The name must not go down: political competition in Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea

Joseph Ketan
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"THE NAME MUST NOT GO DOWN":
POLITICAL COMPETITION IN MOUNT
HAGEN, PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Joseph Ketan

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy

University of Wollongong

2000
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ABSTRACT

This is a study of political competition in one PNG Highlands society, that of Hagen, within which some of the country's most powerful and wealthy men operate. It is about how and why people in Hagen compete for prestige, power and influence. The study examines the major arenas, fields and sub-fields of competition within Hagen politics.

This study examines state-society relations from a local perspective. It is a study of competing legitimacies, of conflicting identities and loyalties, and of parallel moral worlds. It is a study of political strategies, subcultures, and intergenerational power struggles within a weak state.

The study explores the interactions between 'traditional' Hagen and modern PNG state structures, through a systematic analysis of the major arenas of political competition and cooperation within which individuals and their groups compete for prestige, power and influence. Political competition and leadership roles are analysed in a number of contexts, specifically by studying political action by prominent individuals, in both 'traditional' and modern spheres of competition. The 'traditional' arenas of competition and cooperation, such as ceremonial exchange, group warfare and the various types of compensation payment, now exist side by side with, and in many ways have been incorporated into, new forms such as elections and business enterprise.

The study deals with questions of how and to what extent one system has captured the other, if at all, and also examines the wider implications of such developments, particularly in the context of state-society relations and competing legitimacies of political systems. It also addresses some key issues, such as the conflicting role of politicians in local conflicts and the use of state resources in promoting local interests, thereby raising questions of conflicting loyalties between state and society. In the final analysis, the state itself has been incorporated into the Hagen political competition.

Several case studies are presented in this thesis to show that 'traditional' Hagen ideologies and cultural practices have been useful in rationalising political strategies adopted by groups and individuals in attempting to achieve political goals. The Hagen ideology of tepam nga kangem ('father's son') has been used in justifying claims to leadership status, even in cases where there is
clearly no indication that a claimant's father was a leader; just as that of *tepam tenta; mema tenta* ('one father; one blood') ideology governing group solidarity. Group solidarity, or tribal loyalty, as expressed in block-voting and in warfare, is a central feature in both elections and in inter-group warfare and peace-making in the case studies presented here. Above all else, the reputation of the group must not be allowed to suffer: group solidarity is the overriding political value. Leaders manipulate this ideology for their individual enhancement. Massive financial and other resources are used in attempting to extend personal prestige, power and influence. Hageners, like other Highlands peoples, often justify huge disparities in personal wealth and the flaunting of such wealth during elections by using the ‘traditional’ ideology of big-men as a magnet for attracting wealth, expressed in Melpa language as *kung-mel mbo wua nuim kin petim* ('pigs and other wealth stays with the big-men').

This is essentially a study of political change and cultural continuity, of how Hageners react to structural changes imposed upon them, of their engagement with state systems and of how at times they subvert the state when it suits them. Ultimately these political responses and cultures affect the strength and viability of the state of Papua New Guinea, which, despite its weakness, is far from collapsing.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION
Introduction

The Papua New Guinea Highlands region has a history of permanent human settlement, based on agricultural intensification and surplus production, that goes back nearly 10,000 years. And the people have a reputation for remarkable cultural innovation, vigour and resilience. But some of the most revolutionary changes — such as colonisation bringing a state system and the cash economy — have occurred during the last sixty-five years. The analytical focus of this study is on the resilience of indigenous political fields of competition and the innovative manner in which Highlanders have responded to the massive changes that have accompanied the transition from pre-colonial autonomy to colonial autocratic *kiapdom* to post-colonial statehood, with particular emphasis on the last decade.

The social and political implications of such changes, however, are not quite fully understood, despite numerous studies covering various aspects of Highlands societies. Much of what is presently written about the Highlands people comes initially from ethnographic accounts by social anthropologists and secondly from more specifically focused studies on particular topics by observers from other disciplines in the social sciences. It is however evident in the literature that most observers have failed fully to appreciate the complex processes that take place when state systems are superimposed on to tribally fragmented societies, which are sometimes called acephalous, literally 'headless', without centralised political structures. A major contributing factor lies in the historical emphasis on Euro-centric approaches to analysing non-western societies.

In political studies, the application of Western models of state and society in the analyses of Third World societies has proved less fruitful than perhaps originally anticipated. The 'modernisation' approach, for instance, was based on the assumption that newly decolonised countries would develop progressively towards 'modern' state-hood, replicating those found in Western societies. Despite political and cultural diversities, people in the newly created nations in Africa, South East Asia, Latin America and Oceania were expected to integrate quite sufficiently in order to form national identities, to foster common ideas of purpose and pride in national achievements, and to create undivided loyalties and acceptance of the state's authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force. But why has it not happened in PNG, or wider Melanesia, and indeed the rest of the Third World? Chazan et al (1988:15) quite rightly rebuked development theorists for even thinking about such a direction in development: “the supposition that the Western model of development was both feasible and desirable smacked of a type of arrogance not easily acceptable in countries that had only recently emerged from a period of colonial rule”, especially when newly created nations and their leaders at independence inherited from the colonial powers poorly developed infrastructure, underdeveloped economies
primarily based on agriculture and extractive mineral exploitation, severely limited and poorly equipped social services facilities, and a predominantly illiterate population (including a largely unskilled labour force).

Another problem area is the traditional epistemological issue in anthropology: the personal and professional dilemma faced by field-observers in attempting to deal with the contradiction between 'inside' and 'outside' perceptions of society; how to reconcile presumed differences between how people perceive themselves and anthropological interpretations of them. Despite the best intentions of anthropologists to report on the 'native's point of view', the social science literature on the PNG Highlands represents almost exclusively an outsider's view of society. As one anthropologist asked: "How is anthropological knowledge of the way natives think, feel, and perceive possible?", or "if we are going to cling to the injunction to see things from the native's point of view, where are we when we can no longer claim some unique form of psychological closeness, a sort of transcultural identification, with our subjects?" (Geertz 1983:56).

Whilst it is possible for fieldworkers to develop a close attachment to members of their host communities, they probably can never fully relinquish their own cultural identities, for doing so would of course undermine their own socialisation processes. And, their interpretations are thus largely influenced by their own cultural values, personal experiences, and educational backgrounds. As a member of one Highlands society and having benefited from both indigenous Melanesian and the introduced Western systems of socialisation (often called the 'informal' and 'formal' education systems), I present here a study of state-society relations — of competing legitimacies and parallel moral worlds — from the perspective of an 'insider'. An 'insider' who sometimes operates on the 'outside', but one who is equipped with 'academic blinkers' with which to 'look in' from the 'outside'. My interpretations are also influenced by cultural and educational factors, but if the study suffers, or conversely, becomes strengthened by these, then it is because I share with Highlanders their cultural values and understand their political practices. But, as with outside observers, an insider's view of society can also suffer from limitations of objectivity: for example, a certain aspect of human behaviour that may appear quite striking to an outsider may not be considered by an insider as of great significance because it occurs every day and may not be seen as anything other than ordinary. However, where an insider can make a valuable contribution is in combining inside knowledge of how members of society operate, taking into account the norms and values that govern political behaviour, enriched by insights gleaned from the literature — the methodological discussions, theoretical approaches, and comparative studies of Third World societies. That is, combining
abstraction with empirical knowledge, or in Geertz's (1983) formulation, 'experience-near' with 'experience-distant'. This is precisely what I attempt here.

Highlanders have, over the centuries, developed complex social and economic networks through which knowledge, valued scarce resources and surplus products have been passed from one group to another. Specialised knowledge and economic resources are rare commodities and thus universally valued. An almost inevitable and somewhat endless pursuit of power to control such commodities is the stuff of Highlands politics, as is the case in all human societies throughout the world. Those who gain control of such networks invariably rise to the top, regardless of whether societies are hierarchical in structure, as in feudal Europe, or egalitarian in ideology, as in pre-colonial Highlands societies.

In many parts of the PNG Highlands, those who dominated exchange networks became leaders of groups, coalitions and factions. Such individuals were identified by anthropologists as 'big-men', on the basis of certain attributes — principally entrepreneurial skills in surplus production, the manipulation of wealth and pre-eminence in ceremonial exchange, oratorical abilities and forceful personalities. (see A.J. Strathern 1966a, 1969b, 1971; see also Ryan 1961; Lowman-Vayda 1971; Sillitoe 1979; Rappaport 1984 [originally 1968]; and Feil 1987). According to this model of leadership, big-men were perceived as managers and directors of corporate activities upon which group prestige and individual renown are derived. These particular type of leaders, whilst appearing to some as almost obsessively preoccupied with exchange relations, are claimed to have been at the apex of the political order when confronted with new challenges brought about by the incorporation of their universe into the national and global economy nearly 65 years ago (For some early impressions, see Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8; Gitlow 1947; Simpson 1954. See also Standish 1978 and 1992; A.J. Strathern 1984; Gordon and Meggitt 1985; and Feil 1987 for discussions on how the indigenous political and economic systems may have been radically altered by the impact of colonisation).

Since European contact in the early 1930s, PNG Highlands societies have experienced dramatic and monumental changes in the sphere of politics, and their social, religious and economic systems. Some of the changes have had almost catastrophic effects on indigenous economic and political systems. In fact, there has been some interpretation that indigenous systems may have been substantially tampered with, or radically altered, or corrupted by foreign influences.

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1. Adopting a distinction formulated by the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut between what he called 'experience-near' and 'experience-distant' concepts, Geertz views an experience-near concept as one that "an informant might himself naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his fellows see, feel, think, imagine, and so on, and which he would readily understand when similarly applied by others." And experience-distant concept, he says, "is one that specialists of one sort or another — an analyst, an experimenter, an ethnographer, even a priest or an ideologist — employ to forward their scientific, philosophical, or practical aims" (1983:57).
number of observers from various disciplines and sub-disciplines within the social sciences, with
differing views and theoretical approaches, have all commented on the devastating and far-
reaching effects of colonisation, particularly by the deliberate flooding of the local economy with
large quantities of shells during the first two decades of Australian rule in the Highlands and its
impact on the exchange networks which are a major element in Hagen politics (see A.J.
Strathern 1966a, 1971; Hughes 1978; Standish 1978; and Feil 1982). "European tampering with
rates and the supply of exchange valuables", as argued by Feil (1987:95), directly led to the
"destruction of indigenous economies and politics during the early colonial period", which
means that the so-called 'traditional' leadership patterns observed by anthropologists from 1945
onwards may have not been so 'traditional' after all. This argument is partly based on the
assumption that anthropologists who worked in the 1960s may have been guilty of
overemphasising particular aspects of leadership while down-playing the democratising effects
of colonial rule (see Standish 1978; and Feil 1982), a significant point to which I shall return later
(see Chapter Two).

The Hagen2 people — whose cultural values and practices, political strategies and ideologies,
and social networks are currently under scrutiny here — received special attention from the
combined efforts of gold prospectors, Michael and Dan Leahy, Lutheran and Catholic
missionaries, and colonial administration officers. Early accounts of Hagen society by Ross
(1936), Vicedom and Tischner (1943-8) and Gitlow (1947) indicate that in pre-colonial times
there was a rather high degree of social stratification, involving well-defined classes of 'rich and
powerful', a large 'middle class', 'poor', 'serfs' or 'servants' and even 'slaves' (compare A.J.

Men of the upper class were described as chiefs, who passed on the power to their eldest sons
and comprised about six per cent of the total male population (Gitlow 1947:35; quoted in Feil
1987:118). Feil (ibid) claims that these men alone were members of the moka ceremonial
exchange community and controlled the large pearlshells, the most prestigious and power

2. I use 'Hagen' to refer generally to the administrative district (formerly sub-district) and its inhabitants,
'Mount Hagen' for the town and provincial headquarters, 'Hagen society' for the cultural-linguistic area,
which includes both Melpa and Temboka speakers. Such usage of terms is quite consistent with the way
Hageners view themselves: not as Melpa or Temboka but as Hageners who speak different dialects of the
same language; and also consistent with the analysis of the Strathemns (see, for example, A.J. Strathern
1971, 1972; A.M. Strathern 1972a). The cultural-linguistic area called Hagen had a population of over
160,000 during the 1990 Census and covers two districts: Hagen Central (Hagen Central, Anglimp and
Nebilyer Census Divisions) with a population of 99,549 and Hagen North (Mul and Dei Census
Divisions) with a population of 60,653 (excluding Baiyer-Lumusa, pop. 25,479, who are Enga speakers).
Mount Hagen town, which had a population of 17,500, and Kagaruga station, with 1,572 persons in 1990,
were not included in Hagen district because of a predominantly migrant population (see National
Introduction

concentrating items of value. Vicedom and Tischner (1943-8) and A.J. Strathem (1971) were virtually in agreement that before European contact big-men monopolised shell moka payments in Hagen. This situation, some say, was later modified by the presence of Europeans (A.J. Strathem 1971:205), more specifically through the importation by the colonisers of large quantities of shell valuables (see, for example, Hughes 1978; Connolly and Anderson 1987).

Like shells during the early colonial period, more recently it has been the incorporation of cash, cattle, beer, motor vehicles and guns — as highly valued economic resources — into arenas of political competition that has had a major impact on the indigenous political and economic systems. Equally significant had been the incorporation of Hagen and other small-scale societies into a national entity to form the modern state of Papua New Guinea. The cumulative effect of all these processes involving phenomenal transformations has been the radical alteration of the political status quo of pre-colonial Hagen society, perhaps not once but several times over.

This study looks at the ‘transformed’ or ‘altered’ Hagen, which is changed from what essentially and commonly — and sometimes incorrectly — is viewed by social scientists as ‘traditional’ or ‘pre-colonial’ society. ‘Pre-colonial’ strictly refers to the period before colonisation, but what we often find in the PNG literature are models and depictions of society heavily modified by the presence of foreigners. It is extremely difficult, even where fairly reliable oral historical accounts are available, to reconstruct pre-colonial society because no one knows the exact details of pre-colonial political and economic systems. Some of these terms require clarification. In discussing politics, I use ‘indigenous’ to distinguish systems of Hagen origin from introduced systems such as the state, ‘pre-colonial’ for the situation and practices that existed before European contact in 1933, ‘traditional’ for customary practices whose origin predates the colonial period, and ‘historical’ for processes and networks with roots going back to pre-colonial times. Rather than using historical evidence to reconstruct pre-colonial Hagen society, this study focuses on contemporary political strategies and traces backwards in search of the historical origins of cultural values and ideologies that are regularly utilised in contemporary situations. It is therefore a study of contemporary Hagen politics and the ways in which current practices and political behaviour have been shaped by historical processes and greatly influenced by relations between local groups, factions, neo-traditional coalition-style alliances and their leaders.

- Moka is the Hagen term for reciprocal exchanges of wealth between partners, in which the rule is that a main gift should exceed an initial or initiatory one (A.J. Strathem 1981:10). The Hagen moka system involves a complex network of individuals, as pivotal points of linkage between different groups, through which periodical exchanges of wealth items of live pigs, cash and other economic resources are exchanged. Hagen leaders traditionally acquire their eminence by virtue of oratorical abilities and through success in competitive exchanges, particularly through moka, reparation payments and warfare (see A.J. Strathem 1966a; 1969a; 1971; Brandewie 1971; 1981; Burton and Keher 1997). Moka, however, does more than build up big-men; it acts to create links of debt and trust between individuals in an otherwise atomised society (Burton and Keher 1997:156). For further discussion on leadership roles in moka, reparation payment and warfare, see Chapter Five.
More specifically, this is basically a local-level study which deals with questions of how and why Hageners compete for prestige, power and influence. The competition is often expressed through both positive and negative reciprocity, where ‘positive’ includes reciprocal gift exchanges and ‘negative’ includes payback killing. Such exchanges are conducted within the rarefied confines of highly developed indigenous spheres of competition, now linked to state systems by way of systematic merging of ideologies and political practices (though, paradoxically, influenced by often conflicting sets of values).

A fundamental reason for such competition lies in the Hagen conviction that a person’s local group’s ‘name must not go down’ (mbi mana nepangka), as expressed through localised support for politicians even after they may have been dismissed from office and/or jailed for misconduct. It is mainly because of the particular concept of ‘the name’ and pride in group’s reputation that a lot of corrupt and incompetent politicians get re-elected, that massive resources are gambled (and lost) in elections, and that violence is regularly preferred over more peaceful avenues for resolving conflicts. Mobilisation of support for important events such as warfare, ceremonial exchange and elections are usually organised in the name of the group. Most members of a group tend to agree that their clan or tribal ‘name’ is far more important than themselves, even where prominent individuals clearly do stand to benefit personally from making such commitment. It did not matter in the Western Highlands, for instance, that only few businessmen were in a position to prosper under the national administration of local man, Paías Wingti, and that the province as a whole probably did not get as much attention as it deserved, because in the final analysis the voter regularly sacrificed personal benefits to gain ‘the name’ or renown that goes with the office of the prime ministership. For the Hagener, the expression, ol lain Hagen bolim praim minista (the Hagen ‘line’ has the prime ministership), had a nice ring to it. Why worry about lack of development or the appointment of non-Hageners or non-Highlanders as departmental heads, when, after all, you have got the prime ministership? Paías Wingti, a clever political strategist who outmanoeuvred Michael Somare to gain re-election as Prime Minister in 1987 (see Turner and Hegarty 1987), apparently saw no great danger in overlooking senior Hageners and other Highlanders for top public service jobs. Some of them eventually turned against him, including fellow Jika tribesmen, but his stunning defeat in 1997 was ironically at the hands of a rather mild mannered Catholic priest who comes from the same group as Michael Mel — a former Treasurer who was endorsed by Wingti in 1997 in attempt to block Paul Pora in Hagen Open. Although all of his opponents played a part in Wingti’s election loss, that defeat is now seen by many Hageners as resulting from a major conspiracy to pull Wingti down to their level of politics because he, like Iambakey Okuk in 1982, was seen as becoming far too big for a Hagen big-man.
Traditional ideas, infighting and practices thus become factors in contemporary state political institutions, just as modern economic resources and commodities have entered traditional ceremonial exchanges. The incorporation of new economic resources into indigenous arenas of competition, such as the use of cash, cattle and motor vehicles in moka exchanges, is a manifestation of cultural continuity. But the use of cash itself and being part of the world economy indicates change in society. These simple examples are essentially a mirror image of a much broader change in society, involving a significant merging of ideologies and cultural practices. A major case of merging or, more precisely, incorporation, presented in this study is the way in which Hageners have skillfully orchestrated ‘traditional’ local events, such as ceremonial gift exchanges and compensation payments, to coincide with, and culminate in, both national and provincial government elections.

Local groups have thus created what I call a Hagen megacycle in which the state and its events have been incorporated into their political system, whereby Hagen values seem to be overriding state values, and political action at provincial and national levels is heavily influenced by competition at the local level. Several case studies on warfare and elections show that existing military alliances, strengthened by frequent intermarriage and intense moka exchange, are the prime resources which aspiring politicians seek to mobilise or control. This is because election campaigns are essentially tied in with moka sequences, reparation payments for losses in warfare and military alliances. It is based on the principle that once you fight one way, you are bound to vote the same way because it speeds up the reparation payment process. In practice, however, there are inherent problems which must be overcome. Individuals, by virtue of their free wheeling and dealing nature, can sometimes act as loose cannons, defying corporate policy to support candidates other than the one sponsored by the group. Such practices, on the one hand, highlight the contradictions between ideology and practice and between loyalty and betrayal, whilst on the other hand, emphasise the diverging goals and interests of individuals and groups, thereby reinforcing O'Hanlon's (1989:57) point that the ideally solidary group in fact harbours within it traitors.

Essentially, the study contains an analysis of political competition between powerful individuals, backed by even more powerful groups, factions and coalitions. Most of these groups have over the last decade accumulated arsenals of sophisticated firearms with which they can hold their own against any force — including that of the state. Some of their leaders, who are distinguished from the masses by enormous wealth and power, can be described as ‘super-big-men’. These type of leaders, whilst operating in patron-client relations with other types (such as businessmen, big-men, fight-leaders, and leaders of raskol gangs), control the coffee and tea industries, in addition to real estate, haulage, retail, and other business in Hagen and elsewhere in the country.
By examining the composition of local groups and the major arenas of political competition and cooperation within which members of such groups and their leaders interact, this study provides significant insights into the processes which take place when stateless, pre-capitalist societies come into contact with Western state systems and the market economy. It is fundamentally a study of state-society interaction; of how people in Hagen deal with the superimposition of modern state structures onto their tribally fragmented groups. By analysing political competition at the local level where nationally prominent leaders such as Paias Wingti, Michael Mel and Paul Pora operate, this study presents valuable insights towards understanding the behaviour of politicians who interact within and between two separate moral realms.

Furthermore, this study explores the level and extent of interpenetration between state and society in order to determine whether one system has dominated the other. National politics, for instance, is characterised by parochial struggles, nepotism and the various types of clientelism, while at the same time being concerned — at least in name and law — with the governance of the country or nation as a whole. Clearly these are manifestations of a wider process of competing legitimacies, particularly when one set of moral values is superimposed onto another. Parochial loyalties overriding national sentiments and the pervasive practice of looking after people of the same language, tribe, clan and lineage are deeply entrenched in Melanesian cultural traditions. The prevalence of nepotistic patronage in government, for instance, is a manifestation of a wider cultural practice in PNG called *wantok* system. As noted by Standish:

> Most PNG people retain a mind-set of primary attachment and loyalty to their clan and tribal groups, sometimes known as *wantoks*, the Tokpisin word for people who speak the same language. *Wantok* identities extend into notions of region, such as the Highlands and the New Guinea Islands, and often lead to the belief that nepotistic patronage prevails in government (Standish 1994:60).

As expressed through the re-election of numerous politicians after being found guilty of misconduct in office, the PNG voters seem to have a remarkable capacity for forgiveness. An explanation may be found in the concept of ‘us-versus-them’, whereby crimes against the state or similar organisations are deemed morally acceptable, whilst offences committed against members of one’s own group are not. In Hagen society, the origins of such ethical beliefs are firmly rooted in traditional rivalries between groups with a recent remembered history of warfare. That is, stealing from rival groups (and the state is very much viewed in the same way as another clan or tribal group) is not only acceptable but also encouraged because of the virtual certainty that some of the wealth will find its way into the local economy. Public servants who abuse their privileged positions to maximise personal gain are not branded as thieves but rather are admired for taking advantage of their opportunities. PNG however is not unique in developing such a system of largesse, based on the conflicting roles of public servants and politicians who themselves, as members of local communities, are torn between their social
obligations towards their kinsmen (*wantoks*) and their official duties as public office holders. A similar type of *wantok* system has been reported in an African context:

Most educated Africans are citizens of two publics in the same society. On the one hand, they belong to a civic public from which they gain materially but to which they give only grudgingly. On the other hand they belong to a primordial public from which they derive little or no material benefits but to which they are expected to give generously and do give materially. To make matters more complicated, their relationship to the primordial public is moral, while that to the public is amoral...A good citizen of the primordial public gives out and asks for nothing in return; a lucky citizens of the civic public gains from the civic public but enjoys escaping giving in return whatever he can. But such a lucky man would not be good man were he is to channel all his lucky gains to his private purse. He will only continue to be a good man if he channels part of his largesse from the civic public to the primordial public. That is the logic of the dialectics. The unwritten law of the dialectics is that it is legitimate to rob the civic public in order to strengthen the primordial public (Ekeh 1975:108).

Parochial political culture thus impacts on national politics. And because practices such as *wantoks* looking after *wantoks* at national and provincial levels are largely based on, or justified by, ideologies of custom and group solidarity, one may ask: can the behaviour of national politicians be viewed as instances of local values dominating state values? Other similar issues and questions raised here are:

- **Competing values and duties (kinship obligation versus outright bribery and corruption).** Does fulfilling a kinship obligation leads to bribery or corruption? Kinship obligation requires money, hence corruption (theft) or the acceptance of bribes. Are cash handouts during elections perceived as bribery or the fulfilment of kinship obligations?

- **The often conflicting roles held by politicians, policemen and other state officials (as government legislators or state employees, and as tribesmen).** Should legislators always uphold the laws they make or do they have a deeper obligation to their group to participate in local arenas of competition such as tribal warfare? Are there short-term gains in instigating warfare and the use of *raskol* gangs in intimidating rivals and their supporters? Does involvement in local conflicts ultimately undermine their integrity as national leaders?

- **Does what I call the Hagen mode of politics (largely based on nepotistic patronage or *wantok* system, horse-trading after elections and tribal loyalties), ultimately contribute towards bankrupting PNG, morally and economically?** Such a process may well be under way but is surely far from complete.

While these questions may relate to politics in Hagen, the answers relate to other parts of Papua New Guinea, and indeed help explain politics in many Third World societies. In fact, the answers should help explain the PNG political culture, and by implication, highlight the
similarities and differences between Third World societies, different types and styles of leadership and their modes of operation. Understanding local politics, however, requires a good knowledge of cultural values and practices. Whilst the Hagen cultural values and practices will be discussed in the relevant parts of the thesis, it is necessary here to briefly outline the cultural-linguistic area called Hagen (see Map 2, below).

Map 2: The Hagen Cultural-Linguistic Area

Some notes about Hageners

The cultural-linguistic area known as Hagen is situated in the Central Highlands region of Papua New Guinea. A population of over 160,000 people (1990 Census) occupy part of the central valley system of the Highlands. Hageners live in homesteads and villages on the fertile floor and the side walls of the major valleys (upper Wahgi, Nebilyer and eastern Baiyer), the Togoba (pronounced Tokpa in Melpa) and Ogelbeng plains, and the foothills of Mount Hagen. Most settlement in these areas, as noted by Burton and Keher (1997:154), is at an altitude of 1,500 to 1,600 metres.

The people are predominantly subsistence farmers who depend almost exclusively on the land for their livelihood. Land is communally owned and individual access to gardening land is by virtue of membership of local groups, tribes and clans. Although access to clan land, especially that covered by virgin forest, was traditionally regulated by the principle of usufructuary rights, it is nowadays commonly inherited through immediate family ties. An explanation for this may be found in the fact that "shifting, forest-fallow cultivation is virtually unknown in these areas and the population densities rise locally above 100 persons per square kilometres" (Burton and Keher 1997:154). The population density on the floor of the Wahgi and the Ogelbeng plains is believed to be much higher, perhaps at 200 or more persons per square kilometres. However, in the absence of any systematic study linking population pressure to land tenure, it is difficult to make any firm statements about land rights and population growth in this part of the country.

The principal sources of monetary income for these people are cash crops of coffee, tea, cardamom and food crops, including a large variety of tropical fruits (such as bananas, pineapples, pawpaws, guavas, avocados, oranges, mandarins, lemons, passionfruit, tomatoes, marita pandanus) and numerous types of vegetables (lettuces, cabbages, abika, beans, pumpkins, cucumber, corn, capsicum, carrots, broccoli, cauliflower, chilli peppers, winged bean) in addition to tubers (notably the staple sweet potato, and taro, yams, buskin (tuber of winged bean), cassava, English potato, ginger) and some nuts (mostly peanuts and occasionally karuka pandanus) and sugarcane sold at local markets. Some of these food crops are freighted in trucks and planes to the coastal towns of Lae, Madang and Port Moresby where they are sold at exorbitant prices.

Coffee is the principal cash crop in Hagen. Like bananas and sugarcane, coffee is a predominantly 'male-crop', grown by men and, although the cherries are picked from the trees and prepared mostly by women, the proceeds from the sale of dried beans are largely controlled by men. Accordingly, coffee is an important status symbol: for example, a man who has many coffee gardens is regarded with high esteem, while one who has none is treated with contempt. The exceptionally high value placed on coffee is reflected in the speeches made by big-men. In
public oratory, for instance, it is culturally fashionable for orators to associate leadership with ‘long pigs houses’ (kung manga ruke) and ‘ocean of coffee trees’ (kopi pana kua), thereby suggesting that coffee has now been accepted as an important political resource, like pigs, cash and previously pearlshells.

In the wider context, coffee is an important symbolic indicator of the incorporation of the Hagen people into the global economy. As a primary source of income, coffee helps ease some of the pressures of the capitalist economy. Recurrent expenses, including imported food items, travel and clothing, in addition to constantly increasing school fees, airfares and fuel prices, can only be met by the proceeds from coffee. In recent years, however, the small-holding coffee industry has been marred by marginally diminishing returns. Despite recent increases in coffee prices, the returns have been relatively poor due to years of neglect of the coffee trees.

The people of Hagen speak Melpa, a Non-Austronesian language classified as part of the Central Language Family, East New Guinea Highlands Stock, Trans-New Guinea Phylum (Wurm and Hattori 1981). People in the neighbouring Nebilyer Valley speak a closely related language called Temboka (see Merlan and Rumsey 1991). Some Hagen groups — including the Jika, Kukilka and Penambe tribes — are split across this minor linguistic and cultural boundary. Moreover, as noted by A.J. Strathem, Hageners themselves make a number of distinctions within and partly cross-cutting this linguistic classification:

They divide themselves into speakers of Melpa, Temboka and Kowul [also pronounced as Kauil, or Kawigfl]. ‘Temboka talk’, with a number of named sub-dialects, is spoken in the Nebilyer Valley and by persons who belong to groups which have migrated northwards from the Nebilyer. ‘Kowul talk’ belongs to certain groups along the slopes of Mount Hagen, stretching across to Tambul. ‘Melpa talk’ is co-extensive with Wurm’s Hagen language. Around Hagen township people are often bilingual in Melpa and Temboka, and if they understand the latter they can follow ‘Kowul talk’ (and Imbonggni) also. Within this category of Melpa, which they are more likely to refer to as mbo-ik, [‘stock talk’] or ‘native talk’, the people distinguish further between Kama (or Koma)-ik and Kopon-ik. The high plains rolling down from [the foothills] of Mount Hagen out to the Wahgi Valley are the Kama or ‘cold region’, where a dialect or sub-dialect which is closer to Temboka-talk is spoken. Over the range of hills which bounds this region on its north side, is the area spoken of as Kopon, ‘bush country’, and thought of as hot and heavily forested; although the people in this area themselves reserve the term Kopon for the much low-lying Jimi Valley and refer to their own area as ‘Korka-place’ (A.J. Strathem 1971:6; see also Merlan and Rumsey 1991:21-22 for comparable discussion).

The Korka-kona (‘place of scarcity’) is in fact a term used not by people who live there, but by the Kopon people when referring generally to people who live on the southern slopes of the Sepik-Wahgi Divide. In contrast with their own temperate zones at a relatively low altitude of less than 1,500 metres above sea level, where food — particularly the marita fruit pandanus, taro and breadfruit — is thought of as being plentiful, the Korka-place on the mountain slopes has fewer
varieties and people here are seen as being dependent on those in the Kopon-ruan-kona ('humid tropics') for tropical fruits and vegetables.

Andrew and Marilyn Strathem distinguished the Koma and Kopon areas as the Central and Northern Melpa, respectively, and it was at the Kawelka territories at Mbukl — a ridge overlooking the Wahgi, Baiyer and Jimi valleys — within this northern part of the Melpa-speaking area that most of their initial work was done (see, for example, A.J. Strathem 1971:6; A.J. and A.M. Strathem 1971:12-13. The distinction is of course a geographical one and linguistically does not apply to some groups, such as the Kawelka, who have territories in both Kopon and Koma areas and are currently in close association with some Jika groups with whom they have intensive marriage and exchange relations. For me, there is no difference between Kuma and Kopon 'talk', as I speak 'modern' Melpa, which is a combination of both Kopon (my father's sub-dialect) and Kuma (my mother's sub-dialect), as well as Temboka (my maternal grandmother's dialect) and can understand Kauil 'talk'.

Ideally, people in Hagen live in territory-claiming named groups. These groups, called tribes in English, are made up of (at least nominally) patrilineal clans which often claim remote common ancestry (see Chapter Four). These groups can be very competitive and often try to outdo each other with gifts of money and pigs in the never ending politics of reciprocal exchanges (see A.J. Strathem 1971; see also A.J. & A.M. Strathem 1971:3; Rubel and Rosman: 1978:195-196). The Mount Hagen moka ceremonial exchange system is one such arena of inter-group competition but electoral politics is arguably fast becoming an attractive arena for such competition in the modern era.

Why Hagen?

The selection of Mount Hagen as an area of study for this thesis was intentional and purposeful. Hagen is a significant choice for this study not only because I, as a member that society, have 'inside' knowledge of how the system operates, but more importantly because of the following factors. Firstly, Mount Hagen is believed to be the birthplace of agricultural intensification, which initially gave rise to the exchange complex, upon which political competition is largely based. Ceremonial exchanges of wealth items, such as pigs, previously pectadshells and nowadays

The evidence for Kuk, near Mount Hagen, as a "sort of the 'birthplace' of PNG Highlands agriculture and the efflorescence of social and cultural associated with an intensified agricultural regime" (Feil 1987:18), comes from Jack Golson's archaeological work at Kuk, which places the origins of agriculture at the surprisingly early date of 9,000 years, agricultural intensification at around 6,000 years, domestication of pigs at around 2,500 years, and the adoption of sweet potato at 300 years ago (see Golson 1977, 1981, 1982; see also Swadling 1981:31, 1998; Swadling, Golson and Muke 1998; Feil 1987:Chap.2). In other words, PNG Highlanders were among the earliest — perhaps the very earliest — gardeners in the world (see Turner 1994:117), and the intensity of Hagen agriculture, exchange systems and political competition may well have a deeper time span than what most people think.
cash, are particularly highly elaborated in Hagen, where they have crystallised into a specific institutional form known as the \textit{moka}, in which groups and individuals attempt to repay gifts at a higher level than those received previously (see A.J. Strathern 1992). The link between \textit{moka} and a type of leadership called 'big-men' (\textit{wua nuin} in Melpa language) and its remarkable resilience in the face of rapid social change has impressed many people, including Andrew Strathern, a keen observer of Hagen politics since 1964, who recently wrote that:

This has introduced a pervasive process of competition for prestige, and those individuals most successful at \textit{moka} emerge as "big-men", or leaders of factions, networks, and at times even segmentary groups. Far from disappearing as a result of social change, \textit{moka} exchanges has tended to effloresce and ramify. They have made their own contribution to the widening of spheres of political action in contemporary society (A.J. Strathern 1992:231).

Despite the major transitions in Papua New Guinea and the constant economic pressures exerted on the people's lives by the harsh realities of the imposed capitalist economy, Hageners continue to use \textit{moka} as an important arena for political competition and, at times, incorporating state systems and resources into their exchanges.

Secondly, this is a chance to study the innovative manner in which Hageners have captured and modified the state system to suit their lifestyle which may have few parallels anywhere in Papua New Guinea, or in Melanesia, or elsewhere in the world.\footnote{As pointed out by Bill Standish, there are some parallels (for example, Simbu). State politics in Simbu is perhaps not as integrated with an exchange cycle, but neither Paula Brown, nor Standish, nor anyone else had studied the links in detail (personal communication, December, 1997).} Clearly there are local mechanisms at work here, such as:

- In mobilising support and resources for elections, candidates rely heavily on big-men from within their own group, as leaders of their own factions, to secure assurances of support from other leaders of similar factions in other groups with which they often have exchange ties. It is the local big-men, with oratorical skills and historical knowledge of relations between groups (either of alliance or enmity), who tend to be successful in making arrangements between groups, ensuring that one group supports the other's candidate and not endorse its own. By applying the principles of \textit{moka}, such support creates a disequilibrium (of obligation) which must be balanced through reciprocal action on the part of the group that receives the support. The support itself may even take the form of \textit{moka}, as occurred in a recent election (see \textit{Chapter Eight}).

- Huge economic 'investment' to ensure group allies' support, including thousands of kina and hundreds of pigs, in election campaigns.
• The ever increasing use of force, including threat of force and actual physical violence, as a means to coerce voters to vote in a certain way, is in part associated with the use of massive amounts of economic resources.

• The ideology of group solidarity, as often expressed through the practice of ‘bloc-voting’ for a tribe/clan candidate. This becomes the candidate’s ‘base-vote’. Defectors are nearly always punished for what is commonly perceived as betrayal of tribal or clan loyalty. In the Hagen world view, defecting from a local candidate and supporting the opposition is like betraying a fellow tribesman or clansman to enemies during warfare.

• Elections are, in fact, viewed as a form of warfare which requires the full cooperation of all members of the group, especially when a lot of things are at stake here, including the reputations of leaders and the group whose ‘name must not go down’ (mbi mana nepanka).

• While the big-man, orators and factional leaders — representing the interests of churches, youth, women, and ‘name-list’ groups — play an important part in mobilising support for candidates, politicians rely on other types of leaders to convert assurances of support into actual votes. Here, candidates depend heavily on despotic councillors and fight-leaders, raskol gang leaders and other violent and ‘hot-headed’ (peng kundit) men to protect the ‘base-vote’ and to direct voters along parochial lines so that no one votes for the ‘wrong’ candidate.

• Politicians also depend on a variety of other (modern) organisations, such as business development associations, political parties and large business corporations for financial assistance in elections.

• Politicians may even use weapons, especially firearms, to intimidate and solidify the vote.

• The incorporation of ‘traditional’ Hagen ideologies and cultural practices into elections, whereby obligations are created through the exercise of voting for a certain candidate. Again, following moka principles but on individual basis (as opposed to group), this is based on the understanding that such obligations must be repaid somehow, conceivably through the disbursement of government funds (in the event of the candidate being voted into office), or alternatively, through personal means (for losing candidates, although not all of them will honour their obligations); and

• An apparently higher priority placed on elections, above almost every other arena of political competition (and cooperation), as indicated by mutual truce agreements reached by warring groups during both national and provincial government elections, and moreover, by the manner in which moka sequences and the cycles of war reparation payments have been
skilfully orchestrated to coincide with elections. A number of cases involving truce agreements mutually reached by warring groups are discussed in the relevant chapters of the thesis.

Thirdly, the Western Highlands is the second most populous province in Papua New Guinea. The province has a land area of 8,897 square kilometres and in 1990 had a citizen population of 335,592, comprising 285,946 persons born in the province and 49,646 persons born in other provinces, and a non-citizen population of 586 persons (National Statistical Office 1993, 1994). The Western Highlands Province, with a total population of over 336,000 persons, “is now 24.5 per cent of the population of the Highlands region and 9.3 per cent of the population of PNG excluding North Solomons Province” (NSO 1994:7). At the time of the 1990 Census the province had a physiological (nutritional) population density of 81 persons per square kilometre for all sectors and a density of 76 persons per square kilometre for the rural sector (NSO 1994:30). However, in most parts of the province, especially where large populations are concentrated on the floor of the Wahgi valley and on the Ogelbeng plains around Mount Hagen, the population density is believed to be much higher at around 200 persons per square kilometre.

Fourthly, the provincial capital, Mount Hagen, is the main commercial centre for the Highlands region, providing banking, transport and communication facilities for individuals and businesses operating in Enga, Simbu and Southern Highlands provinces. The airport at Kagamuga, which now offers a direct route to Cairns in Australia, is the main point of entry and departure for these provinces, and hence the town has become the main service centre for the oil and gold exploration and exploitation. Economically, the Western Highlands Province is Papua New Guinea’s largest producer of coffee and tea (Turner 1994:228), a point echoed in a recent study:

Its rural economy accounts for half of Papua New Guinea’s coffee exports and almost all of the tea crop, while the provincial capital, Mount Hagen dominates the regional business economy by virtue of its favourable location on the highlands road network, a plentiful supply of land for subdivision near the town, an airport capable of handling jet aircraft, and a service sector primed for expansion by the size of the plantation sector. If, by the mid-1980s, Mount Hagen did not surpass Goroka in these respects, gold, oil

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6. On land area in the Western Highlands Province, there is a discrepancy between the National Statistical Office figure of 8,897 square kilometres (1994:29) and a recent figure of 9,147 square kilometres given by Burton and Keher (1997:155). On the basis of the NSO figure, it was calculated that the crude (arithmetic) population density, which is defined as the number of persons per square kilometre, was 38 persons per square kilometre at the time of the 1990 Census (NSO 1994:30; Table 11:30). As pointed out by the National Statistical Office, “crude population density gives however a rather misleading picture of the real population-land situation and problems, particularly in a province like Western Highlands Province where most people are engaged in agricultural activities. A far more meaningful measure of population density in the case of Western Highlands Province is the number of persons per km² of land which can be used for agriculture, (‘arable land’”) (NSO 1994:29). Citing a 1986 CSIRO figure of only 4,135 square kilometres of land in the province being effectively used for agriculture, NSO arrived at the physiological population density figure of 81 persons per square kilometre (NSO 1994:30; Table 11:13).
and gas developments to the west at Porgera and Mount Kare, in Enga, and at Iagifu and Hides, in Southern Highlands, have since given rise to an investment boom which has assured Mount Hagen an unchallengeable position as the primary service centre of the Highlands region (Burton and Keher 1997:152).

The coffee industry alone, comprising large locally-owned plantations — notably Gumanch, Kinjibi, Kotna, Penga, Wurup, Kindeng, Aviamp, Kimil, Wara Kar, and Kudjip — and smallholdings maintained on an individual basis, is worth about K250 million per annum, a figure which includes other provinces. Significantly, all of these are located in the upper and middle parts of the Wahgi valley. The operations in two other large plantations, Tigi in the eastern Baiyer Valley and Korgua in the Nebilyer Valley, have been disrupted by tribal warfare.

Fifthly, the leaders of the country’s major political parties are based in Mount Hagen, with party-aligned interest groups clearly at work here, perhaps reaching a level of political integration that is much more cohesive than in other parts of the country. Names such as Paias Wingti, Paul Pora and Michael Mel go way beyond local boundaries. A history of competition between party-aligned interest groups has been analysed in the context of the Western Highlands Provincial Government and the rivalry between the People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) Party and the National Party (see Chapter Seven). Both PDM, headed by Paias Wingti, and the two factions of the National Party, headed separately by Paul Pora and Michael Mel, have strong following in the Mount Hagen Central area, but are not as strong in other parts of the province. The other major PNG parties with Hageners as leaders are: Pangu Pati (with Kombukla tribesman, Pati Wamp, as the national president); and the People’s Progress Party (PPP, with Jika Milakamb clansman, Glen Komomga, as its national president). Both Pangu and PPP are relatively weak in terms of party following in Hagen because most people view them as the nambis or coastal parties and their nominal Hagen leaders as mere window dressing (biba tasol). It is nonetheless the competition between such men and their followings and the problems that stem from such behaviour which form the focus of this study.

Although Hagen politics may be influenced by unique circumstances, it has strong implications for PNG political culture because Hagen leaders such as Wingti, Pora and Mel also operate at provincial, regional and national levels. Furthermore, Hagen shares with other Highlands societies certain common historical, cultural and linguistic characteristics. Conversely, there is also considerable variation within the Highlands and at times Hays’s (1993) ‘fuzzy-set’ seems applicable. According to Hays, “the New Guinea Highlands’ as used in anthropological discourse exemplifies well what cognitive psychologists would call a ‘fuzzy set’”, which means

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7. As indicated by Turner (1994:58), coffee is by far the most important cash crop in Papua New Guinea, and the K103 million worth of beans exported in 1990 (55,000 metric tons) represented 9.2 per cent of total PNG exports. Every adult male in Hagen may be engaged in coffee smallholding. Tea, by contrast, is not viewed as attractive because of poor prices, and it is therefore grown by plantations. According to Turner (1994:212), in 1990 K6.7 million worth of tea was exported, mainly to Australia.
that “despite attempts to specify attributes (elevation, population density, agricultural techniques, staple crops, settlement types, or social institutions such as ceremonial exchange), when anthropologists assign societies to ‘the Highlands’ these attributes are less often truly diagnostic than loosely employed, with weightings on sliding scales” (1993:145).

While the cultural delineation of the PNG Highlands may be blurred by overlapping characteristics, the geographical, political and administrative region called the PNG Highlands is made up of five provinces: Eastern Highlands, Simbu, Western Highlands, Enga and Southern Highlands. Initially starting as the Central Highlands District, the area was divided into Eastern Highlands, Western Highlands, and Southern Highlands Districts in 1952. Enga and Simbu provinces were subsequently creations from Western and Eastern Highlands, in 1966 and 1973, respectively (Iamo and Ketan 1992:22). It is easily the most densely populated region in PNG. The resident population of the Highlands region in 1990 was 1,371,000 persons, or 36.7 per cent of the total PNG population of 3.7 million (NSO 1994). The highest concentration of population in the Highlands, according to the 1990 Census, is illustrated below (see Figure 1.1).

There are some seventy-two linguistic groups, ranging from the smallest (Some and Abaga), with only 150 speakers, to the country’s second largest (Enga together with Kyaka), with over 200,000 speakers. There is a tendency for linguistic groups to become larger going from east to west in the central mountain valleys, while the language groups on the Highlands fringe remain small (Iamo and Ketan 1992:22; see also Feil 1987:140-167). The cultural, linguistic, geographical and administrative region described here as the PNG Highlands is indicated in Map 3.
Map 3: The Papua New Guinea Highlands Region

Ethnographic Sources

To date, the literature on PNG Highlands societies in general, and the Hagen area in particular, is quite substantial, both in volume and in the richness of observation and analysis it contains. Much of this literature contains anthropological debates on characteristics of 'traditional' PNG Highlands societies, ranging from descent and kinship relations to group structures, social organisation, leadership and politics. A significant part of this literature extends back to the early years of European contact. Much of social scientists' knowledge of pre-colonial and post-contact Hagen society is owed to the writings of Lutheran missionaries, Georg Vicedom (Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8) and Hermann Strauss (Strauss and Tischner 1962). Vicedom was based at Ogelbeng from 1935 onwards and his work covers a wide range of themes, ranging from myths and genealogies to ceremonial exchange and leadership. He worked mostly with the Jika and Yamka groups around Ogelbeng and, mainly on the basis of genealogies and origin-myths, concluded that they were descendants of a 'master race' which colonised Hagen from the 'West'. Vicedom, however, did not know that the 'West' from which Jika and Yamka came from was in fact the Kaugel and Tambul areas, not some distant foreign places as he may have thought (see A.J. Strathem 1987:253). Of particular interest is his picture of Hagen with a high degree of stratification. His publication, Die Mbowamb is massive (three large volumes), and of considerable value if read with a critical eye, for example, to its full-blown master race theory (see Merlan and Rumsey 1991:30-31; see also A.J. Strathem 1971, 1987 for a critical review of Vicedom’s material of stratification and his 'light-skinned master race' theory). Vicedom's countryman and missionary colleague, Strauss came to Ogelbeng in 1936 and his Die Mi-Kultur is largely a study of Hagen cults, but contains observations on ceremonial exchange and other aspects of Hagen society as well. Strauss worked mostly among the Nengka people of Mul Council. Noting discrepancies between Vicedom and Strauss's interpretations, A.J. Strathem says:

Despite the fact that they were missionaries of the same church and the same nation, their pictures of Hagen society differed considerably and it clear that a political dimension underlies this difference of view. Vicedom's hierarchical, blood-based, picture reflects more the German ideology of the time. Strauss, writing with much better control of the language and better rapport with the people, as well as the defeat of his country in the war behind him, gives an account which is closer to those of the academic anthropologists who worked in neighbouring areas of the Highlands in the 1950s and 1960s (A.J. Strathem 1987:254).

Other early works were by the Catholic missionary Father Ross (1936) and Gitlow (1947), an American military officer stationed in Mount Hagen during the war, whose knowledge of
In introduction

'Hagen economic relations' comes from Ross' notes (see Simpson 1954; A.J. Strathern 1987; Merlan and Rumsey 1991).8

Professional anthropologists began working in Hagen during the 1960s, with Marilyn and Andrew Strathern among Hagen Central and Dei Council groups and E. Brandewie among Mul Council groups. Brandewie conducted his fieldwork in 1963-65 among the Kumdi people of Western Melpa. He has recently published a general ethnographic account of the Kumdi, with special emphases on marriage and exchange. Andrew and Marilyn Strathern have consistently worked in Hagen since 1964. Their initial fieldwork in 1964-5 and 1968 (18 months) was conducted mainly among my people, the Kavelka of Northern and Central Melpa. From this and subsequent visits over the years, the Strathems have published extensively, counting at least ten books and countless papers. Having read their work for more than 15 years, I have benefited quite significantly from their work, particularly Andrew Strathem's, which has had a major influence in my academic life.9 His book The Rope of Moka (1971) is a study of ceremonial exchange and leadership, while One Father, One Blood (1972) looks at group structure and ideology. Some of his other Hagen volumes are Ongka: a Self-account by a New Guinea Big-man (1979b), translated by A.J. Strathern; A Line of Power (1984), a study of political and social change in Hagen and Pangia; Ru: Biography of a Western Highlander (1993), translated by A.J. Strathern. Self-Decoration in Mount Hagen (1971), in collaboration with Marilyn Strathern, is a study of facial and body decoration as art in Hagen. Marilyn (A.M.) Strathern has produced four volumes: Official and Unofficial Courts (1972a), a study of indigenous and introduced dispute management procedures; Women in Between (1972b), a study of Melpa marriage and the role of women as links between different groups; No Money on Our Skins (1975), a study of Hagen migrants in Port Moresby; and The Gender of the Gift (1988), a comparative study of exchange addressing anthropological theories of gender in Melanesia.10

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8. According to Colin Simpson (1954), Abraham L. Gitlow, "a war history officer of the U.S. Far East Air Service Command" visited Mount Hagen during the Second World War. "Gitlow who had been trained as an economist and was to study anthropology on his return to America, remained at Mount Hagen for several weeks" during which "he gathered a great deal of material on the native way of life, most of it from Father William Ross, and he was also helped by Major George Greathead" (1954:106). I take up the discussion in Chapter Two and Chapter Six, but at this stage it should be pointed out that both Ross and Gitlow's material in particular must be treated with caution and we can question the validity of their data in view of their lack of training in anthropological fieldwork and Gitlow's in the context of his severely restricted time frame of "several weeks".

9. In hindsight, it was perhaps no coincidence that my high school headmaster presented me with brand new copies of A.J. Strathern's major volumes, The Rope of Moka (1971) and One Father, One Blood (1972), during the 1982 Sogeri National High School Graduation, a ceremony which A.J. Strathern kindly attended at the school's invitation.

10. Both Andrew and Marilyn Strathern are amazingly prolific writers and whilst it is difficult to give an exact figure, in 1993, at least for Andrew Strathern I counted 18 books, 138 articles, 10 comments, 91 reviews and 8 papers in progress (all complete manuscripts, some submitted for publication).
I have also drawn from studies on people in neighbouring areas, notably Francesca Merlan and Alan Rumsey's (1991) work among the Nebilyer, John Muke's (1994) study on warfare among the Kuma of South Wahgi; Michael O'Hanlon's (1989) work among the Komblo of North Wahgi. Other studies, including Marie Reay's (1959) work on the Kuma, Roy Rappaport's (1984[originally 1968]) work among the Maring and Paula Brown's (1963; 1972) work in Chimbu, are mentioned in the relevant discussions.

**PNG Political Studies**

Studies on PNG politics can be classified into two broad categories, depending on traditional disciplinary emphasis on different levels of political competition. On the one hand is the study of local-level, tribally-based politics, while on the other hand is the national-provincial-level politics. Generally, the former involves competition between individuals and groups in local arenas of competition and cooperation, such as warfare and ceremonial exchange. This is the kind of stuff which anthropologists have traditionally been interested in. And the latter involves competition within state structures and legitimising processes of governance. That is the kind of stuff which political scientists have traditionally been interested in. Recent evidence indicates a third category which we may call 'transitional studies', involving changing and continuing patterns of leadership and political behaviour. Examples of local-level studies can be found in Berndt and Lawrence (ed. 1971), for 'transitional studies' (see, for example, Ward ed. 1970; A.J. Strathern 1984; Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Warry 1987; Standish 1992), and for national-provincial-level, there are numerous election studies (Bettison, Hughes and van der Veur, eds. 1965; Epstein, Parker and Reay, eds. 1971; Stone ed. 1976; Hegarty ed. 1983; Turner and Hegarty 1987; King ed. 1989; Oliver ed. 1989; Saffu ed. 1996). The election studies cover the seven national elections between 1964 and 1992 and all, except Turner and Hegarty (1987), contain a collection of papers by anthropologists, political scientists and others on different electorates within the country. The problems that stem from electoral behaviour and other types of competition have also been analysed (see, for example, Clifford, Morauta and Stuart 1984; Dinnen 1996b); as have Australian responses to PNG's security problems (see, for example, Anderson ed. 1990; Thompson ed. 1994). In addition, there are some useful general studies (Dorney 1990; Mangi 1992) as well as those dealing with specific themes, such as political parties (Wolfers 1970; Loveday and Wolfers 1976; Loveday 1976); political decentralisation and local-level governments (Conyers 1976; Standish 1979; Wolfers, Conyers, Larmour and Ghai 1982; Larmour and Qalo eds. 1985; Ghai and Regan 1992; Peasah 1994; May and Regan eds. 1997); development associations (Gerritsen, May and Walter 1981; May ed. 1982); social stratification (A.J. Strathern ed. 1982; May ed. 1984); alcohol consumption and associated problems (Marshall ed. 1982; Iamo and Ketan 1992); the cultivation and sale of the marijuana drug (Iamo 1991); domestic violence (Toft and Bonnell 1985; Toft ed. 1986); election-related violence (Iamo ed.

My study contains elements of all three categories, linking local-level competition to national politics. The approach I have taken here, in looking at the different ways in which local groups, coalitions, factions and their leaders interact within and between local and national arenas of competition, is somewhat similar to that taken by Andrew Strathern and Bill Standish (see, for example, A.J. Strathern 1984, 1992, 1993; Standish 1983, 1989, 1992). But there are important differences between their studies and mine. It is, for instance, evident in their studies that there is significant emphasis on rigidity and solidity in A.J. Strathern's as well as Standish's picture of society and groups in relation to the various spheres of competition and cooperation. Discussion of arenas such as ceremonial exchange and elections reflect an extraordinarily high quality of analysis, yet neither A.J. Strathern nor Standish was able to consistently link them together in a systematic fashion because of the disciplinary nature of their studies. I have deliberately selected these two observers because their work is directly relevant to this study and if I appear to be hypercritical of their work, then it is because of the great influence their studies — the major works on PNG bridging local and national politics — have had on my work.

A.J. Strathern and Standish have consistently worked in the Highlands — their observations spanning three decades — and whilst they both recognised the resilience of indigenous institutions and remarked on the innovative manner in which Highlanders have coopted introduced and state resources for deployment in local arenas of competition, the interactive relationship between components of the state and indigenous political institutions has not been fully explored. For them, the 'boundaries' of the various arenas of competition seem to be quite constant and the types of leaders who operate within them appear clearly defined as 'big-men', or 'despots', 'fight-leader', or whatever, that is, of one particular kind in a given context, not 'combinatory' or 'generalised'. The nature of 'group' needs further exploration too. A.J. Strathern, for instance, looked at groups (and their leaders) and the way they relate to each other through warfare and moka exchanges. Although he did point out the shifting nature of alliance systems, his considerations for political groups was mainly in solidary terms — almost as if these were ready-made units.
This study differs from theirs by clearly demonstrating that political fields and the groups who operate within them are basically political 'constructions' which are created by different types of leaders for different purposes. The boundaries of political competition are therefore constantly shaped and reshaped by the actions of leaders. And it is important to realise that the same 'big-men' who manipulate wealth to gain prestige can also be shockingly despotic at times, or take on other attributes when it suits them. In other words, this study differs from A.J. Strathem's by arguing that 'big-man' is not (and perhaps never has been) the defining character of Hagen leadership. It will be argued that there are other types of leaders and also that one leader can assume different attributes at different times and in various contexts.

By studying electoral politics, Standish, like most other political scientists, was looking at the output side of political action (not the input side). From his detailed study of different paths to power in Simbu (Standish 1992) and other similar studies, especially the numerous election studies (Standish 1976; 1983; 1989; 1996), it is quite possible to understand the process at work here. It is evident from these studies that success in elections has its rewards, the reverse of the pain and suffering that failure brings. Also evident is the pervasive process of patronage and competing values attached to the management — and mismanagement — of state resources. Election studies and other similar studies that concentrate on the output side of political action are important because they present us the opportunity to understand the process involved in the legitimisation of leaders' claims to govern states. Such studies, however, offer little insight to the processes which take place before elections. This is precisely where the current study can make a contribution. It offers insights into the dynamics of local politics and the way it relates to state politics. In particular, it examines the processes that take place before elections, including the pre-selection phase, and the reasons why some groups cooperate in order to compete against others.

By looking at the contemporary network of power blocs operating in diverging political fields — such as Dei, Mul and Hagen electorates — and the proclaimed historical ties between key players (core groups and their leaders), this study is bringing into the literature a new phase (of escalation and integration) of Hagen politics. Despite their continued interest in political developments in Papua New Guinea, the main strength/focus of A.J. Strathem's major studies on Hagen politics, like Standish's in Chimbu, was the 1970s. There was in fact a massive amount of academic work in the era of independence, but then a general decline in interest. In this study I attempt to help rectify that situation by looking at the trends of the 1980s and their manifestations in the 1990s.

Trends and Patterns of Political Competition

An examination of the patterns of political competition in Hagen indicate that the modern state of PNG remains at a very rudimentary level of integration and its leaders face major difficulties
in dealing with mounting problems of internal security. Recent developments, including escalating levels of violence in the PNG Highlands and other parts of the country, raise considerable concern and, moreover, indicate that the PNG state exists in the midst of a very turbulent society (Standish 1994; Ketan 1995; Saffu 1996). The problems associated with the secessionist movement in Bougainville, the resurgence in tribal warfare in the five Highlands provinces, and of urban crime and violence in Port Moresby, Lae and other metropolitan centres are well known through extensive media coverage, both locally and internationally. But international observers in Australia, North America and Europe hear very little about the enduring trials and tribulations of the liberal democratic process in the modern state of Papua New Guinea. A glance at the recent literature on the PNG Highlands, however, shows a consistent pattern of violence and lawlessness as a direct consequence of political action by prominent individuals and groups competing for power and influence (see, for example, Standish 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997; A.J. Strathem 1992, 1993; Ketan 1995, 1996; and Dinnen 1996a, 1996b). Whilst this study on Mount Hagen is a small contribution towards identifying some of the problems that result from political action, which means that it does not drastically differ from those mentioned above, it does, however, provide special insights into the underlying traditional norms and ideologies behind the political practices of local groups and their leaders. In other words, this study involves a shift in emphasis from one based on what people are and what they do to why they do the things they do. This, in my view, is taking a step further along the lines of T.E. Hays's (1993) plea for a shift from studies of morphology to studies of process.

Although the thesis basically comprises interlinking case studies of mainly local-level politics, it does cover the much wider issues of competing legitimacies and state-society interactions. Escalating levels of violence and the deliberate infringement of PNG electoral regulations are discussed in the context of electoral manoeuvring by powerful individuals, as an innovative extension of rivalry between equally powerful and, in some instances, party-aligned interest groups operating within well established local arenas of competition and co-operation.

It can be argued, on the basis of case studies on Hagen conflict and political action, that the post-colonial PNG state has continuously failed to take control of conflict situations in an authoritative manner, thereby exemplifying Migdal's (1988) model of 'weak state versus strong societies' (see also Standish 1993, 1994, 1996; Dinnen 1994, 1996a, 1997b). Increasingly violent elections, blatant disregard for electoral regulations, coupled with gun warfare and the general breakdown in 'law and order' are prime indicators of government without political strength and control. When societies opt for compensation — as well as more violent means such as payback killings — as an avenue for conflict resolution, this suggests a lack of confidence in the state judicial system, which was never fully in control of the society. Having realised the relatively
weak nature of the state, the people have on numerous occasions taken the law into their own hands. And many have gone unpunished. Elections, as will be shown, are a farce. Violence is commonplace and voters are coerced to vote in a particular way.

Similarly, in tribal warfare, the police are often powerless to intervene. Available data suggest that no major armed conflict has been resolved as a result of state intervention. Instead, it has been local groups themselves who have reached peace agreements (often with local Christian mission leaders acting as mediators). Politicians, to whom people could look for guidance, are themselves caught up in intricate webs of social relations which undermine their integrity as leaders. It is widely believed that some of them (and some policemen also) have supplied guns to tribesmen as part of electoral manoeuvring. They on the one hand are lawmakers and on the other hand are held responsible for lawlessness (see A.J. Strathern 1993; see also Standish 1992 and 1996).

Recognising that "many of these problems are political, and involve complex social and state structures" (Standish 1994:51), PNG Highlands disorder can be best understood from a 'state-society interaction' perspective. Accordingly, explored here are questions of how and why people in Hagen respond to elections, and in ways that may seem peculiar to outsiders. Why, for example, are elections such extravagantly expensive exercises, coupled with correspondingly high levels of violence? Who are the key players and what are the rules, if any at all, involved? It can be argued that one cannot satisfactorily answer such questions without understanding the cultural and historical background of PNG Highlands societies. Electoral behaviour on the one hand is tied in with traditional norms and ideologies of group solidarity in competition for temporary advantages and on the other hand influenced by new economic resources and the wider process of socio-political change. In a general context, people in Hagen and the Highlands, as in other parts of the country, are trying to come to terms with the rapid transition from traditionally subsistence agricultural-based societies to a capitalist economy. But more specifically, this study is about the strategies and ploys of individuals and groups in competition for power and control over valued scarce resources.

From 1980 to 1995, provincial government elections formed an important arena of competition for local leaders and their groups, and success in elections meant access to government funds and resources, but the abolition of the provincial government system by the national government in July 1995 has somewhat altered the level and possibly the intensity of the competition. The background to the demise of the system of elected provincial government in general and the Western Highlands Provincial Government in particular will also be explored in this thesis.
National and Regional Significance

While the thesis is primarily based on field research conducted in just one part of the PNG Highlands, and my discussions are based on Hagen cases and events which may be influenced by unique circumstances, the issues raised here are of both regional and national significance. Accordingly, this study provides some new evidence on wider state-society interaction in Papua New Guinea. Some election strategies mentioned here, such as sponsorship of a candidate by a clan other than his own (as form of solictory gift requesting reparation payment from an ally for war deaths), the courtship of ‘name-list’ groups and the protection of a candidate’s ‘base-vote’ area, have not been previously reported elsewhere. Evidence presented here and elsewhere (Ketan 1995; Standish 1996) suggests that elections in recent times have not been free and fair. While some observers (Reay 1987; Standish 1992, 1994 and 1996; A.J. Strathem 1993; and Dinnen 1996) and the participants themselves are aware of the problems such as voter coercion and punitive and retaliatory raids organised by supporters of losing candidates, these kind of stories are rarely brought to the attention of authorities in the capital Port Moresby, and international observers probably hear much less.11

Competing Themes and Questions

The key question here is what happens when the state (usually the colonial state) comes into contact with ‘traditional’ (so-called stateless), pre-capitalist, indigenous societies? When analysing society’s reaction to structural changes, one must consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of society, including its capacity to absorb, ignore and subvert state authority, and its resilience to change. In Hagen, as in other parts of PNG and in Melanesia, it has been a combination of resilience, as demonstrated by a remarkable capacity to absorb change, and ‘strength’, as expressed through subversive challenges made against state authority, disdainfully ignoring the state’s traditional Weberian claim to a monopoly over the legitimate use of force (including violence) and, moreover, clearly and forcefully calling the state’s legitimacy into question.

A most remarkable part of externally induced social change in the PNG Highlands is the resilience of indigenous prestige institutions like the Hagen moka, Enga tee, or the Simbu buga gende ceremonial exchange systems. Equally remarkable is the constant use of local ideologies — of customary use of violence in conflict resolution, or of clan solidarity as expressed through bloc voting, or of leaders as magnets for attracting and distributing wealth — to justify political

11 In view of an official tendency for brusqueness and scant regard for information on election-related violence and the state’s incapacity or weakness for maintaining public order, it was reassuring to read the Electoral Commissioner’s report to the sixth parliament on the 1997 National Election. Unfortunately, the rather obscure and elliptical reference to “problems that continue to plague the conduct of elections in the country” in Kaiulo (1997b) does little towards finding ways to solving such problems.
action in contemporary arenas of competition. Such processes have been described by some observers as indigenous values and ideologies ‘penetrating’, ‘capturing’, or ‘colonising’ the state (see, for example, Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Standish 1992; 1994; Dinnen 1997a; 1997b). While these are useful ways of explaining some of the more complex processes at work in PNG and in Melanesia, I would suggest, on the basis of data presented in this study, that the overall situation is one of incorporation rather than each having colonised components of the other.

My use of the concept ‘incorporation’ is indeed appropriate for Hagen, as it represents an accurate summation of the material presented here. By incorporation, it means that the state has been fitted into the Hagen political system, thereby emphasising the ‘mutually transforming’ or mutuality aspect of state-society interactions (see Migdal et al 1994). It is therefore necessary to analytically distinguish ‘incorporation’ from ‘penetration’ (as in the penetration of the state by the Enga; Gordon and Meggitt 1985:181), ‘capture’ (which implies taking hold of something), and ‘colonisation’, as in the “PNG State being colonised by Simbu political values” (Standish 1992:250), or by “Melanesian ideologies and political strategies” (Standish 1994:60); or “the system (state and business) by the Melanesian ‘lifeworld’ [society]” (Dinnen 1997a:16; 1997b:22). These are definitely powerful concepts which can capture the imagination of the reader, yet in themselves represent a somewhat misleading picture of state-society relations. In seeking to correct the Euro-centric view of the colonial state which denies the ‘agency’ and autonomy of indigenous society, they tend to give an impression of a one-way process, whereby the mutuality of state-society interactions is not adequately represented.

The incorporation of the PNG state into Hagen society is, in essence, what this thesis is all about. It is a detailed local-level study about how and why local groups, coalitions, factions and their leaders have brought the state into the Hagen moral universe, incorporating components of the state and the modern economy, as part of their competition. This study deals with questions of how and to what extent one system has ‘captured’ the other, if at all, and also examines the wider implications of such developments, particularly in the context of state-society relations and competing legitimacies of political systems. Also addressed are some key issues, such as the conflicting role of politicians in local conflicts and the use of state resources in promoting local interests, thereby raising questions of loyalty between state and society. Such reactions to change are certainly not unique to Melanesia, as there are examples in Africa and other parts of the world (see, for example, Ekeh 1975; Randall and Theobald 1985; Chazan et al 1988; Boone 1994).

Some Analytical Concepts and Approaches

The contemporary relations between the PNG state and the various indigenous political units involve a high degree of complexity and their description requires the use of a range of analytical
tools with some proficiency. But even the most accomplished analysts have encountered serious problems coming to terms with trends and patterns in PNG and the Third World, so one can imagine how difficult it is for a novice like me coming from a general social science background. It is, however, hoped that my work can take an interstitial position between anthropology and political science, and thus will draw from both fields as well as from other disciplines within the social sciences in order to construct suitable explanations for developments and associated problems in PNG.

The difficulties encountered by social scientists in dealing with state-society relations in PNG, tropical Africa and other parts of the Third World is chiefly attributed to the inherent limitations of theoretical approaches. It is possible to distinguish two broad views, reflecting opposite sides to the debate. On the one hand is the overly optimistic view of development fostered mainly by the 1960s modernisation and political development theories, which hold that recently decolonised countries would progress to the level of Western societies, while on the other hand, is a rather pessimistic view fostered by the 1970s dependency and underdevelopment theories, which hold that Third World states were economically dependent on the First World and for as long as they maintained ties with their former colonial rulers, they would remain underdeveloped and heavily dependent on foreign aid. As indicated by Chazan, et al (1988:14), modernisation theories emanated from the West and were closely related to developments in the U.S. political science in the 1950s.

The modernisation approach seems to have been heavily influenced by early social theories of societies, with a particularly disturbing evolutionary twist to it. Randall and Theobald (1985:2) noted that it was probably inevitable that the pronounced evolutionary strain inherent in classical sociology be transmitted via its contemporary exemplars to the study of the Third World. They further say that:

A basic and usually explicit assumption of the modernisation theories we have been considering was that the 'developing' societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were in the process of being transformed into stable democracies of the western pluralist type. There can be little doubt that the already-industrialised world, especially the US, provided the model for political modernity just as for modernity in general. The democratic ideal, it seemed, had reached its zenith in the West and this was the condition towards which the societies of the Third World were evolving. The traumas and strains of this transformation are frequently intense but they are worth enduring for the goal, once arrived at — and arrival was thought to be inevitable — will be more than adequate compensation (1985:2).

Basically, the Western liberal democracies in Europe and North America were seen in the Weberian sense as ideal-types and it was hoped with a fervent optimism that the former European colonies in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific would ultimately end up as 'carbon copies' of the political systems found in the West. The inherent fallacies of this
approach were recognised by both neo-Marxist and dependency theorists, among others, in Africa and Latin America. Drawing from their own experiences with economic conditions in Third World societies, particularly the hardships caused by scarce resources and unequal distribution of wealth from extractive mineral development projects, Africans and Latin Americans were sceptical of the rewards promised by modernisation theorists.

Theories of dependency, with roots in neo-Marxist political theory, and underdevelopment originating especially in Latin America were developed in direct opposition to the assumptions of the development theory. In Africa, for instance, it was noted that:

Theories of dependency and underdevelopment came into vogue as a reaction to the premises and sources of political development theory and were based on the opposite assumption that African progress has been, and continues to be, impeded by forces (international and/or domestic) bent on the ongoing exploitation of the continent and its resources. And moreover, these, primarily capitalist, interests could only be held at bay if the global system underwent a fundamental change that would alter the structural relations between the Third World and the industrialised world (underdevelopment) or between the masses and the dominant classes within Africa (dependency). Thus, in stark contrast to the modernization approach, these theorists have focused not on the process of development but on the roots of underdevelopment (Chazen et al 1988:16).

Recent comments on PNG in Australia have tended to emphasise either optimism or pessimism without much causal analysis. One is the rather paternalistic and benevolent view that characterise PNG-Australia relations, a situation which many PNG politicians and bureaucrats feel uncomfortable about. This view is deeply rooted in the modernisation approach and holds that with a bit of help from Australia, PNG can overcome its problems and climb up that noble path to good governance and economic prosperity (see, for example, Anderson ed. 1990).

The other is the apocalyptic, or to use the Australian Channel Nine’s Current Affairs presenter Ray Martin’s concept, ‘tinderbox’, view fostered by the international media, which holds that PNG is dangerously and precariously poised at the brink of an abyss. Here I sketch that view, in order to contextualise my own study of how local politics works in PNG.

Although ‘brinkmanship’, the practice of going near the edge of the abyss before recovering, is common in PNG, Australians have a tendency towards overreacting to crises situations, judging from recent events associated with the infamous Sandline controversy of March 1997 when elements of the PNG Defence Force rebelled against the ministers responsible for hiring mercenaries ostensibly to eliminate rebel leaders on Bougainville. For instance, there were reports that the Australian Defence Force was preparing to invade the capital, Port Moresby, during the March 1997 political crises caused by the Sandline issue. In a subsequent Australian Bulletin report, Brett Martin revealed that ‘Operation Baritone’ was set up to seize the Jacksons
airport in Port Moresby and evacuate up to 10,000 foreigners (including 5,000 Australians) deemed ‘at risk’ (1997:20).

Noting that the political and civil malaise in PNG that led to the drafting of Operation Baritone goes deeper than the Sandline controversy, Brett Martin wrote:

Corruption is rife, morale in the [PNG] defence force is low and the general population is angry that politicians have failed to deliver promised prosperity. Australian defence analysts fear any perceived discrepancies in this month’s elections may be the trigger for a military coup or popular revolt. PNG is a dangerous place for foreigners in normal circumstances, but the lives of Australians and other foreign nationals would be seriously threatened in any major uprising (Martin 1997:20,22).

Such a view of PNG is not uncommon in Australia, despite PNG having dealt with the issue in the June 1997 election, as it is evident in another Bulletin news article, in which Trevor Watson reported that:

“The monster is dead”, read the banner draped on the fence surrounding defence headquarters in Port Moresby to mark Chan’s stunning election defeat. The former PM was perceived as arrogant, detached from his people, tolerant of high-level corruption and incapable of managing PNG’s economy. But most observers see his defeat as stemming from the chaos that followed his decision to spend $46 million lining the Sandline mercenaries to kill fellow Papua New Guineans on Bougainville (1997:32).

PNG leaders, having grown accustomed to constant criticisms that accompany Australian aid, are no longer surprised by the pessimistic picture of PNG’s future as depicted in the media by journalists. All, however, cannot be dismissed as sensational journalism, because there is some truth in reports of violence and civil unrest in PNG. The apparent weakness of the state is foremost among topics of interest for PNG observers, and demands explanation.

So here I sketch several analytical concepts which may be useful in constructing suitable explanations for the PNG situation, which have previously considered by others (see Hegarty 1989; Ashton 1990; Standish 1994). They are: (1) Myrdal’s (1968) idea of the ‘soft state’; (2) Tinker’s (1965) concept of the ‘broken-backed’ state; (3) Lindblom’s (1959) notion of ‘muddling through’; (4) the notion of ‘upward colonisation’, or ‘Melanesian values colonising the state’ (Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Standish 1992); (5) Migdal’s (1988) concept of ‘weak state versus strong society’; (6) Filer’s (1992) notion of ‘political disintegration’; and (7) A.J. Strathern’s (1993b) concept of ‘disintegrative integration’. From this local level study I add to these my own notion of the ‘Hagen megacycle’, where the state and its events have been incorporated into the Hagen political system.

David Hegarty (1989) found three concepts or notions derived from the social science literature useful: Myrdal’s ‘soft state’, Tinker’s ‘broken-backed’ state, and Lindblom’s ‘muddling through’. Hegarty says that ‘when liberally interpreted and appropriately modified, these concepts provide
a corrective to both the overly pessimistic or catastrophic view and to overly optimistic view, which holds that PNG's problems are akin to 'growing pains'" (1989:13).

**A 'soft state'?**

Myrdal's notion of a 'soft state' is characterised by: a capacity for planning but little ability for implementation; difficulty in enforcing laws; populist rhetoric for reform (land, population, etc.); piecemeal policy action; a low level of social discipline; and a tendency for corruption to increase as opportunities for acquisition increase and standards of probity among high-placed politicians and officials is perceived to decline (Myrdal 1968; quoted in Hegarty 1989:13).

**A 'broken-backed' state?**

Tinker's notion of a 'broken-backed' state entails "a form of quasi-government which will become familiar in the coming years" (1965:114). Tinker predicted that "the centralised state will cease to be" and that "the simulacrum of government will continue in the capital, but within twenty miles there will be a total divorce between appearance and reality. The man with the gun will have taken over" (1965:117). He says that:

> Representatives of the central government will be stationed in the districts. They will sit upon the verandahs of the imposing bungalows of the old European district officers, and they will be called district officers, but their writ will not run as far as the compound wall. The real power in the districts will be exercised by men of force. Some of these will be ministers, who run their own small private armies, and who levy tribute from all the local merchants and traders, great and small. Then there will be the underground or resistance leaders, who are quite frankly bandits, and who levy their tribute from the peasants as well as the townsfolk. Finally, there will be army or military police detachments, sent to protect the rural folk, and exercising their protection with a heavy hand (Tinker 1965:116).

Despite considerable violence and disorder, diminishing legitimacy of the state and an almost complete breakdown of the national machinery, society will not disintegrate into a state of anarchy. Life will continue (as usual) in the rural areas (perhaps because of the 'strength' and resilience of indigenous societies?). Tinker attributed this to the 'loose' (or generalised?) nature of non-western societies:

> Where the web of government and economic life is so much loose, and indeed more perfunctory than in our complex, highly integrated western systems, does not entail a similar breakdown in local life. And so there is no dramatic national collapse: there is just broken-backed government. Very few western journalists have understood this proposition. ... Broken-backed government may seem a poor thing to those fortunate enough to live under more dynamic systems of government. But it has a quality which hard-bitten politicians rate highly: survival (1965:118-119).
The ‘broken-backed’ state offers a model of what might happen to the pluralist Third World state if ‘things fall apart’, yet Hegarty was probably right in saying that Tinker presents a ‘bad case’, rather than a ‘worst case’ outcome:

In a ‘broken-backed’ state a form of quasi-government exists; central institutions are weak; the constituent elements (provinces) border on secession and are intermittently or semi-permanently rebellious, but are capable of cooperating with the centre when necessary (Hegarty 1989:13).

Tinker’s concept of the broken-backed state is applicable where the state cannot exert its authority throughout the country and the application of law is uneven (see Standish 1994:61). According to Chris Ashton, a Sydney-based freelance journalist with African experience, PNG is becoming a broken-backed state:

That means that while a government will continue in Port Moresby, funded by foreign aid and revenues from resources development projects, its writ outside the capital will recede. Its relations with its provinces will be shaped by fluid, ad hoc arrangements between national and regional politicians holding power, rather than by over-arching authority of government in Port Moresby (Ashton 1990:35).

Ashton also suggested that PNG could look forward to growing inequalities of wealth stemming from the mining boom of the 1990s, assuming it proceeded; to rising unemployment and popular resentment at failure by the government to meet rising expectations; and to intermittent challenges to the central government’s diminishing authority by localised groups seeking greater autonomy (1990:36).

Some of these claims will be considered in the relevant chapters of the thesis, but it should be noted here that recent problems in PNG — notably the Bougainville secession crises, the Sandline controversy and the alleged corrupt deals involving Prime Minister Bill Skate and Police Minister Thomas Pelika — suggest that a modified version of the ‘broken-backed’ state may be applicable.

‘Muddling through’?

The third concept which Hegarty says that he finds useful in correcting the extreme views — overly optimistic or overly pessimistic — on PNG is Lindblom’s notion of ‘muddling through’, which was developed in the context of decision-making and administrative theory. He defines it in the following manner:

As an approach to governing, ‘muddling through’ would include an incremental and not necessarily ‘rational’ decision-making style, ‘ad hocery’ and ‘seat-of-the-pants’ semi-strategies for problem solving, the choice of ends appropriate to the available means rather than a choice to adjust the means, crises resolution through a trial-and-error application of sanctions and inducements or simply by sitting out the crises, and a definite tendency toward the ‘slow fix’, or even ‘no fix’ rather than the ‘quick fix’.
Political and bureaucratic practices become modified (in this instance, Melanesianised) to suit the political culture (Lindblom 1959; quoted in Hegarty 1989:14).

'Upward colonisation' or 'Melanesian values colonising the state'?

Gordon and Meggitt's (1985) notion of 'upward colonisation' is similar to Standish's (1992) concept of 'Melanesian values colonising the state', though both views were reached independently, despite communications between Gordon and Standish. While commenting on state-society interpenetration between the PNG state and Enga, Gordon and Meggitt claim that:

The beliefs of Enga obviously do not fit too comfortably with their enforced entry into the larger, contemporary world, whether colonial or post-colonial. As we have said, perhaps the persistent problem of the breakdown of law and order in Enga Province should be related not so much to the penetration of the state into the local affairs of Enga as to the infiltration of agencies of the state by Enga in a process of upward colonisation (1985:181).

