the" revolution the leaders begin the process of making the mass into people more like themselves, the leaders, i.e. more individual — by better feeding, housing, education and hopefully better freedom, justice, communal control, etc., — till the state withers away, etc. From that position it was a five-finger exercise in "scientific socialism" to pick off the woolly-headed anarchists who thought you could ignore the state and over-estimate the people from very early on in the process.

I'd say the basis for that disjunction has probably already begun to be eroded. I don't think there'll be elites who have any more total knowledge of society than anyone else. There'll be, if you like, a number of different competing kinds of "total" knowledge, all inadequate (both methodologically and in empirical and structural detail) that will only transiently and precariously define one elite off against another. A breath of intellectual fresh air will be enough
to blow down the walls between them (call them factions or tendencies or whatever you like) and constitute (i) a squabble if we're unwise and unlucky and ungenerous or (ii) a communal heart or centre for a powerful revolutionary movement if we can only come of age conceptually. What the groups composing this centre (community, heart of mind and will towards permanent revolution, switchboard, focus, synthesis or whatever you want to conceptualise it as) will mainly have to offer is not the old style teaching, leading and master-minding element but rather a set of valuable past experiences within one tradition now hopefully merging with others towards constant revolution (Che's society and great school, etc.); these past experiences translated by much deeper reflection than we've yet made on them into usable contributions about strategy and tactics, particularly concerning the more traditionally political and social framework-type questions, including (a) how to build up consciousness of the straight out class-as-process and power elements of the preparation for decisive take-over phases in various areas and stages and (b) organised insurrection, non-compliance on a mass scale, etc.

That's the elite side of the disjunction. The thing about the masses is that there now aren't any. Except at football matches, in certain frenzied periods of war encounters, riots, etc. For the rest, there's the many different processes of "massing" people that Raymond Williams has spoken of at some length in his books. (I'm talking about revolution in the advanced countries, of course.) People are reduced to "masses" for the convenience of consumer-individuals by the many institutions of technological-capitalism (and technological-bureaucratic-communism) e.g. department stores, industry methods of production, communications media, government departments and so on. If there are masses they result from the fact that there are powerful classes who need to limit human communication and the consequent individuation in their own interests.

Likewise if there are masses they occur (in "advanced" societies) not in times of revolution but in times of managed social stability under the system that needs the revolution. The fact is, if there is going to be revolution, it will be made not by a crowd of foxes getting the horses to stampede but by a release, on a widespread scale, of people's already present individuality, creativity, personal capacity for controlling their own lives, etc., developed even under the present system to a point that is "unmassing" more and more people daily. No vanguard is going to be able to pull the wool over these kind of people's eyes. For one thing they've been on the sheep's back for too long. For another, the range of active interests that has been politicised in a healthy and communally contributory way has been so enlarged that once the present
definers of politics and the unrepresentative institutions they’ve defined as politics begin to come under really immense attack, virtually everyone conscious and articulate in any major field of human endeavour will be having a say about and consequently acting to bring about the manifold re-definition of politics. No vanguard strategy, however sophisticated, will work because as soon as the revolutionary process begins to accelerate (perhaps this is already true) it will be by its very nature anti-elitist — from the impulse up to the theory — and implicitly anarchist in its every move towards socialism. No-one will be able to be a socialist without being an anarchist and no-one will be able to be an anarchist except in his own fantasies without being a socialist.

That brings me to the concept of counter hegemony. This is obviously important but insofar as it’s based on Gramsci as we’ve had him presented so far in Australia it’s merely sophisticated Leninism based on (i) illusions about the nature of interpretation of various kinds of interests with various kinds of ideas and with the socio-economic set-up, and (ii) the most incredibly naive view of the nature of and pursuit of intellectual life in its more intimate connection with people’s emotional needs and other needs for world views, etc., and (iii) a really impoverished notion of the specificities of capitalism and industrialism as huge features of concentrated human systemising of attitudes, processes, structures and inter-relationships within human traditions that began before them and will endure after them. These traditions of human community go back at least as far as the agricultural revolution (as its main enduring substructure), and incorporate elements of feeling and thought that have achieved definition as “human”. They are now facing the more enormous task of transformation to incorporate industry and technology and organisation as elements of the human tradition rather than as obstacles to its continuance and self-transcendence in a new renaissance of unparalleled creativity and humanity. We have to do a lot more thinking about Marx’s notion of the transforming of the world of necessity into the world of freedom. There are other traditions that could contribute to this discussion too, like the whole Christian eschatological tradition.

One final word. I think it’s not a matter of replacing “capitalist” ideas with “socialist” ones in minds (of workers especially). To amount to anything it must be more like releasing in people the power to unleash their self-liberative energies in their own spontaneously-arising categories and ways of thinking and feeling, allowing them to sophisticate themselves in the process of dialectic that would emerge in a movement in which there were not intellectual headquarters and socialist-thinker-leaders and converted disciples,
but rather thoroughly and constantly improving educational relationships, with no roles like teachers and learners, but role-dissolving elements built in by the organisational demotion of any castes that tended to arise. Especially given castes with their implicit socially-conditioned over-valuation of cerebral consciousness and its modes of over-understanding and over-explaining the world at the expense of releasing those forms of consciousness and feeling that accelerate change, and those rapid qualitative intensifications of community that tend to break down outdated social divisions, e.g. intellectuals or students as against workers.

What revolutionary practice is can no longer be defined by reference to any very clear revolutionary theory. The most incredible things (previously not even seeming to be action — as distinct from what? — contemplation, meditation, thought?) may now have revolutionary implications. The whole concept of praxis needs to be re-thought — maybe along similar lines to Marcuse's early assertions ('66 or thereabouts) that in present conditions any kind of theorising was potentially subversive, or Sartre's view of literature as a secondary form of action in the world, action by re-description or re-definition. But not only is there no adequate revolutionary theory to serve as the criterion of "revolutionary this" or "counter-revolutionary" (or "reformist") that: there is also the need to out-grow our native tendency to talk as if certain issues were revolutionary by their very nature and not others. One's almost tempted to echo the piety of a bygone age and say to the revolutionary that all things are revolutionary.

