FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE

It may seem strange that *Australian Left Review* should publish a speech made in the Australian Parliament by the Minister for Defence and a reply by the Leader of the Opposition, more especially because these speeches* were made several months ago. At the time they received little media coverage. Their importance lies in the fact that they represent a certain evolution in foreign policy discussion.

In his speech, Mr Killen is conciliatory; there is an overwhelming impression that the government wants the opposition to maintain the traditional bi-partisan policy of support for the United States alliance and for ANZAS. The Minister agrees with the Leader of the Opposition that, in certain conditions, some military installations, that is United States bases in Australia, could become military targets. He admits that the alliance means our possible involvement in which we would prefer not to be involved, and we cannot always expect to influence the United States to behave as we might wish. No one on the left would argue with this. But in the long run Mr. Killen continues to see the world as a contest between the two super powers with the United States carrying the burden for the free nations of the world. He asks Mr Hayden, and presumably the electorate at large, to judge the United States in terms of intent.

Mr. Killen's views are a mirror image of those who place all their hopes for the future in the Soviet Union. If policies cannot be understood immediately or explained satisfactorily, one is invited to have trust.

Mr Hayden, who had recently visited various United States bases and installations, expressed his reservations to parliament about the bases. His chief concern is the base at North-West Cape. He repeats a statement made earlier to the National Press Club that Australia has a sovereign right to ultimate control of affairs on her own territory, that the present arrangements covering North-West Cape are unsatisfactory and should be renegotiated. If the United States refused, Mr Hayden, without equivocation, pledged that the US would be asked by a future Labor government to wind down its operations.

Mr Hayden's speech reflects a growing disquiet as the United States moves towards a first strike nuclear capacity. He does not want Australian foreign policy options pre-empted or determined by the United States. He makes a plea for nuclear disarmament.

Hayden's views

Mr Hayden's views are still a long way from reflecting all the concerns of those who believe that all foreign bases should be removed and that the road to security requires a break with the US alliance in favor of non-alignment; it would be easy to dismiss the speech. Yet, for all its limitations, it represents a significant change. Foreign policy will not be reversed overnight, in any case, and foreign installations could not be removed at the stroke of a pen, even if there was a much wider acceptance of the dangers inherent in all such installations.

But each base and installation is the subject of a particular treaty and each treaty could, and should be reviewed instead of being automatically renewed. A genuine review of the treaty concerning North-West Cape could lead to wider consideration of all other bases. Mr Hayden has called for an informed and

* The texts which follow have been edited and slightly abridged. The complete texts are in Hansard, May 5, 1981.
persistent discussion and debate in Australia in relation to American nuclear strategic policy and implications. A public review of all treaties would be one way to generate this debate.

Since May, when these speeches were made, further moves away from the former bi-partisan policy are evident. The Labor Opposition and the Democrats have opposed an Australian involvement in the United States-sponsored force for the Sinai, and a Labor Party defence policy, more in keeping with the genuine defence needs of an independent and non-aligned nation than one which depends on the United States, has been outlined.

**Foreign policy**

Of all the questions debated in the left, foreign policy receives the least detailed consideration. For the Labor Party as a whole, it is conventional wisdom that foreign policy is not a good election issue; indeed, foreign policy issues (it is thought), helped keep conservatives in office throughout the ‘50s and ‘60s. While it now seems ridiculous, a major electoral ploy of those times was to threaten the populace with “Chinese hordes”, and it seemed to work. A majority in the community seemed to feel the need for great and powerful friends.

The Liberal-Country Party coalition has always argued for, and acted on, policies which tie Australia closely to the United States. The coalition, under various leaders, established the United States bases and installations, offered both volunteers and conscripts to aid American wars and planned a defence capability based on American military hardware. The latest examples of this policy are the granting of landing rights to B-52 bombers at Darwin, the offer of troops for the Sinai, and the proposed purchase of F-18 Hornets. Based on this co-operation, the assumption has always been that, in times of need, the United States will reward her faithful ally with protection.

Until now, except of course as the Viet Nam war dragged on and opposition to Australia’s involvement grew into a majority, Labor has generally concurred with this approach, if somewhat uneasily.

Within the radical left, including within the Labor Party, moral positions have often been passed off as policy. Disregarding the fact that most people in the Australian community believe there are external dangers — a view which is generally misplaced but persists — the left often projects an “all or nothing” approach in its opposition to military bases and the US alliance. But opposition to foreign bases and the US alliance based on moral principles convinces very few. And the left, having recognised that much war hysteria is built on anti-communist, anti-Soviet and, in the past, anti-Chinese propaganda, often appeared merely as an apologist when it sought to counter these views.