In a similar way, Standish (1992) explains the manner in which Simbu values have been utilised within the new arenas created by the state and the use of new political resources deriving from the state within Simbu political arenas, competition and conflicts. Noting the mutuality of state-society interaction and particularly the dominance of Simbu values in state politics, Standish says:

The process was thus one of interpenetration. It could even be argued that the introduced state has been co-opted into Simbu politics, or been colonised by Simbu political values (1992:250).

'Weak' State and 'Strong' societies?

Melanesian societies' remarkable capacity for resilience in the face of rapid social change has already been noted above. It is this tenacious character of society, its 'strength', when opposed to the relative 'weakness' of the state that has contributed to much of PNG's current problems. The concept of the 'weak state' was developed by Joel Migdal (1987, 1988, 1994). He defined strength in terms of state capabilities, which include:

... capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways. Strong states are those with high capabilities to complete these tasks, while weak states are on the low end of a spectrum of capabilities (1988:4-5).

Arguing from a state-society interaction perspective, Standish (1994), using Migdal's terminology, suggested that Papua New Guinea has 'strong' societies, autonomous but divided. The state, by contrast, is 'weak' (Migdal 1988; Standish 1994).

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12. See also Standish (1994:60) for "Melanesian ideologies and political strategies having colonised the state"; and Dinnen (1997a:16 and 1997b:22) for "Melanesian lifeworld having colonised the system").
In a book on internal security in Papua New Guinea, several observers noted the distance between a relatively ‘weak’ state and ‘strong’ societies (see, for example, Dinnen 1994; Lawrence 1994; Standish 1994). As Lawrence says, the loose attachment of individuals to the national state and the strong attachment to the clan, family and language grouping has emphasised the ‘weak state/strong society’ dichotomy (1994:118). The PNG state, according to Standish (1994:60), does not conform to Max Weber’s ideal type, which suggests the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Quoting an approach proposed by Hewison *et al* for whom the state is:

... an amalgam of social, political, ideological and economic elements organised in a particular manner. In this sense the state is not so much a set of functions or a group of actors, as an expression of power (quoted in Standish 1994:60).

Standish described “the loosening of those relationships in PNG and the reduction of state power” (*ibid*).

The state-society model as applied by Standish is based on the assumption that Papua New Guinea Highlands societies, whilst fragmented by political and cultural-linguistic differences and without any overarching central authority, were individually strong in terms of social control and a number of other ways (see *Figure 1.2*). Despite all its impressive state structures and systems and the raw power that it wields in terms of superior firepower and a ready-made fighting force, the state has been unable to assert its authority in conflict situations. Those issues are explored in this study in relation to conflict resolution in Hagen (see *Chapter Five*, see also *Chapter Six*).

**Figure 1.2: The state-society model**
The state-society model shows that PNG societies are individually strong but divided by cultural and linguistic differences, and in the PNG Highlands there were no centralised systems that could have been used to graft local politics onto the introduced colonial state.

The colonial administration utilised the divide-and-rule tactic with some degree of success, which perhaps overemphasised its apparent strength. Assuming that the ‘traditional’ PNG societies, like Hagen were strong in themselves, precisely how strong is not clear. If they were previously strong, then are they still strong? Indeed the whole concept of the strong society needs examination. It is true that local groups, like tribes and clans, have grown bigger in size (see Chapter Three), but can the same thing be said of their political integration and the strength of their political institutions, especially in reference to the accumulation of guns, the control of large businesses, and access to resources through their connections with the outside world? These and other questions will be considered in the relevant parts of the thesis.

Political and social ‘disintegration’ or Cultural Innovation?

The notion of ‘political disintegration’ (Filer 1992) is slightly similar to the pessimistic view, though perhaps not as apocalyptic as the journalistic view of PNG. Filer, as Standish (1994:60) observes, “writes with serious whimsy of the ‘bits’ of the ‘Humpty Dumpty state’ fallen from the wall”. In his unusually dry sense of humour, Filer adds a typically British kindergarten melodrama to what is an otherwise serious problem in a Third World context. Both Filer and Standish write about the PNG state as an alien construct, as having failed to retain or assert its authority at the local level, and stress its inability to perform its functions and deliver basic social services (Filer 1992; Standish 1994; see also Gordon and Meggitt 1985 and Dinnen 1994, 1996b).

But the most consistent and vocal proponents of the disintegration theory comes from the commentaries of B.A Santamaria (1989), who believes that the current problems in PNG will bring about the collapse of the state. The ‘doomsday scenario’ is also promoted by some academics formerly at the National Centre for Development Studies, at the Australian National University (see, for example, Cole 1993; quoted in Dinnen 1996b:284). While there are many variations of the disintegration theory in circulation in PNG today, Dinnen (1996b) has broadly classified them according to their relative emphases upon what he calls institutional, cultural or material symptoms of disintegration:

Institutional disintegration highlights the progressive weakening of the state and, in particular, the incapacitation of state controls. Problems of order, from this perspective, are viewed largely in terms of the absence or dysfunctionality of the state. Cultural disintegration, on the other hand, draws attention to the impact of Westernisation upon resident social forms and the manner in which Melanesian societies are collapsing under the weight of rapid change. This view attributes problems of order to the corrupting
influence of external forces and their impact on 'traditional' social values. Material disintegration emphasises economic dysfunctionality, growing levels of unemployment, failure of entrepreneurship, mismanagement and the manner in which these have contributed to the marginalisation [of some groups] and accompanying conflict [within communities] (1996b:284).

Data from the case studies and from the literature will be used to confirm or reject such claims. But I should mention here that some of these processes seem to be currently under way, which means that while a composite picture of social change and cultural continuity is possible, measuring or quantifying such processes, however, is difficult. But one should be able to conclusively say whether or not the system has disintegrated to levels of absolute chaos or anarchy, and I will, in the concluding chapter.

'Disintegrative integration' or 'Widening spheres of political competition'?

Both concepts are A.J. Strathem's (1992, 1993b), though he develops the later more fully than the former, which he explained in the following words:

By integration here I refer to the incorporation of local areas into district, provincial, and national political structures and processes. By disintegration I mean that the very processes that link local clans to the state also produce within and between clans a heightened potential for conflict through competition for resources and political office (1993:57).

My own concepts of 'incorporation', 'merging spheres of competition and cooperation', and 'megacycle' are somewhat similar to A.J. Strathem's (1992) 'widening spheres of political competition'. In the expanded field of competition, a number of processes are at work. The first is the actual merging of spheres, where one event (for example, a reparation payment) follows another (such as warfare), and the cycle finally culminates in elections, or may even further develop into ramifying sequences of moka exchanges. On the one hand, local events are built around elections, while on the other hand, elections have been incorporated into the local megacycle. Secondly, what appears to be an integration into the PNG state system is in fact a process of 'tribalisation', where new power blocs are continually created as a result of the incorporation of the Hagen people into a centralised national state (see A.J. Strathem 1992:230). A third process at work here is the physical or geo-political widening of the sphere of competition, where 'traditional' fields of competition expand to link into other fields, which even extend beyond electoral boundaries. As indicated by A.J. Strathem (1992:236), the physical widening of the political field is associated with the adoption of guns in local conflicts and the ambiguous role of politicians — as lawmakers and as suppliers of guns — particularly in the context of electoral manoeuvring. The systematic integration of such local and state political events is what I call the Hagen 'megacycle'.

Methodology
This study is based on my personal experiences as a Hagen and eight months specific fieldwork: two months in 1992 during the National Elections, with the help of funds from the PNG Electoral Commission and the PNG National Research Institute (NR3); and a further six months between August 1994 and January 1995, with the help of a scholarship from the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB, recently renamed Aus-AID), and research funds from the PNG National Research Institute.

Initially, I had entertained the idea of a survey, but the inter-actional nature of Hagen political competition, which made the idea of impersonal and objective research untenable, dictated that case studies was the best approach available to me. The local-level, or 'bottom-up' approach that I chose was not dictated by a predetermined epistemological position: either from 'outside' or 'inside' perspective. Rather, it was a position which I eventually arrived at: an 'insider's perception, or a Hagen world view, of events and processes that make up the phenomena of local political behaviour. It was a 'best-fit' approach, one based on decisions about the best possible strategies to collect data required for analysis. It was determined by questions of how and why Hageners behave in a particular way. By observing and participating in particular events, such as voting in elections, I was able to document the different ways in which Hageners compete for prestige, power and influence.

The main arenas of competition and cooperation which I paid particular attention to were ceremonial exchange, warfare, compensation payment, bridewealth payments, elections and business development associations. I personally participated in two election campaigns, a minor moka, several bridewealth payments and the initial stages of a major reparation payment. Although I observed the devastating effects of warfare, including two spectacular funeral ceremonies for war deaths, and documented the introduction of guns into Hagen warfare, I have never experienced combat and therefore relied heavily on interviews. Similarly I have mostly used interviews for data on business development associations.

For details of particular events that took place outside of the fieldwork period, or where it was not possible to personally observe, I relied on the knowledge of those who participated. After returning to Australia, I have consistently followed events that began in 1994 through countless telephone interviews (running my telephone bills into thousands of dollars). Whilst my interpretations are largely influenced by the various approaches in the social sciences, the thesis is simply a record of the knowledge that Hageners collectively carry around in their heads. What I have done here is basically following in the footsteps of Hagen leaders who constantly manipulate information to promote their positions. I have merely collected and reorganised their knowledge to enhance mine in order to make some general statements about Hageners so that other observers can learn more about my people, my country, and our politics.
Outline of the Study

Political competition and leadership roles are analysed in a number of contexts, specifically by studying political action by prominent individuals, in both ‘traditional’ and modern spheres of competition. The ‘traditional’ arenas of competition and cooperation, such as ceremonial exchange, group warfare and the various types of compensation payment, now exist side by side with, and in many ways have been incorporated into, more modern forms like elections and business enterprise. In fact, there are instances of merging or widening of political spheres of competition, as indicated by the manner in which major ‘traditional’ events such as exchanges and warfare are skilfully orchestrated to coincide with and culminate in elections, thereby resulting in the creation of a megacycle. One such megacycle of important events presented here covers a period of fourteen years (1984-1997) during which a sequence of events took place, beginning with a seven-year period of contracted alliance warfare between 1984 and 1990, briefly punctuated by mutually reached truce agreements in June 1987 and in December 1988, followed by a combined church and state-sponsored one-year truce period (1989-1990) during which two separate peace settlements were reached between the combatants, and a six-year period of intensive reparation payments and gift exchanges (1990-1996) in an attempt to secure assurances of support for the 1997 national elections. Two election studies, one national and the other provincial, and two case studies of group warfare illustrate these processes of merging and widening of spheres of political competition and the co-optative existence of the political systems.

The thesis is organised into nine chapters. The major themes and questions have been introduced here in this opening chapter. In the second chapter I present a brief sketch of what is essentially a retrospective view of pre-colonial leadership, taking into account the differences in emphasis placed on various attributes of leadership, and the major changes in spheres of competition over time. It provides an historical account of the pre-colonial Hagen political order and the power of leaders, the democraticising effects of colonial rule, and the structural and institutional changes that accompanied decolonisation in Papua New Guinea.

The third and probably the most important chapter of the thesis deals with the major levels of social organisation in Hagen society. It is important in the sense that, like a kind of blue-print, the chapter establishes the parameters of discussion in the rest of the thesis. Basically, it identifies the boundaries of the various arenas, fields, and sub-fields of political competition in Hagen. The chapter begins with a critical review of the literature on Highlands social structure, with a view to assessing the applicability of certain theoretical models, including the so-called ‘African models’, prevalent in the literature. It then moves on to deal with two different types of groups: (1) ‘traditional’ groups such as tribes, clans, sub-clans and lineages; and (2) ‘neo-
traditional' groups such as the coalition-style alliances which were set up in the early 1970s to take advantage of the plantation acquisition scheme. The coalitions and their factional leaders are the major players in Hagen politics, with their activities often systematically linked to state politics. Because some of these local leaders are also national leaders, the two systems, Hagen and the PNG state, feed off each other through the exchange of ideas, values and resources.

Many of these neo-traditional coalition-style alliances (cf. A.J. Strathern 1984), initially built on somewhat vague historical ties, have now consolidated into cooperative business groups, with interests in coffee plantations, real estate and haulage. Chapter Four examines these registered business associations. The separation between Chapters Three and Four is therefore an artificial one because the discussion on cooperative business ventures follows on from that of the groups and alliances — the owners of these businesses.

In Chapter Five I present two case studies on Hagen warfare in the late 1980s. It is a big chapter, covering a wide range of issues, including the contexts of leadership and the use of new resources such as guns in inter-group warfare. Hagen warfare is viewed here as a cycle, with different phases of conflict, escalation, military engagement, casualties, compensation, moka, and peace. A common trend in all of these phases is the conspicuous absence of the state, despite the most concerted effort on the part of local groups to challenge the state's claim of monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The military alliances form the core groups of the coalition-style alliances-cum business cooperative ventures described in Chapters 3-4.

Next, Chapters 6-8 are case studies on elections. In Chapter Six I present an overview of Hagen-style electioneering, with an emphasis on political strategies, including the skilful use of the Hagen megacycle for mobilising support. Also noted in this chapter is the rising costs of election campaigns and the correspondingly high rate of election-related violence — with predictions that the abolition of provincial governments may in fact raise the intensity of competition in Hagen and elsewhere in the country. The general discussion on election manoeuvring is followed by a case study of the 1992 national election in Chapter Seven, with special emphasis on the military nature of alliances and the different types of election-related violence. In Chapter Eight I present a special case study on the 1995 Western Highlands provincial government election, with a view to provide special insights to understanding the pre-selection phase of electoral politics. In the latter I present a 'fine-scale analysis' (cf. Burton 1989a) of campaigning and voting in the Kotna-Tiki constituency of the Western Highlands Province. It is primarily focused on the organisation of the election campaign of a particular candidate, William Pik, who ultimately became deputy premier of the province.

The final chapter of the thesis explores the process described earlier as the Hagen megacycle, with a view to demonstrating that local values and practices have been transferred to state
politics, in exchange for the use of state resources in local politics. The chapter begins with solid empirical evidence, but then progressively becomes more speculative as it considers the wider implications of this study, in view of contemporary events in Africa and elsewhere in the world. It concludes by pointing out that, despite having a 'weak state' and the apocalyptic predictions by certain commentators in Australia, the nation-state of Papua New Guinea is a robust democracy which is far from collapsing. Yet it warns that the problems that PNG is currently facing could be far more serious than most observers actually think. What this means is that, if we are not careful, we could end up the same way as those in tropical Africa, where state collapse, which was unthinkable only a decade ago, could become a reality (cf. Ng’ethe 1995:256; Zartman 1995).
Chapter 2

BACKGROUND TO HAGEN LEADERSHIP AND POLITICS
Introduction

This chapter introduces the discussion of traditional Hagen politics and provides essential background information for subsequent chapters of the thesis. It is primarily concerned with the historical context of Hagen political competition and the different types of leaders who operated within the various phases of Hagen history. Basically, the chapter deals with changing styles and patterns of leadership brought about as a result of the colonially-imposed structural changes which accompanied state formation, including the superimposition of state political institutions, which created new arenas, fields and sub-fields of political competition. The state political institutions such as local government councils and village courts offered aspiring leaders new opportunities, while existing and new local groups and their leaders were introduced to new arenas of competition and cooperation such as cooperative business ventures and elections. The new political fields and sub-fields of competition, as indicated in the next chapter, were established through the creation of local government councils, provincial government constituencies, and national government electorates.

The analytical focus of this chapter is on the different phases of Hagen history — from 1933 to 1997 — in order to establish the parameters of this study. With particular attention to the contrast between 'old style' versus 'new style' leaders, the chapter examines the powerful external forces that shaped contemporary Hagen society, and especially its political institutions such as the moka ceremonial exchange system. By studying the activities of the old style, colonial era big-men such as Parua Kuri and Mek Nukuntz, in relation to new style, second generation, younger and educated leaders such as Melchior Pep, Matrus Mel and William Pik, this chapter starts to outline the basic changes and continuities in Hagen political values and practices explored throughout this thesis.

Particular attention is paid here to the impact of colonialism on indigenous leadership and politics, the traditional economy, and the principal arenas of political competition such as warfare and ceremonial exchange. Accordingly, the relevant literature on PNG Highlands leadership is reviewed, so as to ascertain whether the 'big-man' model adequately accounts for Hagen leadership patterns. In light of the considerable variation in contemporary leadership types and the markedly contrasting modes of operation evident in the Hagen case studies presented in this study, the chapter concludes by arguing that the 'big-man' model, if sufficiently modified, can be used to explain only a particular type of leadership, but is otherwise inappropriate because of inherent fallacies within this model.
Phases of Hagen History

The recent history of Hagen society can be viewed as an erratic cycle, alternating between times of peaceful inter-group relations and traumatic periods of turbulence and violence (see Figure 2.1). Each period facilitated contrasting forms of reciprocity, which we may call positive and negative reciprocity. In times of peace there was positive reciprocity between the high-level named groups, which involved the competitive exchange of wealth items in moka transactions, frequent intermarriage, and the exchange of cultural innovations such as dance styles and costumes. But in times of warfare such positive exchanges were not possible and thus replaced by negative reciprocity such as pay-back killings, and frequent accusations of poisoning; these were times when marriage partners were being chosen from either within the tribe or from among allies, rather than from enemies, because wives, as evident in A.M. Strathern (1972b), can be a "road" for the exchange of economic resources as well as poison.

In each phase, it can be argued that a certain type of leader with special skills rose above the rest. During warfare, for instance, fight-leaders and despots tend to be more dominant than other types of leaders, while big-men (who manipulate wealth to gain prestige) appear more prominent during exchange cycles (cf. Standish 1978a). That other types of leaders lack prominence during warfare does not mean that fight leaders and despots are the defining types of leaders in some societies, as reported by some early observers (see, for example, Salisbury 1964; Watson 1971). Similarly, when we fail to find other types of leaders in societies where elaborate exchange relations and big-men are dominant, it would be a mistake to conclude that the big-man type is necessarily the defining type of leader in such societies. This obviously raises serious questions about the kind of debate on leadership which began in the 1960s, a significant point to which I shall return later in this chapter (see section on Big-man Model; see also the concluding section of this chapter).

Anthropologists began working in the PNG Highlands during the 1950s and 1960s when the kiaps, the colonial district officers, banned warfare and licensed ceremonial exchange. Systematic programmes of anthropological research in the PNG Highlands were launched from Sydney University and the Australian National University beginning in 1950 (see Hays 1992, 1993). At the Australian National University the Nadel program (in honour of S.F. Nadel) which, according to Paula Brown, whilst "then competing with anthropological research programmes at Sydney and Washington", concentrated on the Highlands "because of the concentration of population and the excitement of studying people whose areas, social systems, and response to contact [with the outside world] could be traced while Australia brought them into the modern world" (comment in Hays 1993:149). The program at Sydney University was headed by E.P. Elkin. Both programmes, as noted by Hays, were "informed by 'structural-functional' agendas", with "a major emphasis on social organisation" (1993:160). Many pioneer Highlands ethnographers were sent out by Elkin and Nadel during 1950-1955, including: Mervyn Meggitt and Ralph Bulmer in Enga; D'Arcy Ryan in Mendi; Robert M. Glassie in Huli; Marie Reay among the Kuma of South Wahgi; Catherine and Ronald Berndt (in addition to James and Virginia Watson, who were from a different institutional base) among the Kainantu; and Kenneth Read and Richard Salisbury in the Goroka area (see Hays 1993:160). In their foot-steps followed Paula Brown, the geographer Harold
they observed then was a new and almost an artificially created period in which organised warfare remained dormant, large-scale ceremonial exchange prospered, and self-made leaders called 'big-men', economic entrepreneurs, were perceived as having a monopoly over exchange networks and thus could establish themselves at the apex of the prestige scale (see A.J. Strathern 1966a; 1969a; 1971; see also Read 1959; Bulmer 1960; Brown 1963; Salisbury 1964; Meggitt 1971). As noted by Feil (1987:97), such writers described either specific societies, or the wider Highlands region; all using the term 'big-man', they debated the best depiction of Highlands leadership.

For Hagen society, and probably for many other PNG Highlands societies, it was the radically altered political order of the 1950s, swiftly transformed by the presence of foreigners and new economic resources, which became accepted — perhaps uncritically — into the canon of social science literature as the defining character of 'traditional' or pre-colonial Highlands societies. It seems likely that many observers, apparently in pursuit of evidence to support the big-man model, either neglected or paid little attention to the monumental and revolutionary impact of European colonialism, the imposition of state structures, and the seductive powers of Western consumerism on stateless societies such as Hagen. While some of the problems and issues raised in the literature are specifically addressed in the relevant parts of this and other chapters of the thesis, it is worth mentioning here that Hagen and other Highlands societies are in practice much more flexible, innovative, and structurally less rigid than they appear from the ideological and analytical constructs prevalent in the literature. What this means is that common characteristics may often blind observers from seeing important variations within and between the various Highlands societies.

The different phases of Hagen history, perhaps best described by the words 'erratic cycle' because of its alternating periods of violence and peace, are schematised below. Figure 2.1 represents a simplified version of what is in essence a very complex situation. It should therefore be viewed as an analytical tool with which to explain some of the complexities of Hagen history and its political economy as it has developed over a time span of some 65 years, an era in which remarkable changes were experienced by its people.

Brookfield and the linguist Stephen Wurm in Simbu beginning in 1958; Andrew and Marilyn Strathern (field-work from 1964 onwards) and E. Brandewie (fieldwork in 1963-5 and 1968) among the Hagen (Melpa); and numerous others in subsequent years (see Hays 1992; Brown's comment in Hays 1993).
The Hagen area's prehistory is of course far richer in terms of the considerable time depth of agricultural development around the surprisingly early date of 9,000 years before present (cf. Golson 1977, 1981, 1982) and the complex political institutions that arose from agricultural intensification and the exchange of surplus products (cf. Feil 1987), but that topic, though...
Background to Hagen Leadership and Politics

immensely intriguing, is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study. I shall only deal with matters of written — and remembered — history here.

For the post-1930s decades, Figure 2.1 shows different phases of Hagen history since European contact in April 1933. In chronological order, the analytically distinct but otherwise overlapping phases are:

- of first contact with Europeans, people from Eastern Highlands and Morobean societies and, perhaps more importantly, the colonial state in 1933, followed by the establishment of Catholic and Lutheran missions in 1934 and 1936, respectively, which was followed by the great shell trade;

- of colonially-imposed pacification in the 1940s and the subsequent incorporation of Hageners into the global economy through the establishment of coffee and tea plantations in the 1950s and the introduction of store goods;

- of intensified state-sponsored politics and state-imposed political integration through the establishment of local government councils in the early 1960s, the territorial House of Assembly in 1964, followed by self-government in 1973, which culminated in political independence from Australia in September 1975, and the subsequent establishment of the provincial government system in 1977;

- of frenzied commercial activity through the setting up of road-side trade stores in the late 1960s, the incorporation of new economic resources such as cash, cattle, beer and motor vehicles in moka exchanges in the early 1970s, the competitive purchase of motor vehicles during the 1970s coffee boom, and the acquisition of expatriate-owned plantations in the mid 1970s and early 1980s;

- of the proliferation of both genuine Christian and pseudo-Christian missions during the 1970s-1980s period, a trend which continues into the 1990s; and

- of intensified competition through business, warfare, reparation payments and elections, in the late 1980s and 1990s, and the abolition of the provincial government system by the National Parliament in July 1995.

The cumulative effect of these multi-dimensional processes led to an expansion in spheres of competition, a key condition which undoubtedly facilitated the creation of the Hagen megacycle, a significant point to which I shall return later in the concluding chapter of this thesis. It suffices here to say that the widening sphere of competition, which involve geographical/administrative linking of political fields as well as the systematic merging of traditional arenas of competition
with modern ones, resulted in the proliferation of different types of leaders. The new types of leaders, some of which have not been encountered before, include 'super-big-men' (or millionaire businessmen), criminal raskol gang leaders, military strategists and gunfighters, despotic councillors, senior bureaucrats, professionals (such as academics, doctors, lawyers, accountants), and a new generation of highly sophisticated politicians with university degrees and connections with the outside world as well as with the internal underworld.

These new types of leaders seem to have replaced colonial style big-men-cum-politicians — men like Parua Kuri and Mek Nukuntz — who initially built their political careers through pre-eminence in moka exchanges during the 1960s and 1970s, but later denounced moka in favour of cooperative business ventures.

Older style politicians like Kuri and Nukuntz owed their success partly to the colonial administration policies of banning warfare and licensing ceremonial exchange. Parua Kuri epitomises aspiring leaders of the 1950s whose initial power was derived from the colonial administration through their association with kiaps. Parua himself made the perfect transition from bosboi in the 1950s to local government councillor in the 1960s to member of assembly and national parliamentarian in the 1970s. Parua Kuri has played a dominant role in Dei Local Government Council. He has been a vice president since its inception in 1962 and president since 1966 (cf. A.J. Strathem 1976:268). Parua Kuri first got elected to the House of Assembly in 1972 (A.J. Strathem 1976) and held the Dei Open seat for three consecutive parliamentary terms (1972-1987).2 A son of a pre-eminent big-man, Kuri of the Tepuka Keitipi clan, Parua built his renown through selective use of colonial and traditional networks and resources. As noted by A.J. Strathem (1984:149), Parua still gives the impression of being the most important decision-maker in Dei Local Government Council, since retaining his ordinary councillorship after being elected as MP. But Parua Kuri’s dominant role in Dei politics has been consistently challenged by younger rivals from within his own tribe as well as from other tribes in Dei. His most ardent rival is a young university graduate, Matrus Mel, who comes from the same tribe as Parua, but leads a faction opposed to Parua’s faction in Dei politics and business (see Chapters 3-4). The Parua faction has also been opposed by a former deputy premier of Western Highlands Province, William Pik, who comes from a tribe which has a special alliance with Parua’s tribe. Both Mel and Pik, who were in a patron-client relationship with Melchior Pep as patron, played significant roles in Parua’s election loss to Pep during the 1987 national election, as well as in

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2. For some early accounts of Parua’s political career, see A.J. Strathem (1970:562-564; 1976; 1984:149-152); see also H.K. and P. Colebatch, M. Reay, and A.J. Strathem (1971:253-260) for a discussion of Parua’s first attempt at state politics during the 1968 elections. I provide a more detailed account of Parua’s dominant role in the Dei field of political competition in the relevant parts of the thesis. See, for example, his role in the creation of coalition-style alliances (Chapter Three), business development associations (Chapter Four), inter-group conflicts and electoral manoeuvring (Chapters 5-8).
Papua's son, Reuben's election losses in 1992 and 1997 elections (see Chapters 3-4; and Chapters 7-8). In this way the personal history of a few men indicates major changes in Hagen society over several decades.

By contrast, the new-style politicians of the 1990s owe their success to a number of factors such as education, unequal access to wealth through international and criminal connections, and pillage of state resources. These *raskol* politicians have consolidated their positions through selective use of patronage, largesse, intimidation, and terror. Some of them owe their continued existence in state politics to support from criminal gangs rather than by the legitimising process of a free and fair electoral system. A large part of the contemporary PNG political culture is thus based on nepotistic patronage, parochial loyalties, and what I call gutter-politics.3

This obviously raises difficult problems and issues for PNG leaders and peoples in their attempt to construct a nation-state from politically and cultural-linguistically fragmented societies. An explanation for the competing value systems in Papua New Guinea, especially the conflicting allegiances of individuals who are caught between parallel moral realms, may be found in the writings of an anthropologist some 26 years ago. In comparing political systems Peter Lawrence pointed out that in Western society “the state rests on one concept: that of the citizen-isolate, the person who, by acknowledging his obligations to the state, to which he surrenders his title to use force in return for its protection, is automatically guaranteed rights and privileges equal to those accorded all other persons similarly accepting the state’s authority” (1971:5; see also Lawrence 1969:18-19). By contrast, as will become clear in the succeeding chapters of this thesis, most, if not all, Papua New Guineans have strong attachments with their primary kin-groups and have yet to develop into citizen-isolates. However, Lawrence may have been right in suggesting that it is in the towns such as Port Moresby and Lae where the “individual is beginning his metamorphosis from kinsmen to citizen-isolate” (1969:37), owing to factors such as education and employment, acculturation, and interaction with people from other parts of the country. Questions of loyalty and sliding levels of identity will be addressed in the next chapter. I now turn to the phases of Hagen history.

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3. Gutter-politics is a term used here to refer to the use of criminal gangs by *raskol* politicians to solidify their vote by intimidating and terrorising voters and rival politicians. These *raskol* politicians may have criminal backgrounds or strong connections with local *raskol* gangs and even with international criminal organisations. For a detailed analysis of the relations between politicians and *raskol* gangs, see Harris (1988); see also Dinnen (1996b) for an integrated approach to the analysis of criminal gangs, high-level corruption, and other problems as challenges of order in a weak state. In Chapter Five, I present a discussion on the role of politicians as a vital link between warfare and the illicit trafficking of firearms and drugs.
**Phase I: Pre-1933 and 1933-1940**

Prior to colonial rule there was a period characterised by endemic warfare in which despots and fight-leaders were prominent in inter-group relations of enmity. This was the period just before European contact in the 1933 and Australian Colonial Administration-imposed pacification in the 1940s. Although it is extremely difficult to reconstruct pre-colonial Hagen society, oral accounts of warfare and the evidence of population dispersal show that pre-colonial Hagen warfare was more than a political game, that stakes were high, and winning and losing meant everything to the combatants and their groups (see Chapters 5-8 for parallels between warfare and elections). However, as will become clearer in Chapter Five, Hagen warfare was never an uncontrolled descent into Hobbesian chaos, nor an indication of social disintegration, retrogression, or societal collapse. It still provides an important arena of competition and cooperation for local groups and their leaders, and thus remains a highly coordinated political affair, regulated by definite 'rules of the game' (cf. Bailey 1969), and is now systematically linked to other spheres of competition, such as business and elections (see Chapters 3-4).

**Phase II: 1940s and 1950s**

Between the 1940s and 1950s many groups were involved in converting relations of enmity into those of exchange, and intermarriage between some groups even intensified. The Hagen area was effectively pacified by the 1950s, owing largely to the efforts of local leaders who had grafted themselves onto the colonial administration for personal interest. Many of them became *bosbois* before the Second World War and after the war became *lubais* and *tululs* (appointed village officials). In his study of contemporary politics and political change in Chuave, Wayne Warry was able to trace the development of institutions and organisations that have arisen since European contact:

By 1953 the administration had began replacing *bosbois* with *lubais* and *tululs* who were responsible to the *kiap* at Chuave patrol post. Some *bosbois* became *lubais* but, at least in Chuave, the administration commonly appointed younger men who were better Tokpisin speakers, or who had served the administration as interpreters or carriers on patrols. The administration first appointed *lubais* as tribal leaders and *tululs* as clan leaders, but later appointed *lubais* for each clan, occasionally, made one paramount *lubai* (*waiapai*) for the tribe, and assigned *tululs* to act as assistants to the *lubai* within the clan. These officials oversaw government roadwork, the building of rest houses and aid posts. They were also responsible for settling disputes and for enforcing government regulations pertaining to the proper care and maintenance of villages (Warry 1987:72).

The Hagen situation was quite similar to Chuave, except there were no paramount *lubai*. The first appointments in Hagen were of headmen, known locally as *bosbois*, who were initially selected by the *kiap*, but later the *bosbois* were allowed to ‘mark’ important men who were known for their ‘strong talk’ (*ik rondok*) to become *bosboi* (see A.M. Strathern 1972a:43-44). It seems that
some of the earliest appointments were of men who were already leaders in indigenous spheres of competition, while a few may have been fearless warriors.

**Phase III: 1960s and 1970s**

The 1960s and 1970s period was one of relative peace, except for one major war between two large Hagen tribes, the Jika and Yamka, during the early 1970s. The significance of that war — right next to Mount Hagen town — was enormous: (a) because of extensive media publicity in both radio and newspapers; and (b) even more remarkably, it exposed the soft underbelly of the supposedly ‘hard’ colonial state. The link between the crumbling of the autocratic *kiap* system and the resurgence of warfare in the Highlands during this period was noted by A.J. Strathern:

> In the early 1970s it was often stated that one of the main reasons for the outbreak of inter-group fights was the erosion of the system of ‘hard-fisted’ administration by generalist patrol officers, who originally held both police and magisterial powers. These men were able to act as judge, gaoler, and jury in matters involving breaches of Native Regulations, and on their patrols could mete out swift punishment to offenders, and prevent small disputes from escalating (1984:26).

This period was also characterised by an intensification of ceremonial exchange and the incorporation of new economic resources as they became available through the adoption of a capitalist economy, thereby emphasising the resiliency of traditional institutions. But there were important changes, too. The major structural changes and associated social issues become more clearly expressed when events of the sixties are examined separately from those of the seventies.

**Phase III(a): 1960s**

The 1960s was a decade of relative peace in Hagen. Local government councils were established during the early 1960s. Hagen and Kui councils were set up in 1961 and 1962, respectively, but later merged in 1964 to form a joint Hagen Council, covering the areas immediately north and east of Mount Hagen; Dei Council was established in 1963; Mul Council, paired since 1968 with Dei to form a single Open electorate for the House of Assembly, began in 1964 (A.J. Strathern 1970:549; A.M. Strathern 1972a:11). Dei was later removed from Mul because of hostilities between the Mul and Dei people, and since 1972 has remained a separate Open electorate, with its own representative to the National Parliament (A.J. Strathern 1976:269-270; 1984:143).

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*As described by A.J. Strathern, “not long before the 1968 elections, relations between Mul and Dei councils were set in jeopardy by the killing of a driver from Mul Council while he was travelling inside Dei” (1976:269). Although a large compensation was made to relatives of the Mul driver, retaliatory action was taken against the pre-eminent Dei leader, Pana Kuri, during the opening ceremony of the Muglamp police post in 1970. For further information on this matter and its political dimensions, see H.K. and P. Colebatch, M. Reay, and A.J. Strathern 1971:253-254; see also A.J. Strathern 1984:25; and Ketan 1996:259). I present a brief discussion of Dei-Mul relations in Chapter Seven.*
Phase III(b): 1970s

The 1970s was also a decade of increased state-related political activities. It was a decade of state-imposed political integration, through the creation of a separate Open electorate in Dei in the 1972 elections, followed by national self-government in 1973, political independence in 1975, and the establishment of the provincial government system in 1977. The cumulative effects of these were a marked increase in political awareness and the subsequent incorporation of components of the state and its events into Hagen arenas of competition and cooperation (see, for example, discussion on the Hagen Megacycle in the concluding chapter of this thesis). Elective office, for instance, was recognised as the ultimate source of wealth and power. And, as becomes evident in Chapters 3-4, leaders responded by encouraging their groups to form into coalition-style alliances in order to compete more effectively for state resources.

Such intensified competition between groups which were ardent rivals, with recent remembered histories of warfare, almost inevitably led to a resurgence of warfare in the 1970s, a trend which continued into the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapters 3-6). The underlying causes of turbulence in the 1970s have been summarised by Standish:

In the 1970s land pressures and fears of shortage arising from cash cropping and population growth, a general loss of earlier optimism for an exciting new life in the modern economy, combined with a growing sense of insecurity in the period of mass education, and also political decolonisation, have all increased social tension in the highlands. Despite the government’s best intentions, from 1972 to 1977 there was a great deal of large-scale clan warfare in a significant return to the old ways (1978a:19).

The resurgence of warfare in the Highlands and its underlying causes has in fact formed the focus of an important debate in recent times (see, for example, Standish 1973 and 1992; Kerpi 1976; A.J. Strathern 1977, 1992 and 1984; Meggitt 1977; Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Burton 1990; Mube 1994; and O’Hanlon 1995). I review this literature in Chapter Five. Standish, for instance, goes on to say:

My own work indicates that the resurgence of warfare was promoted by clan elders. Politically, it not only promoted these men back into political prominence, but it also reinforced the clan as a political unit to an extent probably far greater than that which had existed in the early to mid 1960s (1978a:19).

In addition to intensified competition and warfare, the decade saw the rise of new types of leaders such as businessmen, church elders, educated elites, government officials and politicians, some of which are the ultimate products as well as perpetrators of such competition. All of these types of leaders now exist side by side with, and sometimes in opposition to, traditional types of leaders such as big-men, orators, fight-leaders and ritual experts.
Phase IV: 1980s and 1990s

The 1980s and 1990s was a period of intensified commercial activity in Hagen. The period saw an expansion in agricultural activity through the establishment of large locally-owned coffee plantations, in addition to further acquisition of expatriate-owned coffee plantations and the conversion of tea estates into coffee plantations. Local business development corporations established in the mid 1970s prospered through diversification and intensification of their activities during the 1980s. But, as evident in Chapters 3-4, in the 1990s many of these business groups have been plagued with internal power struggles between leaders of factions, thereby resulting in the bankruptcy of some companies.

Politically, this period was perhaps the most important in terms of both integration and disintegration. Elections, for instance, became increasingly violent as people realised that it was a zero-sum, winner-takes-all game (cf. Standish 1996:320); that there is no room for half-heartedness or complacency in politics which must therefore be approached with the same commitment and passion that one takes to the battleground; and that the state can be milked in order to feed the primordial community (cf. Ekeh 1975). Although the state is still not the main game, it is nonetheless an important prize in local competition. The abolition of the provincial government system in 1995 has somewhat increased the intensity of competition. The political implications and local dimensions of the abolition of provincial governments in Papua New Guinea are discussed in Chapter Six.

Furthermore, the 1980s and 1990s brought a further resurgence of group warfare. It was a period of turbulence and violence, which saw the resurfacing of despotic leaders and fight-leaders, apart from politicians, businessmen and others. This is perhaps a trend which most anthropologists and other observers least expected. Turbulence of some sort may have been expected as a consequence of rapid social and political change but few expected the resurfacing of despotic fight-leaders. I take up the discussion on despotic fight-leaders and the rise of a new generation of gunfighters, political strategists, and politicians in Chapters 5-8, but shall now turn to an analysis of the different types of leaders.

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There is an apparent contradiction between elections as zero-sum, winner-takes-all game and the state as a prize in local competition but not the main game. This can be resolved through the separation of individual interests from group interests. For individual leaders and their primary kin-groups, elections represent major investments — or gambling of massive resources — and is indeed a zero-sum, winner-takes-all game. Yet for the wider groups, who have a minor stake (including group prestige), the state and its events are valued as a prize, and whilst they do agree that such a prize is worth fighting for, they also realise that it is not the main game in local competition. See Chapter Nine for further exposition of this paradox.
Types of Leaders: Big-men, Despots and Others

My interpretation of leadership types is slightly similar to Daryl Feil’s (1987) configuration: that different conditions gave rise to different types of leadership models. But there is an important distinction between his interpretation and mine: he argued, for instance, that conditions conducive to despotic leaders were superseded in societies where big-men and ceremonial exchange were prevalent; while I argue that both types, among others, can exist side by side within the same period. Arguing from an evolutionary perspective, he proposes that:

An evolutionary continuum of key features of social life can be demonstrated and is based on significantly divergent paths of economic and agricultural ‘development’ in the prehistoric and historic past. Types of leaders may, therefore, vary accordingly, and this variation can be linked to these same historical processes (Feil 1987:92).

He went on to say that archetypal big-men, those who manipulate wealth in exchange, occur mainly in the western part of the Highlands where intensive production of pigs has been long established and where polities are linked in exchange transactions by men of influence and high standing in ceremonial institutions like the Enga tee and the Hagen moka. He then claims that despotism occurs in those societies of the eastern part of the Highlands where production and exchange of valuables are not intensive pursuits and where permanent agriculture and settlement are not as old as they are in the western part of the Highlands (see Feil 1987:98-99). He further argues:

Despotism, like big-manship, is an historically specific form of leadership in societies where production for exchange remains nascent, is recent, and where, furthermore, groups are rigidly bounded and defined, and individuals in them ‘disconnected’ from others in symmetrically replicated groups. Endemic warfare occurred in the eastern highlands and despotic leadership was a response to constant threat: despots built up followings and ensured security which was impossible by means other than domination, intimidation and audacity (1987:99).

Contrastingly, followings built on the exchange of valuables, he says, fell to big-men in the western part of the Highlands, comprising Hagen, Enga and Mendi societies (ibid).

I disagree with the evolutionary twist in Feil’s argument, and suggest that this is not an accurate assessment of the situation in the Highlands, as there is evidence of despotic leaders in societies such as Hagen where — on his model — they should not be found at all. It is important to realise that leadership is generalised: that a fight-leader can also be a leader in exchange transactions, or a skilled orator, or, nowadays, a businessman or a politician, depending on a given situation. In the Hagen world view, a successful leader is one who, like an axe blade (rui anbel), can fit onto any handle: for productive work (like gardening); or for destructive work (as in battle), just as there are productive leaders and destructive ones in modern societies. Accordingly, leaders, as shown in Figure 2.1, take on whatever role required by their groups.
During warfare, for instance, groups look to strong leaders, often daring fighters, for leadership. As Standish argued for Chimbu society:

When its very existence is in peril, in a state of war or near-war, a society is dependent upon its leaders for survival. The group pulls together, and tightens itself into a coherent force. It needs the best leadership it can muster and must follow that leadership or face extinction. This is not a situation which allows rivals the luxury of competing for followers in a state of ‘anarchy’, but one where the group needs leaders and will find the best available, to perform essential roles (1978a:19).

This use of ‘anarchy’ is obviously in reference to an earlier interpretation of Chimbu politics which concluded that tribal leadership changed in a generation from the absence of any fixed authority — a state of ‘anarchy’ — to a system of ‘satrapy’, where government-appointed officials were given the opportunity to dominate, during the colonial period (Brown 1963).

When warfare is formally concluded either by mutual truce or by way of externally imposed ‘pacification’, as occurred during the 1940s, leaders turn their energies to other activities to establish their influence and compete. The archetypal big-men, for instance, become more dominant when relations of enmity are converted into those of wealth exchanges. Furthermore, when groups redirected their attention to new arenas of competition and cooperation such as the competitive purchase of motor vehicles and coffee buying during the 1970s coffee boom, it was the mission-educated small businessmen such as Goimba Kot (see Chap. 3-4) and Ru Kundil (see A.J. Strathern 1994) who became prominent. Nowadays it is the university-educated politicians and millionaire businessmen like Michael Mel, Paul Pora and Paias Wingti who are prominent, which reflects the very high contemporary Hagen cultural value placed on education, business, and elective office (see Chapters 6-8).

Colonial Impact on Hagen society

European colonialism from the mid 1930s, symbolised by the autocratic ‘kiapdom’ comprising Australian patrol officers and their bunch of ‘native’ assistants (including the despotic village bosbois, later replaced by halwis and tululis), came as a rude shock to many Hageners, like many others throughout the country. Although the Germans and British, and later the Australians, did not actually control the large areas they claimed rights over, their influence often spread beyond the small urban centres from which the colonial territories of New Guinea and Papua were administered.

The people of Hagen, as in other parts of the Highlands, interacted with the colonial administration for three basic reasons: (1) they were fearful of the white men’s superior firepower, as it was often demonstrated through the shooting of pigs in front of huge gatherings; (2) they were in awe of the mystique of the white ‘persons-of-wealth’ (mel wamh), as they were
generally associated with the spirit world because of their skin colour and their seemingly endless wealth, whose source could not be explained in Hagen terms; and (3) when the fear of firepower was conquered and the mystique wore thin, interaction continued because of self-interest, taking advantage of an opportunity for personal gain, a strategy which continues to the present. Others have made similar observations (see, for example, Brown 1972:66-67; Finney 1973:Chap.2; A.J. Strathern 1984:Chap.2; 1993b:42; Gordon and Meggitt 1985:163; Standish 1992:33-34; O’Hanlon 1993:21-22).  

The interpretation of the whitemen as Sky People from the spirit world was a common initial reaction, but, as noted by Gordon and Meggitt for Enga, “we would be mistaken to conclude from this that Enga were wholly overawed by the presence of these Sky People” (1985:163). Rather, it was “pragmatism, nurtured in a milieu of widespread suspicion and backed up by a quick understanding of the fire power of .303 rifles and a desire for useful objects ranging from steel axes to steel bridges, that led to the comparative ease of the first pacification in Enga” (ibid). Indeed, the fear of spirits and guns is no longer there, but what is still pursued today is the “self-interest part of the equation” (A.J. Strathern 1993b:42).

**The flooding of the local economy with shell valuables**

The Hagen people — initially those from Jika, Yamka, Elti, Mokei and other tribes around the present Mount Hagen township — first made contact with Europeans during the much celebrated Leahy-Taylor patrol of April, 1933. Soon after this alien intrusion, the local economy was flooded with shell valuables. Between 1933 and 1945, hundreds of thousands of pearlshells, bailer, nassa and cowries were flown in from the coast by private entrepreneurs (principally the Leahy brothers who were working on an alluvial gold deposit at Kuta), missionaries (Fr William Ross at the Wilya Catholic Station and Georg Vicedom and Hebert Strauss at Ogelbeng Lutheran Station), and also by the Australian colonial administration. Connolly and Anderson (1987:250) estimated that the Leahys alone in 1936 were flying in about five hundred kina shells

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6. For a general discussion on the reactions of PNG Highlanders to European contact, see Simpson’s (1954) and Connolly and Anderson’s (1987) accounts of the much celebrated Leahy-Taylor patrol; See also Leahy (1994) for a personal account of his adventures; and Souter (1963) for a general account of patrols in Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya.

7. It is evident from a particularly well-researched narrative account — based on interviews with the Leahy family as well as first-hand accounts of Highlanders who actually met district officer James Taylor, the gold prospector Michael Leahy and his brother Dan, the surveyor Ken Spinks, and more than ninety carriers, armed police and Leahy’s armed Waris from Morobe (some of them accompanied by their Bena Bena wives) — that the Roklaka, Yamka, Elti, Penambi, and Mokei (possibly in this order) were some of the first Hageners to see people of European origin (see Connolly and Anderson 1987). Yamka Mepkang Miti of Keha, who is said to have “travelled several miles to the east to attend a funeral” (almost certainly at Gumanch among the Roklaka) on 16 April 1933, claimed to have heard news of the aliens from a Roklaka man who announced: “The sun always rises! The river always flows in its banks! And the rocks have always been there! But the makers of all these things are coming up now. Perhaps they are spirits, perhaps they will eat us all, but I am bringing them” (quoted in Connolly and Anderson 1987:99-100; as recited to them by Yamka Mepkang Miti).
a month to meet their food and labour bills. Although no one knows for sure the exact number of shells flown into Hagen and the Highlands during this early colonial period, it is generally accepted that between 1933 and 1942 at least five and possibly ten million shells of all types were imported by the European community into the Highlands region to pay for food and labour (see Hughes 1978:315; Connolly and Anderson 1987:250; Feil 1987:118).

Despite the inevitable devaluation, in the first ten years of foreign occupation, there seems to have been no upper limit to the demand for more shells, a situation which was thoroughly exploited by the intruders. It is, for instance, evident in Connolly and Anderson (1987) that apart from settling their food and labour bills with shells, some Europeans — notably the Leahy brothers — and many coastal carriers and guards used shells also to pay for sexual favours from local women, thereby introducing prostitution, something which never existed in pre-colonial Hagen society.8 Quoting from Michael Leahy’s diary, Connolly and Anderson noted that there were marriages and casual sexual encounters in the early years of European occupation:

As Leahy noticed, the normal bridewealth for a marriage was five pearlshells and a tomahawk. But a knife and a few smaller shells would pay for a short visit to the put put. This was a specific response to the arrival of the strangers. Sex on a casual basis was very much frowned upon in Hagen society, and sex for payment was absolutely unheard of. To the women involved it would have been a strange and possibly humiliating experience, perhaps tempered by the satisfaction of knowing they were bringing wealth to their clans. Men say today the women were not forced to participate, but, given their position in society, young girls would have found the pressure very hard to resist. In their desire to get some of the new wealth it seems husbands, uncles and brothers had taken to prostituting their women (1987:142).

At first the presence and economic activities of these seemingly incredibly wealthy foreigners had a ‘democratising’ effect on political competition, whereby the road to wealth and power which had previously been monopolised by big-men was now open to anyone who could obtain shells (see A.J. Strathern 1966a). Obtaining shells was easy: many more men could get enough to obtain a second wife, or to repay debts simply by exchange of garden products, or by working for Europeans and earning them as wages, in addition to prostituting their wives, sisters and daughters. In other words, since the 1930s the system became more egalitarian — for men at least — providing access to wealth to individuals who may have otherwise been squeezed out by the minority who controlled the traditional networks through which shells and other resources flowed.

Before the arrival of the European, the shells which were circulated in moka networks came through extended traditional trade routes via the Southern Highlands. As valued scarce

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8. Connolly and Anderson, however, did not mention that at least one pioneer missionary in Hagen was also involved in the exchange of shells for sexual favours, which proved his fertility. It is widely believed that a now deceased prominent white Catholic priest was the biological father of at least one child. His daughter and grandchildren live in a village just outside the Mount Hagen township.
resources, the shells are said to have been controlled by those who held onto the ‘ropes’ of moka. For instance, in 1964, the Tepuka Oklembo big-man and councillor Rokla listed for Andrew Strathem some 23 men who were the only ones in the Tepuka and Kawelka tribes to have pearlyshells in their possession ‘about the time the European arrived’: and it is likely that his account actually relates to a time shortly after the arrival of the Leahys and Taylor (A.J. Strathem 1971:108). This account, as A.J. Strathem (ibid) says, agrees with that of Vicedom and Tischner (1943-8, Vol.2), who argued that before European contact big-men monopolised shell moka payments in Hagen.

**Inflation of the moka**

The flooding of the Hagen economy had far-reaching implications on indigenous political institutions and leadership systems. An immediate consequence of the massive circulation of shell valuables, as noted by an early observer, was that:

> The native of the Hagen area became the millionaire. He could go to the fringe of the area and buy wives with the shells he was gradually hoarding. Where a chief would formerly be a great man with three wives, now he could buy 8 or 10. Young men who formerly had no standing could now raise their status by working for the white man, receiving payment in shells (Ross; quoted in Gitlow 1947:72-3; cited in Feil 1987:119).

Citing A.J. Strathem (1966a) and his own work, Feil goes on to say that “pearlyshells were devalued and the moka system which [had] provided wealthy, powerful leaders and furthered exploitative class-like relations, underwent a profound ‘democratic’ change once again” (1987:119). Both Standish (1978a) and later Feil (1982) argued that it was this drastically altered situation which anthropologists first encountered and described as the milieu of big-men, a time when plentiful pearlyshells increased the number of players in competitive exchanges, and when warfare was officially banned. But, as argued by Feil (1987:119-20), it was a situation which had been transformed many times in the past.

In the end, it was inevitable that inflation set in and the shell economy was completely destroyed. By the late 1960s shells had definitely lost their economic value among groups around Mount Hagen, where once highly valued items such as gold-lipped shells were considered as being good only for adornment and display purposes. Some observers have, for instance, commented on the rather conspicuous absence of kina shells during moka prestations during the 1970s:

Large-scale moka involving kina shells were still going on in the early sixties, but then they quickly lost their prestige value. In 1965 the anthropologist Andrew Strathem watched men from the Tepuka clans, who lived in an outlying district of Mount Hagen, give more than eleven hundred kina shells in moka to exchange partners from the

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9. For comparable discussions and an elaboration of this point, see A.J. Strathem (1971); and Standish (1978a and 1992).
Kawelka people. In 1974, those shells were 'forgotten' when the Kawelka came to reciprocate. They had gone out of fashion and lost their value. Pigs, money and motor cars were the featured items. Cash was the thing and what it could buy (Connolly and Anderson 1987:281; no specific references given).

Despite the destruction of the shell economy by the Europeans, Hageners moved onto new arenas of political competition, often experimenting with new ideas and economic resources, but social scientists seem to have been sucked into a black-hole of academia called the 'big-man' model. This particular model has been so thoroughly applied, even in instances where it does not fit, that it is now accepted even by members of the societies which have traditionally formed the subject of scholarly inquiry. That PNG Highlanders and many other Papua New Guineans commonly refer to leaders as *bikman* in Tokpisin (English: 'big-man') is ample evidence of how deeply entrenched the big-man concept is in discussion of PNG societies. I now turn to the 'big-man' model in order to assess its applicability in Hagen.

### The Big-man Model

As a typological concept, the term 'big-man' was first made popular by Marshall Sahlins (1963). At a time when social Darwinism was still very much the trend of thought, Sahlins sought to establish an evolutionary point in his comparison of self-made leadership in Melanesia to that of inherited Polynesian chieftainship. According to Sahlins, Melanesia represented a more rudimentary type of leadership structure when compared with the more advanced chieftainship system in Polynesia (1966:160-163).\(^{10}\) While the contrast between big-men, especially the self-made bourgeois, and chiefs, the so-called titled and well-bred ones, remains an important insight, critics were quick to point out the gross generalisations involved in lumping all Melanesian leaders into one category of achieved leadership and Polynesian ones into another ascribed leadership category. Many Melanesian leadership systems, as aptly pointed out by Feil (1987:93), have ascriptive elements and some Polynesian systems achieved ones; it is their relative emphasis that varies. For example, in the PNG Highlands where “the big-man model still reigns supreme, despite many problems not yet confronted” (Feil 1987:93), statistical data

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10. Marshall Sahlins's comparison of “developed Polynesian and underdeveloped Melanesian polities” was based on differences in scale, political structure, historical performance, and quality of leadership (1966:161-163). He claimed that (1) “Melanesian polities” were smaller, numbering “seventy to three hundred persons” in Melanesia in general, and, in the Highlands, “up to a thousand, occasionally a few thousand people”, compared with Polynesian chiefdoms which “might claim ten thousand, even tens of thousands” (p.161); (2) that Melanesian “tribal plan is one of politically unintegrated segments”, by contrast with integrated, hierarchical structures in Polynesia (p.162); (3) that “only the Hawaiians, Tahitians, Tongans and, to a lesser extent, the Fijians successfully defended themselves” against “European cultural pressure in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, by evolving countervailing, native-controlled states” (p.163); and (4) that “the Melanesian big-man seems ... thoroughly bourgeois, so reminiscent of the free enterprising rugged individual of our own heritage”, compared with the Polynesian titled and well-bred chief (p.164). All of these broad, rather simplistic and almost superficial comparisons are inappropriate, as there is considerable internal variation within both Melanesia and Polynesia, just as there are broad similarities between these two cultural areas.
provided by Strathem (1971:209) on Hagen leadership show that, despite the absence of a formal rule of succession, 27 out of 36 major big-men had fathers who also were big-men. My data collected 30 years later conforms to this pattern (see discussion on Hereditary Leadership in the next section). Similar cases were reported by Reay (1959) for the Kuma of South Wahgi and Lowman-Vayda (1971:339) for the Maring of the Jimi and Simbai valleys. For the Kuma the ideal is that the eldest son should succeed his father as the leader of the sub-subclan (Reay 1959). A recent paper by Reay reinforces this point:

Every 'small group' had a leader its members recognised as 'first man' (ji kumna). Ideally, and often in fact, he was descended in a direct line of eldest (kumna) sons from the elder (kumna) of the two brothers who founded the 'small group' (1984:36).

Likewise, among the Maring the position of big-man, which goes with special ‘knowledge of rituals concerned with fighting’ (Rappaport 1984:29), passes from father to son. The contrast between Melanesian leadership systems and those of Polynesia, as previously mentioned, is therefore less real than apparent (Standish 1978a; Douglas 1979, Chowning 1979; Lindstrom 1981, 1984; Allen 1984; cf. Feil 1987:93).

As noted by one Highlands observer, for much of the 1970s the most influential model of leadership was the essentially meritocratic one developed by Andrew Strathem to describe the Hagen system (O’Hanlon 1989:35). Michael O’Hanlon, who himself conducted fieldwork during 1979-81 and 1986 among the Komblo of North Wahgi (immediate eastern neighbours of A.J. Strathem’s Northern Melpa), notes:

The typical Hagen leader, ‘big-man’, was both a compelling speaker and a wealthy polygynist, particularly talented at investing the pigs reared by his wives in the ramifying moka system of ceremonial exchange. From a male perspective, the system was meritocratic in that, though a big-man might give his sons a flying start in their careers by providing them early on with a wife or two, such a start was neither necessary nor sufficient to attain big-man status (1989:35-36).

According to A.J. Strathem (1971:187), there is a proliferation of terms describing attributes and actions of big-men among the Hagen, and the most general term, which one hears most often, is wua ntim (also spelt ntim). That is the term which A.J. Strathem translates as ‘big-man’. It should, however, be noted that the word ‘big-man’ is not an exact translation of the Melpa term wua ntim, but the big-man concept approximates to all that ntim entails. I have translated the term wua ntim as leaders, which is consistent with the way Hageners themselves equate the wua ntim concept with all types of leadership. Thus, orators may be referred to as ik nga wua ntim ('leader in speech-making'); senior public servants and politicians as gapman nga wua ntim ('leader in government'), and outstanding businessmen as bismis nga wua ntim ('leader in business'). These are what Hageners call ‘different types of ntim’ (ntim elepa-elepa moromen), which clearly implies that
the economic big-men who are generally associated with the *moka* ceremonial exchange system can — and must — be distinguished from other types of leaders.

Nonetheless, A.J. Strathem's statement that both 'rich man' and 'chief' are inappropriate as translations for *nuia num* is most probably an accurate assessment at least of his own observations. He rightly argued that it is not the fact of wealth but its deployment which is important and that the big-man occupies no definite office of headship over specific numbers of subjects (A. J. Strathem 1971:187). Hagen big-men are essentially economic entrepreneurs continuously engaged in mastering support and marshalling resources for ceremonial exchange. Other terms used by Hageners when referring to leaders, mostly big-men, emphasise wealth, oratorical skills, and generosity. It is worth quoting A.J. Strathem here in full:

> The Hagen terms for big-men employ concepts of size and physical well-being as well as referring directly to the financial status and power to speak and propose plans which big-men are supposed to have. It is notable also that the greatest spread of terms occurs at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy, and that rubbish-men, who are at the bottom, are often described by symbols which make them the opposites of major big-men, who are at the top. Thus, the major big-men have strong heads, while those of rubbish-men are soft; they are like strong forest trees while rubbish-men are like humble, weak ones; they know how to speak whereas rubbish-men do not. And big-men in general 'make grease' — which carries connotations of both health and wealth — whereas rubbish-men are dry, like ash (1971:187-188).

Simply, this can be interpreted in the following manner. Owing to the competitive nature of society and big-men being such fierce competitors, Hageners perceive big-men in association with success. Rubbish-men are regarded as weaklings because of their lack of ability to succeed. A big-man's success, retrospectively, comes with wealth, knowledge and ability. In the words of Roy Rappaport, "these are primarily the fruits of the same abilities — intelligence, vigour, forcefulness — that make a man a frequent decision-maker" (1984:29). Although he was writing on the Mating who are perhaps culturally and linguistically much closer to the Wahgi and Chimbu than of Hagen peoples, Rappaport's assertion that "big-men are ... intelligent men of forceful personality" (*ibid*) is quite an accurate summation of the situation in Hagen. These abilities appear to mark the difference between big-men and those of other categories.

However, what A.J. Strathem does not mention is the fact that Hageners have two important terminological categories of big-men: one called *ik nuia* (lit: 'speech man') and the other *mel nuia* ('material wealth man'). In their view, both the orator and the wealthy man are important, their positions often complementary. Hageners maintain that in times of need one comes up with the necessary goods while the other has the power of speech with which to highlight the value of those goods during prestations. It is the deployment of goods that makes them both big-men. While the two kinds of big-men represent distinct categories, it is also possible that a successful big-man can play both roles to perfection, depending on the nature of the occasion. If, for
example, the occasion calls for bridewealth payment, the immediate kinsmen of the husband will come up with the pigs and money while a renowned orator, not necessarily from within the subclan, will make a speech on their behalf, during the prestation.

Traditional leadership, according to A.J. Strathem's model, was largely defined in terms of ceremonial exchange. Warfare, as an arena for competition and cooperation, was largely ignored. Fight-leaders are virtually non-existent in his reports of 1960s fieldwork. The present study should help rectify this situation by providing some fresh insights into the different contexts of leadership, both in fighting and non-fighting capacities (see Chapter Five).

Unlike in other societies such as Bena Bena, where the main emphasis is on fighting skills (Langness 1971:309), and Maring, where the position of big-man goes with possession of rituals concerned with fighting (Rappaport 1984:29), in both Enga and Hagen bold warriors are admired but are rarely big-men. In Hagen, for instance, A. J. Strathem (1971:75) noted that fighting ability alone could not give a man claim to being a *nma nyim* (big-man). Financial and oratorical ability were also required (*ibid*). In this respect the Hagen are similar to the Chimbu, where the daring fighter is admired and is important in time of war but does not always attain a following (Brown 1967:46-47; 1972:43-44). Instead, the Chimbu, like the Hagen and Enga, place most emphasis on entrepreneurial skills. Managerial capacity involving coordination and foresight for planning agricultural activities and accumulation for large distributions, abilities to represent the group forcefully (which involve possession of a good oratory style), the stance of a bold warrior, and a certain aesthetic flair required in displays and ceremony are all essential characteristics for a big-man (Rubel and Rosman 1978:165-166). From this, it is clear that being a bold warrior, although an important characteristic of Chimbu leadership, does not necessarily guarantees one of big-man status.

Yet, in times of instability and endemic warfare, we find the emergence of certain men of violence who maintain power with force and threat of violence. These warrior-type leaders, dubbed by anthropologists as despots (see Salisbury 1964; see also Read 1959; Brown 1963; A.J. Strathem 1966; Watson 1971), were violent men who were of real value to their groups in times of warfare. Despots were reported in Eastern Highlands and Simbu provinces. One anthropologist (Salisbury 1964) even suggested that although the indigenous ideology in Highlands societies was one of egalitarian competition for leadership, before European contact leadership was in practice characterised by the serial despotism of powerful big-men, which effectively prevented other aspiring big-men from reaching the top (quoted in A. J. Strathem 1971:224). This view, although at the time rejected by others (such as A. J. Strathem 1971), has recently been revived by Feil (1987). Theoretically, once warfare is removed the value of violent men correspondingly drops (A. J. Strathem 1971:224). It will be interesting to see if this
occurred during and after pacification. I take up the question of despotism as a form of leadership in Chapter Five. Here I refer to re-examination of A.J. Strathern’s big-man model by Standish and others.

The meritocratic model of leadership developed by A.J. Strathern does not sufficiently account for variability in contemporary leadership types, nor does it account for those hereditary and despotic aspects of leadership emphasised by early accounts of Hagen society by Vicedom and others (see Standish 1978a). Although A.J. Strathern himself had rejected Vicedom’s account of class stratification as highly rigid, Standish (1978a) and later Feil (1982) suggested that A.J. Strathern and others who conducted fieldwork during the 1960s had failed fully to appreciate the democratising effects of colonial rule. Part of Standish’s and Feil’s argument was summed up by O’Hanlon:

> By imposing peace, the Australians had removed leaders’ power over refugees; by imposing massive quantities of shells, they had undermined their power over trade and exchange networks. The big-men observed by Strathern and others were substantially colonial creations (1989:36).

Standish and Feil believe that the hereditary and despotic character of leaders was down-played by A.J. Strathern and others. Standish has been particularly influential in the reconsideration of the big-man model. Citing Chimbu informants’ statements that in pre-colonial (and colonial) times there was an ideology of inheritance within leading families, and pointing out that such statements are quite consistent with early accounts of missionary-anthropologists Bergmann in Kamanegu (Chimbu) and Vicedom in Hagen, and more recent studies by Reay among the Kuma (South Wahgj) and A.J. Strathern himself among the Melpa (Hagen), Standish pointed out the major weakness of the big-man model:

> The central core of the ‘Big-man’ theory is the open nature of the competition for leadership, which is achieved on merit rather than ascription. In the highlands, manifestations of operative hereditary principles have been identified in several areas, and practical demonstration shown not only of the mechanics of advantage for members of certain lineages, but also several instances of succession. ‘Hereditary advantage’ is perhaps a better term for the findings presented. If there is no requirement for a strict rule of primogeniture before we use the term ‘hereditary’, then adequate evidence has been presented to argue that hereditary elements are strong in the emergence of leaders, as well as meritocratic factors (1978a:32-33).

My data suggests that there is a combination of both personal ability and hereditary advantage involved in leadership status. In fact, the pervasive principle of succession in Hagen provides sufficient grounds for reconsidering approaches to the study of leadership in Papua New Guinea. Others have reached similar conclusions (see, for example, Chowning 1977; Douglas 1979; and May 1997). I now turn to discuss the empirical data on hereditary leadership in Hagen,
but will return to a reconsideration of the big-man model in the concluding section of this chapter.

'Hereditary' Leadership

Evidence presented in this study shows that whilst leadership status is partly competitively achieved through individual ability, hereditary 'qualifications', as indicated below, are also strong factors in leadership status. *Table 2.1* contains data on 319 leaders in 1994-5 in eight Hagen tribes comprising 31 clans: Tepuka (8) Kawelka (4); Minembi (7); Kombukla (8); Welyi (1); Remdi (1); Kumungaka (1); and Gulke (1). Although the first three were covered in A.J. Strathern's compilation of statistical data in 1964-5 on 97 big-men in 14 clans, specific comparisons involving three or more generations of leaders are not possible because he did not include actual names of the big-men represented in his analysis. The names of the leaders and clans represented in my data are given in *Appendix III*. His data, as mentioned earlier, shows that 27 out of 36 major big-men were the sons of big-men, while 31 out of 61 minor big-men had fathers who were also big-men — a total figure of 58 out of 97 men who succeeded their fathers as big-men (see A.J. Strathern 1971:209). This data, when compared with similar data collected thirty years later (*Table 2.1*, below), should tell us whether or not there has been any change in patterns of 'succession' or hereditary advantage.

*Table 2.1: Hereditary advantage in Leadership Patterns*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Total Number of Leaders</th>
<th>Big-men</th>
<th>Other type of leader</th>
<th>Father was a big-man</th>
<th>Father was another type of leader</th>
<th>Father was not a leader</th>
<th>Father's status not known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawelka</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kombukla</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minembi</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welyi</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remdi (Dei)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumungaka</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulke</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are two important issues involved here: (1) the rule of succession; (2) hereditary advantages. On the first point I agree with A.J. Strathern (1971:210) that there is no rule of succession in Hagen. On the second issue, sons of leaders have real advantages over others in
competing for leadership status. It is also fair to say that since there is now inheritable wealth, in addition to advantages of education, and access to offices and roles in the state, there is a strong tendency towards inheritance in both ideology and practice which may not have been there before (cf. Brown 1987). However, it is perhaps worth mentioning here that the data presented in Table 2.2 should be treated with some caution because it is only a statistical frequency (based on highly subjective judgements of who is a leader and whose father is/was a leader) which tends to confirm a greater likelihood of leaders being sons of leaders. But not all sons of leaders are leaders, of course.

Despite the absence of any rule of succession, data presented here shows that 275 out of 319 — or 86 per cent — of current leaders had fathers who were also leaders. On the basis of his 1964-5 data, A.J. Strathern suggested that major big-men had a 3:1 chance of being the sons of big-men, and for minor big-men the chances were almost even, 1:1 (1971:210). I have not made the distinction between major and minor big-men, nor have I sought out leaders as big-men. Rather, I sought information on ‘leaders’ in general (ol lida man in Tokpisin, or wua nuim in Melpa), but, for comparative purposes, leaders with oratorical abilities and those pre-eminent in ceremonial exchange were tagged as ‘big-men’.

It should be noted, however, that many of the leaders mentioned here as ‘big-men’ are (or were) also local government councillors, national parliamentarians, provincial assembly-men, village court magistrates, peace officers, church pastors, circuit councillors, businessmen, orators, fight-leaders, and so forth — in other words, these are different types of leaders. As Hageners say, they are ‘men with names’ (wua mbi pi), whose renown extends beyond local boundaries, and who are therefore influential in decision-making processes. My data suggests that current leaders have a 8:1 chance of being the sons of leaders. Figure 2.2 shows comparable data on ‘succession’, between 1964-5 and 1994-95.
Background to Hagen Leadership and Politics

Figure 2.2: Pattern of 'succession in leadership status, 1965-1995


This represents a marked increase in sons succeeding fathers as leaders since A.J. Strathern conducted his statistical analysis on leadership in 1964-5. Despite the absence of any systematic study on the reasons for this improvement in chances of sons of leaders becoming leaders themselves, there is the virtual certainty of sons being encouraged — and with decided advantage in socioeconomic privileges such as education, inherited wealth and the right connections — to succeed as leaders. Moreover, the Hagen ideology of ‘the son shall replace the father as a leader’ is vigorously pursued by aspiring leaders. In fact, “major big-men certainly do place value on the idea that at least one of their sons should take their place” (A.J. Strathern 1971:212). In the Dei Council area, for instance, there is strong evidence of succession being advocated and practised by leaders. Furthermore, the Tepuka Keitipi big-man and former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, whose father was a pre-eminent big-man, and his son, Reuben Parua, only recently ousted as Dei MP, are clearly a case in point. The Highlands leader, Iambakey Okuk, who claimed to be the son of a leader, although his biological father was not known to the colonisers as a leader, represents a clear case of the advocacy of succession (Standish 1992:101).

In Hagen, all leaders (and others too) hope that first their wives will give them sons and, second, that at least one of their sons will become a leader of some sort. Accordingly, leaders tend to become polygynists and often encourage their sons to do likewise, thereby ensuring that at least
one wife will produce a son to 'take the father's place' (tepam nga kokl ile moklombd). Whilst it is generally true that all men value the idea of a son 'taking their place' (tepam nga kokl ile moklombd), leaders in particular do tend to encourage their sons to replace them. Thus, if a renowned orator's son shows signs of oratorical abilities, people will say 'the orator's son will take his place' (tepam ik-wua nga kagem kokl ile moklombd), or, more generally, a leader's son exhibiting some leadership qualities will be thought of as 'taking his father's place' (tepam rum nuim e nga kagem kokl ile moklombd). The frequency of polygyny among leaders, despite the hostility towards this practice by Christian churches, is shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Leadership and Polygyny

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Total Number of Leaders</th>
<th>Polygynist men</th>
<th>Wives who are in polygynous marriages</th>
<th>Monogamist men</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total number of wives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>52 (55%)</td>
<td>117 (73%)</td>
<td>41 (43%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawelka</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>30 (54%)</td>
<td>79 (75%)</td>
<td>26 (46%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kombukla</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>27 (43%)</td>
<td>79 (69%)</td>
<td>35 (56%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minembi</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27 (47%)</td>
<td>71 (70%)</td>
<td>29 (50%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welyi</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7 (58%)</td>
<td>21 (81%)</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remdi (Dei)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9 (60%)</td>
<td>23 (79%)</td>
<td>6 (40%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumungaka</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>8 (53%)</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulke</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5 (56%)</td>
<td>13 (76%)</td>
<td>4 (44%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>161 (50%)</td>
<td>411 (72%)</td>
<td>153 (48%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Half the 319 leaders are in polygynous marriages, accounting for 411 out of 569 wives (72 per cent), at an average ratio of 2.6 wives per polygynist. The relatively low range of 36-60 per cent of polygynist leaders suggests that polygyny is neither the prerogative of leaders, nor a prerequisite for the achievement of leadership status. In fact, it is perfectly normal for aspiring leaders to become successful managers of their personal networks without the complications of extra privileges and obligations that goes with polygynous marriages. Yet it is customarily fashionable in Hagen society, as in other parts of the Highlands, for leaders to have more than one wife. As some would say: *Em pasin bilong ol Hailans bikman* ('It is the way of the Highlands big-men').

Correspondingly, all eight groups covered in this survey recorded significantly high percentages of wives in polygynous marriages, with a range of 53-81 per cent. A large majority of Hagen leaders, as indicated in Appendix III, have an average of 2-3 wives, but a few may have as many as 10 wives. The most outstanding leader in the Dei Council area, Parua Kuri, for example, has only four wives, although his father had ten wives. By contrast, Hagen businessman and Pangu Party president, Pati Wamp, who may be nationally known but has far less influence than Parua
The percentages of leaders and wives in polygynous marriages are shown in Figure 2.3.

There are many reasons why traditional Hagen leaders and ordinary men married more than one wife. The most commonly given reasons were: (1) to build up a cheap supply of labour; (2) to extend *moka* networks; (3) to create and strengthen alliances between groups; (4) to raise sons who may replace them; (5) to build up numbers in their groups; and (6) as a status symbol.

In contemporary Hagen society, politicians and businessmen practice polygyny for nearly the same reasons: (1) to extend personal networks for votes; (2) to create and strengthen political alliances; (3) to raise sons; (4) to build up numbers for their groups; and (5) as a status symbol. Although most politicians and businessmen do not use their wives as cheap labour, some of their wives are income earners in the capitalist economy, which is important because elections, as evident in this study, can be expensive exercises, costing massive amounts of cash and other economic resources (see *Chapter Six*, see also *Chapter Eight*).

There are significant differences between Pati Wamp and Parua Kuri, for example, in age, wealth, sphere of influence. Parua is older and perhaps less wealthy than Wamp, and his sphere of influence is Dei while Wamp operates at the national level. But what I cannot demonstrate here is whether or not material factors override physical attractiveness in the decisions that young women and their relatives make when choosing married men as prospective husbands over single men. Despite his age and lack of formal education, Parua is certainly a more striking figure and better looking than Wamp, but do women interpret such characteristics as physical attractiveness? Unfortunately I am not qualified to comment on that but it is fair to say that political and economic factors are important considerations in decisions to do with marriage in Hagen society.
Significantly, what is common to both traditional and modern polygynists is in the infringement of their wives’ constitutional right to vote freely. Despite considerable acculturation and the influence of Christian missions, Hagen is still a male-dominated society. Accordingly, Hagen men have considerable influence over their wives in voting during elections. Because of the ever present threat of retribution from supporters of losing candidates, coupled with kinship and economic obligations, families stand to gain or lose as a unit so it is not surprising that women follow their husbands in their choice of candidates. In respect of ‘recalcitrant’ women — regardless of whether they are highly educated, ‘liberated’, or whatever the case might be — a blow over the ear with a pointed knuckle is usually a sufficient physical reminder that good Hagen wives should always vote the same way as their husbands.12

A major difference between traditional leaders and modern leaders is that a big-man often had the consent of his first wife who provides the pigs with which to acquire a second wife in order to assist her in pig rearing which is a laborious task. By contrast, first wives of modern politicians often bitterly oppose the idea of a second wife and do put up nasty fights, thereby, in their view, protecting their rights to occupy the front seat of the ministerial vehicle, or to occupy the official residence. Many aspiring leaders, including some highly educated ones, marry more than one wife because they see the acquisition of a collection of wives as an important status symbol, without of course realising that there are serious obligations that go with such a practice. The first wife may be highly educated, whereas later wives are usually village women. In urban areas where housing is a major problem, and also rising costs of school fees and consumer items, polygyny has caused real economic hardship for many families, even for wealthy businessmen and politicians. An increase in domestic violence, for instance, has been attributed to the problems caused by polygyny. Surveys by the PNG Law Reform Commission identified polygamy as a major cause of divorce in the Highlands region, and as a factor in domestic violence (see Toft and Bonnell 1985; see also Ranck and Toft 1986). Violence against women, despite the official tendency to pay less than adequate attention, is a real and pressing problem in Papua New Guinea, an important subject which unfortunately cannot be taken up here because of the analytical focus of this study.

Conclusion

There were several important issues raised in this chapter. First, there are different phases of Hagen history, characterised by alternating periods of peace and warfare, with two particular

12. When caught up in the excitement of elections, such behaviour can easily go unnoticed by even the keenest observer. Without attracting attention to themselves, Hagen men can be quite effective in reinforcing their policies through both subtle and crude, yet discreet, means. See Chapter Six for a detailed discussion on voter coercion and retributive actions taken against defectors, and the wider implications of such behaviour.
types of 'traditional' leaders, despotic fight-leaders and big-men, being prominent in inter-group relations of negative and positive reciprocity, respectively.

Second, the political situation observed by anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s was an almost artificially created situation, drastically altered by the impact of colonialism. By banning warfare, which in pre-colonial times gave prominence to despotic fight-leaders, the colonial state significantly altered the political status quo by (a) elevating big-men through the licensing of ceremonial exchange; and (b) opening the doors of opportunity by introducing cash, cash-crops, education, Christian missions, plantations, local government councils and elections. All of these provided aspiring leaders with new paths to prestige, power and influence.

Third, these new opportunities directly resulted in the proliferation of many different types of leaders. If in the past there were only a few powerful types, such as big-men, fight-leaders and ritual experts; now there is a multitude of leaders, including councillors, village court magistrates, parliamentarians, businessmen, bureaucrats, professionals, academics, church elders, and criminal raskol gang leaders (including politicians with criminal backgrounds and connections), in addition to orators, big-men and fight-leaders.

Fourth, in view of the considerable variation in contemporary leadership types and the wide range of arenas of competition in which they operate, it is fair to say that the big-man model does not adequately account for Hagen leadership. Furthermore, the importance of fathers of leaders as a factor in leadership patterns — evidence of succession being advocated and practised — is hard to reconcile with a model that is primarily based on the open nature of competition for leadership. There is no conclusive evidence to support the argument that there was equal opportunity for everyone to enter arenas of competition for leadership status. Quite contrarily, sons of leaders seem to have unfair advantages in both pre-colonial and contemporary contexts.

Admittedly, the situation is further complicated by emerging social stratification caused by disparities in wealth and power, unequal access to wealth and education, and the inheritance of wealth. As recently pointed out by Ron May, “simplistic versions of the big-man model thus require substantial qualification to take account of, first, the effective continuum in (and common mix of) leadership patterns, from hereditary or ascriptive to competitively achieved; secondly, the range of leadership styles, from the ruthlessly despotic to leader-as-steward, and, thirdly, the existence of varying degrees of social stratification” (1997:5). He further notes:

This qualification having been made, however, it is probably still true that, compared to other largely 'tribal' societies, including those of neighbouring Polynesia, traditional leadership in Papua New Guinea can be generally characterised as largely dependent on personal qualities (and as a corollary only partly susceptible to inheritance), and substantially constrained by competition, by specialisation of leadership roles, by the
prevalence of communal modes of decision making, and by communal demands on leaders and resentment of leaders who attempt to raise themselves too far above other members of society (May 1997:5; my emphasis).

Indeed, it is possible that, with the above qualification, the big-man model can be applied to Hagen and other Highlands societies, but only to a particular leadership type: the traditional big-men, those who gain prestige through ceremonial exchange, and orators who are influential decision makers in peace negotiations, dispute settlements, and compensation payments. In other words, the big-man model, whilst applicable to traditional big-man type leadership, is inappropriate to describe the full spectrum of contemporary Hagen leadership. Given their shared history of colonialism and its legacies, the same argument can be applicable to other societies in the Highlands and elsewhere in Papua New Guinea and Melanesia.