On the organisation of revolutionaries I haven't got much to offer apart from all the implications of the above except to suggest that organisation should more and more be deliberately conceived as probably a temporary adjustment to a fast changing set-up, and it should be underpinned by an acceptance of the principle that the movement is more important than any of its organisations and that its least important organisations are those that identify themselves too readily with the movement and the movement too readily with themselves. A function of the above is the proposition that the theory of an organisation is not something to which all its members subscribe. The theory of an organisation is the foliage, or rather part of the foliage, not the root. I could conceive of an organisation producing a dozen manifestoes, rather than one that took months of re-hashing, haggling, increasingly uncreative concession and counter-concession to produce. That seems to me to be the same kind of choice of creativity or conformity that we're saying should be made in so many other fields. Why preserve conformist ways of saying "don't be conformist" or routine ways of organising for a spontaneous society?
Don’t waste time **attacking** reformism, except at times of crisis and needful choice. Rather invade intellectually and practically the areas of social theory and action where reformist theorists now hold almost undisputed sway, and integrate those concerns with concerns already included in revolutionary perspectives. I mean things like housing, underprivilege, education, local government, urban problems, etc., etc. Snedden’s new ACTU approved anti-strike procedures, all the areas where the creative thinking is now being done mainly by people like Gough Whitlam and Bob Hawke.

On the united front and lowest common denominator politics, I think they should be eschewed if it means any form of soft-pedalling or disguise or manipulation. But I think a lot of naive bullshit is talked about ventures misdescribed in those ways by left-left-leftists (or fools as they used to be called). I mean ventures in which any numbers of different kinds of people are involved and in which revolutionaries too could be involved, raising explicitly and publicly, undisguised, the question of the need for revolution and the connection of the issues at hand to revolution.

The CPA’s future possibilities seem to me to depend on looking at the advantages it has:

1. Australian idiomatic presence and history within the life of this country since the 20’s.

2. Rootedness in the trade unions and economic life generally.

3. Good regional and cross-institutional link-up, especially the urban-country spread.

4. **Tribune** has the makings of a focus of revolutionary agitation, publicity, organisation across the country.

5. Experienced militants and theorists capable of contributing to the emergence of a new and qualitatively superior synthesis and dialectic with the new revolutionary forces. But you may have to go deeper down and further out than many of you seem at present to anticipate. You may have to go further than being the most open Communist Party in the international movement and become the most open ex-party or something likely to risk being called that by the rest of the international movement.

I can see how loath to risk the secular equivalent of schism or heresy many may be, but it may even within the “liberal” or “revolutionary” communist international get to the hard choice between principle or convenience of remaining within some
sort of "family" or even a very hard strategic choice that would split the party again, giving rise to a new grouping that doesn't care much whether it's called communist or not. But, of course, this is all a bit speculative.

6. The best physical plant and with it the kind of natural "home of the homeless left" authoritativeness that everyone's almost constitutive materialism even on the "idealistic" left gives to it. After looking at these advantages I think you ought to decide how to re-arrange them, starting without certain preconceptions that seem up to now to have inhibited the reform of the party, including belief in the need for a party, however newly defined. I can see, however, that decisions as radical as some on the rearrangement might be, might possibly have to await further clarification of the nature, strength and permanence of the non-CPA revolutionary and radical movement in Australia.

Attitude to CPA's present opposition: "I'd say let the thousand flowers bloom. In which I'd include things like the majority of the party (the "goodies") talking to the many other left groups in the country and the real concerns of the living movement far more than to the dissident one-third. I wouldn't rule out public and vigorous disagreement on principles, strategy and tactics by the majority liners and the minority liners before any and every kind of audience, including the press, the university campuses, the high schools (ha ha), but most importantly the man on the job and the rank-and-filers in the trade unions. Screw unity based on anything but (at the least) fundamental humanist and libertarian socialist assumptions and the ability to stomach one another's attitudes to the human spirit. As embodied in the Vietnamese people and the Czechoslovaks.

If the majority of the party is going to use its power against the minority let them use it to determine the issues to be debated and the people to debate them with, not to machine-politik the minority into an insignificance that will produce a set of emotional cross-currents sucking the party back down into the swamp of ideological-rationalising infighting and vindictiveness. Surely the whole exercise has not been to produce a majority saying the right things in an Aaronite chorus, but rather to facilitate talking about and organising around the issues of the 70's rather than the non-issues of the economic-determinist non-history or the pseudo issues of the exhumed 30's. Let the dead bury their dead and talk to the living (or at least half-living) movement.

As for the USSR, I hope they get to the moon, especially the bureaucrats.
Interview with Markos Dragoumis

ALR: On April 21, 1967, a military coup took place in your country. Did the coup really come as a surprise to the left?

DRAGOUMIS: This particular coup by this particular junta at this particular time came as a surprise to everybody except those who took part in it. We on the left had always subscribed to the theory that if a coup were to take place in Greece — and we had repeatedly stressed this possibility — it would come as direct result of the combined actions of the King, the traditional right who are organised in the National Radical Union (ERE) and the representatives of US imperialism.

A fortnight before the coup we concluded that two of the main pillars of reaction within Greece had opted for a “parliamentary” solution of the crisis. The King had agreed to elections and appointed the leader of the right, Kanellopoulos, as Prime Minister to organise them. We had also assumed that the Americans would think twice before risking a coup at a time when their Vietnam policies were under heavy fire both in Europe and at home. What we feared was a repetition, on a grand scale, of the rigged elections of 1961 with the Army and the police securing a safe majority for the right. In the event, the coup took everyone by surprise, including the King and Mr. Kanellopoulos who was among the first to be arrested. Over-simplified analyses and failure to study the very structure of the various forces threatening democracy in Greece led us into error. Circumstantial evidence about American involvement and fore-knowledge of the coup included, for instance, the advice to families of American diplomatic and the military personnel in Athens not to leave their homes and go out in the streets on the night of April 21. However one does not need to rely on this kind of evidence to ascertain the American involvement. The junta relies on the Pentagon and the NATO military command for their military aid and support and the American 6th Fleet pays regular visits to Greek ports.