In general the left can agree that most of the running in the arms race has been initiated by the United States and most of the proposals to diminish tension have come from the Soviet Union. But it should not give the impression that all blame lies with one side and all virtue with the other.

Another factor, which does not assist the credibility of the left when foreign policy is considered, is the tendency to “spend” defence allocations over and over on proposed hospitals, nursery schools, pensions, etc. This approach adds to the impression that opponents of traditional defence policies are unconcerned with the legitimate defence of Australia. That more money should be allocated to social services is not the issue, but proposals which sound like zero spending on armaments will never find acceptance. Indeed, one price of independence and non-alignment may be increased defence spending.

Some efforts have been made to develop a coherent policy of independence and non-alignment, but the need for an adequate defence policy to back this foreign policy has hardly been raised until now. The concept of non-alignment has been bogged down in discussions of the nature of the non-aligned movement, as if to be non-aligned is to identify with every member of that very heterogeneous movement.
The basis of non-alignment is to refuse to join either great power bloc. The key elements for a non-aligned Australia would be to end automatic acceptance of United States military policy, withdrawal from military pacts, and evidence that foreign military bases will be dismantled. When most of the bases and installations were established in Australia there was little public debate and even less information. In contrast, when landing rights for B-52s were established in 1981 there was much debate, considerable opposition and large protest actions in Darwin. While there are differing estimates on the role of installations such as Pine Gap, Nurrungar Smithfield and Omega, there is a growing understanding that all foreign bases limit sovereignty and invite nuclear retaliation.

CND campaign

This understanding has triggered off the massive European nuclear disarmament campaign. When United States military and political leaders indicated that limited nuclear war was under consideration, many Europeans understood that this is a policy which would put them in the front line. The concept of limited nuclear war is a fantasy since it assumes that the Soviet Union, a European power, would play the game according to some United States rule book. But the European movement has begun to demonstrate its opposition to all nuclear weapons systems and nuclear bases which make Europe a prime target. Australia may not be quite as vulnerable but the bases it hosts make it a target too. In Europe, most bases are in heavily populated areas, while those in Australia tend to be in isolated regions. Perhaps this explains why some of the more significant actions against foreign bases have centred on areas which perceive a distant threat — Darwin (the B-52 facility), Alice Spring (Pine Gap) and Adelaide (Smithfield).

Even if bases are not close to most cities, community awareness is growing that there is too much arms building in the world and an almost total absence of negotiations for disarmament. In the run-up to the 1980 US Presidential election the United States refused to ratify SALT II (not a disarmament measure, but a useful aspect of the process of arms control). Since the election, President Reagan has embarked on a program to increase US nuclear capacity and the options for a "first strike" have been canvassed.

UN disarmament session

Some negotiations are planned for later this year and pressure for meaningful negotiations will increase as the United Nations prepares for its second special session on disarmament to be held in the middle of 1982. The Soviet Union has recently proposed that nuclear weapons states should sign a declaration prohibiting the use of such weapons, a change from an earlier position when it abstained from voting in the United Nations on a similar proposal. But the European disarmament movement is not relying on the goodwill of any nuclear power. It is developing against the deployment of the SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union, and the planned deployment of new Pershing missiles, the Cruise, the Trident submarine and the manufacture of the neutron bomb.

In Australia, and the region, a diverse and independent movement is growing for a nuclear-free Pacific. The movement connects concerns over the arms race, the fact that nuclear weapons and/or delivery systems are tested in the region by the United States, the Soviet Union, France and China, the problems arising from nuclear power and nuclear-waste dumping and the mining of uranium which fuels the nuclear-weapons industry.

There is no easy route to disarmament; indeed, the enormity of the task immobilises many, but the debate reported here is an opening for all concerned Australians. In future issues of Australian Left Review the discussion and debate will continue. Your views on how to achieve an independent Australian foreign policy and contribute to halting the arms race would be welcome.
Joint Australian-United States Defence Facilities

Mr. J. Killen, Minister for Defence

Honourable members will know that recently the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Hayden) spoke to the National Press Club about joint Australian-United States defence-related facilities in Australia and associated questions.