Finally, in view of recent comments by A.J. Strathem (1987) in discounting claims of early evidence of stratification in Hagen, the debate on leadership is certainly far from over. Hopefully, future research in this area should take into account of (a) the wide range of leadership types, their modes of operation, and respective arenas of competition; (b) the dichotomies of internal and external forces that shape leadership patterns; and (3) social stratification. In the next chapter I deal with an equally important debate, that concerning social structure, which began in the 1950s and 1960s, before moving on to Hagen case studies on business, warfare, and elections (all of which are discussed here as arenas of competition and cooperation) in subsequent chapters of the thesis, which are contemporary examples of Hagen leadership and of Hagen groups in action.
HAGEN GROUPINGS, OLD AND NEW: TRIBES, CLANS, FACTIONS, ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS
Introduction

According to their ideal-type model, the people who belong to the cultural-linguistic area around Mount Hagen live in territory-holding named groups called *reklaep* (line’, or ‘row’), which are poly-segmentary in nature. In practice they largely conform to this model, despite considerable variations, as in the size of the groups. The Hagen *reklaeps* vary significantly in size, ranging from below 200 to nearly 20,000 persons, and function. Members of such groups often refer to themselves as of ‘one stock’ (*mbo tenta*), usually share a common origin-myth and observe a particular taboo substance. The segments or sub-units are constantly engaged in competition (including warfare) with each other, but may occasionally cooperate in sponsoring large-scale sociopolitical or economic events. Inter- and intra-*reklaep* rivalries are most commonly expressed within well-established arenas of competition and cooperation, such as warfare, compensation payments, ceremonial exchange, business, and elections.

The way in which Highlands people here organise themselves politically and the nature of their social and analytical constructs has formed a major focus of academic debate in recent times. Researchers from a Western cultural and educational background, for instance, have been forced to deal with sociopolitical systems quite unlike their own. In attempting to analyse these complex systems, researchers (mostly social anthropologists and political scientists, but others too) have had to rely on conceptual frameworks and terminology derived from other similarly ‘simple’, ‘non-industrialised’, or ‘stateless’ societies, notably from the European colonies in Africa. Thus, for example, ‘trading’ between groups and individuals became ‘exchange’, armed conflict between groups became ‘tribal warfare’, and pre-eminence in ceremonial exchange equated with a ‘political leadership’ type called ‘big-man’. Furthermore, the social groupings, from the highest and most inclusive level to the lowest, were labelled ‘tribe’, ‘clan’, ‘sub-clan’ and ‘lineage’.

This somewhat carefree and bulk borrowing — rather than adopting or developing conceptual ‘tools’ based on local concepts — has directly resulted in a sad situation where foreign words and concepts are now almost permanently established in the literature as well as in daily conversations (among Hageners too, especially educated ones). While I find concepts such as ‘reciprocity’ (give and take), ‘warfare’ and ‘ceremonial exchange’ useful analytical tools in discussing Hagen political competition, some of the established anthropological terms for the various forms of social groupings in the literature may need some reconsideration.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the major problems encountered by early ethnographers in attempting to apply anthropological concepts derived from mainly African studies to Papua New Guinea Highlands social structures. It is essentially a brief but critical scrutiny of the literature on Highlands social structures, with a view to demonstrating how and
why Highlands social organisation may be different (or similar) to other societies in PNG and elsewhere in the world. It involves an examination of the main levels of social and political organisation in Hagen, beginning with the high-level named groups, tribes and clans, and discussing alliance systems, such as coalitions, factions and confederacy-type alliances.

The chapter then moves to a description of the major alliances between these clan and tribal groups which have become the major actors in contemporary Hagen competition, whether in warfare, business or elections. The major coalition-style alliances are analysed in the context of political competition between groups and their leaders. Also explored here is the proclaimed relationship between traditional military alliance systems, the business development associations that were formed in the mid-1970s, and contemporary political networks vis-a-vis the constant shifting allegiances of non-aligned voter blocs in elections. This is mainly to determine the presence or absence of any significant linkages between them, that is, to identify any common bonding ‘threads’ which may run through these organisations.

The final part of this chapter looks at the Dei Open electorate as a field of political competition, emphasising the diverging sub-fields (provincial constituencies) and the problems encountered by the various power blocs and their leaders in attempting to maintain cohesion. In particular, the discussion concentrates on the military alliances operating within this political field in order to find explanations for the development of rifts within them — and their political implications for corporate activities in other arenas of competition such as elections.

The chapter concludes by identifying a number of salient features of Hagen political organisation, and suggests that groups, factions and coalitions are ultimately created to serve specific functions and goals. Moreover, it is argued that leaders play an important role in the construction and maintenance of these groups, a significant point which I think has been downplayed by those in search of descent models in the Highlands region. A further argument is that Highlands observers failed, also, to recognise the Hagen notion of the ‘name-must-not-go-down’, which is a significant factor in the composition, recruitment, solidarity, and continuity of local groups. Such processes, once having been identified, are then built into the overall theme of the study, that of competing legitimacies (and competition for the allegiances of individuals) in state-society relations.

The Hagen Social Structure

One of the first and perhaps most impressive things that Westerners may have learnt about people in Hagen (and many other parts of the Highlands) is the way in which members of a local population may identify with, and organise themselves into, a high-level named group, in relation to other similar groups. Indeed, for many anthropologists, who must have been
impressed by elaborate hierarchy or set of structures, these groups resembled ‘segmentary lineage structures’ of some African societies. Individuals, for instance, belong to an elaborate set of progressively more inclusive named groups, such as ‘tribes’ which have a segmentary structure (A.J. Strathern 1971: Chap.2; 1972:18; Burton 1989:256; Merlan and Rumsey 1991: Chap.3; Muke 1994: Chap.6; Ketan 1996:243). Despite some difficulties encountered in early attempts to categorise the various units according to size and functional criterion, these group levels, from the largest to the smallest, are: coalition-style alliances, tribe-pair, tribe, tribe section, clan, clan section, sub-clan, sub-sub-clan, and lineage (cf. A.J. Strathern 1971; 1972).1 In an earlier paper, A.J. Strathern (1966a:356) identified eight main levels of group segmentation: tribe, major section of tribe, minor section of tribe, clan, clan-section, sub-clan, sub-sub-clan, and lineage. These terms, he says, are usually sufficient to deal with all levels found in a particular group (ibid). A revised and more detailed version was published in his book, The Rope of Moka, in which he identified ten levels: great-tribe, tribe-pair, tribe, major section of tribe, clan-pairs, clan, clan sections, sub-clan, sub-sub-clans, and lineage (A.J. Strathern 1971:19-27).

Although Hagen social organisation is supposedly based on ‘tribes’ (see Burton 1989a), I have included coalition-style alliances and tribe-pair as levels above the tribal level because of their relevance to the discussion on political organisation. Hageners have no direct translations for these terms although there is definite organisation (and cleavage) along these lines. However, as indicated by A.J. Strathern (1972), they do have words for other levels: the tribe is referred to as reklaep tenta (‘one line’); clan as tepam tenta (‘one father’); sub-clan as manga rapa tenta (‘one men’s house’); and the lineage as tepam-kangemal (‘father and his sons’).

Reklaep tenta (wan lain in Pidgin) is a term that can also be used when referring to other group levels, including major section (e.g. Jika Maipngel ‘line’) and clan (e.g. Jika Milakamb ‘line’). But this is more a matter of expression rather than an actual social construct, which means that the term reklaep, when applied to ‘tribe’ is more consistent with the way Hageners think of themselves (as a ‘line’ in dance, war, elections, etc.). Other idioms applicable to the whole range of group levels are: mbo tenta (‘one stock’ or ‘one kind’); mbi tenta (‘one name’). Andrew Strathem has previously published a more comprehensive discussion on Melpa idioms and group

As argued by Merlan and Rumsey (1991), any attempt to “distinguish analytically among various levels of the segmentary hierarchy and to establish a standardised set of terms for units at each [level]” may meet with less than satisfactory results. A major problem is the fact that there is considerable difference in size (and function). In Nebilyer, for instance, “the maximally inclusive named units (‘tribes’) differ greatly in size: from under 100 to over 7000 people, with a corresponding variation in the number of named sub-units” (Merlan and Rumsey 1991:38). Likewise, Hagen groups, as indicated earlier, differ significantly: from under 200 to nearly 20,000 persons. One may distinguish levels according to functional criteria, but here too one encounters problems, which are discussed later in this chapter (see subsection on the Differences in Size and Function in this chapter; see also Merlan and Rumsey 1991: Chap.3 for comparable discussion of Nebilyer tribes).
structure so it is not worth going over the same ground here.2 Suffice it to say that the idioms Strathem recorded for my group, the Kawelka, have not changed much in thirty years, but the structures certainly have, as evident in Figure 3.2. The changes in structures, as will be argued, correlates with population growth, which is also a factor in the formation (and shifting nature) of Hagen alliance systems.

Anthropological concepts such as ‘tribe’, ‘clan’, and ‘lineage’, whilst initially borrowed from elsewhere and applied by early ethnographers as useful analytical tools, are now deeply entrenched in the literature — however flawed or imprecise they may be in some cases. When dealing with societies like Hagen it is important to note that such terms only roughly approximate to existing social structures and must therefore be used rather cautiously. Accordingly, I have used local terms where appropriate, but reverted to anthropologically established terminology in instances where I feel there is clearly a need for greater edification for the vast majority of readers who are not familiar with Hagen idioms. If, by using such concepts, one appears to be keeping in line with the anthropological tradition I have criticised earlier, then I am doing so rather reluctantly and only as, I believe, originally intended — as useful analytical tools.

**The Hagen reklaep**

The Hagen reklaep is the same as the Nebilyer talapi (Merlan and Rumsey 1991:Chap.3). I have no doubt that reklaep and talapi have the same meaning and are slight variations in pronunciations of the same concept. Merlan and Rumsey (1991:36) have literally described talapi as ‘line’, ‘row’, or ‘column’. All of these are applicable to reklaep, which, like talapi, “is a broad generic term”, as “nowadays it is used for provincial, national, and even geo-political identities in so far as these are known”: ol lain Jika (‘the Jika line’); lain bilong Simbu (‘line of Simbu’); even Australia lain (‘Australian line’).

The established anthropological usage for this term, as indicated above, in both Hagen and Nebilyer is ‘tribe’. Suggestive as this image of ‘line’ (lain in Tok Pisin) might be for descent theorists, Merlan and Rumsey have warned that:

...in Ku Waru [Nebilyer] discourse the point of contact between the more and less literal senses of talapi is not — as they might assume — in some notion of a line of descent by which each member of a group is linked to its apical ancestor. What is locally relevant is not a vertical, genealogical line, but a horizontal, tactical one: the line of men who form a single flank on the battlefield and dance as a single row at ceremonial exchange events (1991:36).

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2. See A.J. Strathem (1972:Chap.1); See also Merlan and Rumsey (1991:Chap.3) for comparable discussion of the talapi ['line'] structure in the neighbouring Nebilyer valley.
The local terms for social groupings in three closely related cultural and linguistic areas in the Western Highlands Province are given in Figure 3.1. Listed below are local terms which roughly approximate to the anthropological concepts. The stacked structure of the diagram reflects the conceptual relationship between the various categories: Hagen and Nebilyer being very similar in cultural-linguistic terms (albeit with minor differences in pronunciation), while Hagen, being in an interstitial position, shares some attributes of both Wahgi and Nebilyer. All three cultural-linguistic areas, however, have similar social groupings, which are functionally and analytically equated with the anthropological concepts of tribe, clan and sub-clan. However, it is important to note that these are less than precise translations, even though they have now been accepted into the canon of the anthropological literature.

**Figure 3.1: Hagen social groupings: compared with Nebilyer and South Wahgi areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANTHROPOLOGICAL</th>
<th>SOUTH WAHGI</th>
<th>HAGEN</th>
<th>NEBILYER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td><em>Ka</em></td>
<td><em>Reklap</em></td>
<td><em>Talapi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td><em>Kap</em></td>
<td><em>Tepan teta</em></td>
<td>..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-clan</td>
<td><em>Kanem</em></td>
<td><em>Manga rapa</em></td>
<td><em>Llee tape</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Based on A.J. Strathem (1972); Merlan and Rumsey (1991); and Muke (1994).

All these groupings are described in the lingua franca, Tokpisin, as *lain* (line). Indeed, as it will be made clear in the next section (see discussion on The Tribe) and in subsequent chapters, 'line' is a solid entity to which members owe their first loyalty, especially in critical situations when one is forced to choose between his own group and another (including the state). Yet, and somewhat paradoxically, 'line' often fails to direct members to support each other in group events, thus echoing O'Hanlon's (1989:54-56) point that there may be 'shadow communities', with divided
loyalties, and even traitors within the ideally solidary group.\textsuperscript{3} As evident in the case studies on warfare and elections, not all members of a ‘line’ will participate in warfare, nor will they all support a home candidate in an election. But will they go over to the other side? That depends on who or what constitutes the other side. And also on the type of competition and on underlying historical relations between the participants. In Hagen warfare, for instance, one or more segments may choose not to fight alongside other segments of a reklaep mainly because of cross-cutting kinship ties, but will rarely assist the opposing side. There is even evidence of segments (mostly at the clan level) having teamed up with the other side to fight against their fellow tribesmen. That happens in very rare instances, especially when a clan (or section) may be structurally part of one tribe but closely associated with a clan (or section) from another tribe (and both tribes would be rivals in major warfare, elections and business). During 1986-1990, the Minembi Kimbo clan, for example, allied themselves with the Kawelka and fought against an alliance of Minembi clans because there was more ‘warmth’ (mukl-mukl eteni) in their association with the Kawelka Kundmbo clan (with whom they are currently paired) than the Minembi tribe (among whom they are structurally part, but against whom they have also fought in pre-colonial warfare). See Chapter Five for a detailed analysis of military alliances; see also Chapters 6-8 for shifting allegiances of non-aligned voter blocs in elections, which generally follows military alliances.

Of course, there is an element of degree of size involved here: smaller groups tend to be more united than large ones, yet the ‘name-must-not-go-down’ principle is important to all Hagen groups. In other words, being a member of a reklaep has its privileges and obligations — and one may of course vote, fight and die as a Jika, Mokei, or Yamka — but it is important to recognise that ‘line’ membership does not necessarily dictate automatic participation in such group activities.

\textit{Is the Hagen reklaep based on descent?}

The reklaep, as argued below, is not based on descent. Hagen is an area where people have tremendous difficulty tracing descent for whatever its worth (which may pragmatically be of little value in the overall scheme of things). Except for a few older leaders (usually orators) who can trace their genealogy beyond the fourth generation, most people’s knowledge can be as shallow

\textsuperscript{3} O’Hanlon (1989:54) says that “within any clan there are likely to be sets of individuals who identify themselves as the ‘cuttings’ of, and indebted to, each of the other major groups with which that clan has intermarried”. As a member of a ‘shadow community’ within his clan, “a man may experience divided loyalties when his clan is at odds with that of his ‘blood’” (ibid). Such a situation would be true for Hagen, as it is for North Wahgi. For example, the sons of women from the Jika Milakamb clan in Remdi Jikambo clan may refuse to fight if these two clans ever declared war on each other. Traitors, which O’Hanlon discussed in the context of betrayal (1989:Chap.3), are another matter. I discuss these matters in terms of contradictions: between group and individual interests; loyalty and betrayal; ideology and practice (see concluding section of this chapter).
Hagen Groupings: Tribes, Clans, Factions, Alliances and Coalitions

as three or four generations at the most. It is also an area where people tend to place much weight on the numerical strength of a group. These are the major reasons why descent is strictly not a charter for recruitment. As a result, not all members of a reklaep can claim common descent.

When reviewing the relevant literature on Hagen group structures, it might be useful to posit two basic questions: (1) is descent relevant to group recruitment; and (2) is descent a primary principle governing group identity? In his study of descent and group structure among the Melpa, A.J. Strathern (1972) made an important distinction between principles of group recruitment and those of group identity. Based on fieldwork conducted in the 1960s (between 1964 and 1968) in mostly Hagen Central and Dei Council areas of Hagen district, A.J. Strathern (1972) asserted that 'descent' was irrelevant to the former, but operative in the latter. Medan and Rumsey, who jointly conducted seventeen months of fieldwork (between June 1981 and November 1983) in nearby Nebilyer Valley, tend to agree with A.J. Strathern on the first point but beg to differ on the latter. Based on their observation of Nebilyer groups, Medan and Rumsey claimed that "neither the talapi ('line'), nor the leu tapa (men's house), nor any other social unit in the Nebilyer entails descent as a structural basis". They further went on to say:

...the sharing of a common apical ancestor is not even imputed as a notional principle of 'group identity' among people who share a common segmentary identity (are of 'one line'), at least not at the level of 'tribe' (i.e., named segmentary identity of the most inclusive order). Rather, where common ancestry is explicitly posited by origin myths, these almost always involve pairs of ancestors who are related as brothers... Though we assume such pairs of brothers would have had a common father, he is not named or even mentioned in most such stories. From this and other evidence, we conclude that the image of relatedness which they project is not one of 'common descent', or even filiation to a common stock, but brotherhood per se (1991:37; italics in original).

Apart from this particular discrepancy, Medan and Rumsey (1991) were otherwise virtually in agreement with A.J. Strathern (and also with Marilyn Strathern) on many other points. So why the discrepancy? Is it because of structural differences between Hagen and Nebilyer? Or is it because they differ in cultural, linguistic, or any other aspect of society? Or is it because there are significant differences between the observers rather than the people who form the focus of their observations? The last question is a general one which may be applicable here as it would in other parts of the Highlands, PNG, and elsewhere in the world. And, I might add, it is probably best left unanswered. However, in relation to the second and third questions, I see no real difference between Nebilyer and Hagen. At least on the basis of social structure and cultural-linguistic evidence, I suggest that Hagen does not differ significantly from Nebilyer. Except for minor linguistic differences, as evident in different ways of expressing the same concepts (for example: reklaep and talapi for 'line'; manga rapa and leu tapa for men's house), Hagen and Nebilyer are very similar in almost all aspects of society.
Can the discrepancy be explained in terms of differences in research methods? Again, I see no real difference here. Merlan and Rumsey's research methodology, for instance, was generally no different to A.J. Strathern's. Both studies, for example, relied on the traditionally tried and tested technique of 'participant observation' and 'selective interviews'. As well, both do not seem to differ significantly in their utilisation of anthropological concepts: Merlan and Rumsey, like A.J. Strathern (and Marilyn Strathern), identified the most inclusive social unit in the 'segmentary' order as the 'tribe'.

However, it is worth mentioning here that their works were greatly influenced by differences in theoretical emphasis, reflecting the times in which the studies were conducted. Andrew and Marilyn Strathern, for instance, conducted fieldwork during a period when descent theory dominated social anthropology. Some of their earliest and most detailed studies were focused primarily on group structure and its relation to patterns of residence, marriage, ceremonial exchange, political leadership, dispute settlement, warfare, and so forth (see, for example, A.J. Strathern 1971, 1972; and A.M. Strathern 1972a, 1972b). Their work epitomised the general PNG Highlands ethnography that emerged during this period. Merlan and Rumsey, however, seem to have benefited quite significantly from the Stratherns' contribution to exchange theory (A.J. Strathern 1971; 1979a and A.M. Strathern 1972b, 1988). While the central focus of Merlan and Rumsey's study was on the form and content of Highlands oratory, their study was largely influenced by exchange theory, which in their words, "has provided a valuable corrective to segmentary lineage theory" (1991:3). Segmentary lineage theory, according to Merlan and Rumsey, "included the presupposition that what 'holds together' the segmentary system — the principle by which social groups are defined — is 'descent', i.e., common connection through more or less extended series of parent-child (read: father-son) links to common ancestors" (1991:3). They claimed that "no such principle was evident here [in Nebilyer]" (ibid).

I shall return to the question of descent theory vis-a-vis exchange theory in a short while, but meanwhile here is my contribution to the debate on descent as a principle governing group recruitment and group identity. I will argue, on the basis of case studies (on warfare, elections, business, etc.), that some of the explanations put forward are inadequate, just as the principles considered as governing group recruitment and identity are inherently deficient. The way in which the different arenas of competition and cooperation — ranging from the more traditional forms such as warfare and ceremonial exchange to modern ones like elections and business development associations — have merged in recent times suggest that there are (at least now) far more significant factors other than those put forward by anthropologists (e.g. 'descent', 'exchange', etc.) involved in the 'construction' and 'maintenance' of groups. And the fact that such groups are constantly competing against each other as well as with the PNG state for the
allegiance of individuals is of direct relevance to this study (see the final section of this chapter for further elaboration of this theme).

Like A.J. Strathern (1972) and Merlan and Rumsey (1991), I found no evidence suggesting that descent is the key organising principle of Hagen society, nor do I accept that the principle of agnation, or patrilineal descent (through father's line), sufficiently accounts for group membership. Confusions and misunderstandings are almost inevitable in areas like Hagen where people may say things in a particular way, but actually do things in a different sort of manner. For instance, it is not unusual for people of the same ‘tribe’ to describe themselves as of ‘one stock’ (mbo tena), without necessarily implying that they originated from the same ‘stock’ or ancestor. Similarly, people of a particular ‘clan’ may speak of themselves as of ‘one father, one blood’, and therefore cannot marry within because of the common bloodlines; yet we find that not all of them can claim common descent. Perhaps the best example comes from the most minimal unit, tepam kangemal (‘father and his sons’), where clearly one would expect to find a father and his sons and their families. Not quite so! It is more often (than not) the case that there are non-agnates in all levels, including the most minimal unit.

Descent, therefore, is not the sole criteria for group membership, especially in recruitment (see sections on The Tribe and The Clan). In relation to A.J. Strathern’s point on descent as a principle governing group identity, I suggest that descent, or the idea of having a common origin, comes into play as an ideology of group solidarity. As evident in the case studies on warfare and elections, it is an ideology utilised by individuals, especially leaders, to drum up support for activities in which they stand to benefit personally. Furthermore, I suggest that descent is not the only factor in group solidarity. Following Muke (1994), I would argue that ‘patrilineal descent’ as a factor in group solidarity can be matched by a factor called ‘matrilineal ascent’. Taking a crucial step further from Muke and especially Merlan and Rumsey (on their endorsement of the exchange theory), I would argue, also, that there are far more important pragmatic factors in the ‘construction’ and ‘maintenance’ of social units than those put forward by A.J. and A.M. Strathern on Hagen, Merlan and Rumsey on Nebilyer, and Muke on South Wahgi groups. I shall return to this point later, but now turn to Muke’s Ka structure.

John Muke, who describes himself as a ‘native anthropologist’, conducted fieldwork in the late 1980s among his own Kuma people of South Wahgi. From the standpoint of an ‘insider’, Muke presented an interesting model of the Ka (tribe/clan) structure (1994:Chap.6). By utilising the analogy between the growth of a plant (sweet potato) and the social reproduction process, Muke asserted that groups developed in the same way as a plant does and their structures were therefore named accordingly, thus the comparable terms: Ka (tribe/clan) for base; Kip (main section) for shoots; Kanem (sub-clan) for vines.
The term *Ka* (as in Kawelka, Kondika, or Yamka) is a commonly recurring suffix to group names in both Wahgi and Hagen, which Muke (1994:177) believes is an archaic word for sweet potato. Likewise, Hagen group segment names often end with *mbo*, which means 'stock', or 'shoot of something planted' (A.J. Strathern 1972:42). In attempting to explain the origin of this phenomenon, Muke (1994:178), after A.J. Strathern (1972), says that this ideology relates to planting of maternal substances and states that the name of the female ancestress is taken and the suffix *mbo* added to it to form a new segment in a tribe. Indeed, Hageners do speak of the female substances, which include *kopong* ('grease') and *mema* (blood), as transplants taken from the mother's group (for which a certain form of gift exchange has been instituted for the purpose of honouring such obligations). However, my data on Hagen groups suggest that the suffix *mbo* is far more commonly attached to the name of the group into which the female ancestress (or usually a number of them) was born, rather than her personal name. A number of examples can be identified in Figure 3.2; at its most minimal, or sub-sub-clan, level can be found: Dakap-mbo (after Dakapkae), Kiklpukla-mbo (after Kiklpukla); Elti-mbo (after Elti), Minembi-mbo (after Minembi), Romalke-mbo (after Welyi Romalke), Tipuk-mbo (after Tepuka) and Penambi-mbo (after Penambe). One only needs to consult the segmentary structures given in Appendix I to see that this is the case throughout Hagen society.

Nonetheless, as far as the Wahgi and Hagen *Ka* structure goes, a sister's children are also described as 'cuttings' or 'shoots' taken from the father's group and being transplanted when they shift residence back to their mother's agnatic group. Here, Muke's discussion of the checker-board-type sweet potato gardens (*angka doog*) directly corresponds to the Hagen idea of men being organised according to *pana ru* ('garden ditch', or 'division'). A.J. Strathern expressed this point very clearly:

> There is the image of the whole clan as a 'garden division' (*pana ru*) and the idea that persons who change membership 'plant' themselves, or are planted by big-men sponsors in a new 'garden division'. The emphasis here is on the territorial nature of the land-holding and on a symbolisation of residence which states that joining a group

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4. His suggestion that the sweet potato (*Ipomea batatas*) being the plant which may have served as the botanical metaphor for the *Ka* structure was made on the assertion: "It is quite possible that the word *Angka*, used in South Wahgi to describe mature sweet potato tubers, can be separated, just like proper genealogical names can be separated from the suffix idioms of the groups" (Muke 1994:177). In noting the similarities in the word for sweet potato in neighbouring languages, such as: *Kais* (in Chimbu), *Oka* (in Melpa), *Angkai* (in East Kambia), *Kep* (in North Wahgi), and *Ngai* (in Temboka), he says that the metaphor could be an archaic word for the base or matures of the sweet potato crop, which is associated with the checker board (*doog*) agricultural practices (ibid). But the *kaukau*, as pointed out by Bill Standish, came only came a few centuries ago. Other crops have stock, roots, stems, etc, so it is possible that the names predate *kaukau* (personal communication, August 1997).

5. The Nebilyer, as pointed out by Alan Rumsey, use the suffix *amb* (woman) in stead of *mbo*, which once again highlights the prominent role of women in the 'creation' of new segments within groups (personal communication, August 1997).

A.J. Strathem further noted that “this idiom becomes fused at certain points with the Melpa concept of kinship, since the lexeme pukl can mean both a physical root and a kinship link. Hence sister’s sons have a particularly strong ‘root’ with their mothers’ clan groups” (1972:222; see also A.J. Strathem 1971:35). While A.J. Strathem’s emphasis was largely on the individual’s connections to the land, Muke associates the botanical mode of kinship expressions with a ‘matrilineal ascent’ system:

Generally the expression ‘men within a square’ (yi googmi) implies a segmentary group division, an historical process which is based on the notion of balance, static and gradual changes. The composition of groups at each structural level is thought of as squares in a field system, just like the checker board field systems in sweet potato gardens (Muke 1994:183).

Muke’s Ka model is far more detailed than what is given here and moreover he suggested the antiquity of the structure at 300 years (about the same time as the introduction of the sweet potato). Unfortunately it is not possible to work out the kinship system that preceded the Ka structure, but we can at least benefit from this particularly refreshing approach to analysing Highlands social structures from a different perspective. In particular, Muke made two important points which should be kept as pointers to future studies on this subject matter:

• The composition of groups at each structural level (tribe, clan, sub-clan etc.) can be thought of as squares in a field system, just like the checker-board-type field systems in sweet potato gardens. Accordingly, high-level named groups in Wahgi, such as Dambinge, Kuma and Nene, may have historically operated as squares but are now seen as ancient field systems. As population increased over time these origin groups divided into Ka squares. Each Ka unit operated as a square unit in relation to other Ka squares and once the population within each of the units reached beyond the carrying capacity of the size of a square, the expanding groups divided into Kup unit. The same principle applies to other levels, such as the Kup and Kanem segments (see Muke 1994:183).

• Since the Ka, Kup and Kanem are field systems superimposed upon one another, one can peel each layer and define them as independent functioning units; Ka being the most ancient structure and Kanem the recent functioning one. Therefore an interval of time can be determined for each of the structural levels: approximately 100 years, which suggests that the Ka structure may be 300 years old (see Muke 1994:198, 199).

Although there is a difference in emphasis between their interpretations, I see A.J. Strathem’s discussion on the Hagen idea of ‘planting’ a person in a new group as quite complementary to
Muke's Ka structure. An important idea emerging from both Wahgi and Hagen kin categories, as aptly stated by Muke (1994:183), is the emphasis on the planting substance which, in another way, refers to the reproductive capacities of women. This leads us to the point where a sister's offspring, particularly sons, become significant factors in group solidarity. A sister's sons, as pointed out by A.J. Strathern (1972), have particularly strong roots with the mother's clan (see discussion on the clan in the next section). Like those of agnatic descent, a sister's sons will have no trouble in marshalling support for group events such as warfare or ceremonial exchange. In fact, many are known to have gone on to establish themselves as leaders in their mothers' natal groups. Likewise, members of a group founded by a group of clan sisters often stand together as a solid unit in group events. The principles of 'patrilineal descent' and 'matrilineal ascent' are therefore both of direct relevance to group solidarity.

However, as will be demonstrated by the numerous cases studies discussed in subsequent chapters, there are many other factors — pragmatically even more significant than the principles of 'descent', 'ascent', or 'exchange' — which determine the composition of a group. It can be argued that neither the principle of descent, nor exchange, nor 'ascent', nor population size can adequately account for both group recruitment and group identity. My argument is simply based on the two most fundamental characteristics of groups: first and foremost is the fact that all groups are ultimately created to serve certain functions and in some instances to achieve specific goals; and secondly, all groups are shifting in nature, in a constant state of flux and wane, as old members are lost (via death, marriage and outward migration) and replaced by new ones (via births, marriage and inward migration). This raises serious questions about the value of debate on descent theory vis-a-vis exchange theory, an important point to which I shall return later (see Conclusion in this chapter).

Moving away from the Hagen-Nebilyer-Wahgi area of the Western Highlands, I now turn to the more general discussion on PNG Highlands literature, with a view to establishing some working definitions for social groups found in Hagen.

**Some general comments on an ancient paradox**

Difficulties in the use and definition of group structures have warranted much attention. Fundamentally, the most prolonged debate in all of the anthropological literature is whether the Highlands social structure is exclusively based on (1) a patrilineal descent system or (2) a descent dogma based on a cognatic system. Under the latter an individual can claim dual membership (through both the father and the mother), whilst under the former one can in theory claim group membership only through the father's line. The controversy over the nature of PNG Highlands group structure encountered various twists and turns, but ethnographers have made gallant attempts in salvaging some logical explanation from this paradox (see Barnes 1962; 1967;
Langness 1964; Sahlin 1965; Meggitt 1965; Scheffler 1966; 1973; de Lepervanch 1967-68; A.J. Strathem 1969b; 1972. As previously noted by others, Barnes (1962), for instance, "questioned the use of African models in the New Guinea Highlands, pointing out that in many respects the Chimbu and their cultural relatives [such as Wahgi, Hagen and Enga] were different from the Tiv, Nuer, Tallensi, and other Africans: genealogical reckoning was shallow, non-agnates were easily incorporated into groups, segmentary processes and the ways of conceptualising them seem different" (Keesing 1975:58; see also Langness 1966 [1964]:131; A.J. Strathem 1969b:37; Feil 1987:128). Barnes went on to generalise that:

... although some Highland societies are appropriately classified as agnatic, the area as a whole appears to be characterised by cumulative patrifiliation rather than by agnatic descent. ... But in most, though not in all, Highland societies the dogma of descent is absent or is held only weakly; the principle of recruitment to a man's father's group operates, but only concurrently with other principles, and is sanctioned not by an appeal to the notion of descent as such but by reference to the obligations of kinsfolk, differentiated according to relationship and encompassed within a span of only two or three generations (1966[1962]:120-21).

Cumulative patrifiliation means that a man would normally become a member of his father's group, but if due to circumstances he affiliated with his mother's or paternal grandmother's group, his children's rights in that group would be secure. For they, though not related by patrilineal descent, were related by patrifiliation to the group he had attached himself to (see Keesing 1975:58-59). Although Barnes's (1962) generalisation was statistically supported by empirical evidence (see, for example, A.J. Strathem 1972:104-105; 218-219), other writers pointed out that factors such as matrifiliation, co-residence, and participation in exchanges and warfare or in cult rituals can all be important also in determining affiliations (see Brown 1962; Langness 1964; de Lepervanche 1967-8; A.J. Strathem 1969b, 1972 and 1979a; Scheffler 1985; O'Hanlon and Franklin 1986; Feil 1987; O'Hanlon 1989; Merlan and Rumsey 1991; Muke 1994).

After Barnes's (1962) insightful article and especially in light of more recent work on exchange theory as a "corrective to segmentary lineage theory" (see Merlan and Rumsey 1991; see also A.J. Strathem 1979a; and A.M. Strathem 1988), one may wonder whether the above debate was ever relevant at all? Segmentary lineage theory, needless to say, was always going to be inadequate when it comes to understanding PNG Highlands social structures. Despite its early popularity among certain academic circles during the 1950s and 1960s, segmentary lineage theory was fundamentally flawed in its application because anthropologists either ignored or refused to recognise some basic facts about PNG Highlands social structures.

As noted earlier, it was based primarily on the principle of descent, and it was thought (quite incorrectly) that descent was the key organising principle that held a group together. As a
member of not one but several progressively more inclusive named groups, it came as no real surprise to me when I read Merlan and Rumsey's report of the absence or irrelevance of descent as a principle by which social groups are defined in Nebilyer. Their suggestion that exchange theory, unlike segmentary lineage theory, can be used to explain Highlands social structure is a useful one, though I do not agree that it sufficiently accounts for group composition. While it is true that groups, factions, and coalitions are created for, and as a consequence of, exchange transactions, it is equally true that such groups are 'constructed' and maintained for specific purposes (see the concluding section in this chapter).

It should be noted that many of the problems encountered by early Highlands ethnographers were of their own making. The application of Western anthropological concepts onto Highlands group structures, or trying to explain Highlands societies using African models, was a common mistake made by many early ethnographers. However, to continue the inquiry along this line would be pointless. Suffice to say, what appears to outsiders as bewildering makes perfect sense to Highlanders and one need only to ask the people themselves how and why some things are done in a particular way. Hageners, for example, agree that some of the members of their lineages are \textit{wu-a-nt-mei} ('born of the man') while others are \textit{am-b-nt-mei} ('born of the woman', i.e., the sister), without implying that the latter are formally 'second-class members' (A.J. Strathem 1966a:357; 1971:35). This clearly indicates that group membership in Hagen is not restricted to agnatic descent (father-to-son), even though the lineage (\textit{tepam kangemal}, 'father and his sons') is described that way. In practice, a sister's sons as well as others, including war refugees, can gain membership in a group without necessarily tracing descent to an apical ancestor. (Examples of sons of the sister having gone back to her father's group are given in Chapter Eight). However, most members of a group, especially at the levels below the tribe, can claim common descent to a putative male ancestor.

When dealing with questions of agnatic descent, or the ability to trace one's line through the father to a founding male ancestor, or genealogical structures in general, it is important to realise that (1) such questions are of far less pragmatic value to a Hagener than it might appear to an...
observer; and (2) a claim of common descent must not be confused with the ability to actually trace one’s lines to either male or female founders of a group. My experience with Hageners is that there is a sliding scale of memory or amnesia when it comes to tracing lines. That is, the lower the level, the more the people who can claim common ancestry, but less than half will have difficulty tracing their lines. For instance, in a sub-clan, or manga rapa (man’s house), just over fifty per cent of all males may claim to have descended from one putative ancestor (usually named), but only about five per cent or even less will be able to trace an unbroken line with any degree of success. In the Kawelka Membo clan (c.2,000 pop.), for example, only one old man, Ul Koromba (Kaimbkul), could manage to deliver a comprehensive account of clan history (including genealogy) while two others could only manage to recall their own sub-sub-clan histories.7

The Tribe

In spite of all the difficulties, the language of descent used in ethnography of today when describing social units is still littered with words such as lineage, clan, tribe, and phratry (see Feil 1987:34; see also Barnes 1962; A.J. Strathern 1969b; 1971; Scheffler 1985). While accepting that there is considerable difficulty in putting these terms to use, some working definitions will suffice here. A tribe can be defined as a politically or socially coherent and autonomous group occupying land or claiming a particular territory (RAI 1951; Burton 1988; Muke 1994). In fact, it is true in some areas that the tribe is the most cohesive and autonomous political group. While this is usually the case in areas where there are many small tribes, with average populations of fewer than 500 persons, those with larger populations are typically less cohesive and more fragmented

7. I had the benefit of four older informants among the Kawelka. Three were big-men while the fourth was a man of exceptional knowledge of Hagen culture. My big-men informants here were once regarded as the three most important Kawelka Kurnapei (‘those who live at Kuma’, or the Upper Wahgi) leaders — Goimba Onombe, Ken Ripa and Toa Pani — who are generally accepted as the mae tepam (‘father of land’) or mae pukl tvm (‘land-root-man’, or ‘owner of land’) of the Kawelka territories at Kuk in the Upper Wahgi Valley. All are now over seventy years and have quite considerable influence in land ‘ownership’ among the Kawelka. Goimba, whose father Onombe and grandfather Kund Mend (together with other Kawelka) were brutally evicted from Kuk during pre-colonial warfare, took advantage of the presence of the Australian Colonial Administration by reclaiming his forefathers’ land in the 1960s (see Gorecki 1982 for a more detailed discussion of the reoccupation of Kuk). That was done through the use of historical information (and genealogies) and Goimba in particular has a very good knowledge of Kawelka history, yet neither Goimba, nor Ken, nor Toa could trace their own genealogies beyond the third generation. It was partly complicated by the fact that both Ken and Toa, are non-agnates, originally of Klamakae Kopimbo and Tepuka Kengeke clans, respectively, but have gone on to establish themselves as influential leaders among the Kawelka. My fourth and non-big-man informant Ul Korobe, on the other hand, is an exceptionally culturally-oriented person. Not only can he, now known by his Christian name Kaimbkul, give a full account of clan genealogy, but he is also gifted in the construction and use of traditional artefacts, as demonstrated to ANU researchers (see Swadling 1981:39, picture of Kaimbkul and another Kawelka man, Korowa of the Kurupimbo clan, with 300-400 year old wooden spades found at the Kuk archaeological site).
— in which case, the level of cohesiveness in corporate activities is often found to be most effective at the clan and sub-clan levels.

**Segmentary structure of the tribe**

Tribes, as indicated in *Figure 3.2*, have a segmentary structure and may, depending on size, be subdivided into several levels of sections, clans and sub-clans (A.J. Strathern 1972; Burton 1988; 1989). Following Merlan and Rumsey, my use of ‘segmentary’ is in the simple sense: that within a single *reklaep* or tribe, “distinctions are made among multiple, homologous, named sub-groupings, each of which is divided in the same way, etc” (1991:36). Hagen groups, for instance, are functionally and ideologically divided into subgroups (as in the case of ideology governing group solidarity), which are further divided into sub-subgroups and so forth. Accordingly, the *reklaep* (tribe) is the most inclusive level within the ‘segmentary’ structure. Within the *reklaep* may be found sections, often a pair of them (in instances where they have been founded by brothers) which are clearly named and distinctions are made between them. There is no direct translation for ‘sections’ in the Melpa language, but the most commonly used concept is *ruklay* (a pair of them), a term which is applicable to all levels of pairing.

In each of the sections are the various named ‘clans’ which, as we shall see in the next section and in successive chapters, are major units in political competition. As indicated above, ‘clan’ is a term which best equates with the Hagen ideology of *tepam tena nga* (‘of one father’), or having originated from a single putative ancestor to whom most — but not all — members can claim descent. As a result, certain taboos are observed, including the rule of exogamy (where one must not marry from within the clan); the virtual absence of major warfare between these subdivisions (clans); and because of the absence of warfare, *moka* exchanges are generally conducted between clans rather than within themselves. Within the clan are the men’s houses (*manga rapa*) which tend to be territorially localised (see Merlan and Rumsey 1991:41-44 for comparable discussion on land tenure in Nebilyer).

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8 A.J. Strathern's compilation of data on 258 adult or near-adult Kawelka men in 1964 shows that 95 or 37 per cent were non-agnates (1966a:357; 1972:104). I give some examples in Chapter Eight.
Figure 3.2: A typical Hagen segmentary structure: that of the Kawelka

Source: Based on A.J. Strathern (1972:35); Ketan (1996:246); and information supplied by Ben Konts, Kawelka Membo Oyambo sub-clan.
The *manga rapa*, which roughly approximates to ‘sub-clan’, is generally the most important and frequently operative social unit in Hagen society. While levels such as section, clan, sub-clan, sub-sub-clan and so forth come within the overarching umbrella of the tribe, this in no way suggests that each level is functionally or otherwise subordinate to the next most inclusive level. In other words, the tribe must not be viewed as a corporate management structure, where each franchise or division can be directed to meet certain demands, nor can it be compared with that of an interest group. Why not? Because there is no overarching authority; it is not a power structure. It is basically a ‘functional’ structure, which simply means that different functions are performed at the various levels, depending on the size of the *rekhep*. Cooperation in major arenas of competition such as warfare, ceremonial exchange and elections is mainly on a voluntary basis, although this is clearly complicated by factors such as loyalty, group pride (that is, ‘the name must not go down’) and, above all, self-interest.

It is also necessary to distinguish the *rekhep* structure from the African-derived notion of ‘segmentary lineage system’. As noted by Merlan and Rumsey:

> This African-derived notion of ‘segmentary lineage system’ involves concepts of ‘descent’ and ‘apical ancestor’ which are analytically distinct from the notion of ‘segmentary’ per se, either in our general sense or in the sense we distinguished as *segmentary*. It is important to keep these features separate if we want to develop useful ways of comparing, not only the range of societies found in Africa but societies as different as those of Africa and Highland Papua New Guinea (1991:36).

Furthermore, they argued that “notions of descent and apical ancestor are of little or no relevance in the Nebilyer area” (Merlan and Rumsey 1991:36). Likewise, in Hagen the notions of descent and apical ancestor are of limited consequence, even though the principle of descent can occasionally be used by prominent individuals to justify their efforts in mobilising resources and groups for sponsoring large-scale events such as warfare and elections.

**Differences in size and function of Hagen tribes**

The tribe is probably the most important political and military unit in Hagen society. It is an alliance of clans which may or may not claim common descent, and membership is ideally by agnatic descent (through the father’s line). Its members may live in territory-holding clans and

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9. Following Durkheim (1964), Merlan and Rumsey (1991:35) considered “the concept ‘segmental’ or ‘segmentary’ to be far more general and widely applicable than ‘segmentary lineage’ which portrays an image of a ‘hierarchically ramified tree-like organism’”. In the more general sense the term ‘segmentary’, as originally suggested by Durkheim (1964), is used when referring to “social differentiation by the multiplication of (or division into) like parts” (Merlan and Rumsey 1991:35). In the more restricted sense, which Merlan and Rumsey called *segmentary*, the term refers to internally ramified structures, where two or more segments at one level comprise a single segment at a higher level, etc. However, they did quite clearly state that their “usage of the term does not presuppose such ramification, although most of the social identities which we call segmentary do in fact exhibit it” (ibid).
access to land for coffee plots, food-crops, and homesteads are based on both usufructuary rights and through inheritance. Hageners speak of 'tribe' as something to be reckoned with in terms of warfare, ceremonial exchange, commercial enterprise and modern politics. In the event of war, tribesmen may have to defend their territory together or face decimation. Apart from this military function, a tribe may stage a moka or a singsing as a single unit. It can also sponsor candidates to contest elections as well as promoting business enterprise. While it is true that these functions are currently being performed at this level in smaller tribes, they have been transferred down to the section or clan level in bigger tribes. Jika as a tribe, for example, is so large and fragmented that in 1986 gun warfare broke out within its Maipngel section in which the Komb-Akelem clan-pair were subsequently routed by an alliance of Komapi, Opromb, Milakamb and Muklmana clans. As well, candidates have been sponsored by the respective clans against each other in 1987, 1992 and 1997 national elections. That Pais Wingti, who was then the incumbent MP for Hagen Open and Prime Minister of PNG, had opted for the Western Highlands Provincial seat rather than accepting Paul Pora's challenge in Hagen Open during the 1987 election was partly because of his fear of losing to Pora, but perhaps more importantly because he was unable to obtain assurances of support from within his Jika tribe.

In Hagen, the biggest tribes, in order of numerical strength on the basis of 1997 population estimates, are: the Jika and Mokei of the Hagen Central area, with nearly 20,000 and 15,000 persons, respectively; the Kumdi of the Mul Council area, with a population of about 10,700; the Minembi of the Dei Council area, numbering around 7,000; and the Kuli of the Anglimp-South Wahgi area, with over 5,000 persons. The Dei Council area is characterised by relatively smaller but more numerous tribes than the Hagen Central area which has thirteen tribes, including the three large ones, Jika, Mokei and Yamka.

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10. Jika has three major sections: Andapunts, Mukaka and Maipngel (which is easily the largest) with an estimated 1997 population of more than 10,000 persons. Maipngel has two minor sections: Andakelkam, which is made up of the Komb-Akelem clan-pair and the Tokpa-based Roklamb; and Rukumb, which is made up of five clans (Parklemb, Opromb, Komapi, Muklmana and Milakamb). Although the war was mainly fought along this minor sectional line, the two Tokpa-based clans, Roklamb and Parklemb did not participate because "they physically live in between the Mukaka clans at Togoba [Tokpa] — and speak their language — while the other Maipngel clans are located in the Ogelbeng-Hagen Tech area in the centre of the [Hagen Open] electorate, some ten kilometres away. At any rate, the Roklamb-Parklemb are now more interested in the political scene around Togoba [Tokpa], with its national dimensions, than in the more distant and parochial struggle going on near Hagen" (Burton 1989a:263-64). In spite of this conflict, Maipngel is unusual in the sense that it has remained as an exogamous unit at the sectional level while others are usually exogamous at the clan level. Only once was this rule broken: in the early 1980s when a woman from the Komb clan married a Milakamb leader, the late Brass Wak, a candidate for the Hagen Open seat in 1987 and son of the pre-eminent Jika big-man, Wak. See Burton (1989a) for segmentary structures of Hagen Central tribes and the issues and circumstances surrounding Brass Wak's death.

11. There is a discrepancy between the figures given here and those given in a recent paper by Burton and Keher (1997). According to their population estimates, the "Jika, who number some 12,000", may be broken down into three exogamous sections", and the other two large tribes, "the Mokei, with about 11,000 people, and the Yamka, with about 3,500, are demographically important in Hagen politics"
Some of these large tribes have been successful in warfare and occupy huge continuous territories across minor linguistic boundaries. For example, some clans within the largest Hagen tribe, Jika, speak Melpa while others, including Paia Wingti’s Mukaka clan, are Temboka speakers. As indicated in Table 3.1, the smallest tribes, which have been decimated in warfare, are closely associated with, or almost incorporated into, larger ones from which they sought and were given refuge.

Table 3.1: Groups associated with, or incorporated into, larger ones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jika</th>
<th>Mokei</th>
<th>Kumdi</th>
<th>Remdi</th>
<th>Kentpi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kungunka</td>
<td>Epilkae</td>
<td>Kungunka</td>
<td>Klalka</td>
<td>Kumungaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palka</td>
<td>Elti</td>
<td>Kenapka</td>
<td>Milaka</td>
<td>Gulk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milaka</td>
<td>Jika Komb-Akelemb</td>
<td>Punti</td>
<td>Kiklpuaka</td>
<td>Punti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teiya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ndilika</td>
<td>Prandi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jika in the past gave refuge to many groups, including Elti-Penambi and Kungunka-Palka, but only sections of Milaka and Teiya were fully incorporated into its Milakamb clan. Some Kungunka-Palka clans are almost incorporated into Milakamb as well (cf. A.J. Strathern 1971:230; Appendix 1.2; and Burton 1989a).

More recent instances of ‘incorporation’ are: (a) the Jika Komb-Akelemb pair into Mokei Andakelkam section; (b) a large group of Poiyaka-Aiyaka tribesmen into Kawelka at Kuk; (c) Tipaka tribesmen into Tepuka in Dei; and (d) some Enga and Simbu migrants into Remdi at Muglamp. However, only the Komb-Akelemb ‘incorporation’ into Mokei was a direct consequence of warfare, while the others have been largely motivated by economic and

(1997:156). It is however not clear from their discussion whether these figures were taken from the 1990 population census, or from more recent estimates. In any case, their figures appear much too conservative, suggesting underestimation on their part. My estimates of 20,000 Jika, 15,000 Mokei and 5-6,000 Yamka in 1997 would be more accurate, considering that there was widespread underenumeration in Western Highlands during the 1990 census, in addition to the fact that many members of these tribes work and live outside the province.

According to an account given to me by an older Milakamb informant, Makinda of Bomri village, the Milaka and Teiya are linked to Milakamb through an historical alliance. The Milakamb are in fact said to have been originally part of the Nebilyer-based Milaka. Some members of the Teiya, also a Nebilyer group, came with the Milaka to settle in Milakamb territories near the Hagen township. Descendants of Teiya migrants who have gone on to establish leadership status among the Jika Milakamb are Glen Komonga (businessman and national president of the People’s Progress Party) and Kuimbakul Piandi (Deputy Commissioner of Correctional Institutional Services). Other prominent Milakamb leaders (though not of Teiya origin) are Malcolm Culligan (former Secretary for Western Highlands), Bob Nenta (former Commissioner of Police), Ogla Makindi (former President of Gutnius Lutheran Church, Enga, and current District Coordinator, Baiyer River area), to name but a few of many outstanding Milakamb leaders.
demographic factors (see Chapter Five). The term incorporation, if strictly applied, suggests that some sort of merging has taken place. In this case, all four cases given here may be more accurately described as being closely associated rather than incorporated because none of them seem to have relinquished their original structural identities. Of course, this may happen over time, perhaps in future generations, but individuals at the present time have assumed refugee status and will live and die as Komb-Aklem, Poiyaka-Aiyaka, Tipaka, or Engan or Simbu. Upon death, it is likely that in most cases, their bodies will be returned to their agnatic groups, and should they die fighting alongside their hosts, reparation payments will be made by the host group to relatives of the deceased.

Some smaller tribes, although dispersed through warfare, have remained autonomous, while others have regrouped in recent times. Although the remnants of some groups, such as the Elti-Penamb pair of tribes and the Kawelka, have regrouped and consolidated their numbers since colonially-imposed pacification in the 1940s, many others, including Kopi, Punti, and Kungunka-Palka remain split groups. Smaller groups such as Klalka, Kiklpukla and Ndilika have almost lost their autonomy as tribal units. Table 3.2 shows the smaller groups which have been dispersed through warfare and as a consequence have dual residency, usually beside larger and more powerful groups from which they sought refuge; in cases where bigger groups have dual residency is usually a result of conquest (for example, the Jika are said to have acquired most of their land around the Ogelbeng plains and those in the upper Wahgi valley through military conquest).13

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13 Jika appears to have been far more successful than other groups in warfare. Some of their present territories which were acquired through conquest are: Ainya, Kela, Kimininga, Kala, Kukramp, Kuamp, and Kenta. The Kimka (also known as Ainya Kimka) originally lived at Ainya, west of Ogelbeng, currently occupied by the Jika Komapi. The original residents of Kala were the Anglmp-South Wahgi group, Menipsi (sometimes called Kala Menipsi), together with their historical pair partner, the Kemi (also known as Kala Kemi who are now paired with Kukilka).
### Table 3.2: Dual Residency: Groups with more than one territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Group</th>
<th>Territories</th>
<th>District/Census Division</th>
<th>Geographical Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elti-Penambi</td>
<td>Baisu, Kenta, Kelu, Kumunga, Kuta, Kihoga</td>
<td>Hagen, Hagen, Hagen, Nebilyer</td>
<td>Upper Wahgi Valley, Nebilyer Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kuklinga Plains, Kudor Range, Nebilyer Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kukilka</td>
<td>Motemp, Bakl, Kuklinga, Tepkla, Tenya</td>
<td>Hagen, Hagen, Nebilyer</td>
<td>Gumants Valley, Upper Wahgi, Ogelbeng Plains, Tokpa Plains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopi</td>
<td>Tiki, Welya, Kum, Kaijge</td>
<td>Hagen, Nebilyer</td>
<td>Buiyer Valley, Upper Wahgi, Nebilyer Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nokpa</td>
<td>Wurup, Kaijge</td>
<td>Anglimp, Nebilyer</td>
<td>South Wahgi, Nebilyer Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>Ambukla, Nunga, Kulkaramp, Basu, Raemp</td>
<td>Dei, Dei, Hagen</td>
<td>Muka Valley, Jimi Valley, Upper Wahgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavelka</td>
<td>Mbukl, Kuik-Mbukl, Kuningramp</td>
<td>Dei, Hagen, Buiyer</td>
<td>Sepik-Wahgi Divide, Upper Wahgi, Buiyer Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welyi</td>
<td>Kotra, Kenterka, Kenamb-Keiya, Kul</td>
<td>Dei, Buiyer</td>
<td>Muka Valley, Jimi Valley, Buiyer Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klarnakae</td>
<td>Angkuel, Rulna, Kindeng-Muneng</td>
<td>Dei, Dei, Anglimp</td>
<td>Buiyer Valley, Jimi Valley, South Wahgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiklpukla</td>
<td>Kul, Muglamp</td>
<td>Buiyer, Dei</td>
<td>Buiyer Valley, Gumanch Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roklaka</td>
<td>Gumanch, Penda</td>
<td>Dei, Dei</td>
<td>Gumanch Valley, North Wahgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mokei</td>
<td>Keltiga, Riparnul, Basu, Raemp, Rouna</td>
<td>Hagen, Hagen, Buiyer</td>
<td>Kigornet Plains, Upper Wahgi, Gumanch Valley, Buiyer Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jika</td>
<td>Ketiga, Ogelbeng, Kenta</td>
<td>Hagen, Hagen</td>
<td>Tokpa Plains, Ogelbeng Plains, Upper Wahgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jika Komb-Akelemb</td>
<td>Pulkimb, Run-Rapung</td>
<td>Hagen, Dei</td>
<td>Ogelbeng Plains, North Wahgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poiyaka-Aiyaka</td>
<td>Tokpa, Basu</td>
<td>Nebilyer, Hagen</td>
<td>Nebilyer Valley, Upper Wahgi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punn</td>
<td>Mala, Tiki, Mapkla</td>
<td>Dei, Dei, Mul</td>
<td>North Wahgi, Buiyer Valley, Buiyer Valley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** During a recent war against the Jika Maipngel section in the 1980s, the Kukilka were brutally evicted from their Kuklinga and Tepkla territories and have since joined their fellow tribesmen at Bakl and Motemp. This happened soon after the Jika Komb-Akelemb pair were routed from their Pulkimb territory. Some Komb clansmen have moved to their Run-Rapung settlements in Dei — where they are closely associated with the Nelka tribe — while most have taken up residence with the Mokei Andakelkam section.
Originally dispersed through warfare, most of the groups indicated in Table 3.2 had sought and were accepted as refugees, while a few are closely associated through special alliances. Elti and its pair-partner Penambi were initially given refuge by Jika, after routed by sections of the Mokei, but later joined a friendly Mokei section and some Elti relatives were incorporated into the Mokei Nambka clan. After a major war in the early 1920s, the Elti-Penambi pair were driven from the Nebilyer Valley up to the Ogelbeng Plain by a powerful coalition of Mokei, (‘Kum’) Kopi and some other neighbouring groups (see A.J. Strathern 1971:66-67; Connolly and Anderson 1987:109). According to accounts given by some Mokei informants, the former Western Highlands MP Raphael Doa’s clan was directly descended from Elti refugees. Doa of course went on to become not only an important leader of the Mokei Nambka clan but the entire Mokei tribe and virtually the whole of Hagen, which reinforces the point that non-agnates and their descendants can rise to leadership status.

The Clan

Opinion on the usage and definition (functional or however defined) of the clan is divided but most anthropologists agree that the clan is strictly the largest exogamous unit in any given structural hierarchy (Lowman-Vayda 1971:322; Brown 1971:212; Meggitt 1971:196; A.J. Strathern 1972:18; Rubel and Rosman 1978:187; Burton 1988:1.5). Exogamy is the rule which requires that individuals must seek a marriage partner outside the group. It is a clearly named and historically autonomous group, which means that members cannot marry from within the clan because of a common acknowledgment of close blood relationship (Burton 1987). While this narrow definition fits some Highlands societies, it may not be a useful one for others. It is therefore necessary to consider much broader approaches. Citing Vicedom and Tischer (1943-82:9-10) and A.J. Strathern (1971:33), Rubel and Rosman noted that for the Hagen:

A clan is usually occupies a single territory and fights as a unit to defend that territory. Ideally, there should be no lethal fighting within the clan. The clan is the exogamous unit. Men of a clan organise moka exchanges as a group. There is a clan cemetery that is the location for sacrifices made to clan ancestral spirits. Clansman are obliged to take blood revenge and must contribute to compensation paid to allies for men lost in warfare on their behalf. The clan operates as a unit at cult performances, and dances as a unit at festivals. Clans stand towards one another as major or perpetual enemies or as minor enemies who can become allies. The clan will also have a major ceremonial ground. In terms of descent dogma, the clan is spoken of as tepam tenta (founded by a single father) and this dogma is referred to as the basis for rules of exogamy, and cooperation in warfare and ceremonial exchange (1978:187).14

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14 For further discussion on these matters, see A.J. Strathern (1966a:357; 1972:18); and A.M. Strathern (1972a:11-12); see also Brown (1972:35-37); O’Hanlon (1989:26-27); Merlan and Rumsey (1991:Chap.3); and Muke (1994:Chap.6) for comparable discussion on Chimbu, North Wahgi, Nebilyer and South Wahgi groups, respectively.
While the clan still performs some of these functions, it no longer makes sacrifices to clan ancestors at cemeteries. Instead, it may now have a church adjacent to the ceremonial ground to worship the Christian God. In addition to its military function, the clan also operates as a single unit in elections and business enterprise.

Major characteristics of the clan, according to Vivelo (1978) are: (1) based on unilineal descent ('one-line' descent; tracing of descent through one parent and that parent's same-sexed progenitors, i.e., all males or all females); (2) from this can be formed local or residence groups (of people living together); (3) may be a corporate group, i.e., they may control some valued commodity (such as land); (4) may be exogamous (cannot marry from within the group); (5) often have group taboos (a proscription, a 'don't', which, usually, carries with it supernatural sanctions); and 6) contain members of both sexes originally but, following the rule of exogamy, one sex must leave the group upon marriage (Vivelo 1978:162-3; see also Keesing 1975:31).

Using these general characteristics as a check-list, an examination of Hagen social structure shows that none of these fit perfectly but, with some modifications, the first four points and the last one may be applicable. In this way, one may conclude that in Hagen the clan is a land-holding local group of which the core members are related by 'patrilineal descent', tracing bloodlines to a common male ancestor, which means that one cannot marry from within the group. Descent, however, is not the only criterion of membership because marriage into the group also provides members, while marriage out of the group results in loss of active membership (see Vivelo 1978:163).

A major problem with this definition is its disregard for exceptions to rules governing this type of organisation. Hageners, for instance, describe the clan (and levels below the sub-clan) as of tepam tenia, mema tenia ('one father; one blood') but that does not mean patrilineal descent is the sole charter for recruitment, nor can all its members claim common descent. Females born into the clan, upon marriage gain membership to a husband's group, but never entirely relinquish that of their own, and are addressed by using the name of their descent group as a prefix to their personal names. Clansmen rely on their married sisters for assistance in staging large events, such as ceremonial exchange, and often encourage them to shift residence, together with their husbands and children, back to their place of birth. A sister's sons, in particular, are usually encouraged to return to his maternal kin and sponsored by their uncles to do so. This and other factors show how flexible Highlands groups are when it comes to defining their social structures.

This flexibility and continuous evolution can be seen all around. Some groups are clearly named and historically autonomous. The Tungei of South Wahgi are a good example (Burton 1988). But others have developed into large exogamous tribal sections, such as Jika Maipngel. A tribal
section in the making is the Kawelka example shown earlier in Figure 3.2. The three Kawelka clans — Kundmbo, Mandembo and Membo — can be more accurately described as tribal sections rather than clans because the Kawelka themselves do not have a name for this level today. Currently the most commonly used names are Membo Keiyambo, Membo Oyambo, Krupmbo, Klambo and Kundmbo. This clearly indicates that Krupmbo and Klambo, previously sub-clans, have now almost assumed clan status while Keiyambo and Oyambo, former sub-sub-clans, have evolved into sub-clans and possibly clans. This leaves Kundmbo which remains as a clan.

The change in structures thus correlates with population growth. The Kawelka, which had a population of about 860 persons in 1964 (A.J. Strathem 1972), has experienced considerable population growth over the last 33 years. It had a 1990 population of some 4,100 persons, including some Tepuka, Poiyaka and Aiyaka migrants at Kuk (see Table 3.3; see also Table 3.4). The other reason for structural changes lies with exchange relations, a factor which is related to population growth. Sub-groups are created and separately named by leaders in order to receive larger shares during distribution of wealth items from compensation payments, ceremonial exchange, bridewealth, and pork from festivities. Similarly, rival leaders may also influence subdivisions to be divided into further sub-sub-divisions by deliberately presenting them with separate initiatory gifts in order to receive large amounts of wealth items in moka. The former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, a pre-eminent big-man and exceptionally skilful moka strategists, devised and utilised such a strategy among his mother's people, the Kawelka. Kawelka leaders often express fears of unnecessary fragmentation brought about in this manner. Such fears are reflected in a statement made by the Kawelka Membo big-man, Kont, who says that “We are all one small group here but Parua has divided us into tiny little groups because he wanted to eat from as many of us as possible” (personal communication, January 1995).

I have thus far discussed the major levels of traditional social organisation in Hagen, noting that within the tribe are important subdivisions, such as clans and sub-clans, which all exhibit considerable variation in size and function. How these groups work together in contemporary Hagen politics is the focus of the next section. Different types of alliances, both old and new — which we may call ‘traditional’ and ‘neo-traditional’ — are analysed in the context of the major arenas of competition and cooperation (particularly warfare, business and elections) within a particular field of political competition (Dei Council/Open electorate).

Coalitions and Factions

Above the tribal level is a loosely organised level which I have previously described as ‘phratry’, meaning an alliance of tribes which do not necessarily claim common descent but may have corporate property and functions (Ketan 1996:248). I am aware of the discrepancies between
Hagen Groupings: Tribes, Clans, Factions, Alliances and Coalitions

this and other more 'orthodox' definitions (see, for example, Brown 1972:35; Keesing 1975:150), which emphasise common origin-myths as a basic criteria for distinguishing 'phratry' from other level of groups, including tribes. Thus, a more accurate term for these Hagen groupings would be 'coalition-style alliances' to describe coalitions, based on military alliances, formed in the early 1970s to achieve specific goals. Undoubtedly there are many ways of defining coalitions, but the one which best sums up the Hagen situation was given by Jeremy Boissevain:

The coalitions which people form in their drive to attain their goals are temporary alliances. Although their internal structure and organisation vary enormously, all coalitions are built by individuals who are dependent, in different ways, on each other. Because the very existence of a coalition depends not only upon the specific and varied goals and resources of individuals who compose it, but also on the relations between them, they are unstable. In time, goals alter, resources shift and relations between people change. Moreover, the ad hoc nature of coalitions makes them ideally suited instruments to exploit new resources in changing situations. Coalitions may thus reflect changing circumstances, they may bring about change, and, by their very nature, are constantly subject to change. They may disappear as certain goals are achieved, or they may evolve into social forms of a different structural order, such as more permanent associations, often transforming their social and cultural environment in the process (Boissevain 1974:170).

Generalisations are usually way off the mark, but this one is spot on. As evident in the business development associations of the 1970s (discussed in Chapter Four), the coalition-style alliances of Dei are explicitly goal-oriented, highly personalised in key areas of operation, and their stability has been threatened by disruptive power struggles between leaders of different factions within them. Although some of their goals have been achieved, relations between the various factions (headed by prominent individuals) have not been warm. Rifts do occur, predictably along structural lines, yet the coalitions — somewhat strengthened by recent bouts of warfare in the eighties — seem far from disappearing. Rather, they have hardened into semi-permanent associations. And while they have been a driving force in transforming their social, cultural and natural landscape, their internal structures seem to have changed largely because of shifts in corporate goals, personal interests, and common perceptions of economic disparity between the leaders and their people.

As illustrated in Figure 3.3, there are three major coalition-style alliances operating in Dei. Significantly, they all have major business investments (see Chapter Four). These are: (1) the Pipilka, an alliance of mainly Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka tribes, which has an estimated population of around 5,000 and controls the giant Gumanch Plantation and Mount Hagen Park Motel, among other businesses; (2) the Welyi-Kuta, an alliance of mainly Welyi and the Kombukla-Minembi pair of tribes, which has an estimated population of around 14,000 and

For a more detailed discussion of coalitions, in committing resources and how this affects power relations, see Boissevain (1974:Chap.7); and A.J. Strathern (1984) on coalitions in the Dei Council area.
business interests in coffee plantations; and (3) the Raembka, an alliance of mainly Tepuka, Kawelka, Nelka and several other small tribes, with an estimated population of 18,000 and has business interests in coffee plantations and plantation management agencies.

The population data, by core groups, is given below (see Table 3.3), though the 1990 Census figures should be treated with some caution as it is evident that there was widespread underenumeration in Western Highlands Province. Some of these groups, for example, appear to have grown by over 100 per cent in 11 years, which clearly needs explanation. Two Raembka groups, the Kawelka and Kentpi tribes, appear to have experienced extraordinary population growth of 156 and 153 per cent, respectively, while a third, the Welyi of the Welyi-Kuta alliance, appear to have doubled its population size in eleven years. There is likely over-enumeration involved here. Firstly, it is possible that Kawelka may have been enumerated twice, both at Mbukl and Kuk, in addition to a large population of migrants at Kuk, numbering 500 or more persons, which were counted at the Kuk census point. Secondly, the large increase in the Kentpi population may have been caused by the inclusion in the 1990 census of several small tribes (including Prandike, Gulke, Punti, and perhaps Mungapke) who may have been counted separately in 1979. It is also likely that migrants at Kinjibi and Nunga plantations were included in Kentpi. Thirdly, the 110 per cent increase in Welyi population is believed to have been caused by large migrant populations at Penga, Mangolg and Kotna plantations.
Table 3.3: Coalition-style alliances: Core groups by population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>1979a</th>
<th>1990b</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
<th>Adjusted 1997c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAEMBKA</td>
<td>8,111</td>
<td>14,502</td>
<td>78% increase</td>
<td>18,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>2,575</td>
<td>3,351</td>
<td>30% increase</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawelka</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>4,168 d</td>
<td>156% increase</td>
<td>4,500 d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumungaka</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>374 e</td>
<td>28% decrease</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentpi</td>
<td>2,040 f</td>
<td>5,158 f</td>
<td>153% increase</td>
<td>5,000 f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelka</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>45% increase</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klamakae</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>335 e</td>
<td>42% decrease</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIPILKA</td>
<td>2,369</td>
<td>1,523 e</td>
<td>36% decrease</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remdi</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>587 e</td>
<td>41% decrease</td>
<td>2,000 g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimka</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>56% increase</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roklaka</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WELEYI-KUTA</td>
<td>7,334</td>
<td>10,657</td>
<td>45% increase</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kombukla</td>
<td>2,262</td>
<td>2,939</td>
<td>30% increase</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mnembi</td>
<td>3,596</td>
<td>4,609</td>
<td>28% increase</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welyi</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>3,109</td>
<td>110% increase</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources and notes:

- a. Provincial Data System, National Statistical Office (1982);
- b. 1990 National Population Census (NSO 1993; 1994);
- c. Estimates by author;
- d. Including some Tepuka, Poiyaka-Aiyaka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at Kuk;
- e. Likely underenumeration in 1990 Census;
- f. Including Prandike, Gulke, Punti, and possibly Mungapke;
- g. Including Kiklpukla and Ndilika.
The el paraka or major warfare disjunction, as indicated in Figure 3.3, is the major line of fissure, which means that the different tribes and clans, except for a particular case (that of the Minembi Kimbo clan), have little choice as to which alliance they can join. Individuals and factions, however, enjoy considerable freedom in shifting allegiances from one candidate to another in
elections, yet such freedom of selection cannot be exercised in warfare. Military alliances tend to be more stable than election alliances, though the latter is clearly based on the former. An important rule in warfare is that reparation payments may be made to minor enemies, thereby converting relations of enmity into exchange of wealth items (and eventually into alliance), but one does not and cannot compensate major enemies for war deaths. Thus minor enemies in one conflict can be allied against a common major enemy, whilst major enemies maintained relations of enmity (see Chapter Five; see also A.J. Strathern 1971:Chap.4; 1972:Chap.4). Whereas in elections, some individuals are known to have supported candidates sponsored by major enemies, in warfare, the rules are virtually set: that is, once your group considers itself as a major enemy of another (or vice versa), there is not much you can do about it. Yet, there are some inspiring stories about cross-cutting kinship ties and individual courage in initiating peace settlements between warring groups (one such narrative which appears in Chapter Five is that of two PNG Defence Force soldiers’ role in negotiating peace between the Remdi and Minembi in 1989).

Alliances in action

The major coalition-style alliances of Dei, as noted earlier, were formed by prominent individuals in the early 1970s to achieve specific goals. Their composition is schematised in Figures 3.4-6. They were initially set up as business development associations, whose membership was founded on what A.J. Strathern described as “neo-traditional coalition-style ties between existing large groups” (1984:87). The ties are mainly of a military nature and their somewhat vague historical roots suggest that they may well be fairly recent formations. What is not vague is their role in contemporary politics, in addition to business and warfare.

The Tepuka-Kawelka pair form the core of the Raembka alliance, which is in competition with Welyi-Kuta in mainly warfare, business and elections. The Tepuka-Kawelka pair have fought against the Kombukla-Minembi pair in major warfare since pre-colonial times (see Chapter Five). Parua Kuri, the first Dei MP since the creation of the Dei electorate in 1972, came from within the Tepuka-Kawelka pair. Kuri held the seat for three consecutive five year terms, from 1972 to 1987. Melchior Pep, the man who replaced Kuri during the 1987 elections, is from the Kombukla-Minembi pair, which forms the core of the Welyi-Kuta alliance. Pep held the seat between 1987 and 1992, but chose to resign after charges of misconduct were laid against him under the PNG Leadership Code. By resigning, he ceased to be a ‘leader’ under the Code. He was thus able to stand in 1992, because he had not actually been found guilty of breaking the Code. But on his re-election, the charges were revived and he was found guilty, thereby precipitating a by-election. In 1993 Kuri’s son, Reuben Parua, succeeded Pep.
The situation since 1993, however, has changed. Although Reuben Parua won the 1993 Dei Open By-Election as a Raembka candidate, in 1997 he was forced to seek re-election as a Tepuka candidate, because the Kawelka had sponsored their own candidate (William Pik). Furthermore, the agreement he had with former Kentpi candidate, Philip Bobby, now no longer stood, as the Kentpi, too, sponsored their own candidate (Paul Koi) in 1997. Similarly, Melchior Pep, who consolidated his position as a Welyi-Kuta strongman during his term as a minister in the national government, was forced to contest the 1997 election as a Kombukla candidate because the Nambka clan of the Minembi had their own candidate (Maj. Pun Kaip). An update of the political situation in Dei Open electorate in the 1997 election is given in Chapter Seven.

Unlike the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, none of the core members of the Pipilka alliance are ‘traditional’ enemies of those in the Welyi-Kuta alliance. The major warfare disjunction indicated in Figure 3.3 is therefore a ‘modern’ one, taken from the context of more recent cases of warfare between the three principal partners of the Pipilka alliance and the Kombukla-Minembi pair (see Case 1 in Chapter Five). The Remdi Jikambo clan and the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair form the core of Pipilka, which combines with a faction of Raembka against the Welyi-Kuta alliance in warfare, but competes against both Raembka and Welyi-Kuta in business and elections.

The Pipilka alliance, created in c.1973, appears to have been far more successful than the other two in business but has virtually failed to replicate such success in elections. Their principal candidate, Koi Ranpi, has unsuccessfully contested every election since 1977 (see Chapter Seven). Before Ranpi, and during pre-Pipilka times, a prominent Roklaka leader, Pim Koldpi, unsuccessfully contested the Mul-Dei Open during the 1968 elections and the Dei Open in 1972. In 1968 Koldpi scored only 456 votes — compared with eventual winner, Mek Nugintz (3,029) and the runner-up, Parua Kuri (2,315) — and was therefore eliminated after the first count, under the preferential voting system (see H.K and P. Colebatch, M. Reay and A.J. Strathern 1971:274; Table 15). In 1972 Dei was separated from Mul, thereby creating two new electorates.¹⁶ Pim Koldpi was among seven candidates who contested the Dei Open seat. He came third, with 1,422 first preference votes, compared with the winner, Parua Kuri (2,131) and

¹⁶ A brief history of the Dei Open is given in A.J. Strathern (1976). In 1964, as A.J. Strathern notes, the people of Dei Council "had voted within the Minj Electorate and had helped Kaibelt Diria to win his first electoral contest" (1976:265). For the next election in 1968 Dei was paired with the neighbouring Mul Council to form an electorate separate from both the Hagen and Wahgi areas (ibid; see also H.K and P. Colebatch, et al 1971). A.J. Strathern writes that “owing to a series of confrontations between groups and individual leaders in Mul and Dei, in which the two main rivals for the position of House of Assembly Member in 1968 [Mek Nugintz and Parua Kuri] were closely involved, the Dei Council President [Parua Kuri] asked that Dei and Mul be made separate electorates for 1972; and, because of the evident bad relations between the two councils, this request was granted by the visiting Electoral Boundaries Distribution Committee” (1976:265; for Mul-Dei relations, see also A.J. Strathern 1984-24-25; 1992:236-237; Ketan 1996:259).
the runner-up, Gapa Wai of the Minembi tribe, who polled 1,819 votes (see A.J. Strathem 1976:283; Table 2).

Mek Nugintz's election victory in 1968, with a score of 5,675 votes, over Parua Kuri, who polled 3,108 votes, after the fifth and final count (ibid), cannot be described as an election success story for the Pipilka alliance because (1) Mek is a member of the Mul Council-based 'Upper Remdi' section of the tribe which is not part of the Pipilka alliance; and (2) his victory came before the formation of the Pipilka coalition, which was a genuinely new aggregation of groups.

But how do we explain Puri Ruing's victory in Dei Open during the recent national elections in June 1997? Ruing's success, despite a strong challenge from within Pipilka via the candidacy of a Remdi candidate, Willie Wundaki, came about as a result of unique circumstances and personal ability. As will be argued, there are several important factors which contributed to Ruing's win, but none of which point towards Pipilka as a base-vote. The rift within Pipilka and other underlying factors (including power struggles between faction leaders) are discussed in Chapter Four, while the reasons why Puri Ruing's personal triumph was not a Pipilka-wide corporate victory are argued in Chapter Seven.

The Pipilka alliance, in particular, came about as a result of the plantation acquisition scheme. The historical relationship between its two main factions is not quite clear, as indicated by the difficulties encountered by informants when trying to make historical connections between them. One faction is made up of Dei Council-based groups, such as the Remdi Jikambo clan and the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, while the other is composed of the Nebilyer, Hagen and Anglimp residents, the Kopi-Nokpa tribe-pair. Apart from cooperation between the two factions in business activities, they act separately in other spheres of competition such as warfare and elections because their members are divided by electoral and local government council boundaries and, in some ways, they can be described units divided by electoral geography. The Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka faction operates within the Dei Open Electorate, while the Kopi-Nokpa pair of tribes are split across both the electoral and council border between Hagen and Anglimp.

Thus, the apparent lack of cooperation in warfare and elections can be attributed to diverging fields of political competition within which these groups and their leaders interact. The Nokpa group and its leaders, notably Michael Mel and his elder brother Peter Wama, operate mainly within Anglimp-South Wahgi, but its pair partner, Kopi, belongs to the Hagen Open electorate. The Kopi are in a very similar position to the Remdi who are split across the Dei-Mul electoral

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17 As pointed out to me by his adviser, Richard Mel — an accountant who himself was unsuccessful in 1997 in attempting to oust fellow Kumdi tribesman Robert Nagle in Mul-Baiyer Open — all of Puri's rivals in general, and William Pik and Pun Kaip in particular, played important roles in Puri Ruing's win (personal communication, October 1997).
border. One half of Kopi, also known as ‘Kum Kopi’ live and operate in central Hagen and are paired with Nokpa, while the other half, also known as ‘Kopon Kopi’ reside in Dei and are currently in close association with the Kawelka Kundmbo and Minembi Kimbo clans, with whom they share some territories around Tiki in the Baiyer valley. Special alliances such as pairing and close associations are described in the next section (see discussion on *The Dei Council Field of Political Competition*), but I should mention here that electorate, local government council, or other similarly arbitrarily created administrative boundaries that ignore either ethnic, cultural or linguistic variations have caused considerable problems for some groups and their leaders.

Although Michael Mel appeared not to have been impeded by such difficulties in 1987 when he won the Anglimp-South Wahgi Open seat, his unsuccessful bid for re-election in 1992 and subsequent switch to Hagen Open in 1997 indicate that a divided popular-base is indeed an impediment to success in elections. After losing the Anglimp-South Wahgi Open seat to William Ekip (a Port Moresby-based businessman and Tsekieng tribesman) in 1992, Michael Mel switched to Hagen Open in 1997, but was beaten to third place by the incumbent and Mel’s former National Party colleague, Paul Pora, who polled 10,038 votes (28.98%), compared with Mel (6,571) and the runner-up, King Kela (also known as Stanley Nui), who polled 8,143 votes (see Kaiulo 1997a:103).

Like Pipilka, the Ræmbka alliance’s vague historical roots suggest that this could well be a recent formation. In fact, most Ræmbka informants that I have spoken to had great difficulty tracing historical links, militarily or otherwise, between the various member groups. While some groups can be linked historically through military alliances, especially in the context of tribe-pairing and limited coalitions of three or four small tribes, there is no historical evidence of a confederacy-type alliance having been in existence during pre-colonial times. The Ræmbka alliance, like its rivals Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta, became popular only in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. As a matter of rhetoric, it is now fashionable in public oratory for Ræmbka leaders to give the impression that theirs is a united and powerful alliance. As pointed out to me by an emerging Ræmbka leader, Matrus (Dokta) Mel, in January 1995:

*The Ræmbka coalition, with a membership of some seventeen tribes, is easily the biggest group in the Dei Council area. It is named after a strong jungle vine called *raembka kan* which grows in the Jimi valley. Ræmbka leaders often claim that theirs is ‘an extended group’ — just like the *raembka* vine — stretching far and wide, drawing membership from Wariki Kuiyake, near Tiki in the Baiyer valley, to Old Temb Keri, near Kimi in the upper North Wahgi. Orators frequently refer to this ‘long vine of groups’, when appealing for group solidarity during national elections as well as at*

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18 The same can be said of warfare: diverging political fields of competition can be an impediment to both elections and warfare. The recent war efforts of the Pipilka and at least one faction of Ræmbka were hampered by geographical and political boundaries, an important point to which I shall return in *Chapter Five*. 
other large-scale events such as moke exchanges, compensation payments, and peace settlements] when elik (‘fight talk’) speeches are delivered [in which extravagant claims are deliberately made to belittle rival groups and their leaders].