Dr. Markos Dragoumis is a prominent member of the Greek Patriotic Front (PAM).
He recently visited Australia seeking moral and financial support for the struggle of the Greek people against the military junta, and just before he left gave this interview to ALR.
A former member of parliament, he has been an activist since his student days, and was interned for a year in 1955 in a political prisoners’ camp.
He was abroad when the junta seized power on July 21, 1967.
ALR: It has been said that the leadership of the Greek Communist Party abroad has warned communists in Greece about the imminence of a coup and that these warnings were disregarded. Is this true?

D: No it is not. We have heard the story and we have asked for concrete evidence which has not been provided. When was this warning issued? Why did this leadership not make the warning public? In fact the General Secretary of the Party, Kolliyannis, in his closing speech at the 10th Plenum, held a few months before the coup, did not even mention the possibility let alone give directives as to how such a coup was to be faced by the Party. Let us face the truth: Nobody expected this coup at the time it occurred. As for the leadership of the CP, they were mainly preoccupied with the problem of the legalisation of the Party, not with taking measures to avert an imminent coup.

A.L.R.: Isn't it true however that a coup was always possible, even probable, in Greece and that the left ought to have had some contingency plan to face it in case it happened?

D: This is true of course. I will try to explain what happened. It should be clear that we are discussing the unpreparedness of the left to face a coup, not necessarily its possibility to avert it. To believe that the left could have averted any coup at any time is a case of wishful thinking; but to believe that with proper contingency planning it could have avoided being caught unawares is, I think, more realistic. Our unpreparedness can be ascribed to the following main causes:

First the leadership of the CP had, after the events of summer 1965 (i.e. the dismissal of the lawfully elected Prime Minister George Papandreou which produced mass demonstrations and even a general political strike) under-estimated the determination of US ruling circles to clear up the situation by any means. On the other hand the leadership overestimated the effectiveness of mass political struggles and their potency against an enemy who controlled the Army and the police.

Second the peaceful road to socialism was interpreted by the leadership of the CP in the narrowest possible sense leading to a series of legalistic errors in estimating the enemy’s intentions. In a country where a dynamic democratic movement has been so long contained by police persecution, intimidation and political manipulation, the normal functioning of political democracy (even distorted, even impeded by the exceptional laws of the period of the civil war) was a danger in itself for the powers that be, and a democratic majority emerging through elections might have ended
the police state and taken the country towards more and more advanced forms of democracy and independence. Moreover, after the elections of the 29th of May — which never took place — it would have been more difficult to organise coups since one of the issues of the elections was to bring the army under civilian control and stop the King's interference in politics. In such a situation the blind insistence of the left on playing the game of peaceful evolution without considering that the enemy might at some stage stop the game by force, was an error.

These are the reasons why the preparations for an eventual coup were completely disregarded. Whatever communist organisations there were before the coup in Greece were not involved in planning action in case of a coup, not even securing printing facilities or a network of emergency hideouts for those militants who might have to go underground. I would like to stress here that the problem is not whether or not there were too few communist cells in Greece but what they were supposed to be doing. Those cells that existed were certainly not prepared to take over an underground struggle if the legal party of the left, EDA, were to be dissolved and its leaders arrested. It is indicative that the then leadership of the CP decided to reconstitute its party organisations in Greece in 1965, 7 years after having dissolved them in 1958. This decision of the 8th plenum in 1965 was taken because the CP felt conditions were ripening for it to become a legal party following the defeat of the right at the elections of 1964. The establishment of CP cells within the organisations of EDA was a sort of semi-legality for the party even though this meant that the cells were not much more than discussion groups. It can be argued that the creation of cells, completely independent of EDA, having as their primary concern the preparation for a coup and manned by communists relatively unknown to the police who would operate in strict secrecy as if the dictatorship was already established, could have had very beneficial effects, but this did not happen. When the coup came the underground organisation had to be built from scratch by the very communists who were the leaders of EDA.

These facts are not contested even by the Kolliyannis group who call themselves the leadership of the CP today.

**ALR: How has this split in the Greek CP come about?**

D: Immediately after the coup the members of the Central Committee of the CP within Greece went underground. Under the guidance of the Bureau of the Interior, that is the four member body which was in charge of the work of the party within Greece before the coup, they started organising the resistance against the
junta. Nine days after the coup the "Patriotic Front" was formed by Mikis Theodorakis, Andonis Brillakis (a member of the Bureau of the Interior), youth leaders and others not belonging to the left.

Almost three months after the coup the 11th Plenum took place abroad without the participation of, contact with or the knowledge of the members of the CC working inside Greece. As soon as contact was established the Bureau of the Interior sent a message to the leaders outside Greece which in essence said that discussion of the main problems facing the party should include them. They stated that it was a mistake to hold the 11th Plenum without them. While this plenum had simply opened the discussion the next would analyse the situation, call for the convening of a "representative body" (possibly a conference since a congress was difficult under the circumstances) and decide upon the responsibilities for the past, the line of the party, its alliances, the forms of struggle and the organisational structure. It was essential that members from within Greece should take part in this.

Suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, in February 1968 the members of the CC in Greece heard over the radio that the 12th Plenum had been convened and at the suggestion of the General Secretary, Kolliyannis, and that the four members of the Politbureau who were present had demoted the other three and that this decision was ratified by the votes of twelve full members of the CC abroad against nine full members opposed. Very serious accusations of "right wing opportunism", "factionalism", etc., were made against the dissidents. Such a serious vote was close enough but taking into account the alternate members of the CC there were actually 19 in favor and 19 against. Even more serious was the fact that a number of new members totally in support of Kolliyannis were then coopted both to the CC and the Politbureau.

