

SPECIESISM AND SEXISM

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On a global scale the most exploited humans are women and in factory farming the most exploited animals are female. Women are severely exploited through the non-recognition of unpaid subsistence activities and home-maker services as 'real work'. By 'real work' I mean a fiscally responsive operation, within current Western economic systems. Consequently, as Marilyn Waring argues, this 'hidden economy' means that women are under-counted in the labour forces and their contributions are not recognised in national accounts.¹

Similarly, female animals are over-exploited on the basis of their sex.² According to Gruen, the egg industry is indicative of abusively exploitative farming practices. Egg factory farming generates approximately 4.2 billion, that is 95% of all eggs in the United States every year. De-beaked hens are confined for 12 to 18 months in wire mesh cages, without room to move around, stretch their wings, or build nests.² In the United States, more than 100 million cows, sows, sheep and 5 billion chickens, (mostly hens and chicks) are raised and slaughtered for food production each year.³ Mechanistic, assembly-line processes, designed for efficient, economical and ever increasing production dominate the husbandry of these animals.⁴ The infliction of pain and slaughter in the pursuit of profit and technological advancements is justified through constructing the experimental subject or farm animal as *other*. Being *other* means that animals are constructed and interpreted as being without desires, interests or feelings. On what basis are they judged as without these qualities? Gruen argues that the symbolic operation of the categories *woman* and *animal* satisfy equivalent predominantly utilitarian functions in Western patriarchal societies. Their similarities are presumed to be natural, which disguises both motive and investment of speakers and discourses that construct/ed the natural connection. Theoretical and practical correlations between *woman* and *animal* are manifest in everyday life and in the ideology that justifies and preserves their submission to masculine authority.⁵

For instance, scientific experimentation regarding reproduction has been justified on the basis that potential benefits outweigh emotional and

physical suffering. The human contraceptive pill can increase the risk of blood clots and heart attack. IUDs can induce haemorrhages and bring about infertility. Hormonal treatment has uncalculated short and long term effects. Surgical intervention and manipulation with the risks of anaesthetisation and infection are all 'justifiable risks'. How is it that the failure rate of contraceptive technologies has contributed to the infertility that reproductive technologies are designed to address? The basis for justifying these technologies provides the answer.

A fundamental basis that justifies this way of thinking is derived from traditional Western philosophy. The systematic connections inherent in the dichotomisation of subject/other, polarises man/woman, nature/culture and human animal/non-human animal. This polarisation situates woman and animal in a secondary, subordinate and discriminated location - in relation to man. Dichotomisation is not derived from essential biological properties, it is a learned mode of thinking, perceiving and knowing that transforms reality into static, oppositional and hierarchical conceptual categories. These conceptual categories are confined to the manifestation of specific ideas and images in regard to subjectivity and identity. It is the constructed categories of subjectivity and identity that are the focus of racism, sexism and speciesism.

The connection between categories of subjectivity and identity is neither random nor natural. Inherent to Cartesian dualism is the disassociation of mind from body⁶ and the connection of mind with culture and man. This network of connections excludes any being that is not cultured, white, middle (or upper) class, Western and a citizen. Women, animals, people of other races are all necessarily excluded. Descartes orchestrated a network of strategic connections that systematically excluded woman - regardless of whether this was his intent, it was a consequence. The exclusion of woman was based on her constructed and assumed association with *nature*⁷ and the body. My argument is that the exclusion of woman is connected to other forms of exclusion. Cartesian epistemological paradigms provide a basis with which to justify the exclusionary concepts of racism, sexism and speciesism.

Cartesianism is based on the polarisation of terms. It posits the privileged designation of positive for one term (in this context: subject, man and human). The privileged classification is dependent on the

negation or oppression and, or, suppression of its opposite term (other, woman and animal). This necessary relationship is one of determined advantage or disadvantage. This relationship is central to speciesism and sexism, and it is a primary reason for the indefensibility of speciesism. Another reason is that while the consequences of negation, oppression or suppression are visible the strategic connections that inform these processes are invisible. Debates about abortion, reproductive technology and the availability of contraception for women - in both Western and non-Western cultures - provide an example of the binary of visibility/invisibility. Denial of these services and technologies is arguably a visible form of oppression, but the processes that inform the politicisation of females as a producer of progeny, food, sexual desire and so on are invisible. 'Natural' vocation, economic rationality, beauty and religious faith are indicative of some of the beliefs and processes used to justify mandates on reproductive technology. Economic rationalism is exemplified in the following: 'The dual aims of veal production are firstly, to produce a calf of the greatest weight in the shortest possible time and secondly, to keep its meat as light coloured as possible to fulfil the consumers requirement. All at a profit commensurate to the risk and investment involved.'⁸ The same processes of economic rationality are used to justify a variety of discriminatory treatments from the immobilisation and over-feeding of veal calves to negating the value of 'women's work' because it would unbalance the national economy. None of these terms are isolated, objective, neutral concepts. Each term has a complex history of associations that predetermine specific responses.