He further explained that Raembka is metaphorically thought of as having either a head and a tail/bottom (using anthropomorphistic image), or as having a shoot/top and roots/base (in plant metaphor). The Raembka peng (head) or mun (shoot, top), according to Mel, is made up of six high-level named groups, while the Raembka por (tail, bottom) or pukel (roots, base) has eleven, altogether a total of seventeen groups (with a combined estimated 1997 population of some 30,000 persons). An important point to make here is that large coalitions are good for military and electoral support, yet they can be very bad for business, as they are far too difficult to keep together. It is, however, not unusual for politicians to embrace as many groups as possible.

Thus, the discrepancy between these figures given by Matrus Mel and those presented earlier in Table 3.3 can be explained in terms of personal interest of informants, changes over time, and perhaps varies with the informant’s degree of knowledge of local politics. It is important to recognise that leaders generally and politicians in particular tend to associate with as many groups as possible, mainly through contemporary personal networks, but such networks can also be built on historical relations between groups. Leaders are not only responsible for the creation and maintenance of such groups but also adding new members in attempting to extend their personal networks. One consequence of extensive networking, as argued later in this thesis, is the creation of confederacy-type alliances, often cutting across electoral boundaries (see Chapter Five and Chapter Nine). As well, what is physically evident is a recent increase in the number of groups aligned with Raembka, including groups which are structurally part of those in opposing alliances (e.g. Minembi Kimbo clan) and numerous others that were previously

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19. Matrus Mel, in fact, gave actual names of the groups which make up the ‘head’ and ‘tail’ of Raembka. Raembka peng (head), he says, is made up Tepuka, Kawella, Mapkli, Palke, Klamakae and Kimbo. The first five are tribes, while the last, Kimbo, is a clan, which is structurally part of the Minembi tribe, but closely associated with the Kawelka Kundmbo clan and the ‘Kopon’ Kopi tribe. The Raembka por (tail), he added, is made up of Kentpi, Nelka, Gulke, Dapi, Prandike, Ope, Krange, Kumungaka, Purke, Mungapka, and Oklomoni. All of these are tribes except Krange, which is commonly referred to as structurally part of Kentpi. While the core groups remain constant, there is slight variation in the number of groups which make up Raembka, depending on different informants. Groups such as Kimbo, Purke, Mungapka, Oklomoni, Mapkli, Palke, Ope, Gulke, and Punti have only recently been included in Raembka mainly for political reasons. Wakkupka, through their close association with the Roklaka ‘Nu-por-per’, are now considered as part of the Pipilka, although they were previously included in Raembka (personal communication, January 1995).

20. While discussing Raembka it was easy to tell, from the unmistakable glow in his eyes, that Matrus, a UPNG commerce-economics graduate, is proud of his tribal roots and apparently enjoys talking about local politics. Particularly impressive is his knowledge of the Raembka alliance, within which he has considerable influence. Matrus Mel is most probably the only village councillor in the province with a university degree, and there is no question about his loyalty towards his Kelmbo clan (which he represents in Dei Local Government Council), or about his strong tribal roots with the Tepuka, or about his role as a power-broker within Raembka and Dei politics. Nonetheless, and rather ironically, he has also been implicated in the processes that have destabilised group solidarity (as evident in Chapter Four on cooperative business ventures and in Chapter Seven on national elections).
non-aligned (e.g. Mungapka, Gulke, Punti). By increasing membership in the various levels of organisation, leaders like Matrus Mel thus become 'engineers' in the 'construction' and 'maintenance' of political blocs, a key point to which I shall return later in the concluding section of this chapter.

It is, in a way, fair to say that Raembka clearly lacks cohesion, has never fought together in warfare\(^{21}\), and is highly fragmented because of enduring and at times disruptive power struggles between leaders of factions and minor coalitions. Matrus Mel, for instance, leads a faction that is opposed to the one led by Parua Kuri and prominent Dei businessman, Goimba Kot. Their struggle for power in Dei, as it will be made clear in Chapter Four, has resulted in bankrupting at least two once-prosperous business groups and arguably losing at least three national elections which Raembka could otherwise may have won.

Problems of disruptive power struggles, however, are not restricted to Raembka, as both Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta have faced similar problems of their own. An overview of the connection between warfare, elections, and businesses is presented in the next section (see Dei Council Field of Political Competition), and the various spheres of political competition are being analysed more specifically (by way of case studies) in subsequent chapters (see Chapters 4-8), so it will suffice here to schematically present the various factions and the key players involved (see Figure 3.4-6). Bear in mind that the number of key players in each of the factions given, however, is not exhaustive, as there are many outstanding leaders who have not been mentioned here (see Appendix III for a more comprehensive list of Dei groups and their leaders). Note also that not all of the individuals mentioned as key players within the different coalitions, factions, and sub-factions can be described as 'big-men'. They are, in fact, different types of leaders, endowed with varied skills and knowledge. Some of them, for example, are successful businessmen but generally poor orators, others are politicians (including a few with despotic tendencies), and a few are gifted orators (but lack knowledge of modern business and politics).

Furthermore, the size of their highly personalised following within factions is in fact much smaller — at an average of perhaps only fifty or even fewer, core supporters — than the population figures given in the following diagrams. To use Boissevain’s (1974) model of

\(^{21}\) In pre-colonial warfare, some Raembka groups fought against each member of the Welyi-Kuta alliance, but not in a concerted effort on a single front, nor in a single battle. When informants speak of alliance warfare, one must take into account of the fact that in these matters regarding warfare, Hageners tend to exaggerate. The nearest thing to alliance warfare between the Raembka and Welyi-Kuta was said to have occurred sometime during the 1930s, when the Welyi group was almost decimated by the combined forces of the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and their, Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae allies (see Ketan 1996:264). Other members of the Raembka, however, were not involved and the Kombukla-Minembi pair were said to have assisted Welyi in a mainly non-fighting capacity.
personal networks, these core supporters form a leader’s ‘intimate’ and ‘effective’ zones, comprising friends and relatives in the former and the latter being made up of a circle of persons who are important to him in a more pragmatic sense for economic and political purposes. Some of these people, as Boissevain says, are strategic persons who may be useful to a leader because of their own networks, through which he can gain access to friends of his friends (1974:47-8). It is thus possible to depend on a small circle of relatives and friends to extend one’s networks, mainly by a systematic selection of wives from a number of strategic groups, careful cultivation of exchange ties and by keeping relations warm through the investment of material and emotional resources (see Chapter Six for a more detailed discussion of personal networking as a political strategy). In this way, the various factions within Raembka, Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta can be seen as personal networks. In Raembka, for example, men such Parua Kuri, Goimba Kot and Matrus Mel are at the centre of their personal networks through which they attempt to influence activities around them. Factions such as ‘Tepuka (I), ‘Tepuka II’, ‘Kawelka’ and ‘Kentpi-Nelka, etc.’ can therefore be viewed as personal networks of these men inasmuch as their realm of influence spreads unevenly throughout these groups. This interpretation is valid for both Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta.

Figure 3.4: Raembka factions and key players

RAEMBKA

TEPUKA (I)
Parua Kuri, Goimba Kot, Kuma Rukka and Reuben Parua are the key players in the Tepuka Anmbilika faction (1990 pop. 1,374).

TEPUKA (II)
Matrus Mel and the Waembe councilor, Nukunts, are the key players in the Tepuka Avelka faction (1990 pop. 933).

KAWELKA
William Pik, Yap Rokipa, Yap Goimba, and the young councilor, Nicholas Namba, are the key players in the Kavelka group (1990 pop. 4,168).

KENTPI, NELKA, ETC.
Tei Kumi, John Moka, John Koi, Philip Bobby and Paul Keng, among others, lead a loosely organised faction comprising more than a dozen tribes (including Nelka, Kentpi, Kumunguka, Punti, Dapi, Waklupla, Prandike), with a combined 1990 population of some 10-15,000 persons.

Note: All population figures are from the 1990 National Population Census (For a more detailed population data on Dei tribes and the reliability of National Statistical Office (NSO) data from the 1990 Census, see Appendix II, see also Table 3.4 and explanatory notes).
The Kopi are split across the Hagen-Dei electoral border. Those in Hagen, also known as Kum Kopi, are paired with Nokpa, while those in Dei are closely associated with a Raemba faction. There is a small faction, led by Andrew Konts, which is opposed to that led by Michael Mel.

The Nokpa are also split across an electoral border between Nebilyer and Anglimp. The Nokpa leaders, Michael Mel and his elder brother, Peter Warna, are the key players in the Kopi-Nokpa faction. Remdi is yet another group that is split across an electoral border, between Mul and Dei. But those in Mul are not part of the Pipilka; only those in Dei are. And the key players are Pukma Kopi and Henry Tiki, who are business rivals, Councillor Koi Ranpi and Willie Wundaki, both unsuccessful candidates in national elections.

The Roklaka are traditionally paired with the Kimka and are currently in a military alliance with Remdi and Kimka. Their key players are the current Dei MP, Puri Ruing, his mentor, Pirn Koldopi, and Councilor Dot Roltinga. The Kimka are in close association with Remdi (with whom they share territory) and their pair-partner, Roklaka. Their key players are Mount Hagen lawyer and businessman, Simon Nurum, and Councilor Kumi Krai.

Note: Population data for Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka tribes are given in Table 3.3 (see also Table 3.4), while figures for Kopi-Nokpa pair of tribes were not readily available to me at the time of writing. Owing to multiple residency — in Nebilyer, Hagen and Anglimp districts — it was difficult to determine the Census Division in which the Kopi-Nokpa pair were enumerated during the 1990 census. However, an estimated combined population of 2,500 persons for the Kopi-Nokpa in 1997 would not be unreasonable.
The registered business groups, which bear the same names, are discussed in the next chapter. But it should be noted here that the faction leaders mentioned above played dominant roles in the creation of these businesses, which they now control. Individuals such as Parua Kuri and Goimba Kot (in Raembka), Michael Mel (in Pipilka), Melchior Pep, Pati Wamp and Sapom Kipa (in Welyi-Kuta) launched their business and political careers by manipulating these networks. The next generation of leaders such as Matrus Mel (in Raembka), Simon Nurum and Henry Tiki (in Pipilka), and Pun Kaip and Wikai Membu (in Welyi-Kuta) are attempting to do the same, thereby resulting in rifts within the coalitions, a significant point to which I shall return in the next chapter, after first briefly discussing the military dimension of political allegiances in the Dei Council political field.
The Dei Council Field of Political Competition

The Dei Council field of competition covers the entire national parliament electorate of Dei Open, which had a population of some 41,842 resident citizens in 1990 (NSO 1993:5). In the Dei Council area, as in other parts of Hagen, there are clearly established alliance networks, through which military assistance is sought and given in warfare, and nowadays arrangements for support in elections and business development corporations are organised along these same broad lines. This political field and the constituent alliances are schematised in Figure 3.7. There are at least 28 tribes or reklap operating within the Dei Council field of political competition, constantly competing but sometimes cooperating with each other to form large blocs in arenas such as business, elections and warfare. Table 3.4 contains population data for 25 Dei tribes. The variation in size of groups is again emphasised here by the population data, a major contributing factor in the degree of cohesion within groups. As evident in the case studies on warfare and elections (Chap.5-8), large groups tend to split quite predictably along structural lines whilst smaller ones form into alliances in order to match bigger rivals.

Some of these groups have organised themselves into large coalition-style alliances such as those mentioned in the previous section (Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta). Within these loosely organised coalitions are the core groups, whose membership is based on traditional military alliances, and which are currently in close association. In this section, I discuss these predominantly military blocs and the way they organise themselves in relation to other similar groups, thus emphasising the political cleavages within them, and make some general remarks about their proclaimed allegiances — and opposition — towards each other and the larger coalitions to which they belong.

However, it should be noted that my discussion is a simplified version of what is otherwise a very complex situation. It is primarily based on informants' perceptions of contemporary relations between the various groups. It is possible that such perceptions may have been largely influenced by recent events rather than historical relations, although this means that what is given here is a fairly accurate assessment of contemporary Dei politics (see Chapter Five and Chapter Seven for some historical discussions). Furthermore, the field of military cooperation between the groups sketched below (see Figure 3.7) is taken from the context of recent conflicts (see Chapter Five) and therefore should not be viewed as a permanent arrangement, as the patterns of alliance and enmity are bound to shift in future as the goals and interests of the key players change.
Figure 3.7: The Dei Council field of political competition and alliances

- Traditional Pairing
- In current military alliance
- Likely to support a candidate sponsored by an ally in 1997
- May shift allegiance in 1997
- In close association with each other

Legend:
- El paraka (major warfare) disjunction
- Likely to support a candidate sponsored by an ally in 1997
### Table 3.4: Tribes of Dei: population data

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2262</td>
<td>2939</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1476</td>
<td>3109</td>
<td>3500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kentpi</td>
<td>1196</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td>5158</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Remdi</td>
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<td>988</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4168</td>
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<td>770</td>
<td>1116</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Not counted</td>
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<td>1000</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Epilkae</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Dakapkae</td>
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<td>Not counted</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Ndilika</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>with Remdi</td>
<td>with Remdi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16,464</td>
<td>18,328</td>
<td>28,662</td>
<td>40,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes and Sources:
2. Data from Western Highlands Provincial Data System (NSO 1982).
4. Including Prandike, Gulke, Dapi, Mungapka and Punti tribes.
5. Including the Mul-based ‘Upper Remdi’ section.
6. Including the small Kiklpuka and Ndilika groups.
7. Including some Tepuka, Poiyaka-Aiyaka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at Kuk.
8. Including 401 Roklaka ‘Nu Por pei’ who are sometimes paired with the Waldupka.

- * Suspected underenumeration during the 1990 Census. In the case of ‘Lower Remdi’, for example, it is unlikely that the population had significantly decreased from 988 persons in 1979 to 387 in 1990. The opposite, however, is believed to have occurred, hence my conservative estimate of 2,000 persons in 1997. The same would be true for both Kurungaka and Klamakae populations. In fact, underenumeration is suspected in all groups, a point which was raised by NSO itself. Owing to operational difficulties involved in the 1990 census, it was suggested that “more case of omission and duplication is likely to have occurred during the 1990 Census than during the 1980 Census”, and “in the case of the Western Highlands Province, omission has almost certainly been far more extensive than duplication” (NSO 1994:9). It should also be noted that “the entire Rural Sector of Western Highlands Province was enumerated using the ‘line-up’ system of enumeration. In the absence of PDS data, coverage must have suffered” (NSO 1994:10). The extent of underenumeration, however, is not known mainly because of “unreliable results of the Post Enumeration Survey which was carried out in 1991”, thus, “comparison of 1980 and 1990 data should be made with the utmost caution” (NSO 1994:10).

- Population figures for six small tribes have not been included here: (1) the small Rulna resident Mapkle-Palke tribe-pair, which may have been enumerated together with the Tepuka Jikimbo-Wanyembo clan-pair; (2) the Baiyer residents Epilkae-Dakapkae tribe-pair, which had a combined population of only 138 persons in 1966.
(A.J. Strathem 1966b); (3) the small Dapi tribe which has almost been incorporated into the Kentpi; and the 'Kopon' Mungapka tribe who reside in the Jimi valley. Also missing are the little-known Jimi Valley-based Oklomi and the Kiril-based Opel who operate mainly within the Dei political field but are administratively part of the North Wahgi electorate.

- Rural Non-Village Census Units (such as plantations, small stations and schools) have not been included in the local population data because many of these contain predominantly migrant populations (originally from other provinces). However, it is important to take note of such populations, especially in instances where the migrant populations are in a patron-client relationship with their hosts. In such situations, migrant populations often vote with their hosts and may even support them in war, as in Remdi's case with Simbu and Enga migrants at Gumanch Plantation (see Case 1 in Chapter Five).

Apart from their military functions, these blocs also operate in other arenas of competition and cooperation, notably elections. Some questions worth considering here are: What is the historical basis for traditional pairing? Are they in a current military alliance? Are they in close association? Are they likely to support an election candidate sponsored by a military ally? A further question worth raising here would be whether or not there was a shift in allegiances of allied groups during the 1997 national elections. Some of these questions will be considered in the context of recent warfare between a confederacy of two such blocs in a 'fight-partnership' against a common enemy bloc (1986-1990), and subsequent reparation payments during 1990-1996 and the 1997 national election.

Figure 3.7 (above) is based on the traditional division between the Tepuka-Kawelka pair of tribes and the Kombukla-Minembi. It was precisely along this major rift that serious fighting broke out at the end of 1986 (see A.J. Strathem 1993:236; see also Chapter Five). The Dei Council area is divided into three provincial government constituencies — Gumanch, Mala-Kinjibi and Kotma-Tiki. The later — or more precisely, activities within it — form the central focus of analysis in Chapter Seven. The following are predominantly military alliances which operate within (and out of) these constituencies.

**The Tepuka-Kawelka Pair**

The Tepuka-Kawelka see themselves as traditional rivals of the Kombukla-Minembi in warfare, business and elections. Theirs is a traditional pairing, based on military alliance and exchange relations, dating back to pre-colonial times (see Chapter Five and Chapter Seven; see also A.J. Strathem 1971:64-6). In fact, it is evident in the Kawelka origin-myth that the alliance has its roots in a marriage between a Kawelka ancestor and a Tepuka woman. As indicated by A.J. Strathem (1972:40), it is a generalised alliance of great importance in warfare, current marriage patterns, land use, and ceremonial exchange. This alliance was later extended into commercial enterprise and elections in the 1970s and early 1980s, largely through the initiatives of the former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, himself the son of a woman born into the most numerous Kawelka clan,
Membo. The Tepuka-Kawelka, or more precisely the Tepuka half of the pair, have dominated Dei electoral politics since 1972 — either as members of parliament (MP) or the provincial assembly (MPA) — through Parua Kuri, MP (1972-87) and his son, Reuben Parua (MP, 1993-1997), in Dei Open electorate, and Kuma Rokla (MPA, 1980-1984) and Kar Kil (MPA, 1984-1994) in the Kotna-Tiki constituency of Dei (see Chapter Eight for more information on these leaders).

Recently, however, the alliance has been considerably undermined by certain events and the conflicting roles and ambitions of some leaders. The strength of the alliance between the Tepuka and Kawelka tribes began to falter during the mid 1980s. A less than successful occasion in 1984 when Parua Kuri's clansmen repaid a ceremonial gift of pigs and money (moka) to the Kawelka heralded this decline, which was hastened by a tragic event in 1988 when a young Membo man was killed in Port Moresby by a fellow clansman of the politician (see A.J. Strathem 1993:50; Ketan 1996:256; see also Chapter Seven for further discussion on Parua Kuri's moka, and Chapter Eight for a more detailed discussion of this incident and its political implications). One of a new breed of fearless leaders in gun warfare, his death was considered a major set-back to the Kawelka war effort against the Minembi. As A.J. Strathem says, this untoward event split the alliance, and even after a large compensation payment of hundreds of pigs and K12,000 cash had been made, relations were still shaky:

> There was suspicion that the death was not an accident but might have been planned. The Kawelka people at home in Mount Hagen had been involved for some years in bitter fighting with long-established enemies within Dei, and there was a feeling that the MP had not given them support but had rather attempted to gain favour with the more numerous enemies as a part of electoral manoeuvring. (All this was unsubstantiated rumour, but it affected people's attitudes). Guns had been introduced in this war and the enemies held the better weapons. It happened that the Membo youth killed in Moresby was one of a new generation of fighters with guns and his removal was regarded as giving an advantage to the Kawelka's prime enemies. Previously, in 1987, the politician had lost the parliamentary election to a rival from the opposing bloc within Dei. Relationships that had held since the 1960s were now being shattered in all directions (1993:50).

For further discussion of these matters, see also Chapter Six on electoral manoeuvring; Chapter Seven for discussion on Tepuka-Kawelka relations in the context of the 1992 and 1997 elections; and Chapter Eight for discussion on the circumstances surrounding the death of the Membo youth in Port Moresby. Parua Kuri's election defeat in 1987, which was replicated by his son Reuben Parua's loss in 1992, are widely regarded as a direct consequence of Kawelka's withdrawal of support. This situation is further complicated by the political aspirations of a former deputy premier of Western Highlands Province, William Pik, himself a Kawelka Kundmbo clansman. Pik and Melchior Pep have been, and possibly still are, friends (though they both contested the Dei Open seat in 1997). Although Pik assisted Pep to secure some
Kawelka votes (mainly from Pik's Kundmbo clan) during both the 1987 and 1992 national
elections, he himself entered the race in 1997, perhaps believing that he had become strong
enough to defeat Pep and Parua (see Chapter Eight for a more detailed analysis of Pik's social
networks vis-a-vis Pep and other key players in the Dei political field).

Whilst personal networks between the Tepuka and Kawelka have not been severed by these
events, corporate relations between the Tepuka and Kawelka appear, at best, shattered, if not
hostile. The traditional military alliance between the two groups seems to have been temporarily
'suspended', as the Kawelka are now in a military alliance with a group described here as the
'Tiki Alliance', comprising Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae groups. Furthermore, they are not likely
to support each other in elections, as they both sponsored candidates in opposition to each
other during the 1997 election and are understandably bitter not necessarily over their defeat by
the Roklaka candidate, Puri Ruing, but towards each other for jeopardising their chances. Thus,
in post-polling violence, they both expressed their anger and frustration at each other rather than
at Puri Ruing's supporters.

The Kombukla-Minembi Pair

The Kombukla-Minembi are a numerically powerful pairing, based on traditional military
alliance. They compete against the Tepuka-Kawelka pair in major warfare, business enterprise
and national elections. Although potentially a very powerful political force, neither Minembi nor
Kombukla leaders have been able to mobilise support for a combined effort in either warfare or
elections. There is no doubt that if the pair of tribes had fought wars or contested elections in a
concerted manner, they would have won quite easily. But they have mostly assisted each other at
the level of their constituent clans rather than as a unified grouping during warfare, and have
consistently endorsed candidates against each other in elections.

Part of the problem is that Minembi, being a large tribe, is quite fragmented, with memories that
most of its constituent clans fought each other in pre-colonial warfare. As well, the Minembi are
split across a provincial constituency boundary: one half of Minembi belong to Gumanch
constituency while the other are part of the Kotna-Tiki. The division does not even follow
structural lines. Instead, it is based on residential grounds. The Minembi clans who live within
the Kotna-Tiki constituency are called Komonga Mandong Minembi ('the Minembi who live down
there on the other side of the mountain') whilst those in Gumanch call themselves Komonga
Rondong Minembi ('the Minembi who live up here on this side of the mountain'). The mountain

Kombukla-Minembi comprises the Kimbo, Elyipi, some Papeke, Ruprupkae, Komonkae and
Engambo clans who live in and around Tiki, whilst Komonga Rondong Minembi is largely made up of the
Nambkae, Ropke, Napakae and Mimke clans who live in territories at Keraldung, Moga, Kuta-Kori and
Kumbunga (compare with segmentary structure given in Appendix I).
Hagen Groupings: Tribes, Clans, Factions, Alliances and Coalitions

is in reference to the Miti range which divides the Gumanch valley from the Muka and Baiyer valleys.

This situation is further complicated by the fact that Minembi's principal allies, the Kombukla and Welyi tribes, are also split across the same boundary, with Kombukla operating in Gumanch and Welyi in Kotna-Tiki. The Welyi have traditionally supported the Kombukla in pre-colonial warfare and later in elections against the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, but some of them have recently shifted allegiances towards Reuben Parua in 1993. However, a large section of the Welyi remain aligned with Melchior Pep and his Kombukla tribe, whilst a few (perhaps between 200-300) are believed to have voted for Reuben Parua in 1997. Relations between Minembi and Welyi are less certain. They may assist each other in warfare on an individual basis and largely in a non-fighting capacity, but it seems very unlikely that they would support candidates sponsored by either side in future elections. Even at the provincial level, they have opposed each other, as evident in Chapter Eight.

The traditional military alliance between the Kombukla and Minembi is still valid at least at the clan level, which means that a particular Kombukla clan may assist a neighbouring Minembi clan in warfare (and possibly elections), depending of course on the degree of warmth in the relations between them and a factor described by Burton (1989a272) as 'social propinquity' (affinal and exchange system ties become important when lain fails to guide warriors and voters in their choice). Military cooperation at the tribal level, however, seems unlikely since they both have recently fought wars independently of each other (though some assistance was given on an individual basis). Similarly, it seems unlikely that they will support candidates sponsored by one or the other pair-partner. A tradition (since 1972) of opposing each other in elections was continued in 1997 when Kombukla and Minembi each sponsored candidates in opposition to each other. It is widely believed that a large number of Minembi and possibly some Kombukla voters shifted allegiance to the Roklaka candidate, Puri Ruing, thus enabling his relatively small group to triumph over numerically stronger rivals.

**The Tiki Alliance (Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakae)**

The alliance being described here as the 'Tiki Alliance' is a fairly recent formation, based on their common military alliance with the Kawelka in a recent war fought against the Minembi during 1986-1990 (see Chapter Five). They also share some territories at Tiki in the Baiyer Valley and operate mainly in the Kotna-Tiki constituency of Dei. The Tiki Alliance, together with the Kawelka, were thus in a 'fight-partnership' with a similar bloc, described here as the 'Gumanch Alliance' (see below), in their war effort against the Kombukla-Minembi bloc. The clans in the Tiki Alliance, although currently in a military alliance with only the Kawelka half of the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, are likely to either individually (as individual men) or collectively (as members of
each clan) support candidates sponsored by either the Tepuka or the Kawelka. However, in 1997 it is believed that a large majority of the Kimbo and Klamakae vote went to the Kawelka candidate, William Pik, while some Kopi voted for the Tepuka candidate, Reuben Parua. An explanation for this may be found in (1) Tepuka's decision not to assist Kawelka and the Tiki Alliance in the late 1980s war against the Minembi; and (2) the subsequent reparation payments of 300 pigs made by the Kawelka to the Tiki Alliance for men lost while assisting Kawelka during the war (see Chapter Five; see also discussion in the concluding chapter of the thesis). Only close Kopi relatives within Reuben's mother's natal clan are believed to have remained loyal to him.

The Gumanch Alliance (Kimka-Roklaka-Remdi)

What I have labelled the 'Gumanch Alliance' is in fact the core of the Pipilka Coalition which operates mainly within the Gumanch Constituency of Dei Council. It is a traditional alliance, founded on historical military cooperation. The Kimka-Roklaka are paired and whilst historically have been closely associated with the Remdi (with whom they share some territories near the Muglamp station), relations between them have not been particularly good in recent times. Despite their cooperation in warfare and a large reparation payment of 1,000 roasted pigs made by the Remdi to their Kimka-Roklaka allies in 1994 for losses sustained in war, they compete against each other in elections. The Kimka-Roklaka sponsored their own candidate to oppose Remdi candidates in 1992 and 1997 elections as well as a by-election in 1993. The relationship between the Kimka-Roklaka and Remdi is quite complex, the details of which are given in Chapter Seven (see also Chapter Nine).

The North-Eastern Confederacy (Kumungaka-Kentpi-Nelka-Waklupka-Prandike)

What is described here as the 'North-Eastern Confederacy' is a constellation of relatively small tribes in the Mala-Kinjibi Constituency of Dei Council. It is not an alliance but a loose association of groups who sometimes cooperate with each other and at other times oppose each other in arenas of competition such as elections. While they have cooperated in major warfare against other similar confederacies, they have also fought against each other in minor warfare. They are likely to support a candidate sponsored by Tepuka rather than Kawelka because of Tepuka's historical military alliance with the Kentpi. But with Parua Kuri out of the picture, it is not clear whether they would vote for Reuben Parua because of their traditional ties with Kuri and his group. In 1997, as in 1992, the Waklupka are believed to have pledged allegiance to the Roklaka candidate, Puri Ruin, because of their close association with the "Nu Por Pei" section of the Roklaka who live with them at Penda. The Kumungaka-Kentpi pair of tribes, with Prandike who are closely associated with Kentpi, had a home candidate in 1997, while Nelka is believed to have split between the Kombukla candidate, Melchior Pep, and the Tepuka
candidate, Reuben Parua. The Nelka have since the 1970s been closely associated with Reuben Parua's Tepuka Keitipi clan, both groups being core members of the Raembka alliance. Yet in recent years Melchior Pep has developed strong ties with a section of the Nelka through association with a former Western Highlands provincial assembly member, John Moka, who himself contested the 1993 Dei Open By-Election when Pep was ineligible. John Moka, like Matrus Mel and William Pik before 1997, is almost in a clientage relationship with Melchior Pep as patron and therefore could not contest against Pep in 1997.

**A Comparable Bloc in the Hagen Central Area: A Confederacy of Kinjika-Yamka, Elti-Penambi and Kemi-Kukilka interests**

By way of comparison, the confederacy-type alliance system in Hagen Central area (also known as Hagen Open electorate), however, is slightly different. As will be shown in Chapter Six, there are a number of party-aligned interest groups at work, each led by prominent and powerful individuals. Most of these are loosely organised coalitions, with vague historical roots, suggesting that they are very recent formations serving the political aspirations of certain individuals. The power-base of the Mount Hagen Open MP since 1987, Paul Pora, is made up of one such coalition. His relatively small Kinjika-Yamka group, having realised that it cannot compete effectively against either Jika or Mokei groups, has made a pact with two other smaller tribe-pairs, the Elti-Penambi and Kemi-Kukilka to share out political offices and leadership roles. According to Yamka informants

> In light of recent developments — notably Kingal Kuikuri's loss to Kinjika candidate, James Kond, in January 1995 and the abolition of all provincial governments in July 1995 — it is fair to say that leaders of this coalition may encounter some difficulties in keeping it together as a cohesive unit. The Elti-Penambi pair are most likely to perceive Kuikuri's election defeat in 1995 as directly resulting from the Kinjika-Yamka pair's failure in not keeping their end of the bargain. Future elections can be viewed as an ideal test for its leaders and Paul Pora in particular. However, the 1997 election results confirmed a widely held view that Pora had done enough in Hagen to retain his seat, despite a direct challenge from his former National Party colleague and Anglimp-South Wahgi MP (1987-1992), Michael Mel, who opted to contest the Hagen Open

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23 The information on the agreement between the Kinjika-Yamka, Elti-Penambi and Kemi-Kukilka coalition was given to me in January 1995 by John Puk and members of the Atenga family of Tega village, Mount Hagen.
seat. Pora had previously retained his seat during a 'supplementary' election in August 1987 (held some six weeks after the close of polling in the main national election period, 13 June to 4 July), despite a challenge from a PDM-endorsed Kinjika candidate, Terema Runints (see Burton 1989a).

Conclusion

A major aim of this chapter has been to establish the various levels in which local groups organise themselves for political purposes. The different types of groups discussed here cover a wide range of possibilities — from the most minimal units such as families and lineages to progressively more inclusive levels such as clans, sub-clans, tribes and coalitions — all of which are in competition with each other as well as with the PNG state for the allegiances of individual citizens. The corporate nature of political competition will become evident in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

This final section of the chapter has a dual purpose: firstly to summaries the main points of the chapter; and secondly to highlight some salient features of social organisation in Hagen society in order to situate the discussions in the succeeding chapters. I now turn to some important points raised in this chapter.

Sliding Degree of Identity and Loyalty

There are progressively more inclusive levels of group membership, identity, and loyalty. In many cases, an individual has little choice: on the one hand is the group into which a person is born to, whilst on the other hand, there is a wide range of administrative groups. It is, for example, nowadays not uncommon for a person to think of himself as first a member of a particular lineage or sub-clan, clan, tribe, then as belonging to a particular census division, constituency, electorate, and finally province, region and nation. It should be noted here that there is a tendency towards a progressively declining level of loyalty as one moves away from the family, or what Boissevian calls “Ego’s personal cell”, which is “usually composed of his closest relatives and possibly a few of his intimate friends” in whom “he invests a great deal of his material and emotional resources” (1974:47). This sliding level of loyalty is reflected in a statement made by a senior UPNG academic, Jo Mangi, which is worth quoting here in full:

When I am in the village I am known as Tumbe, the son of Mangi of the Kondi Wimans Enduk Kanem lineage and I identify myself as such. In the mid-Wahgi area I am a Kondika. In the Western Highlands I am a Jiwaka (acronyms of Jimi, Wahgi, Kambia). In other parts of the Highlands I am a Western Highlander. In other parts of the country I am a Highlander. When I am overseas I am a Papua New Guinean. This is my perception of my identity and I proudly adhere to it. If someone was to ask me as to where my loyalty laid this is the answer they would get and it is in the order presented above (Mangi 1992:124).
Personally revealing as it might be, this is an important statement about individual identity and loyalty in Papua New Guinea. As will be shown in the succeeding chapters, the PNG state, in comparison with the kin-group, comes a poor second when it comes to individual allegiances, thereby clearly emphasising the fundamental questions of competing legitimacies between state and society; of parallel moral worlds, as expressed through the Hagen notion of 'us-versus-them'; and of the familiar and, therefore reliable source of physical and emotional security, versus the alien and sometimes unpredictable entity known as the state.

Nevertheless, what is also evident in the Hagen case studies is that group membership does not automatically translate into support for group events, either in the form of military assistance in warfare, or by way of votes in elections. It is often the case that there is greater internal cohesion within smaller tribes/clans than there is in large ones. The sub-units of smaller groups tend to cooperate more frequently than those in large ones mainly for pragmatic reasons such as survival. But what is common to all Hagen groups is that they all value the 'name-must-not-go-down' principle. It is this particular principle which has kept Hagen tribes together, despite major rifts within them. It has also kept the remnants of groups decimated by pre-colonial warfare from losing their tribal identities completely through the process of incorporation into more powerful groups.

**Factors determining group composition, solidarity and continuity**

The 'name-must-not-go-down' principle is a major factor in the composition, recruitment, solidarity and continuity of Hagen groups, a significant point which I think has been neglected by Highlands observers, particularly by those in search of evidence to support the so-called African models and also by proponents of the exchange model. While the principles of descent, ascent, and exchange may be factors in group solidarity, they cannot adequately account for variations in group structure and recruitment patterns in Hagen and elsewhere in the PNG Highlands. But this Hagen notion of the 'name' can help us to understand the reasons behind the actions of leaders in building up their numbers through the recruitment of non-agnates, in mobilising support for corporate activities such as business, elections and warfare.

The case studies on Hagen political competition highlight the most fundamental characteristics of groups: that all groups are ultimately created to serve certain functions and in some instances to achieve specific goals; and that all groups are shifting in nature, in a constant state of flux and wane, as old members are lost (via death, marriage and outward migration) and replaced by new ones (via births, marriage and inward migration). In light of this evidence, one may ask whether there was any great value in the debate on descent theory vis-a-vis exchange theory.
Leaders as 'engineers' in the 'construction' and maintenance of power blocs

An important point worth emphasising here is that it is the political elites (men such as Michael Mel, Parua Kuri and Melchior Pep), not the mass of the population, that initially define the political agenda. Such an argument is very similar to one made by Marina Ottaway, an observer of African politics, who recently remarked:

As many studies have shown, in Africa the emotional allegiance of most people is not directed originally to the group that politicians choose to define as the nation, or tribe. The Oromo Liberation Front in Ethiopia does not build on a primordial sense of affinity among all Oromos. It is leaders, not primordial attachment, that define the boundaries of Oromia. Popular sentiment is usually created by the political agenda of the leaders, not vice versa, but once it is unleashed, it becomes very real (Ottaway 1995:243).

The role of leadership in the construction and maintenance of local groups and coalitions have also been noted by other African observers. Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhill, and Rothchild, while commenting on the fluidity of the ethnic group, its lack of homogeneity and cohesiveness, concluded that "it is less than accurate to characterise the ethnic groups on the African continent as having a fixed, centuries-old, primordial consciousness" (1988:102). They further noted that:

Among such peoples as the Sukuma in what is now Tanzania, the Sara of Chad, the Yoruba and Igbo of Nigeria, the Kikuyu and Luhya of Kenya, the Ngoni and Plateau Tonga of Zambia, and the Karamojong of Uganda, there were affinities based upon co-residence in a region and upon similarities of culture, traditions, and legal and economic practices. However, an awareness of the group as a distinct entity in relationship to other cultural groups remains a relatively recent phenomenon. In fact, the process of ethnic self-definition occurred in the short time span that it did because of the impact of colonial interventions and the intense competition over power, status, economic resources, and the social services happening during the late colonial and post-colonial periods (1988:103).

There are important distinctions between the Hagen coalitions described in this study and those African ethnic groups mentioned above. A major difference is in size: African ethnic groups number tens of thousands while Hagen groups have an average population of only a few thousand, with a range of 200-20,000 persons. Yet, the prominent role of leaders in the creation of groups and the tendency to embrace as many groups as possible is a common trait in Hagen, in Africa, and indeed in many other human societies throughout the world. In fact, it is fair to say that by increasing membership to the various levels of social organisation, leaders such as Michael Mel, Paul Pora and Paias Wingti become political 'engineers' in the 'construction' and 'maintenance' of political blocs. Some salient features of Hagen social organisation should illustrate some of the points raised here.
Salient Features of Hagen Social Organisation

Named groups as points of reference

A salient feature of Hagen society is that named groups are crucial for reference — the tribe being the most inclusive category (see A.M. Strathern 1975). Others have made similar observations (see, for example, A.J. Strathern 1971; 1972; Burton 1988; O'Hanlon 1989; Merlan and Rumsey 1991; Mangi 1992; Muke 1994). There are at least 85 tribes in the Hagen cultural-linguistic area (see Appendix IV). Names of individuals are often contextually prefixed with their tribe or clan names. In inter-tribal activities, for instance, tribal names may be used. Personal names such as Raphael Doa (of the Mokei Nambka line), Parua Kuri (of the Tepuka Keitipi line) and Paias Wingti (of the Jika Mukaka line) thus become Mokei Doa, Tepuka Kuri and Jika Wingti. Likewise, in intra-tribal activities, clan names are appropriate: Nambka Doa, Keitipi Parua and Mukaka Paias, which indicate a sliding degree of identity and loyalty.24

Tribe-pairs

A second feature of Hagen society is that most — but not all — Hagen tribes are paired, which, as noted by Burton (1989a:256), directly corresponds to the way the natural world is structured, with almost all plant and animal species being named in pairs. Greater solidarity supposedly exists between pair partners than between either of them and other allies, and sometimes the linkage between a pair of tribes is supported by an origin myth associating the first ancestors of the two tribes (see A.J. Strathern 1971:19; A.M. Strathern 1975:432). But in practice, this is not always the case. For instance, when a group migrates to a new area, it is likely to lose its original pairing and develop another with one of its new neighbours, which means that the new pairing may not be supported by a myth (see A.J. Strathern 1971:19). The functions of pairing at this level, as A.J. Strathern says, are also variable:

Some pairs are staunch allies, others have little to do with each other. Small tribes are likely to have strong pairings, if only because these were important for survival in the past (1971:19).

As mentioned above, size is an important factor in the degree of cohesion or fragmentation within tribes and coalitions, and moreover in the degree of ‘warmth’ between tribe-pair partners.

24. See Merlan and Rumsey (1991:Chap.5) for linguistic structures of segmentary politics in the Nebilyer area; See also Mangi (1992:124) and Clark (1997:67) for a sliding degree of identity and loyalty to clan, tribe and state. I provide a discussion on the question of loyalty (and conflicting roles of leaders) in Chapter Five.
Preoccupation with ‘name’ and numbers

A third feature of Hagen society is the perpetual preoccupation with ‘name’ and numbers of a group. It is expressed in a myriad of cultural expressions — in the words of folk songs, funeral laments, el ik (‘fight-talk’) speeches, dance formations, moka exchanges, group warfare, commercial enterprise and elections — some of which form the focus of analysis in subsequent chapters. Hageners place great value on group identity, and while they realise that men make a group, they also know that a group makes a man. If, for instance, a girl must find a husband with a neighbouring tribe, her immediate kinsmen and clan brothers often make it their business to inquire about the potential groom. If the future husband’s tribe is of considerable renown, or has a ‘name’, then approval is granted. If, however, the group is of no consequence, the girl’s people will register their disapproval by referring to its members as ‘men without name’ (wua mbi naparom), or men of no renown.

The preoccupation with numbers is reflected in the statements that Hagen men make in justification for practising polygyny. Men say that they marry more than one wife in order to have sons and ultimately to build up numbers for their groups. Using a plant metaphor, Hageners associate the birth of sons in particular with the sprouting of a wild banana species, rouwi, and the subsequent proliferation of groups generally with the propagation of a tropical palm called dakla (pronounced dalgd) in Melpa language. A group that is experiencing considerable growth in male population is often described metaphorically as sprouting shoots like rouwi and flourishing like dakla plants. The preoccupation with numbers, particularly of males, however, is not unique to Hagen. In Wahgi society, for instance, O’Hanlon (1989) reported that “men often express dismay at the birth of daughters” and “make periodic demands that non-agnates residing elsewhere should return home to their natal clans” (1989:32).

Hagen tribes, accordingly, have grown bigger as a result of population growth. This has led to problems associated with population pressure on agricultural land and marginally diminishing returns on investments in land-based resources (including poor yield in coffee and food-crops...
due to impoverished, overused land). Nevertheless, Hageners, especially leaders, in attempting to build their support base for elections and other purposes, continue to recruit people from other parts of the province and elsewhere in the Highlands. The Hagen case studies indicate that it is the smaller groups who actively participate in the recruitment of non-agnates. For example, the Kawelka have sponsored a large number of Poiyaka and Aiyaka migrants from Nebilyer to settle at Kuk. Likewise, the Remdi have taken in a large number of Enga and Simbu migrants, who, as indicated in Chapter Five, have assisted the Remdi in warfare. This is quite consistent with observations made by other observers (Reay 1971; O'Hanlon 1989). In North Wahgi, for example, O'Hanlon (1989:32) noted that it was the smallest Komblo clan, Milyand, which most sharply augmented its size during the early 1980s by providing land for several immigrant Simbu families.

**Alliance Systems: Some general points**

A general point worth raising in any discussion on alliance systems and local group formation is the shifting nature of alliances. The alliances are not fixed, though may have historical roots. As a direct consequence of warfare and subsequent population movement, groups now allied to each other were previously involved in totally different arrangements with others geographically and historically removed from contemporary cases. According to historical accounts of warfare given by Hagen informants, most groups involved in current military alliances have often fought each other in previous wars. Bearing in mind that Hageners make an important distinction between major, perpetual or traditional enemies (el paraka wua) and minor enemies (el namb wua), groups opposed in minor warfare may combine in major warfare (see A.J. Strathem 1971:55-56; 1972:74-75; A.M. Strathem 1975:168). This is made possible through reparation payments, following a general rule that one may compensate minor enemies but not major enemies for men killed in war (see Chapter Five, see also A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3; 1971:Chap.4; 1981:12). Similarly, groups opposed in provincial elections may combine in national elections and mobilising support from minor enemies is much easier than from major enemies.

Secondly, despite this historical process of shifting alliances, the present alliances of Dei are relatively stable in the context of the various arenas of competition and cooperation analysed in this study. Their relative stability depends heavily on the historically military nature of the alliances. But here one should be careful in dealing with historical accounts of military alliance given by informants. As indicated by A.J. Strathem:

*It is possible that the further away in time the period of endemic warfare becomes, the more the informants are likely to simplify warfare patterns, or to make them more rigid, or to attribute actions to whole groups which in fact involved only certain individuals of the groups... A further danger is that informants may project back onto the past features of their current political situation so that, while their ostensibly historical*
account is covertly valid for the present, it is invalid for the period which it overtly purports to describe (1971:54-55).

This is an important point, which requires us to ask why they make such statements. Part of the answer, as indicated above, lies in individual motive and perception. Another reason for this is that in the absence of reliable details of past events, individuals are recasting history in the context of contemporary relations, which does not necessarily mean that they are consciously manipulating information. Since each individual's perceptions are shaped by personal experiences and by oral accounts handed down through the generations, it is quite possible that the information they present is, in their view, accurate. In fact, there are only few older men, usually big-men and fight-leaders, who have some knowledge of pre-colonial warfare and alliances, which means that for most people it is the present alliances that matter. The alliances described in this study are thus relatively stable insomuch as allowing us to predict where the rifts will occur and why some groups will cooperate in order to compete against others.

Finally, in matters regarding group affiliation and warfare vis-a-vis alliance systems, Hageners tend to exaggerate, at times deliberately inflating figures regarding the number of men, groups, guns and so forth as part of political strategy. In the Hagen world view, as would be the case elsewhere in the country and in other parts of the world, it is always better to give others — including friends, enemies, potential rivals and supporters, or whatever they may be — a clear impression that your group can more than hold its own against any force, militarily or otherwise. There are two sides to this strategy, which we may call constructive and obstructive. On the one hand, it is constructive in the sense that other non-aligned groups will find it attractive to associate with in terms of intermarriage, moka exchange, and cooperation in business and elections. As for groups which belong to the same alliance as yours, the task of securing assurances of support for elections and contracting allies in warfare becomes much easier if they perceive strength and cohesion in your group. On the other hand, it is obstructive by way of deterring potential enemy attacks. Exaggerating a group's strength is an effective way of casting doubts in the minds of enemy strategists about their own group's strength, which can protect the group from enemy aggression, or buy time in order to organise defences.

In this chapter I have described the major alliances in Dei, which, together with Chapter Two, provide important background information for Chapters 4-8, which contain case studies on the major arenas of competition and cooperation in Hagen. As noted, some of these alliances are nowadays mobilised in business competition and politics in state-sponsored arenas. The roles of business groups will be discussed in the next chapter. Because the alliances described here are also registered business organisations, the division between this and the next chapter is therefore an artificial one forced on me to make it easier for the reader.
Chapter 4

BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONS
Introduction

The history of capitalistic enterprise in this country is comparatively short. Yet, it is quite complex and its political, economic and social implications are not yet fully understood. This study provides some useful insights into how people in a particular area of Papua New Guinea have devised strategies to accommodate state-sponsored programmes of commercialisation. In the PNG Highlands, for instance, it has been said that people here were more ready for capitalism than their coastal counterparts (see Finney 1973). Although I do not subscribe to this theory, there is some truth in the notion that Highlanders are spirited competitors. One only needs to see the activities around us today to appreciate the fact that these enterprising people have taken over a substantial part of the country's economy. The coffee industry, for instance, is dominated by Western and Eastern Highlanders. Even the service industry in Port Moresby, including PMV buses, taxis, automobile service and fuel stations, real estate, and retail outlets are predominantly Highlands businesses. The roots of this spirited enterprise lie in their sociocultural, demographic and environmental background (see Finney 1973). A glimpse of that spirit will be revealed in this chapter.

The second and third chapters focused on leadership and social structure, highlighting some of the major debates in the literature, to establish analytical parameters for later case studies. This and the next four chapters deal with major arenas of competition and cooperation in which groups described in the previous chapter and their leaders operate. This chapter examines the major business groups in the Dei field of political competition, and attempts to account for the relative successes (or lack of it) in terms of historical and current military and political alliances.

Also under scrutiny here are the new political actors — superseding big-men — who now appear more prominent than other types of leaders. These new actors are the millionaire businessmen, their henchmen (who are themselves aspiring businessmen or politicians), and politicians at provincial and national levels. The chapter explores their links to local groups and their common appeal to local identities, highlighting the largely personalised nature of these corporate business ventures and the problems that stem from this arrangement. It concludes with a brief critique of Amarshi, Good and Mortimer (1979) and Donaldson and Good (1981), arguing that the power base of wealthy capitalists in Hagen is the primordial community rather than class.

Problems of Terminology

Despite numerous studies of 'business development associations', there is little agreement between observers on characteristics and definitions. Without getting involved in the debate on the application of terminology, it needs to be pointed out that 'business development
associations', interchangeably used as ‘development associations’, equate to what Rolf Gerritsen (1981) calls ‘dynamic community groups’. Other descriptions are ‘community development associations’ (Walter 1981), or ‘self-help movements’ (May 1981), or ‘self-help development movements’ (May 1982:21). These groups, also described as “spontaneous local movements, differing in their origins and specific objectives but sharing a broad concern with the achievement of economic, social and political development through communal action”, were collectively dubbed as ‘micronationalist movements’ (May 1982:1). The term ‘micronationalism’ was introduced by May (1975) “to describe a varied collection of movements which displayed a common tendency, at least at an ideological or psychological level, to disengage from the wider economic and political systems imposed by colonial rule, seeking in a sense a common identity and purpose, and through some combination of traditional and modern values and organisational forms, an acceptable formula for their own development” (May 1982:1).

A major problem with such a concept, as May himself may have been aware, is in its application — or misapplication — to embrace the vast differences between the various movements described in Micronationalist Movements in Papua New Guinea (May 1982). Inconsistencies and discrepancies are not confined to terminology, in that May’s description of Pipilka as “an ethnic group, comprising a number of clans which claim common ancestry” and numbering “about six thousand” (1982:21), is at odds with Standish’s claim that “Michael Mel’s people at Wurup near Mount Hagen joined with other traditional allies and formed a neo-tribe covering many fragmented groups in the Medlpa language area, which they called the Piblika Association” with “4,000 members” (1982:387, 391). The Pipilka, as described in the preceding chapter, is a coalition-style alliance, with membership drawn from existing tribes in Dei, Anglimp, Hagen and Nebilyer areas. Neither the registered business group, Pipilka Development Corporation, nor the Pipilka coalition are descent groups, nor do the principal factions — the Kopi-Nokpa and the Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka — claim common ancestry. The Pipilka, as indicated in Chapter 3, compete with two other coalition-style alliances, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta, and their principal field of competition is Dei, not Hagen, Anglimp, or Nebilyer.

The registered business groups, which bear the same names, were formed by educated elites and local leaders from within these groups to facilitate participation in the national government’s plantation acquisition scheme that began in the mid 1970s (A.J. Strathern 1984; Ketan 1996). The Dei Local Government Council was instrumental in setting up these business groups. Councilors were encouraged by the government to mobilise resources to buy shares in plantations. The national government, eager to localise plantation economy, provided easy credit to enterprising local groups to buy these properties. Groups with traditional landownership claims over plantations were given preference, but where ownership was disputed, groups with adjoining territories were invited to compete against each other. Of the individuals who played a
prominent role in this scheme, none was more influential than a young, energetic, forceful Parua Kuri, who was a member of the House of Assembly and President of the Local Government Council during this time.

The business groups have also facilitated the political and economic ambitions of certain individuals (Ketan 1996:249; comparable discussion in May 1981:75), a point that does not sit too well with most members of such groups. Dissension has crept in because of the substantial disparities in income and living standards between the leaders who control the businesses and the members of groups who are the supposed shareholders. Those who control the collective investments of the associations have become extremely wealthy while those at the periphery have watched quietly in anger. All these groups have been plagued with problems, such as widespread dissension among shareholders and disruptive power struggles between leaders of factions, which in one case resulted bankruptcy for the group. Whilst leaders, especially educated elites and politicians, have been jostling for power, the mass have been marginalised by a combination of their own ignorance, feelings of apathy and disdain, and by the dishonourable motives and actions of their leaders.

The Pipilka factions, rifts and disruptive power struggles

Pipilka is probably the most successful business development association in Papua New Guinea. Michael Mel and Andrew Kei formed it in the early 1970s to take advantage of the new opportunities created by the national government's plantation acquisition scheme (see A.J. Strathern 1984:150). Among its first acquisitions were the Wurup and Alimp South coffee plantations in May 1975. An expatriate planter, William Manton, built the plantations in 1958. Wurup was established on land traditionally owned by the Kopi-Nokpa and Roni-Lati alliance, while Alimp South in the Nebilyer valley was built on land traditionally owned by the Kulga and Miliga groups. It took Michael Mel, then a student at the University of Papua New Guinea, and Andrew Kei, a local magistrate, 18 months to negotiate the purchase of the plantations, but in the end it was decided that the respective landowners of Alimp and Wurup take over the estates. As noted by Standish (1982:387), a combination of sometimes crude, sometimes subtle pressure on Highlands expatriates, as well as Michael Mel's direct access to the chief minister's advisors through university contacts, helped overcome ministerial or bureaucratic blockages to the government's acquisition of these large coffee plantations.

The purchase of Wurup and Alimp South were described by a PNG Post-Courier reporter as "the first time in the Highlands that a plantation has been bought back by the original owners of the land" (Stocker 1975:21). The government, as financier, paid K367,000 while Pipilka, as the purchaser, made a deposit of K11,000. At the handover ceremony in May 1975, which was attended by three government ministers (Thomas Kavali, Ebia Olewale and Peter Lus), the
Minister for Lands, Thomas Kavali, gave the owner and builder of Wurup plantation, William Manton, a cheque from the government. The Leader of the Opposition, Tei Abel, hailed the sale of the plantation as an act of free enterprise, the sort of thing that should continue in this country, while Justice Minister, Ebia Olewale, said the transaction was visible proof of the Eight Point Plan in action (see Stocker 1975:21; see also Standish 1982).

Initially Pipilka had some stunning success, largely made possible by the 1975-1977 coffee boom. Bill Standish reported that 15 months of extraordinarily high coffee prices enabled Pipilka to fully repay the government loan of K212,000 by 31 December 1976 in addition to acquiring the Mount Hagen Park Motel for K225,000 (with K65,000 cash down payment with no need for government development bank assistance). A dividend of 100% was paid to the association's 4,000 members (Standish 1982:391, footnote).

Despite the initial success, there were problems in the direction of the association and its registered company, the Pipilka Development Corporation. At the time Michael Mel told Bill Standish that Pipilka's next step would be to buy urban real estate to utilise the group's large cash surplus.

However, inter clan tensions involving Pipilka members embroiling the Wurup area had developed in 1976 and could disrupt the smooth operation of the association's businesses. Attempts were being made to block the group's expansion into Mount Hagen town property ownership and local jealousies seem to have been aroused by the association's windfall success. By mid 1977 the Wurup estates had been divided into separate units comprising different clan groups (1982:391, footnote).

Initial problems arose because of differences between Michael Mel's Kopi-Nopka group and Andrew Kei's Roni-Lati group. The Wurup plantation, as noted by Standish (quoted above), were split between these two groups. One observer, perhaps a little overwhelmed by the violent manner in which these groups sorted out their differences, concluded that Pipilka "after a spectacular early success appears to be in the process of disintegration" (May 1981:73). Far from disintegrating, Pipilka consolidated through a common process called 'shifting alliances': dislodging from one alliance to enter into another. In this case, the Kopi-Nokpa group shifted away from their alliance with the Roni-Lati to form a coalition-style alliance with the Dei Council-based Pipilka alliance, which is a consortium of Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka interests.

As well as the conflict with the Roni-Lati, the difficulties involved in securing real estate in Mount Hagen forced the Kopi-Nokpa group to look elsewhere for expansion. An explanation for Pipilka's inability to enter into the Mount Hagen real estate business may be found in the traditional animosity with which Hagen Central groups, Jika, Mokei and Yamka, deal with groups from 'peripheral' areas. As traditional owners of the land occupied by the township, Hagen Central groups feel that they have a right to decide who gets to own or control part of
the town. As evident in Chapter 6, these ‘super-tribes’ of the Hagen Central area have been highly critical of appointment of people from other parts of the province to key positions within the province and, on several occasions, have forced senior government officers to vacate their offices. These tribes control the real estate market in Mount Hagen. Groups from other parts of the province have found it extremely difficult to buy into this lucrative business. The Kopi-Nokpa group, despite its prominent role in Hagen politics, does not have the numerical strength to muscle its way into the Mount Hagen real estate business.

This is where the Dei Council-based Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka alliance comes into the equation. The Kopi-Nokpa thus entered into a larger alliance with the Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka groups. The combined forces of Pipilka, led by Michael Mel and current company secretary Puklma Kopi (a Remdi Jikambo clansman), went into competition with Welyi-Kuta. As indicated in Chapter 3, the Pipilka ultimately acquired Gumanch coffee plantation, one of the largest in the southern hemisphere, but lost out on Kugmi, an adjoining portion of ‘undeveloped’ land, to prominent Kombukla leaders, Pati Wamp and Melchior Pep, who acquired the land on behalf of the Kombukla-Minembi pair. Although the Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka faction claims traditional ownership over the land on which the Gumanch coffee plantation was established by an expatriate planter in the 1950s, their principal rivals, the Kombukla-Minembi, have always disputed this claim. This point was ultimately contested on the battlefield but not completely settled (see Chapter 5).

Pioneer coffee entrepreneur Dick Hagon first developed Gumanch, 25 kilometres northeast of Mount Hagen. The 500-hectare coffee property stretches along and beyond the banks of the Gumanch River. The Pipilka Development Corporation, now with more than 5,000 local shareholders, bought the plantation for K3 million from an exporting form, Coffee International Pty Ltd, in March 1985. Gumanch was taken over by Coffee International Pty Ltd when then owners, the Collins (PNG) group went into receivership in Australia and were selling off their PNG interests. Pipilka already had an interest in the property through its 18 per cent shareholding in Coffee International (see Times of Papua New Guinea 1985:29; Pascoe 1985:11; Sinclair 1995:433). The purchase, described by the media as the biggest payout by a wholly national company for the country’s largest plantation, marked the fruition of a ten-year dream for Michael Mel. The Post-Courier journalist Noel Pascoe reported that Gumanch was the original

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1. Despite its small size, the Kopi-Nokpa pair of tribes play a dominant role in Hagen politics mainly through the activities of brothers, Peter Wama and Michael Mel — and now Fr Robert Lak (governor) and Thomas Webster (recently appointed administrator of Western Highlands). Wama, a former administrator, Mel, a prominent businessman and former MP, and Lak, current MP, are all members of the Nokpa tribe while Webster, a former UPNG academic who recently completed his PhD studies at the University of Bristol in England, is a ‘Kum’ Kopi tribesman.
target for Michael Mel when he helped start Pipilka in 1975. He was still a final-year law student at the University of Papua New Guinea when Pipilka began operations (Pascoe 1985:ibid). At the time of the takeover it was reported that Pipilka's managing director Michael Mel was confident that Gumanch would start servicing its ten-year loan of K2 million from the PNG Banking Corporation from the end of that year. Moreover, at K1,900 per tonne of coffee, Gumanch was expected to produce a total revenue of K1.7 million by the end of 1985 (Times of Papua New Guinea 1985:29).

By 1985 Pipilka also owned the Wurup and Ulya plantations, in addition to the Hagen Park Motel. Gumanch was then managed by the National Plantation Management Agency (NPMA) for a fee of K13,000 a month (Times of Papua New Guinea 1985:ibid). Michael Mel estimated that Pipilka, as NPMA's biggest client, were paying NPMA K300,000 to K400,000 in fees annually. He claimed that when Pipilka pulled out NPMA could not hold it together and it folded. Pipilka formed a grower company with other NPMA clients, called Natgrow, which is now owned 100% by Pipilka (Michael Mel, June 1994; quoted in Sinclair 1995:432-433).

For the young elites, like Michael Mel and Puklma Kopi, the acquisition of Wurup in 1975 and Gumanch in 1985 was an important step towards establishing patronage systems that would come to characterise interpersonal relations with clansmen later in life. They developed into major leaders later, but started their careers as brokers between the state and their groups. The same pattern is being continued by the next generation of leaders such as Henry Tiki and Simon Nurum in attempting to challenge Michael Mel and Puklma Kopi's dominance over Pipilka.

Initially there were two major factions within Pipilka, divided according to geographical and political basis: the Hagen, Anglimp and Nebilyer resident, Kopi-Nokpa faction, led by Michael Mel (Chairman); and the Dei Council-based Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka faction led by Puklma Kopi (Secretary). Recently, however, the Dei Council faction divided into (1) the Remdi Jikambo clan; and (2) the Kimka-Roklaka pair of tribes. The situation is further complicated by power struggles within the Remdi faction. It is fair to say that there is power struggle at two levels: between Remdi and Kimka-Roklaka (through the initiatives of Kimka lawyer Simon Nurum and Councillor Kumi Krai); and within Remdi itself, between the faction led by Puklma Kopi and a faction led by an aspiring leader and coffee planter, Henry Tiki, and his lieutenant and adviser, Pora Kui, an accountant with the South Pacific Bank in Mount Hagen.

The differences between the Remdi and the Kimka-Roklaka factions has been taken on to the arena of national elections, where the Kimka-Roklaka sponsored their own candidate, Puri Ruwing, to oppose Remdi candidates, Koi Ranpi in 1992 and 1993 by-election, and Willie Wundaki in 1997. Whilst the underlying reasons for the rift between the Remdi and Kimka-Roklaka factions are detailed in the relevant parts of the thesis (see, for example, Chapter 7), it
should be pointed out here that Remdi political strategists gambled — and lost — by somewhat arrogantly assuming that the Kimka-Roklaka would back their candidate, Koi Ranpi, in 1992, despite outstanding reparation payments and alleged unpaid business dividends owed by the Remdi and the Pipilka Development Corporation.

The Raembka factions, rifts and disruptive power struggles

The Raembka Development Association, like Pipilka and Welyi-Kuta, was formed in the early 1970s by then Dei MP Parua Kuri and businessman Goimba Kot who became its first nominal directors. By 1977 Raembka had acquired two coffee plantations, Nunga and Kinjibi (pronounced Kentpi), and a third, Tigi (pronounced Tiki), jointly with the Council. Both Kuri and Kot are influential leaders within the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance and they come from the same section of the Tepuka tribe. Since none of the plantations were located on land traditionally owned by the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, one cannot help wondering whether Kuri and Kot would have bothered putting together a group as large and fragmented as Raembka had they been able to claim traditional ownership at either the level of the tribe-pair or at lower levels such as the tribe or clan.

The Nunga and Kinjibi plantations, located in the upper North Wahgi, were established in the 1950s by expatriate planters on land which was traditionally owned by the Nelka and Kentpi tribes, respectively. The traditional ownership of the land which is now Tiki plantation in the Baiyer valley was never fully resolved, as the contest for territory and group prestige was frozen by colonially-imposed pacification in the 1940s. This land was previously used as a major battlefield during pre-colonial warfare between the Kawelka-Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakae alliance versus an alliance of mainly Minembi clans. Owing to this particularly ambiguous nature of historical ownership and equally vague claims by the neighbouring groups, the land was virtually handed over to the expatriate planter, John Collins, by the colonial administration and later acquired by the Council in 1975.

Raembka Investments was incorporated as a business group in 1985. Its business activities were centred around Parua Kuri and Goimba Kot, both men having interests in coffee estates and retail shops. Raembka had some early successes, particularly through the efforts of Kot in attempting to expand and diversify into areas such as automobile fuel sales and service stations, trade stores and supermarkets, plus coffee buying, processing and exporting. Kot built his business on small retail shops, beginning with the acquisition of a Lutheran Mission-owned

2. The Tiki plantation was established in the mid-1950s by an enterprising Australian called John Collins. According to A.J. Strathern, "John Collins was of a well-known business family in the Highlands and was sister's son of Danny Leahy, one of the early Australian explorers and farmers in the area. John Collins' highly productive plantation in Dei Council was taken over in 1975 by the Council itself after his death" (explanatory footnote in A.J. Strathern 1979:131).
trade-store at Kotna which he managed in the early 1970s on behalf of the Kotna (Lutheran Church) Circuit. By the mid-1980s the business, exclusively under Goimba’s control, had developed from a small trade-store (no bigger than the size of a street-corner ‘tuckerbox’ trailer) into a significant company with investments in supermarkets, coffee estates and a fleet of Toyota pickups which were used mainly for roadside coffee buying.

In hindsight, it would seem that Kot probably took too much upon himself and at times juggling both personal and public businesses, considering his direct involvement in at least three areas, Raembka Investments, the Dei Development Corporation and his own coffee estates at Kotna and Mount Ambra. Kot ultimately lost control of both Raembka Investments and Dei Development Corporation to his rivals. He lost the Chair of the Dei Development Corporation in 1989 to a younger rival, Matrus Mel, who comes from the same tribe as Kot and Kuri but leads a faction which acts in opposition to them in business and politics.

Despite its early successes, Raembka Investments collapsed in 1987, after much dissension and power struggles between the various factions. This was the year in which Parua Kuri lost the Dei Open seat to Melchior Pep. As indicated above, before 1987 its business interests in addition to the three plantations mentioned above were: two supermarkets, one at Penga and the other in Mount Hagen town; the Kotna Coffee Plantation; and shares in various companies. Currently, Raembka is a dormant company and, as indicated in Figure 4.1, individuals have taken control of the business interests. The diagram represents the de facto, rather than de jure dismemberment of Raembka, as in most cases the business interests were taken over by physical force.

Whilst the Nunga and Kinjibi plantations have been occupied by members of the Nelka and Kentpi tribes, respectively, the future of Tiki plantation is uncertain. As in pre-colonial times, the Tiki area once again became a battleground during 1986-1990 between the Minembi and an alliance of Kawelka, Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae groups. Despite reports that a certain group, led by a Dakapkae tribesman and Holy Trinity Teachers College lecturer, Teng Wanenga, had shown interest in taking control of the plantation, others claim that Tiki has almost been reclaimed by Muka Puklapukl, an exceptionally malevolent spirit, which is famous in the area and was claimed to have been responsible for the death of the plantation’s previous owner and founder, John Collins. 

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3. The information on Raembka Investments was given to me by Matrus Mel, the leader of a faction opposed to the Kuri-Kot faction. A UPNG graduate with a combined major in Economics and Accounting, Mel, after unsuccessfully contesting the Dei Open seat against Parua Kuri in 1982, became a Local Government Councillor in 1986 and subsequently in 1989 ousted Goimba Kot as Chairman of Dei Development Corporation, a business arm of the Council.

4. According to local folktale, this particularly spiteful spirit Muka Puklapukl (named after a frog that lives in the Muka River) has deceived many men, including John Collins. Its modus operandi involves enticing men to have sexual intercourse with it after transforming itself into a stunningly attractive maid. It kills men by
The Raimburger Supermarket in Mount Hagen town was taken over by Matrus Mel, who became owner-manager between March 1988 and December 1989. From January 1990, Matrus took control of the Dei Development Corporation as its Chairman and left the retail shop to be taken over by a Kuli-based Jika Milakamb businessman. We can safely assume that Raimburger too has gone broke.

After the collapse of Raembka and presumably Raimburger, our principal actors next turned their attention to the Dei Development Corporation. As in Raembka before its collapse in 1987, here too individuals contested the right to control Council-owned businesses, mostly coffee impregnating them with contaminated eggs, hence the swelling of the stomach several days before death. Before Collins's arrival, Tiki and the surrounding swamps were considered by local folk to be the home of malignant spirits like Puklapul and were therefore avoided. Puklapul in particular was said to have been angered by Collins's clearing of the area and sought revenge by way of enticement and impregnation with a dreadful disease after sexual intercourse with Puklapul in the guise of a young girl. The statement that the Tiki plantation 'has almost been reclaimed by Muka Puklapul', however, can be inferred as an implication of the plantation being in a run-down state, thus being reclaimed by the jungle and the swamp, conditions which suit Puklapul (and perhaps mosquitoes?). The relationship between human settlements, malignant spirits, swamps and malaria has been mentioned elsewhere (see Ketan 1996:242; see also Gorecki 1979; Muke 1994:56).
estates. A bitter power struggle between factions saw Matrus Mel wrestle power from Goimba Kot in 1989. Mel was chairman of the Corporation between January 1990 and July 1992. The company closed all its operations in July 1992. In a personal document given to me by Matrus Mel in January 1995, he attributed the closure of the company mainly to the national “economic crises, coupled with the depressed price of coffee”.

After what may be described as particularly unsuccessful attempts in both business and politics — having unsuccessfully contested the Dei Open seat in 1982, 1987, 1992 and a by-election in 1993 — Matrus Mel returned to his professional field of accounting. Since May 1993, he has been employed by the Small Business Development Corporation’s Highlands Regional Office in Mount Hagen and did not contest the 1997 elections. His former rival, Goimba Kot has now permanently migrated to Mount Ambra where he resides with his wife’s Yamka group. Kot has developed a number of coffee blocks at Ambra and grows bananas on a relatively large-scale. In January 1995 Kot made a large presentation of pigs to the Yamka as payment for the land which he occupies.

Meanwhile, Kot’s old business partner, Parua Kuri, has retired from national politics after some 20 years. Kuri first contested the then combined Mul-Dei Open seat in 1968 and lost to Mek Nugintz, but in the succeeding election he successfully contested the Dei Open seat which he held for three consecutive five year terms (1972-1987). Kuri is still influential in Dei politics, at times performing a significant role in the political career of his son, Reuben Parua. Kuri assumes many roles, as a father, confidant, adviser, for which he may be better qualified for than anyone else in Dei. His organisational abilities and extensive personal network would be of huge value to Reuben. The skilful manipulation of such networks and Kuri’s personal involvement in mobilising support for Reuben during the 1993 Dei Open by-election directly influenced a shift in allegiances of non-aligned voter blocks and ultimately resulted in a favourable outcome for his son. Significantly, his son lost the election in 1992 when Kuri’s involvement was minimal, almost reluctant.5

The Welyi-Kuta factions, rifts and power struggles

The Welyi-Kuta development association was formed around the same time as Pipilka and Raembka. The Welyi, being the traditional owners of the land occupied by the Tremearne (Penga) coffee plantation, were invited to contribute money towards the purchasing of shares in the plantation.6 Their first acquisition was the Penga plantation in the late 1970s, followed by the

5. See Chapter 7even for a more detailed account of this election and Kuri’s involvement as a major contributing factor in Reuben’s change of fortune in 1993.

6. The Tremearne coffee plantation, at Penga, in Dei Council was built by an entrepreneur and pilot called Bob Gibbes, who earlier had run Gibbes-Sepik Airways and subsequently ran hotels in the Highlands before retiring to Australia (see explanatory footnote in A.J. Strathem 1979:131).
creation of others, including Mambogl, in the 1980s. Similarly, a section of the Kombukla tribe, as traditional landowners of the Bitam coffee plantation, near Muka Kengnapana, were invited to pool their resources towards buying plantation shares and acquired Bitam. Together, the Welyi and Kombukla required a managing company, hence the formation of the business group called Welyi-Kuta. The Welyi-Kuta group then went into competition with Pipilka for the right to gain control of Gumanch coffee plantation, but was unsuccessful here. It was however successful in beating Pipilka for Moitemp plantation. After the acquisition of the Moitemp plantation, near the Kugmi creek — also known in Tok Pisin as deti-ivai%, derived from the English dirty or muddy water — by Pati Wamp, the Kombukla-Minembi tribe-pair broke away from the Welyi-Kuta business group.

The competition between Pipilka and the Kombukla-Minembi pair was especially intense, both parties claiming traditional ownership over Gumanch and Moitemp plantations. Their differences were ultimately sorted out on the battlefield: first by the Kimka-Roklaka pair against the Kombukla during 1980-1982; and later by the Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka alliance against the Kombukla-Minembi pair during 1984-1989. In both wars, the Minembi suffered heavy losses, including nearly 20 deaths, whilst Kombukla managed to escape without substantial loss. This fact has not been lost on the Minembi, particularly the large group of educated Minembi leaders. They resent the fact that Kombukla commands leadership status in both business and national politics while Minembi sacrificed warriors in defending Kombukla-Minembi honour and territory. If this resentment spreads among Minembi communities and clans, it could develop into a Minembi-for-Minembi group to compete against the Kombukla and their principal leaders, Pati Wamp and Melchior Pep. In fact, there are signs that such a group may have already emerged, as indicated by electoral challenges made by the Minembi Nambka clan in 1992, through the candidacy of Wikai Membi, and again in 1997, through Maj. Pun Kaip's candidacy.

Meanwhile at Kotna, the Welyi had consolidated their business investments, through the appointment of Sapom Kipa, a high school headmaster, as managing director of the Welyi-Kuta business group. Under his direction, the Wely-Kuta incorporated a coffee exporting company in 1989 in an attempt to diversify its business. Further development in this area appears to have been hampered by dissension and internal power struggles.

The Welyi-Kuta business group, like Raembka in 1987 (and Dei Development Corporation in 1989), has been the focus of power struggles between faction leaders, Sapom Kipa and Jimmy Wara. The faction led by Jimmy Wara was critical of Sapom Kipa's management and wrested power from Kipa in 1996. After ousting Kipa from the company's senior management, Jimmy Wara, according to one informant, paid K30,000 in dividends to Sapom's clan in October 1996,
ostensibly to show shareholders that he was a better manager than his predecessor. Such payments may well be motivated by a desire to gain support in upcoming elections.7

Discussion

The business development associations were founded on relatively weak historical alliance networks, but the core member groups have since strengthened their linkages through current military and political alliances. Despite bitter power struggles between faction leaders, the various companies owned by the Pipilka Development Corporation and the Welyi-Kuta Business Group have remained robust, whereas dominant individuals have grabbed Raembka assets.

For the core groups, with a recent history of warfare, business enterprise and elections presented new and exciting arenas of competition in which outstanding scores could be settled. Initially, personal interest was sacrificed in favour of group prestige; a classic case of group sentiments overriding individual goals. Amidst the excitement generated by the competitive manner in which the coalition-style alliances were registered as commercial businesses, coupled with the rapid acquisition of large plantations, there is little chance that anyone would have foreseen a future in which only a few educated and dominant individuals would become increasingly wealthy and powerful at the expense of their tribesmen. In the heady days of the late 1970s and early 1980s — a period characterised by intensive commercial activity and the competitive purchasing of motor vehicles as a direct result of the coffee boom — the group 'name' mattered most.

Dissension crept in only after the money disappeared, when inequalities between leaders and ordinary people became more marked, as reflected by status symbols such as Range Rovers and private education for children of the wealthy compared with fellow tribesmen who travel by PMV and send their children to sub-standard, poorly equipped bush schools; when it dawned on fellow tribesmen that, apart from group pride and prestige, they had no personal stake in these businesses and were therefore unable to influence the direction of these companies; and when it became obvious that some of these companies were suffering from mismanagement and were thus unable to pay dividends because they were broke.

7. The information on Sapom Kipa's removal from the senior management of Welyi-Kuta and subsequently Jimmy Wara's ascendancy was given to me by Ben Kons, a close relative of Wara, who claims to have been present when the cash sum of K30,000 was handed over to the Sapom-led faction. Although there has been some suggestion that Jimmy Wara supported his cross-cousin, Reuben Parua, rather than his own brother, Roman Rombol Wara, during the 1993 Dei Open By-Election, it is not clear whether or not he was in this instance attempting to secure assurances of support from his tribesman for his cousin for 1997. This type of electoral manoeuvring is not uncommon in Hagen. For instance, a family who received a cash sum of K3,000 from Reuben Parua to revitalise the Kul Coffee Plantation in the Baiyer Valley told me in November 1997 that they had to vote for him during the 1997 national elections, despite considerable pressure from their own group who had a home candidate. The man who received the grant was Pana's second cousin.
In Australia, Europe, North America and elsewhere in the industrialised world, these leaders would have been prosecuted and possibly jailed for bankrupting public companies. Either through pillage or negligence, factional leaders of many of these corporations have not registered profits, claiming that they are still repaying bank loans, while shareholders have not received any dividends since these companies began operations more than 20 years ago. The major reason shareholders have not revolted against their leaders is because (a) of the influential roles these leaders played in setting up these businesses; and (b) the substantial contribution towards the purchase of the plantations from the state in the form of development grants which were brokered by some of these factional leaders. Moreover, leaders such as Michael Mel and Puklma Kopi are protected by the Hagen concept of *pukl wua* ('root man'), which means that they are the 'owners' or custodians of these businesses and, by implication, whether they make a profit or not is their businesses, not everyone else's.

In any case, the cleverest leaders are usually those who effectively utilise the specialist skills of traditional big-men and orators to maintain peace and warmth in their relationship with member groups. In exchange for special favours and gifts of mainly cash and beer, skilful orators can easily downplay the economic disparities, whilst emphasising the worthy efforts and enormous achievements of the business leaders in lifting up the name of the group. Special favours may include the sponsorship of big-men to travel to Port Moresby or the northern Queensland city of Cairns for a week of fun and mischief. A commonly used strategy involves the appointment of nominal company directors, representing various segments of a group, who receive a small fee for protecting the interests of the business leaders. These so-called directors have no direct influence over the operation of their companies. But a guaranteed regular income, occasional gifts of beer, and the prestige that goes with such a title may be sufficient inducement to secure their support. It is however important to note that most big-men are vain, self-centred and sometimes indomitable creatures, but definitely not fools. Always seeking new opportunities for maximising their wealth and influence, big-men will accommodate the interests of businessmen and politicians for as long as they feel that such a relationship enhances their own reputation. Prestige is the driving force behind the activities of such men.

Is this really capitalism? Leaders are still mobilising group sentiment (in elections, business and warfare), even if they act as dominant individual capitalists. This is a major weakness (or gap) in the work of Amarshi, Good, and Mortimer (1979) and Donaldson and Good (1981). The Hagen case studies presented here suggest that Marxist models of economic relations and social class systems are inadequate when it comes to analysing business development associations and the behaviour of millionaire businessmen. The common assumption that a small class of owners of capital who control the means of production would dominate the majority of people who have nothing but their labour to sell is hard to justify in light of the evidence presented here.
Nearly all Papua New Guineans are landowners and do not need to sell their labour in order to make a living.

Despite the presence of wealthy capitalists who may associate with other people of similar socioeconomic brackets, all of them are tribesmen and depend on their primary kin-groups for security, emotional well-being and votes; and their political power-base is still the primordial community, not class.

A final point is that there is more cooperation in warfare than in elections or in business, which means that the military alliances are more stable than political and economic alliances. Military alliances generally follow moka networks and are therefore dominated by traditional leaders such as big-men. Political and economic alliances, though founded on military alliances, are more commonly dominated by politicians and businessmen. Conflicts, however, arise when modern and traditional leaders compete for dominance. In the next chapter I discuss a particular type of conflict, group warfare, which was organised along these same coalition-style alliance lines described here and in the previous chapter.
Chapter 5

THE DYNAMICS OF HAGEN WARFARE
Introduction

This chapter deals with warfare as an important arena of political competition and cooperation, previously linked to ceremonial exchange through reparation payments, and nowadays to state-sponsored arenas such as elections and business. Elections, as will become evident in the following chapters, are generally organised along the lines of military alliances discussed here and in the previous chapters. But, as indicated in the previous chapter, there is more reliable cooperation in warfare than in other arenas of competition and cooperation. Evidence presented in this chapter will show that clans of the same tribe may oppose each other in business, elections, and even in minor warfare, but are highly likely to cooperate in major warfare against traditional or perpetual enemies. The high degree of cohesion in warfare can be viewed as a basic survival strategy — with a political dimension. Cooperation between the constituent clans of a tribe was especially vital in pre-colonial times because annihilation was an ever present danger. By no means of lesser significance, was the group 'name' factor, a significant theme which runs throughout this thesis.

Previous studies on PNG Highlands warfare have been approached from various perspectives: functionalist and cultural ecological (Vayda 1967; Rappaport 1984[1968]); and demographic — involving focus on pressure on land and social and social relations (Meggitt 1977); other writers have stressed social and ritual aspects of warfare (Muke 1994); and shifting alliances (A.J. Strathem 1966b; 1971; 1977; 1992). The wide range of social-structural, ecological, political and psychological theories applied to Melanesian warfare has been critically reviewed by Knauf (1990; see also Muke 1994 and O'Hanlon 1995). The value and validity of the various explanations of Melanesian warfare and the historical influences that shaped anthropological perspectives have been assessed by Knauf (1990). By providing insights into the dynamics of Hagen warfare, my study attempts to correct some fallacious assumptions inherent in Western theoretical perspectives on PNG Highlands warfare, and moreover argues that Hageners engage in warfare to ensure that their respective group 'names must not go down'.