The comrades of the Interior (whose number when added to the dissenters abroad placed Kolliyannis automatically in a minority) chose to resist this coup within the party. They suggested a new plenum, and suggested that the 12th Plenum should be considered as having never happened. They asked for a new plenum with the composition of the CC as it was before the 12th Plenum. This demand was rejected by Kolliyannis time and time again. When comrade Brillakis, representing the Interior, came out of Greece in June 1968 he was told by Kolliyannis that the validity of the 12th Plenum was to be the starting point for any discussions. Brillakis, representing the Interior, refused this.

From then on the split deepened and crystallised. The Kolliyannis group used all the means at their disposal to attack opponents within the Party. First they "purged" the party in a most unortho-
dox way. The criterion of whether or not someone was to be regarded as a party member was his acceptance of the validity of the 12th Plenum. Those questioning it were left out, not always expelled but simply barred from taking part in any of its organisations. In the EDA organisation abroad wherever the Kolliyannis group was in a minority they set up a parallel organisation. They did this quite recently in the “Patriotic Front” (PAM). First they announced the appointment of Tony Ambatiellos as the representative of PAM and maintained this despite the fact that the National Council of PAM made it quite clear in their underground paper Nea Hellada that the Front was represented abroad by Brillakis. Then desperate because the communists inside Greece, within the Front, did not recognise their action they set up a new body which they called “Central Committee of the Patriotic Front”. They have attacked by all the means put at their disposal by various socialist countries, leaders such as Glezos — our national resistance hero — and more recently Mikis Theodorakis.

ALR: Is it true that they are a majority as they claim?

D: In a way they are more than that. They are the totality, the absolute unanimity, because their argument has become entirely circular. If a communist must accept the 12th Plenum then there are no communists opposing it any more. The truth of the matter is that amongst those who were members of the party before the 12th Plenum something like 25-30% have stayed with the Kolliyannis group. The CPSU supports the Kolliyannis group of course. But this fact cannot guarantee a significant part in the resistance. This requires the loyalty and dedication of Greek communists.

ALR: Have the differences between the communists inside Greece and those abroad been on matters of procedure all along?

D: No. But the demand for respect of the rules and the constitution of the party was decisive after the 12th Plenum. As things stand now the majority of the CC represented by leaders of the Interior plus “dissenters” abroad have the following differences with the Kolliyannis group. First democracy within the party. Democracy becomes a weapon in the struggle only if those in the struggle who risk torture, or life imprisonment, have the confidence that their opinions and views will be taken into account. Democratic procedure is not a luxury for easy periods. It is a method for the party to assimilate the wisdom and the inventiveness of all the militants. It is the only way that the party can become a “collective intellectual” as Gramsci put it.
Second, autonomy of the Greek CP. This must not be confined to lip service. Thus, for example, the CP regretted the invasion of Czechoslovakia while Kolliyannis hailed it as a success against “right wing opportunism”, and the CP criticised the trade agreements of certain socialist countries with the junta. Autonomy cannot mean blind faith that the parties of some socialist countries, particularly the CPSU, are always right.

Third, the principle that what is to be done in Greece must be decided there. The CP has established the pre-eminence of the Interior, of the leadership inside the country. Not all its leaders are in Greece all of the time but the decisions are not imposed from without. The Kolliyannis group is out of touch with Greece. This has been the main reason why it has had so little success in co-operating with any other non-communist anti-junta forces within Greece or abroad. On the contrary it has attacked viciously Andonis Brillakis for the agreements he signed with Prof. Andreas Papandreou, leader of PAK, and with the “Democratic Defence”, that is with two main resistance organisations which are fighting within Greece. The Kolliyannis group cannot accept that the Greeks who resist have coordinated their action without it. Seeking to find something objectionable in these agreements a very big lie is propagated, namely that the resistance organisations have not included in their program the abolition of the anti-constitutional laws of the civil war banning the CP. All those who bothered to actually read the agreements know that this is not true but it is being repeated by radio stations broadcasting from six socialist countries, and by the Kolliyannis Voice of Truth as well.

Last but not least, I would like to mention that the Kolliyannis group accuse the Communist Party of having become a loose party of the social-democratic variety. This is an even bigger lie. The communists inside Greece have organisations which have not been damaged by the enemy. They have proved to be efficient organisers and have in their ranks the most experienced and ablest underground workers. Moreover, the Communist Party has made it quite plain that it advocates active resistance in all forms, including violent action to the extent that it has been used till now (bomb explosions and violence against property) because this keeps the junta on its toes and increases its persecution complex. The Kolliyannis group disapproves of these activities.

In conclusion I would express the view that despite the difficulties caused by the split, the CP is being strengthened because it is seeking its own national way towards advanced democracy and socialism, and overcoming the dogmas, the authoritarian methods and the prehistoric bureaucracy which in conjunction with its lack of autonomy have harmed it so much in the past.
TOWARDS SCIENTIFIC HUMANIST SOCIALISM

ALTHOUGH — or perhaps because — I am a professional scientist, I cannot entirely agree with Robin Blackburn (ALR Apr.-May 1970) about "the debate between those seeing socialism in the humanist way and those seeing scientific socialism."

Science is concerned solely with ascertainable facts and demonstrable causal relationships, and is totally irrelevant to value judgements. A scientific approach is therefore quite indispensable when we are concerned with the best way to achieve a given end, but it can tell us absolutely nothing about whether that end is worth achieving.