Arguing that each term has a complex history of associations and consequences is best explained according to Foucauldian theory. For Foucault, social formations - in combination with his classificatory systems of thought - are the current aftermath of former struggles. These classificatory systems are rendered invisible through processes of naturalisation.⁹ In other words interpretation of the networks that link exceptions and qualifications to normative evaluative classificatory systems is required. The rendering invisible of classificatory systems of thought means that deconstruction of these processes of naturalisation can be used to reveal 'invisible' organising elements and principles. The implicit messages encoded within the concepts of speciesism and sexism can be rendered visible because systems of knowledge are predicated on invisible organising terms, that is, categories of

knowledges. Decoding is possible partly because classificatory systems of thought are not atemporal, ahistorical and continual. They are subject to socio-political and economic struggle. This means that the occurrence of changes may render obvious previously invisible organising elements within systems of knowledges.

Foucault would argue that the intimate reciprocal associations between related concepts in dualisms (for example woman, animal, natural, manipulable) create subordinated, habituated, docile bodies that are brought closer to an idealised standard. Processes of reciprocity, elementary to dualist concepts, instigate the automatic and perpetual functioning of distinctions based on concepts of ‘normality’, ‘abnormality’, race, sex and species. For instance, idealised notions of ‘femininity’ require specific repetitive practices.¹⁰ Romanticised versions of animal behaviour illustrate how culturally generated representations of subjectivity assume the validity of ‘truthfulness’ when they are in accord with publicly predetermined notions of ‘who we are’ and ‘who or what they are’. The pastoral image of a dairy cow wandering around a lush green pasture - featuring in butter and milk advertisements - is an example of a romanticised version of reality. The industrialisation of the dairy business means an intense five year cycle of pregnancy and hyperlactation, after which the dairy cow is slaughtered. Mastitis, infected teats and internal cannibalisation of body tissue are common effects of dairy industrialisation.¹¹ The mediatory process involved in feminising woman and romanticising animals indicates the gradual and cumulative objectification of woman and animal.

Objectification is achieved through the formation of specific knowledges by discourses of power. These formulated knowledges have the effect of dictating desired and non-desired characteristics thereby classifying a specific norm as preferential. The racial norm of whiteness is perhaps the most common and one of the most exclusive normative characteristics preferred by Caucasian Western cultures. Race, education, location and communicative abilities, to name a few qualifying characteristics, can automatically deny or warrant membership to the preferred norm. When certain characteristics are privileged and combined they reinforce each other in a circular process, multiplying their individual effects. These circular processes, which are intersubjective and interactive, produce the appearance of normality, a major consequence of which is invisibility. The invisibility of circular processes means the processes that produce

norms are themselves unapparent, so it is difference that is remarked on and set apart. In other words the absence of difference represents a privileged condition. In this way psychical characteristics are connected to anatomical features in a determining manner that facilitates the categorisation of a living being into a type, a species. Even though animal and woman may appear to be totally disparate concepts, their categorisation as *other* is a parallel that identifies their mutual relations.

Categorisation as *other* is processed through discourses of power. Inclusion within the category of *other* is influenced by motive and investment. For example, investment and authority is evident in the following explicit, supposedly guiltless, admission of cruelty. They hate it! The pigs just hate it! And I suppose we could probably do without tail-docking if we gave them more room, because they don't get so crazy and mean when they have more space. With enough room, they're actually quite nice animals. But we can't afford it. These buildings cost a lot.' A non-speciesist discourse would not justify death from porcine stress syndrome because it 'in no way nullify[s] the extra return obtained from the higher total output'.¹²

The relationship of the subject¹³ to the power/knowledge network, and therefore the motive and investment of the subject, must be established. Though he did not suggest this, a Foucauldian genealogy of connections can be used to make visible the connections between the supposedly disparate concepts of speciesism and sexism thereby manifesting the active and systematic processes of participation and motivation. Both these processes are fundamental to producing coherent knowledges; in other words, to make visible, and thereby accountable specific discourses and speakers who/that have the power to construct, categorise and determine meaning and to conceal their investments while doing so.