Furthermore, this study provides explanations for the persistence of warfare in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, with a special emphasis on cultural and societal 'strength' and institutional 'weakness' in state structures. In a recent paper on social disorder, A.J. Strathem (1993b) discusses state-society interaction and competing legitimacies. Although my overall aim in this thesis is similar to Strathem's — to map competing legitimacies — the main purpose of the present chapter is to provide a more detailed and refined discussion of contemporary Hagen warfare than hitherto available. Accordingly, I present a micro-analysis of warfare, stressing the dynamics of political competition between groups, factions and coalitions and, more specifically,
The Dynamics of Hagen Warfare

on the role of leaders in warfare, particularly in the context of Western influence in terms of new ideas and beliefs such as Christianity and technological innovations such as guns.

The chapter is organised into four parts. The first contains a brief background discussion on Hagen warfare, with a particular emphasis on important distinctions made by Hageners when discussing warfare. The second part contains two case studies of Hagen warfare during the late 1980s, with a view to demonstrating the corporate nature of warfare, the difficulties involved in organising modern warfare, and the conspicuous lack of state intervention. The third part of the chapter looks at the impact of technological innovations, especially the devastating effects of gun warfare and its economic dimensions. The final part of the chapter looks at the contexts of leadership in warfare. In particular, it examines change and continuity in leadership roles in the context of gun warfare and wider social change. A model of Hagen warfare is used to explain some of the complex processes involved. The model encapsulates a general pattern of escalation in disputes and conflict management. The chapter concludes by arguing that Hagen warfare, despite common belief, does not represent societal collapse or disintegration. Rather, it can be fruitfully viewed as a way of asserting authority and restoring order within a weak state.

The Hagen Concept of Warfare

It must be stated at the outset that the term ‘tribal warfare’ can be misleading when loosely used, especially as in media reports. It is misleading because warfare does not involve tribes alone but other levels of group as well. For example, warfare can be a clan matter in some instances, while, in others, it can be at a level higher than the tribe, such as tribe-pairs, coalitions, or other forms of alliance. Tribal warfare, then, involves physical violence between groups. Since definitions, contexts and patterns of Hagen warfare have been adequately treated by others (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3; Muke 1994), I shall only briefly deal with them, in order to allow for fuller discussion of the role of alliance networks as a basis for competition and the role of leaders in warfare, the effects of guns in Hagen warfare, and the political (including electoral) dimensions of that warfare.

Without duplicating the work of others, like Rappaport (1984[1968]) and Meggitt (1977), it is, nevertheless, necessary to mention the major contributing factors behind group warfare. There are many reasons why groups engage in warfare, but it is important to point out that in most cases groups resort to armed conflict either because peaceful avenues of resolving conflicts have

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The Jika Maipngel intra-section warfare of 1986-87 is a good example. During this war Maipngel's two subsections, Rukumb and Andakelkam, fought each other and, consequently, Rukumb, comprising Komapei, Opromb, Milakamb and Muku mana clans, routed the Komb-Akelemb clan-pair, who have since taken up residence with a Mokei section. The adoption of guns, as a technological innovation in Hagen warfare, was first noted in this war.
been totally exhausted, or because circumstances dictate such action. The latter occurs when existing relations between the antagonists have deteriorated to such an extent that peaceful avenues of settling disputes will be deliberately ignored and war will not only be considered inevitable but ideal and noble — very much to do with questions of honour, group ‘name’ or renown, pride and dignity.

Resolving conflicts through violence becomes a more realistic option when a person or group considers an insult caused by some wrongdoing — such as homicide, assault or theft — to be so grave that even the offer of wealth items as compensation payment in generous amounts would not make adequate incentive for appeasement. The reason for this may be found in the Hagen concept which I have identified earlier as *mbi mana nepanka* (‘the name must not go down’). The other is the Hagen concept called *popokl* (‘anger’), which influences the choice to be made. The offer of compensation may be accepted if a person’s *popokl* is not so intense; or conversely, revenge will be chosen if the *popokl* is very intense. A.J. Strathern (1981) makes this point clearly in discussing

...Hagener ways of describing their feelings after a killing or death for which responsibility is imputed: they are angry (*popokl*), and they want to take revenge, to retaliate. Not to do so is to behave like women rather than men. *Only* the sight of wealth, they say, can soothe their feelings and make them amenable to peaceful settlement (1981:7).

What Strathern does not mention is that Hagener also say that *only* revenge or pay-back killing can settle outstanding debts in reciprocal killing. It is often the case that people have long collective memories regarding killings, and when a son fails to avenge his father’s death, the grandson takes over the responsibility, and so on until outstanding debts in reciprocal killings, in the clan or family view, are balanced.

In spite of Christian mission influence, the pay-back mentality (good-for-good and bad-for-bad) still prevails. The key is people’s perceptions regarding positive and negative reciprocity and their notions of a balanced system. Functionalists (for example, Rappaport 1984 [1968]; and Meggitt 1977), however, argue otherwise, but my empirical data, such as Case 2 (Kawelka-Minembi War, described below) suggest that sometimes groups fight for almost purely psychological reasons (see, for example, Standish 1973; Knauf 1990), in which case, of course, functional reasons are secondary considerations.

Hagen warfare typically involves armed conflict between groups with strong military traditions stretching back to pre-colonial times. The rules governing war preparation, battle sequences, and indemnity payment are clearly defined. Moreover, war alliances follow a pattern quite similar to those involving ceremonial exchange networks. Any serious scholarly inquiry into warfare must cover all its dimensions. It cannot be analysed adequately without a historical perspective of
social relations between local groups. Otherwise a great injustice will be done to the subject at hand. Most reasons for fighting mentioned in the media, for instance, are not major contributing factors, but are, in fact, trigger mechanisms. For example, the particular cases of warfare described in the next section of this chapter were both triggered by alcohol-related incidents, yet there were underlying factors which prevented the eventual antagonists from seeking peaceful avenues of conflict resolution — hence, alcohol was blamed for both wars. Groups fight for various reasons, which are quite complex and multifaceted, but informants tend to agree that groups fight mainly over land, suspected and actual killings (including motor vehicle accidents), assault causing serious injury, rape, theft of property (especially pigs), arson, non-payment of compensation, and (nowadays) over election results (see Iamo and Ketan 1992:102-103; see also Standish 1992 for comparable discussion in Simbu).

It is worth mentioning here that any serious attempt to understand the complexities of warfare must allow for the distinctions made by the participants themselves. Hageners, as pointed out by A.J. Strathem (1966b:49), make three basic distinctions in their own accounts of warfare: (1) between the ‘root man of war’ and the ‘ally’ (el pukl wua and kui wua); (2) between major or traditional enemies and minor enemies (el paraka wua and el uninga wua); and (3) between clans which are paired and those which are not. I shall explore these dichotomies of Hagen warfare rather briefly here, but later provide a discussion on how key warfare relationships are maintained (see section on Reparation Payment later in this chapter).

The Hagen term, el pukl wua (lit: ‘fight root man’), is used when referring to the principal instigators of war, as opposed to kui wua (lit: ‘dead man’; or those who died while supporting the ‘fight root man’). In Hagen there is a clear distinction between the pukl wua, as ‘owners’ of the war and the kui wua, who, as allies, must be compensated for assistance rendered and losses sustained. This idea of identifying a person or group as the ‘owner’ of a dispute, wrongdoing or fighting, which is expressed by the term pukl (‘root’, ‘base’) (A.J. Strathem 1981:12), not only facilitates compensation payments but also serves other functions such as retribution. The principal combatants in Case 1, the Remdi Jikambo and the Minembi Nambka clans, for example, were the el pukl wua, whilst the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair were the kui wua to the Remdi (and el uninga wua, minor enemies, to the Minembi).

The second dichotomy of Hagen warfare distinguishes major or traditional enemies from minor enemies. The words, el paraka wua (lit: ‘fight-bird of paradise plumes-man’) translate as ‘the man who fights you wearing his feather head-dress’ (often made of bird of paradise plumes), which means in his full war apparel (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:49). It is a term used when referring to major or traditional enemies who maintain hostile relations in both times of peace and war. A time of peace, in other words, is a truce period, mutually reached for various reasons (for
example, when both sides have had enough of fighting, or when both sides are threatened by famine owing to neglect of food-crop gardens). By contrast, *el uninga wua* (also called *el namb wua*) simply means there is a lesser degree of enmity and centrality in the conflict. It can be used when referring to those assisting a major enemy in war; your major enemy’s allies are the *el uninga wua.*

In *Case 2*, the Kopi (as well as Minembi Kimbo and Klamakae) were seen by the Minembi as *el uninga wua* because of their supporting role to the Kawelka. As pointed out by A.J. Strathem, “in Hagen the rule was that one paid compensation to minor enemies, with whom there was regular intermarriage and exchange. With major enemies matters were much more uncertain” (1981:12). The fact that one paid compensation to minor enemies meant that previously hostile relations could be converted into exchange networks and sometimes into alliance systems. In this way, groups which had in some instances fought against each other as minor enemies were in other instances allied against a major enemy. The phenomenon of group relations alternating between alliance and enmity is quite consistent with an observed pattern of shifting alliances (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3; 1971:Chap.4; see also Kawelka example in *Case 1*).

A third dichotomy deals with the difference between clans which are paired and those which are not. The difference lies in their approach to negotiating each other’s assistance in war. Paired clans, strengthened by intense intermarriage and frequent *moka* exchanges, are ideally automatic allies in warfare, unlike non-paired clans which may not be automatic allies. They may share territory, have usufructuary rights in commonly held gardening land, and in the past they may have given refuge to each other. It is evident from A.J. Strathem’s examination of clan pairs within the Tepuka tribe that paired clans: (1) do speak of themselves as intermarrying closely; (2) do share territory and have given refuge to each other; and that (3) their military situation is such that (a) whilst there may be stick fights between them, which are conflicts of a lesser order of seriousness, they are automatic allies of each other when one is involved with an outside enemy; and (b) whilst there may be some unpleasantness between them over *kui wua* payments, they are never arrayed on opposite sides in a fight; (4) ideally there is no poisoning between them (and A.J.S. found no cases where accusations of such were made); (5) they are linked by the marker word *nukel* (‘pair’), suffixed to their names spoken together; and (6) internal compensations between such groups are continued in the form of *moka* (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:Chap.3; 1971:Chap.4).

While this is a fair assessment of the situation in the Dei Council area, which is characterised by numerous and relatively small tribes, the situation in other parts of Hagen may be slightly different. The military situation in the Hagen Central area, for instance, significantly differs from that of Dei. Hagen Central area, as indicated in *Chapter Three,* is home to the ‘super-tribes’ of Jika, Mokei and Yamka: all of which are quite powerful in terms of numerical strength as well as political influence (often backed up by superior firepower). This means that, on the one hand,
groups below the clan level can hold their own and match others at both the clan and tribal levels in warfare, while on the other hand, they may not become automatic allies when one member of a clan-pair is involved in a fight. Owing to factors of size, strength and Christian mission influence, some paired clans in Hagen Central are not automatic allies. For example, during the Jika Maipngel-Kukilka war, fought in the late 1980s, a section of the Jika Opromb clan allegedly gave safe passage to fleeing Kukilka tribesmen instead of assisting their Jika Komapi clan-pair partners in attacking them.

Christian church membership may have been a factor here. A common response from both Jika and other Hagen informants, when asked why this was allowed to happen, was that the Kukilka were protected by God. Attacking them would have evoked the wrath of God. Their escape from the Jika Komapi troops after leaving their Tipukla and Kukulinga territories, west of Ogelben, was directly likened to that of the Israelites of the Old Testament who, under Moses's leadership, fled from slavery in Egypt and made a dramatic escape from the pursuing Egyptian army by crossing the Red Sea, after "the LORD drove the sea back with a strong east wind [which] blew all night and turned the sea into dry land, [hence] the water was divided, and the Israelites went through the sea on dry ground, with walls of water on both sides" (Exodus 14:21-22). It is said that before the Kukilka left for Kelua and Bagi, they gathered at their Tipukla Church for prayers and collected an offering of cash which they deliberately left behind, knowing full well that their enemies would steal it and therefore be punished by God. Incidentally, the head of the Lutheran Church, Bishop Sanengke, is a Kukilka tribesman, and he has strong ties with the Opromb clan through church work. The Opromb live in and around the Ogelben (also called Uklpeng) Lutheran mission station, which was founded in the early 1930s by the German missionary, Georg Vicedom. In this context, it is clear that the Opromb clan-section's decision not to attack the Kukilka is quite understandable: how could they possibly justify attacking fellow Lutherans and Christian brothers with whom they have shared fellowship for more than fifty years?

However, what is not so clear is the relevance of group size and strength in decisions to do with military alliance. Komapi can hold its own against any similar size group, as it did against the Kukilka tribe. And so would Opromb in a similar situation. Komapi and Opromb are in an unusual situation in the sense that they belong to a single large tribe section, Maipngel, whose clans act independently in most events, have endorsed candidates against one another in national elections, experienced internal fighting in 1986-87, yet still remain an exogamous unit. Another

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2. Indeed, many Hagen informants, including some Komapi leaders, have pointed out to me that the Komapi have consistently been embroiled in conflict after conflict and will continue to do so simply because they committed the ultimate crime by attacking the house of God.
reason why the clan-pair ‘rule’ regarding warfare was ‘broken’ here lies in the Hagen concept described earlier as *popokl* (‘anger’). An offence such as assault evokes *popokl* which makes people want to take revenge, unless compensation is offered. It is even more pronounced in murders, where *popokl* drives people to seek revenge (although in some cases compensation may prevent this). In the Kukilka case, it was the Jika Komapi’s *popokl* over an alleged poisoning of a young Komapi man by a Kukilka man’s wife which gave the Komapi a valid reason to fight. The Oprofmb, however, had no *popokl* with the Kukilka and so did not join their paired clan in attacking them. It is this notion of Hagen reasoning, taking into account the nature of previous relations and the severity of an offence, which determines the outcome of disputes.

Beyond that lies the analytical realm where structural explanations have been offered by anthropologists and other observers. The resurgence of warfare in the 1970s, after colonial administration imposed pacification in the 1940s, has been largely attributed to demographic pressure (see Meggitt 1971, 1977). For example, in the case of the Central Enga, Meggitt (1977) argued that Enga population build-up has meant the inevitable return to warfare, as alternative means of coping with the problem of land shortage have been exhausted. For Hagen, however, this argument does not hold because of factors dealing with recruitment for warfare, business enterprise and election campaigns. In spite of a high population density, which approaches 300 persons per square kilometre in some areas, leaders actively recruit new members, comprising mainly Simbu and Enga immigrants, for both political and economic purposes. Such migrants receive access to garden land, but are dependent on their hosts and patrons. Migrants have at times played vital roles in warfare. In the Remdi-Minembi war, for instance, both Simbu and Enga migrants residing with the Remdi in and around Gumanch coffee plantation fought against the Minembi (see Case 1). Such support can also be extended to election campaigns (see Chapter Six) and to business activities in terms of labour. Thus, the demographic argument cannot be extended to Hagen because land acquired through violent eviction is seldom occupied by the victors for fear of both enemy attack and enemy spirits seeking revenge. Both the Jika Maipngel and the Kawelka-Minembi cases reinforce this point. After the Komb-Akelemb clan-pair were routed during the 1986-87 Maipngel war the Milakamb clan and its allies — Komapi, Oprofmb and Muklmana — deliberately avoided the vacant Puklgimp settlement. Similarly, neither the Kawelka, nor its allies — Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae — showed interest in claiming the former Minembi territory in Tiki for resettlement. In both instances, the most attractive option appeared to be business development (of mainly coffee plantations) on these properties. Labour, however, will remain a major problem because traditional sources of plantation labour recruitment such as the Southern Highlands and Enga currently offer more attractive monetary rewards as a direct consequence of mining and petroleum exploitation in those areas. This is further complicated by the fact that Hageners, for reasons to do with status, do not like working for other Hageners, and recruitment from within the tribe for expanded plantation holdings is
limited by reasons mentioned previously (fear of attack). Recruitment of group 'members' from other provinces as well as encouraging migrant settlements in Western Highlands, therefore, remains a viable option, which is mutually beneficial to the provinces concerned because it eases demographic pressure in some areas (Enga and Simbu) and increases manpower in others (Western Highlands) where plantation labour is scarce. Recruits from other parts of the province and the Highlands region, as indicated in Chapter Three, are sponsored by leaders as part of political strategies, and while their continued 'membership' to Hagen tribes and clans is constantly renewed through participation in corporate activities such as warfare and elections, they never fully relinquish their membership to natal groups in their home provinces. This statement is also applicable to descendants of migrants. I shall now turn to the case studies on Hagen warfare in order to assess the corporate nature of warfare.


The Remdi-Minembi conflict lasted nearly five years. Although the groups were not traditionally major enemies, relations between them had deteriorated to such an extent that armed conflict was inevitable. As indicated in the second and third chapters of this thesis, the plantation acquisition scheme, which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, played a vital role in this conflict. To facilitate participation in the government's plantation acquisition scheme, Remdi and other Pipilka groups (Kimka, Roklaka, and the Nebilyer, Hagen Central and Anglimp residents, Kopi-Nokpa tribe-pair) in 1975 formed into a development association called Pipilka Development Corporation. Pipilka went into competition with a similar group called Welyi-Kuta, comprising mainly the Kombukla-Minembi tribe-pair and their allies in Welyi tribe (see A.J. Strathern 1984; see also Ketan 1996). Pipilka ultimately gained the giant Gumanch Coffee plantation, but lost out on Kugmi, an adjoining portion of land, to prominent Kombukla leaders Pati Wamp and Melchior Pep, who acquired the land on behalf of the Kombukla-Minembi. Pipilka's Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, who share a common territorial boundary with Kombukla, disputed the PNG Land Board decision and consequently war eventuated. While Kimka-Roklaka and Kombukla were the principal combatants, both Minembi and Remdi informants agree that their groups provided assistance to their respective allies. After almost a year of fighting, using mainly traditional weapons such as bows and arrows, a period of mutual truce prevailed in the early 1980s.

Although the Remdi and Minembi groups were not principal combatants during the Kimka-Roklaka versus Kombukla war, their relationship had deteriorated to such an extent that

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3. The plantation, according to one Remdi informant, was formally taken over by the locals in 1985 with a 2.7 million kina bank loan, which was fully repaid in 1993. Such complexities of modern commerce are not fully grasped by Hageners and consequently resulted in a dispute over non-payment of dividends (see Chapters 3-4; see also Chapter Seven).
peaceful avenues of resolving conflicts were ignored when a minor incident involving a
disagreement over a snooker game developed into full-scale warfare. The Remdi-Minembi war
was triggered off by an incident at a village tavern owned and managed by a Remdi tribesman, a
senior government employee in Mount Hagen. Following a disagreement over a snooker table, a
now prominent Minembi leader, then a government employee in Mount Hagen, was alleged to
have ‘confiscated’ the snooker balls, which angered the Remdi caretaker of the premises. A
tussle ensued and during the confusion, someone damaged the caretaker’s testicles.
Compensation was demanded, which the Minembi claimed was to excessive, and Remdi
declared war on Minembi.

During the initial encounters warriors on both sides used traditional weapons — bows and
arrows, shields and spears — and the battle sequences followed shield formation and
manoeuvres which characterise traditional Hagen warfare (see discussion below on The Adoption
of the Gun as a Technological Innovation in Hagen Warfare; see also Muke 1994 and Burton 1990 for
comparison). The turning point of this war was marked by a particular incident now vividly
remembered by warriors on either side and was simply referred to by one Minembi informant as
the “Tenga incident”. While engaged in a battle at the Tenga creek, with opposing troops on
either side of the water, a shotgun went off “accidentally” on the Minembi side. Although no-
one was hurt and no further shots were fired, which suggests that it may in fact have been an
accident, the Remdi were quite convinced that the gun shot was meant to kill someone but the
cartridge failed to find its target.

In hindsight, I am convinced that the shot was neither an accident nor meant to kill someone,
but was an expression of strength, or a flexing of military muscle. If this is correct, then, Remdi
read it well by responding with guns. The fact that it did not take both sides long to come up
with several guns for battle a few days later suggests that this was a war which had deeper (much
deeper) roots and both sides were well-prepared for it. It is believed that some gun-men had
served their apprenticeship in other conflicts prior to this war, whilst a few had technical
knowledge of guns through participation in criminal gang activities (chiefly robbing and
terrorising coffee buyers and expatriate plantation owners and/or managers). Most others had to
learn, which they did very quickly. By the second week, open battlefield tactics were abandoned,
for reasons discussed later in this chapter, and gun-men formed gangs to attack and counter-
attack using raiding and ambush tactics.

Principal Combatants and Allies

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4 The information on the “Tenga incident” was given to me by Mr Bu Phill of the Minembi Napakae clan,
which, together with its clan-pair partner, Nambka, were the ‘fight root man’, or ‘owners’ of this war.
The principal combatants, *elpukl wuna* ('fight root man') or 'owners' of the fight were the Remdi Jikambo and Minembi Nambka clans. The Remdi Jikambo were assisted by a number of groups: some in fighting capacity, such as major allies; and others, especially the minor allies in non-fighting, yet materially supportive roles. Likewise, the Minembi Nambka were assisted by a number of groups. A full list of allies on both sides is given below (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Alliance Systems: Remdi-Minembi War (1984-1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major allies of the Remdi Jikambo clan</th>
<th>Minor allies of the Remdi Jikambo clan</th>
<th>Major allies of the Minembi Nambka</th>
<th>Minor allies of the Minembi Nambka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remdi Elpuklakmo</td>
<td>Nengka</td>
<td>Minembi</td>
<td>Kombukla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remdi Penambembo</td>
<td>Jika Maipngel</td>
<td>Minimbi Papeke</td>
<td>Kumdi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remdi Ropmbo</td>
<td>Yamka</td>
<td>Minimbi Kutmbbo</td>
<td>Jika Andapunts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remdi Kundumbo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimbi</td>
<td>Welyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remdi Ukunimbo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimbi Napakae</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimka</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimbi Mimkae</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roklaka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiklpukla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enga Migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simbu Migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Based on information supplied by Remdi informants: Ivan Tau, Maip Kei, Puklma Kopi and Jerry Yar Rombina of Muglamp, and Minembi informants: Bu Phill, Moga village, and Peter Watinga, Keraldung village, Mount Hagen.

Remdi Jikambo fought according to its structural divisions: Pilembo, Roklomb and Kulemb-Paklembo subclan-pairs. Remdi as a tribe is split across both a Local Government Council and an Open Electorate border. One half comprising predominantly Jikambo and some
Penambembo live in Dei Council (also Dei Open electorate) and are also known as “Lower Remdi”, while the other half comprising the rest of the Remdi clans live in Mul Council (which is part of the Mul-Baiyer Open electorate) and are also known as “Upper Remdi”. In this particular war, Upper Remdi clans, like the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair and Kiklpukla, actively participated as major allies. The Engan and Simbu migrants, who live with the Remdi Jikambo clan and are employed by the Gumanch Coffee Plantation (which is owned mostly by the Jikambo), also participated in fighting as major allies.

Remdi Jikambo’s minor allies — Nengka, Jika Maipngel and some sections of the Yamka — assisted in a largely non-fighting capacity. They provided the links through which resources, including guns and cartridges, were channelled towards the Remdi war effort. As is customary in Hagen, one or two warriors from these groups may have acted independently and strictly on an individual basis to take up arms and fought on the Remdi side. Such men are called *el kentep wua* (‘steal fight man’) and when one of them is killed, the responsibility lies with the ‘owner’ of the fight, not the killer, which means that his group will not normally take upon themselves to avenge his death. The ‘owner’ of the fight will pay compensation, in the same way as allies are compensated for their support and losses sustained. This rule of placing responsibility on the ‘owner’ of the fight acts as a constraint for full-scale confederation-type alliance warfare.

The Remdi also had an active fighting partnership, *el kompani* (‘fight company’, or ‘joint venture-ship’) with the Kawelka (who were involved with the Minembi Andakelkam section), and by extension of its allies, were also in partnership with the Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae (Kawelka’s allies) who were involved with the Nguni and Minembi Andakelkam section with whom they share a common border.

Like their Remdi Jikambo opponents, Minembi Namkla also coopted the assistance of fellow Minembi clans: Ropkembo, Napakae, Mirmkae, Papeke, Kutmbbo and Engambo. They also had a major ally in the Kombukla but here the support was not given in a concerted effort, rather it was mostly on an individual basis, thus we may call Kombukla a minor ally.

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5. Remdi, through its Jikambo clan, has strong connections with the Maipngel section of the Jika, which is Hagen’s biggest tribe. Both Remdi and Jika Maipngel had fought in separate wars, at different times, against another Jika section, Andapunts. That explains why Maipngel supported Remdi while Andapunts threw its weight behind Minembi.
The Dynamics of Hagen Warfare

The figure illustrates the structural organization of Minembi forces against the Remdi-Kawelka fight partnership (El Kompani). The diagram shows the alliances and conflicts among the tribes and their subclans. The source of the information is based on data provided by various individuals from Remdi and Kawelka clans.

Source: Based on information supplied by Ivan Tau, Jerry Yar Rombina, Maip Kei, Puklma Kopi and Pen 'Seholda' Kei of Remdi Jikambo clan; Yap Goimba and Komori Ongky of Kawelka Elpuklmbo sub-subclan; and Bu Phill and Peter Watinga of Minembi Napakae and Nambka clans, respectively.
Figure 5.2: The Hagen *El Kompani* ('Fight Partnership') System.

**Key:**

- **Green:** Active combatants
- **Yellow:** Assisted in fighting on an individual basis
- **Red:** Assisted in a mainly non-fighting capacity

**Legend:**

- **El Paraka Disjunction:** Currently in confederated-style alliance, providing links through which firearms and sensitive information are passed from one conflict to another.

- **El Kompani Disjunction:** The *el paraka* disjunction indicates either historically established major enemy lines or that these groups have recently fought each other in major warfare.
The Dynamics of Hagen Warfare

Notes:

1. Based on information supplied by Ivan Tau, Jerry Yar Robina, Pukina Kopi and Pen 'Seholka' Kei of Remdi Jikambo clan; Yap Goimba, Goimba Onombe and Komorui Onky of Kawelka Elpuklombo sub-subclan; and Bu Phil and Peter Watonga of Minembi Napakae and Namka clans, respectively. Ivan and Kopi in particular were responsible for my education on el kompam systems and how information and resources (including guns) are channelled through alliance networks. Kopi was particularly patient in explaining political strategies, such as the conversion of previously hostile relations into one of moka relations, especially when engaging war with a major enemy. At the inception of the Remdi-Minembi conflict in 1984, for instance, Kopi led a group of Remdi Jikambo leaders into presenting a sum of K500 as moka gifts to their minor enemies, the Jika Kilampi clan (of the Jika Andapunts section), thus converting previously hostile relations into one of friendship. This effectively prevented the Andapunts, as a group, from supporting Minembi (although it is widely believed that some members of the Andapunts section assisted Minembi on an individual basis, mainly in a non-fighting capacity).

2. Although the Kopi-Nokpa are Hagen Central residents, they are part of the Dei Council-based Pipilka alliance, mainly through business activities.

3. The Nguni are not part of the Welyi-Kuta alliance but are listed here because of their role in the Kawelka-Minembi war, as an active fighting partner of the Minembi.

Minembi had an active fighting partnership with the Baiyer resident, Nguni, who were in alliance with the Minembi Andakelkam against the Kawelka-Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakaee alliance.

Minembi’s minor allies were: Kumdi, Jika Andapunts and Welyi. Both Kumdi and Jika Andapunts had scores to settle and may have joined in on individual basis, but Welyi mostly acted as a non-fighting partner by allowing Minembi to use its territories to set up road-blocks against Remdi and Kawelka. Both Kumdi and Kombukla have historical ties with the Minembi. The Kombukla are currently paired with the Minembi and have previously fought together in major wars against other groups such as the Tepuka-Kawelka pair. The Jika Andapunts-Minembi association, however, is a more recent formation, founded on common military grounds—they both had an enemy in Remdi. The Jika Andapunts section, comprising mainly Kilampi, Jilimb, Kundka and Pangaka clans, fought the Remdi in a bow and arrow fight during the 1980s.

It is significant to note here that the Remdi-Jika Andapunts conflict was quickly resolved as a direct consequence of some smart thinking on the part of Remdi military strategists. As the Remdi-Minembi war intensified, Remdi strategists offered a gift in cash (K500) as a token of peace and goodwill to the Jika Kilampi clan of the Andapunts section, thereby effectively preventing Kilampi from mobilising significant fighting blocks as well as preventing Minembi from contracting the Andapunts as a major ally. Following this, moka relations were created.

There is no doubt that Remdi leaders would have taken this opportunity to remind Kilampi leaders that this particular war was a Dei Council matter and Hagen Central groups should keep out of it.
which culminated in presentation of 15 pigs to Remdi by the Kilampi in early 1995. Remdi used the pigs in their *wua peng* compensation to their Kimka-Roklaka allies in January 1995.

The Remdi and Minembi maintained hostile relations for nearly six years, from the inception of war in 1984 until it was concluded in 1989. During this period, nearly forty warriors were killed, almost all in raids and ambushes as battlefields were abandoned (for reasons discussed later in this section), large human populations were displaced (many have yet to reclaim previous settlements, especially those around the Tenga battle-grounds), and no accurate figure can be placed on damage to property which is believed to be in tens of thousands of kina.

Unlike previous inter-group conflicts in which the state played an active role in at least attempting to prevent them from escalating, this particular war was typical of conflicts in the eighties where there was virtually no state intervention. In the 1970s, for instance, police mobile squads, assisted by helicopters, were sent into ‘tribal fighting zones’ to apprehend warriors and restore order, but in the 1980s there were so many fights, at least 22 separate cases in Western Highlands (see *Appendix VII*, see also Iamo and Ketan 1992:104), that police were unable to cope with the situation.

### Table 5.2: War Deaths: Remdi-Minembi War (1984-1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remdi &amp; Allies</th>
<th>No. of Death</th>
<th>Minembi</th>
<th>No. of Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Remdi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Papeke</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Remdi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nambka</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roklaka</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Engambo</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimka</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ropkae</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiklpukla</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Napakae</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enga migrants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rapake</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simbu migrants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mimkae</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Based on information supplied by Ivan Tau, Muglamp, and Peter Watinga, Keraldung village, Mount Hagen.

The Remdi-Minembi war, like numerous others, ended in 1989 not because of state intervention but mainly because the combatants themselves felt that they had had enough of fighting. That

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*The information on the conversion of enmity into moka relations between the Remdi Jikambo and the Jika Kilampi was given to me by prominent Mount Hagen businessman and Remdi big-man, Puklma Kopi, who himself played a significant role here and now enjoys warm relations with the Kilampi. Kopi told me that this was a common ploy put to use successfully by imaginative leaders in the past, but current leaders are sometimes slow to realise the importance of making friendly gestures towards minor enemies when confronted with the prospect of full-scale war against major or traditional enemies (Puklma 1994: personal communication).*
there were nearly equal number of deaths on both sides (see Table 5.2) suggests that debts in reciprocal killings were settled. A church-sponsored peace settlement was endorsed by leaders on both sides and the war was ended in 1989.

However, the process towards accepting the eventual peace settlement was initiated well before the missions stepped in. Prominent individuals, mostly businessmen and senior government employees, related by cross-cutting kin-networks, met on a regular basis in Port Moresby. One of the Minembi leaders who was principally held responsible for the pub incident, which initially triggered the war, has strong personal connections with important Remdi Jikambo leaders through marriage. Also, his Nambka clan has marriage and moka ties with the Jikambo clan. In this regard, the war was viewed by many people as an unfortunate, if not shameful, event which threatened to destroy these special ties. In fact, when an attempt was made on his life at Mount Ambra, whilst travelling to Mount Hagen town for work, many Jikambo leaders realised that they would have caused the death of the husband of their sister and father of her young children. After the attempt he transferred to Port Moresby, where he was allowed to attend those meetings between Remdi and Minembi leaders. The key individuals here were two PNG Defence Force employees, both commissioned officers: one with the rank of Captain, a Nambka clansman who recently resigned with the rank of a Major in 1996 to contest the 1997 national elections; and the other a Jikambo clansman who is currently a Captain in the army. The officers were linked by both work and cross-cutting kinship ties. On this basis, they were able to attract prominent individuals from both Remdi and Minembi to attend informal weekend gatherings at their army barracks residential premises. The gatherings were in the form of barbeques and mumus and were mostly family events, but would invariably coincide with the visit of one or more leaders from home. The fact that these meetings were conducted inside military establishments with visible security precautions such as entry check-points meant that visitors, despite their backgrounds, felt quite comfortable. I personally know both officers quite well and was invited to several of those gatherings in which the conversation, despite the absence of any set-agenda, always revolved around the war: dealing with questions such as why they fought, and how to stop it. It was clear to me that these two officers, for different reasons, were rebuilding

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8 I certainly had confidence in both their intentions and in the security offered by the military establishment, although in one instance I may have been saved by the Nambka army captain from possible harm. I was in his house one evening when some of his clansmen who were visiting from Hagen inquired about me and he told them to leave me alone. Whilst my own group, the Kawelka, were never directly involved with the Nambka, they were nonetheless enemies by virtue of the 'fight partnership' system, which made me an enemy by extension. The danger was more real than apparent because I later learnt to my horror that some Kawelka had assisted the Remdi in at least one battle against the Nambka and they were more fearful than I, even in 1992, long before the war was over. On this occasion, I was doing some research for the PNG Electoral Commission and visited Minembi territory for the first time in over ten years. Although I was accompanied by the same PNGDF officer, my tribesmen (about five men) whom I took with me were so petrified that they almost wet themselves. It was their first time, too, in over a decade since they last entered Minembi territory and came face to face with the enemy.
bridges between themselves and their groups, the Jikambo and Nambka, both el pukl wua, or 'owners' of the war. Without doubt, the heavy burden of responsibility for losses sustained by respective allies was a factor in their calculation, but they were also worried about re-establishing ties. Indeed, an important point frequently raised in these meetings and later taken up by leaders in Hagen was that although gun warfare had caused far too much damage and cut off relatives on both sides, efforts towards restoring ties should be made so that people could “see each other's face” again, especially those of daughters and sisters and their children (and they in turn would see their fathers, brothers and uncles). I now turn to the second case on warfare, before making some general statements about Hagen warfare.

Case 2: The Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990)

The Kawelka and Minembi are traditionally major enemies. Kawelka sections have either individually or collectively fought against Minembi clans in pre-colonial times. The 1986-1990 conflict was triggered off by an incident involving a Kawelka Kundmbo man who died inside Minembi Elyipi territory under dubious circumstances. Although apparently intoxicated with alcohol at the time of his death, and the cause of death was never established, Kawelka suspected foul play and demanded compensation. Denying responsibility, Minembi refused to pay what they considered was a hefty compensation claim, and Kawelka, obviously angered by this treatment, declared war on the Elyipi clan. In the ensuing war, involving nearly five years of brutal deaths and massive destruction of property, a section of Minembi was routed, but not without substantial loss of life and property to Kawelka and its allies. Compared with previous wars, informants claimed that the loss of life and property in this particular war was unusually high, something which has been directly attributed to the adoption of western technological innovations in the form of guns and motor vehicles used mainly for the movement of troops and equipment.

The el pukl wua ('fight root man'), or 'owners' of the fight, were the Kawelka Kundmbo and Minembi Elyipi clans. The Kundmbo were supported by other Kawelka clans, chiefly Membo and, to a lesser extent, Mandembo. They also coopted the services of Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae. All of these groups fought as major allies of Kundmbo.

The historical military situation is that Membo and Mandembo have paired against the Kundmbo-Kimbo pair in minor warfare but combined against Minembi in major warfare during pre-colonial times. The Kimbo are structurally part of the Minembi but have in the past fought against other Minembi clans and are currently in close association with both Kundmbo and Kopi, with whom they are paired together and linked idiomatically as Kopi-Kimbo rakl (a 'pair'), in the same way that clan-pairs are described. The Klamakae have in the past fought against the Membo in minor warfare but are now closely associated through intermarriage and
moka exchanges. All of these groups, including Kimbo (which is a more recent inclusion), are part of a larger but rather loosely organised group called Raembka (see Chapter Three, see also A.J. Strathem 1984; Ketan 1996).

Some assistance was received from the Raembka confederacy, but not in a concerted effort. And, those who came forward to provide assistance did so on individual basis and mostly in a non-fighting capacity, because most Raembka groups remained neutral in principle. However, Kawelka had a solid fighting partnership with the Remdi, Kimka and Roklaka tribes who were engaged in active warfare with a section of the Minembi during the same period (see Case 1 in this chapter).

Like Kundmbo, the Minembi Elyipi clan was assisted by other Minembi clans, mainly Papeke, Engambo, Komonka and Ruprupkae. They were also supported by the Nguni tribe. The historical military situation is that the Papeke-Elyipi are paired, having descended from a pair of brothers, Romnggukl and Waep, and whilst the two have not fought between themselves, there were causes of enmity between them which prevented them from being close allies during the sequences of warfare within living memory (A.J. Strathem 1966b:60-61). The Elyipi are currently in close association with the Tepuka Kengeke, with which they have intense intermarriage and frequent moka exchanges. An explanation for this may be found in that in pre-colonial warfare the Elyipi were attacked by the Numereng section of the Engambo clan and driven out from their old territory at Krapana where the Engambo now are. The Elyipi, as a result were scattered and later reformed in a new territory granted them by the Tepuka Kengeke, hence the Elyipi-Kengeke alliance which subsequently developed across the supposed el paruka disjunction between Tepuka and Minembi (A.J. Strathem 1966b:60). The Komonka-Ruprupkae pair have fought against the Kawelka Membo with the small Klamakae tribe helping them as their neighbours (A.J. Strathem 1966b:63). The Minembi-Nguni association appears to be a more recent formation, founded largely on common military grounds.

Both the Kombukla and Welyi were minor allies of the Minembi and assisted in a largely non-fighting capacity. In addition to supplying resources towards the Minembi war effort, these tribes also allowed Minembi to set up road-blocks within their territories, which resulted in at least two Kawelka deaths. Road-blocks were a key tactic, considering the fact that Kawelka warriors residing at Kuk had to travel all the way to Mbul and into the Baiyer Valley to fight. Along the way, they had to somehow pass Kombukla and Welyi territories without encountering road-blocks. The journeys were always made at night, leaving Kuk after 10.00 p.m. and reaching Kotna before dawn. Half the journey would be covered by vehicles in less than two hours but after Penga it became difficult for vehicles because of road-blocks at the Kuiya bridge and other similarly strategic locations within Welyi territory. A common route taken was to follow the
Highlands Highway down to Kindeng and across to Kondapena, or alternatively to cross over the suspension bridge near Rukmump and into Roklaka-Waklupka territory, and from there follow the old highway back to Penga and try to sneak past Welyi territory in the early hours of the morning. Once past Kotna, they were into Tepuka territory (although they were often wary of possible danger in Kengeke territory because of the Elyipi-Kengeke alliance). The Mount Ambra-Kotna road, although it is more direct and takes considerably less time to reach Penga, was deliberately avoided because more than two-thirds of the distance is within Kombukla territory. The Kombukla were viewed by the Kawelka as an active ally of the Minembi whilst the Welyi were considered as, at the most, sympathetic towards the Minembi.

Overall, it was an extremely difficult war, especially for the Kawelka, in the sense that these long journeys, coupled with shortage of food supply and cartridges, put enormous pressure on the warriors whose task was to drive out the Minembi from Tiki while at the same time protecting their own territories, most of which lie in difficult terrain on the Jimi-Wahgi-Baiyer divide. Initially, many people from within the Raembka alliance provided food and cash but as the war progressed further it became especially difficult to maintain such support. As a result, many warriors who returned to Kuk showed signs of malnutrition, having suffered from lack of food and fatigue. Many of them were reluctant to go back to Mbul, often openly expressing anger at other members of the community, blaming them for lack of support. A few even demanded that fellow clansmen and their families contribute towards trips taken to Port Moresby, ostensibly to purchase more powerful guns and cartridges. Those who did make it to Port Moresby often boasted of almost single-handedly driving out the enemy and demanded that Port Moresby-based clansmen supply food and beer for themselves (so that they could regain weight and strength) and cash for guns and cartridges. At first the Port Moresby-based clansmen felt obligated towards these warriors, whom they considered as protectors of their territorial rights back home, and tolerated their excesses and outrageous demands, but as time went on, they came to realise that some of these ‘great warriors’ were selfishly exploiting the kinship system for personal gain. Although a few of the visitors were in fact warriors with genuine intentions, the others were ‘businessmen’ looking to make a quick profit from re-selling communally purchased cartridges (see discussion on Economics of Gun Warfare). Once this important source of resources was cut off as a direct consequence of human greed it became extremely difficult to maintain the

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9. It is significant to note that the exploitation of the kinship system for personal gain follows a common trend in which urbanites feel that their rural counterparts make far too many demands on them without reciprocal action. The system is supposed to be mutually beneficial in the sense that clansmen who come on visits to urban centres like Port Moresby are given shelter, food and cash by their urban-dwelling kinsmen and when the urbanites return home for visits they are supposed to be taken care of by their rural kinsmen. However, this does not seem to be the case any more. It has become a largely one-way process, where many urbanites have complained of clansmen who have failed to reciprocate and, moreover, are resentful of people who not only fail to reciprocate but also expect and often ask for cash when they visit home.
war effort back home and it was only a matter of time before other options, too, became exhausted, thus bringing the war to conclusion in 1990.

As previously mentioned in the Remdi-Minemb case, here too was a notable absence of state involvement. Apart from instances where state agencies' involvement was specifically requested by the combatants, the state generally failed to take control of the situation in an authoritative manner, even where opportunity presented itself. The state's incapacity was emphasised by its apparent failures in at least two accessions when police action was requested.

The first occurred in January 1987 when the Kawelka and their allies invited the then Provincial Police Commander, Robert Korus, and his deputy, Jeffery Kera, to attend a wina paka funeral ceremony at Mbukl. It was a public ceremony attended by several hundred people, including leaders from neutral groups, who came especially to see if the police would take some kind of action against those responsible for the killing of a Kawelka Kundmbo man (which triggered the war). Whilst both Korus and Kera were personally in favour of a peaceful settlement and promised that some sort of action would be taken, they were unable to back their words because of lack of resources and eventually the rugged nature of the terrain and Minemb's unwillingness to hand over the alleged killer conspired against the officers.

The second incident occurred in July 1989 when a Church-sponsored truce was violated by the Minembi through the killing of a Kawelka Kundmbo man, Kupakl. Prior to and possibly because of the higher priority of the Western Highlands Provincial Government elections in June 1988, leaders from both sides agreed to a peace proposal jointly submitted by the Lutheran and Catholic churches (in consultation with the Provincial Peace and Good Order Committee). The truce ceremony was witnessed by representatives from missions, the Provincial Government and members of the Police Department. Whilst the details of the agreement were not available, it was, nonetheless, evident from the speeches made at Kupakl's funeral ceremony that representatives from both Kawelka and Minembi had signed the agreement pledging that they would take responsibility for any violation of the truce. Precisely what course of action would be taken in the instance of truce violation, it seems, was not stated in the agreement, because that proved to be a point of contention in the debates that followed. Since the final peace settlement, which signals the conclusion of war, was never held, the Minembi, who obviously felt that the debts in reciprocal killings had not been balanced, set up the road-block at Kenimba (inside Kombukla territory) in which the Kundmbo man was killed (see Election Case II: 1995 Western Highlands Provincial Elections). Consequently, the Kawelka invited provincial government officials and the Provincial Police Commander to attend the funeral ceremony at Kuk-Rungamundi village in an attempt to press home the point that Minembi had violated a state-sanctioned truce.
The significance of the truce agreement, or lack of it, was questioned by many speakers who wanted to know what course of action the state was going to take. This point was clearly expressed by the Jika Kilampi councillor, David Maip, who said:

This agreement that you [state representatives] made them [Kawelka and Minembi leaders] sign, what kind of agreement is it? Does it empower you to take [punitive] action against those who have violated it? If it does, then you should send the police in to take appropriate action [raid villages, apprehend the killers, and take the leaders into custody]. When you made that agreement, what kind of power did you have? You should now use that power against the violators [Minembi] (Ketan 1989b).

Although the then Acting Provincial Secretary, Oseah John10, and the Provincial Police Commander, Samson Mapi, were quite sympathetic and promised to look into the matter, it was obvious that their investigations were hampered by lack of resources. In the end no action was taken and the groups returned to take up where they left off. Hostile relations were maintained until 1990 when a peace settlement was finally reached. Between 1986 and 1990, a total of about forty warriors were killed, twenty from Kawelka and its allies and about the same number from Minembi11. Most of these deaths resulted from raids and ambushes. Battlefields, as mentioned earlier, were abandoned soon after guns were introduced into this war during the early part of 1987. The reasons for the change of tactics, from battlefields to raids and ambushes, are discussed later in this chapter (see *The Adoption of the Gun as a Technological Innovation in Hagen Warfare*). The unusually high number of deaths on both sides has been attributed to the change in tactics and the use of guns. A large majority of deaths on the Kawelka side, for example, resulted from cartridge wounds and nearly all, except Kupakl and a young Membo man, were victims of enemy raids and ambushes.

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10. Oseah John, a devout Christian with exceptionally high work ethics, often went beyond the call of duty to assist in restoring order in conflict situations throughout Western Highlands, but without the support of local public servants and the police force, his efforts almost inevitably failed to bear much success.

11. The number of women and children killed during this war is unknown. Considering that the war had been fought outside of the battlefields, casualties of war, especially in raids, did include non-combatants, which means that the total number of deaths on both sides is much higher than the figures given here.
Table 5.3: War Deaths: Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kawelka &amp; Allies</th>
<th>No. of Deaths</th>
<th>Minembi</th>
<th>No. of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kawelka Membo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>all clans</td>
<td>c.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawelka Kundmbo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nguni</td>
<td>c.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopon Kapi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minembi Kimbo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klamakae</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurupmbo-Klambo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>c.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information supplied by Yap Goimba and Komori Ongky, Kuk-Mbakla Village, Mount Hagen.

Note: Informants maintain that the Kawelka Kurupmbo-Klambo clan-pair did not lose any men because only a handful took part in the war. Membo and Kundmbo were the major participants. A Kumdi Oynamb man, listed above as 'other', married into the Membo clan and residing at Kuk, was killed while fighting on the Kawelka side.

I have excluded actual names of individuals elsewhere but, here, owing to its relevance to the discussion on compensation, the names of war dead are listed.

Table 5.4: A breakdown of Kawelka and allies deaths, by group (clan and tribe).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kawelka Membo</th>
<th>Kawelka Kundmbo</th>
<th>Kopi</th>
<th>Minembi Kimbo</th>
<th>Klamakae</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pengk Kakl</td>
<td>Palim Kun</td>
<td>Mok</td>
<td>Tu</td>
<td>Ken Kewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumi Karl</td>
<td>Kel Raem</td>
<td>Pot</td>
<td>Kuri</td>
<td>Kerow Kupri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketipa Raklpa</td>
<td>John Pangk</td>
<td>Koim Mok</td>
<td>Kepha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wump Pengk²</td>
<td>Umdi Romba</td>
<td>Wanga's bro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruk Tiki</td>
<td>Kupakl²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nopa¹</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information supplied by Yap Goimba and Komori Ongky, Kuk-Mbakla Village, Mount Hagen.

1. Originally of the Kumdi Oynamb clan but residing with his Kawelka Membo wife inside Kawelka territory at the time of his death. He fought as a Kawelka against Minembi and may have faced fellow Kumdi tribesmen at some stage of the war. His clan received mostly pigs as compensation from the Kawelka.

2. All of these, except Kupakl and Wump, were warriors killed in action or 'line of duty'. Kupakl was killed in an enemy road-block whilst travelling from Kuk to Mбуkl on the Kotma-Tiki road, whilst Wump (who lost his father, Pengk, in an enemy raid only weeks earlier) was killed in an enemy road-block on the Hagen-Bayer-Tiki road.
The Adoption of the Gun as a Technological Innovation in Hagen Warfare

An overwhelming majority of deaths on both sides resulted not from pitched battles, as we would expect from normal Hagen warfare, where opposing troops are arranged in prepared positions on pre-arranged set battlefields, but from pre-dawn raids and ambushes. What made this an unusual war was the role played by politicians and the way in which new resources, or Western technological innovations, dramatically altered the pattern of warfare, specifically in terms of combat strategies and their effect on both combatants and non-combatants. As will become clear in the next chapter, politicians and their henchmen, as part of electoral manoeuvring, are some of the major suppliers of guns and cartridges used in warfare (see Chapter Six; see also A.J. Strathern 1993). They are also known to have supplied vehicles used in raids and the general movement of troops, as well as giving financial and other aid to victims of war.

The use of guns in particular has added an extremely dangerous dimension to Hagen warfare, resulting in more fatalities because of a general shift in emphasis from one largely based on display and adornment to that of ambush and slaughter. The adoption of guns in warfare has meant that battles fought with bow and arrows on designated fields, watched by neutral spectators, is now a thing of the past. Whilst pre-gun battles were serious confrontations and should not be compared to football matches, it is important to realise that firstly warriors in war dress were on display, both as a group exhibiting tribal might as well as individual fighting prowess, and secondly, the chances of dying from arrow wounds were quite minimal. In fact, many have survived from injuries inflicted by arrows. And, furthermore, as noted by Muke, “in traditional [pre-gun, or bow and arrow] fights, only a few men were killed in a single encounter and in some instances, the war lasted for several months or even years without war deaths” (1994:112). Hagen battle scenes are characterised by weaving and dodging combatants so it is almost impossible to target the heart of someone in perpetual motion, even by competent marksman.

However, it is also important to mention that combatants can die from such battles. According to accounts of warfare given to me by Hagen informants, deaths on a battlefield occur when one group is forced by the other to withdraw. If the weaker group withdraws in a structured manner, where the front-line shield-men and their archers’ withdrawal is covered by the flank archers, deaths can be avoided, and they can regroup to fight again or call it off till another day. If, however, they receive no such cover and flee, deaths cannot be avoided because they will be easy targets for enemy archers and spearmen (who are also shield carriers). In such situations, the seriously injured can be left behind with no protection. Here shield-men are very important because they can save their stricken comrades from being hacked to death. By planting a shield firmly on the ground in front of the stricken man and at the same time holding off the pursuing
enemy with an axe or spear can buy precious minutes in which the wounded can be rescued by fellow kinsmen. But if no such rescue team or backup is forthcoming, the shield-man must abandon the rescue attempt and try to save himself, or he, too, will be hacked to death. It is because of this possibility that brothers, fathers and sons, and cousins fight side by side in battle. It is said that only an immediate relative, or in special cases, a good friend, will come back to rescue you when you're facing the axe. Even if one is already dead from an arrow or spear wound, relatives will still try and save the body from being hacked. This is because a mutilated or disfigured body has a particularly demoralising effect on warriors. Younger and inexperienced warriors, therefore, are never allowed near a hacked body. Likewise, immediate relatives, especially women and children of the deceased, will be prevented from seeing the body, in the hope that it will not add to their anguish and he will be remembered as he was before the battle.

On the other hand, men who have used an axe to kill in battle are described as those 'without spirits/souls' (min pi-napetim), or with 'dead blood' in their veins (memu ksurum). It is a highly specialised task, handled by a very few and only by those who have the stomach for the job, or the killer instinct. It is said that they have permanent bloodshot eyes, from having seen too much blood, and generally avoid pork because a butchered pig reminds them of exposed human flesh. Their axes are jealously guarded and women and children are forbidden from touching them for fear of retaliation from the spirits of the victims. Such men are generally despotic in nature and are both feared and admired by other members of their groups. While the power relations between warriors such as those mentioned above and other members of society are discussed in the section on the Context of Leaders in Warfare, here I turn to the history of guns and the effects of gun warfare.

Guns were first introduced into Hagen warfare in 1986 during intra-sectional fighting within the Jika in Hagen Central, but soon spread to other areas in inter-group conflicts, such as Dei (Remdi-Minembi; Kawelka-Minembi); Nebilyer (Kukliga-Uklga); and South Wahgi (Konumbka-Kondika). Guns are passed from one conflict to another through social networks, just the same way in which dance costumes and head-dress do in times of moka and other festivities. Both guns and dance costumes, especially the kei wal head-dress (which are largely made of Raggiana and King of Saxony sprays), are valued scarce resources. Ownership of the kei wal, for example, is limited to enterprising individuals who loan them out to members of a group staging a dance. After the dance, pigs will be killed and choice pork bits and, in many instances, cash will be presented to owners of the kei wal. Similarly, owners of guns will be rewarded with pigs and

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12 Reciprocal hacking exists where fighting is especially brutal and only between major enemies. In less brutal encounters, the bodies of warriors killed with arrows or spears are left behind on the battlefield for neutral groups to collect and return to respective groups for funeral ceremonies.

cash, or votes in some instances, for guns used in warfare. Initially, when guns were in short supply, owners regularly loaned them out for cash payments. The same guns used in warfare were also used in armed robberies, thus making it difficult for law enforcement agencies to apprehend criminals because of their value as warriors to their groups. In a few cases, owners of powerful guns were allegedly hired as mercenaries to fight in other people’s wars. In the Wahgi ‘border war’, for instance, I was told by South Wahgi informants that mercenaries fought for women in addition to cash and other economic resources. In the Kondika-Konumbka war, Muke (1994) mentioned the involvement of mercenaries from Hagen. And, during the Remdi-Minembi war, it was reported that a Daru man fought on the Minembi side while some Engans and Simbus fought on the Remdi side. The hiring of warriors, or mercenary killers, does not seem to be a new phenomena, as it is evident from Georg Vicedom’s description of a man called Ko of the Yamka tribe who claimed that:

> When the Kuthi [Kuli] fought, their brothers said to me: Kill Ketla [Keli] Pora, this rich man, for us. You are the man who kills people. We do not ask more of you. Only kill this one for us. I joined up with two men of the Keme. We went and killed the man. The Ketla [Keli], however, came and asked [for] compensation. I paid them a string of cowrie shells and my Jamka [Yamka] added something else. The Kuti [Kuli], however, killed pigs [and] gave us the meat and paid also with valuables. This I took and distributed amongst my people. I kept only one cowrie string and some meat for myself (Vicedom and Tischner 1983 [1943-48], Vol.1:81).

The life history of Yamka Ko suggests that he was of a despotic nature and was both feared and admired by the people. I take up his story latter in this chapter (see Context of Leadership in Warfare).

Presently every clan has its own collection of guns, which means that any group in conflict with another of comparable size can hold its own in war. But the battles, such as the one described earlier, are no longer possible. Battles have been replaced by raids and ambushes.

Traditional battle formation, involving shield-men in the front-line with archers fighting out of the wings and returning for cover behind the shield formation, was no longer possible because shield-men could not defend against guns which can easily penetrate the wooden shields. In both the Remdi-Minembi and Kawelka-Minembi wars the principal battlefields of Tenga and Golke, respectively, were abandoned after the first shots were fired. Some tried corrugated roofing metal sheets for shields but these, too, proved ineffective against guns. In South Wahgi, John Muke, who observed the Konumbka-Kondika war in which guns were introduced in September 1989, reported that:

> ...shield carriers are sitting ducks during gun warfare: the Kondika lost seven men in two set piece moves within a single week. Three were shot in one set piece move and four were shot in another formal combat. All of them were shield carriers (Muke 1994:254).
The devastating impact of guns on shields and men resulted in the transition from battlefields to raids and ambushes. A typical raid would involve five to ten young warriors sneaking into enemy territory, under the cover of darkness during the early hours of the morning, and killing anyone found before returning home. In the Kawelka-Minembi case, for instance, I was told that young warriors from Kawelka and its Kopi-Kimbo allied groups would travel from Tiki, cross over the Miti Ku mountains, through Minembi territories, and follow the ridge into Remdi territories at Muglamp. Similarly, Minembi and Nguni warriors would sneak into Kawelka, Kopi and Kimbo territories in their search-and-destroy missions, and in one particular instance, killed three Kawelka at their Mope territories. A similar pattern of warfare was observed in South Wahgi, during the Konumbka-Kondika war, where Muke (1994) reported that:

After the loss of seven men within a single week the Kondika abandoned the idea of carrying wooden shields. A similar shock-wave was generated throughout the Konumbka fighting forces. The ‘fight husbands’ and the ‘bone shield men’ felt reluctant to go in the front-line. From mid December 1989 to January 1990, the Kondika used ambush tactics instead. The traditional battlefields were abandoned and some of the Kondika young warriors formed gangs and made a number of raids into Konumbka territory around Minj town from strategically convenient places. The war was now in the hands of the young men and they conducted a kind of war without any rules at all (Muke 1994:255).

Muke’s point on rules of warfare is a significant one because in these seek-and-destroy missions young men are known to have been involved in indiscriminate killing — of both combatants and non-combatants, including women and children — which is not a feature of traditional Hagen warfare. In a particular raid, for instance, I was told that a woman was killed and a couple of young boys, both under ten years, were almost killed, but were saved by an older member of the raiding party. He pleaded with the younger members of his team not to kill the boys and was allowed to bring them back with him14. This is perhaps the only instance in which a traditional rule on prohibition against the killing of women and children was observed, mainly because of the presence of an older man who still believed in the rules of warfare. Otherwise, both the Remdi-Minembi and Kawelka-Minembi wars indicate characteristics of unrestricted warfare, such as those of traditional Eastern Highlands warfare (see Feil 1987: Chap.4). Following Langness (1972), D.K. Feil makes a useful distinction between types of warfare in the Highlands: the practice of unrestricted warfare in eastern highlands and restricted warfare in western highlands societies. Unrestricted warfare, according to Feil (1987:68), “is waged in the total absence of ‘rules’ and not invariably linked to specific incidents or motives. It is general, pervasive and perpetual warfare between groups more corporate than those that wage restricted warfare.” He further suggested that “this ‘absence of rules’ involves, among other things, a less

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14. One of the boys was given to a man as a replacement for his own son who was killed by the enemy, while the other was raised by the man who saved their lives. They lived amongst the enemy for the duration of the war and were only recently returned after negotiations initiated by the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG).
The Dynamics of Hagen Warfare

complex and interlocking set of constraints on individual choice determining participation in a given war, such that more united and corporate fighting units can wage war” (ibid). For ethnographical accounts of unrestricted warfare in Eastern Highlands societies, see J. Watson (1983) on Tairora; see also Langness (1964) on Bena Bena; Read (1955) on Gahuku-Gama; and Robbins (1982) on Auyana. For accounts of restricted warfare in the Western Highlands, see Brandewie (1981) on the Kumdi of Western Melpa; see also Reay (1959) and especially Muke (1994) on the Kuma of South Wahgi; and A.J. Strathern (1971) on the Northern Melpa.

In gun warfare, it is mostly young men with knowledge of guns who organise raids and set up ambushes for counter-raids. The ‘traditional’ big-men who played a general’s role in pre-gun warfare have little or no say at all in these matters, which indicates that guns have also affected the balance of power, a significant point to which I shall return to later. But, here, I discuss the economics of gun warfare.

The Economics of Gun Warfare

Some of the costs of warfare, such as loss of human lives and destruction of property, are more obvious than others as a result of mass-media coverage and people can more easily relate to them because of physical or tangible evidence. Other costs, by contrast, are not so obvious principally because of problems in quantifying and sometimes it is difficult to put a price on things like psychological effects of warfare. However, by establishing the cost of guns and cartridges used in warfare during specified periods in relation to major source of income, it is possible to get some impression of the economics of gun warfare.

In 1987, when guns were introduced into a number of conflicts in Hagen, a colleague and I were told that an average clan of 100-200 fighting men out of a total population of 2,000-5,000 persons would have 20-50 guns (both factory-made and home-made). A particular clan, which has an exceptionally large number of its members in the disciplined forces (military and police) as well as other key positions in government (both politicians and public servants) as well as the private sector, was claimed to have more than 50 guns, including a number of high-powered semi-automatic weapons. Many others with smaller populations were said to have fewer than ten guns each. We were also told that during heavy fighting periods, of up to a week or more in certain cases, a gun-man can fire as many as twenty cartridges in a single day. Since cartridges are scarce and costly, at a retail price of K2.50 per cartridge and at a black-market price of K5.00 per cartridge, we estimated that one gun-man could fire an average of twenty cartridges in one week. If, however, in the unlikely event that he did fire up to 20 cartridges per day for seven days or more, he would most likely end up firing blank shots, getting himself killed, or bankrupting his group. I shall return to this point later but first a word on the number of guns.
As it is customary for Hageners to deliberately inflate figures as part of war propaganda, we reached a conclusion that a more accurate figure would be ten guns per clan. That would have been a more likely figure in 1987. But soon after that, many clans sent out representatives, with thousands of kina, to purchase guns mainly from criminal gangs in Port Moresby and Lae. Some buyers came as far as Australia and, according to Hagen informants, several returned to Hagen (via Torres Strait) with guns. A more likely figure, thus, would be 50 guns per clan (c.5,000 persons). At K250 black-market price, 50 single-shot guns work out to K12,500 per clan. High-powered self-loading rifles and semi-automatic weapons would, of course, cost a lot more than that.

Despite restrictions on cartridge sales in 1986 and 1987, cartridges were easily available from Chinese shops at Boroko, National Capital District, for K2.50 per shot-gun cartridge, and could be transported to Mount Hagen without much trouble at all. At more than K5.00 per cartridge on the black-market, businessmen and others saw this as an opportunity and freighted in thousands of kina worth of cartridges. One particular 'businessman', a Kawelka Membo clansman, who profited from the Kawelka-Minembi war by selling cartridges to his own clansmen at a high price, was caught at Jacksons Airport in 1989 and jailed, but later escaped from police custody while being transported to the Boroko District Court house.

Based on an estimate of 50 guns per clan and cartridges at K5.00 black-market price, held constant, and the number of shots and the number of days, treated as variables, the cost of cartridges, in PNG Kina, can be worked out in the following manner (see Table 5.5).

Table 5.5: The cost of cartridges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1 shot</th>
<th>5 shots</th>
<th>10 shots</th>
<th>20 shots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 week (7 days)</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>8,750</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 month (30 days)</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 year (365 days)</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>456,250</td>
<td>912,000</td>
<td>1,825,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A single shot per day is tactically impossible because the initial confrontations before the abandonment of battlefields most certainly would have required more than one shot fired from each gun. Even in raids gun-men would rarely be restricted to a single cartridge each. Conversely, each gun-man could fire 20 shots in a single battle, but a raid would not require that many shots, except in the instance of being ambushed while out on a raid. In such a scenario — where each gun-man fired 20 rounds — a single day's fighting would cost K5,000, and K35,000 if the trend continued for a week, while one month's cost would be K150,000. If the intensity was continued for a year, it would cost a staggering 1.8 million kina, but that is practically
impossible, even if guns were rotated amongst any combination of men. However, 10-20 shots fired by each gun-man, each day for a month or more, is possible but would still cost between K75,000 and K150,000, which is a lot of money and almost impossible to raise during a war. If cartridges for just a single month cost that much money, imagine how much it would cost in five years, in addition to food, transport, and the cost to property. Apart from the cost of property damaged by the war, the war effort alone would have cost at least one million kina each year. How was the money raised?

At first regular collections were made, but once the coffee trees, due to years of neglect, stopped bearing cherries, people were forced into alternative crops. Food crops are an alternative to coffee but marketing was a problem. People travelling to and returning from markets can be easy targets for enemy patrols. Eventually, many people resorted to the cultivation and sale of marijuana crops. Large gardens of the drug were cultivated, usually under coffee trees or amongst other crops such as bananas, and the product was flown into Port Moresby where it was sold to mostly expatriate dealers but also to middlemen (mostly educated nationals with overseas connections). Highlands-grown marijuana is reputed to be of a distinctively high quality and is in great demand on overseas black-markets. Compared with coffee, marijuana fetches good money (according to one police source, between K300 to K500 per kilogram) but because of harsh penalties, many people were scared and it is mostly young men who were — and still are — actually involved in the trade. Whilst individual cultivators claimed that income derived from the sale of the drug is solely for the war effort and are therefore protected from the police, some young men (like our cartridges-smuggling ‘businessman’ mentioned earlier) were greedy and often kept the money for themselves, telling their clansmen that they were unable to sell the product in Port Moresby. In this regard, marijuana as a source of income for the war effort was not very reliable.

In contrast, a more reliable source of income was provided by clansmen residing in Port Moresby and other parts of the country. Boxes of cartridges were regularly sent home and, in some instances, guns and cash were also sent. Among the Wahgi a similar pattern was continued: in one case, a clansman living overseas at the time told me that he had sent half of his

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15. According to Bruce Harris, formerly of the Department of Finance and Planning, PNG Highlands-grown marijuana, called New Guinea Gold, is in great demand on the streets of Los Angeles (Public Lecture on razed gangs at Bomana CIS Officers' Mess in September 1990).

16. However, as pointed out to me by Sinclair Dinnen, it is extremely difficult to generalise about the price of marijuana. It is mainly dependent on a number of factors, including geographical location, social relations, type of market (such as local uis-uisi international), and seasonal availability of cash (for example, during coffee seasons and elections). The big trade in marijuana, Dinnen says, is between the Highlands growers and expatriate buyers in the northern parts of Australia, but the Americans have intercepted some of the trade via Hawaii. The flow of marijuana from PNG to Australia basically follows the same route in which guns and bullets travel in the opposite direction, via the Torres Strait (personal communication, August 1996).
annual salary towards the war effort. But the major contributors here were politicians and aspiring politicians — a more detailed examination of their role is attempted in the next chapter (see also section on Contexts of Leadership in Warfare in this chapter).

An important point worth mentioning here is in the role played by PNG national middlemen in both shot-gun cartridges and marijuana businesses. The marijuana cultivator, just as the gunman, is an ordinary villager with no knowledge of the international firearms and drugs trade, nor does his personal network extend to overseas connections. It is precisely those with overseas connections that profit most from guns and drugs. Whilst my data on the middleman is inconclusive, I can only speculate that those who reap considerable profits are some of the country's most wealthy and powerful individuals who are well-connected to take advantage of such opportunities. People like our friend the village cartridge 'businessman' makes peanuts compared with what our elite make through illegal sale of firearms and drugs. I now turn to the role of leaders in warfare and discuss the implications of gun warfare on Hagen leadership.

Context of Leadership in Warfare

There are a number of leadership roles in Hagen warfare, just as in other aspects of society, but a major difference lies in the emphasis by observers. A.J. Strathern (1966b:362-365) mentioned two aspects of leadership in warfare: (1) the leader's own ability in fighting; and (2) his judgement on when to make war and peace. J.D. Muke (1994:Chap.3) presents a cycle of Wahgi warfare comprising five stages, ranging from war preparations to peace settlement and festivities, in which any one of the stages would require leadership roles (although Muke was not quite explicit here). I have presented a similar cycle elsewhere (Ketan 1989a). I explore some of these aspects of leadership in the context of gun warfare and extend the discussion to leadership roles in rituals on war deaths. A major aim here is to assess the level of change and/or continuity in aspects of leadership in Hagen warfare. It basically follows the model of Hagen warfare I have sketched below:
Phase I: Dispute

This is the first phase of a cycle in which human behaviour is governed by definite rules, and leadership roles are clearly marked by culture. Disputes in general arise from both perceptions of insult and actual assault on person. Acts of violence resulting in loss of blood, limb or organ, are serious matters which can be resolved through compensation or reciprocal acts of violence. Homicide, either by design or accident, is an ultimate act of violence which can be reciprocated by way of pay-back killing or alternatively resolved peacefully through compensation payment. Disputes may also arise from theft and damage of property, sexual offences such as rape and adultery, and use of someone else’s land without prior permission. In all of these the use of wealth items of pigs and cash play an important part in determining the final outcome of
disputes in the sense that in principle they 'replace' stolen or damaged property, blood spilt, and life taken. Compensation for property is called *kumop*, which Marilyn Strathern (1972) calls restitution\(^ {17} \), for assault resulting in injury is called *mena pentemen* ('putting back blood'), and for homicide is called *nnta metemen* ('carrying or bearing a man')\(^ {18} \). However, as pointed out by A.J. Strathern (1981:8), it may happen, of course, that people choose revenge rather than compensation. This is particularly true in homicide cases involving groups which presently maintain hostile relations or have a recent history of warfare. A.J. Strathern stated that "revenge is likely to be chosen only between major political enemies who also have other scores to pay off. That is, a group dimension is involved, and groups have a history of disputes which may include a number of loose ends waiting to be sorted out" (1981:8). The decision to choose revenge, or not to, is weighted by factors of social propinquity (the offender's relative position within the victim's personal social network), the nature of group relations (alliance or enmity), and severity of offence\(^ {19} \).

If fighting between brothers or lineage members ('father-and-sons'), for instance, resulted in severe injuries, it would not lead to armed conflict because it is within the family, and other members will try to prevent such fights from escalating rather than taking sides. When asked why revenge is not an option a common reply from informants is that these are family fights, which side shall we fight on? Homicide resulting from lineage fights are very rare and are treated as a major disaster.\(^ {20} \) If, however, fighting between members of two different tribes resulted in serious injuries or homicide, armed conflict was more likely than if the antagonists belonged to the same tribe. Armed conflict was even less likely if the antagonists were members of the same clan or subclan. The closer the relationship the less likely the chance of armed conflict. Below

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\(^ {17} \) Property compensation payments, according to A.M. Strathern, fell into two main categories: (1) restitution, where amounts equivalent to the value of the stolen item, damage to property or previous debt, were returned; and (2) reconciliation payments, which were paid when the injury had no cost in material terms but where a breach of norms had to be recognised or relations brought back to some equilibrium (1972a:25).

\(^ {18} \) The phrase, *nnta metemen*, as noted by A.J. Strathern (1981:7), tells us that the wealth stands in direct replacement of the man who has been lost, and can be used to obtain a new group member, for example, by payments for a new bride who will bear children for the kin group which has received the compensation.

\(^ {19} \) In his discussion of hostile relations between the Maring groups (neighbours of the Hagen), R.A. Rappaport reached a similar conclusion. "A violent episode between single or a few members of a pair of groups did not in all cases lead to inter-group armed conflict. Whether or not it did seems to have been mainly dependent upon (1) the results of the violence; and (2) the previous relations of the two groups" (1984:110).

\(^ {20} \) Paul Sillitoe makes a similar observation among the Wola of Mendi. During fights between relatives, witnesses would intervene and part them for fear of serious injury. "It is unlikely that other men will join in the fight, and if a dispute does escalate into a fight between the disputants' relatives, they will try not to injure seriously or kill one another because to do so would be an unthinkable and tragic thing" (Sillitoe 1981:72).
the clan level armed conflict is not allowed — and compensation is encouraged as a way of resolving disputes.

However, there are instances where less-than-fatal or minor injuries which have led to armed conflict between clans of the same tribe. In the early 1980s fighting within the Kumdi tribe of Mul Council was triggered by what seemed to be a minor incident, during a ceremonial dance, involving young boys shooting at each other with coffee beans projected from bamboo blow-pipes. One of the projectiles missed its intended target and found its mark amongst the dancers. A male dancer sustained an eye injury and the alleged culprit was attacked by the victim's kinsmen. The boy's kinsmen retaliated and what seemed to be a minor incident led to armed conflict, now known as the Kumdi *kopi mong el* ('Kumdi coffee bean fight'). Although the circumstances surrounding this conflict are less understood, it is, nonetheless, clear to me that one of the antagonists, the Kumdi Oynam clan, shares with other Kumdi clans less than warm relations. It has, for example, a history of warfare in which individuals have gone against tribal policy and fought for groups which are opposed to those in alliance with Kumdi.

Having sketched the likely scenarios, I now turn to the question of leadership role in disputes. Who decides whether or not to choose revenge? How do individuals reach a decision on the outcome of a decision? It is mostly big-men with knowledge of past relations and current connections, through *moka* and marriage ties, with big-men of other groups who influence decisions regarding revenge or compensation. Big-men are forceful public speakers and can easily persuade others to take up arms or to ask for compensation. But the decision to seek revenge usually takes more than sheer power of a big-man's words. And a decision to take up arms does not instantaneously result from a single incident. It is, in fact, based on a number of events or offences, to which a big-man makes reference in his *elik* ('fight talk') speeches. It is his ability to sum up a situation, in this case, one of a deteriorating relations between his own and the offending group, that makes a big-man a powerful instigator of war (or of peace). In cases where previous transgressions have not been adequately addressed through compensation, and *moka* and marriage ties between the two groups are minimal or virtually non-existent, most people would agree that revenge should be sought for a killing. A big-man would weigh up the situation carefully and if he stands to lose nothing personally and the tribe can hold its own in terms of strength in numbers and nowadays firepower, or is able to draw support from its allies, he then proceeds to advocate armed confrontation. Since the relations between the groups, due to recurring negative reciprocity (reciprocal theft, assault, rape and such), has reached a point beyond which it can no longer be salvaged, a big-man's suggestion to seek revenge through...

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21. See, for example, Kawelka-Minembi War in which a Kumdi Oynam clansman was killed while fighting on the Kawelka side. In a system of fight partnerships (*el kampari*), Minembi received assistance on an individual basis from Kumdi, just as Kawelka did from Remdi, so a Oynam man fighting against Minembi was certainly not in line with corporate or tribal interests.
armed combat is merely restating a view that is already collectively held. Once a decision is consensually reached, after each spokesman of the different sub-groups has had his say on the matter at hand, the segmentary units will be told to prepare for war.

Of course, it may be the case that they had already prepared for war and were waiting for something to trigger it off, in which case, this latest incident will be the perfect opportunity to engage war. Traditional war preparation is similar to that of the South Wahgi (see Muke 1994). It involved wealth reduction ceremonies in which outstanding debts were repaid to potential allies, pigs were sacrificed to ancestors, weapons were produced, and orators released war statements at public gatherings (see Muke 1994:Chap.3). In each of these exercises big-men were prominent: as major sponsors of the ceremonies and as major donors in prestations; as ritual leaders in sacrifices to ancestors (asking spirits of victims to assist in avenging their deaths); as supervisors and advisers in the production of weapons and keeping mental tally of shields; and as orators in releasing of war statements at public gatherings.

The influence of Christian missions, which began operations in the early 1930s, and the recent introduction of guns have, somewhat altered this situation. Pig sacrifices to ancestors, for example, were stopped by the Lutheran Church. The introduction of guns in particular has limited the role of the big-men in war preparation quite considerably. Elaborate ceremonies such as those mentioned by Muke (1994) are no longer necessary because those who possess such powerful weapons believe they can do the job without the assistance of the ancestors. A big-man's role is, thus, limited to releasing war statements. Furthermore, gun-men often play a dominant role in decisions regarding warfare, arguing that it is they, not the big-men, who will do the fighting. Also, the supervision of weapon production (home-made guns) and purchase of factory-made guns and cartridges is now handled by younger men with knowledge of guns. In my view, it is only a matter of time before they, too, will decide when to and when not to go to war, thus effectively reducing the power of big-men in war preparations.

Phase II: Compensation or Escalation?

If we were to strictly follow a cycle of warfare, phase II would involve escalation of a conflict. But it is important to recognise that compensation may positively short-circuit the process back to peaceful relations, thereby restoring some sort of equilibrium. Since the various types of compensation payments are discussed separately in another section (see Compensation Payments), I shall only briefly present a general outline here in order to allow for a fuller treatment of escalation as a sub-phase of warfare.
2.1: Compensation

Compensation is a powerful means through which disputes are resolved. The anger, expressed through the concept, *popokl*, can only be appeased by wealth items of pigs and cash offered as compensation (see A.J. Strathem 1981; see also A.M. Strathem 1972b). By paying compensation the *pukl wua*’s (‘root man’) group accepts responsibility for the offence (theft, assault, or killing) and attempts to prevent retaliation. Big-men on either side would speak for the groups: those representing the aggrieved party would demand compensation and speakers representing the *pukl wua*’s group would try to shift the blame away from the group, the *pukl wua*’s family, and try to blame it on immaturity or a particular nature of the offender such as *noman pi-napeitim* (‘has no sense of reasoning’), *ndoimb ri-neri* (‘inadequate mental capacity’), *rakra* (‘wild’), or *raskol* (‘rascal gangster’). This does not mean that they are denying responsibility, nor is it intended to infer insignificance of the matter at hand. Instead, it is a way of telling the aggrieved party that group relations are far more important than the cowardly acts of some individuals and efforts will be made to restore some equilibrium. At the same time, the speakers on the *pukl wua*’s side will try to persuade the *pukl wua*’s family to come up with a reasonable size compensation payment, one that would not only ‘fit the crime’ but also take care of the *popokl* factor, thus removing the need for retaliation. It may follow Marilyn Stratthern’s scheme: “where restitution was demanded reconciliation items might be added to the original amount. Thus after the theft of a pig, the thief would return a similar pig (*kumop*, restitution) and then add a further article ‘to shake hands’ (*ki titimbi*) with the owner” (1972a:25). It is this reconciliation aspect of compensation which may remove the *popokl* factor and lead to restoration of relations. This best sums up disputes involving theft and damage to property, sexual offences, assault and other such relatively minor offences. But severe injuries and homicide compensation are certainly more serious matters in which the behaviour of big-men and their approach to settling disputes differs markedly from that involving minor disputes. In such cases big-men from neutral groups would be invited to act as arbitrators. Their task was to negotiate a settlement that would satisfy both parties in the case of injury compensation and especially the victim group in homicide cases. Some aspects of Hagen dispute settlement procedures are similar to those of the Wahgi. John Muke’s description of South Wahgi conflict solving procedures can easily be applied to Hagen:

The victim group and the offender’s group assembled at their own central activity place and invited a third party group to act as arbitrators. This group consulted the principal protagonists and then carried back and forth the confrontational debates between the two groups. Depending on the proximity between the disputants, such negotiations lasted a day or for several days (Muke 1994:99).

He goes on to note that “if the peace mediators were successful, a compromise was reached and some form of damages payments were exchanged” (*ibid*). It needs to be added here that big-men from neutral groups acting as arbitrators were quite forceful in directing the ‘owners’ of a dispute...
involving homicide compensation. They would generally set the target (as near as possible but not necessarily as high as the one demanded by the victim group) and worked away at the offending party until the required amount in wealth items was raised. Elsewhere I explore the strategies involved in the raising of homicide compensation (see Compensation Payments), but here I should mention that the use of third-party arbitrators in resolving such disputes has worked well in the past and the modern state, having the foresight to recognise its value, has validated their role by creating local peace and good order committees. These committees, comprising prominent individuals (such as local government councillors, village court magistrates, as well as big-men) representing the various local groups (tribes and clans), arbitrate in major disputes between high-level groups (mostly at above the subclan level). All the members are men and are typically skilful orators. They are paid a basic allowance of K25 per month and act mainly upon request and are usually rewarded with a small portion of the compensation. Their role in society is nonetheless an important one which is recognised by both state and society, and the members, therefore, are held in high regard in their Local Government Council areas. Their renown, of course, goes beyond local government council boundaries but their power and influence is limited to groups within their respective council areas.