Of what use is it to prove scientifically that "socialism is the form of society that resolves the contradictions of capitalist society", if most of the people of the capitalist countries retort, "Yes, but we prefer the contradictions of capitalism"? We could perhaps go on to prove that socialism will raise the living standards of the overwhelming majority of humanity, but the upholder of capitalism replies, "Maybe, but I'm too busy looking after number one to worry about other people's bad luck." So the argument could go on, until, to avoid an infinite regress, we must eventually fall back upon some such grossly unscientific but therefore unanswerable argument as "that's the way all decent people feel it ought to be." This, however, is obviously quite futile unless we can persuade our interlocutor to accept our standards of decency, and this, of course, involves a moral rather than a scientific judgement.

When Attorney-General Hughes alleges that the organisers of the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign cannot completely control all the participants, and that the Campaign is likely to lead to "actions repugnant to all decent Australians", thereby implying that he and his fellow-warmongers are in complete control of the actions of their hirelings and conscripts in Vietnam, and that the massacres, the rapes and mutilations and tortures, the laying waste of the people's homes and countryside, are being carried out with his connivance, and are not repugnant to decent Australians, we can demonstrate no scientific fallacy in his argument; we can only point out its moral implications, and hope that Australians who are "decent" by Mr. Hughes' standards are in an insignificant minority.

When External Affairs Minister McMahon threatened that the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign might lead to the same kind of tragic results as the peace demonstration by University students at Kent, Ohio, a few days earlier, he was using a scientifically valid method of discouraging some people from taking part in the Campaign. He could, of course, have equally scientifically guarded against such a tragedy by guaranteeing that armed troops and police would not be used against the Campaign. The correctness or otherwise of his choice can be judged only in moral and humanist, not scientific terms.
It has been proved scientifically that, if pollution and despoliation of the earth and its air and water continue unchecked at the present rate, our planet will be literally unfit for human habitation by about the end of this century, and the human race, along with most other higher forms of terrestrial life, will be set irrevocably on an unspeakably miserable road to rapid extinction. If, however, some business tycoon or Tory politician likes to say, "Yes, that is important, but not as important as an umpteen-billion-dollar industry," we cannot prove scientifically that he is wrong. It is, after all, neither more nor less scientific to use science for the purpose of murdering one's children for one's own enrichment (provided one can get away with it) than to use it to build a better world for one's children, but nearly everyone who is neither a business tycoon nor a Tory politician would agree that it is immoral and inhuman.

It follows from all this that, to have any social and political relevance, socialism must be both scientific and humanist: scientific in its choice of means, humanist in its choice of ends.

The supposed irreconcilable dichotomy between science and humanism, reason and emotion, knowledge and feeling, that has bedevilled much marxist thought for nearly half a century is, in fact, the product of an undialectical interpretation of Marx's theories. Robin Blackburn justifiably refers to "the marxist concept of a human nature to a great extent historically determined", but, like many people before him, argues from this as though "to a great extent" were synonymous with "entirely". Interpreted in this way, the "concept" is demonstrably false, and therefore unscientific and unmarxist.

The new-born human infant is not an undifferentiated lump of protoplasm, passively waiting like wet clay to be moulded into whatever form its environment imposes upon it, but a highly complex organism, every detail of whose structure plays a part in determining how it will react to a given environment, just as surely as its environment determines in which of innumerable possible ways it will develop. In short, no human being is formed solely by his environment nor by heredity, nor is he a chimera of environmental and hereditary factors, but the product of continuous complex dialectical interaction between the genotype and the total environment (in which, of course, social and historical factors pay a major but not an exclusive role).

The contrary view, often erroneously attributed to Marx by friend and foe alike, leads to such absurdities as the ludicrous pseudo-marxist idealised concept of capitalist society as made up of a proletariat consisting entirely of determined, class-conscious revolutionaries (forgetting that right-wing trade union bureaucrats and renegade politicians and their supporters, scabs and blacklegs, even storm-troopers, are usually of working-class origin, not to mention the late ex-house painter Adolf Schicklegruber, alias Hitler), an idiotic middle class universally incapable of original thought or determined action (forgetting that Abraham Lincoln, Lenin, and Marx himself, were middle class intellectuals), and a ruthless, monolithic bourgeoisie (forgetting that Engels, Robert Owen, and Wilberforce of anti-slavery fame, were capitalists).*

* To forestall charges of "revisionism", I must emphasise that I am not trying to refute Marx's theories on the historic roles of the classes, but only the ultra-marxist, super-proletarian view that all the characteristics of every individual are solely and completely determined by his class origin.
Without denying that accepted moral standards tend to differ between different societies, and between different classes within the same society, everyone who relies on his own observations rather than on some accepted dogma must admit that individuals vary widely even within the same class in the same society, that we all know individuals whose attitudes to some matters are quite inappropriate to their class origin and even to their epoch, while, on the other hand, there are certain basic attitudes that seem to be common at least to those generally regarded as the most advanced thinkers in every age. Every one of the world’s great religions, for instance, preaches the Golden Rule in one form or another, though they originated in different millennia and in societies in widely differing stages of development. It is also significant that identical twins nearly always show remarkable similarities in their mental and emotional attitudes, even when separated at birth and reared in quite different environments, while, on the other hand, infant anthropoid apes never develop more than a superficial resemblance to human beings, even when reared as human babies. Any social theory that fails to explain all these facts is ipso facto unscientific, and therefore unmarxist.

**BASIC HUMANISM**

**UNIVERSAL MORALITY**

It seems, then, that there is a definable “basic humanism” or “universal morality”, despite the widely different ways in which it manifests itself in different societies, different classes and different individuals. This, however, does not necessitate the adoption of any kind of idealism or supernaturalism, nor of “some ideology of supra-historical human nature”, but can be explained in purely scientific and materialist terms.