A good deal of the statement accords not only with my own views but also with views of Ministers over many years in governments from both sides of the House. I welcome and value this continuing bipartisanship in regard to these important matters. I welcome particularly the honourable member’s statements about the facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar and that the requirements of his party’s policy are met at both facilities. The honourable members said: ‘In certain conditions, industrial centres and military installations in Australia could — I repeat, could — become nuclear targets. Pine Gap and Nurrungar would be unlikely targets and, in our view, Smithfield not at all’. I agree with this assessment. The honourable member very properly reminded his listeners that he and his deputy were bound by the restrictions on public disclosure about the facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar and that the requirements of his party’s policy are met at both facilities. The honourable members said: ‘In certain conditions, industrial centres and military installations in Australia could — I repeat, could — become nuclear targets. Pine Gap and Nurrungar would be unlikely targets and, in our view, Smithfield not at all’. I agree with this assessment. The honourable member very properly reminded his listeners that he and his deputy were bound by the restrictions on public disclosure about the facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar. He went on, however, to say that much of those restrictions was part of ‘obsessive secrecy’ surrounding these establishments.

I do not believe that the secrecy attaching to these facilities is obsessive. Why would this Government, or any other government, wish to maintain secrecy about the facilities when their position would be much easier if there were no secrecy?

Given the basic accord between us regarding the facilities at Pine Gap, Nurrungar and Smithfield, I am more amazed that it is the facility at North West Cape — a naval relay station — that apparently causes my honourable friends difficulties. I wish to spend some time examining these difficulties, which I believe to be lacking real substance. First, however, I wish to deal with a particular subject regarding the North West Cape station that has been raised in the Press. A newspaper recently, under the sensational headline ‘China, South Africa could use base to send war orders’ stated:

A secret treaty between Australia and the United States allows the North West Cape signals station in Western Australia to be used by any of Washington’s allies without the Federal Government’s knowledge or consent.

This means Australia could become a naval command post in a Middle East war, a conflict between North and South Korea or even hostilities between China and the Soviet Union. If the Americans wished, the North West Cape station could be used by South Africa to send orders to its navy.

Secret treaty

There is no secret treaty as stated in the Press. That is a fabrication. There is a document entitled ‘Agreed Minutes of Interpretation’. It is dated 9 May 1963 and was signed by the then Australian Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, and the then United States Ambassador, Mr. William Battle. The minutes are not 'secret'. They are unclassified. The fact of their existence has been public knowledge since 21 May 1963, when the then Minister for External Affairs affirmed their existence to the then Leader of the Opposition. Why the minutes were not tabled in the first place I do not know. It is clear enough that the reason they have not been tabled since is that their significance is purely formal. Let me deal with the first minute, which refers to Article 4 of the main agreement. The minute says:

Any use of the station by third countries would be a matter for agreement between the two governments. However, communications originated by a third government and accepted into United States channels elsewhere than in Australia would be United States defence communications in the context
of this agreement.

The minute deals with the use of the station by third countries. There was and is nothing new in this.

Before the Second World War Australia's defence communications system was linked with the systems of the then British Commonwealth countries. During the war Australia became associated also with the United States communications network. It has remained so since. Through its association with the United States and United Kingdom communications systems, the Australian communications system has been associated with the communications systems of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries, to which the United States and United Kingdom are allied. There is nothing secret about this. It has been general public knowledge for decades.

Australia has received, as it continues to receive, the reciprocal advantage of worldwide access to other parties' communication facilities. When the North West Cape station was established, there was certainly no suggestion that this co-operation between allies should cease. Already in May 1962 the then Prime Minister told this House that the purpose of the station would be to provide radio communication for United States and allied ships over a wide area of the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. In March the following year, he stated that such use was intended for allied submarines as well as for allied surface ships.

For the sake of completeness, perhaps I should add that the North West Cape station will also assist merchant ships in putting their messages into the civil network if they cannot themselves gain access to that network, or if they are in distress. That a NATO or New Zealand message might occasionally be transmitted through North West Cape does not seem to me objectionable.

Except in the broadest sense that members of the communications network are countries that share certain attitudes regarding global strategic issues, use of facilities in a member country does not involve that country's endorsement of the traffic through those facilities and related activities. Concern in that respect fails completely to comprehend how modern communications work. Once a message has been accepted into the system — and access is automatic for countries such as Australia which participate in the standing arrangements — it is normally handled by computers rather than individuals, and sent to its destination with little or no human intervention. The actual route taken by a particular message could be traced only afterwards, not predicted before or detected at the time. In large, sophisticated, highly automated highfrequency networks like the US defence communications system and those of its allies, messages are not necessarily transmitted by the shortest route but by the speediest and most reliable. Deliberately created redundancies in the system mean that there are a substantial number of alternative routes available. So even the originators of the message, let alone other countries, do not know how it might be relayed.

VLF communication

I want to say a few words about very low frequency communications to submarines. Third countries' use of North West Cape's very low frequency transmission without Australian knowledge or consent would be possible only if the third country had suitable reception equipment and also access to US cryptographic key material. It would not otherwise be possible for third countries to have access to the VLF channels without Australian knowledge because they would have to use the Australian channel. I leave it to the House to consider to what countries the United States might pass its cryptographic key material, given that this would enable the other country to read all US traffic on that channel.