The Dei Council Peace and Good Order Committee, for example, has eight members (see Table 5.5) and handles mostly homicide and serious injury cases. According to committee member and Roklaka councillor, Dot Roltinga, and Muglamp Village Court Chairman, Pim Koldpi, the committee’s power to enforce compensation claims falls within a ceiling figure of K6,000 and 40 pigs for homicide cases, including fatal motor vehicle accidents. Dot Roltinga, who has been a local government councillor for over twenty-three years, pointed out that this ceiling price is much lower than the current rate of over K10,000 and at least 50 pigs, which makes their job more difficult, and exposes its apparent lack of power.
Table 5.6: The Dei Council Peace and Good Order Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee Member</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Type of Leader</th>
<th>Approximate Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dot Roltinga</td>
<td>Roklaka</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumi Krai</td>
<td>Kimka</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuggints</td>
<td>Waembe</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ring</td>
<td>Nelka</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romba</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pini</td>
<td>Mapkli</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingal</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>50+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dot Roltinga and Pim Koldpi, Gumanch Village, Mount Hagen.

Both Roltinga and Koldpi claimed that the lack of resources as a limiting factor in their work. This was supported by Jika Komapi councillor, Tepra, who said that the state itself has “no strength” (rondokl ti mon) and must therefore recognise the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG) and other churches, together with the Peace and Good Order Committees, as leading peace-makers, by allocating more resources such as vehicles and funds to continue their good work. Tepra blamed politicians for lack of action in conflict areas and his own Hagen MP, Paul Pora, for not responding to conflicts in the Hagen Central area. Meanwhile, Dot Roltinga blamed politicians as being responsible for contributing towards inter-group conflicts by supplying guns as well as paying compensation, both of which can enhance their status in society.

2.2. Escalation

Escalation, depending on the type of relations maintained, may take two basic forms. Where hostile relations are maintained, one offence will be reciprocated with another, in a fashion that can be described as mutually destructive negative reciprocity. For example, if one man was assaulted, his kinsmen would not hesitate to retaliate by assaulting either the assailant or a member of his kin-group, or if this is not possible, they would grab and/or kill pigs, or even rape women in serious injury and homicide cases. However, in the event of seemingly normal relations — neither friendly nor hostile — a single offence may not require direct retaliation and in fact the offended group may settle for compensation, but all such incidents will not be forgotten. They will be kept as unsettled scores, together with outstanding war deaths during previous fights in their history. In the meantime, big-men will begin to release war statements during public ceremonies. Also certain incidents involving big-men, such as peculiar behaviour, will be interpreted by other big-men as signalling war messages. Prior to the Kawelka-Minembi War, for example, a certain Minembi big-man’s behaviour during a Kawelka Kundmbo pig-killing ceremony at Golk was interpreted as intending to kill someone. This man, according to
Kundmbo informants, paraded around the ceremonial ground with a woman’s net-bag (wal met) containing some unripe bananas, stones and some other fruits and nuts. At a funeral speech, after a Kundmbo man was killed by the Minembi in a road-block in 1989, the Kundmbo big-man, Rai, made reference to this by saying that:

This man, a big-man, did a strange thing by carrying those objects around in a public place. There were many people from different groups who came for the feast saw this strange behaviour and were baffled by it. Some said: "This man is going to kill someone, but who is he going to kill?" I thought he was hungry for pork so I asked my brothers to add some to my own and gave it to him. But did he want pork? No, he wanted something else. Instead, he took and ate [killed] my man [referring to Kundmbo Palim]. That is how he waged war against me. I did not want to fight - He started it all (based on Melpa transcripts of tape recordings made by Andrew Strathern in July 1989).

As happened here, relations, whilst appearing to be quite normal may hide tensions which at any time can flare up in full-scale war. Revenge for the death of Palim, who died under dubious circumstances inside Minembi Elyipi territory (lamo and Ketan 1992:103), appears to have been chosen instead of compensation (see Case 2).

Escalation also involves the contracting of allies as well as reaching temporary truce and establishing moka ties with minor enemies. This is where the persuasive skills of orators (ik wua) and the entrepreneurial skills of wealth transactors — both qualities that successful big-men possess — are required. Big-men will call upon their allies to repay debts for assistance previously given to them during their fights. At the same time, they will make sure that the fight is only on a single front and discourage minor enemies from attacking by making small prestations of gifts to them. In the Remdi-Minembi War, for example, Remdi leaders, led by Remdi Jikambo big-man and Mount Hagen businessman, Puklm K opi, gave a gift of K500 to the Jika Kilampi, thus converting a previously hostile relations into one of exchange network (see Case 1).

When making peace with minor enemies, no matter how temporary it might be, whilst at the same time initiating war with a major enemy, big-men will almost apologetically (but never explicitly) point out to their former enemies that fighting should never have occurred between them (and perhaps never should again), arguing that the positive aspects of their relations, such as moka exchanges and intermarriage, far outweigh those of negative reciprocity. A major aim here is to explicitly state the current nature of their relations between the ex-minor enemies whilst emphasising the point that current enmities are strictly between the major enemies. Thus, in this way, the battle lines are clearly drawn at the outset so that third-parties (except for major allies of principal combatants) are discouraged from entering into the conflict. In Hagen, alliance systems are clearly established (although shifting in nature) and, therefore, act as a preventive mechanism in negotiations between minor enemies, where one or both parties are also major
allies of the principal combatants. In other words, one principal combatant will not initiate exchange relations with a major ally of its principal opponent. It may happen some time in the future but not at the time when the major combatants are preparing for war. In the same way, alliance systems may act as a major constraining factor in all-out warfare between confederacy-type conglomerates with members who are parts of more than one alliance network. It is big-men with knowledge of such networks who can successfully exploit them to their own and their group's advantage. But even for the most successful of big-men there are constraints such as individual cross-cutting kinship ties, marriage and moka exchanges, and nowadays business and work ties. These can prevent the big-men from contracting individuals from allied groups to assist in fighting, in the same way that it is difficult to prevent one or two individuals from minor enemy groups from supporting the principal opponent. The point to remember here is that a group may pledge allegiance one way, or declare neutrality in a particular conflict, yet individuals, for reasons mentioned above, may not necessarily act accordingly. Significantly, this trend is continued in other spheres of competition and cooperation (see, for example, elections in Chapters 6-8).

Phase III: War

This corresponds to John Muke's "actual engagement" phase (1994:107), or combat, in which battle sequences were fought between the combatants. Since I have already mentioned traditional battle formations, albeit briefly, and they are described more extensively by Muke (1994), I deal with only leadership aspects of combat here.

3.1. Fight-Leaders and Despots

The first aspect is the leader's own ability in fighting (A.J. Strathem 1966b:362). Strathem goes on to note that "fighting ability is always listed as one of the ideal capacities of big-men (although they were matched in this by fighters who were not big-men)" (ibid). Drawing from early accounts of warfare (Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8, Vol.1 and 2; A.J. Strathem 1966b), one gets the impression that excellence in moka, not fighting skills, was required in achieving and maintaining big-man status. This is probably an accurate assessment in so far as the big-man model goes, with strong emphasis on pre-eminence in moka exchanges, but does that mean that there were no other types of leaders? If big-men, as Vicedom and Tischner (1943-8, Vol.2) and A.J. Strathem (1966b) say, did "incite their clansmen to war, in order to humble neighbouring clans and prevent them from holding successful moka occasions", yet "important big-men might keep away from fighting" (see A.J. Strathem 1966b:363), it makes one wonder just who might have led clansmen to war. If someone did lead them to war, then shall we call such persons fight-leaders? Vicedom would have said no: he claimed that "there were no real fight-leaders, although an orator might marshal the men initially for a pitched battle" (vol.2:147; cited in A.J.
Strathem 1966b:363), and Strathem himself offers little in the way of either rebutting or supporting Vicedom, apart from this general comment on big-men:

On the whole, then, it seems that personal prowess in warfare was neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for becoming a big-man. Yet it enters as a component in the ideal picture of the big-man, in his guise as the triumphant victor over other clans and rival big-men (1966b:363).

There are two points worth raising here. Firstly, it is possible that Vicedom in particular and also Strathem (perhaps to a lesser extent) down-played the role of leaders in battle. Secondly, the power and influence of 'fight-leaders' (those who led others in battle) appears to be lesser sixty years ago than it is today. If the situation had changed over time, then it must have been very dramatic because my own observations of warfare over the last ten years indicate that there are in fact fight-leaders. These are men who formulate strategies, organise battle formation and led others in attack and defence. Some are skilful fighters themselves, excelling in several aspects of fighting such as shield formation, archery, or counter-attack. Others are fearless men who organise raids and ambushes. A few are violent men who terrorise others in times of both war and peace. These men are especially despotic in nature and feared by enemies but are valued by their own groups for their licensed violence in warfare. I have heard stories of such men but personally know of only one. He is of the Kawelka Membo clan, aged between 35 and 40, his nickname, *Mbakla Ami*[^22], is well-known amongst many groups in the whole of the Dei Council area and some parts of the Hagen Central area. Among the Kawelka his prowess in fighting is matched by none and he was a major driving force behind the brutal eviction of a Minembi section from their Tiki territories in the Baiyer Valley. He is said to have fought a number of battles almost single-handedly and in one instance fought on despite a spear lodged into his thigh. With the sharp end of the spear firmly buried into the ground and the other end sticking out of his thigh, he was pinned to the ground, but as the enemy closed in for the kill, he used the back of his palm and karate-chopped the spear at both points of entry and exit, thus freeing himself to face the enemy. Spurred on by his courageous act, his clansmen engaged the enemy in a pitched battle and finally chased the enemy off. Mbakla Ami is one of the few 'older' fighters who have made the transition from bow and arrow fights to gun warfare. He is now skilled in both weapons and, during the Kawelka-Minembi War, led numerous raids into Minembi territory. He is well respected by warriors and all of them feel comfortable being led by him in raids.

[^22]: *Mbakla Ami* (lit: 'Mbakla army', or 'a one-man army from Mbakla'). Mbakla (as in Mbakla Imp manga, 'origin place') is the Kawelka sacred site near Mbuli on the Sepik-Wahgi Divide, and one of the villages at Kuk has been christained Kuk-Mbakla. It is a term that is also used as a prefix when formally referring to the group or an individual member of the Kawelka, thus Mbakla Kawelka or Mbakla Ami. Incidentally, Ami is also the name of an important ancestor but I see no direct linkage here — the word derives from the English (and Pidgin) army.
Ami is also a leader in other aspects of society. He is a renowned orator, possesses skills in compensation negotiation, is prominent in clan and subclan matters regarding bridewealth payment and has been involved in some minor moka exchanges. And, he is referred to as a wua nuim (big-man), precisely the same word used when referring to those who are pre-eminent in moka exchanges. Ami is admired for all these ‘positive’ aspects of his character and is considered an hero by many of his tribesmen. Yet he is feared by many people from both within his own tribe and outside. There are two cases which illustrate this point.

The first involved the renowned social anthropologist, Andrew Strathern, in late 1994. During a brief visit from Pittsburgh, USA, Andrew killed a pig for his old friends at Kuk to settle some outstanding matters. The meeting went well and as he was coming out of a friend’s settlement he encountered a road-block. A young man of the Kawelka Kurupmbbo clan, apparently unhappy with Andrew over some land matter, had felled a gum tree across the road. As the young man (who was in fact the nephew of the Kawelka big-man, Ru, a close friend of Andrew) was about to confront Andrew, Mbakla Ami appeared with a chain-saw and cleared the road. There was no objection to his intervention and the matter was dropped without further problems.

The second involved a young councillor from a Hagen Central group. In 1992 three young men from the Kawelka Klambo clan were involved in a fight with the councillor’s brother, in which the Hagen Central man sustained a broken arm. After the fight the councillor took it upon himself to hand out punishment. He first assaulted one of the assailants, then followed another into Mount Hagen town and after having spotted him sitting inside a vehicle confronted him. He tried dragging him out of the front-seat, threatening to cripple him. Ami who had been sitting next to him got out of the vehicle and challenged him: “You promise to cripple him but first tell me how many men have you personally killed?” It was Ami’s way of telling the councillor that ‘do not start what you cannot finish’, or ‘do not get involve in matters which you cannot handle’. The councillor, in spite of his reputation as a tough character himself, did not pursue the matter, at least not along this line of strategy, and the conflict was later resolved peacefully through an exchange of compensation.

These two cases, whilst illustrating fear, also suggest the use of fearless reputation as a tool in the prevention of disputes from further escalation. This makes men like Ami become unlikely peace-makers, despite their use of heavy-handed tactics. All of these may be good for the community in terms of maintaining some form of order, but there are bad or disruptive aspects to the behaviour of such men as well.

Ami in particular is known to have taken goods from local markets without paying, demanded women from the Kundmbo el pukel wua (although this is normal in el pukel wua-kui wua relations) and was promptly given one (for which he has yet to pay bridewealth), and in the past stolen
pigs and attempted rape on at least one woman, and defaulted one *moka*. This behaviour is consistent with that of similar men in the past. In Georg Vicedom’s account of Yamka Ko, we learn that Ko began his life-time career as a tough character early in his youth. He claimed to have ‘never listened to talk’, stole pigs, struck-down men with sticks and wounded them, raped women, broke into houses and stole valuables, killed a number of men and women, and people generally fled at the sight of him. He described himself as ‘shameless’ and ‘non-hearing’, a ‘napitla’ [one who would not mend his bad ways, nor take advice regarding such behaviour]. His own people were said to have been proud of him and often praised him but many feared him (1943-8, Vol.1:80). Further, he goes on to claim that:

I killed Kutli [Kuli] Kiti. His relations came and asked for compensation, so I gave them shells. I killed a Ndika [Jika], the Kuntaka [Kundika] Ketla [Keitkla], during a fight; also the Kutli [Kuli] Ropoka. From the *Mokæ* [Mokei] I killed the Kononka Korama and from the Namboka [Mokei Nambka] a young man on the dancing ground. During a fight I killed the Ndika [Jika] Nditing and the *Mokæ* Koepaka [Mokei Koipka], as well as the Koka Medimbo [Mokei Melimb]. When I killed *Mokæ* [Mokei] Oklambo, I left his body on the dancing ground (Vol.1:81).

Such outrageous claims, if made today, would get someone killed. In fact, the real and ever present fear of pay-back killing would prevent most men from making such bold claims. Moreover, considering the size of Yamka which is rather small compared with Jika or Mokei (see Table 5.6), it is incredible that Yamka was not routed as a result of this man’s actions.

**Table 5.7: Hagen Central’s ‘super-tribes’, by population.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Period</th>
<th>Jika</th>
<th>Mokei</th>
<th>Yamka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>6,749a</td>
<td>6,199b</td>
<td>2,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 residents counts¹</td>
<td>8,943</td>
<td>7,809</td>
<td>3,653c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 est. pops.²</td>
<td>10,508</td>
<td>9,241</td>
<td>4,642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1: These figures are for people deemed to be ‘residents’, which suggests that the total figures (including non-residents) would be much higher.

2: On the basis of population growth at 2.0 per cent a year.
Georg Vicedom who must have been shocked by this man's self-account tried to place Ko's behaviour in the context of tribal strength and the man has a certain kind of hero from whom people around him could draw strength from. His comments are given below:

When reading this life history, one shudders and could think that the man has exaggerated. But this is not the case by any means. There are a few men of this kind in every tribe. They are always celebrated as heroes by their relations, for it is this kind of man who makes a tribe strong, protects his clan, and enriches it by his actions. When one gets the impression that Ko tells of his deeds with a certain satisfaction, one has to keep in mind that the Mbowamb [Hagener] do not detest such men but have a certain fear of them and even magical shyness. If other men are not like this it is only because they have not such strength. The Mbowamb's [Hagener] attitude towards criminals is different from ours [Westerners]. Crime is only what harms the clan, everything else is welcome (Vol.1:82).

It is clear from the Mbakla Ami and Yamka Ko cases that such men have a place in society, their power and influence derived from reputations and in war they led by example. Hagen society, in contrast with Western society, has no regimented military structure and ranking in which orders are followed strictly to the letter. But that does not necessarily mean the absence of leadership in warfare. There were — and still are — fight-leaders who may not be big-men (and why should they be?) but are still leaders.

3.2. Initiators of War and Peace

It has been suggested in the literature that big-men often play a major role in initiating war as well as in peace-making (see Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8, Vol.2; see also A.J. Strathern 1966b; 1971). Big-men have been depicted as calculative individuals who influence others to fight so that they may personally benefit at the expense of rival big-men (see Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8, Vol.2; de Lepervanche 1968:176; Sillitoe 1978:252, cited from Muke 1994).23 There may be some truth in this in the sense that the accounts of warfare given by Hagen informants often indicate that particular wars were started or ended by certain individuals who are usually big-men, or nowadays, politicians and educated elites. Testing this, however, is difficult because firstly, it is almost impossible to document cases in which big-men did win or lose from wars initiated by them or by their rivals; and secondly, no big-man or politician would admit to either starting, or profiting from, a particular war, without serious repercussions. It is mainly for these reasons that there is no substantial evidence.

23. In a subsequent paper, Sillitoe (1981), however, states that "in the acephalous society of Wola, rival big-men do not lead factions nor do they try to extend political control over one another through war (which is the argument put forward in Sillitoe 1978). The Wola think that war is a bad, but sadly an unavoidable, part of life, and big-men stand to gain nothing from it. The only time they stand out above average is following the end of a war when men make reparation payments to relatives of dead allies. This is because of their superior ability in handling wealth in ceremonial exchanges, upon which their and positions as big-men depend" (Sillitoe 1981:75).
Nevertheless, in recent times, politicians have been blamed for encouraging others to fight, as part of electoral manoeuvring, or as part of punitive action against supporters of rival candidates. Again, there is no conclusive evidence, apart from rumours and allegations. The closest I came to documenting the involvement of big-men and politicians as initiators of war (and peace) was in 1992. After the 1992 National Parliament elections, war broke out between the Welyi and Kentpi tribes of Dei Council over election results (see Chapter Seven; see also Ketan 1996:263-4). A prominent big-man and former provincial government member outlined a strategy to me, which he argued would win the support of both Welyi and Kentpi voters for the Tepuka candidate, Reuben Parua. He argued quite convincingly that it was in Tepuka’s interest to encourage the antagonists to fight for a while and then step in with gifts of pigs and cash to settle the dispute, thus putting them into positions of obligation towards Tepuka as the peace-maker. As it transpired, the conflict was resolved and the Kentpi candidate, Philip Bobby, was persuaded to step aside in favour of his fellow Raembka candidate, Parua, and some Welyi voters shifted allegiance to Parua during the 1993 Dei Open By-Election. Whilst this case suggests that there is a possibility of big-men and politicians exploiting conflict situations for personal and group interests, the evidence, is still insufficient to make any firm statements about the role of leaders in initiating war as a strategy designed to achieve personal goals.

Contrarily, the data on leadership role in peace-making is quite sufficient. A.J. Strathern (1966b; 1971) has already reported on big-men as peace-makers. I extend the discussion to cover the role of politicians and other leaders such as church leaders, businessmen and educated elites (see discussion on Peace Settlement; see also the discussion on the role played by leaders in ending the Remdi-Minembi War in 1989).

**Phase IV: War Deaths**

In traditional Hagen warfare, there was a definite leadership role here. After Muke (1994), I break the discussion into two sub-phases, reflecting the two opposing sides to war death ceremonies: the victim’s funeral ceremony; and the killer’s victory ceremony.

**4.1: Funeral Ceremony (Victim’s group)**

There were two parts to this ceremony. The first involved funeral rites and this is where the ritual leader comes in. If a warrior was killed instantly on a battlefield it is believed that the victim’s *min* (‘spirit’, or ‘shadow image’) escapes suddenly and stays where the incident occurred (Muke 1994:112). The objective of the victim’s group, as pointed out by Muke, “is to form an enclosure at the scene of the death and invite the shadow image to come with them back to the proper burial place” (*ibid*). A ritual expert (*man mai*), armed with a bamboo tube and a piece of clothing taken from the victim, would roast pork-fat over a fire, whilst at the same time summon
the min by calling the name of the victim, often explaining to the victim's min that he is in foreign
territory and therefore must come home with them. The min, supposedly operating on the basis
of smell (of something familiar such as clothing) would be lured into the bamboo tube by the
aroma of the burning fat. It responds by chirping like a quail as it approaches the ritual expert
who must catch and trap it inside the bamboo tube by closing it with leaves or a piece of cloth
once he and his clansmen are convinced that it had entered the tube. If successfully captured it
will be taken back to the tribal burial grounds where it will be released soon after the corpse is
buried. On the other hand, if unsuccessful, the victim's min is said to be unhappy with somebody
which calls for public confession in order to eliminate clansmen who may have wronged the
victim so that only those considered to be on good terms and preferably his best friends may
participate in the rituals. The ritual expert, if it is believed that he is not doing a good job, may be
substituted with another. And, the ritual will be repeatedly performed until the min is captured
and delivered to the clan cemetery. The ritual min calling also extends to deaths resulting from
motor vehicle or other similar accidents in which the victim dies instantly.

The influence of missions, however, has meant that such rituals are becoming very rare and face
the real possibility of being phased out with church rituals. There are very few ritual experts
around; many have died out, while others have now been baptised, which prevents them from
practising. This has forced people to go outside their tribal groups to hire ritual experts. For
example, in 1988, when a Kawelka man was killed in Port Moresby, a Koiari ritual expert was
hired to summon the min so that it would be taken back to Hagen with the body. Although my
tribesmen were convinced that the min had been captured, I was not so convinced. There are
two ways of testing the procedure. Firstly, it is claimed that you can hear the min chirping away
like an excited quail, both from inside the tube after it is captured and from outside as it
responds to the ritual expert's call. Secondly, it is said that there is a big difference in the weight
of the bamboo tube before and after it is captured. I heard no such chirping noises, nor felt any
difference in weight. When I pointed out this to the ritual expert, he responded that he was not
too sure. When I asked why then did he claim to have captured the min, his response was simple
and quite logical: "it is what your tribesmen believe that is important, whether or not the spirit is
in the bamboo is not important." I saw no reason to withhold payment so I advised my
tribesmen to pay him for his specialist services.

The second part of a traditional funeral ceremony involves the wua poka ('up-lifting man'), or the
public display of the corpse, or alternatively his clothing such as front-apron (bat), bark-belt (kaŋe)
and aft-tanger or cordyline leaves (kaŋa pukle). This would occur at a ceremonial ground (moka
pena) in which mourning women and close male relatives of the victim would assemble around
the corpse (or his clothes) suspended on a platform or cross-bar and would rise to join grieving
neighbours as they marched into the grounds in clan and subclan groups. Each group would
sing a funeral song considered appropriate for the occasion, whilst the victim’s group would sing two or more newly composed funeral songs together with old ones. After circling around the grounds for some time and once all the neighbouring groups (both allies and neutral groups) have joined in, everyone will be told to assemble for el ik ('fight talk') speeches. This is where big-men and nowadays politicians come in. An exceptionally high level of oratorical skills is required here in order to persuade allies to continue with the war effort and urge warriors to avenge the death.

The wua paka ceremonies for important leaders were similar to those of war deaths, except for a major difference in being that the objective of the orators here is to emphasise the group’s loss rather than to marshal support for revenge.

The Christian missions, however, have banned this ceremony, so now it is reserved for important leaders who have not yet been baptised. Even those who have died whilst being prepared for baptism have been denied a traditional funeral ceremony. This has led to some tension between those who have been converted to Christianity and a small but powerful minority (including most politicians) who still cling to some aspects of the past, especially in matters of personal interest (such as funeral ceremonies in which their participation can gain them political support, “polygyny, which secures for a big-man wives as a labour force and affines as exchange partners” [A.J. Strathem 1969a:44] and potential voters in elections, and other aspects of traditional society which contribute towards the overall success of individuals and groups). The tension between Christians and ‘traditionalists’ over funeral ceremonies was highlighted by a South Wahgi case in early 1987. I was part of a UPNG research team which visited the Western Highlands in January 1987. We flew to Goroka by plane and from there travelled by road to Minj where we had an invitation from UPNG academic and Kondika clansman, Jo Mangi, to overnight at his house. Mangi and a colleague, Linus Digin’rina, had arrived in Minj two weeks earlier. There were four of us in the second team, comprising two expatriates and two nationals, and as we arrived at the rendezvous point (Minj High School), neither the UPNG pair, nor Mangi’s brother, Andrew (the school’s headmaster) were present. As we started walking towards a small Kondika hamlet on the hills behind the Minj township, a messenger told us that Mangi was not able to meet us because of a family tragedy but he (messenger) would lead us to Mangi’s home. The others, being outsiders (the other national was from the coast), may not have noticed but the first thing that struck me upon arrival at the Kondika hamlet was the conspicuous absence of mourning. I found that disturbingly unusual because people throughout the Highlands always cry when someone dies. An explanation for this was given to us later. The deceased, who was Mangi’s paternal uncle, was studying for baptism when he died, which, according to the Catholic church, made him a Christian and therefore required a non-traditional funeral. This ‘non-traditional’ or Christian funeral consisted
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of prayers, a sermon and singing of Christian songs accompanied by guitar music. The denial of a full traditional funeral ceremony to the deceased angered his relatives, especially Mangi and his younger brother, who considered this as an infringement of individual rights as well as a violation of traditional custom. The dispute resulted in Mangi pulling a stunt on his clansmen, which eventually cost him a pig. The details of this incident are given in Appendix XI.

4.2: Victory Ceremony (Killer’s group)

This particular ceremony also involved ritual leadership, especially in the purification rites performed immediately after the killing. Muke’s description of South Wahgi purification rites are applicable to Hagen:

Meanwhile, the killer’s group showed their jubilant mood and humiliated the opponents by singing abusive war songs, chants and dancing. After their victory ceremony in the battlefield, they also returned to their sacred site to perform a series of rituals known as ‘they killed the person and are eating them’ [which, in Hagen is symbolised by the eating of pig liver]. The main objective was to purify the killer from the minmaan [the Hagen min of the deceased enemy from haunting him and to honour the gods for assistance. A huge pig was killed during this ceremony. The liver and heart of the pig was removed and cooked on a specially prepared platform. The fresh meat was steamed and was given to the warrior who struck the first blow. The rest was oven cooked and distributed among the crowd, but portions of the meat were not given the test of the population. After the ceremony they displayed their shields to an audience and then waited for the victim’s group to conduct all the funeral rituals and then stage the next battle known as the ‘paint war’ (Muke 1994:113).

The Hagen purification rites are similar to those of the Wahgi as described by Muke. The victory celebration is called gude noromen (roughly equates with jubilation), which involves taunting the victim’s group with words, songs and actions. No definite leadership role is required here and the participants are mostly younger warriors. It is in the next part of the ceremony which requires ritual leadership. The symbolic ‘eating of the man’ through the consumption of pig liver is called wua ruk kaimb kaig noromen (‘killing man and eating his liver’) are activities which are supervised by a ritual expert, or alternatively by clan leaders with knowledge of ritual procedures.

Nowadays, victory celebrations, as a direct result of gun warfare, are no longer possible because successful raiding parties cannot express their jubilation nor taunt the enemy without drawing unnecessary attention to themselves and face the real possibility of being killed. Furthermore, mission influence has meant that most men cannot participate in these ‘pagan’ ceremonies.

Phase V: Peace Ceremony

This is the ceremony which formally marks the end of a single bout of warfare and the beginning of peaceful relations. As pointed out by Muke (1994:113), it is difficult to define the duration of wars between groups. He goes on to note that:
...in some cases (like 'the brother' groups) there exists a permanent hostility that lasts for several hundred years. In other cases (as the wars against the 'brother-in-law' groups) wars were fought for a short duration: each brief bout of war was brought to an end, followed by a period of *mut*, and back again. In both cases, however, it was intervention of a third party group that brought a formal war to an end (Muke 1994:113).

The South Wahgi groups’ maintenance of permanent hostility between 'the brother' groups can be compared to major or traditional enemy relations in Hagen where one compensates minor enemies but not major enemies and the relationship between major enemies is characterised by mutual distrust, fear and accusations of poisoning.

Without compensation (which would otherwise terminate hostilities and convert relations of enmity into exchange partnership), hostilities are never truly terminated. And the virtual absence of intermarriage and *moka* ties means that friendly relations are never achieved. In this regard, Muke’s characterisation of the South Wahgi ‘brother’ group warfare as “permanent hostility that lasts for several hundred years” (1994:113) may hold for Hagen.

Likewise, the Wahgi ‘brother-in-law’ groups can be compared with the Hagen minor enemies who share intermarriage and *moka* ties and whilst having fought one another in minor warfare, have also combined against a major enemy.

In both cases, a single bout of warfare may last several years, as indicated by the Remdi-Minembi and Kawelka-Minembi cases, which ended when the combatants got tired of fighting.\(^{24}\) This would invariably coincide with diminishing food supplies and difficulties in maintaining the support of allies. Moreover, it seems that wars were always brought to an end as a result of third party intervention (see Muke 1994:113; see also A.J. Strathem 1966b:364-5). Indeed, third party groups and important leaders played a significant role in initiating peace. But it was a combination of factors, in addition to third party intervention, that brought a war to an end. Firstly, it is the combatants who themselves must decide that they have settled outstanding debts in reciprocal killings (as seems to have occurred in the Remdi-Minembi and Kawelka-Minembi cases), or when one group is routed (as in the Jika Maipngel case). Secondly, when it becomes difficult to maintain support for the war effort in terms of manpower and resources, especially cartridges in contemporary gun warfare (as in the case of the Kawelka). A third factor was that of cross-cutting kinship ties, especially in the contemporary context where relatives from warring groups can meet at work places, in hotels and homes in urban centres, away from the battlefields (as in the Remdi case). Finally, after all these factors have been brought to bear on the outcome of the war, the third party intervention becomes a reality. Any premature intervention,

\(^{24}\) An important point worth mentioning here is that there is no clear winner in this confrontation, although one group may route another (as occurred during the Jika Maipngel war).
particularly when uninvited, may result in further problems, such as truce violation (see Kawelka-Minembi case). It is partly because of the difficulties involved in reporting that these factors I have mentioned are rarely brought to the attention of authorities in Waigani. In newspapers, for instance, we only read of peace settlements and the involvement of church and government agencies, but rarely or none at all on 'human interest' stories about the role of individuals in peace settlements (like the two PNGDF soldiers that I have mentioned in the Remdi-Minembi case).

The role of the churches, nonetheless, is an important one. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Papua New Guinea (ELC-PNG), for example, has an on-going program on inter-group conflicts. It began with church leaders, comprising pastors, circuit councillors and headmen (miti nap mua, 'man who has custodian of the gospel') from neutral groups contacting their counterparts in warring groups to see if they would be receptive to a peace proposal. Meanwhile, the congregations within the various circuits were formed into prayer groups, each responsible for a particular conflict. The prayer groups, mostly headed by women, met every night praying for peace, and their fellowships often ended in the early hours of the morning. The church leaders, on the other hand, maintained frequent contact until they were convinced that the combatants were ready for peace, hence their congregations' prayers were answered. Their warring counterparts' task was to convince their fellow clansmen to end the war. Once this process, which may take months or even years, was completed, they would report back to their peace-making counterparts that they were ready for peace. The church leaders would then proceed by inviting government agencies to witness a peace settlement on a date convenient to all parties.

A mission-sponsored, state-sanctioned, peace settlement was symbolically marked by a ceremony in which leaders of rival groups would pledge to God (by taking an oath on the Bible) and State (by signing an agreement) to end hostilities and seal the agreement by shaking hands. It is a public ceremony in which the combatants are said to 'shake hands' (ki itūmbī). It is also during this ceremony that the church will erect a wooden cross on the border of the combatants' territories, as a symbol of peace (but it may decide to do so earlier in an effort to stop them from fighting). Muke reported a particularly interesting example of church intervention by way of a placard 'planted' in the battlefield, which read in Tok Pisin.

_Pinisisim pait bilong Kondika na Kornumbka. Olsim na ol man i sakim tok bilong Gavaman, ol i sakim tok bilong God tu. Olsim na bai ol i kisim pe nogot bilong ol yet (Rom 13:2) [italics mine]._ 

The Kondika and Kornumbka fight must stop. Those men who disobey the government, also disobey God. Therefore they will receive their bad rewards (Romans 13:2) [Muke 1994:113-114].
Although it is not clear from his discussion about the origins of the placard, we can assume on the basis of its message that it was put there by members of one of the churches. Muke’s comments, however, are useful for our purpose:

This placard is interesting because of the unique combination of authorities and belief systems it refers to. Most obvious is the presence of the Christian God. Warfare is disapproved of by God and its missionary envoys, and it is God’s divine justice that will punish the wrongdoer. Unequal relationship between God and man is inherent to Christianity because it is believed that God created man and that man must worship the divine creator... At the same time, the authority of God extends (or is extended) to the government, which has its own system of laws and sanctions. Lastly, the placard displays also an indigenous symbol of peace. This is the taboo substance known as miltbol (fern), often erected by a neutral group at the boundary of the battle-ground. This taboo substance, of the highest order of moral and religious sanction symbolises the willingness of the third party group to bring the opponents together by conducting a peace ceremony which would bring the war to an end (Muke 1994:114).

Muke’s final point regarding taboo substance is worth commenting on. Hageners, too, have taboo or divination substance called mi (see A.J. Strathem 1981:15), upon which oaths are taken when claiming innocence in any wrongdoing and certain taboos, or “don’ts” (which carries with them supernatural sanctions), are observed. As others have previously noted (Strauss and Tischner 1962; A.J. Strathem 1972:40), the origin myth of each Hagen tribe contains a reference to its mi, explaining how this was revealed to a tribal ancestor either by Sky Spirits or by a ghost, as in the case of the Kawelka. The Kawelka mi or mystical divination-substance (cf. A.J. Strathem 1972:34), for example, is the cordyline plant (keiya koema), which, according to one older informant (the Kawelka Membo big-man, Goimba Onombe), was used by third parties in an attempt to stop minor warfare between the Kawelka Kundombo and Membo clans. No recollection, however, was made of the mi being used in major warfare, nor is there any mention of it by A.J. Strathem (1966b) who conducted his fieldwork in the sixties. If, however, it was used to stop warfare in the past, then the situation has changed considerably over time, as evident in both the Remdi-Minembi and Kawelka-Minembi cases in which the influence of Christianity was most apparent. The comparison between South Wahgi and Hagen use of taboo substance may not of course be valid on the basis of cultural differences, but this, I think, is not the case, as there are far too many similarities (almost to the point of exact likeness). It may well be the case of the ‘ethnographic past’ versus that of the ‘ethnographic present’. I now return to the Lutheran (ELC-PNG) program mentioned earlier.

After a peace settlement was reached, the next step for Church leaders was to re-educate the ex-combatants about Christianity and its virtues of forgiving and peaceful co-existence. Members of the Wahgi congregation, headed by Pastor Petro Timbi, for instance, were assigned the task of

25 In a footnote, A.J. Strathem (1966b:365), however, did admit that “a close account of the strategy of peace-making was not obtained by me.”
miti orukl (‘gospel revision’) work amongst the Minembi congregations of Keraldong and Mokla (also spelt Moga). This is the long-term aspect of group relations in which church leaders can play a crucial role in the maintenance of peace and order. The state, however, as pointed out by Jika Komapi Councillor Tepra (and also by the Rolklaka Councillor, Dot Roltinga, and Muglamp Village Court Chairman, Pip Koldpi), does not always recognise this. In stead, its over-enthusiastic and rather clumsy efforts in attempting to stop tribal warfare has almost inevitably failed. Police riot squads have been largely responsible for damaging the image of the police and the ultimate decline of the state. One local observer, appalled by the destructive manner of riot squad operations, has described them as “the rape and pillage squad of the Highlands” (Mangi 1992:118). He goes on to argue that:

The Mobile Riot Squad of the Police Force based in the Highlands is as much a criminal element as any petty criminal; only they are in uniform and under the protection of the Law of the land... They know no bounds and go in to rape and pillage. As their superiors often put it: “This is Operation Mekim Save” (Operation: Teach a Lesson). There are many cases pending before the courts throughout the Highlands whereby the people are claiming compensation for damages done by the police when raiding villages. These range from assault charges to ones where whole villages and settlements have been razed to the ground (Mangi 1992:118).

I can only add here that such claims are not unfounded because I too have heard of and witnessed police brutality. Elsewhere, I have reported on one case of destruction in which the Riot Squad destroyed an entire Konumbka village near Minj “with the sensitivity of a Nazi blitzkrieg” (Ketan 1989c). As asked by Mangi, one wonders “how the hell does the Police Force expect to win the cooperation of the people if terrorism is the only method they apply when dealing with the people?” (Mangi 1992:118).

Phase VI: Reparation Payment

This refers to compensation for killings or reparations for losses sustained by one’s allies (A.J. Strathem 1981:12). In tribal warfare, principal combatants are called elpukl wua (‘fight root man’) and allies who have sustained losses as kui wua (‘dead man’). It is the elpukl wua, on both sides, as ‘owners’ of the fight, who pay compensation of wealth items (mainly pigs, pork and cash) to respective allies. Referred to as wua peng (‘man’s head’) in Hagen, and using moka principles, this is usually reciprocal payment for solictory gifts, wua omhul (‘man’s bone’), previously received from the kui wua. Such compensations, according to A.J Strathem (1981:12), are largely aimed at ensuring an ally’s goodwill in future fights, but also to maintain one’s prestige (see also A J. Strathem 1966b; 1971; 1981).

The compensation of allies for war deaths is called wua peng (‘man’s head’) payment. It is made after a war to compensate for losses, especially of warriors, incurred by allies while providing military assistance. There are two strategies involved in allies compensation: (1) direct payment;
and (2) a series of payments involving solicitory gifts, and counter-gifts, which may develop into moka. The two cases given below illustrate these strategies. In the latter case, a wua peng compensation usually follows a wua ombil (‘man’s bones’) solicitory gift. In this case, moka may or may not eventuate, depending on the individuals involved.

**Kawelka wua peng payment to allies**

Following the second approach, Kawelka received solicitory gifts before reciprocating in a large presentation of pigs to its allies. The allies may or may not return the gifts as moka in future, although it is generally accepted that some form of reciprocal payment will be made in future to compensate for Kawelka men who died whilst fighting on the Kopi-Kimbo and Klamakae fronts. As indicated in Table 5.7, Kawelka received 30 pigs as wua ombil gifts from its allies. In return, Kawelka gave 300 pigs to Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae.

**Table 5.8: Kawelka wua peng payment to allies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allies</th>
<th>Items (pigs) received from allies as wua ombil gifts</th>
<th>Items (pigs) given to allies as wua peng compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kopi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimbo</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klamakae</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Based on information supplied by Yap Goimba, Tangka Timbi and Komori Ongky, Kuk-Mbakla village, Mount Hagen.

*Note:* The 300 pigs given as wua peng compensation were contributed by all Kawelka clans: Membo (100); Kundmbo (100); and Kurupmbo-Klambo (100).

Apart from the wua peng compensation, the Membo clan of Kawelka also made a wua ombil moka to Kundmbo, soliciting compensation or wua peng payment for the loss of three men (Kumi, Pengk and Ketipa) who died on the Kundmbo front against the Minembi.26 A total of 20 pigs and three cows were given to the Kundmbo, who were planning to use these to celebrate a successful election win. Much of which will, of course, go to voters and supporters. Further, Kawelka as a group gave a wua ombil moka to its Kimbo and Kopi allies, soliciting compensation for the loss of four men (Wump, Ruk, John and Kel) who died while fighting on the Kopi-Kimbo front against the Minembi. Membo, Kundmbo and Kurupmbo-Klambo contributed 10

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26 In late 1996 the Kawelka Kundmbo clan reciprocated Membo’s solicitory gifts by making a large wua peng payment. For details, see Chapter Six.
pigs each towards the *wua ombil* gifts. Of all deaths, only the allies (Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae) deaths were compensated by Kawelka through *wua peng* payments after receiving *wua ombil* solictory gifts. The others were delayed for mainly two reasons: (1) owing to Kawelka's status as *el puki wua* ('fight root man'), both Kimbo and Kopi cannot be pressured into rushing payment; and (2) the Kundmbo *wua peng* payment to Membo has been tied up with the Western Highlands Provincial Government election campaign, in which Membo sponsored a Kundmbo candidate (as part of soliciting for payment). See the concluding chapter of this thesis for an update of this situation. Membo also contributed towards his campaign by provision of funds and other economic resources (see Chapters 7-8).

**Remdi *wua peng* payment to allies**

Unlike Kawelka, who tied up allies' compensation in *moka* and election campaigns, Remdi took a simpler approach by opting for direct payment in roasted pigs, which means that these payments will not be reciprocated in future. As indicated in Table 5.7, the Remdi Jikambo clan, as 'owners of the fight', gave away a total of 1,750 pigs (all roasted) in reparation payments. The major recipients were the Mul Council-based 'Upper Remdi' section, with 500 pigs in 1990 for the loss of two men, and the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, with 1,000 pigs in December 1994 for the loss of six men in battle. Remdi Penambimbo and Kiklpukla were paid 200 pigs in 1992 for the loss of three men, while Enga and Simbu migrants received only 50 pigs for the loss of two men in battle.

The highly disproportionate nature and possibly the sequencing of the payment partly reflects the nature of relationship between these groups, whilst at the same time emphasising the potential fear of retribution — or lack of it — from *kui wua* groups. The 'Upper Remdi' section, for instance, belongs to a separate political field, the Mul-Baiyer electorate, and is an important political and military force in the Mul Council area. The social, administrative and geographical distance between the two Remdi sections, 'Upper' and 'Lower', meant that the compensation amount, taking into account the number of deaths, had to be of a reasonable size and 'Upper Remdi' given priority over other allies.

Conversely, the Enga and Simbu migrants, because of their clientage relationship with the Remdi Jikambo as patrons, were perhaps inadequately compensated for two deaths. The Simbu and Enga migrants, despite losing as many men as 'Upper Remdi', were paid only 10 per cent of what the Mul Council group got. Apparently, Remdi Jikambo leaders saw no danger in down-playing the contributions from their Enga and Simbu clients. These migrant groups live and work at the Gumanch coffee plantation, and whilst they were definitely not used as mercenaries here, one cannot help feeling that they may have been used as a new form of labour in warfare. Furthermore, the fact that these migrant groups do not have the numerical strength with which
to demand reparation payments was not lost on Remdi political strategists. Although it is a normal practice in Hagen for *koi wua* groups to demand compensation and even threaten to kill pigs and rape women of the *el pukl wua* group, it is clear that Remdi leaders took advantage of the 'foreignness' of their clients. It is typical of Hagen groups to treat clients — such as refugees (*wamb etc*), migrants (*tepa-pi wamb*), and 'servants' (*kintmant wamb*) — with indifference, almost contemptuously, and certainly without the kind of respect and esteem which they themselves expect and sometimes demand from others.

Similarly, the Remdi Penambimbo and Kiklpukla, though losing three men, were given only 200 pigs because of their close association with the Remdi Jikambo clan. The Kiklpukla are almost incorporated into the Remdi Jikambo clan, while some Remdi Penambimbo share territories with Jikambo clansmen near the Muglamp station. It seems that both these groups were treated as part of the Jikambo clan and therefore shared responsibilities of 'fight ownership'.

Meanwhile, the Kimka-Roklaka, who lost six men, were paid 1,000 pigs, which works out to 166.66 pigs for each death. The Remdi-Kimka-Roklaka alliance, as evident in Chapter Three and involves a high degree of complexity, which will be examined later in the thesis (see Chapters 7-8), but it is perhaps worth mentioning here that the Remdi Jikambo made two vital mistakes. In light of recent developments, especially the 1992 and 1997 national elections, Remdi Jikambo strategists firstly erred in their judgment that the Kimka-Roklaka pair of tribes were not important enough to warrant priority over others in reparation payments, and secondly, their blunder in assuming that the Kimka-Roklaka would 'commoditise' their votes as solicioty gifts for reparation payments was not corrected earlier. In retrospect, it would seem that by 1992, it was far too late, as the Kimka-Roklaka had already sponsored their own candidate, Puri Ruing, to oppose the Remdi Jikambo candidate, Koi Ranpi.
Table 5.9: Remdi wua peng payment: allies deaths & compensation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group (Allies of Remdi Jikambo)</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
<th>Items (Roasted Pigs)</th>
<th>Pigs Per Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>'Upper Remdi'</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>R. Penambimbo &amp; Kiklpukla</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>66.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Enga &amp; Simbu migrants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Kimka-Roklaka</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>166.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>102.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Based on information supplied by Ivan Tau and Maip Kei, Muglamp, Mount Hagen.

The different approaches in reparation payment selected by the Remdi and the Kawelka groups reflects, among other things, the varying degree of corporate emphasis placed on arenas of competition and cooperation. The Kawelka, for instance, have been successful in moka, setting trends in incorporating new ideas and resources (see discussion on Moka), whilst Remdi has had major successes in business. Significantly, prominent individuals such as Ongka and Kont who acquired their big-men status through moka, are still active and very much influential amongst the Kawelka, whilst those among the Remdi, men such as Maip Kei, have been either converted to business or replaced by younger and Western educated leaders, such as Puklma Kopi, Stanley Pil and Ivan Tau, who made their name through business and government positions. Pig-rearing is a full-time occupation, requiring considerable investment of time, labour and energy. Men such as Puklma, Stanley and Ivan are already committed to full-time occupations and, though they may find the energy, do not have the time nor the labour required in pig management. Consequently, most men in this category do not have pigs of their own — as aptly described by Chris Owen’s (1990) documentary film on PNG’s first professor, John Waiko — they are ‘men without pigs’. When they do need pigs, they just simply buy them or acquire them on credit basis through social networks. For example, during the 1994 Remdi reparation payment to its Kimka-Roklaka allies, Madang Open MP Stanley Pil brought two truckloads of pigs from the coast while others went shopping for pigs in nearby villages and hamlets. The point is that these men cannot engage in moka for sustained periods without seriously jeopardising their business and career prospects in government. On the other hand, men like Ongka can and do take every opportunity to do so because that is what they do best and their position in society depends on it.
Phase VII: *Moka*

There are three types of exchanges: (1) enemy compensation; (2) ally reparation payment; and (3) pure *moka* (see A.J. Strathern 1971). Enemy compensation involves gift exchanges with minor enemies, thereby creating relationships of enmity into exchange networks for political purposes (as in the Remdi-Jika Kilampi case mentioned above). Ally reparation involves the payment of compensation to one's allies for assistance rendered and losses sustained in war (see above examples). Pure *moka*, whilst initially may have developed from warfare exchanges, take the form of gift exchanges between established partners. The link between war payments and pure *moka* has been noted by Andrew and Marilyn Strathern:

> In practice pure *moka* and warfare exchanges become intertwined. An important feature of all ceremonial exchange relations in Hagen is that they are expected to continue over a number of years. If one group compensates, reparates, or gives *moka* to another it expects that the recipients will reciprocate after a few years. *Moka* relations are explicitly based on this norm of reciprocity; war payments come to follow the same pattern since it is often the case that there have been reciprocal killings or ally-losses between clans. Thus A pays B for losses and later B pays A, much as done in *moka* itself (1971:48).

I have recorded no examples of enemy compensation except the Minembi Engambo clan's approach to the Kawelka candidate, William Pik, with minor gifts and promise of votes during the 1995 provincial assembly elections (see *Chapter Eight*). This may lead to compensation, but they are major enemies. If it does eventuate, then it will be a result of elections as an all-encompassing event. Examples of ally reparation payments, as mentioned above, are (1) the Remdi payment to the Kimka-Roklaka and other allies; and (2) the Kawelka payments to their allies.

**Phase VIII: Peaceful Relations**

After bouts of warfare, reparation payments and *moka* exchanges are necessary to bring about peaceful relations between local groups. However, it is worth mentioning here that neither peace nor war are natural states of human societies. Moreover, peaceful relations may even be only truce periods, that is, a temporary political arrangement, just as warfare is temporary. A true picture of society, thus can be interpreted as one of alternating peace and war. In fact, the Hagen case studies presented in this study suggest that the dynamics of Hagen society can be best described in terms of cycles within a megacycle (see *Chapter Nine* for further exposition of this point).

The cycles and sub-cycles of Hagen society are the key features of Hagen society, a society which is still going through the motions of change. In the second chapter of the thesis I presented an erratic cycle of Hagen history, characterised by alternating periods of peace and
war, where the exchange of blows and gifts was prominent. In each case, we have seen the rise to prominence of certain leadership types, each with special skills. In this chapter I have shown that despotic leaders, although not necessarily of the ruthless type described by Salisbury (1964) and Watson (1971), have a place in society, and moreover, that their value to their groups becomes more significant when their societies are caught in the grips of warfare.

The recent resurgence in warfare in the Highlands can be understood in the context of social and political change, coupled with a remarkable resilience of traditional customs and values of Highlands societies and a corresponding weak institutional capacity of the post-colonial state, a significant point to which I shall return in the next chapter of this thesis.

Conclusion

The key issues raised in this chapter need further elaboration here. Traditionally, warfare has always been an important arena of competition and cooperation for Hagen groups and their leaders. Prowess in fighting skills was an important criterion for acquiring leadership status. Also important were skills in management of large-scale events such as warfare and specialist knowledge of esoteric activities, especially in the conduct of rituals regarding war deaths. Traditional Hagen warfare, like contemporary Wahgi warfare, was ritually regulated. This and other studies (see, for example, Meggitt 1977; A.J. Strathern 1977 and 1992; Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Burton 1990; Muke 1994) show that group warfare was never an uncontrolled descent into Hobbesian chaos. Evidence presented in this study and in Muke's (1994) study provide support for a corrective to Western assumptions (about Melanesian warfare) that conflict escalation corresponds to a progressive breakdown or abandonment of social controls (cf. O'Hanlon 1995:472).

Contemporary Hagen warfare is less ritually regulated than Wahgi warfare, mainly because of its political and economic dimensions. The influence of Christian missions, new economic resources and technological innovations such as the gun have significantly altered the pattern of Hagen warfare. In particular, gun warfare, with rising cost of guns and cartridges, can become expensive exercise. The economic costs can be measured in millions of kina, but what is really shocking for observers and participants is the high number of deaths involved in gun warfare.

The way in which Hagen warfare has been systematically linked to other arenas of competition, especially reparation payments, moka exchange and elections — to form a megacycle — may be unique to Hagen. However, the inherent intergenerational power struggles between older style

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27 See Muke (1994) and O'Hanlon (1995) for accounts of Southern and Northern Wahgi warfare, respectively. See also Rappaport 1984[1968] for a sophisticated discussion on ritually regulated warfare among the Maining people of the Jam and Simbai valleys.
leaders such as big-men and new style leaders has wider implications for Bougainville, Melanesia and elsewhere in the world, an important point to which I shall return in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

Secondly, the case studies on Hagen warfare suggest that the persistence of organised violence in the Highlands and in other parts of the country represents the most powerful and consistent challenge to state authority, thereby exposing the weakness of the post-colonial state. The PNG state’s lack of administrative capacity in policy implementation and its inability to penetrate, dominate and regulate society has substantially diminished its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Moreover, the challenge to public order and particularly to the state’s claim of monopoly over the legitimate use of force raises wider questions about the definition and function of the modern state. For instance, what exactly is a ‘state’? According to one textbook definition:

The state refers to the authoritative decision-making institutions for an entire society, to which all other groups, institutions and persons are legally subject. In other words, the state is legally supreme: in the last resort, its authority is compulsory. The state is the ultimate regulator of the legitimate use of force within its territory (Hague, Harrop and Breslin (1992:6).

In fact, as pointed out by Dahl, in practice “the Government of a State does not necessarily monopolise the use of force, but it has the exclusive authority to set the limits within which force may legitimately be used” (1976:10). In Papua New Guinea it is this particular claim of authority and indeed the state’s legitimacy which has come under fire from local groups in recent times.

Finally, it is precisely in those areas that the state has failed to assert authority where PNG Highlands societies such as Hagen were effective, as indicated by the relative ease with which conflicts are resolved especially after government efforts in peace negotiations fail. Actions by local groups which may at times appear to be in defiance of state authority, upon closer scrutiny, may in fact prove to be not only necessary but perhaps the only course of action open to participants. A series of unsuccessful attempts at peace settlements initiated by the state in conflict areas demonstrate this point. The Hagen case studies on warfare presented in this thesis show that the state’s peace attempts were premature and government officials lacked local knowledge of conflict resolution skills. A bit of local research would have indicated to state agencies that group warfare comes to a formal conclusion only after outstanding debts in reciprocal killings between the warring factions are balanced. It is therefore partly due to lack of

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28. After Weber, Dahl (1976:10) says that “The Government is any government that successfully upholds a claim to the exclusive regulation of the legitimate use of physical force in enforcing its rules within a given territorial area.” (italics in original). Furthermore, he says that “the political system made up of the residents of that territorial area and the Government of the area is a ‘State’” (ibid).
understanding of historically proven methods of local conflict resolution, and also because of inadequate and at times, inappropriate, police action in dealing with local conflicts, that there has been an escalation of violence in Hagen, the PNG Highlands, and other parts of the country. The other reason of course lies with people’s reactions to structural changes and the state’s incapacity to deal with such problems, a trend which is evident in other arenas of competition such as elections, which form the focus of analysis in the next three chapters.
Chapter 6

ELECTIONS AND THE HAGEN MEGACYCLE
Introduction

In this chapter I present an overview of elections in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, in order to situate the case studies discussed in the next two chapters. Basically, it deals with two major issues: elections and violence. A particularly worrying feature of elections in recent times is the escalating cost of election campaigns and correspondingly high rate of election-related violence in Papua New Guinea (see, for example, Iamo ed. 1992 and Saffu ed. 1996; see also A.J. Strathem 1993b; Standish 1994; and Dinnen 1996b). While these and other observers have reported instances of election-related violence in varying degrees of severity, none has attempted to provide detailed analysis of the underlying reasons for such violence. And whilst some observers have commented on election campaign expenditure and associated problems (see, for example, Standish 1989), perhaps none may have pointed out the economic irrationality of elections. This chapter, largely based on observations in Hagen, attempts to help rectify that situation.

Accordingly, the escalating levels of violence, in addition to the deliberate infringement of PNG electoral regulations, and the use of large sums of cash to buy votes, are discussed in the context of electoral manoeuvring by powerful individuals, as an innovative extension of the rivalry between equally powerful and, in some instances, party-aligned ‘interest’ groups operating within well established arenas of competition and cooperation. These election case studies of local-level politics again raise wider issues of competing legitimacies and state-society interactions.

The chapter starts by providing some essential background information on elections in the Highlands, highlighting some important symbolic and functional parallels between traditional Hagen and PNG state political systems. It then looks at the specifics and elementary aspects of elections, commenting on behavioural patterns of participants and the general characteristics of contemporary Hagen political culture. More specifically, it examines factors such as the respective power-bases of nationally prominent Hagen leaders, disruptive power struggles between national and provincial politicians, and the rivalry between party-aligned ‘interest’ groups. A relatively prolonged history of confrontation between the National Government and the Western Highlands Provincial Government highlights this perpetual power struggle between national and provincial politicians. Such a situation ultimately led to the abolition of the provincial government system in Papua New Guinea, the implications of which include a possible increase in the intensity of competition as people realise that the stakes are now higher since the sphere of competition has been considerably narrowed.

It is essentially an analysis of political strategies of local groups and their leaders in competition for state-derived resources, prestige and power. One of the most sophisticated and effective
strategies analysed here is the skilful use of the Hagen megacycle and its sub-cycles of warfare and reparation payments as political resources by candidates and their supporters in their attempts to mobilise support for elections. Also examined in this chapter are some salient features of Hagen elections, such as ‘cash-for-votes’ and ‘name-list’ groups, ‘vote-banks’ and ‘base-vote’, the pervasive practice of voter coercion, and the problems created by the rising cost of elections and unrealistic expectations of elective office.

The final part of the chapter attempts to place the empirical evidence in wider theoretical perspectives. In particular, it argues that some of the current problems faced by PNG are the cumulative effects of a new political culture, which can be examined in the context of (1) competing legitimacies and the re-invention of legitimisation processes by local groups to facilitate their aims and goals; and (2) the weak state/strong society dichotomy. By drawing from the experiences of other Third World countries, especially in tropical Africa, this chapter concludes by pointing out that, despite being blessed with a wide range of natural resources in generous proportions, the PNG nation-state’s current economic, social and political problems are almost like a mirror image of the kind of problems faced by some African regimes before crumbling.

Background

One of the most striking aspects of Papua New Guinea Highlands societies generally and, Hagen in particular, is the spirit of competition. Both ethnographers and casual observers tend to agree that it is here in these densely populated high valleys that one finds extraordinarily competitive societies in which groups and individuals constantly compete for temporary advantages over one another. The traditional spheres of competition are warfare, ceremonial exchange, bridewealth and various types of compensation payments — all of which are status-oriented and can be described as monumental prestige institutions. These institutions of both positive and negative reciprocity have shown great resilience in the face of rapid social change and now exist side by side with, and in some ways are incorporated, into modern spheres of competition such as commercial business enterprise and elections, one of which forms the subject under scrutiny here.¹ This competitive character of Highlanders is partly based on an ideology of equality, although in practice big-men have more influence and prestige than others. Ordinary men, however, believe that they too can become big-men (cf. Feil 1987:116). Few in

¹. The way in which traditional Highlands ideologies and practices have been incorporated into elections can almost be equated to the processes of socio-religious syncretism which occurred in the Caribbean; voodoism (or what Haitians respectfully label vodou, vodun, or voudou), for example, arose from contact between African ‘paganism’ and European Catholicism, but whether the current trends in politics will develop into something uniquely Highlands only time can tell.
fact actually do, but that is not the point; what needs to be stated is that there is a system of ideological equality, or what others may call ‘egalitarianism’, which fuels such competition.²

However, it is crucial that competition also involves some form of cooperation. For it is true that members of society, either as individuals or as a group, must cooperate in order to compete effectively against those perceived as common opponents. Certainly, large-scale socio-political events like tribal warfare require cooperation between most, if not all, segmentary components (clans and subclans) of a politically and militarily autonomous group (tribe) to avoid routing and possible decimation. Tribal strength and individual status, for instance, depends on successes and failures in group activities so it is not surprising that we find well-developed arenas of competition and cooperation in most parts of the Highlands. Although Highlands societies all exhibit forms of competition for status, and the competition is often expressed through a struggle for control over valued scarce goods and their disbursement through reciprocal exchanges (A.J. Strathern 1982:138), it is here in Hagen (and Enga) where more advanced reciprocal exchange systems requiring astute entrepreneurship are found (see Feil 1987; see also A.J. Strathern 1971; and Meggitt 1977). While traditional spheres of competition and cooperation, especially warfare and ceremonial exchange systems, have warranted much attention (see, for example, A.J. Strathern 1966b; 1971; 1977; 1992; Meggitt 1977; and Muke 1994), a more modern form of competition (and cooperation), perhaps of similar magnitude, is the focus of this chapter.

In spite of the fact that European contact with the PNG Highlands was made only recently — beginning in the Eastern Highlands in 1929 and the Western Highlands in 1933 — and formal elections for Local Government Councils and the colonial House of Assembly were introduced in the early 1960s, elections in general and especially provincial and national government elections have become an important sphere of competition and cooperation for Highlanders.³ The level of political integration and cohesion between Highlands groups is far more advanced than coastal and lowland groups could ever achieve because of the inherent structural and institutional differences between them. This is evident in the mobilisation and management of massive economic resources required in elections. We may add here that candidates in coastal areas, by contrast, generally spend less money on election campaigns and that participation levels are much lower.

². In his criticism of those in search of an ‘egalitarian’ Highlands and a timeless ahistoric big-man model, Feil (1987:116-118) has pointed out that while structural, enduring inequalities may be absent, they can be subtle and marked by an ideology of equality. Even today the Highlands has that character.

³. See Chapter Two for more information on the background of Hagen politics as they have developed historically during colonial and post-colonial periods. See also A.J. Strathern (1977, 1984, 1992, 1993b) for similar discussion. For a comparable discussion of historical events in Simbu, see Standish (1992, 1994; see also Warty 1987).
This conforms to a generally observed pattern in electoral behaviour. In a comparative analysis of electoral behaviour, a colleague and I noted that:

In some societies, elections are serious events which can draw a high level of interest and participation. Elections in the Highlands, for example, are marked by aggressive campaigns and a very active and responsive public. Election campaigns are usually characterised by placard-carrying convoys of supporters in traditional finery, political rallies, mob oratory, emergency party conventions, traditional dances, massive pig ceremonials, and seemingly endless beer parties. This active interest and participation often leads to exceptionally high, or even inflated, voter turnout at polling places. Conversely, in other societies, elections are not such serious events and the level of interest and participation can be very low (Ketan and Eyre 1991:18).

Indeed, in three PNG government-supported election monitoring and assessment studies4 (in which I was involved) covering by-elections in the coastal provinces of East New Britain and Central, one could not fail to note the general lack of fanfare that so typically depicts elections in other parts of the country, especially in the PNG Highlands (Ketan and Mangi 1991; Ketan 1991; Ketan and Eyre 1991). During the Gazelle Open By-Election, in May 1991, it was found that:

Voter turnout was poor. Not many people turned up for voting. They were not very enthusiastic about it as if they would, say in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea. For example, when we visited the polling booth in some of the areas around 11:00 a.m. there was hardly anyone who had turned up to cast their votes. When this was rechecked in the afternoon the turnout had not really improved at all (Ketan and Mangi 1991:10).

Similarly, in two Central Provincial Government by-elections voter turnout was especially low: as poor as ten or less votes in at least two polling stations during the June 1991 Kuni By-Election in Kairuku District (Ketan 1991); and members of at least one village in Cloudy had to be notified on polling day in August 1991 because they had no idea that there was a by-election underway (Ketan and Eyre 1991). As in Gazelle, voters here in Central showed a general lack of interest in both by-elections. In Cloudy Bay, for instance, we noted that:

There were no convoys or rallies, and no feasting or dancing. Such fanfare and gaiety which depict elections in other parts of the country were lacking here. Except for posters, there was hardly any campaigning. Some prospective voters were not even aware of the fact that there was a by-election being held at Cloudy Bay. If this is any indication, the level of political awareness is believed to be exceptionally low in Cloudy Bay (Ketan and Eyre 1991:18).

With a view to improving elections in Papua New Guinea, the PNG Electoral Commission assigned the PNG National Research Institute the task of election monitoring and assessment. I was involved here as principal researcher in three by-election studies in 1991: (1) Gazelle Open (with Jo Mangi, Anthropology Dept., UPNG); (2) Kuni; and (3) Cloudy Bay (with Henry Eyre, formerly of UPNG). Based on these and one other study (by Wari Iamo and others), the Electoral Commission made significant changes to the electoral system, including the introduction of one-day polling in PNG elections. However, other recommendations, such as the re-introduction of preferential voting, interagency cooperation in a single and unified civil registration system, etc., were sadly ignored.
In the absence of any systematic nation-wide study, it is difficult to say whether these differences in electoral behavioural outcomes are largely dependent on the level of sociopolitical, economic, and infrastructural development.

However, it is fair to say that significant differences in electoral behaviour, including high levels of violence in some areas and relatively peaceful conduct in other parts of the country, can be explained in the context of markedly contrasting cultural backgrounds. Highlanders, for instance, were perhaps more ‘qualified’ than their coastal counterparts in entering this new arena of competition and cooperation because of their cultural background which is characterised by impressive prestige institutions such as the Mount Hagen moka and other ceremonial exchange systems. *Moka* is the term in Melpa language for reciprocal exchanges of wealth between partners, in which the rule is that a main gift should exceed an initial or initiatory one (A.J. Strathern 1981:10; 1971). The main items of exchange used in *moka* are pigs, pork, previously pearshells and nowadays cash. In a return *moka*, which may take place several years later, one must give more than he had received. The increment is referred to as ‘making *moka*.’ Group prestige and individual status is derived from ‘making *moka*.’ Similar systems existing in other parts of the Highlands are: the *tee* in Enga and *mok ink* in Mendi. The Wahgi konggar and Simbu bugla gende are slightly different in the sense that their emphasis is predominantly on the exchange of roasted pork. All, however, operate on the principle of delayed exchange, where goods received in one ceremony will be reciprocated with similar kind in another at a later date.

Furthermore, there are symbolic and functional parallels in the modern state and traditional Highlands politics. Important clan issues are discussed by clan members in the men’s house where it is usually the big-men who dominate such meetings. The Hagen men’s house, for example, is called *manga rapa*. In front of the *manga rapa* stands the *pukla mbo* monument which commemorates the first *moka*. Hageners, as indicated in Table 6.1, easily associate the National Parliament House with *manga rapa*, the national flag with *pukla mbo*, the Prime Minister and his cabinet ministers with *wua nuim mumuk* (major big-men), budget speeches with *el-ik* (‘fight talk’), which is the most formal kind of public oratory. It is, therefore, easy to understand why elections are important to Highlanders because they fit in well with existing institutions and cultural practices. Some symbolic and functional parallels are given in Table 6.1 (below).

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5. One Hagen informant, Jerry Yar Rombina, himself a skillful orator and a big-man of the Remdi Jikambo clan, gave me a more specific picture: that of Paias Wingti as major big-man, his handling of the national budget as a major pig ceremonial, and Wingti’s speeches in parliament as *el-ik* that goes with ceremonial prestations involving the distribution of roasted pork. See A.J. Strathern (1975) for the delineation of Hagen speech form and its functions; veiled speech (*ik-ek*) and *el-ik* (‘fight talk’) as the most formal kind of oratory.
Table 6.1: Symbolic and functional parallels in political systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>Traditional Mount Hagen</th>
<th>Modern PNG State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(a) The <em>manga rapa</em> as a symbol of clan solidarity, its internal structure of converging rafters held together by a central post is associated with a big-man surrounded by his followers; (b) as central meeting place where important issues and disputes are resolved collectively through consensus; (c) the <em>pukla mbo</em> commemorating the first <em>moka</em>, and (d) the <em>moka pena</em> as the ceremonial ground for display of men (during <em>singsings</em>) and wealth (during <em>moka</em> prestations).</td>
<td>(a) The National Parliament as a symbol of democracy; (b) as central meeting place where legislation (regarding important issues and disputes) is passed collectively through debate; and (c) the PNG national flag as a symbol of national solidarity, a statement of unity in the face of diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Both the major and minor big-men are prominent in clan meetings just as they are pre-eminent in <em>moka</em>.</td>
<td>The prime minister as chief executive and his cabinet ministers have more say in matters regarding respective portfolios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The big-men, through control of <em>moka</em> exchange networks, have more access to valued scarce resources than ordinary men.</td>
<td>The prime minister and his cabinet ministers, as political heads of government departments, have more access to economic resources than ordinary MPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The management and distribution of valued scarce resources is controlled by big-men through selective <em>moka</em> exchanges.</td>
<td>The management of national resources and distribution of wealth is controlled by the PM and his cabinet ministers through budget allocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Individual status and group prestige is derived from success in <em>moka</em> exchanges.</td>
<td>Individual status and 'good' government is based on sound economic management and delivery of goods and services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Major big-men are skilled orators who make extravagant claims of group achievements during <em>elik</em> speech-making.</td>
<td>A prime minister and his ministers are constantly defending their actions (or inactions) during crises, often claiming success (even where there is apparent failure) and take credit for positive outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The achievement and maintenance of big-man status is dependent on individual ability to attract followers and wealth through reciprocal exchanges.</td>
<td>The basis of a continued role in Parliament ultimately lies with the voters but is dependent on personal ability to mobilise and maintain a solid support-base in respective electorates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Big-men are generally good leaders who lead by example, but there are some 'good' big-men and others are 'bad' big-men who default creditors and are despotic in nature. Such 'bad' big-men often lose followers to rival big-men, ultimately resulting in a loss of status.</td>
<td>Politicians are often their own worst enemies, creating problems (such as misappropriation of public funds) which ultimately bring their downfall. There are 'good' politicians just as there are 'bad' ones who make mockery out of the word 'representative'. Such 'bad' politicians are consistently punished by seemingly unforgiving constituents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Elections involve a significant change in the level of participation — a marked shift away from competition between a select band of individuals to one of active participation on a much wider scale. Unlike warfare and ceremonial exchange, where competition for status and struggle for control over valued scarce resources was restricted to warriors and big-men, elections are more encompassing, involving far more ordinary people. Although it is difficult to establish precisely how powerful big-men were in control over valued scarce resources before European contact in the 1930s, the early accounts of German Lutheran missionary-anthropologist, Georg Vicedom who worked in Mount Hagen between 1934 and 1939, suggests that the power of big-men sixty-five years ago was then greater. Big-men were described as chiefs, belonging to rich lineages and ruling over clans. The chiefly lineages monopolised the pearlshell valuables and circulated these in moka transactions only among themselves. Pigs could be reared by all but only the pearlshells carried prestige (A.J. Strathem 1966a:362; see also Vicedom and Tischner 1943-8: Vol.2, cited from Strathem 1966a and Feil 1987). The work of other early observers, such as Ross (1936) and Gitlow (1947), which is largely based on Ross, confirms this picture of the Mount Hagen political order as one of a high degree of local class stratification. A large middle class, a class of 'rubbishmen' and one of 'serfs', called 'slaves' by Vicedom, lived as dependants and at the behest of the more rich and powerful class (see Feil 1982; 1987).

A word of caution here: too much weight placed on the accounts of missionaries and others could lead to unnecessary complications, and even portraying a somewhat misleading picture of the Mount Hagen political order. While accepting that there was some degree of inequality, the descriptions of Hagen social classes by these early observers, as pointed out by A.J. Strathem (1987) is far too rigid — not too different to that of feudal Europe. Although Vicedom's work in particular provides useful insights into Mount Hagen society before contact, it is influenced by his own background and the times in which he was writing — European feudalism, colonialism, and especially Adolf Hitler's fascism. It is extraordinary that he was able to publish three large volumes at the time of the Second World War in a country ravaged by disease and chronic shortage of basic needs.6

European colonialism, however, drastically altered the Mount Hagen political order, first by the inflation of the local exchange economy with plane-loads of pearlshells in the millions (see Hughes 1978; see also Connolly and Anderson 1987; and Chapter Two in this thesis), and then

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6. As indicated in Chapter One, Vicedom's work, as evident in his 'master race' theory, was apparently influenced by German fascism. His belief that the original inhabitants of Hagen were dark-skinned dwarfs which were colonised and subsequently displaced by a light-skinned tall race from the west reflects Nazi Germany's Aryan race policy. See A.J. Strathem (1971 and 1987) for a more critical review of Vicedom and other earlier interpretations of Hagen as a highly stratified society.
through the processes of ‘development’ in general, and more specifically by the creation of modern political structures.\textsuperscript{7}

In a drastically altered economy, through the introduction of cash, cash-crops and education, elections offer ordinary men and, perhaps more significantly, women the chance to compete for power and influence. In other words, it opens doors for people who otherwise would have been shut out by traditional big-men who had a monopoly over exchange networks in pre-colonial times. This partly explains aggressive electoral behaviour. As evident in recent elections, Hageners approach the campaign trail with the same passion and vigour which they take onto the battlefield: to win at all cost! Like warfare and ceremonial exchange, which produce leaders such as fight-leaders and big-men, so too do elections which generate a special brand of leaders. Whilst all of them are referred to as wua maim (leader), politicians are commonly known in Hagen as kikemik wua, a pejorative term which roughly translates to the English ‘rogue’. Retrospectively, a person with no principles or scruples is often called politik wua (political man), which, in reality, can be far less flattering than is initially apparent.

PNG Highlands-style Electioneering: A Unique Experience

PNG Highlands-style electioneering is a culture in itself, with election fanfare unmatched anywhere else in the country. With floats of awe-inspiring warriors and full-bodied women in magnificent plumes of birds of paradise\textsuperscript{8}, simultaneous orchestration of exchange sequences, and mobilisation of supporters, Highlands election campaigns have few parallels in size or scale, and in sophistication of strategies and ploys involved. It is not uncommon to find candidates and supporters in varying states of intoxication, not from alcohol consumption but simply because of the frenetic pace of events and the way in which the various events of social, economic, political and religious significance are all brought together to coincide with elections. Relations of enmity, for instance, can be transformed into ones of alliance, or temporary truce can be mutually reached by warring factions to cater for the higher priority of elections (see Ketan 1996). Similarly, those who hold the ‘ropes’ of moka will simultaneously release them, thus resulting in a series of return payments.\textsuperscript{9} Furthermore, reparation payments to allies for losses

\textsuperscript{7} D. K. Feil describes colonialism as the second great revolution, after the introduction of sweet potato (ipomoean revolution) which altered the status quo of the then political order through an intensification of pig production and the exchange of surplus products (1987:115-120).

\textsuperscript{8} The men wear kesi wua head-dress which are largely made of Baggiana and King of Saxony sprays while women wear mok and rumbo tails of Princess Stephanie and Sicklebill (an influence of Wahgi styles). For decoration sets and the way in which particular types of feathers distinguish between different festivals, see A.J. and A.M. Strathern (1971). The King of Saxony feathers, for example, were reserved for the more important occasions such as moka. When men are ready to make a big moka, they say, ‘the bird is on its way’, meaning, ‘now the Saxony plumes will appear’ (ibid 63).

\textsuperscript{9} See, for example, Parua Kur’s return moka to the Kawelka in 1984 (Ketan 1996). For a discussion on moka sequences and those who hold the ‘ropes’ of moka (moka kan ambromiri), refer to A.J. Strathern (1971).
sustained in war, compensation of minor enemies for killings, and even peaceful negotiations between major enemies will be made in deliberately ordered sequences prior to and culminating in elections, thus creating what I call the Hagen megacycle.

Conversely, rifts can occur within alliances and groups once allied to each other may find themselves on opposite sides. Electoral manoeuvring, for instance, may involve negotiations with major enemies, abandoning existing military allies in the face of war, and the use of criminal gangs and guns by politicians and their henchmen to manipulate voters. In a recent study on violence and political change in Mount Hagen, A.J. Strathem reported that:

...the recurrent suspicion on the part of ordinary people (and some electoral officials also) that certain politicians are among the most important suppliers of guns to their constituents, largely because guns buy votes. Politicians' henchmen distribute guns to their networks and build their own influence on the putative possession of powerful weapons (1993b:47).

Here I can only add that such suspicions are not uncommon, nor unfounded, because I too have heard and seen instances of guns and ammunition being distributed by aspiring politicians. In my discussion on the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance in the context of the 1992 Dei Open election and of the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990), I have explored the way in which electoral behaviour is dictated by the type of relations maintained by individuals and groups, and how this is translated into election results (Ketan 1996).

Electioneering is also an extremely serious business involving millions of kina and vast amounts of other economic resources changing hands between thousands of individuals and hundreds of groups. In many ways it involves the redistribution of wealth in varying amounts and ways, from simple cash handouts inside a haus-man (men's house) to ceremonial prestations on a grand scale involving thousands of people. Iambakey Okuk's distribution of 4,000 cartons of beer at Kundiawa airport during the 1982 National Election ranks as one of the most spectacular of all.

Bill Standish, a keen observer of Simbu politics since 1972, reported that:

Okuk's most spectacular innovation was on the eve of the [1982] election liquor ban to give out 4,000 cartons of beer, each with twenty-four bottles, at Kundiawa airstrip on the 29 May, following an all night string band competition. In ten years I had not seen him wear traditional dress, but on this occasion Okuk did wear the traditional apron and breast clout. The story of the 'bare-bottomed MP' and the deputy prime minister's wife 'dancing bare breasted' at the 'beer barrel election' was duly reported internationally along with front-page photographs (Sydney Morning Herald 5 June 1982; ABC Background Briefing 6 June 1982; The Age 2 June 1982), but this was not an occasion for mockery. Witnesses said that Okuk — who as at Maki spoke in Tokpisin — again said that he was the son of a traditional Chimbu leader and asserted a right to political power under the Simbu ideology of hereditary leadership. At least 10,000 people came to collect the beer, with Okuk as master of ceremonies distributing huge piles for supporters in each open electorate and fifty cartons each for the police, Pangu supporters [his principal opponents] and the mostly expatriate Hash House Harriers (Standish 1989:194; see also Dorney 1990; and Standish 1992).
Such flagrant flaunting of personal wealth, whilst usually justified through the use of the 'traditional' ideology of big-men as magnets for attracting wealth, can sometimes have an adverse effect, as in Okuk's case. Although Okuk was quite clever in dressing traditionally so that he could cite custom as a defence against possible bribery charges\footnote{As pointed out by Bill Standish, "Okuk dressed traditionally in order to be able to cite his use of custom, which is supported in the National Constitution, should he later need to defend himself against any possible charges under the Criminal Code of treating (corruptly providing food, meat, drink or entertainment in order to influence votes). Bribery and the exercise of undue influence (threats or use of force obstructing the free exercise of voting rights by an elector) are grounds for rendering a poll null and void" (Standish 1989:194; 1992:237-238). In this regard, Okuk's grand performance seems to have been based on a conscious and calculated decision. He further goes on to say that "Okuk had read reports in which [Standish] had argued that gift-exchange for prestige purposes could be defended as customary, with generosity and display intrinsic to Melanesian leadership" (Standish 1992:238; 1978b).}, he obviously forgot that gifts given through inter-personal networks create obligations while those given at a public level are merely dismissed as *pablik samting bilong kisim tasol* ('public things to be taken only', not meant to be reciprocated).

Subsequent events in Hagen and other parts of the Highlands suggests that modified versions of Okuk's innovation have been adopted by other politicians throughout the Highlands and in some parts of the country, especially in the capital, Port Moresby, where many Highlanders live in a number of relatively large settlements and until 1997 a Simbu, David Unagi, was a MP for the Port Moresby North-East Open electorate.

That Okuk admitted having spent between K240-250,000 in Chimbu, compared with the eventual winner, John Nilkare's admitted K45,000 (Standish 1989:195) and still lost the election suggests, among other things, that factors other than mega resources are also important in elections. I now turn to the key players who interact between the local Hagen political field and the PNG national scene.

**Powerful Individuals and Political Parties**

At the centre of the expanded Hagen-PNG political field are some of the country's most wealthy and powerful men competing for *super-big-man* status. For instance, the leaders of the country's major political parties are based in Mount Hagen, where party-aligned business and tribal groups are clearly at work, perhaps reaching a higher level of political integration than in other parts of the country. Names such as Paias Wingti, Paul Pora and Michael Mel are known way beyond local boundaries. A history of competition between 'party-aligned groups' is analysed here in the context of the Western Highlands Provincial Government and the rivalry between the People's Democratic Movement (PDM) Party and the National Party. Both PDM, headed by Paias Wingti, and the two factions of the National Party, headed separately by Paul Pora and Michael Mel, have strong following in the Mount Hagen Central area, but are not as
strong in other parts of the province. The other major PNG parties with Hageners as leaders are: Pangu *Pati* (Kombukla tribesman, Pati Wamp, as the national president); and the People’s Progress Party (PPP), with Jika Milakamb clansman, Glen Komomga, as its national president. However, both Pangu and PPP are relatively weak in terms of party following in Hagen because most people view them as *nambis* or coastal parties and their nominal Hagen leaders as mere window dressing (*bilas tasol*). *Table 6.2* shows the local groups, power bases and government positions of six prominent Hagen leaders in the last 20 years.