It is the sexed and embodied subject (for example, the pig-farmer) who experiences and practises the ideas that guarantee the connection between knowledge and practice.¹⁴ Open declaration of intent and context by the speaker of discourse may alleviate the deception inherent in the existing (Western) power/knowledge networks. However, it does not explain either how or why porcine stress syndrome can be an acceptable factor in the pork industry. I agree with Althusser's assertion, that the way in which we understand the experience of ourselves (such as

our subjecthood) is directly related to pre-determined constructions of social categories within specific ideological frameworks.¹⁵

For Althusser, the concrete existence of ideology¹⁶ is manifested in systems of belief, (dead meat is necessary to human health) everyday practices (tail-docking, debeaking), institutions (agribusinesses, supermarkets) and social structures (economic rationality justifies abusive farming practices) which function to rationalise and justify widespread values (animal value is judged according to use) and conventions (animals don't feel pain). These systems have the potential to render invisible or distort the real operations of power.¹⁷ This means that ideology produces, or interpellates individuals as historically and culturally specific subjects.¹⁸ The concepts of sexism and speciesism transform the concrete existence of women and animals and reconstruct them as part of the social totality, partly because *woman* and *animal*, historically, represent a category, a social relation, not an individual. By which I mean the actuality of woman and animal in real, material social, political and environmental discourses do not get translated into the social anthropocentric constructed totality. Althusser demonstrates that categories of thought (sexuality, race, animality, identity and subjecthood) need to be historically and culturally contextualized, to prevent uncritical acceptance, and to render visible the investments of ideological and power relations.¹⁹

This is evident in the way increasingly varied types of animal research are revealing different forms of social relations, tool making, and communication amongst animals. Cooperative hunting through division of labour and coordinative signalling by Aplomado falcons²⁰ is one example of animal social relationships. Another is the manipulation by beaver family units of their local environment.²¹ Tool use can be demonstrated by the sea otters use of stones to hammer loose molluscs and abalones.²² A good example of animal communication as a two-way process is provided by the semantic alarm calls of vervet monkeys that indicate different types of danger and clearly generate specific responses depending on whether the predator is a leopard, eagle or python.²³

These diverse characteristics (social relations, tool making, and communication), previously the domain of the exclusively 'cultured' are not correspondingly represented in our treatment, relationship or attitude to animals. Similarly, women are increasingly diversifying in social and

political arenas, but this is also under represented in our systems of social knowledges.

With the help of theoreticians like Foucault and Althusser, it is possible to argue that systems of knowledges, discourses and concepts interconnect. Therefore, we can expose weak links, or generate alternative pathways. One could produce counter practices, counter strategies and counter discourses in an effort to re-direct the existing strategies of power and ideology at a local and conjunctural level, rather than simply trying to eliminate them. Both a rationalist and an empiricist view would reject Foucault's genealogy as a method of producing knowledge because it does not prove continuity between historical events, nor does it focus on origins or causal relationships and so cannot produce essential singular truths.

Deconstructionism, however, provides the opportunity to acknowledge and describe without recreating conceptual oppositions. Deconstructionists claim that meaning and interpretation are produced through the artificial and constructed contrasts of dichotomous terms. Derridaen deconstructionism argues that analysis of the marginalised dichotomous concept and the characteristics of its exclusion, prove that the privileged concept derives its meaning and pre-eminence through the contrast and suppression of the marginalised concept.²⁴ Therefore the privileged concept does not achieve either unmitigated identity or conceptual absoluteness; instead its parasitic and contaminatory nature becomes evident. Deconstructionism could provide a new and positive discourse of the body and of the subject, which would be socially and historically contextual and non-dualistic in its approach. This would be possible because the unity, continuity and coherence of the body and the subject can be shown to have no natural biological pre-determined basis. Deconstruction argues that natural biological pre-determination is an effect of traditional discourses of knowledge. If speciesism is seen to be an effect of traditional discourses of knowledge then speciesism is a constructed and pre-meditated position. It follows that a constructed position can be broken down into its constitutive elements and its foundational networks of bias and profit made visible.