Nearly everyone nowadays knows something about Darwin’s theory of the “survival of the fittest”, but it is not always appreciated that “fitness” in the Darwinian sense has little in common with the sense in which the word is used by sportsmen and physical training instructors, or in such vernacular expressions as “you’re not fit to lick his boots”. It refers simply to the fittest to survive genetically, or, more precisely, to the possession of hereditary traits that can be passed on to the maximum number of viable offspring. The organism that lives to a healthy and contented old age and then dies peacefully with no descendants to mourn his passing, is much less “fit” in the Darwinian sense than one who lives a short but hectic life, leaving behind numerous offspring to transmit his genes to generations yet unborn. It follows that an individual prepared to risk his life for his offspring may be fitter to survive than one motivated solely by instincts of self-preservation.

Similarly, when animals band together for warmth or protection against predators, the fittest herd may be the one with most members prepared to subordinate their individual interests to the good of the herd. In this way, gregarious and altruistic instincts tend to be favoured at the expense of instincts of self-preservation, although the latter, of course, can never be completely eliminated. Every species has achieved its own equilibrium between those instincts and other traits that fit the individual for competition with others of its own species, and those which fit it for –co-operation in the preservation of the species. The fossil record shows, however, that when the former become very highly developed at the expense of the latter (as in the dinosaurs of about sixty million years ago, and in the great cats and some other large animals of present and recent times)
the species is on the verge of extinc-
tion.*

Man, of course, as the most social of
all animals (with the possible excep-
tion of the ants, bees and termites,
whose rigid, hierarchical social struc-
ture would hardly be envied even by
fascists and tories, since it provides
no privileges for parasites), has the
most highly developed altruistic in-
stincts. Moreover, with increasing
complexity of social organisation, his
social loyalties have tended to extend
from the family to the horde, to the
clan, the tribe, the nation, and finally
to the whole species. It is therefore no
accident or miracle that what is com-
mon to all the great religions and all
ethical codes that have won broad
acceptance throughout the ages, is an
emphasis on the sacredness of life, and
of human life in particular, and on
man's duty to his neighbour, on the
brotherhood of man.

It is precisely this common human
heritage which determines that all men
tend to react similarly to similar
environments, and so produces class
morailities and class loyalties within
the broad framework of our common
heritage. On the other hand, it is
precisely the fact that all men, though
similar, are not identical, that has
enabled natural selection to work upon
the individual differences among our
early ancestors to produce that com-
mon heritage which so sharply differ-
entiates us from even our nearest
relatives among the other anima's.
Similarity and dissimilarity form a
dialectical unity of opposites, as they
do in every evolutionary process.

* This theme is developed more fully
in Kropotkin's Mutual Aid, which,
though proved by later research to be
wrong in some details, is still probably
the best available text on the subject
as a whole.

In the present era, when the whole
of humanity has become socially and
economically interdependent, and the
very success of the species is tending
to exhaust and destroy the very en-
vironment that renders human life
possible, our highly developed social
instincts become more than ever es-
sential to the very survival of our
species.

There is therefore an objectively
deinable sense in which all those
who, like Nixon, Gorton, Hughes, Mc-
Mahon and the rest, preach and prac-
tise genocide and exploitation of
man by man, and consider investments
more important than human life and
a human environment, are themselves
human only in a physiological and
biochemical sense, while socially and
ecologically they have ceased to be
human and become dangerous vermin,
which must be destroyed or rendered
harmless if humanity itself is to sur-
vive.

The views here expressed are not,
of course, purely scientific, since they
imply, in addition to the scientifically
ascertainable facts I have adduced, the
aesthetic judgement that life is more
beautiful than death, the emotional
judgement that humanity should live
on, the moral judgement that our
children and their children have a
right to inherit an earth at least as
rich and beautiful as that which we
inherited from our fathers. Neverthel-
less, this is the only possible basis for
a political philosophy relevant to the
present epoch, and, arming ourselves
with this philosophy, we shall win
the world for communism, not by
appeal to scientific texts, but by
appeal to the common humanity and
basic morality of the overwhelming
majority of our fellow-men.

ARTHUR W. RUDKIN

Despite the limits the author set himself with his book (a short history, mainly for students and scholars, and primarily an institutional history with little analysis of social and economic conditions), it must still have been a very difficult task to write it, and for doing so Dr. Davidson deserves congratulations.

It is also difficult to review adequately, partly on account of this framework, for history is a unity, not the sum of separate parts. Thus there is an overall thesis advanced which has quite some validity, but it suffers from lack of depth and all-sidedness. On the other hand, considering that the book was completed in 1967, the author shows more perspicacity about the nature and decisiveness of the changes in the CPA (only then emerging) than many critics with the benefit of another three years of more obvious and rapid development.

The facts assembled are of great value, although I believe lacking in some key areas, and one would hope that the wealth of facts would mean that this would stimulate serious study of the history of the CPA. But some of the reviews and comments on the subject indicate that the conclusions have been drawn before the study, and that the worth of any work is determined by how closely or otherwise it conforms with those preconceived attitudes.

From the right we have Peter Coleman (Bulletin, May 2) whose main criticism is that Davidson “does not see the party for what it is” because he (Davidson) leaves some doubts about unproved accusations of a bashing in a union over 20 years ago, though he (Coleman) can cite none since. (It will be interesting to see what Mr. Coleman has to say about the actual bashing of a girl student by Australian racists shouting “kill the reds” — SMH May 19 — which is today, and historically, more typical — as indeed is also the case in the use of violence in the unions). Writers on the left also show a tendency to judge historical matters by whether they conform with their already decided political conclusions. (See Doug White’s review, Arena No. 21, and the resolution of a section of the Fourth International, International No. 12).

In order to try to avoid this error — admittedly difficult — I specify the three main criteria I use in judging the book: the validity of the over-all thesis; the adequacy of the facts; the accuracy of the facts.

The overall thesis is “that the vicissitudes of CPA history were due to the fact that it thought the Russian revolution was entirely relevant to Australian history. It was not” (p.183). Broken down from this broad generality there are involved such questions as the validity or otherwise of “Leninism” for Australian conditions; adoption or otherwise of the “Australian socialist tradition”; and in line with this following (or not) a policy of “National communism”.