The statement that, in the circumstances I have described, the North West Cape station could become a naval command post in some conflict between third countries is another absurd fabrication. It also ignores the
elementary fact that the North West Cape station is simply a relay station. It does not originate messages and could not act as a command post.

I turn now from these peripheral issues to the central theme of my honourable friend’s statement. This was a demand for new and more extensive Australian control over the transmissions of the North West Cape station because of a ‘dramatic change taking place in nuclear doctrine’. The honourable member’s description of trends in United States strategic capability and doctrine contained what I would describe as some rather elementary misconceptions. In essence, he said that the United States is moving from a doctrine of mutually assured destruction to the use of nuclear weapons as a normal part of the conduct of a war. He even speaks of the United States moving towards a first-strike capability, that is, a pre-emptive strike that effectively destroys an opponent’s ability to strike back.

In Soviet military doctrine, the distinction between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons in war is unclear. For decades, therefore, United States policy has been concerned to establish deterrence across the whole spectrum of possible nuclear assault. The United States cannot credibly deter limited and selective attack against United States military targets by threatening to wipe out Soviet cities — especially when the response might then be to wipe out United States cities. The Soviet Union has been making immense allocations of resources to the development of larger, more accurate and harder-hitting inter-continental ballistic missile forces — a highly important fact that my honourable friend failed even to mention, let alone assess in his statement to the National Press Club. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will shortly be in a position to destroy the bulk of the United States intercontinental ballistic missile force with only a part of its own. Should the United States then respond with its submarine and residual bomber force, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would still have capability for a further devastating strike. What United States President would press that button having regard to those circumstances?

United States strategy for deterrence must demonstrate to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that there is no level of attack that would not result in at least a matching loss by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Also it must demonstrate that even after attack on its inter-continental ballistic missile force, the United States would still have the capacity to take out targets of value — be they military, industrial or politico-administrative. The basic concept of ensuring that a President has a wider range of response than national suicide goes back twenty years or more. Far from being a new and dramatic change, as my honourable friend believes, Presidential Directive No 59, issued by President Carter in late 1979, was merely the latest in a long series of statements of this doctrine. Directive 59 updated basic doctrine more directly to current and prospective conditions. Four important points in the doctrine are: It does not aim at a first-strike capability; it does prepare the United States to respond to a limited Soviet nuclear attack in ways other than automatic, immediate and massive retaliation; it does not, however, assume that nuclear war could be kept limited; but it does aim to avoid automatic escalation.

What I have been describing does not amount to any ‘dramatic change’ in US nuclear doctrine, such as the honourable member claimed was changing the whole basis and justification for our cooperation in the North West Cape station. The basic principles of US nuclear strategy have been unchanged for decades. The technological developments the honourable member spoke of are in the future, and uncertain. It is not acceptable to read into them now a fundamental change in US nuclear doctrine. In any case, the Leader of the Opposition is falling into the basic error of confusing capability with will and intent. I do not deny for one moment that Australian controls are required concerning North West Cape. We must always be able to judge whether the operation of the station risks our security or associates us with policies and operations contrary to our interests. But the whole point
of our arrangements is that US strategic policy is not to be assessed simply in terms of technological capability, but more essentially in terms of intent. It is common ground, I believe, that no control measures can be effected at North West Cape. It is a relay station, not an originating station. My predecessor in this portfolio, the honourable member for St George (Mr Morrison), said in August 1975:

...the practical, realistic and effective mode of monitoring and control is certainly not a matter of intervention in the operations of the station. The proper focus of our effort is the United States global policy. If we know what that is about, we will have an accurate understanding of the type of message being transmitted through North West Cape.

Control of North West Cape

I agree with every syllable in that statement made by my honourable friend some six years ago. The statement very accurately comprehends the essence of Australia's control over North West Cape. It comprehends the limitations on Australian control in respect of practical measures. It understands the requirement for us to judge the impact of developing US policies upon Australian interests at an earlier stage, and in a more substantial way. My honourable friend, however, wants 'Australia's consent to be mandatory for all orders to initiate military action which flows from the station'. He also wants us to be 'Given firm and convincing assurances that the Station will not be used to send orders for a first-strike nuclear attack nor to initiate a limited strike.'