Systematic networks of bias and profit are paralleled within the construction of sexism. It is not difficult to find feminist criticism²⁵ which is directed against defining woman on the basis of her body.

Biologically determined paradigms rationalise objectification and utilisation of woman (as property) solely on the basis of what she can produce for man. This last point is equally true for female animals.²⁶ In response, a proponent of factory farming might argue that it is the female animals' biological reproductive characteristics which dictate their predominance in 'modern' farming practices: 'The modern layer is, after all, only a very efficient converting machine, changing the raw material - feeding stuffs - into the finished product - the egg - less, of course, maintenance requirements.'²⁷ This quote, from a farm industry trade journal, wherein one might expect to find the most favourable accounts of the farming industry, demonstrates the Cartesian interpretation of body as machine. The attitude expressed in this quote is not dissimilar to descriptions of the female uterus as a 'vessel' or 'storage space' passively receptive to the 'active' male seed. These similarities correlate with the Western historical tradition which conceptualises the body as a machine. 'Thus I may consider the human body as a machine, fitted together and made up of bones, sinews, muscles, veins, blood and skin in such way that, even if there were no mind in it, it would still carry out all the operations that, as things are, do not depend on the command of the will, nor, therefore, on the mind'.²⁸ Inherent to the concept of body as machine are assumptions that help explain the parallel treatment of female humans and female animals. The most common assumption about machines is their specific functionality added to which is the value, use and productivity that can be gained from the possession of the machine. Fundamental to the concept of body as machine is Descartes' disassociation of mind and body. I am not that set of limbs called the human body. For Descartes the mind (or consciousness) is unextended and indivisible, while the body (or matter) is both extended and divisible.²⁹ When this divisibility is applied to animals, it supports their exploitation because fundamental to Cartesianism is the pre-eminent value of mind (and soul) and the subjugation of body to the mind. In the context of animals this translates as the subjugation and expendability of animals to the interests of man. This 'rationalisation' denies an inherent value of animals in themselves, to each other and in relation to the ecosystem. Values which, a non-anthropocentric viewpoint might argue could outweigh the needs and wants of man and justify a balanced, mutually beneficial relationship between humans and animals.

Human-animal relations are widespread, diverse and longstanding as indicated by Native American names such as *Running Deer* and *Hawkeye*,³⁰ Ancient Egyptian religious beliefs featuring human-animal hybrid gods, seeing-eye-dogs and patents that have been taken out on genetically altered pigs with a human immune system.³¹ These human-animal relationships, indicate that crossing the human-animal divide is considered justifiable if it is to human advantage. A contradiction exists in the sometime separation and at other times combination of human and animal. We separate and hierarchise our relationships on the basis of *difference* and at the same time cite our mutual compatibility as the basis for combining human with animal. For example, consider the relationship between owner and domestic pet; farmer and commercial product; and animal donor organs and human health. In these cases human and animal subjectivity is a flexible, manipulable construct. The relationships between types of discrimination and prejudice are mutually supportive and may be seen in the way the human-animal hierarchy is used to confirm racist human-human hierarchies. The stereotypical representation of non-caucasians as 'blacks' originates from falsely constructed stereotypes about animals. They set up 'black' and 'beastly' as exact synonyms, evidenced in the following book title: *The Negro: A Beast*.³² Humans distinguish ourselves from all non-human animals on the basis that we are superior, mentally, genetically, socially and spiritually. These distinctions are thought to exist, even though humans are genetically and behaviourally closer to primates, than primates are to amphibians. Unless it is to human advantage, we disregard animal welfare, intelligence and wellbeing because we maintain a hierarchical paradigm that stipulates a superior/inferior divide.

As Midgley argues, *speciesism* presupposes a massive, hierarchised distinction between humans and non-humans.³³ This distinction determines how we define and practice morality and it determines how we judge the importance, utility and value of any non-human. 'Degrees of capacity on either side of the human species-barrier are not allowed to affect this sharp divide.'³⁴ Importance, utility and value are decided and classified in terms of human benefit and advantage. Value is judged only in human terms. Vivisectionists argue for continual animal experimentation on the grounds of human to animal similarities. At the same time, they contrarily claim an uncrossable divide between humans and non-humans.