These are all large questions which I can only touch on here. The specific meaning which might be attributed to the term “Leninism” is very difficult to define, but accepting the way Dr. Davidson uses the term, I think he has tended to accept (as the Communist Party did; as I did) what was purvey-
ed under Stalin as "Marxism-Leninism" as being "Leninism." It is not. But leaving this aside, I agree with Dr. Davidson that "marxism-leninism" was accepted mainly without question and that the results have greatly hampered the party's development. Dr. Davidson also, I believe, makes organisation ("democratic centralism" — and in its Stalinist version) a weightier part of the whole than it was, (which is not to deny that it is important). It is also hard to see on what basis it is concluded that renewed emphasis on the importance of factory organisation was "another indication that the party had not changed its (bad) ways" (p.99). Even now when factory organisation is receiving considerable attention, it is hard to see why Dr. Davidson would think it should not.

"National Communism" also means different things to different people, but taking it (as Dr. Davidson does) to mean refusal to accept the hegemony of other parties — whether Russian or Chinese — or to regard their theoretical pronouncements and policies as beyond question, and the liberation of thinking given the realisation that issues must be analysed right through by each revolutionary movement, then the CPA has now indeed turned in that direction. (Some take "national communism" to ipso facto involve a departure from "internationalism", but this does not follow from the above definition; nor is it characteristic of the CPA today.)

The question of the "Australian socialist tradition", and the supposed return to it by the CPA, is far more problematical, both in the interpretation of what that tradition might be, and the desirability or otherwise of embracing it. Leaving aside organisation, the main issue raised by Dr. Davidson involves the attitude to be adopted to the Labor Party. He says: "Indeed, the new line logically led to the belief that the role of the CPA was to be a ginger group on the left of the ALP. As in the socialist parties before 1920 which actually adopted such a role, the first question also provoked the second, 'Why stay outside?' " (p.168).

But the new line in my opinion does not involve such conclusions, either logically or in fact. And it was the tradition (it was only of a section, as Dr. Davidson himself points out on p. 4)), so much the worse for the tradition. It needed to be broken. The same might be said of the traditions of the other sections of socialists mentioned — those organised in isolated clubs, and those confining themselves to work in the trade unions. This does not mean that the attitude of the CPA to the ALP, as the mass party, has not varied widely and been gravely mistaken on many occasions; but this does not logically or otherwise lead to the conclusion that there should be a return to the "ginger group" idea. This has been followed by the Fourth International for over 30 years and by other, more traditional socialists, for about 80; but have they proved its revolutionary effectiveness?

Nor are all the changes in attitude to the Labor Party to be taken, in my view, as errors. It seems "logical" to me that as the Labor Party changes its policy (actual or declared) then differences in approach are necessary. Dr. Davidson recognises this, but seems to place equal blame for the policy of the ALP in the cold war on the CP as on the Labor Party (see last par., p.103 and first par. on p.107). I do not think the view can be sustained that if the CP had been more "moderate" in 1946-49 the Labor Party policy would have been basically different.

The stress put by Dr. Davidson on "moderation" (e.g. pp. 99, 114, 139, 142, 143, 158) has a point, of course, for many occasions. But on other occasions, including the recent period.
something quite different seems to me to be necessary. The recently held 22nd Congress documents spell out the party's present views, and for some treatment see p. 52 of the present issue. In general, on attitude to the ALP, it is interesting to note that around the time of the 1966 Federal election sections of the new left were enthusiastically looking to the Labor Party, and even joining it in some numbers. In 1970 many of the same people are "disenchanted" and dismiss or oppose the Labor Party altogether. (the same has happened in Britain). I think examination of history (which of course "proves" nothing in any conclusive sense) nevertheless provides much more evidence in support of the present CPA policy than for such extremes (to which it also has been prone in the past).

On the general question of tradition: True it is of great importance; but is more diffuse, less definable and deeper than a political attitude on a particular question. Furthermore, revolutionaries must inevitably set out to break at least some traditions: so they are not of value in themselves. And if a socialist tradition could be established in a period of 30 years (p. 4), why cannot a tradition be established in 50? I would argue that it has been, to a degree, and agree with Dan O'Neill on this point (see p. 64 on the present issue).

As to the adequacy of the facts presented it may seem captious, in view of Dr. Davidson's diligence, to raise the question. But I believe it is a matter of some substance that little is said of the CPA's consistent and considerable support for national liberation movements, right from the time of its foundation. This is not to say that there is no ground for criticism, but the general picture is very positive I believe, including on the Aborigines and New Guinea as well as for example the Indonesian and Chinese revolu-

ions, opposition to the war in Korea, and especially to the war in Vietnam.

True, Indonesia, Korea and Vietnam are all very different, but it should be clear now, if it was not before, that they all involved the same issues of anti-US imperialism in its aims in Asia, and the subordination of Australian policy to this. These issues loom very large today, but there are only passing references to them in the book. There is also a lack of treatment of theoretical development in the CPA's thinking over the period.

Accuracy of facts involves matters of substance and interpretation, as well as mundane questions. On the former I would dispute for example the imputation of opportunism in support for the Spanish Government in the civil war (p. 85); the statement on p. 93 that the "proletariat" became smaller during the war because of automation — in fact it became much larger; the view that the 12th Congress of the CPA exceeded the broadness of Dimitrov's united front (p. 78); or that Frank Johnson skillfully hid his loyalty to Hill (p. 154) — it was one of the most open secrets on record!

On the latter, most probably reflect poor proof reading. In the quotation on p. 135 "moment" becomes "movement"; on p. 63, six lines from the bottom there is an obviously out of place "not"; J. Nolan becomes J. Molan (p. 155) and Horace Ratcliff becomes Horace Ratcliff (pp. 81 and 83).