These demands can be expected to arouse some unthinking support. Let us look at them more closely. What these demands amount to is an Australian veto over US use of the North West Cape station. Is it reasonable to expect the US to cooperate in such a veto? Would it be sensible and acceptable for Australia to seek it? My answer to both questions is no. The US carries enormous risks and responsibilities in the global relationship with its Soviet adversary. Australia, a US ally, remote from the central theatres of strategic confrontation, cannot realistically say to the US: 'Now every time you want to send a signal through North West Cape initiating military action you must first secure our permission'. The NATO countries do not have this arrangement. The formula applying to US initiation of military action from their territory is 'notification time and circumstance permitting'. Yet they are far more directly exposed and vulnerable than is Australia.

Look at the practical implications of my honourable friend's demand. The US Defence Communications System is built on a network of redundant capacity. If one link goes out or becomes less efficient for any reason, including enemy action, other links are automatically selected by the switching equipment. There is no way, therefore, that we can select our messages coming through North West Cape. Messages, and particularly important messages such as those initiating a military action, will travel through multiple channels and facilities. The only sure way of stopping a message transiting North West Cape would be to stop all messages coming to North West Cape. In effect, we should have to close the station down. How else could we be sure, also, that our demand was being met?

Does my honourable friend understand that if the station closes down, our own communications will severely suffer, and at a time when fast and reliable communication would probably be of first importance to us? Has my honourable friend paused to reflect on how he would deal with some possible consequences of the demand he wishes to make of the United States — for example, a demand from the United States that we expose our own national traffic to its monitoring and consent, or a denial of access to the allied communications network and consequent disruption of our defence communications beyond Australia?

Trust in the United States

When we and the Americans agreed on the establishment of the North West Cape station we acknowledged and accepted the common and enduring security interests that shaped
our cooperation.

That was some two decades ago. We have seen some very large changes in the international situation and our own strategic circumstances since then. Our present perspectives and policies give far more emphasis to our independent national interests and responsibilities. Yet all parties in this House continue to acknowledge the fundamental importance to us of our alliance with the United States. We accept that the alliance still assumes a substantial community of interest and a substantial degree of mutual trust. The alliance can involve risks to our security, although I agree with my honourable friends that the risk presently associated with the joint facilities is not significant. The alliance can risk our involvement in matters in which we should prefer not to be involved.

All these positive and negative factors have to be weighed. There is scope — quite significant scope — for us to influence our ally’s policy. We cannot, however, expect that we shall always be able to influence it to the extent we believe desirable. We have to make a judgment then, and a choice. This is really what I am saying to my honourable friend. I am saying that he cannot leave his choice to the last minute as he seems to envisage. This is not sensible, realistic or practicable politics. He has to make it earlier. Nor can he, even at an early stage before the pressure of a developing situation is upon us, say to the Americans ‘Give me your assurance now about no military use and limited nuclear attack and all will be well between us,’ because, for the reasons I have explained, he will not get this assurance. So he has to ask himself the fundamental question: ‘Has the time now come when the disadvantages of the alliance outweigh the advantages, when the risks of association with some policy we disapprove of outweigh the benefits of our continuing co-operation in security matters?’

I can see the logic of his reasoning about knowledge and consent. I respect it. But I do not for one moment accept that the time has arrived or is in prospect when we need to contemplate the closure of North West Cape, of which he speaks so lightly, and the effective reduction of our alliance with the United States that this would most certainly entail. I believe, and I have sought to demonstrate, that the argument that has led him now to this extreme position is ill-founded and unsound. I do not believe that it would be in this country’s basic security interests to close down the station. Our protection against major threats ultimately depends upon the efficacy of the United States deterrent.

The honourable member rightly demands that Australia not behave as a servile client state of the United States. Surely, however, that is what his own policy involves; for he seeks to retain United States protection while reducing United States capacity to provide that protection. He seeks to retain United States protection while freeing Australia from risk and requiring all risks to be borne by our protector. This is not the attitude of an independent ally prepared to make its contribution and to accept its share of the risks.

I ask my honourable friend most earnestly to think again. I ask him to weigh the rhetoric of his fine sentiments — and let him claim no monopoly of nationalist sentiment — against the substantial national interests involved in the ANZUS alliance. I ask him to let the House know, to let the nation know, whether he believes that the time has now come in respect of North West Cape station for the alliance to be reduced and our practical co-operation with the Americans dismantled. There is no ambiguity about the Government’s attitude. We believe the United States carries an enormous burden on behalf of the free nations. We believe that through the ANZUS alliance we can continue to help in the discharge of that burden. This is precisely what we propose to do.