*Table 6.2: Prominent Hagen leaders and their power-bases*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Local group</th>
<th>Power-base and Party-aligned ‘interest’ groups</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Pora</td>
<td>Yamka Pepka</td>
<td>Pora and his faction of the National Party have a strong following among the Kinjika-Yamka, some Mokei sections and Elti-Penambi tribe-pair.</td>
<td>Leads one half of National Party, MP for Hagen Open (1987-present), former Finance Minister (1988-92).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Mel</td>
<td>Nokpa</td>
<td>Mel and his faction of the National Party have a strong following among the Kpoli-Nokpa, Roni-Lati, and the Pipilka Coalition-style Alliance.</td>
<td>Leads one half of National Party, Pipilka Chairman, former national government Treasurer &amp; MP for Anglimp-South Wahgi (1987-92).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pati Wamp</td>
<td>Kombukla</td>
<td>Kombukla-Minembi, Welyi-Kuta Coalition-style Alliance.</td>
<td>President of Pangu Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glen Komonga</td>
<td>Jika Milakamb</td>
<td>Jika Maipngel section</td>
<td>President of Peoples Progress Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All, except Michael Mel (Anglimp) and Pati Wamp (Dei), are from Hagen Central tribes. Significantly, all of the Western Highlands Provincial MPs have been Hagen Central men: Raphael Doa (Mokei Nambka); Kindi Lawi (Jika Oprimb); and Paias Wingti (Jika Mukaka), emphasising my point that here in Hagen Central *super-big-men*, backed by sections of large tribes, are able to compete for positions of great power and influence. However, it must also be noted that whilst Wingti, Pora and Mel could definitely be described as *super-big-men*, the same could not be said of Doa and Lawi.
Political parties have virtually failed to reach the grass-roots level, where voting is principally based on the kinship system and personal networks, and while it is not my intention to pretend otherwise, it needs to be pointed out that: (1) parties are a good source of economic resources for use in election campaigns; (2) party membership may have advantages in securing employment for the party elite, thus, conforming to the true spirit of “jobs-for-the-boys” mode of patronage and spoils system; (3) party alignment is often a major factor in securing government-funded projects and development funds; and (4) it is widely believed that party-aligned ‘interest’ groups and prominent individuals often receive preferential treatment in business deals and government contracts. It is chiefly for these reasons that individuals compete for party leadership, and Hageners have been particularly successful in this regard. In each of the cases mentioned above the party followings (or followers) are of course supporters of influential leaders and their numbers, depending on the fortune of the leaders, flux and wane, just as the relations between individuals are constantly shifting.\textsuperscript{11} Paul Pora, for example, led his supporters out of Pangu and into National when he switched parties before the 1987 National Elections, but defected back to the Pangu-led Opposition when the other National Party faction, led by Michael Mel, entered into an alliance with PDM to form the government after the 1987 elections. He was then Finance Minister in a Pangu led government from 1988 to 1992.

Nonetheless, as noted by Burton (1989a:271), party is important in Hagen in the sense that sets of party-aligned groups are at work. This is perhaps more so in Hagen Central than elsewhere because my own investigations revealed no evidence of party-based political organisation in peripheral areas such as Dei, Mul and Anglimp. If there is any party confrontation which comes to the fore of political discussions by Hageners, then it is the rivalry between PDM and National in the context of the Western Highlands Provincial Government versus the PDM-dominated national government in early 1987.

The background to this rivalry is given below, based in part on Burton (1989a:270-271) and Burton and Keher (1997). The National Party, led by Philip Kapal, came to power in the Western Highlands Provincial Government through a no-confidence motion in April 1985. Kapal’s government was suspended by the Wingti-led national government in early 1987 and not reinstated until after the 1987 elections.\textsuperscript{12} As was widely tipped at the time, this cost PDM a

\textsuperscript{11} While the party following in Hagen is generally along the lines indicated above, it needs to be pointed out that the actual situation can be far more complex. Despite party-aligned groups at work here, there is far more fluidity in individual choice, as in instances where families are split between candidates. Cash inducement is also a major factor in the final analysis of a voter’s choice of candidate, but there are other factors (such as kinship ties, intermarriage, and moka exchange relations).

\textsuperscript{12} The suspension was based on an Auditor-General’s report in February 1987 which alleged “gross mismanagement of finances in the years 1982, 83, 85 and 86”. Premier Kapal, however, appealed against the decision, claiming that it was politically motivated and his administration unfairly penalised for the wrongdoings by the two preceding governments, those of Nambuka Mara and Kagul Koroka. In September 1987 a National Court judge, Justice Hinchliffe, ruled that “the Auditor-General’s report of
great deal of support in Hagen Central and Wingti, who had held the Hagen Open seat since 1977, was forced by Paul Pora's candidacy in Hagen Open into nominating for the Western Highlands Provincial seat. Paias Wingti and Paul Pora won the Provincial and Hagen Open seats with big majorities of over 40 and 30 per cent of the total vote, respectively. After the elections and in the subsequent government formation, the principal combatants then faced each other on the front benches of the National Parliament — Wingti as Prime Minister and Pora as senior Opposition spokesman.

The Western Highlands Provincial Government remained in suspension until fresh elections were called in June 1988. This time the National Party, again led by Philip Kapal and his deputy, Lucas Roika, was returned to power for a second term in office with a two-thirds majority in the provincial assembly. It was reported that:

Western Highlands Premier Philip Kapal and his deputy Lucas Roika unanimously retained their respective positions yesterday [5 July 1988] following the swearing in of the new government. Mr Kapal collected 19 votes defeating his PDM party challenger, Kagul Koroka who only collected five votes. Mr Roika also collected 19 defeating the opposition sponsored member Mr Er Tal who only got five votes (Post-Courier, 6 July 1988).

For Philip Kapal and the National Party, it was a major victory against PDM and Paias Wingti in particular because it was Wingti whom many people in Hagen — rightly or wrongly — saw as being responsible for the suspension of the provincial government. The People's Democratic Movement Party's comprehensive defeat in Western Highlands in 1988 led many people to suggest the end of PDM in provincial politics. This trend was continued at the national level when Paul Pora, who had earlier defected to the Opposition with five National Party members, was rewarded with the powerful Finance and Planning Ministry after Paias Wingti was defeated — 58 votes to 50 — by Rabbie Namaliu in a no-confidence motion on Monday 4 July 1988 (Ninsini Nius, Editorial 5 July 1988).

February 1987, which the then Provincial Affairs Minister, Mr Warena, tabled in Cabinet was incomplete”, which meant that the suspension was invalid. The report referred to “major unsatisfactory matters”, much of it during the years prior to Mr Kapal's time, but some matters did refer to his government. Justice Hinchliffe said he was satisfied that Cabinet was wrong in law when it said that the matter “can only be put right by suspension”. He added that there was a lot of work to be done because it appeared the financial mismanagement prior to Kapal's government was “quite staggering” (Buruka, Post-Courier, September 1987; cited in PNG Electoral Commission, Press Coverage of 1987 Elections). The National Government, however, appealed against the decision and in November 1987 a full-bench Supreme Court quashed the order of the National Court and declared that the provisional suspension of the Western Highlands Provincial Government by the NEC was valid (PNG Electoral Commission, ibid).

13. The People's Democratic Movement Party and the National Party had each endorsed candidates in all 26 constituencies. PDM pledged to upgrade the Mount Hagen hospital to a base hospital whilst National promised a scholarship scheme for grade 7, 8, and 9, and to build enough dormitories in High schools to enable all students to be boarders (Bengi, Post-Courier, 6 May 1988).
The Western Highlands Provincial Government was again suspended soon after Wingti won back the reins of power following the 1992 National Elections. This time it was not reinstated even though Wingti was replaced by his deputy Sir Julius Chan as Prime Minister in August 1994. Despite court challenges brought against the National Government by suspended Premier Lucas Roika — who had replaced Kapal in an internal power struggle — the Western Highlands Provincial Government remained suspended until November 1994 when fresh elections were called to be held in January 1995.

The Provincial Government Factor

The Western Highlands Provincial Government came into existence in 1977 as part of the decentralisation process throughout Papua New Guinea. The history of post-independence decentralisation in Papua New Guinea has been adequately covered by others (see, for example, Conyers 1976; Standish 1979; Axline 1986; Ghai and Regan 1992; Regan 1997a and 1997b; and May and Regan ed. 1997), so it is not necessary to go over the same ground here. It is, however, necessary to mention that after considerable pressure from some parts of the country — including Bougainville, the Gazelle Peninsula, and the Papuan region — action was somewhat reluctantly taken in 1977 to establish nineteen provincial governments based on the existing nineteen administrative districts of the country, apart from the National Capital District (see Peasah 1990; Ghai and Regan 1992; and Regan 1997a). As Peasah says:

This demand for substantial devolution of governmental powers and functions to the district/provincial level reflected a dramatic emergence of intense micro-nationalist sentiments and interests in many parts of the country in the decade immediately preceding independence in 1975. It was most strongly expressed by such movements as the Mataungan Association of the Gazelle Peninsula, the Napidakoe Navitu of Bougainville District, and the Papua Besena in the Papuan Region. Bougainville District and, to a lesser degree, the Papua Besena (on behalf of the Papuan Region) went to the extent of even threatening secession of their respective areas from the state of Papua New Guinea. In the process, a three-tier system of government comprising the national, provincial, and local levels has replaced the previous two-tier system of the national and local levels (Peasah 1990:2).

While establishing the provincial government system the national parliament retained the power to suspend those considered by the national government as being incapable of looking after their own affairs. The grounds for suspension, as outlined in the Papua New Guinea National Constitution, are if:

(a) there is widespread corruption in the administration of the province; or (b) there has been gross mismanagement of the financial affairs of the province; or (c) there has been a breakdown in the administration of the province; or (d) there has been a deliberate and persistent frustration of, or failure to comply with, lawful directions of the National Government (Constitution ss.187E(1) and 187E(4), cited in Peasah 1990:12).
Peasah goes on to say that “the actual procedures for suspending a provincial government have been simplified since 1983 to the point of permitting the National Executive Council to provisionally suspend that government, subject to later confirmation by the Parliament” (ibid). Anthony Regan, a keen observer and consultant to the PNG government on provincial government, makes this point clearly:

In addition to the provisions on disallowance of provincial laws by the National Parliament, it is the provisions for suspension of provincial governments contained in the Constitution and OLPG [Organic Law on Provincial Government] which most emphatically assert the unitary nature of the provincial government system. In their original form, the suspension provisions contained various procedural safeguards designed to protect provincial governments from precipitate or politically-motivated action by the national executive. The two laws were amended in 1983, removing or modifying almost all the safeguards, a step which shifted the balance in the decentralised system heavily towards the national government (1997b:49).

It was under this power that the Kapal government in Western Highlands was suspended in 1987, and in many instances it seems that the national government, when confronted with problems of unaccountability at the provincial level, has dealt with them in rather ruthless fashion. Accordingly, and since 1983, numerous provincial governments have been suspended chiefly for ‘gross mismanagement of financial affairs’. The then Prime Minister, Paias Wingti, while addressing the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce in October 1992, estimated that “over half of the provincial governments in the country have been suspended for gross mismanagement and corruption at one time or another” (Wingti 1992:8). In fact, Regan says that “as of early 1994, fourteen provincial governments have been suspended, the first (Enga) in 1984 and the latest (Madang and Enga again) in early 1993” (1997b:49).

Whilst the problems of ‘mismanagement of public funds’, or ‘corruption in administration’, or any other matters of incompetence and personal enrichment are not restricted to provincial governments, it would seem that the national government has acted on the somewhat misguided principle that such problems could be resolved through suspension. Since the problems of corruption and financial mismanagement are widespread throughout national as well as provincial departments, provincial politicians, whose governments can be suspended by national politicians (who themselves, however, appear immune to suspension under similar grounds), often view their national counterparts as rivals rather than partners. This situation is further complicated by patronage relations between some national politicians and their provincial counterparts. But, generally, the relationship between national and provincial politicians is one based on mutual distrust, characterised by confrontational debates on the level of autonomy in regard to mineral resource development rights and similar issues of both national and provincial interests. At the core is the persistent and sometimes disruptive power struggle between national and provincial politicians.
The struggle for control over state resources is a key element in any political confrontation, but even more so in a system of patronage where the ‘rules of the game’¹⁴ are bent towards maximising profit for key players and their followers. This is particularly true in Papua New Guinea where elective office-holders have converted their representative role into one of patronage towards their electorates (see A.J. Strathem 1993b:49) and the spoils of office are flagrantly displayed during elections and at other times. Dictated by the harsh realities of PNG elective office in which politicians are judged not by their stand on policy issues but by how much they can personally deliver to their voters, politicians at all levels have quite consciously concentrated on extending their personal networks. This, amongst other things, has resulted in a direct confrontation between national and provincial politicians. National politicians, as indicated by former Prime Minister Paias Wingti, argue that “this costly second tier of government [arose] as a result of blackmail from one provincial grouping [Bougainville]” (Wingti 1992:4).¹⁵

Furthermore, provincial governments are seen by national politicians as “an unnecessary intermediate layer between them and their electorates, and thereby obfuscating the usefulness of national politicians in the eyes of the voters” (Peasah 1990:15). In a country where there is a lack of distinctive ideologies and political party platforms, complicated by the highly localised nature of party-aligned interest groups, the anxieties of politicians to prove themselves as the link between their people and government resources has generated suspicion and antagonism between national and provincial politicians.

The evidence for mutual antagonism and suspicion (subsumed in a generalised power struggle), as indicated by Peasah (1990) is demonstrated in the following:

- the scant regard normally given by the national government to recommendations of the Premiers’ Council conferences;

¹⁴ Using F.G. Bailey’s (1969) game analogy of political competition, where competitors agree that the prize is worth having and they accept some basic rules of conduct; ‘rules’, as used here, refers chiefly to what Bailey calls normative rules. “Rules which express such ultimate and publicly acceptable values are called normative rules” (1969:4). Normative rules, he goes on to say, “are very general guides to conduct; they are used to judge particular actions ethically right or wrong” (ibid). The word ‘game’, however, should not be taken literally, as PNG politics is far more serious than that.

¹⁵ According to Wingti (1992), a total of K329 million goes into delegated functions of the provincial government system every year. “Five hundred and fifty provincial politicians and their provincial government staff took up just over K10 million in 1991 in wages bill alone, [which] excludes perks and privileges for 240 provincial ministers” (1992:4). Wingti makes an interesting comparison between PNG and New Zealand, a country “with a similar population as PNG [but] a far more advanced economy which supports only 97 politicians [compared to] PNG taxpayers supporting 659 politicians” (1992:5). The 97 politicians, he says, “costs the New Zealand taxpayers $7 million per annum [in] salaries and allowances. That works out to about K3.5 million [in 1992; before the devaluation of the PNG Kina]” (ibid). If 550 provincial politicians cost K10 million, then surely 109 national politicians would cost a lot more, and a total of 659 politicians would definitely be much higher, perhaps five times that of New Zealand.
• the emasculation of the National Fiscal Commission, one of the most important aspects of the constitutional machinery for overseeing national-provincial relations;

• the extra-legal accretions and even sometimes arbitrariness on the part of the national government in the fiscal relations between the national government and provincial governments;

• the lack of adequate consultation and notification (contrary to constitutional recommendations) in passing national or provincial laws;

• the unconstitutional establishment and retention of provincial administrative departments despite a court decision on the unconstitutionality of these departments;

• the foisting of national parliamentarians on provincial assemblies; and

• the increasingly free hand assumed by the national government and the Parliament in suspending provincial governments (Peasah 1990:14).

Given these unfortunate and rather sad circumstances, it came as no big surprise when the National Parliament finally decided to abolish the provincial government system in June 1995.

According to the PNG Foreign Affairs Department News Summary:

Papua New Guinea's 20-year-old provincial government system was yesterday [28 June 1995] abolished in an historical passage of reform bill. The controversial bill was passed 86-15 following the third reading which was introduced by Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan. However, five prominent Government Ministers did not vote for the Bill [together with] prominent senior Opposition MPs Sir John Kaputin (Rabaul) and Masket Iangalio (Wapenamanda). The obstinate Ministers were John Momis (Communications), Bernard Narakobi (Agriculture and Livestock), Bart Philemon (Public Service), Jerry Nalau (Labour and Employment) and Paul Pora (Civil Aviation and Tourism). Mr Momis and Mr Narakobi are the parliamentary bosses of coalition partner Melanesian Alliance [Party]. Mr Philemon and Mr Nalau are from Pangu Pati and Mr Pora heads National Party. The MA pair and Mr Pora abstained from voting. Mr Philemon and Mr Nalau voted against the Bill. They had all declined a request to resign and are likely to be sacked by Sir Julius (News Summary, 29 June 1995, p.2).

As it transpired, all five government ministers were later replaced, but it is significant to note that Paul Pora had quite sensibly abstained from voting. There is no doubt that if Pora had voted for the bill, he would have antagonised his henchman, Lucas Roika, who had only five months earlier been voted in as Premier of Western Highlands Province. Roika has considerable influence in Hagen Central, which is the heart of Mount Hagen Open politics, and Pora needs a man like Roika to mobilise support during national parliament elections. Whilst Pora's decision may have been weighted by more parochial struggles in Hagen, Momis and Narakobi's had more to do with matters of principle — these two Melanesian Alliance leaders are generally credited for being the founding fathers of the provincial government system in Papua New
Guinea. Despite their noble stand, they were overwhelmingly outnumbered by those favouring abolition. Hence:

In place [of provincial governments] is now a system which abolishes provincial politicians and enables [national politicians] to become members of provincial assemblies. Local Government [Council] presidents will now form the new provincial assemblies together with their MPs. Regional MPs will automatically become Governors, except for a Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister, plus funds for development purposes will be channelled directly to local-level governments. Financial powers will be centralised and provincial development programs or similar [projects] will now have to get the blessings of Waigani (PNG Foreign Affairs Department News Summary, June 29, p.2).

Back in Hagen, the termination of the last elected Western Highlands Provincial Government, headed by Lucas Roika of the National Party, which ceased operations in July 1995, is another factor which will come into the equation when the heavy-weights clash in future elections. In yet another interesting twist to this rivalry between PDM and National Party, the abolition of provincial governments, saw Paias Wingti resign from his position as Leader of Opposition and take charge of Western Highlands as the first Governor of the province, thereby, in effect, displacing Roika.

Most people in Western Highlands would see this as yet another defeat of National by PDM, but those familiar with Hagen history will know the traditional rivalry between Hagen's two largest groups, Jika and Mokei. It goes back to the colonial period, when Jika leaders were said to have laughed at Mokei leaders who were told to wear red laptops supplied by the Australian administrators. Mokei leaders, angered by what they considered to be deliberate ridicule, challenged Jika to a contest in log-dragging whilst working on road constructions. This rivalry was later transferred into sports, business and politics.16

The Mokei, as traditional owners of land now occupied by the Mount Hagen township, feel that they should have more say in the management of the town. The Jika, on the other hand, feel that they have the right, by virtue of size and strength, to control town affairs. This has in the past resulted in some conflict between these two large tribes, and will continue because the Mokei will view the replacement of the Roika government by the Wingti governorship as an extension of that rivalry. As Hageners say, when giants lock horns in the sky there is bound to be thunder and lightning. Similarly, the clash between political and economic heavy-weights will surely produce turbulence of massive proportions.

Elections in Mount Hagen, at best, are times of uncertainty and, at worst, of widespread fear and anxiety. These are natural psychological phenomena in times of conflict, but the 1997 National

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16. The historical background to the Mokei-Jika rivalry was given to me by Mathew Nokkie of Mount Hagen. Nokkie's tribe, (Kum) Kopi, has strong ties with the Mokei.
Elections and the Hagen Megacycle

Election\textsuperscript{17}, following recent structural changes, or more specifically the abolition of provincial governments, caused the jitters in certain circles, notably among the churches. Amidst widespread violence during the 1995 Western Highlands provincial elections, entire congregations within the Wahgi Parish (Melpa Circuit) of the Lutheran Church (ELC-PNG) were not only vigilant in prayer but held their considerable numbers away from trouble through some powerful preaching and community work. Anticipating trouble in 1997, many church leaders had expressed the need for an end to inter-church rivalry and greater cooperation between the various Christian denominations towards achieving more peaceful and fair elections in future. I now turn to strategies of candidates in elections.

**Cash-for-Votes**

The strategies adopted by candidates in soliciting for votes vary, ranging from more subtle forms such as mini *moka* to use of threat or force. But the use of cash has become a common denominator in the mad scramble for votes. Cash-for-votes, or open bribery, is a common practice and accepted as an integral part of electioneering in Mount Hagen society, but candidates express disgust at clan leaders who openly solicit for money in return for promise of votes on polling days. Of the candidates interviewed, most of them admitted that cash-for-votes is indeed a bad practice, which not only goes against the spirit of democracy but also contributes to election-related violence, yet it is practically impossible for a candidate to avoid such a situation without seriously jeopardising his chances of winning.

As previously indicated, there are parallels in traditional spheres of competition and cooperation such as the Mount Hagen *moka* ceremonial exchange system and a modern election campaign. Both involve some form of cooperation between mutual interest groups, such as clans of a particular tribe, in order to compete effectively against other similar groups. As in *moka*, where big-men try to outdo each other with the size of their gifts of pigs, pork and cash, in election campaigns candidates try to outdo each other with 'gifts' mainly of cash. In both instances, clan support is considered vital, where both the big-men and candidates depend on fellow clansmen and relatives for resources to launch their careers as well as consolidating their positions.

The difference, however, lies in the manner of approach and type of return payments. In *moka* the original gift is given in good faith to exchange partners who are usually kinsmen or affines and will be repaid with an increment of similar kind at a later date. On the other hand, elections involve transactions between relatives as well as total strangers, and economic resources —

\textsuperscript{17} This would be PNG's eighth national election and the fifth since political independence in 1975. After four different Prime Ministers and nine governments, PNG, while I was writing this chapter, was preparing for 1997 which is possibly the nation's most important election in history. See Appendix VI for a full list of PNG national governments, 1972-1992.
mostly cash, but other valued scarce items such as pigs, cattle, cars, guns, and beer, too — are often directly exchanged for votes, or in the hope of receiving votes.

Moreover, the economic irrationality of Western Highlands elections in particular raises considerable concern. It is shocking to find so much resources committed to an office which carries a basic salary of less than K500 per fortnight for ordinary members of provincial assemblies. However, what appears irrational to outsiders makes perfect sense to Hagenerans whose behaviour is governed by clearly defined rules and their efforts driven primarily by prestige rather than profit motive. A major aim of individuals is simply to become the biggest big-man in the area. In other words, it is mostly big-men competing for super-big-men status. Monetary considerations become secondary issues here.

Two candidates from Dei Council, during an interview conducted in Mount Hagen in early 1995 less than 48 hours before polling for the provincial assembly, revealed that they had spent K10,000 and K12,000 respectively, while another's costs were approaching K15,000. It was estimated that about eighty per cent of that money was used in buying of votes. Although this is an accurate representation of campaign expenditure in peripheral areas such as Dei, it does not, however, reflect actual election expenditure in Mount Hagen generally because it is in the Hagen Central area where the super-big-men operate. It is believed that here in Hagen Central, candidates spend well over K20,000 in provincial elections alone. The figure for National Elections, in view of major political party confrontations and personality clashes, is much higher. Equivalent figures for Dei Open in 1992 went beyond K250,000. That should give us a picture of how much a candidate spends in Hagen Central during both provincial and national elections. As shown in Table 6.3, projected expenditure for Hagen Central (Open) in 1997 was K100,000 to one million kina, which means that each candidate’s expenditure will fall roughly between these figures.¹⁸

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<tr>
<td>Dei Council</td>
<td>20-250,000</td>
<td>10-15,000</td>
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<td>Hagen Central</td>
<td>50-500,000</td>
<td>20-50,000</td>
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¹⁸ Bill Standish provides comparable figures for campaign expenditure in Simbu during the 1982 elections when Okuk said that the National Party had spent K1 million in total, of which K547,000 was his own. Okuk himself spent close to a quarter of a million in Simbu (Standish 1989:195; see also Standish 1992).
It should be pointed out that these are conservative estimates of expenditure in cash alone; add other wealth items such as pigs, pork and beer, and it presents a more accurate picture of pure economic irrationality. During the 1992 Elections one candidate in an open electorate was said to have spent more than K200,000 in less than a week. In one village this same candidate came across an aging big-man who was ill. After learning that the old man was suffering from a bad cold, the candidate reached into his breast pocket and said: “You seem to be suffering from the same cough as I. Here are some cough medicine that I have been taking.” The medicine was a K50 note! Such generosity however did not win votes for the candidate because he gave out cash outside of the context of social relations, which means that his kind gesture may have been interpreted as gris moni (‘grease money’) intended to influence voters rather than meeting social obligations.

In this somewhat strange game of massive spending and correspondingly high levels of violence, various breeds of leaders, representing different interest groups, have emerged. Amongst these are some who represent what is commonly known as ‘name-list’ groups, some fictitious but others real, comprising an average of fifteen voters. Their names are listed roughly on a piece of paper and delivered to a candidate by their leader who negotiates for cash in return for promise of votes which may or may not be actually delivered on polling day. The same list may be delivered to one or more candidates and cash collected. And the candidates know of such practice, yet they persevere in their quest for support. Thus, it becomes a game of deception which can be mutual. This supports a particular theory which holds that there is a relationship of mutual deception, gullibility and ridiculous naivety (see Iamo and Ketan 1992:2-3; see also Ketan 1995). The ‘name-list’ group is one with perhaps the most sinister of motives. Candidates will tolerate them only to a certain extent, by dealing with them for as long as they believe that the group genuinely exists in neutral locality or not being part of a larger base-vote belonging to a rival candidate.

In the event of an imbalance in reciprocity, when cash is not reciprocated with votes, retribution will surely follow in varying forms. Post-polling violence in Western Highlands during the 1992 National Elections included murders, rape, injury to person, destruction of property, and even banishment of fellow clansmen from tribal territorial boundaries. Banishment is perhaps the harshest of penalties for members who do not conform to clan policies regarding elections, but there are of course more hideous forms of punishment (such as death) which can be handed out.

Although candidates are not easily fooled by self-styled leaders such as those claiming to represent name-list-groups, they persevere in their quest for electorate-wide support because of the common belief that he who consistently picks up marginal votes, in addition to a solid base-vote comprising his local group, will eventually win (see Ketan and Eyre 1991). In spite of conclusions reached by a previous study (Burton 1989a), primordial factors can alter the course of an election quite significantly in Hagen politics, as occurred during the 1995 Western Highlands provincial assembly elections (see Chapter Eight).
to 'nonconformists' from outside the clan. In the instance of a clan having endorsed its own candidate, clan members automatically become members of what is commonly known in Hagen as a 'base-vote', something that has led some people to believe in the existence of 'vote-banks'. Both concepts are the focus of discussion in the next two sections.

'Vote-banks'

It can be argued that issues, policies and political parties are not significant factors in Papua New Guinea elections. My own experience with election monitoring studies is that election campaigns are not based on comprehensive policy issues, nor on party ideologies, but are rather based on kinship systems and personal networks. Kin-groups are undoubtedly important factors in elections. In fact, clan and tribal loyalty, as noted by Standish (1978a), are of prime importance in directing voters during elections and remain the principal resource available to skilled manipulators. In any election it is quite normal for candidates to claim clan-wide support as well as significant proportions of other clans and sections from both within and outside of their own tribe. Such claims, coupled with the actual practice of 'block-voting' in a candidate's home-base area, has led many people to believe in the existence of 'vote-banks'. The composition of a 'base-vote' and how it is nurtured and protected from rival candidates will be the subject of the next section, but the following discussion will show that 'vote-banks' are merely based on claims made by candidates, while a 'base-vote' actually represents mobilised support.

Despite claims of clan-wide support, there is no such thing as a ready-made group which automatically forms into a 'vote-bank' that a candidate can call upon when required. While there is a circle of relatives and intimate friends in whom he invests considerable material and emotional resources, an aspiring leader still has to mould that group and those beyond what Boissevain (1974) calls the intimate circles into a 'base-vote'. And that requires skill as well as knowledge of social networks. In other words, anyone can claim support of primary kin-group, but it requires superior capacity to mobilise support required in elections, which means that leaders need to invest a great deal of resources in each individual within his personal network. This essentially means that there are no absolute units, or parameters within which a candidate can safely claim automatic support without keeping his relations warm with others around him. Some groups, therefore, are easier to manipulate than others. The Hagen social networks are schematised below (see Figures 6.1-6.2).

20. Retribution, as a political option in asserting tribal authority, is more commonly sought in patron-client relations, where the client population offend the patron-group by voting for a candidate other than the patron-group's choice. During the 1992 national elections, for instance, a Simbu migrant was killed because it was believed that he and his fellow Simbu migrants, whilst residing on one Hagen group's land (and therefore being clients of the landowners in a patron-client relationship), had voted for another candidate instead of the local candidate (see Ketan 1996; see also Chapter Seven in this thesis).
Both diagrams are based on Bossevain’s representation of network structures, specifically the centrality of an individual in personal networks (1974:47-48). Figure 6.1 is a simple concentric model of Hagen social relations. It represents the various levels of organisation, sometimes arranged as segmentary structures (see examples given in Appendix I). Figure 6.2 is a model of a person’s first order zone in a concentric form. In his model of personal networks, as told to him
by Maltese informants, Boissevain (1974) identified five analytically distinct, though sometimes overlapping, zones:

At the centre is Ego. Around him are clustered (I) Personal Cell, usually composed of his closest relatives and possibly, a few of his most intimate friends. He invests a great deal of his material and emotional resources in these persons. Beyond his personal cell there is a range of people who are also emotionally important to him, his intimates. [His intimates are divided into two categories based on the nature of relations: active and passive]. (II) Intimate Zone A is composed of very close friends and relatives with whom Ego maintains active, intimate relations. (III) Intimate Zone B consists of both friends and relatives, with whom he maintains more passive relations but who nonetheless are emotionally important to him. (IV) Effective Zone is a circle of persons who are important to him in a more pragmatic sense for economic and political purposes and the logistics of daily life. A number of people in this zone are there, rather than in Zone V because of their own networks. As these contain strategic persons who may be useful to Ego, he keeps his relations with them warm so he can gain access to friends of his friends. Thus many in Zone IV are instrumental friends rather than emotional friends. Still farther from Ego in subjective terms is what could be called his (V) Nominal Zone, persons he knows but who mean little to him pragmatically and emotionally...These persons, and those beyond his first order zone, form the (VI) Extended Zone of his network (Boissevain 1974:47-48).

This model can be modified to suit particular purposes. In the case of Hagen, for instance, we may use this model to explain the behaviour of individuals, specifically big-men and other types of leaders, in their attempts to mobilise support for elections and other corporate activities.

In the context of a concentric form, those closer to him emotionally would be ideally easier to mobilise and as one moves outward and away from his personal cell it would become progressively more difficult to do so, thus requiring more skilful use of economic resources to manipulate them. But there are exceptions. First, interest groups, such as ‘name-list’ groups can be quite unpredictable and even deceptive in their behaviour. Since profit — in the form of cash handouts — is their primary motive, they are loyal to none and the word ‘honour’ is not part of their vocabulary.

A second factor which complicates this process is the fact that those from within a candidate’s primary kin-group are, as individuals, primarily free agents who may choose to support an opposing candidate simply because of relations which they consider more pragmatic in their own personal networks. And if they stand to gain more from supporting someone outside their own kin-group, as opposed to their own candidate, then they will vote that way.

In whichever the case it may be, it certainly requires a more skilful candidate to manipulate networks — his own as well as those of others to reach friends of friends — to mobilise enough support to form a comfortable ‘base-vote’ upon which to launch his campaign. Needless to say that it is the more skilful candidates who can convert that support into votes, and go even a step further by competing effectively in areas peripheral to respective ‘base-vote’ areas, who will
ultimately win elections. Therefore, one may conclude that there are no such things as ‘vote-banks’, some groups are easier to mobilise than others, and it requires superior capacity and skilful use of resources to manipulate individuals within the various circles. A primary kin-group, however, remains an important resource to skilful candidates in mobilising support for respective ‘base-votes’, which forms the basis of my discussion in the next section.

‘Base-Vote’

‘Base-vote’ is a term used by Hageners when referring to a candidate’s power-base, or stronghold, which is basically composed of secured votes. It may be, depending on the level of elective office, composed of a subclan, clan, an alliance of clans, or in some cases, an entire tribe or tribe-pair. As previously mentioned (Ketan 1995), in the instance of a clan having endorsed its own candidate, clan members automatically become members of the ‘base-vote’. This base-vote, which may number up to several thousand eligible voters, is protected jealously by supporters. Anyone believed to be courting with rival candidates is deemed to have betrayed tribal or loyalty and punished accordingly. The punishment, which is normally delivered during or after polling, may range from a severe beating to banishment. Voters are told to call the name of the local candidate loudly when voting, or face the consequences.

An effective way in which Hageners try to convert a base-vote into actual votes on polling day is to conduct open voting either by calling the name of the local candidate loudly or alternatively by asking the presiding officer to mark each registered voter’s ballot-paper in favour of the local candidate for every person who passes through the polling booth. To deviate from this can mean trouble for most people. For example, during the 1988 Western Highlands provincial elections, supporters of a losing candidate organised a punitive raid in which they beat a fellow clansman and his family, a woman was allegedly raped, and a man’s house burnt down because they believed that he had voted for the wrong man (see A.J. Strathem 1993b:49-51, Case 1, for a discussion of events leading up to this case). This illustrates the potential for supposed members of a base-vote to defect to the opposition side, which means that group membership is not an absolute indicator of commitment from its members. The conversion of an assumed base-vote, thus, rarely meets with a hundred per cent success rate, as indicated in William Pik’s case during the 1995 Western Highlands provincial elections (see Chapter Eight).

Nevertheless, there are ways in which a base-vote can be protected from rival candidates. Since the base-vote is a predominantly localised group, territorial boundaries which run mostly along rivers and mountains act as natural barriers to vote-poachers. Anyone who belongs to a rival candidate’s clan or in any way connected to him will be told to leave if found within the base-vote area. Candidates regularly warn each other against poaching but encourage their supporters to do so and they themselves are active in soliciting defectors. Consequently many of them have
ended up with injuries and loss of vehicles at road-blocks set up by enraged supporters of rival candidates. The road-blocks, usually set up at entrances into respective base-vote areas, are mainly designed to catch rival candidates and their supporters who visit villages and hamlets in the dark of the night with bags of cash for the purpose of buying votes. For instance, in a single week of pre-polling violence during the 1992 Dei Open election, four vehicles were damaged, two others were impounded, and one candidate was abducted at such road-blocks. I have reported cases of election-related violence elsewhere (Ketan 1996; see also Chapter Seven). Vehicles are a primary target because large amounts of cash, meant for vote-buying, are usually transported by road, but individuals with smaller amounts are known to have been dropped off at the entrances into base-vote areas during the day.

In instances where a neutral group — one not having sponsored its own candidate — is split between two or more candidates, voter blocks aligned to the various candidates are physically transferred across into the base-vote areas of their preferred candidate, where surveillance is more effective and they are treated almost like royalty. As I have previously mentioned (Ketan 1995), they are kept busy with entertainments of the Hagen mortya dance, local version of disco called six-to-six, and some feasting. Both the mortya and six-to-six provide avenues for courting in which young people actively participate, eventuating in marriage for some, but have met with disastrous consequences for others. In one North Wahgi area, Warakar, near Banz, for example, a man was killed and others sustained injuries following an argument over a girl at a six-to-six associated with the 1995 Western Highlands provincial assembly elections.

Another way in which Hageners try to ensure full cooperation from members of a base-vote is through the use of threat, force, and violence to prevent them from voting for the wrong candidate. By forcing voters to call the name of the local candidate at home polling booths, husbands can monitor their demand that their wives (and children in some instances) vote the same way as they do. Hageners have deliberately turned the democratic feature of secret ballot into an open event, thereby drastically curtailing an individual's right to freedom of selection. This apparently gross infringement of an individual's right to vote freely has been continuously ignored by authorities over the decades and has now become an accepted evil in Hagen politics (Ketan 1995). It is fair to say that this happens only at polling stations within a candidate's base-vote area. Conversely, in neutral areas, polling is a less painful exercise in which polling officials are less intimidated and voters enjoy more freedom in their choice of candidates. Polling officials, without police support, are often at the mercy of the local candidates' supporters who virtually dictate policy. I have witnessed polling stations in which polling officials were told to place an 'X' beside the name of the local candidate as voters passed through the polling booth. It was understood that everyone was voting for the local candidate. In this way one can expect the conversion of a base-vote into actual votes as near as possible to achieving a hundred per cent
success rate. Yet, as the results indicate, one can never be sure, because some will always get away through abstention or defection (see Chapter Eight).

Based on previous experiences and current assessment of the situation in Mount Hagen, I am of the opinion that it will be difficult to prevent these instances of violence from occurring again, both in 1997 and in future elections. Therefore, it is hardly unreasonable to suggest that we will continue to see: (1) leaders of various groups submitting lists of names of voters to more than one candidate for cash payments; (2) candidates visiting villages and hamlets with bags of cash (usually at night); (3) the practice of ‘open ballot’ voting at candidates’ home booths; (4) women being forced to vote the same way as their husbands; and (5) violence resulting from candidates and supporters seeking retribution for non-deliverance of votes. These are the features of an emerging political subculture in contemporary Hagen politics. I now turn to some problems associated with the high cost of election campaigns.

Campaign Expenditure and Associated Problems

Despite the underlying ideologies and principles governing competition and political action, much of election-related violence, especially post-polling violence, stems from this practice of massive spending in election campaigns. Furthermore, it leaves winning candidates in the unenviable positions of immense pressure to reward voters for their votes, repay supporters for their campaign contributions, and to settle debts with creditors. There are a number of ways to fund election campaigns, including private donations of cash and other resources (mostly vehicles) from local businessmen and educated elites, political party sponsorship and contributions (of cash and pigs) from kinsmen. However, ‘serious’ candidates, according to the Hagen world view, must demonstrate not only leadership qualities but also the ability to attract wealth. Those considered as ‘serious’ candidates must have sufficient personal funds, at least K10,000 for provincial and K20,000 or more for national elections, before announcing their candidacy. In other words, as Hageners say, you need to have ‘big’ money to contest elections these days. This mentality has forced many intending candidates into seeking commercial bank loans or overdrafts against business and personal assets (see, for example, Standish 1989), others into withdrawing their life-savings or retrenchment benefits and superannuation (in the case of ex-government employees), and even a few into crime (ranging from illicit sale of drugs such as alcohol and marijuana to ‘white-collar’ crime such as stealing money by fraud). As a result, many have ended up bankrupt, and a few in jail. In the case of the recently suspended Western Highlands Provincial Government, nearly all of them are faced with the difficult task of balancing the system as they have now caused a situation of disequilibrium in their relations with others. The following case, that of Kawelka candidate William Pik should illustrate this final point.
Pik's campaign effort, like that of his rivals and many others, was considered as a collective investment. Accordingly, all the Kawelka clans were involved in one way or another. The campaign cost nearly K20,000 in cash, 25 pigs, numerous roasted hindquarters of pigs, tonnes of vegetable food (for visitors), and thousands of man- and woman-hours. Nearly half of the cash and about three-quarters of the pigs were contributions from kinsmen. In addition to that, Pik received donations of several 44-gallon drums of fuel from a provincial politician from the Mul Council area, some electrical equipment (including an overhead loudspeaker system) from a former national politician from the Dei Council area, and his election posters were arranged by an aspiring national politician, also from the Dei Council area. Finally, his campaign vehicles were donated by individuals: a Toyota Land-Cruiser from a fellow Kundombo clansman; a Toyota Dyna truck from a Dei Council man; and a Mazda utility from an Engan businessman.

Consistent with Hagen ideology of group solidarity, the tribe-wide support for William Pik was expressed through bloc votes, thereby enabling him to score almost a hundred per cent of total votes cast at his home-booths (98.1%): Kuk I (99.51%); Kuk II (99.47%); and Mope (93.53%). Amazingly, he lost a total of just 35 votes at home-booths, 28 at Mope and 7 at Kuk. The slightly higher number of votes lost to other candidates at Mope was put down to poor 'security', which clearly implies that his scrutineers were not totally effective in directing all voters along tribal lines.

Despite winning the election and becoming a deputy premier of the province, the abolition of the provincial government system caused him considerable problems, a significant point to which I shall return in Chapter Eight. At this stage, it is worth mentioning here that, although the group 'name' factor is important in mobilising support and resources for elections, obligations are continually created through such actions. For instance, individuals who contribute large sums of cash, pigs and other economic resources expect a return on their investment. One cannot overestimate the kind of pressure to which candidates subject themselves.

Implications: Competing Legitimacies and Violence

One conclusion derived from this rather complex matrix of Mount Hagen socio-political relationships is one of competing legitimacies and the re-invention of democracy to suit Mount Hagen needs and life-styles. It is neither rejection nor acceptance of democracy as a political process, but rather an innovative use of democracy, by adopting new resources but using Mount Hagen rules and ideologies. In his study on Simbu paths to power, Standish (1992) comes to similar conclusions.21 As new resources became available, both Simbu and Hagen leaders readily

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21. In another study, based on Chuave politics, Warry (1987) pointed out the persistence of traditional beliefs and behaviour that continues to affect political action in the Highlands.
incorporate them into both traditional and more modern spheres of competition and cooperation such as the use of cash, cattle and beer in Simbu *bngla gende* pig ceremonial, the Hagen *moka* system, and in election campaigns. The use of beer in election campaigns, creating obligations and in entertaining constituents, is not restricted to Hagen, since it as been reported elsewhere (see Standish 1978b, 1989 and 1992; Reay 1982; Warty 1987; see also Marshall 1982). Similarly, in warfare, the adoption of Western technological innovations such as guns — many of which are believed to have been supplied by politicians and their henchmen — have added yet another dimension to this sphere of competition and cooperation, resulting in more fatalities because of a general shift in emphasis from one based on display and adornment to that of ambush and slaughter, an important point already discussed in the previous chapter (see *Chapter Five*).

In terms of coping with introduced state structures, Hageners have been quick to recognise that local methods can be quite effective in pursuit of political office. In a system where tribal loyalty overrides that of national sentiments, local group objectives appear far more practical than national goals. And local groups will go to great lengths to achieve desired results. Traditional methods of coercion, through use of shame, threat and violence, have worked well in many cases.

It has also become painfully clear that not having someone from your own local group in key political and administrative office means no access to goods and services. Politicians, owing to the nature of the electoral system, tend to favour a particular group and neglect others considered peripheral to respective power bases. Because of the *first-past-the-post* system, in which the candidate with the largest vote wins even if it is only a small minority of the total, representatives at both provincial and national levels need not command electorate-wide support and consequently may seek to represent only those considered as part of their base-vote group, which may turn out to be a single tribe or an alliance of clans.22 It is only natural that MPs and MPAs concentrate their efforts on base-vote areas, for instance, by allocating resources such as the Electoral Development Fund to a single area rather than the whole electorate as intended. A tribe’s access to power, therefore, becomes increasingly important; and elections provide a good opportunity for a group to have their own man placed firmly there. Empirical evidence suggests that local groups will do everything within their power, including deliberate infringement of national laws, and the ever increasing use of force, to achieve that goal. In many ways, elections

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22. One way of overcoming such problems would be to introduce preferential voting which ensures wider representation. Reilly (1996) has discussed the voting systems in some detail. Elsewhere, I have discussed the problems associated with the current electoral system and made necessary recommendations so it is now up to the PNG Electoral Commission and the National Parliament to consider changes along those lines (see Ketan 1991; Ketan and Eyre 1991).
in Hagen and the Highlands, as suggested by Standish (1996), now represent a bizarre form of democracy at gunpoint.

The strategies and ploys used in getting a tribesman elected to political office may vary depending on the specific nature of each case but the most commonly recurring ones are:

• the intimidation of polling officials;

• the infringement of constitutional rights (via absence of secret-ballot);

• the violation of electoral regulations (via double or multiple voting, impersonating or representing deceased and absentees);

• the use of threat, force, and violence to prevent members of a base-vote group from voting for the wrong man;

• the reactivating of traditional alliance networks and old exchange partners (via ‘gifts’ of cash and other economic resources);

• the courting of ‘name-list’ groups from neutral areas (mainly through use of cash); and

• the prevention of rival candidates suspected of poaching votes from entering the base-vote area, which involves guarding territorial boundaries of the local group as well as those of traditional allies who have pledged support.

Much more sophisticated strategies are used where confederacy-type alliance networks exist. This is particularly true for the Dei Council area in which alliance systems are characterised by complex networks centred around three large coalitions — Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta — which compete in business, warfare and elections (see Chapters 3-4). These networks have facilitated a process described in this study as the Hagen megacycle, the details of which are outlined below.

The Hagen Megacycle

Recent developments in Hagen suggest that there has been a definite merging of spheres of political competition, between ‘traditional’ Hagen and modern PNG arenas of competition and cooperation. It is not only a fusion of ideas and practices, borrowed from one field to use in another, but also involves the deliberate and systematic ordering of major events to form a megacycle. In one way, as A.J. Strathern (1992) says, it represents an actual widening of spheres of political action, while at the same time, it emphasises the major political lines of cleavage between local groups, factions, and coalitions.
The megacycle involves a high degree of complexity which cannot be adequately analysed without understanding the social relations involved. It is therefore necessary to go into some detail, before returning to an analysis in the next section, in order to explain some of the more complex processes at work in this turbulent society. A particular megacycle described in this study is given in Figure 6.3.

As indicated above (in Figure 6.3), the expanded field of competition covers a number of important political events occurring over a period of around fourteen years, beginning with a seven-year period of hostilities (1984-1990), punctuated by a combined church and state-
sponsored one-year truce period (1989-1990) during which two separate peace settlements were negotiated, first between the Remdi and Minembi in 1989 and later between the Kawelka and Minembi in 1990. This was followed by a six-year period of intensive reparation payments and gift exchanges (1990-1996). The seven-year period of hostilities was twice broken by short intervals of mutual truce, first in 1987 for a short while during the national election, and again briefly in 1988 during the provincial government elections. The one-year truce period also coincided with preparations for the national government election in June 1992. The last six-year period of peace, between 1990 and 1996, was apparently building towards the 1997 national elections.

During a large-scale alliance warfare involving over ten tribes during 1984-1990, a total of nearly 100 men were killed, large populations were brutally evicted from their homes, and property valued in tens of thousands of kina was destroyed, and there was perhaps millions of kina in lost income (see Case 1 and 2 in Chapter Five). Whilst the war was predictably fought along lines of historically established military alliances, the introduction of guns in late 1986 changed the pattern of Hagen warfare, involving a major transition from massed confrontations between bowmen and shield carriers on battlefields to raids and ambushes, which resulted in an alarmingly high number of deaths on both sides. It also necessitated the contracting of allies from neighbouring alliance networks to form super-networks or fight joint-ventureships called el kompani ('fight-company') systems, thus resulting in a physical widening or expansion of the political field. The expanded field of warfare and alliance between Mul and Dei Councils, as pointed out by A.J. Strathern (1992:236-237), is associated with the use of firearms. As indicated in Chapter Five, the political field has also expanded into the Hagen Central area. There are cross-cutting ties through which guns, military intelligence and other types of sensitive and secret information travel from one conflict to another.

The war was formally concluded in 1990 after protracted peace negotiations were initiated by the Christian missions. In more than seven separate compensation ceremonies, between 1990 and 1996, over 2650 pigs were given by the 'owners' of the fight, or the el pukl wua ('fight-root-men') groups, in reparation payments to allies for losses sustained while assisting them in war. Most of these payments were built around election times, in an obvious attempt to secure assurances of support for candidates put up by the respective 'owners' of the fight. The following examples of more recent reparation payment should clarify this point:

- On the 12th of October 1996, the Kawelka Kundmbo clan, as 'owners' of the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990), made reparation payments of 400 pigs to the neighbouring Kawelka Membo clan for three Membo men who died fighting alongside the Kundmbo against an alliance of Minembi clans (see Case 2 in Chapter Five; see also The National, October
The timing of the payment is a significant factor here, considering the fact that Kundmbo clansman and former Western Highlands Deputy Premier, William Pik, was contesting the Dei Open seat in 1997. William Pik wanted to ensure as much support and as many votes as possible from allied groups.

- In December 1996, the Minembi Nambka, as ‘owners’ of the Remdi-Minembi War (1984-1989), made reparation payment of nearly 200 pigs, plus some cattle and horses, to another Minembi clan for losses sustained while assisting the Nambka in their fight against the Remdi (see Chapter Four, Case 1). Again, the timing of this payment is a significant factor, in light of Minembi Nambka’s decision to endorse one of their clansman and former PNGDF officer, Major Pun Kaip, as a candidate for the Dei Open in 1997, and of course to maximise his vote.23

Previous cases of reparation payment were also centred around elections. In four separate ceremonies, the Remdi Jikambo clan, as the el pukl wua, or ‘owner of the fight’, during the Remdi-Minembi war (1984-1989), gave away a total of 1,750 pigs (all roasted) in reparation payment to their allies for losses sustained (13 deaths) while assisting Remdi in fighting an alliance of Minembi clans: the first in 1990 when they gave 500 pigs to the Mul Council-based ‘Upper Remdi’ section of the tribe for loss of two men in battle; the second, in 1992, when they gave 200 pigs to Remdi Penambimbo and Kiklpukla for the loss of three men; the third ceremony was also in 1992 during which a total of 50 pigs were given to Engan and Simbu migrants residing at Gumanch Plantation for the loss of two men; and the final one was in December 1994 when a massive presentation of 1,000 pigs was made to the Kimka-Roklaka pair for loss of six men.

The first three compensations were built around the 1992 elections, attempting to secure assurances of support for the Remdi Jikambo candidate, Koi Ranpi. Remdi’s gamble in not compensating Kimka-Roklaka before the 1992 elections was based on the assumption that because the Kimka-Roklaka were owed reparation payment, they would not complicate matters by endorsing their own candidate. Furthermore, it was assumed that the Kimka-Roklaka pair would support the Remdi candidate, thereby ‘commoditising’ votes as valuables used as solicitory gifts, a form of request for reparation payments. As indicated in Chapter Seven, misjudging the Kimka-Roklaka was a major blunder on the part of Remdi strategists, which may have cost Koi Ranpi an election victory. The Kimka-Roklaka, who had lost six men while

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23 Both Major Pun Kaip and William Pik, however, were unsuccessful. Both were closely associated with Pep before the 1997 election. It is however difficult to determine whether or not the voters saw them as Pep’s political stooges. According to the victor, Puri Ruing, there have been reports that Pep and Pik were seen together on friendly terms after the elections (personal communication, January 1998). This I cannot confirm or reject here.
supporting Remdi during the Remdi-Minembi war, were obviously upset over not receiving either set of reparation payments as well as the non-payment of dividends from the giant Gumanch Coffee Plantation. Gumanch is jointly owned by the Pipilka alliance, comprising Remdi Jikambo, Kimka and Roklaka, but controlled by a predominantly Remdi Jikambo management. As a result, the Kimka-Roklaka pair went ahead and endorsed their own candidate, Puri Ruing, for the Dei Open seat during the 1992 elections, thereby splitting the relatively small Pipilka alliance base-vote between two candidates (see Chapter Seven; see also Ketan 1996).

The fourth and final ceremony in December 1994 was designed partly to correct their blunder in 1992 and also to make way for another Remdi Jikambo candidate, Willie Wundaki, a senior officer with the PNG Electricity Commission, to contest the Dei Open seat in 1997. Wundaki and his supporters, however, failed to convince Puri Ruing to step aside in Wundaki’s favour, and Ruing ultimately proved that he alone was the strongest Pipilka candidate by winning the election.

Likewise, the Kawelka Kundmbo clan, as the el puel wua, or ‘owner of the fight’, during the Kawelka-Minembi war (1986-1990), gave away 700 live pigs in two separate ceremonies, to allies for losses sustained (15 deaths) while assisting Kundmbo in fighting an alliance of Minembi clans: the first in 1993 when they gave 300 pigs to Kopi, Kimbo and Klamae for loss of nine men; and the other a presentation of 400 pigs to the Kawelka Membo clan in October 1996 for loss of three men. The first payment was an attempt to mobilise support for the Kundmbo candidate, William Pik, for the 1995 provincial elections (see Chapter Eight), while the second was designed to mobilise support for William Pik for the 1997 national elections.

The evidence presented here suggests that elections are highly coordinated events involving meticulous planning and deliberate exploitation of underlying social and political relations between local groups. Existing relations such as the confederacy-type alliances, strengthened by intense intermarriage and frequent moka exchanges, are important resources utilised by skilful leaders. This is because election campaigns are essentially tied in with moka sequences, ally reparation payments, and military alliances.

24 In fact, Kundmbo gave only 500 pigs because in the first ceremony, 200 of the 300 pigs were contributed by the other Kawelka clans, Membo (100), Kurupmbo (50) and Klambo (50). The Membo contribution of 100 pigs, followed by a further gift of 20 pigs, three cows and nearly K1,000 cash, together with the sponsorship of William Pik’s candidacy during the 1995 provincial election, was made in the form of a wua omhil moka, soliciting compensation, or wua peng payment for three men who died while fighting alongside the Kundmbo.

25 Although the Kawelka Membo clan lost five men while assisting Kundmbo during the war against the Minembi, only three (Kumi, Pengk and Ketipa) died fighting on the Kundmbo front, while the other two (Wump and Ruk) died on the Kopi-Kimbo front.
In addition to these ‘positive’ political strategies, politicians and other types of leaders have also been implicated in processes that exacerbate violence in Hagen society. In recent times, politicians have been blamed for encouraging others to fight, as part of electoral manoeuvring, or as part of punitive action against supporters of rival candidates. Such blame on politicians, although based in part on rumours and allegations, is not entirely misplaced, as there are cases in which politicians and other leaders are said to have been the principal instigators. As pointed out to me by Bill Standish, conflicts can boost a leader’s role — he may put himself in a dispute as stirrer, mediator, compensator, or whatever fits at the time — to increase his influence (personal communication, August 1996; see Standish 1992:113 for Siwi Kurondo’s role in a Simbu dispute which resurrected his political career after his 1972 election loss).

In the Dei Council area, for instance, at least two recent wars were triggered by incidents involving national election candidates and a third case involved a certain MP who was alleged to have supplied guns to traditional enemies of a group which is allied to his own by a traditional pairing (see A.J. Strathem 1993b). Instead of assisting the group that was allied to his own, the MP “attempted to gain favour with their more numerous enemies as a part of electoral manoeuvring” (A.J. Strathem 1993b:50). The MP’s alleged role here, as pointed out by A.J. Strathem, “was unsubstantiated rumour, but it affected people’s attitudes” (ibid). Stories about the involvement of politicians in warfare may be partly based on unsubstantiated rumours and allegations, but if believed by the people to be true, then they will be true for them in their consequences, thereby conforming to what is known in sociology as Thomas’s theorem (see Standish 1992). In this regard, reputation is what matters here; if a particular politician is believed to have initiated a conflict, then he will be principally held responsible for its consequences.

The closest I came to documenting the involvement of big-men and politicians as initiators of war (and peace) was in 1992. After the 1992 National Parliament elections, war broke out between the Welyi and Kentpi tribes of Dei Council over election results (Ketan 1996:263-4). A prominent big-man and former provincial government member outlined a strategy to me, which he argued would win the support of both Welyi and Kentpi voters for the Tepuka candidate, Reuben Parua. He argued quite convincingly that it was in Tepuka’s interest to encourage the antagonists to fight for a while and then step in with gifts of pigs and cash to settle the dispute, thus putting them into positions of obligation towards Tepuka as the peace-maker. As it transpired, the conflict was resolved and the Kentpi candidate, Philip Bobby, was persuaded to step aside in favour of his fellow Raembka candidate, Parua, and some Welyi voters shifted allegiance to Parua during the 1993 Dei Open By-Election. This case suggests that there is a strong possibility of big-men and politicians exploiting conflict situations for personal and group interests.
While the kind of evidence presented here may not be accepted as proof of guilt in a court of law, it does not, however, suggest that we cannot make any firm statements about the role of leaders in initiating war as a strategy to achieve personal goals. Perhaps the most important point to make here is that there is always a *el pukl wua* ('fight root man'), or 'owner of a fight', on both sides of a conflict. And regardless of whether real or perceived, an individual (usually a leader) is always identified as principal instigator and his group held responsible for losses sustained by supporters on both sides. This is to facilitate compensation of allies, and whilst establishing the 'owner' of a fight or dispute over an accidental killing is a straightforward matter, leaders who are perceived as being perpetrators of trouble are less likely to admit responsibility — precisely because of the devious nature of their political strategies. A point worth emphasising here is that the inability to clearly identify leaders as culprits in conflict situations presents a problem only for law enforcement agencies and researchers. The people who are involved in these conflicts, by contrast, are aware of such schemes designed by conniving politicians and have often repaid them in kind — at election time — simply by accepting gifts of cash in return for promise of votes on polling day (while, of course, knowing full well that they would do no such thing). In other words, the megacycle, despite the planning, may not always work.

One may ask that if politicians are such cunning, deviously scheming characters whose actions have generated more pain than pleasure, why accommodate them at all? Firstly because they are seen as local creatures, and as prominent members of local groups, factions and coalitions, they are important links through which government funds and resources can be channelled towards local events. Even after wars have been triggered by the words and actions of politicians, they are still useful to the combatants in various capacities. One such capacity in which politicians have excelled is the somewhat dubious role of the firearms supplier. Ultimately, too, they are needed to make peace.

**Discussion**

There are many issues involved here — and I may have raised more issues than I have answers for — but the general point is the acceptance of certain practices as 'necessary evils' of electioneering in Mount Hagen. Firstly, violence in terms of its increasing frequency and its apparent inevitability has added a dangerous dimension to elections. Physical attacks on persons and destruction of property are almost natural consequences of election losses. Secondly, cash-for-votes or bribery is now an integral part of election campaigns. Various categories of voters, such as 'name-list' groups, are constantly on the market in search of the best possible deals with candidates. Politicians, therefore, in their search for power, no longer depend on platforms or policies but rather on the contexts of violence and cash payments (A.J. Strathern 1993b:56). The extent to which people will go in order to get one of their own group members elected includes
physical coercion, infringement of electoral laws, and the disbursement of vast economic resources.

In all of these, the state has been unable to intervene, or to take control of the situation in an authoritative way. This, coupled with an escalation of criminal gang violence in urban centres and a resurgence of tribal warfare in many parts of the Highlands, has led to a general decline in the legitimacy of the state. The politicians whom people could look up to for guidance are themselves entangled in intricate webs of social relations in “which they on the one hand make laws to control crime and violence and on the other hand are implicated in the processes that escalate the overall level of violence in their areas” (A.J. Strathern 1993b:57). In Mount Hagen, as in other parts of the Highlands, it is difficult for politicians to perform their electoral duties without being influenced by their personal social networks. They, of course, are members of local groups and, in the Hagen world view, it is their primary kin-group to which they owe their first loyalty, not the state.

In advanced liberal democracies like Britain and Australia, where there are well-organised parties, elections do determine change in government and policy. Contrarily, in Papua New Guinea, elections do not necessarily determine change in government or change in policy. Instead, PNG elections are important for the way in which they affect groups and individuals in terms of the allocation of the spoils of office and renown. This is mainly because of the fact that state resources are regularly used in local arenas of competition.

In any case, such a scenario represents the more complex aspects of electioneering in Mount Hagen society, whilst the strategies mentioned earlier indicate a lack of respect for election procedures and, ultimately, raises the question of competing legitimacies. Although the legitimacy of the state may not be questioned directly, it is, however, implicit in many cases that people are aware of the state’s inability to assert authority. It also shows that people are more interested in achieving what they consider to be more practical goals rather than adhering to rules and regulations set up by a largely faceless system which has little bearing on their lifestyles. Here lies the danger that what appears to be harmless disdain may actually lead to minimally organised chaos in future elections.

In a country where corruption in government offices is rampant, local or tribal loyalty overrides that of national sentiments, and a checks-and-balance system is seriously flawed by the selfish manipulation and chronic shortage of funds, future elections in PNG could be a nightmare for law enforcement agencies. Already there are insufficient police to even attempt to control all polling booths in a one day poll. Events such as elections must be approached cautiously with meticulous planning and inter-agency cooperation to ensure maximum use of scarce resources required for monitoring and policing procedural aspects of elections. Knowing full well that
inter-agency cooperation between government departments rarely meets with a hundred percent success rate, it is perhaps time to approach the churches to assist in some capacity, preferably in logistics and identifying personnel for recruitment as polling officials.

Turbulence of some sort is expected and, in Hagen, considered an inevitable consequence of rapid political and social change. The Western Highlands provincial government story illustrates this. It was voted into office in January 1995 after a lengthy suspension, but abolished together with others throughout PNG in July 1995, thereby further complicating an already complex situation. For many assembly members, the 1995 provincial election was a wasted effort especially after what they consider to be a full five-year-term investment, instead of less than a year. Undoubtedly, many of them feel cheated and decided to enter the race for national seats in 1997 and future elections. That alone can be enough to raise the intensity of competition. Election-related violence, given these unfortunate circumstances, cannot be avoided, yet concerted efforts towards minimising this particularly disruptive process must be attempted. But whether the intensity of this competition will reach new and possibly dangerous heights, and precisely how the nature of democracy in PNG will be shaped by mostly isolated local events, even in an area of national importance such as Hagen needs further academic debate and speculation (as started in Standish 1996). Having summarised the main points of this chapter, I now attempt to place the evidence in the context of wider theoretical perspectives.

'Weak' state versus 'strong' societies

A major theme identifiable throughout this thesis, and one that can be supported by available data, is the tension between a 'weak' state and 'strong' societies (Migdal 1988). Arguing from a state-society interaction perspective, Standish (1994), using Migdal's terminology, suggested that Papua New Guinea has 'strong' societies, autonomous but divided. Migdal's (1988) main concern is states, and the degree of control — compliance, participation and legitimisation — they have. It seems the 'strength' of a society is basically to do with the degree of autonomy of the many and varied groups, quite apart from what is done by the state. The state, by contrast, is 'weak' (Migdal 1988; Standish 1994). In a more recent paper, Standish (1996) added that:

It [the PNG state] lacks administrative and service capacity, without political strength to make difficult policy decisions and implement programmes; it does not politically penetrate and dominate the society. Sometimes state resources can be used for local benefit, but politicians lack authority outside their own communities, and the state as a whole lacks popular legitimacy, worsened by its own excesses in the attempt to gain

26. Only months after the election provincial assembly-men were given notice by Paias Wingti, as incoming Governor of the province, to vacate their offices. Surely, someone must have known that provincial governments would be abolished in 1995, so why conduct an election in January of the same year? It has been a wasteful exercise for both candidates and the Electoral Commission. Needless to say, winning candidates who have committed massive amounts of resources to a seat in the assembly have been unfairly victimised.
control. The societies are increasingly isolated from the state, which is irrelevant to their needs, and withdraw from engagement with the state (Standish 1996:319-20).

Many of the problems which characterise the weak nature of the state are common to many developing countries, especially the recently decolonised states of Africa and the small Pacific island states. In many ways the problems such as lack of resources, inadequate manpower training facilities and underdeveloped economies are a distinct legacy of the colonial past. If the colonial state was relatively strong, then it is because it was highly centralised in Port Moresby and had strong control over fairly efficient operatives in districts (see Standish 1996:320). But it clearly did not wholly dominate, nor completely penetrate into the societies it claimed control over. At the periphery (in this case, the entire country outside the national capital and the much smaller dots symbolising the provincial metropolitan centres), the Melanesian societies functioned much in the same way as they did for thousands of years, although changing and incorporating new ideas and innovations when it suited them.

The imposition of rigid hierarchical state structures onto fragmented but autonomous and in many ways 'sovereign' groups of the Papua New Guinea Highlands inevitably resulted in competing legitimacies, of state versus society, and conflicting roles for politicians, policemen and other government officials, between their roles as state employees and members of local groups. By contrast with many African societies, A.J. Strathem (1993b:42) noted that the small-scale societies of Papua New Guinea tended to be politically acephalous, and in the Highlands there were no established centralised chiefdoms that could have been used to graft indigenous politics onto the introduced colonial state. He goes on to say that:

Big-men were leaders of groups, coalitions, and factions in pursuit of competitive ends. When populations of this kind are introduced at first to colonial and then to post-colonial power, we should not expect them to invent overnight a respect for the hierarchical authority. They obeyed the colonial power out of a combination of fear and self-interest. When fear is no longer there, they will continue to pursue the self-interest part of the equation unless curbed. In short, the national government, inheriting the colonial state apparatus in 1975, was not initially equipped with any automatic legitimacy in the people's eyes (A.J. Strathem 1993b:42).

Indeed, the state system was flawed from the beginning and the people in the Highlands, as in other parts of the country and elsewhere, recognising its lack of capacity to assert its authority, have deliberately manipulated various aspects of the state for self gain.27 As indicated by the evidence presented here and that of others (Reay 1987; Standish 1992, 1994 and 1996; A.J. Strathem 1993b; and Dinnen 1996), the people engage with the state on occasions, such as elections, when the opportunity for economic gain is most clearly present. Otherwise, they have become increasingly isolated, and withdraw from engagement with the state (see Standish 1996).

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27. That elections are a farce, with inflated voter turnout, intimidation of polling officials and gross infringement of electoral regulations, is indicative of this sad state of affairs.
In this regard, the data presented in this paper and elsewhere (Ketan 1995 and 1996) supports Standish's assessment of the state as being weak and now lacking administrative capacity and coordination, both at the centre and at the periphery (1996:320).

If, in fact, the PNG state is weak, we then can ask whether Hagen and other PNG Highlands societies must be strong. Apart from the autonomy of society and its high level of social control as characteristics of a strong society (Migdal 1988:34-35), there is not much else that Migdal says about strong societies. The strength of Melanesian societies is in their kastoms, values, autonomy and effective maintenance of public order. If strength is to be defined in terms of kastom, ideology and cultural practices influencing the behaviour of people in their engagement with the state, then, Hagen society is indeed strong. In this regard, we may consider Hagen political strategies — including violent means of asserting authority and compliance, use of state resources in local competition, and defiance of state authority — as manifestations of a strong society. Clearly, the state, by contrast, does not function in a coherent manner, which indicates the absence of what Migdal calls integrated domination, in which the state as a whole establishes broad power and in which it acts in a coherent fashion (Migdal 1994:9). But this in no way suggests that the reverse is true, such that the society has been dominant in changing parts of the state. Whilst accepting that the PNG state has been relatively ineffective, it is equally important to realise that, generally, the state and society are mutually transforming, which means that Hageners, as citizens of the PNG state, are affected by political decisions made in Port Moresby, but as members of local groups, coalitions, and factions, they also subvert the state when it suits them. This ‘mutuality of state-society interactions’ conforms to Migdal et al’s generalisation that “states may help mould, but they are also continually moulded by the societies within which they are imbedded” (1994:2), a significant point which leads us to our next theoretical perspective.

Beyond the rather statist state-versus-society perspective is the state-in-society perspective proposed by Migdal et al (1994) for the comparative study of the state and politics in developing countries. The former perspective, they argue, “is misleading in so far as it renders the state in an adversarial position vis-a-vis the society, and instead favour viewing the state as part of society” (ibid:4). The state-in-society perspective is largely based on the ‘mutually transforming’ aspect of the interactions between components of the state and society. Nevertheless, Migdal et al (1994) do focus on degrees of state domination of society. The Papua New Guinea situation, as evident here and in the writing of other observers (see, for example, Reay 1987; A.J. Strathem 1993b; Standish 1994 and 1996), fits into a category conceptually labelled by Migdal et al (1994) as dispersed domination. According to Migdal, it is a form of domination “in which neither the state

28. Noting the ‘strength’ of Melanesian political cultures in adapting to and surviving ‘revolutions’ such as colonialism, Standish concluded that “Melanesian ideologies and political strategies have colonised the state” (Standish 1994:60; see also Standish 1992).
(nor any other social force) manages to achieve country-wide domination and in which parts of the state may be pulled in very different directions” (Migdal 1994:9). He goes on to note that:

Conflicts flare up over specific thrusts and parries: attempts by the state to increase tax collection, efforts by local figures to gain control over particular state offices and resources, initiatives by state agencies to regulate certain behaviour, attempts by local strongmen to extend the area of their own dominance, and more. The struggles in these multiple settings end up reshaping both the state and society (Migdal 1994:9-10).

All of these points are applicable to the PNG situation, especially in the context of elections in which local groups and their leaders compete for political office and power to control state resources, and in the PNG Highlands where the state has unsuccessfully tried to stop tribal warfare, and attempts by politicians to build their networks and consolidating existing power bases by converting their representative role into one of patronage towards their constituents (A.J. Strathem 1993b; see also Boone 1994 for comparable discussion of a patronage system in post-colonial Africa). Papua New Guinea is like the African state of Senegal where the political practices, based on a system of patronage, seem to undermine the administrative capacities and resource base of the Senegalese state (Boone 1994). Such evidence, as pointed out by Migdal (1994), present great difficulties for state-centred theories which are based on the assumption that state organisation is powerful and cohesive enough to drive society. Such a perspective, as noted by Migdal (ibid), leaves us at a loss to explain such instances as Senegal and Papua New Guinea.29 Boone’s (1994) study of the Senegalese state presents a strong warning for Papua New Guinea, and in many ways portrays an image that most PNG people (including some foreign observers) in Papua New Guinea will be familiar with. Commenting on Boone’s study, Migdal (1994) reported that:

The [Senegalese] state itself came to be based on a system of patronage in which chiefs and other local-level authorities exercised a tremendous degree of discretion in local areas. These local patterns of domination came to be rooted in the state organisation, crippling it and rendering it unable to deal with the pressing problem of eroding national production that left the state with a drastically declining tax base. Authoritative and autonomous forces in society shaped the state as much or more than they were shaped by it (Migdal 1994:20).

Amazingly, this could have been written for Papua New Guinea. A definite parallel between the Senegalese case and Papua New Guinea would become even more apparent if we were to

29. Owing to the difficulties involved in attempting to use a state-centric view of security as something created or imposed from above, Standish (1994), explicitly following Clifford et al (1984), urged the need to recognise that ‘law and order’ can only emerge ‘bottom-up’ from within the society and must come from within the community as well as the state (Standish 1994:61). Similarly, we need to shift away from a state-centric perspective and view Third World states as interacting with societies and at the same time recognising that there are significant differences between them as well as with those in developed countries, gaining insights from comparison while treating each case strictly on the basis of empirical evidence.
formulate further questions. In the context of patron-client relationships and lack of public accountability, have our national leaders become too powerful, and in Hagen have big-men like Wingti, Pora and Mel, in pursuit of super-big-men status, become too big for their small local groups? Will the abolition of the provincial government system create even more disparities in wealth and power between this type of super-big-men leaders and their people, and therefore, extend their domination beyond local boundaries? Is the patronage system of domination an hindrance to effective government? Are the current economic, social and political problems in Papua New Guinea rooted in this system? The answers, though contestable, are implicit in the questions, a significant point to which I shall return in the concluding chapter of this thesis. It suffices here to say that the people and state of Papua New Guinea face great problems, which are the cumulative result of their colonial history, the political practices of leaders and followers, and the wider processes of social and political change. Many of these problems stem from ineffective state penetration, and the distinct lack of administrative capacity to formulate and implement appropriate policies, and moreover, are a direct result of a political culture based on parochialism and the pillage of national resources. That is, the state is in a different moral sphere from the local groups.

Finally, if the African experience has any implications for PNG, then a key issue is the manner in which the emerging political culture is taking shape: that elections are viewed as the fastest road to wealth, power, and influence; that state resources are constantly used for personal enrichment and nepotistic patronage; that local cultural values and political practices have dominated state politics; that they have thereby rendered the state ineffective in dealing with problems of public accountability, security, and policy implementation. Moreover, as Zartman (1995:6) says, "the normal politics of demands and responses atrophies; the political processes for popular legitimisation are discarded or prostituted; politics and economics are localised; and the centre becomes peripheral to the workings of society" at the local level. The fact that some African states, which had experienced problems similar to those currently faced by Papua New Guinea, have collapsed (see, for example, Ng'ethe 1995; Ottaway 1995; and Zartman 1995) ought to be a strong warning for PNG leaders, observers and others. I shall return to discuss this point on state collapse in the concluding chapter of this thesis. As preparation for this argument I now present a couple of election case studies in the next two chapters, so as to provide further instances of and insights into the dynamics of Hagen society and the way it interrelates with state politics.
Introduction

The 1992 Dei Open election was won by Pangu Party candidate, Melchior Pep, with 5,435 votes or 27 per cent of the popular vote and 1,998 more than his nearest rival, an independent candidate, Koi Ranpi, who polled 3,437. Another independent, Reuben Namba Parua, came close behind in third place with 3,036. Melchior Pep beat seven other candidates to retain his seat, which he had won in 1987 by beating Reuben's father, Parua Kuri, a long-time MP since the colonial House of Assembly days.

This chapter is partly based on an earlier version published in Saffu (ed. 1996), in which I examined structural group-based campaigning in Western Highlands and the supposed law and order problems stemming from such behaviour. The chapter starts by providing some basic background information about the electorate of Dei Open. It then moves onto a discussion of the candidates and their local group affiliations, with particular reference to the large coalitions which were outlined in Chapter Three, in an attempt to highlight the dynamics of local Hagen politics and the way in which local groups compete for elective office.

The second part of the chapter deals with election-related violence. Purported 'electoral violence', for instance, is analysed in the context of the underlying relationship between groups and individuals. The concept of electoral violence can be rather misleading when analysed on its own. Thus, one can argue that forms of violence during elections can be explained in terms of historical and structural organisation of local groups in the Papua New Guinea Highlands. Similarly, it can also be said that the various types of violence can be identified and categorised for possible analysis. The final part of the chapter argues that local group-based campaigning and election-violence is a way of asserting group solidarity, strength and cohesion within a weak state. It also shows local methods of coercion and maintaining social control are more effective than state agencies. Like warfare, election-related violence poses a serious threat to the state's claim over the legitimate use of force. In effect, these are challenges to the state's authority, thereby exposing the weakness of a state with flawed policy-making and implementation and limited capabilities.

Background to the Dei Open Electorate

The Dei Open electorate is part of the Hagen North District of Western Highlands province. With a population of 41,849 persons (1990 Census), Dei is the largest Local Government Council area-cum-Open electorate in the area. It comprises almost half of the Hagen North population, which makes it the only local government council area considered big enough to be defined as an open electorate. The population figures for the Local Government Council areas in Hagen North district are given in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Local Government Councils in Hagen North District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government Council</th>
<th>Population (1990)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mul</td>
<td>18,813</td>
<td>21.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dei</td>
<td>41,849</td>
<td>48.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baiyer</td>
<td>18,692</td>
<td>21.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumusa</td>
<td>6,796</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>86,150</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Although separate census divisions, Baiyer and Lumusa are far too small for separate local government councils.

Source: Based on final population figures for 1990 Census (National Statistical Office 1993; 1994).

The electorate of Dei is strategically placed in a geographically unique position. Contrasting features within its boundaries are: (1) the North Wahgi swamplands which are currently the centre of intense commercial activities, including one of the largest coffee plantations in the Southern Hemisphere; (2) the rolling plains of Hagen North, covered by thick layers of volcanic ash and debris, which are home to some of the world's oldest agricultural systems (cf. Loffler 1977; Steensberg 1980; Golson 1981; 1982; Gorecki 1982); and (3) the rugged terrain of the southern slopes of the Sepik-Wahgi Divide which are densely covered with rainforest.

The Dei electorate shares administrative boundaries with five other open electorates: Hagen; Mul-Baiyer; Jimi; North Wahgi; and Anglimp-South Wahgi. In the east it shares a common border with North Wahgi at Kimil. Westwards it runs parallel with the Wahgi River and the Jimi-Wahgi Divide till it reaches the Gugla creek, a tributary of the Gumanch River which empties into the Wahgi at Rukmump. In the northwest, it drops over the Jimi-Wahgi-Baiyer Divide at Mbul, then crosses the plains of Baiyer and onto the slopes of the Miti Range where it separates Dei from Mul. In the southwest Dei shares a common border with Hagen Central at Kuk (see Burton 1987a; 1987b; 1988). In the south the Wahgi River separates Dei from Anglimp-South Wahgi.

The bulk of the population occupy the fertile valleys, where the population density is about 200 persons per square kilometre and, in parts of the valley where portions of land had been allocated for resettlement, the figure is even higher. Swamplands which were once considered as the domain of bad spirits (kor rakem in Melpa language) are now filled with human settlements. This is a by-product of a shift in perception of the socio-religious system, largely influenced by the Health Department's malaria eradication programme which began soon after European contact, and also by improved methods of swamp drainage introduced by the Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL). Being ideal breeding grounds for mosquitoes, the Wahgi...
Valley floor was avoided and the high fever which resulted from malaria was generally regarded as the work of malevolent spirits (Melpa: kar rakeru, Wahgi: kangi; see Muke 1994:55-56; see also Gorecki 1979). But in recent times, after both the mosquitoes and the evil spirits were driven away from the valley by draining the swamps into the Wahgi River, human populations have returned in greater numbers. A.J. Strathem (1984:87-88) provides a discussion on relocation of settlements. Examples of such movements are: (1) the Kawelka's return to their lower-altitude Kuk territory from Mbuli (A.J. Strathem 1984:88; Gorecki 1982); Tepuka kinsfolk who have joined the Kawelka there and also at the ancient Raemb settlement not far from Kuk (A.J. Strathem 1984:88); (3) the movement of various groups, including many Minembi clansmen, who have migrated down to the Baiyer valley around Tiki plantation, where coffee grows fast at an altitude of less than 2,000 metres (A.J. Strathem 1984:88); and (4) Minembi and Kombukla tribesmen who have moved down to the Kugmi and North Wahgi swamplands. This considerable relocation of settlement, both towards roads when they are newly built and, more strikingly, from high to low-altitude terrain (A.J. Strathem 1984:87), is a widespread phenomenon. Muke (1994) presents an excellent discussion on both historical and prehistorical population movement in South Wahgi. As inward migration continues to accelerate towards the twenty-first century, these fertile valleys will face major population pressure. In fact, it has already resulted in conflicts between the occupants, with several clans brutally evicted from the Tiki area following the Kawelka-Minembi war (1986-1990) and another war fought over the Kugmi swampland between the Kombukla and Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair during the early 1980s (see Chapter Five). Furthermore, the Remdi-Minembi war (1984-1989), although triggered by an incident at a local tavern, had its roots in conflicts over land. That the Tenga valley was used as a battlefield was not incidental; antagonists on both sides had their eyes on such prime land.