While some of the above criticisms are substantial, the book is a very valuable one, indeed essential reading. I hope all communists and all others on the left do read it because of the vital issues raised, whether one agrees with a particular interpretation or not. I agree with Rex Mortimer (Nation, March 21) that there is far from adequate explanation of the deeper causes and motivations of the changes of the
last decade, though I think Mortimer himself shows surprisingly little understanding for one who was a prominent participant in it for a period. Of course the challenge is to have a go oneself. I will attempt in a coming issue of the journal to describe the processes, as I see them, that took place in myself and the party during the 60's.

ERIC AARONS


AS, at the time of writing, six US students have been shot dead on campus by National Guards within the last twelve days, I should perhaps begin by stating that Anthony Ryle's book is neither on US students or this type of casualty. Rather, it is about the emotional problems and academic failures (not very often separate) of students in British universities, and about the role of the university in the treatment of such issues. Though much is of little direct relevance to the Australian situation, discussion of British university entrance requirements and student services from this psychological angle presents the reader with an interesting opportunity for making comparisons.

Student Casualties' fourteen chapters deal with four overlapping issues: the character of the undergraduate and his university, the incidence and nature of psychological disorder amongst students, the qualitative questions of failure (including dropping out and failure to come up to potential), and more social problems such as drug abuse, sex, suicide, and protest in the university.

The first of these sections deals at some length with methods of university selection and the student's early commitment to the nature of his future studies. He notices that, for reasons he attributes to the disturbing nature of the modern world, undergraduates tend to place more importance on subjects demanding divergent, questioning thinking such as those taught in the Arts faculty and in the scientific-cum-humanitarian subjects of psychology and sociology rather than the more ordered, convergent ones. In sheer numbers, of course, the scientists and technocrats dominate the universities: speaking as the head of the University of Sussex Health Service, though, Ryle finds his majority of disturbed students amongst the divergent thinkers.

On the subject of the student's frequently disillusioned reaction to his university Ryle, without adopting a laissez-faire attitude to the institution himself, quite reasonably also blames student romanticism: 'Basically this is a disappointment at finding that the world here is no less imperfect than elsewhere . . .'

In the light of such thought it may still appear surprising that up to 42% of undergraduates suffer from anything from mild psychological disorders up to severe disorders requiring hospital admission. The most frequently occurring psychotic disorders amongst students are schizophrenia, manic-depression and schizo-affective disorders but frequently even these cases may be brought under some control presumably since students, being young, tend to be diagnosed early. Some extreme disorders seem no less frequent amongst non-student peers. Less dangerous neuroses, however, occur more frequently amongst students, especially in the humanities, are frequently related to questions of role-identity, are often nurtured by the university atmosphere and tend to be most frequent amongst students from non academic backgrounds.
The question of student failure is so widely discussed recapitulation of Ryle’s discussion seem unnecessary. Schonell’s Promise and Performance and A.C.E.R. reports have covered Australian students’ problems in these respects thoroughly. Ryle here adds his name to the list of those advocating freer examination systems and his chapter on exam neuroses repeats what are mainly commonsense and well known arguments.

Finally, Ryle looks at the generally social problems and issues encountered in a university. Most of these differ from peer groups’ only in degree — more drugs, more protest and, it would seem, less sex characterise student life. However the suicide rate of students is three to ten times that of the students’ peers. On these issues Ryle prefers to estimate rates and to recommend university attitudes — largely of tolerance and of civil rather than internal action when action is deemed necessary. There is little attempt to seek the causes of social phenomena as these are not seen as being in the psychologist’s domain except to the degree to which case histories suggest a cause for an individual predilection.

Should this fail to suggest an exciting or original book, Ryle’s aims have not been overlooked. What Student Casualties attempts is a handbook for student advisors, tutors and, if they can avoid indulgent self-analysis, undergraduates themselves. Ryle has acknowledged the student population as a minority but one whose problems are encountered in a special environment that is at once sheltering and provocative. What the book finally demonstrates is that students are as much adolescents as their brothers in the work force and, as such, are faced with problems of identity and role transference (son or daughter to adult, social outsider to member of society) the theory of which they may well be studying at the same time in any number of academic disciplines.

On the subject of documentation the specialist may well question Ryle’s references. Student Casualties is largely a well ordered but commonsense book whose rather theory-free layout is presumably intended to present a neutral front to the bigot or unsympathetic teacher who needs to be wooed into respect for students’ individual problems and his responsibility for seeing that they are attended to. However Ryle makes no mention of child development theorists of the status of Ausubel or Havinghurst or Piaget (whose Moral Judgements of the Child — 1955 — gives a fuller account of Ryle’s own concept of adolescent development); on the subject of sex he relies on Schofield’s study that, completed in 1965, pre-dates the ‘permissive society’ and the bulk of the massive shift in sexual mores of the young and must be considered outdated. Equally unfortunately Ryle’s belief that drug takers are passive and sexually insecure or that there is no significant difference between students who have sexual relationships and those who do not are off-the-cuff and not substantiated in the text by references or case studies.

This should not detract from the general usefulness of Student Casualties. As a handbook it is so perceptive and well laid out it opens the possibility for some generalising both about the values of the student population and about the way the university may serve the students through health services that include a full time psychiatric staff, the establishment of a greater degree of teacher-student rapport and co-operation in situations where students require guidance, and administrative sympathy for the less well adjusted in the place of what is often mere bureaucracy.

Carl Harrison-Ford
Roger Garaudy

Perry Anderson

AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW

announces with pleasure

visits to Australia

by these outstanding marxists

ROGER GARAUDY is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Poitiers, and was for many years a prominent member of the Communist Party of France. He is author of several books, the latest being The Great Turning Point of Socialism.

He will be here for about three weeks in September this year, and will visit most States.

PERRY ANDERSON is Editor of New Left Review, and has written extensively on socialist strategy for today.

He will come in March 1971.

Watch for further announcements.