Mr. W. Hayden, Leader of the Opposition

Quite recently the Deputy Leader of the Opposition (Mr Lionel Bowen) and I visited several joint facilities in this country — Nurrungar, Pine Gap, North West Cape and Smithfield. Clearly this was the most
intensive investigation ever undertaken by representatives at least of the Opposition — probably it was equal in intensity to any investigation undertaken by any members of this Parliament — into the functions, purposes and implications of these centres. At a Press conference at Smithfield I said that it was my hope that the product of our visit would be an informed and persistent discussion and debate in Australia in relation to American nuclear strategic policy and its implications. I pointed out that Australia is very much involved in the implications of that sort of policy as a consequence of a number of factors, the most dominant of which is the operations of these bases.

I have expressed my views in relation to three bases — Smithfield, Nurrungar and Pine Gap. They have been stated again clearly and correctly by the Minister for Defence (Mr Killen). I have expressed also my reservations about the lack of control, the lack of knowledge, and the absence of procedures for Australia’s consent in relation to the way in which the North West Cape base operates. Nothing that the Minister said today in any way diminishes that concern. Everything he has said reinforces the justification for the worries which we — that is, my colleague, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition and I — have expressed in relation to the centre. Today’s statement does not contribute to the informed debate which I had hoped would get underway following our visit and the statements which we made.

Control of North West Cape

I wish now to declare the attitude of the Australian Labor Party on this matter. The inescapable fact remains that Australia has a sovereign right to be in ultimate control of affairs on her own territory. In these circumstances we find present arrangements covering the North West Cape unsatisfactory. We would seek to renegotiate the North West Cape agreement to provide, firstly, that Australia’s consent is mandatory for all orders to initiate military action which flow from the station; and, secondly, that we be given firm and convincing assurances that the station will not be used to send orders for a first-strike nuclear attack or to initiate a limited strike. If the United States would not accept these reasonable provisions designed to protect our national sovereignty then we would ask it to wind down the operations of the North West Cape as rapidly as possible. I make no apologies for that declaration of principle and policy.

The North West Cape facility operates under circumstances dramatically different from those which applied less than a decade ago. Military equipment, hardware — especially strategic nuclear equipment — command control and communications systems and early warning systems are all profoundly more effective and efficient than they were several years ago. We have reached a point where we are moving into a new generation of nuclear armaments with greater accuracy and a capacity to take out hard targets such as reinforced concrete silos containing inter-continental ballistic missiles. We are seeing America’s nuclear capacity moving more towards a first-strike force. That, in turn, will contribute to a degree of instability in super-power relationships. I do not deny for a minute that at the same time Russia is rushing headlong towards improving her nuclear capacity and effectiveness.

But the fact remains that the North West Cape communication facility operates in circumstances of greatly enhanced military and nuclear capacities. At a time when we are moving towards a new generation of nuclear missiles with a first-strike capacity, it is operating in different circumstances. We are moving towards a point where the deterrent role of the United States nuclear force is about to be superseded apparently by a first-strike capacity. In those circumstances we have a profound obligation to ensure that the operations of the North West Cape facility or any other facility under our control, that they proceed with our consent and so that we know what is happening. Should we wish for certain things not to happen we should be able to regulate such operations. To argue for anything less than that is to surrender in the most craven way the sovereignty of this
country. That we will not accept.

I point out another factor. The North West Cape facility could be used also for more conventional engagements should that be the wish of the United States. There could be circumstances in which America might conclude that its interest was such that it should undertake certain things, for instance conventional engagements. It could do so in an area where we had a major self-interest which was somewhat different from that of the United States of America. In those circumstances we do not want the course of development of our foreign policy preempted and then determined by actions initiated by the United States of America, as powerful and as important an ally as she undoubtedly is to us. There can be no quibble on the part of members of the Government that they share this view when it suits them. They were the people, after all, who professed much commitment to the Americans at the time of the most regrettable incarceration of diplomats in Iran. But they were much less than enthusiastic in the support they gave to trade embargoes. That support fell considerably short of what the United States sought. Self-interest for Australia determined a different level of response from that which the Americans believed was appropriate in terms of its sovereignty.

Naval exercises

Secondly, we recall a public announcement in the course of the last election that, after the election, there would be major naval exercises involving units of the United States and Australian fleets in the north-west Indian Ocean. In the upshot, once the election was safely out of the way, the Australian units exercised separately and quite distantly from the American units. The reason was that the Australian Government had concluded that it was not in our best interest to be seen so closely involved in those sorts of exercises with America, given the volatility of conditions in the Middle East and the possibility of certain difficulties arising for Australia in terms of both foreign relations and trade relations. What we are proposing in principle is no different from the policy the Government pursues when it suits it. We are concerned that messages can be transmitted through this facility without any knowledge by the Australian Government and in circumstances which would determine a course of events over which we would have no control, either nuclear conflict or more conventional conflict.