This divide justifies treatment of non-humans that is considered cruelly untenable for humans.³⁵ The well-being and well-fare of the non-human is inconsequential in comparison to the privilege and preference accorded to humanness; 'animals used in biomedical research should not be considered as mere animals but rather as standardised biological research tools'.³⁶ The implicit construction is that, after all, tools are for human use, advantage and profit. This perspective is completely anthropocentric: it is the elevation of humans as superior to animals regardless of context. There is no context left for the needs and well-being of animals to be considered in preference to humans. Extinction of an entire species is possible on these terms. Nor is speciesism limited by time, geography or culture. For instance, the expanding human population in the Mediterranean reduced animal habitats and extinguished lions and leopards by 200BC in Greece and Asia Minor. The last pair of *Auks* (a flightless seabird) were killed in 1844 in Iceland. On Mauritius, the ground nesting dodo was extinct by 1681. The North American passenger pigeon thought to have numbered about 5 billion was hunted to extinction between 1630 and 1914. One animal species every four years became extinct between 1600-1900. By the 1970's about 1000 animal species were made extinct each year. It is estimated that 20 percent of the worlds animal and plant species will be extinct before 2000.³⁷ This version of human superiority justifies cruel and abusive practices towards animals in the pursuit of knowledge and profit. Speciesist practices are maintained through ignorance, isolation, legislation and secrecy which protect agricultural industries and research institutions from a critical and punitive public scrutiny.³⁸

Anthropocentric thought requires animals to conform to human standards of intelligence and communication, if we are to extend to them human rights and inherent value. I find anthropocentricity problematic on two counts, firstly because it does not recognise or accommodate non-human standards of intelligence, communication, rights and value. Secondly it establishes a singular standard for human rights and human values which are pre-eminent, universal and absolute. These characteristics exclude possibilities for change, difference and alterity - amongst humans, let alone recognising the possibility for parallel or concurrent rights, values and intelligences by other species. This perspective maintains that animals lack the ability to think, to emote or to consider consequences, supporting the presumption that humans are superior. It continues, contrary to current research into non-human behaviour and cognition.

Herman's³⁹ bottle nose dolphin experiments indicate, amongst other things: understanding of word order, observational learning, self-training and the refusal to respond to nonsense commands. Given these and other empirically validated examples it seems advisable to dispute the human/animal divide and to examine what humans regard as communication and understanding and the capacity to abstract.

Regan and Singer reproduce the idea that rationality and the capacity to abstract are essential qualities and so they indirectly support speciesism. My reasons for this claim are twofold. Firstly, their dual focus on rationality reproduces a biased, normative, hierarchical reason/emotion dichotomy. Secondly, if abstraction is the basis for speciesism then the consequences of speciesism are distanced to the point of virtual ineffectuality. The separation and distancing of theory and practice is self-defeating and self-perpetuating. Considering speciesism outside of its practical application removes responsibility to act, or change, through disassociation of the self from speciesist practices.

I have argued that the theory and practice of speciesism are interdependent. By which I mean the justification for abusive factory farming practices is derived from the belief that animals are inferior to humans. It places the onus of proof on the animal or on the human to prove otherwise.

Why do all non-human animals have to compete with human animals in a contest for equality? As Midgley argues, the idea that moral agents represent a chosen archetype and interact within a contractual circle of morality on an equal basis is self-defeating.⁴⁰ The notion that all moral agents must be of a certain type implies circumscribed boundaries. These boundaries exclude or deny moral agency to any being that does not comply with pre-determined qualities. Rather the onus should be on those (human animals) who have the authority and power to extend respect and kindness. If a reciprocal arrangement is required, then it can be justified on the basis of what associated species can contribute to human welfare and well-being.

I do not know, however, whether I would go so far as to suggest that this be our Kantian duty. Kant's notion of duty includes the polarisation of duty and inclination, and the inherent valuation of intent as of greater significance than the consequences of the act.⁴¹ Instead I lean towards Hegel's moral consequentialism which stipulates consequences must be taken into account.⁴² For Hegel, rational (social, economic, legal,

occupational and political) institutions form a system that is paradigmatic of objective ethical life. In turn, the individual is predisposed to behave in accordance with norms and conventions proposed by those rational social (etc)institutions.⁴³ Hegel would deny moral rights and moral acts to animals because they lack rationality and freedom. However, his idea that the nature of a moral action must include any unintentional or unforeseen consequences that develop condemns the maltreatment of animals by factory farmer, and researcher as immoral - even if they believe in the greater good or the inability of animals to experience pain. It follows that what is expected of each individual is context dependent, which means that motive and intent are context dependent.