Sinai

I give another illustration of why there is a need for Australia to be alert to this matter, to take a very keen interest in the role and implications of this facility and to ensure that our best interests are at all times preserved. It is unfortunate that these things receive such scant attention in this House. When they do they are usually the victims of frenetic propagandising to the effect that ‘The Russians are coming’ from members of the Government, especially the most obsessive and manic member. It does not contribute to a better understanding about major developments in the world in which we are directly implicated. It is equally unfortunate that the media finds little interest in this matter. It is proposed that America should establish a peacekeeping force in the Middle East. I refer to an article in the Washington Post which was reproduced in the Guardian Weekly of 29 March this year. It was headed ‘Smuggling US Forces Into Mideast’. It stated:

The problem is how to establish an American ‘strategic presence’ on the ground in a way that would deter — or conceivably defend against — Soviet penetrations without embarrassing the host nation and/or unnerving the neighbourhood.

The solution: Smuggle it in, so to say, in the guise of a peace-keeping force to supervise compliance with the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

I put to one side my very genuine concern that it has been consistently proposed by America that Australia should provide military support to such a deployment. That is a matter for another occasion. I suggest, so that we can clarify the issue, that it is most
unlikely that there would be a direct Russian military penetration into the Middle East for a number of reasons which have been extensively canvassed publicly by intelligent, informed, concerned analysts — people who support the West. What is more likely is some sort of Middle East conflict involving Arab states and, perhaps, Israel. But again, here is a classic instance of when, should this project go ahead, messages could be communicated through the North West Cape facility without any awareness on the part of Australian authorities with extraordinary implications for this country which we would want to resist. Therefore, I put the argument that our concern is entirely justifiable and consistent with protecting the national interest and preserving our sovereignty.

We recall what happened in 1973. The North West Cape facility, with other facilities in the world, was put on a red alert at the time of military engagement between the Israelis and the Egyptians. We knew nothing about it until it was over. The Minister, in his statement, argued that it is wrong of me to suggest that there has been change in nuclear doctrine in recent times. On page 12 of the statement which was distributed to members of the House, as distinct from the way in which it will appear in the Hansard, he stated:

The basic principles of US nuclear strategy have been unchanged for decades.

He also said:

Presidential Directive No 59, issued by President Carter in late 1979, was merely the latest in a long series of statements of this doctrine.

That is palpable nonsense. There has been a succession of changes over the decades in the conceptualisation and projection of American nuclear strategic doctrine. To the 1960s the John Foster Dulles doctrine was massive retaliation. He said that the war would be all over in a few days. In the 1960s McNamara evolved a policy of mutual assured destruction. Nixon advocated a policy of flexible response and escalation control. President Carter issued presidential directive No 59 which, incidentally, is secret and is not known in all its detail to the Government. All the Government knows is what other honourable members and I know from informed reading from public sources in the community. The presidential directive conceives that a protracted nuclear war could be selective and controlled. I refer to what Defense Secretary Brown said on this matter in his Fiscal Year 1982 Annual Report. He said:

In addition to providing the ability to devastate the full target system of the Soviet Union, the countervailing strategy gives the President a wide range of options, including more selective, lesser retaliatory attacks.....

The Minister said that was nonsense, and that there is no such things as controlled, restricted or limited nuclear war. He said that there would be inevitable escalation. I suspect that he is right but there is a schizophrenia if he is right and the President of the United States is saying something to the contrary. The point I am making is that in the succession of American Executives there have been changes in nuclear doctrine on the part of the United States of America.

(Note: Mr Killen interrupted Mr Hayden to make the point that Mr Killen agreed with this. Mr Brown did say that he doubted very much indeed that there could be such a thing as a limited nuclear war. Mr Hayden then continued.)

The point must also be taken on board that Harold Brown returned to that point of view, which was one he expressed before he became Secretary of Defence, only in his final statement when the game was up and he knew he was on the way out. The American Executive believed otherwise. There is no indication of any changes. I am making the point that there has been a succession of changes in American doctrine of substantial order. The Minister admitted that there is a need for control. On page 13 of the statement he said:

I do not deny for one moment that Australian controls are required concerning North West Cape..... But the whole point of our arrange-
ments is that US strategic policy is not to be assessed simply in terms of technological capability but more essentially in terms of intent.

He agrees that there should be control but then says that it is a matter not of capability but of intent. The Government does not believe that the Americans have this intent. I do not believe that they have either. I believe they would honestly assure us that they do not. But the history of mankind is littered with the distress and vicissitude of countries that made the mistake of believing that another country's good intent would always be there to preserve them from difficulties of some form or another. I repeat that America in 1973 put North West Cape on red alert and did not advise us. At the time of the abortive exercise aimed at rescuing the imprisoned diplomats American went into Iran through Oman airport without the authority of the Government of Oman. This created great difficulties in the relations of the Oman

Government with its neighbours. Of course, we need control. We need effective control. But it is wrong of the Minister to suggest, as he does on page 17 of his statement, that we are opposed to the military use of these bases. They are military bases. We are saying that we have a right to know, we need to know what is happening. There needs to be knowledge of what is taking place and there needs to be consent.