Benton's position is context dependent. He rejects Regan's distinctions between types of moral patients and rejects Singer's theory because it is too difficult to weigh up different types of pleasure and pain. He argues that human animals and non-human animals are all embedded within ecological niches. We cannot abstract individuals from their embeddedness because it can lead to misguided actions. For Benton the individual is indissolubly bound up in their social and ecological position, relationships and conditions of life. Benton argues that focusing on, or isolating, specific characteristics or qualities such as a 'rationality' or 'emotion' results is an incomplete solution. Human-animal and non-human-animal embeddedness must be considered in their own particular contexts and relationships. Social relations are not necessarily species specific consider, for example, the ownership of a pet kitten by the gorilla *Koko*.⁴⁴ This was a relationship which defies commonly accepted boundaries for friendship and ownership. Furthermore, the satisfaction of need is essential for survival and well being of individuals. Benton is aware of the difficulty in distinguishing between genuine and superficial needs however he does not give any clear criteria for deciding between a conflict of needs. This is problematic because needs are Benton's basis for morally valid claims.⁴⁵ For Benton both human animals and non-human animals can be in relationships and therefore can be moral agents.. Accordingly, a moral claim which meets the needs of humans at the expense of animals could be presented using Benton's moral paradigm.

The exclusionism and denigration inherent to racism and sexism has a custom-made feel to it, limiting the scope of rights and moral agency. to

particular kinds of subjects. The non-included subjects are denied and excluded by definition, simply because they are not white men.⁴⁶ Humans comprise one species, that is, one biological classification. Racism and sexism, referring as they do to human-to-human interaction on a cultural or (biological) sex difference are defined and reproduced in human terms, therefore they are in a sense restricted to a human context. This is not to say that the consequences of racism are determined solely by race. As I argued previously (when discussing the dichotomous aspects of these terms) the concepts of racism and sexism do not operate alone, they materialise historical and contemporary beliefs and bias. Speciesism covers a broader area than the concepts of racism and sexism. It relates to the immense scale of difference between humans and non-human animals. It is a classic example of anthropocentric thinking which blends the multiple, complex, varied possibilities in the animal macrocosmos into a single category: animal, specifically a non-human animal. The relative homogeneity of human habitats in comparison to the heterogeneity of non-human-animal habitat requirements should be enough to recognise that the anthropocentric nature of the term 'speciesism' renders it invalid and indefensible as a position.

Unfortunately, most people would not consider it an adequate rebuttal to speciesism. This is because discourses of power are not disembodied structures that simply produce knowledge and meaning. Each concept must be located and contextualised because it is not an isolated neutrality. If we argue that each individual does not create their own knowledges and truth then meaning is the property and product of the social community. However this is not to say that knowledge is disconnected from speakers and discourse, instead it is to say that knowledge is not independent of theory and subjectivity. It follows that acknowledging that subjectivity is constructed is required to balance the alleged guaranty and intellectual appeal of *knowledge*.

Notes

1. For a detailed account see, Marilyn Waring *Counting for Nothing: What men value and what women are worth* (Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1993).
2. Lori Gruen, 'Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of the Connection Between Women and Animals' in *Ecofeminism: Women, Animals,*

- Nature*, ed. G.Gaard, (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993), p.72.
3. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*, (Pimlico, London, 1995). p.94.
 4. Gruen, *Dismantling Oppression*, p.74
 5. Ibid., p.61.
 6. R. Descartes, 'Second Meditation', in *Philosophical Writings*, Second Edition, ed and trans E. Anscombe and P. Geach, (Nelson, Sydney, 1970), p .69.
 7. *Nature* is taken to include animals.
 8. Quoted in Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* (Pimlico, London, 1995), p.130.
 9. Michel Foucault, 'Intellectuals and Power' (with G. Deleuze) in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* ed D.F.Bouchard,trans. D.F. Bouchard and S. Simon (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977.), pp.207-213.
 10. Female beautification, maintenance and reproduction are understood as needing repetitive, sometimes daily practices such as waxing, shaving, cosmetics, hairstyle, fashion and deportment.
 11. Lori Gruen, *Dismantling Oppression*, pp.73-74.: 'In order to obtain the highest output, cows are fed high-energy concentrates. But the cow's peculiar digestive system cannot adequately absorb nutrients from such feed. As a result, during peak production the cow often expends more energy than she is able to take in...Because her capacity to produce surpasses her ability to metabolise her feed, the cow begins to break down and use her own body tissues'.
 12. F. Butler, cited in Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* , p.121.
 13. The term 'subject' is here referring to Foucault's constructed and subjugated subject.
 14. For Foucault, the sexed and embodied subject, is the essential focus of systematic power alliances and discourses which also means that the embodied subject has meaning only within the boundaries of its discursive articulation. A Foucauldian politicisation of the body involves control, management, surveillance and self-policing. Central to this notion is the determination of the body as analysable and manipulable and therefore both object and target of discourses of power.
 15. Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)', in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. (New Left Review Books, London, 1970), pp.150-153.
 16. Ibid., p.155.
 17. Ibid., pp.155-159.
 18. Ibid., pp.160-2.
 19. See Michel Foucault, 'Intellectuals and Power', pp. 205-206, for the reasons that theory is contextually located and relayed from one practice to another, whilst practice is a network of relays.
 20. D. Griffin, *Animal Minds* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992), p.62.

21. Ibid., p.87 ff
22. Ibid., p.106.
23. Ibid., pp.156-157.
24. Jacques Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' in *Writing and Difference* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978), p. 278 and p. 282.
25. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Essays on Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1982); Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America*, (Grossman, New York, 1976); R.P. Petchesky, *Abortion and Women's Choice* (Verso, London, 1986); A Rich, *Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution* (Norton, New York, 1976).
26. I am aware that most people would not disagree with owning animals. Animals as property cannot be dealt with here, however, ownership, whether morally acceptable or not does entail specific duties of care, care that is not extended to animals used in factory farming. For example, the British *Protection of Birds Act* was intended to prevent cruelty to birds, with the explicit exception of poultry. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*, p.110.
27. Quoted in Singer, *Animal Liberation*, p.107.
28. R. Descartes, 'Sixth Meditation: The Existence of Material Things: the Real distinction of Mind and Body' in *Philosophical Writings*.
29. R. Descartes, 'First Meditation', in *Selected Philosophical Writings*, trans. by Cottingham and R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988), pp.114-5.; 'Sixth Meditation' pp.120-121, and p.176: 'Body is of its nature always divisible; mind is wholly indivisible'.
30. Marjorie Spiegel, *The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery* (Heretic Books, London, 1988), p.14.
31. Cited in Emily Martin, 'Working Across the Human-other Divide' in *Reinventing Biology*, ed. by L. Birke and R. Hubbard (Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1995), pp.268-269.
32. M. Spiegel, *The Dreaded Comparison*, p.31.
33. M. Midgley, *Animals and Why They Matter*, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983). p.101.
34. Ibid., p.104.
35. Spiegel, *The Dreaded Comparison*.: 'Cruelty relies upon a rigid observance of the categorical distance between victim and oppressor'.
36. Quoted in Singer, *Animal Liberation*, p.75.
37. Clive Ponting, *A Green History of the World*, (Sinclair-Stevenson Ltd, London, 1991), pp161-193.
38. Gruen, *Dismantling Oppression*, p. 75.
39. L. Herman, 'Cognitive Characteristics of Dolphins' in *Cetacean Behaviour: Mechanisms and Functions*, ed. Louis Herman, (Wiley and Sons, New York, 1980), pp. 390-409.

40. Midgley, *Animals and Why They Matter*, p.67.
41. See Kenneth Westphal, 'Hegel's Critique of Kant's Moral World View' in *Philosophical Topics*, 19, (1991), p.143.
42. The alternative of duty inspired by reverence for universal laws means we are faced with the problem of having a pre-existing set of principles that determine behaviour. It is very hard to imagine a set of pre-determined principles sufficient for the purpose of accommodating all potential complexities of moral dilemmas and the considerations of consequences. However, for Hegel, freedom of choice and freedom to act are restricted by normative community standards because moral life is regulated by community standards and values that have achieved a legitimate and authoritative status. See E. Kant, *The Moral Law or Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans by H.J. Paton, (Mayflower Press, Watford, 1947), §402, §403.)
43. G. Hegel, *Elements in the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991), §145 and §146.
44. P. Cavalieri and P. Singer, *The Great Ape Project*, (Fourth Estate, London, 1993), Chapter 6, The Case for the Personhood of Gorillas by Francine Patterson and Wendy Gordon, pp58-77.
- 45 Ted Benton, *Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice* (Verso, London, 1993).
46. Midgley, *Animals and Why They Matter*, p. 82.

Biography

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