US-Soviet Military Strengths

I jump back to page 11 of the statement where the Minister implies that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may be overhauling the United States in terms of strategic capability and that by implication we have a great obligation to be perhaps less questioning in this matter - more compliant, as it were.

(Mr Hayden then presented the following table prepared by the Defence Department on the relative strengths of the two major nuclear power.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALT II limits</th>
<th>Present levels</th>
<th>With SALT II</th>
<th>Without SALT II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIRV'd ICBM's 820</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRV'd SLBM's 1,200</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers with ACLM's 1,320</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles with single warhead or MRV's ICBM 2,250</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles with single warhead or MRV's SLBM 2,250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers without cruise missiles</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total operational delivery vehicles</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total warhead numbers</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures for delivery vehicles ('Present Levels' and 'With SALT II') are much more accurate than those for total warhead numbers and the 'Without SALT II' columns which depend on a large range of assumptions.

It (the table - editors) shows very simply that the arms capabilities of the two powers is about equivalent. America has about 9,000 warheads and Russia has about 8000
matter that ought to be pursued in this House with more vigour than we have the opportunity to do, namely, the overwhelming case for pursuing SALT II — the strategic arms limitation talks — detente, world disarmament, peace — things that do not belong to starry-eyed idealists but things of concern to people genuinely worried about the future of mankind. This table shows that with SALT II the number of warheads available to the United States will go up to nearly 12,000, to Russia to about 9,000 but that without SALT II the number will go up to nearly 14,000 for the United States and up to 12,000 for Russia. That is a mad escalation to self-destruction. We have an obligation to ensure that to the extent that we make a contribution in terms of the nuclear deployment between the super-powers, it is a contribution towards deterrence, not one that in any way at all might facilitate a first strike. That is what we are constantly talking about.

Harold Brown in the statement I quoted from — I acknowledge that the Minister arranged for me to receive this — said of the effects of any nuclear exchange between the super-powers:

For massive nuclear exchanges involving military and economic targets in the United States and the Soviet Union, fatality estimates range from a low of 20-55 million up to a high of 155-160 million in the United States, and from a low of 23-24 million up to a high of 64-100 million in the Soviet Union.

That is massive slaughter of mankind. In those circumstances we have no compunction at all about declaring our determination to do everything we can to regulate the nuclear race between the super-powers to ensure that to the extent that it exists it is a mutual deterrent role and beyond that to work for eventual nuclear disarmament.

The other matter that the Minister invites me to take up is that of ANZUS. There is some implication in what he says that there is perhaps a doubt about the strength of our commitment to the alliance, perhaps even nascently a betrayal of the American alliance, of ANZUS by these sorts of questions. The Curtin Labor Government 40 years ago established the Australian-American alliance. On that occasion Curtin was condemned by the conservatives for betraying Great Britain. The criticism never ceases. I want to say only one thing on that matter. It is my concluding point. I invite the Minister and his colleagues to respond. The Minister sees great difficulties with what I am proposing. He believes what I am proposing is impractical and unreasonable. Overriding all that the Minister states quite categorically that the proposal is a threat to the effectiveness of the ANZUS alliance. Does he know what the two most senior people in the American Embassy, apart from the Ambassador who is yet to arrive, have declared to me, to members of my staff and to at least one of my colleagues that they find no problems with what we are proposing. They understand completely our concern about national sovereignty. They believe they can work with the proposal. We are up to date with what the ANZUS alliance means. We are not prepared to be servile. We do not see it as a master-servant relationship but one of equals. We are determined to make it work but it will work in circumstances where there will be areas of disagreement. That is clear.

The final point that I want to make on the strength of the ANZUS alliance comes from Admiral Synnot who said yesterday:

...the ANZUS defence treaty with the United States did not guarantee security.

He continued:

......the US would help Australia if it were under fundamental threat——

Whatever that is——

but he told a Commonwealth Club luncheon in Adelaide there could be many other occasions when Australia might have to deal with lesser though very demanding threats on its own.

That seems to me to be a sensible assessment of what it is all about. That is what we are about — national self-respect, a determination to preserve our sovereignty to work, in spite of all the differences which are going to arise from time to time, in a self-respecting way, not a servile or demeaning way, with our major ally.