Above the tribal level is a loosely organised level which I have described as coalition-style alliance. The major coalitions in Dei are the Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta. As indicated in Chapter Three, these groups were formed to serve two basic functions: (1) to facilitate the plantation acquisition scheme which began in the mid-seventies; (2) to facilitate the political ambitions of groups and individuals in both warfare and elections. The former Dei MP Parua Kuri, for example, had successfully utilised both Raembka and the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance as his political foundation for three successive parliamentary terms (1972-1987), until Kawelka pulled out of the alliance in 1987. Likewise, Kuri's successor, Melchior Pep, appeared to have consolidated his position within his Welyi-Kuta group since taking office in 1987. He was returned to Parliament during the June 1992 elections but was thrown out of office by the PNG Leadership Tribunal after found guilty of 17 breaches of the Leadership Code (Ombudsman Commission 1993:66).
Between the tribe and coalition-style alliance levels can be found another level of organisation called the tribe-pair. These are mainly political units whose membership is drawn from traditional ties based originally on military alliances between tribal groups. Although Hageners have no definite term for this, it is, however, a widespread phenomenon, in which moka exchange is usually intense and many wives are taken from each other. Within the Tepuka-Kawelka pair, for example, members of each partner refer to those of the other as ang wua ('brother-man'). The intriguing phenomena of tribe pairing and neo-traditional coalition-style alliance have already been discussed in Chapter Three. In any case, it must be emphasised that in Hagen, politics at both local and national levels are generally organised along these broad lines.

There is evidence suggesting that candidates have been sponsored by all levels of group. Former Dei MP Parua Kuri, for example, had largely been a (Raembka) coalition-based candidate during his early days in the House of Assembly and later a (Tepuka-Kawelka) tribal pair-based candidate when tribes from within Raembka began sponsoring their own candidates. In contrast, his son, Reuben Parua, was a (Tepuka Kiteipi) clan-based candidate during the 1992 elections. Paias Wingti was another clan-based candidate when he first contested the Hagen Open seat in 1977. Melchior Pep is a good example of a tribal-based candidate. While he may have consolidated his position amongst the Welyi-Kuta coalition-style alliance during this election, his Kombukla tribe provided the necessary foundation for his win during the last election. The candidates and their groups are given below (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Candidates, tribes, tribe-pairs and coalition-style alliances of Dei

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Tribe-pair</th>
<th>Coalition-style alliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koi Ranpi</td>
<td>Remdi</td>
<td>Kumdi-Remdi¹</td>
<td>Pipilka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puri Ruing</td>
<td>Roklaka</td>
<td>Roklaka-Waklupka²</td>
<td>Pipilka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wikai Membi</td>
<td>Minembi</td>
<td>Kombukla-Minembi</td>
<td>Welyi-Kuta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Yona</td>
<td>Minembi</td>
<td>Kombukla-Minembi</td>
<td>Welyi-Kuta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melchior Mack Pep</td>
<td>Kombukla</td>
<td>Kombukla-Minembi</td>
<td>Welyi-Kuta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Bobby</td>
<td>Kentpi</td>
<td>Kumungaka-Kentpi</td>
<td>Raembka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuben Namba Parua</td>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>Tepuka-Kawelka</td>
<td>Raembka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrus Dokta Mel</td>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>Tepuka-Kawelka</td>
<td>Raembka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Although the Kumdi-Remdi is a more traditional alliance, and the relationship is continued in Mul Council area (where “Upper Remdi” is paired with Kumdi), the Remdi in Dei (aka. “Lower Remdi”) are now closely associated with the Kimka-Roklaka pair.

2. Like Remdi, Roklaka is also geographically divided. The Roklaka nu porpi (“those who live downstream”) are commonly paired with the Waklupka while those residing at Gumanch are paired with Kimka.
Candidates and Group Affiliations

During the National Elections in June 1992, eight candidates contested the Dei Open Electorate seat held by Melchior Pep, a Pangu party member. As indicated in Table 7.2, the major coalition-style alliances — Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta — were all represented by candidates. Both Raembka and Welyi-Kuta had three each while Pipilka had two candidates. The candidates' biographical data is given below:

- **Matrus (Dokta) Mel**, aged 35 (9/7/62), was born into the Kelmbo Kopimbo clan of the Tepuka tribe. He spent his early school years with his Kentpi maternal uncles while attending Nunga Community School (1969-1974). He completed his secondary education at the Fatima Catholic Mission High School near Banz (1975-1978), before entering the University of Papua New Guinea where he graduated with a combined Bachelors Degree in Economics and Commerce (1979-1985). His first employment after completing university studies in February 1985 was with Coopers and Lybrand Accountants in Mount Hagen as a trainee accountant. After having progressed full accountancy status in the Tax and Accounting Division of the firm, Matrus resigned for personal reasons. From 16 February 1987 to 16 March 1988, he was employed by Touche Ross and Company (Chartered Accountants) in the Tax and Accounting Division of that firm before being transferred to its auditing division. In March 1988, Matrus resigned because of a job offer from the Highlands Regional Secretariat, but did not take up the offer because of infighting amongst member governments of the Secretariat. Instead, he went into private business as owner-manager of a retail shop in Mount Hagen. In 1989, Matrus was elected a Local Government Councillor and, in January 1990, he ousted fellow Tepuka tribesman and prominent Dei businessman, Goimba Kot, as Chairman of the Dei Development Corporation, the business arm of the Dei Local Government Council, with interests in coffee plantations and investments in Niugini Loydds Bank, Farmset (a farm supply store) and plantation management. After the company closed down all its operations in 1992, due to what Matrus described as “economic crises coupled with the depressed price of coffee” (personal communication, January 1995), he left the now defunct company to contest the 1992 PNG National Elections. Matrus first contested the Dei Open seat, then held by fellow Tepuka tribesman, Parua Kuri, during the 1982 PNG National Elections, whilst still a student at UPNG. After losing to Parua Kuri, who successfully retained the seat he had held since the House of Assembly days in 1972, Matrus returned to UPNG to finish his studies. Again, during the 1987 PNG National Elections, Matrus contested the Dei Open seat, but both he and Parua lost to Kombukla tribesman, Melchior Pep. The rift between Matrus Mel's Kelmbo clan and Parua Kuri's
Keitipi clan widened, just as Mel and Parua’s rivalry intensified, and culminated in Mel’s wrenching of power from Parua Kuri and Goimba Kot in Dei Development Corporation. By the 1992 PNG National Elections, as will be seen, Matrus appears to have resigned to the fact that his Kelmbo base-vote is far too small compared with Parua’s to launch a serious campaign. Since the rift between his group and Parua’s had deteriorated to a level where differences could not be resolved, Matrus struck a deal with Melchior Pep and Pati Wamp, Pangu Party president, rather than throwing his support behind Parua’s son, Reuben, during the 1992 elections.

- **Reuben Namba Parua**, aged between 35 and 40, was born into the Keitipi clan of the Tepuka tribe. Reuben is the eldest son of the former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, who is undoubtedly one of the major ‘traditional’ big-men in the whole of the Hagen area. Despite the lack of tertiary educational qualifications, Reuben is an astute businessmen, can be quite articulate at times, sophisticated, and forthright in manner. He can be most eloquent when he wants to be, but can sometimes be quite unpredictable. He has considerable experience in the hotel industry. Reuben served his political apprenticeship with a number of prominent politicians, including Ted Diro, Paias Wingti, and of course his father Parua Kuri. Having been away from his home electorate for most of his adult life, Reuben relied heavily on his father’s extensive social networks, especially among the core Raembka groups such as the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and Nelka, to launch his election campaign. He lives in Port Moresby and this was his first attempt in elective office.

- **Melchior Mack Pep**, aged between 40 and 45, belongs to Rondong clan of the Kombukla tribe. He worked with the Health Department as a Health Inspector before entering parliament in 1987. During the 1987 National Elections, he contested the Dei Open as a Pangu candidate and ousted sitting member, Parua Kuri, a long-serving MP since 1972. He briefly served in the Opposition backbenches, but after the Wingti government was ousted in July 1988 through a successful no-confidence motion, Melchior was appointed Minister for Correctional Services in the Namaliu government. Before the 1992 elections, Melchior and two other government ministers were forced to resign in order to avoid facing charges brought against them under the PNG Leadership Code. In a deal reached between the ministers and the Prime Minister, they were paid K100,000 each as compensation for being replaced in a ministerial reshuffle. The other ex-ministers charged together with Melchior were Timothy Bonga (Nawae Open) and Peter Garong (Tewai-Siassi Open). All of them knew that the charges would be brought against them in the event that any, or all of them, were to retain their seats, but that did not stop them from contesting the 1992 elections.

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1. As it did transpired, Melchior Mack Pep did in fact win the 1992 Dei Open election, but was thrown out of office after being found guilty of breaching the Leadership Code.
• **Puri Ruing**, aged between 35 and 40, is a member of the Roklaka tribe. Puri is a Port Moresby-based policeman but has remarkably strong ties with his kinsmen at home. A devout Christian and a somewhat reluctant politician, Puri entered the campaign way behind his rivals. It is widely believed that he was pressured by certain individuals, including a prominent Roklaka big-man, into contesting the elections. His candidacy was also viewed as a protest against the Remdi candidate, Koi Ranpi, for reasons to do with corporate business deals. There was an obvious rift between the Remdi and the Kimka-Roklaka pair over non-payment of dividends from the giant Gumanch Coffee Plantation which they jointly own but which was controlled by a predominantly Remdi Jikambo management. In addition, the Kimka-Roklaka, who lost men while supporting Remdi in their fight against the Minembi and therefore were owed reparation payments, may not have been impressed by the Remdi election fanaticism. It seems highly conceivable that Puri may have been used by Kimka-Roklaka leaders to get back at Remdi. Despite such rumours and allegations, there is no conclusive evidence to prove this point, nor is there any substance in a claim that Puri may have been endorsed by Melchior Pep to split Koi Ranpi’s vote. As will be seen, Puri appears to be a serious candidate, with a genuine interest in the people, and as voters come to understand him better, he will become an important candidate in Dei Open elections.

• **Koi Ranpi**, aged between 45 and 50, is a member of the Remdi Jikambo clan and has been a local government councillor for many years. He took over the councillorship from Maip Kei, an important Remdi Jikambo leader and a former provincial government minister, thereby symbolically inheriting the Remdi leadership and the right to contest government office through elections. Accordingly, he has dutifully contested every national election since 1977. The 1992 election was his fourth attempt. In both the 1977 and 1982 national elections, Koi was runner-up to Parua Kuri, and in 1987 he was again runner-up to Melchior Pep. Little did he know that history was about to repeat itself, yet again in 1992. Unlike his rivals, Koi is a ‘traditional’ big-man, with skills in oratory and knowledge of local alliance systems, but has limited knowledge of the wheeling and dealing nature of modern PNG politics (including its evils).

• **Wikai ‘Weeks’ Membi**, aged between 35 and 40, is a member of the Minembi Nambka clan. Wikai was employed by the Justice Department as a Court Clerk before going into private business with interests in real estate. Wikai is distantly related to both Koi Ranpi and Melchior Pep through marriage ties. Both Kai’s Nambka clan and Koi’s Jikambo clan were the ‘fight-root-man’ (*el pukl wua*), or ‘owners’ of the Remdi-Minembi War, fought between 1984 and 1989. Because of the Minembi Nambka clan’s *el pukl wua* status and outstanding debts in reparation payment owed to groups in alliance with them, Wikai’s candidacy came as a surprise to Melchior Pep, who did not take this too kindly, taking into account of the
fact that Melchior's Kombukla group had given assistance to the Minembi in a largely non-fighting capacity. Wikai, according to one Minembi Nambka informant, should have waited until after the 1992 election, after Pep's second resignation, to contest the by-election in Dei. The reasoning behind this lies with a belief that both Melchior Pep and Pati Wamp would have supported Wikai for the 1993 Dei Open By-Election if Wikai had supported Pep in 1992. As it transpired, both Pep and Wamp vowed not to forgive Wikai for contesting against Pep in 1992, even though in the final analysis, Wikai's candidacy made little difference, as Pep won quite easily. In a complicated sequence of events following Melchior Pep's second resignation after winning the 1992 Dei Open Election and subsequent by-election, Wikai briefly lost his liberty and although it cannot be substantiated, many ordinary people suspected that his political enemies had something to do with it.

- **Philip Bobby (Kupaki)**, aged between 45 and 50, is a member of the Tembokambo Nu Wurung section of the Kentpi tribe. He is a school teacher by profession and this was his first attempt in political office, but it ended in disaster (see post-polling violence in this chapter; see also Ketan 1996), which ultimately led to his decision not to contest the 1993 Dei Open By-Election. Following the Kentpi-Welyi fight after the 1992 elections, in which three men were killed, Tepuka leaders saw this as an opportunity to persuade Philip Bobby to step aside in favour of Reuben Parua chiefly on the basis of the argument that the Dei Open seat must be retained by the Raembka alliance and Reuben (through his father's network) had a much better chance of doing that than Philip. As a result, a deal was struck between these two Raembka candidates, ensuring Philip's predominantly Kentpi supporters to vote for Reuben in the by-election, thus effectively transforming Philip Bobby's status from one of serious contender to that of political henchmen. Philip Bobby has now switched his attention to growing coffee.

- **Michael Yona**, aged between 35 and 40, is a member of the Minembi Napaka clan. He attended Mount Hagen High School in the late seventies and briefly worked as a car salesman with what was then called New Guinea Motors (now merged with the giant Mount Hagen-based Wamp Nga group of companies) before going into private business with interests in trucking and haulage. This was his first attempt at elective office and, judging from his poll performance, appears to be his last. After an especially disastrous attempt in politics and business, Michael Yona has finally returned to his previous profession as a salesman with Wamp Nga Motors.

Out of the eight candidates, only four were serious contenders with 'big money', resources and strong support. They were Koi Ranpi, Wikai Membi, Namba Parua and the incumbent Melchior Pep. The others, in spite of genuine interest they held in contesting, provided little competition
for Pep and mostly ended up being used as political stooges by others for the purpose of splitting votes in opposition strong-holds. It was widely believed that Melchior Pep, with Pati Wamp's assistance, encouraged Matrus Mel amongst the Tepuka and, possibly, Puri Ruin amongst the Roklaka to split both Raembka and Pipilka votes, respectively. This facilitated the prevalence and dominance of Welyi-Kuta in Dei. Either accidentally or by design, the choice of candidates available for voters somewhat favoured the sitting member. While the results indicate the employment of the principle of divide-and-rule, this, however, cannot be proven conclusively. The Dei Open election results are given in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3: The 1992 Dei Open Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes Polled</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koi Ranpi</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>17.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puri Ruin</td>
<td>1,989</td>
<td>9.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wikai Membi</td>
<td>2,345</td>
<td>11.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Yona</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melchior Mack Pep</td>
<td>5,435</td>
<td>27.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Bobby</td>
<td>2,079</td>
<td>10.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuben Namba Parua</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td>15.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrus Dokta Mel</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>7.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,990</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is, nonetheless, interesting to note that Tepuka Kelmbo clansman Matrus (Dokta) Mel appeared to be emerging as a 'power broker' type of candidate in Dei generally and, particularly, in Raembka politics. He is, by virtue of tribal membership and a special relationship maintained with his maternal Kentpi uncles, in a unique position to influence stability in Raembka politics. Conversely, he could easily cause instability because of his vulnerability to external forces. This appears to have eventuated in 1992. By accepting a campaign vehicle from Pangu Party president and Kombukla tribesman Pati Wamp, Matrus may have compromised his own position, in addition to jeopardising the chances of his fellow Raembka candidates by splitting...
their vote. But Matrus alone cannot be blamed for risking the position of the Raembka group in Dei politics because all the Raembka candidates were equally responsible for narrowing Raembka chances. While one may have been a safe bet, for three to stand was always going to be risky.

As it turned out, Tepuka-Kawelka votes were mainly divided between Matrus Mel and his fellow tribesman Namba Parua, while a large proportion of Raembka votes were spread between the three candidates. Although Matrus was expected to pick up a good fraction of the Kumungaka-Kentpi votes, it is difficult to determine a more accurate figure due to lack of relevant data. Progressive tally sheets, with records of individual ballot-box counts, are essential for this type of analysis. These, however, were not available at the time of writing.3

Meanwhile, at Gumanch, fellow Pipilka candidates Puri Ruing and Koi Ranpi were pitted against each other in a contest which would ultimately determine the fate of Pipilka as a unit in Dei politics. The Pipilka, now also a registered business name, historically4 comprised the mainly Dei resident Kimka, Roklaka, Remdi, Waklupka tribes and the Hagen, Anglimp and Nebilyer resident Kopi-Nokpa tribe-pair (Burton 1988:1.5). This indicates Pipilka's relatively small size in Dei and the difficulties involved in trying to win elections. But Puri Ruing won in 1997, proving that the biggest group does not necessarily win (see Chapter Eight for comparable discussion).5

It can be argued that Puri Ruing was able to collect votes which otherwise may have gone to Koi Ranpi. Furthermore, he picked up Waklupka votes which otherwise may have gone to Philip Bobby and Namba Parua. Yet, it can also be argued that had Puri Ruing not contested, his votes would not necessarily go to Koi, because the Waklupka votes would have gone to Philip Bobby and his fellow Raembka candidates.

Even at this crude level of analysis, it is clear that a Raembka candidate was never going to win. It was boxed in from all corners right from the beginning. Pipilka, likewise, was never going to make it either. With the Kimka-Roklaka alliance thrown behind Puri Ruing, Koi Ranpi depended entirely on his own Remdi tribe with a bit of help from some Kawelka and a few

3. Pending results of challenges in the court of disputed returns, the chief electoral commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo, is understood to have instructed his officers not to release any results (but see footnote 18).

4. The historical roots of Pipilka are very remote, suggesting that it could well be a more recent construct, based on the business association of the same name founded by Michael Mel, to facilitate the plantation acquisition scheme in the 1970s (see discussion in Chapter Two and Three).

5. Puri Ruing's win in 1997 however does not constitute as a win for the Pipilka coalition because he was a Kimka-Roklaka candidate, and was opposed by Willie Wundaki, a candidate from with the Remdi half of Pipilka. Puri Ruing won because of an electorate-wide perception that he was the best man for the job. A devout Christian, Ruing was perceived as a humble man who could be trusted. The other reason was that William Pik was quite effective in splitting Reuben Parua's votes (see Chapter Eight).
others. Although the Kopi tribe belong to the Pipilka alliance, they live closer to the Tepuka and are in fact Namba’s matrikin. Namba, therefore, picked up most of the Kopi votes and Koi only a few.

The Welyi-Kuta group, on the other hand, were well in control. The votes of their principal candidate, Melchior Pep, mainly came from his own group, the Kombukla, the Minembi Papeke clan who reside on Kombukla territory, as well as ‘bloc votes’ from the Welyi tribe. That was enough to give him a good foundation. He made up the extras from the Kawelka Kundmbo clan, through his relationship with, Pik Ruin6, and he may have picked up the usual marginal or swing votes from all over. Considering that he was a minister in the Namaliu government, his chances of picking up swing votes were pretty good.

That Namba Parua was able to come third must be a strong warning to the others because no one expected him to do that well. Although his father, Parua Kuri, was a former MP, Namba was believed to have been rejected by some Raembka leaders in favour of his younger brother, Ilam (Robert) Parua, during the planning stages. But he insisted on standing as an independent. Even his own father, who was silently entertaining the idea of re-entering national politics himself, did not endorse Namba’s nomination. This became more apparent during Namba’s abduction by Nengka tribesmen when Parua was said to have ‘celebrated’ with two cartons of beer at his Urunga home: “What did I say? Go tell his mother, Kopi amb (woman)..., to go and

6. While Pik Ruin does enjoy a special relationship with Melchior Pep, the Kombukla-Kawelka Kundmbo relationship is an historical one. For example, Strathern’s analysis of marriage patterns showed that “Kundmbo have intermarried mainly with groups among the Minembi and Kombukla with which they do have either traditional military alliances or recently developed exchange partnerships” (1972:134). See Chapter Seven for further discussion on the relationship between Melchior Mack Pep and William Pik Ruin.
get him" (Kawelka informants: pers. comm.). Part in anger, part in remorse at his helplessness, he appeared to have blamed those who had endorsed his son as a Raembka candidate and Namba for not consulting and listening to advice offered by his father. Whatever the case, what matters most now is the fact that Namba attracted enough support to come third, after winning candidate Melchior Pep and runner-up Koi Ranpi. With Melchior Pep's political career in the balance, pending the outcome of the Leadership Tribunal hearing of charges of misconduct, Namba could well give competitors a run for their money either in a by-election this year or in five years time. Clearly, in the years to come, Namba Parua will be a force to be reckoned with.7

The primary political support bases of these candidates have been discussed in Chapter Three. I shall now discuss election-related violence.

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Figure 7.2: 1992 Dei Open Election Results

![Figure 7.2: 1992 Dei Open Election Results](image)

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`Electoral Violence`: Cases and Explanations

`Electoral violence`, as a term denoting various types of violence during elections, is being deliberately avoided here mainly for analytical reasons. This is because of the argument that there is no such thing as `electoral violence` per se. And that purported `electoral violence` cannot be fully understood without knowledge of the underlying historical and structural organisation of the groups involved. The term, election-related violence, is used instead. Election-related violence can be divided into three broad categories: (1) any form of violence that occurs before polling; (2) violence during polling; and (3) violence that occurs after the polling period.

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7 Following Melchior Pep's resignation, Reuben Namba Parua won the 1993 Dei Open By-Election with 4,494 votes, improving on his 1992 position with 1,458 votes. Again, Koi Ranpi came second with 3,522 votes, only 85 more than his 1992 score of 3,437. Puri Ruing made a significant improvement, from 1,989 to 3,138 (a positive difference of 1,149 votes).
'Pre-polling violence'

'Pre-polling violence' is a term that can be used when referring to election-related violence which occurs before the polling period. It includes any form of violent act; ranging from fist-cuffs to the total destruction of property and lives. During the 1992 Dei Open election a number of cases fitting these criteria were observed. The first involved the alleged 'kidnapping' of Raembka candidate, Reuben Namba Parua, in which he was said to have been forcefully taken by members of the Nengka tribe. Allegedly, Reuben angered the Nengka by jumping onto the bonnet of a car they were driving and tried to rip the mesh on the windscreen. Afraid that he would damage the vehicle, the driver shifted into gear and took off abruptly, whereupon the force sent Reuben sprawling onto the roof. He was pulled over into the back of the utility as the vehicle accelerated towards Kotna and away from his home. His Tepuka tribesmen gave chase rather gallantly but in vain. According to Remdi informants, he was taken into Nengka territory and held captive until his release was negotiated by a fellow candidate (Koi Ranpi) and his supporters on the following day.

The second case involved a fight between supporters of Melchior Pep and those of two other candidates, which resulted in damaged vehicles and minor bruises. Pep's supporters were alleged to have set up a road-block between Kotna and Kondopina in an effort to stop other candidates from 'poaching' votes. Vehicles belonging to Puri Ruing and Wikai Membí were stopped at this road-block and during the ensuing struggle, Ruing's vehicle was extensively damaged while Membí's escaped with minor dents. The next day, a PMV bus owned by a Kombukla big-men, Krai, was confiscated by Ruing's Roklaka tribesmen in a road-block at Gumanch and was damaged in revenge.

Case three also involved the impoundment of a vehicle. But this time the vehicle did not belong to either the candidates or their supporters. It was the Returning Officer's official vehicle which

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8. Nengka are traditional enemies of the Tepuka and a number of Raembka allies. In 1970 former Dei MP and Tepuka tribesman, Parua Kuri (father to Reuben) sustained serious axe wounds to his cheek after an attempt was made on his life at Muglamp by members of the Nengka tribe. This violent attack, according to Strathern (1984:25), was an attempted revenge for an earlier event in which a Mul driver was killed inside Dei. Consequently, a member of this Mul Council tribe was sentenced to jail for a lengthy period because of the attack on Parua.

9. When questioned about the incident two weeks later, Reuben Parua, however, shrugged his shoulders and brushed aside the issue as anything but important.

10. Wikai Membí's Land-Cruiser station wagon was said to have escaped with minor dents because of the extensive wire mesh and iron reinforcement on the windscreen and side glass. Wikai's Minembi tribe is a traditional pair partner of Melchior Pep's Kombukla tribe; Puri Ruing's Roklaka tribe had fought a war against the Kombukla over land (see Strathern 1984:24-25).
was taken. Melchior Pep's supporters were alleged to have seized the vehicle from the Assistant Returning Officer while he was returning to Muglamp station from an official run.

These examples show that violence arising from issues to do with the structural and historical relationship between Hagen groups is becoming increasingly important in elections. Reuben's apparent act of aggression towards the Nengka can easily be explained in this context. Naturally he was suspicious of the presence of Nengka tribesmen inside Tepuka territory during an election period. Certain historical events were carved into his young mind at an early stage and probably will remain important in his life. At a tender age he witnessed the brutal attack on his father, then as a young man he watched his father being toppled from power and now he saw his clan's traditionally loyal Raembka supporters turn their back on him. It is widely known that a large number of Raembka voters were successfully courted by Pipilka candidate Koi Ranpi. The Nengka, owing to their traditional ties with the Remdi, were perceived by Reuben Para as supporters of Koi Ranpi. In this context, their unceremonious flight from Tepuka territory, with Reuben as captive, is quite understandable.

Likewise, the second pre-polling incident can also be understood from a structural and historical perspective. Wikai Membri's vehicle may have escaped with minor dents because of its precautionary reinforcements but one must consider the fact that Wikai Membri is a Minembi tribesman and Pep needs Minembi numbers in order to win elections. Any attempt by Pep's supporters to hurt Wikai's supporters or damage his property would be seen by the Minembi as an offence against them as a group. Pep, therefore, would do his utmost not to offend Minembi voters. Conversely, to offend Puri Ruwing and his Roklaka tribesmen would not be of major electoral consequence to Melchior Pep. It is generally believed that Pep does not rely on Roklaka votes because they are not only traditional enemies but also a relatively small tribe.

The third incident involving Pep supporters and the Assistant Returning Officer can also be explained in terms of structural and historical relationship of Hagen grouping. The Remdi are traditional enemies of the Minembi-Kombukla pair and modern business enterprises are organised along similar lines. It is obvious that Pep supporters were suspicious of a Remdi tribesman, albeit an electoral official, found inside their territory with a government vehicle. In this instance, it is also reasonable from a Hagen world view to suspect rival candidates and their supporters of 'voter-poaching' inside one's own territorial boundaries, also known as a base-vote area. Elsewhere, I have discussed the composition of a base-vote group, how its nurtured and protected from rival candidates, and other similar strategies designed by local groups in an attempt to win elections (see Ketan 1995).

11. The Assistant Returning Officer, Steven Korowa, happens to be a fellow Remdi tribesman of Pipilka candidate Koi Ranpi.
This pre-polling violence fitted the patterns of conflict which already existed, but flared up in the context of inter-group rivalry during the elections. In many instances, personal confrontations between powerful individuals often made situations very volatile, invariably resulting in assault on persons and destruction of property such as vehicles.

'Polling violence'

The term, polling violence, is used here when referring to instances of violence which occurs during the polling period. While some cases of violence during this period can be explained in terms of traditional relationship between groups, it is disturbing to see that state-generated violence is on the increase. Dissatisfaction over the logistical organisation of the elections resulted in heated arguments between electoral officials and candidates, which culminated in the punching of a Returning Officer. Generally, polling in Western Highlands was peaceful, with minimal disruptions. In Dei it was no different; it was particularly pleasing to see that polling in the home-base of candidates was exceptionally peaceful and very orderly.

There were only two reported cases of violence during polling in Dei. According to electoral officials, a bus-load of Pep supporters was attacked by Wikai Membı supporters at Kumbunga village. Compensation of K90 was later paid to the Pep supporters and the conflict resolved.

The other incident involved an attack on Reuben Parua's supporters by those of Melchior Pep. Informants claimed that a vehicle hired by Reuben for his supporters was smashed, a man was injured and a substantial amount of cash was stolen from the truck.

It is significant to note that the incident involving Pep and Membı supporters was resolved so quickly while the case of the missing money and the attack on Reuben's supporters was not treated with similar urgency. Again, it is a reflection of the kind of relationship that exists between the various groups. In this light it would not surprise me should Reuben decide to drop quietly the case of the missing money.

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12. This refers to violence in response to action, or inaction, by polling officials, such as non-delivery of ballot-papers, coupled with an apparent lack of police presence at polling stations.

13. Western Highlands Provincial Returning Officer, Kapping Isong, was attacked on the 16th June 1992 at Kagamuga, allegedly by supporters of Paia Wingti, over the non-delivery of ballot-papers. Mr Isong, when questioned in Port Moresby over the incident, blamed the Electoral Commission for the delay which resulted in his attack, but said he was reluctant to lay charges against the assailant.

14. This information was supplied by Assistant Returning Officer Steven Korowa and Presiding Officer Henry Rumints. Stationed at Kumbunga polling place, Mr Rumints, who was on site, agreed that Wikai supporters possibly resented the Kombukla intruders.

15. As revealed by Robert Parua, a victim of an incident at Mitamp on the eve of elections, two of Reuben's campaign vehicles were allegedly attacked by Kombukla tribesmen, with damages valued at almost K3,000.
'Post-polling violence'

Any form of election-related violence which occurs after the polling period is referred to as *post-polling violence* here. This also includes violence that continues even after the election results have been announced. Whilst the data on post-polling violence is insufficient, my own assessment, based on election monitoring studies, suggests that post-polling violence usually culminates in tribal fights, but not always. Again, these conflicts are organised along tribal and coalition-style alliance lines, although its potential to escalate into full-scale alliance-based warfare, or it being resolved more peacefully, depends on kinship networks. Since kinship networks cross-cut clan and tribal boundaries, it can be a prime factor in conflict resolution.

Since the election, in June 1992, there has been only one serious case of post-polling violence reported for the Dei Open electorate. It was widely believed that more than one case of tribal warfare would eventuate, and people gave predictions of considerable violence during and after the 1992 elections, but only this one resulted in fatalities. It has seen three brutal deaths, several hospitalised with serious injuries and massive destruction of property. A few months later the situation had reached a temporary truce phase but was still very tense and, therefore, anything was possible.

The conflict, referred to here as the Welyi-Kentpi War, started over the fatal shooting of a Simbu tradesman while employed by a business group representing Welyi-Kuta interests. The deceased was one of many Simbu workers employed by the company to work on its coffee estates. He lived at Yan, a small Simbu settlement inside Kentpi territory, with his family and friends. Owing to their residential status, the Simbu migrants were expected to 'block-vote' for the Kentpi candidate Philip Bobby but, as it turned out, they were already committed to their employer. It is commonly held that most of them voted for Welyi-Kuta strongman Melchior Pep.

According to Raembka informants, the deceased was allegedly attacked by a gang whose motive is believed to be robbery. Informants say, the gang members were after the labourers' wages and coffee money which was kept at the factory office. The Kentpi and their Raembka allies maintain that the deceased was an unfortunate victim of circumstances and that there was no foul play.

But the Welyi blamed the Kentpi, saying that they were upset over the election results and that this was their way of attempting revenge. Kentpi denied this and put the blame back on the

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16. In the absence of progressive tally sheets containing results of specific ballot-box counts, voting patterns were largely based on assessment of information supplied by scrutineers. Polling officials are an ideal source of information, but accessibility can be a problem for the casual observer.
Welyi. Warfare erupted and in the battle two Kentpi warriors were killed. A Welyi sustained injuries and is believed to have recovered in hospital.

From an analytical stand-point, two explanations are possible: (1) that a murder was committed as part of an attempt to restore tribal authority; or (2) that robbery was the motive leading to an unplanned death, which triggered off conflict in an already strained relationship. If murder was, in fact, committed then it must have been a desperate act of restoring tribal authority. The Simbu settlers owed their jobs to the Welyi but the land to the Kentpi. By supporting the Welyi in their election bid, they clearly compromised their neutrality, an act which could have been interpreted as defiance of Kentpi authority. Retribution comes in various forms — some more hideous than others — and death might have just been one of those. And, of course, the inevitable mayhem had to follow.

However, it is also possible that this may not have been premeditated murder; that the initial motive was robbery and the Simbu man — a motor mechanic — might have been shot on the spur of the moment. In this instance, the shooting of the Simbu could have been taken by both the Welyi and Kentpi as a good reason to wage war on each other. In any case, it is quite certain that relationships may have deteriorated to an extent where both sides had to resort to violence. That the outbreak of war was so sudden, with little attempt at exploring avenues for a peaceful settlement, was indicative of an unfriendly relationship. Hostility between the groups was so high that an outbreak of fighting could have followed anyone of many pretexts.

The magnitude of this hostility had loomed large, considering the possibility that the Kombukla and Minembi tribes could have thrown their support behind their fellow Welyi-Kuta coalition-style alliance colleagues. In which case, it was possible that fellow Raembka tribes of Kumungaka, Nelka and Gulka may have joined forces with Kentpi. Even, Tepuka, in spite of their differences, could have joined in with the rest of Raembka members following suit. That would surely have resulted in large-scale coalition-style alliance warfare — something which has been unheard of in recent times.17

Conclusion

Electoral politics remains as complex as ever and exact mapping of candidate or group performance at the polls is still far too difficult a task to achieve. Only rural ballot box analysis, with knowledge of structural organisation, would help us understand this process better. But at 17 According to accounts given by a Kawelka big-man, Goimba Onombe, the last major coalition-style alliance war was fought between the Raembka and Welyi-Kuta some time in the 1930s, when the Welyi were almost decimated by the combined forces of the Tepuka-Kawelka pair and their Klamakae, Kopi and Kimbo allies.
this stage one must be content with the discussion on local group-based campaigning and associated factors such as election-related violence.

My analysis of structural organisation in Dei leads to two major conclusions: (1) that Dei politics is still centred around neo-traditional coalition-type groups; and (2) election-related violence is largely determined by these underlying social and historical factors.

Dei politics largely revolve around the major phratries of Pipilka, Raembka and Welyi-Kuta. While tribal groups may compete against each other in endorsing candidates, it is, however, necessary for each candidate to court prominent leaders in attempting to gain coalition-style alliance-wide support. Fundamentally, this forms the central foundation for winning elections. Both Parua Kuri and Melchior Pep used Raembka and Welyi-Kuta, respectively, in order to win during various elections. Raembka, however, did not win during this election because of a number of reasons. Perhaps the most important one was that Raembka had three different candidates contesting the election, which resulted in the splitting of Raembka votes. In addition, none of the candidates was able to muster the support of 'neutral' groups from both within and outside the coalition-style alliance. This raises an important point that in spite of a primary kin-group, it takes superior capacity to mobilise support. In other words, all candidates may claim a solid vote-base, comprising kinsfolk and clansmen, but it is the more skilful candidates who can convert that support into votes, and go even a step further by competing for votes in marginal areas.

Similarly, election-related violence is rooted in the kind of relationship maintained by individuals and groups in the area. The type of relationship is often determined by historical and structural factors. The possibility and severity of election-related violence depends on whose involved. Warfare such as the one between the Welyi and Kentpi indicates an already deteriorating relationship because other avenues of resolving the conflict were not sought. But the fact that it did not escalate into a full-scale alliance-based warfare was largely because of cross-cutting kinship ties. Groups may be politically aligned differently, but individuals, including some very powerful and influential ones, have interests on all sides. Large-scale warfare, in this context, is almost an impossibility. Perhaps another reason why large-scale warfare did not eventuate was because of the higher priority of the election. After all, the fighting leading to deaths occurred after the election, when the need for peace may have been less crucial, but once a by-election was imminent, the need for peace once again prevailed. In closing, I am convinced that there is no such thing as 'electoral violence' and that the reported instances of violence during elections have deeper meanings than what meets the eye. Merely to concentrate on such cases would be symptomatic in approach, rather than identifying and addressing the root causes. As I have consistently argued throughout this thesis, election-related violence, warfare, criminal raskol gang
activities, and economic sabotage in many parts of the country represent powerful challenges to the state’s authority. It also represents self-help methods of asserting local group solidarity, sometimes in direct opposition to state-sponsored values. The biggest problem remains: there is limited state penetration, and the state has yet to come up with effective strategies to prevent or limit violence in society. In the next chapter I present a detailed analysis of local politics in order to highlight the preselection phase of elections.
Chapter 8

ELECTION CASE II: THE 1995 PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN KOTNA-TIKI CONSTITUENCY
Introduction

Every national election in Papua New Guinea since 1964 has been studied by observers from a wide range of disciplines within the social sciences (see references cited in the Introduction of this thesis). As aptly pointed out by Standish, "elections are striking events which not only reveal political activity at its most intense", but also because "they illuminate with singular clarity, the dynamics of state/local level interactions" (1992:10). For people in Hagen and many other PNG Highlands societies who feel that their needs are habitually ignored by government officials in Port Moresby, elections provide real opportunities for maximising wealth and power. In spite of the fact that only a few stand to gain from election 'investments', many, if not all, members of a tribe/clan contribute towards the campaign efforts of local candidates, if only to ensure that the group 'name must not go down'.

Most election studies in Papua New Guinea have concentrated on the output side of politics. Such studies, whilst providing important analyses on issues such as legitimisation of rulers' claim to rule over countries and command allegiances from its citizens, often neglect the processes that take place before the formal campaign period. Studies that concentrate on the output side of politics, like a good polaroid camera, may at times capture spectacular events, but the observer often leaves the field none the wiser as to why rifts occur within ideally solidary groups. This study suggests that if we understand the input side of politics, then it is possible to predict not only why but where the rifts will occur. Groups, factions, coalitions and their leaders may choose to cooperate or compete with each other in elections for a number of reasons. This chapter aims to show that explanations for such behaviour may be deeply rooted in historical events and the type of relations maintained between the major players.

It hardly needs stating that elections are only a small part of Hagen politics. By now it should be clear that Hagen politics is multi-dimensional, many parts of which been presented earlier as a megacycle (see Chapter Six; see also Chapter Nine). Moreover, an important stage of elections, involving various forms of preselection and the securing of assurances of support from non-aligned voter blocks, occurs years before elections (cf. Burton 1989a). This study differs significantly from other similar studies by examining the 'preselection' phase of elections.

This chapter provides a micro-analysis of campaigning and voting in the Kotna-Tiki constituency of the Western Highlands Province. It contains a detailed analysis of voter
mobilisation and election campaign strategies utilised by Hagen leaders. It is based on personal observation and information derived from interviews with key players, including candidates, their scrutineers, members of campaign committees, big-men and other types of leaders. Although focusing on a particular candidate, this study aims to provide significant insights into the dynamics of Hagen politics and the way it relates to PNG state politics.

William Pik Ruin's Election Campaign

In this second case of Mount Hagen-style electioneering I present a fine-grained case study. While observing the 1995 Western Highlands provincial assembly elections, I paid particular attention to Kawelka Kundmbo clansman William Pik's performance, documenting significant events leading up to the announcement of his candidacy and nomination, campaign strategies adopted by his team, his election as a member of the provincial assembly (MPA) for the Kotna-Tiki constituency following the declaration of election results, and his subsequent election to the office of deputy premier of the province.

Even after the formation of government and appointment of ministries in Western Highlands, I was able to keep in touch with the member on a regular basis until the abolition of all provincial governments throughout Papua New Guinea in July 1995. His personal details are as follows:

William Pik Ruin, aged 35, was born at Golke, just beyond the Mbulki patrol post, on the Sepik-Wahgi Divide, where Andrew and Marilyn Strathern conducted most of their early fieldwork. Without finishing his secondary school education, in the late seventies he left for Port Moresby, where he briefly ran a fast-food service with some Asian business partners. After the business collapsed in 1984, Pik formed a security company, with some assistance from Melchior Pep. His business prospered and by 1987 he was in a position to assist Melchior Pep in his attempt to oust Parua Kuri in Dei Open. Pep was successful and, after a brief spell in the government back-benches, was appointed Minister for Correctional Services in the Namaliu government. He promptly rewarded Pik with a ministerial staff appointment. As Pep's henchman, Pik had direct access to government resources and, by disbursement of such resources, Pik built up his own influence. Being a son of an important Kawelka big-man, and also a capable orator, Pik quickly acquired the skills of a modern politician. In 1988 he contested the Kotna-Tiki seat during the Western Highlands Provincial elections, but was narrowly beaten by the sitting member, Kar Kil. He returned to Port Moresby and continued working for Melchior Pep until 1992, when Pep was forced to resign despite retaining his seat during the national elections held that year. Pik sought employment with a local company specialising in car spare parts. Whilst employed as a workshop manager — and also by exploiting forest products from the old Kuk Agricultural Research Station on the side
he continued to extend his networks. During the peace settlement between the Kawelka and Minembi in 1990, Pik played an important part in negotiating peace, just as important as his role in the Kawelka war effort against the Minembi during 1986-1990.

The Preselection Phase

Political parties, as indicated in Chapter Six, are of little relevance in rural Papua New Guinea. If political parties have yet to develop grass roots following, then how do people in Hagen, the Highlands region and elsewhere in the country select their candidates? Is preselection the same everywhere? As pointed out by Burton (1989a), there are few functional differences in the way Hageners, Australians, Americans or Britons assess a candidate's suitability for office:

In each case the first phase is a form of preselection to screen out the candidates who are perceived to have a poor chance of winning. This can take place in the men's house, at party headquarters or more publicly as in the U.S. But in all the systems much weight is placed on a nominee's acceptability to as many as possible of the interest groups within the community. A comparison between the American system and PNG practice bears analysis. In the U.S., Democrat and Republican presidential candidates attempt to win vote guarantees through the system of primaries; in PNG electorates like Hagen, preselection is a matter of a candidate and his campaign team securing arrangements with other sections and clans of the tribe that they will back him and not nominate their own people. As in America, this is undoubtedly where personal leadership qualities must shine (Burton 1989a:277).

Indeed, this chapter attempts to show that, despite significant differences in preselection processes throughout the world, the way in which Hagen clans chose their candidates is just as effective as any political party system in advanced liberal democracies. Although the interests, motives and strategies of key individuals and groups may differ from society to society, the aim is fundamentally the same — that is, to get the best possible candidate to represent the aspirations, hopes and dreams of a group. In this section I present a discussion of the way strategies and ploys adopted by one Hagen tribe, the Kawelka, in an attempt to achieve a collective goal of getting one of their members elected to the provincial assembly.

The Mapa meeting: A kind of preselection

A meeting of Kawelka elders, representing each clan, was convened at Mapa in October 1994. Two major issues were discussed: (1) the resignation of Kawelka Membo councillor, Nicholas Namba, and identification of candidates for the councillor's post; and (2) the endorsement of William Pik as the only Kawelka candidate for the Kotna-Tiki constituency in 1995.

During this meeting it was resolved that each clan contribute K50 towards Pik's nomination fee of K500, a strategy designed to show potential Kawelka candidates that Pik alone had the total support of all Kawelka clans. Pik was nominated by the Membo clan for reasons discussed later
in this chapter (see section on The Campaign). Although there was no expression of interest from anyone else for candidacy, the absence of Klambo clan, with the exception of Ongka Kaipa, a well-known major big-man of that clan (see A.J. Strathem 1979), was taken as an indication of protest by Klambo who were believed to be supporting their own candidate. It was later revealed that a section of Klambo, led by Yap Roklpa, a former councillor and prominent Kawelka leader, was in favour of Max Poka, a Port Moresby-based taxi operator. In the speeches that followed, it was emphasised — perhaps overemphasised — that this would dramatically reduce the chances of a Kawelka candidate winning, and many warned Ongka that his clan would be held responsible for failure in this instance. Ongka's clan had suffered primarily at the hands of Membo and Kundmbo clansmen, following the loss by Pik during the 1988 provincial elections, but he remained calm and composed, despite barely concealed threats made by most speakers. He suggested that Max Poka could be persuaded not to contest the elections, but would not take the task upon himself because modern politics, as he aptly pointed out, was a game played by young educated men. Thus, Ongka, being a shrewd operator, shifted responsibility and possible blame for an election loss away from himself and his family.2

Following the Mapa meeting a series of minor meetings took place mostly at the subclan level. In these meetings, each subclan discussed Pik's candidature and their role in the campaign effort. The Membo clan, for example, resolved that they would spearhead the election campaign, not only by supplying economic resources but also by providing manpower to actually go out and campaign, thus, sending out a signal to their allies that Pik, albeit a Kundmbo clansman, was now a Membo candidate. That, Membo leaders argued, was the key to winning because Membo, through moka and war alliance networks, had a much wider field from which to draw votes than Kundmbo. As a Kundmbo candidate, Pik's chances of winning would have been minimal because of his clan's status as the el pukl wua ('fight root men'), or 'owner of the fight', during the Kawelka-Minembi war. All seemed well and the stage was set for a smooth election campaign.

Nonetheless, there was an immediate problem to be solved before nominations opened in November. Max Poka was the problem. He was considered an election risk because of his background: he was young and inexperienced; belonged to the smallest Kawelka clan and he lived in Port Moresby. The following is a record of what transpired at a meeting of selected individuals, mostly leaders and some young educated elites, at Kuk-Rungamundi hamlet in William Pik's manga rapa ('men's house') in November 1994.

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2. During the previous provincial government elections, William Pik was beaten by the incumbent, Kar Kil, by less than a hundred votes. It was alleged that Ongka's clan was largely responsible for the loss, which led to several incidents (see below). Ongka's family suffered most because it was claimed that his son, Namba, had taken a number of voters to the Kil camp.
Pik’s supporters meeting at his manga rapa (men’s house)

During this meeting of Pik supporters, at Kuk-Rungamundi, a strategy to dump Max Poka was put in place. Membo leaders, with Kont Klent, Yap Goimba and Yap Pokl, led the discussion. The Membo leader, Kont, who had lost his son, Eki (see Appendix VI), during the previous election in post-polling violence, was very vocal in pledging his support for Pik. He expressed his desire for Pik to win the election as well as his desire for Pik’s Kundmbo clan to make *wua peng* payment for the loss of both his son and those who were killed during the Kawelka-Minembi war. While not being explicit in their approach, it was implicit in their speeches that Membo speakers were reminding Kundmbo of their war obligations towards their allied clans. Moreover, it was implied that their support for Pik ought to be considered as part of the *wua omhil* gifts, soliciting for *wua peng* payments. That was made perfectly clear and understood by the Kundmbo. But Kundmbo leaders, led by Ruin and Rai, reminded Membo that the job was still unfinished, pointing out that Membo still had a task ahead in dissuading Max Poka from running.

With a view to discouraging Max Poka and his group, two major approaches were considered. The first was a direct approach suggested by Komorui of Membo Keiyambo subclan to solving the dual candidacy problem. A renowned fiery speech-maker, Komorui suggested that they express disgust at Klambo’s irresponsibility in sponsoring their own candidate in Poka. Furthermore, he wanted to raise historical issues, particularly one in which the Mandembo section, comprising Kurupmbo and Klambo clans, had engaged in battle with the Tepuka Oklembo clan. It is said that Klambo fled the fighting scene, leaving behind Kurupmbo, who were outnumbered and consequently lost several big-men. Kurupmbo would have lost more if it were not for Membo’s intervention, which ultimately won them the war. This argument was a simple ploy designed to win Kurupmbo support for the Membo-sponsored candidate, William Pik, while effectively reducing Max Poka’s chances by discrediting his group.

The second approach put forward by Kawelka Membo leader, Yap Goimba, was more subtle and involved coaxing and persuasion. Membo spokesmen, Yap Goimba and Yap Pokl, took upon themselves the task of gently persuading the Klambo to withdraw Poka’s candidature. Kundmbo leaders, especially Ruin and Rai, being the *pukl wua* (‘owners’) of this enterprise favoured this strategy so others endorsed it.

But in the end a compromise was reached: (1) that William Pik, with the assistance of Membo and other clans, would reimburse Max Poka’s expenses incurred during pre-election preparations; (2) Membo leaders would persuade the Klambo to withdraw Poka’s candidacy; and
(3) the fiery Komorui either control his speech or to refrain from speaking (unless necessary, that is, should Klambo show signs of stubbornness).

**Pik Versus Poka: A Process of Confrontation and Elimination**

The following day, 12 November 1994, a Kawelka general meeting was convened at Kuk in front of the former Agricultural Research Station office complex. Those present, around 200 persons (including some women and children), assembled in two roughly separate but adjoining camps: the Klambo on one side and the Membo-Kundombo-Kurupombo on the other. Even before a word was spoken, one could sense that this was no ordinary meeting. The atmosphere was very tense. After a brief and precise opening speech by Yap Goimba (Membo clan leader and village court magistrate), stating the purpose of the meeting, it was handed over to the aspiring candidates — William Pik and Max Poka — to present their cases, mainly to state reasons for their respective candidacies. William Pik took the opportunity to remind voters that he had lost the last election by a very narrow margin. Owing to post-polling violence, in which his supporters had caused massive destruction of property and the subsequent death of Eki³, Pik added that he had been reluctant to contest the elections, but the Membo endorsement had left him with no choice but to stand as a candidate. Pik further pointed out that because of his Membo endorsement, and with backing of all Kawelka clans, he was confident of winning with a big majority.

Max Poka, on the other hand, pointed out that it was Pik’s announcement not to contest future elections, especially after the post-polling violence, which prompted him to contest. And he went on to claim that it was far too late for him to pull out of the race, especially after having expended considerable resources on the campaign effort. He, too, claimed the support of many Kawelka, including some from within the Membo clan, and said he was currently courting support from segments of groups traditionally allied to the Kawelka.

Both Pik and Poka claimed solid support from the Kelmbo clan, a segment of Tepuka which was split between the aspiring Kawelka candidates and the incumbent, Kar Kil, a Tepuka Kintke clansman. Poka’s cause, however, was not helped when it was revealed that Matrus Mel, a Kelmbo candidate in the previous three national elections, had thrown his considerable weight behind William Pik’s candidacy. That was a big blow to Max Poka because Poka and his Klambo clansmen had always counted on Matrus Mel to deliver the votes when it mattered most — on polling day. Poka was apparently disappointed with Mel for not reciprocating

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³ The circumstances leading up to Eki’s death are discussed in the next section (see *Max Poka’s Compensation*; a more detailed version is given in Appendix XI).
support which he had received from the Klambo and a handful of Membo, largely through Poka's initiatives, during the 1992 National Elections.

When it became obvious that neither camp would bow out gracefully, a select band of leaders, mostly prominent clan leaders, took the stage. Most of them took a middle stand, choosing their words carefully, but emphasising the need for a single Kawelka candidate, until Membo Komorui came out with a barrage of words aimed at Klambo, blaming them for trying to jeopardise Kawelka's chances of winning the election. But before he had done too much damage, Membo Yap salvaged a rather tricky situation by taking control of the meeting and offering compensation of two pigs and K1,000 to Poka for his campaign expenses.

However, Poka was not ready to go out without a fight. He had to make a stand, for not doing so would not only disappoint his supporters but also undermine his future in provincial politics. Having already recognised the intention of the speakers and the purpose of the meeting — to dump him — Poka questioned the motive of the speakers. And, further, he asked: "What am I going to do with these pigs and cash of K1,000?"

Although Poka's question may have been a genuine reflection of his dilemma, an unwinnable position in which he was torn between his desire for political office and his clan's precarious position in Kawelka politics, the Pik camp took offence and launched an attack. It was really a case of closing in on a cornered and seriously wounded animal for the kill. Led by Yap Goimba, the Membo and Kundermbo speakers switched from normal to veiled speech mode. In a brief review of Kawelka history, the Klambo were reminded that it was Membo who had won wars for them at Mbuk4, reclaimed lost land at Kuk (see Appendix X for a brief history of the Kawelka), and made peace with potential enemies amongst the Kwi tribes of Hagen Central by sponsoring large moka prestations.5

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4. Leaders of Kurupmbo and Klambo, to their discomfort and embarrassment, were reminded of the Mandembo section's lack of participation during the Kawelka-Minembi war in the 1980s, and previous instances in which acts of cowardice were suspected.

5. One such moka prestation was made by Goimba Onombe to the Jika Kilaampe clan of the Andapunts section in the early 1960s. Others followed and wives were given and taken, including Goimba's own daughter, Beldepa-Mbo, being one of the first Kawelka girls to be given as a bride to the Jika. Bekelapa-Mbo's marriage to Jika Kilaampe Pui, presently an important Kilaampe leader and son of an important big-man, Anda, strengthened Kawelka's relations with Jika at such a crucial stage, when factions of Kilaampe, led by an important big-man, Maip, were opposed to the Kawelka's return to Kuk. Another Kilaampe big-man, Waluwa, played an important role in the reoccupation of Kuk. At a colonial land dispute hearing, Waluwa testified against Maip's group, supporting Goimba's claim to the land. A patrol officer — whom Goimba remembers as 'Krepen' (Griffin) — ruled in favour of the Kavelka and Waluwa was rewarded in moka with gifts of pigs and a woman of the Kavelka Kurupmbo clan given as a wife.
Max Poka's Compensation: Elimination of a Rival

Eventually the meeting resolved the issue of dual candidacy and Max Poka's supporters, through Klambo big-man Yap Roklp, accepted the two pigs and K1,000 as adequate reimbursement for Poka's campaign expenditure. Yap Roklp, a former local government councillor and skilful orator, could tell in which direction the speech-makers were heading so he quickly stepped in front of Poka and accepted what was offered, thus effectively shielding Poka from embarrassment and his clansmen from being subjected to further insult. Although sufficiently veiled, or so it seemed to women and children, it was apparent to most men present — including some from groups which were politically opposed to Kawelka — that restrained recital of historical events would soon give way to graphic accounts of contemporary incidents. What Yap tried and succeed to do was prevent more recent incidents, including two very sensitive cases of perceived betrayal, from being raised.

The first had occurred in 1988 when a young Membo clansman, Eki, the son of an important Kawelka leader, Kont, was killed in Port Moresby by a man from another tribe. One of a new breed of warriors in gun warfare, his death was considered a major set-back to the Kawelka war effort against the Minembi (see Chapter Three, see also Chapter Five). His death occurred only six hours after he arrived in the national capital from Mount Hagen. He was met at the Jacksons airport by a Klambo man who drove him in his taxi to the assailant's house at the Administrative College, Waigani, where they got themselves entangled in a brawl. At around 9:00 p.m., according to the taxi driver and three other witnesses (all Membo clansmen), he was struck down while attempting to stop a "deliberately staged fight between two men from the assailant's tribe". The Klambo man fled in his taxi and so did the others, while the victim was bleeding to death. He was not taken to the Port Moresby General Hospital until some six hours later, around 3:00 a.m. on the following day, by some neighbours of the assailant, but once there he died in less than three hours.

Immediately after his death several telephone calls were made to Mount Hagen: one such call probably saved the life of a community school teacher, a clansman of the assailant but married to a Kawelka woman of the victim's subclan, while others reached various people and the terrible news was relayed in whispers. Even so, none of Eki's kinsmen nor any Membo clansmen received any message regarding the tragic event until more than forty-eight hours later. It was alleged that the calls were made from a Klambo man's house and that one such call was received in Mount Hagen by his brother who deliberately kept the news from the Membo for

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6. According to one witness, the fight was deliberately staged between the assailant and his own clansmen. The victim was an innocent bystander, which fuels rumours and allegations of a conspiracy to murder him, thereby eliminating an important fight-leader (see Annex XI for details, including names and historical references).
more than forty-eight hours. There are two important questions worth asking: (1) had the taxi driver not fled from the scene but raced the victim to the hospital, would he have survived?; and (2) had the Membo been informed earlier would they have avenged his death via pay-back killing? Most Membo men I have spoken to have no doubt that Eki certainly would have survived if he had been taken to the hospital earlier. Opinion on the second question is divided: some believe he would have been avenged (probably through the killing of the school teacher); while others only expressed anger over the fact that the assailant’s clansmen had been informed ahead of the victim’s relatives. Whichever the case may have been, there was a strong impression that Klambo as a clan was guilty of disloyalty to the tribe even though what was involved was clearly the action of a few individuals only.

The second case of perceived betrayal is believed to have directly resulted in the death of a Kawelka Kundmbo man in 1989. He was travelling on a PMV to Mbukl when the vehicle was forced to stop at an enemy (Minembi) roadblock inside Kombukla territory on the Hagen-Kotna road. Soon after being identified as a member of the Kawelka tribe, he was pulled off the PMV (public motor vehicle) and hacked to death by Minembi tribesmen in front of horrified fellow passengers. It was claimed that a member of the Klambo clan had supplied information to the waiting enemy. This, however, was not substantiated. But the feeling amongst the Kundmbo, as expressed by some to me, was that Klambo were responsible for this death.

Another point that would have been raised by Pik’s supporters in their speeches was the defection of some Klambo who voted for a candidate opposed to Pik during the previous provincial elections. Since Pik stood as a Kawelka candidate, endorsed by the tribal leaders, a punitive raid was organised in which the homes of the defectors were burnt, pigs killed and a woman allegedly raped.

These and other similar incidents would have been raised if not for Yap Roklpa’s quick and calculating mind. Yap intervened for two basic reasons: (1) the fiery talk would have implicated important individuals and their families; and (2) given the case that there was a coalition of Kawelka clans against his own small clan, Yap knew that Klambo would not have survived any serious confrontation.

The recital of historical incidents involving indiscretion and cowardice can cause much discomfort but they are often raised in veiled speeches, especially during intra-clan conflicts. And, while individuals are responsible for the various transgressions, it is the group which will collectively be blamed in speeches as part of political manoeuvring. However, when contemporary incidents are raised in an effort to discredit both individuals and groups, conflicts can easily escalate to serious levels, often resulting in various forms of fighting — hair-pulling
(peng-nti mal), fisticuffs (ki-kum mal), stick-fights (tembukl mal), armed warfare (el-kaupanda mal) — or even serious rifts leading to the breakdown of military alliances.7

William Pik's Nomination

William Pik Ruin's nomination at Kitip High School in November 1994 was witnessed by over a hundred people, including many supporters who braved the rainy weather to attend. From Kuk he had taken two truckloads of about fifty supporters who were joined by some Welyi, Tepuka and other supporters at Kotna. Still many others came out of curiosity, perhaps to get a personal view of Pik and others who nominated. As registered on the common roll, Pik was nominated as Pik Ruin, using his father's first name as his surname, rather than both his own name, William Pik, as he was commonly known throughout the constituency. That caused a slight problem with voters so Pik's team had to spend some time educating the voters about the change of name and how it would appear on the ballot-paper.

In addition to Pik, five other candidates nominated to contest the Kotna-Tiki seat. There were two Welyi candidates, Oikai Pana and Buldung Apa, one Tepuka Kintke, Kar Kil, and two Minembi, the Elyipi candidate David Nema and Kimbo candidate Joseph Kit. Kit, a school teacher, whose clan, although structurally part of Minembi, is currently in a military alliance with Pik's Kundmbo clan, was not very happy with Pik and his Kundmbo clan because he had been told that Pik would step aside in his favour. When he heard of Pik's candidacy, he refused to enter into any preselection deals and went ahead and nominated instead, thereby threatening to split Pik's votes. However, it seems highly unlikely that he made some sort of deal with Pik's principal rival, Kar Kil, nor is it possible that there were other vote-splitting deals involved, as happens in national elections.

The Campaign

Election campaign strategies employed by candidates cover a wide range of possibilities and have been discussed in a general context earlier in Chapter Six, but here I only deal with Pik's campaign in detail. As previously indicated, William Pik's candidacy was sponsored by a clan other than his own as part of solicitory gifts (wua ombil) requesting reparations (wua peng) for men lost while assisting Pik's Kawelka Kundmbo clan during a recent war against an alliance of Minembi clans. Owing to Kundmbo's status as el pukl wua ('fight root man') and since not all of

7. As confirmed to me by Membo big-man, Kont, these issues were raised after the elections, during a homicide compensation settlement between the Membo and Klambo. A young Membo girl suspected of courting a married Klambo man was killed by one of his wives. Although a compensation of K9,600 and 80 pigs were paid, relations between the Membo and Klambo have since deteriorated to a level where joint ventures such as election campaigns and business enterprise would be extremely difficult to negotiate (see discussion on Aftermath, below).
its allies (including Membo) were compensated for losses sustained, mobilising support for Pik or any other Kundmbo candidate would have been difficult. This was further complicated by Pik's close association with former Dei MP, Melchior Pep, a Kombukla tribesman, whose kinsmen could not vote for Pik because they belonged to a separate provincial assembly constituency. This problem was replicated on a larger scale involving Pik's clan which has traditional ties with groups that are based either outside of, or residing in areas considered peripheral to the Kotna-Tiki constituency.

The densely populated Muka valley, in the context of political activity, is the heart of that constituency. Previous provincial assembly member, Kuma Rukla, the incumbent Kar Kil, former Dei MP, Parua Kuri, and the then incumbent Dei MP, Reuben Parua, are all based in the Muka valley and are members of a single tribe (Tepuka). By supporting Melchior Pep, who unseated Parua Kuri in 1987, and again in 1992, when he beat Parua's son Reuben, William Pik may have jeopardised his own chances in the Muka valley. Table 8.1 shows the elected representatives of Dei in both the national parliament and provincial assembly.

Table 8.1: Elected Representatives: Dei Open and Kotna-Tiki Constituency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dei MPs and MPAs</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Tribe-pair</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parua Kuri</td>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>Tepuka-Kawelka</td>
<td>Dei Open</td>
<td>1972-1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melchior Pep</td>
<td>Kombukla</td>
<td>Kombukla-Minembi</td>
<td>Dei Open</td>
<td>1987-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuben Parua</td>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>Tepuka-Kawelka</td>
<td>Dei Open</td>
<td>1993-1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puri Ruing</td>
<td>Roklaka</td>
<td>Kimka-Roklaka</td>
<td>Dei Open</td>
<td>1997-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuma Rokla</td>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>Tepuka-Kawelka</td>
<td>Kotna-Tiki</td>
<td>1980-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kar Kil</td>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>Tepuka-Kawelka</td>
<td>Kotna-Tiki</td>
<td>1984-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Pik</td>
<td>Kawelka</td>
<td>Tepuka-Kawelka</td>
<td>Kotna-Tiki</td>
<td>Jan-July 1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is where Membo came to the rescue. Whilst Kundmbo maintains strong ties with the Kombukla, Membo have equally strong ties with the Tepuka, particularly with Parua Kuri's Keitipi clan and its Oklembo clan-pair. Since the Keitipi-Oklembo clan-pair forms the core of Reuben and his father's base-vote, it is highly unlikely that any of its members would have voted for William Pik if he had not been sponsored by Membo. As a Membo candidate, and with Membo clansmen actually on the ground in Tepuka territory, Parua and his clansmen could not
ignore him. For doing so would have been an insult not to Pik but to Membo who are predominantly Parua supporters. And so William Pik was accepted as a Membo candidate by its allies and Keitipi-Oklembo clans were split almost equally between Pik and their fellow tribesman, Kar Kil.

Having resolved the candidacy status problem and once the campaign parameters were established, through the classification of target groups, it was business as usual on the campaign trail. Individuals with strong personal connections were appointed as campaign committee men and sent out to live with the target groups. The committees were assigned the primary task of mobilising support using their own social networks. Most of them were leaders and had few problems being recognised, some were there to reactivate old *moka* ties, while others depended on the goodwill of their relatives to mobilise support.

Based on the degree of support received from external groups and the type of relations maintained with them, target groups were classified into three vote categories: (1) Kawelka base-votes; (2) external support votes; and (3) marginal votes. These, together with the number of promised votes, are given in Table 8.2.

### Table 8.2: Vote Categories and number of promised votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kawelka Base-votes</th>
<th>Expected Votes</th>
<th>External Support Groups</th>
<th>Votes Promised</th>
<th>Marginal Areas and Groups</th>
<th>Votes Promised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuk</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>T. Keitipi</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Kenamb</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mope</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>T. Oklembo</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Rulna</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T. Kelmbo</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>Mam Gor</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Welyi</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>M. Elyipi</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M. Engambo</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>M. Kimbo</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kopi</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Klamakae</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kurungu-Pakl</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Based on information supplied by William Pik and his campaign committee.

*Note:* An estimated grand total of 3,081 votes. A comparison of this figure with that of actual number of votes polled will give an indication of the successes and failures in the conversion of support into actual votes (see *Results*, below).

Since the first category constituted the Kawelka settlements of Mbukl (Mope) and Kuk-Mbakla, campaigning was limited to speeches during meetings and no economic resources were required
in mobilising support from within the various clans and subclans. That task was left to the persuasive skills of clan and subclan leaders.

All economic resources were channelled towards the campaign effort covering the second and third categories. A total cash sum of K12,500 and 25 pigs were given as gifts to the various groups in exchange for promise of votes. A further sum of about K2,500 was spent on store goods — mostly on frozen meat, sugar and coffee — to feed visiting groups. Also, a great deal of pork hindquarters presented to individuals via personal networks were used in entertaining guests. Almost two-thirds of the cash and nearly all the pigs were presented to groups from the second category who visited the candidate at home, while a third of the cash was exchanged for promises of votes with ‘name-list’ groups during visits to their respective areas. The claims of ‘name-list’ groups were investigated by campaign committees and only after being verified were they paid cash. Most of the ‘name-list’ groups were from marginal areas but some also came from the second category. In most instances, leaders of ‘name-list’ groups represented genuine voters, but there were a few fictitious ones too. It was the job of the committees to separate the fake from the real and generally they did a fine job in isolating swindlers. In most cases when swindlers are identified, skilful candidates will opt not to expose them publicly, but play along in the hope that they can eventually be persuaded. While no money is given, they will be treated politely and excuses will be given for non-payment of cash.

Target Groups and Committees

Target group I: Welyi

Although the Welyi are major traditional enemies of the Tepuka, and Kawelka, by virtue of the Tepuka-Kawelka alliance, have fought them as minor enemies in warfare before European contact, they have in recent times established strong ties with Kawelka through inter-marriage. The Membo in particular through its Oyambo subclan have very strong relations with the Welyi. There are three sisters of important Oyambo big-men — including Kont Klent and Yap Pokl — married into Welyi while at least five Welyi women are married into the Oyambo subclan. Because of this relationship three Oyambo men, Kont Klent, Yap Pokl and Rembil Toki, were selected to lead the campaign amongst the Welyi. The Welyi connection is expressed in terms of intermarriage ties outlined below (see Table 8.3).
Table 8.3: Membo Oyambo marriage ties with Welyi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oyambo women married to Welyi</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Child-Age (Years)</th>
<th>Oyambo Men married to Welyi</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Child-Age (Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rangmba Pokl</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Childless</td>
<td>Nukundi Klent</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>&gt;30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kum Pokl</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Palke’ Puklum</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>&gt;25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kont’s sister</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Polti Pori</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>&gt;20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kum Ukl</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Rambil Toki</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>&gt;20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mou Nukundi</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>15-20</td>
<td>Dokta Ntip</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torou Nukundi</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>Ekip Pana</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Childless</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information supplied by Ben Kont, Kawelka Oyambo clan, and on personal observation.

Rambil Toki, who has two adult sons and had once lived with the Welyi for some years in the 1980s, was asked to spend the entire campaign period in Welyi territory. In his day to day activities he was assisted by Kont’s nephew, himself a young leader, and also by Kum’s son, Fred Rop, who has dual residency with both the Welyi and the Oyambo. Both Kont and Yap made daily trips and were sometimes assisted by a Kurupmbo clan leader, Kei Akil, who also has strong connections with the Welyi. Kei’s mother and grandmother were both abducted by Membo Oyambo big-man, Ntip Dong, from the Welyi during a war in the early 1930s, but the Kurupmbo big-man, Akil (a fearless warrior himself), was allowed to marry the girl because Ntip claims to have been not yet ready to settle down with a wife. Although now firmly established as a Kurupmbo leader, he is often affectionately referred to as ‘Welyi Kei’ for his connections to that tribe. He was able to mobilise his kinsmen with whom he still maintains active relations. Together they brought in a total of about 150 supporters from the Welyi.

**Target group II: Tepuka**

Two field camps were established amongst the Tepuka: one at Ambukla, managed by Tepuka Kelmbo clansmen; and the other at Muka with the Keitipi-Oklembo clan-pair. Two campaign vehicles, including one donated by a Kelmbo clansman, had Kelmbo drivers and were virtually based there, operating out of Ambukla.

Kawelka’s relationship with Kelmbo is a recent one, established largely through the initiatives of an aspiring national politician and businessman, Matrus (Dokta) Mel, who has in successive elections since 1982 tried to court traditional Parua Kuri-supporters among the Kawelka with some degree of success. Like William Pik, Mel is closely associated with Kombukla leaders,
Melchior Pep and Pati Wamp (see Chapter Seven). Although they initially built their own ties through this common Kombukla connection, they have in recent years extended those ties to their own subclans. This was reaffirmed in 1994 at a Kelmbo ceremony in which Pik and some other Kundmbo leaders were presented with gifts of pork.

The Kelmbo team also called upon the support of Kawelka sisters' sons, including a young leader, Kont Ruing, who has strong ties with the Membo Elpuuklmbo subclan. Kont's mother is the daughter of an important Membo big-man, Goimba Onombe. Moka ties between the Kelmbo and Membo were initially established through this connection. And Matrus Mel utilised this network by gaining some Membo votes during both the 1987 and 1992 elections. Mel now has a strong supporter in Kont's uncle and Goimba's eldest son, Nukundi, an important Elpuuklmbo subclan leader. The Kelmbo team, through these connections, were able to bring in about 175 supporters from within the Kelmbo clan.

The Keitipi-Oklembo field camp at Muka was headed by a young Oklembo leader, Merowa Doa, who was assisted mostly by Membo leaders, some of which have affinal and moka ties, others being sons of Oklembo women, or descendants of Oklembo men accepted as refugees of war (see Table 8.4; see also Table 8.5a and 8.5b). Merowa has strong ties with the Kawelka in general and especially with his maternal uncle, Kei Akil and his Kawelka Kurupmbo clan.

Table 8.4: Descendants of Oklembo war refugees with Membo clan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Subclan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pana Nurum¹</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>Recently deceased</td>
<td>Oyambo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ropa Nurum¹</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>65-70</td>
<td>Oyambo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontil²</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
<td>&gt;50</td>
<td>Oyambo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mel²</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>&gt;50</td>
<td>Oyambo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gena²</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>45-50</td>
<td>Oyambo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poiya Mel</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>Oyambo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miti Mel</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>Oyambo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ai Mel</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>Oyambo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plang Mark</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
<td>35-40</td>
<td>Elpuuklmbo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Despite their historical ties to Oklembo, these men are fully recognised as members of the Kawelka tribe, with as many rights as anyone else, and many of them would have difficulty tracing their genealogy (for whatever its worth; see discussion in Chapter Three on non-agnates and genealogies).

¹ Pana and Ropa are brothers; their father, Nurum, was a boy when his Kawelka Oyambo mother brought him back to her natal group. Both Pana and Ropa are important Kawelka big-men; they married many wives and had many sons. Pana's sons are: Tiptip, Kingal, Ouwa (Ou'ndi), Timbi, Pati, Miti, Ekip, Kerot
Noki, and Burrdi Puri. Ropa's sons are: Rumint Rungwua, Philip Pepa, Simon Makop, James Ntembari, Eldi Put, and Raema Rumbndi. The information on Pana and Ropa were given to me by Ben Konts, Membo Oyambo clan.

2. Kontil, Mel and Gena were young boys when their Kawelka Oyambo mother, Karekl, brought them back to her natal group. Poiya, Miti and Ai are Mel's sons, while Plang's father, Mark, was adopted as a young boy by the Kawelka Elpuklnbo big-man, Gommba Onombe.

The Membo, as noted earlier, are closely associated with the Keitipi-Oklembo pair, previously through military alliances and currently by political alliances. This has been reinforced by intense moka exchanges and more wives are given and taken. Former Dei MP, Parua Kuri's mother, for instance, was given to Keitipi big-man, Kuri, as part of a big moka prestation made by the Membo before European contact. Since then, other moka prestations, including 'Ongka's big moka of 1974 (see A.J. Strathem 1979), followed. These events involving massive economic resources and astute entrepreneurial skills culminated in 1984 during Parua's moka to the Kawelka. This relationship has been nurtured by important big-men on both sides. Significantly, Tepuka's most important big-men, Parua Kuri, Kuma Rokla and Dei businessman, Gommba Kot, are all sons of Kawelka women. While Keitipi-Oklembo women married into Kawelka generally are too numerous to mention, only those married into the Membo clan are given in Table 8.5a (and Membo women married into the Keitipi-Oklembo pair are indicated in Table 8.5b).

Table 8.5a: Kawelka Membo men married to Keitipi-Oklembo women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membo men married to Keitipi-Oklembo women</th>
<th>Status of husband</th>
<th>Wife's clan</th>
<th>Year/Period of Marriage</th>
<th>Child-Age (Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ntip Dong</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuntil Dong</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Ripa</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mepa-endi Kaukla</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koom Goimba</td>
<td>Son of big-man</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>&gt;20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumint Ropa</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>&gt;20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekip Engdi Rop</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>&gt;20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Wamp</td>
<td>Emerging big-man</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Childless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Kumi</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>&lt;10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Ken</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
<td>Oklembo</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timbi Pana</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
<td>Oklembo</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pati Engk</td>
<td>Ordinar big-man</td>
<td>Oklembo</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>&gt;20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Waklup</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>Oklembo</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokta Pun</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
<td>Oklembo</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>&lt;10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information supplied by Ben Konts, Kawelka Oyambo clan, and on personal observation.
Table 8.5b: Kawelka Membo women married to Keitipi-Oklembo men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membo women married to Keitipi-Oklembo men</th>
<th>Relationship to Membo men</th>
<th>Husband's clan</th>
<th>Year/Period of Marriage</th>
<th>Child-Age (Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Memb-amb1</td>
<td>Kuntil and Ntip Dong's sister</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nengi</td>
<td>Kont Klen's sister</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geunt</td>
<td>Andpi's daughter</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaka</td>
<td>Waema's daughter</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yara</td>
<td>Pana's daughter</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuipa</td>
<td>Ropa's daughter</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pora</td>
<td>Kontil's daughter</td>
<td>Keitipi</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Childless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Puklimp's daughter</td>
<td>Oklembo</td>
<td>1965-1970</td>
<td>Adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokta Tiptip</td>
<td>Tiptip Pana's daughter</td>
<td>Oklembo</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baem Tiptip</td>
<td>Tiptip Pana's daughter</td>
<td>Oklembo</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>10-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noman</td>
<td>Kingal Pana's daughter</td>
<td>Oklembo</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Childless</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information supplied by Ben Konts, Kawelka Oyambo clan, and on personal observation.

1. Memb-amb ('Membo woman'; real name: Nomani), is the mother of Tepuka's major big-man and former Dei MP, Parua Kuri. She was given to the Keitipi big-man, Kuri, as part of a large *moka* prestation during the 1930s. The marriage itself is as significant as the *moka* which set in motion a chain of events, including many reciprocal *moka* exchanges and an alliance system based on cooperation in warfare against major enemies such as the Kombukla-Minembi tribe-pair. The association between Kawelka and Tepuka was later extended to cooperation in modern politics and business enterprises.

That William Pik was assured the support of 250 Keitipi and 120 Oklembo members was generally attributed to the Tepuka-Kawelka tribe-pair alliance and more specifically because of Membo's special ties with the Keitipi-Oklembo clan-pair.

**Target group III: Minembi Engambo**

The Minembi Engambo, like most other Minembi clans (except Kimbo), are major traditional enemies and recent relations with the Kawelka are one of intense hostilities. However, there are individual links through intermarriage and blood ties suggesting that there may have been alternating periods of warfare and peaceful relations. Although Andrew Strathern, who began fieldwork in 1964, reported in some detail on relations of alliance and enmity between groups in the area, his discussions are mostly of events prior to European contact in the 1930s and does not give us clues towards establishing time periods in which those events took place. My discussion here and elsewhere, however, is based on accounts of warfare given to me by Hagen informants as well as on personal observation of a more recent conflict (see Case 2 in Chapter Five).

Whilst individual ties still exist, any threads of relations at the corporate level were drastically severed by the Kawelka-Minembi War fought between 1986 and 1990. Given these unfortunate
circumstances, especially with the high number of deaths and massive destruction of property on both sides, Minembi clans were not considered as major campaign target groups during William Pik’s election campaign. That is why their approach with a promise of 250 supporters was received cautiously and with scepticism. But when a delegation of Engambo clansmen was sent to Kuk, inside the heart of enemy territory, not once but several times, bringing with them gifts of store goods to assist with the campaign effort, William Pik’s supporters received them with open arms and treated them as long lost brothers. In fact, when reunited with some of their kinsmen for the first time in more than ten years, many cried with tears of joy and vowed that there would be no such war again.

The Engambo were praised for initiating peaceful relations and rewarded with gifts of cash, pork and a pig on one occasion. Although the gifts were exchanged in the context of an election campaign, the individual donors and recipients themselves viewed them as initiatory gifts, which would be reciprocated in *moka* items some time in the near future. As for the election, the Engambo leaders (including a son of a Kurupmbbo woman) came to William Pik, rather than their own candidate, a Elyipi clansman, because they believed that he had the best chance of winning and wished to see him bring some form of ‘development’ — in schools, roads and bridges — to their area. Owing to a number of factors such as warfare and the rugged nature of the terrain, the Engambo and a number of other Minembi clans live in virtual isolation and have been somewhat systematically marginalised by successive governments at both the national and provincial levels. By coming to William Pik, who was not only an enemy but a leader of a clan seen by many as perpetrators of the Kawelka-Minembi War, the Engambo were making a powerful political statement — the implications of which I explore elsewhere (see discussion on *Shifting Allegiances* in Chapter Six). Simply, they were asserting that there are more important things in life than just warfare; that there had been enough killing and suffering on both sides; and that it was now time for peace, all of which conforms with a consistent pattern in Hagen of alternating relations of peace and enmity.

**Target group IV: Others**

The Minembi Elyipi and Kimbo clans, each had sponsored candidates so they were avoided. But the other marginal groups such as Kopi, Klamakae and the Mapkli-Palke tribe-pair were covered by both Kundmbo and Membo leaders. These groups did not receive campaign committees to their areas mainly for economic reasons but were visited occasionally by campaign teams operating out of Ambukla and Kuk. All of these groups, however, sent delegations representing ‘name-list’ groups who negotiated cash for promise of votes on polling day. But, as indicated by the election results, these and other categories of target groups did not deliver in full.
The Kuk Rally: A Show of Strength

Some weeks after William Pik's nomination a political rally was organised at the old Kuk school grounds in December during which candidates for the Kotna-Tiki constituency were invited to give speeches. It needs to be stated at the outset that such rallies are major election events involving numerous groups and the distribution of economic wealth on a grand scale. Amongst other things, such rallies are organised by a candidate's supporters to serve two basic functions: first, a rally provides an avenue through which an opponent can be tested; and second, it is usually used as a show of strength or support for the local candidate. This particular rally attracted representatives of most candidates but only the incumbent Kotna-Tiki member and provincial works minister, Kar Kil, attended in person. The other candidates did not give themselves much chance against Pik in his base-vote area since he was what Hageners call a 'hot' candidate. Kar Kil, however, has in previous elections managed to pick up not only votes of his fellow Kint-Kengeke clansmen who reside inside Kawelka territory but some Kawelka votes as well.

The absence of rival candidates — with the notable exception of the incumbent MPA Kar Kil — at William Pik's rally conforms to a general pattern in which candidates deliberately avoid the base-vote of certain candidates, especially in instances where a particular base-vote is believed to have been secured by the local candidate. Some base-votes, therefore, are more secure than others. Rival candidates concentrate only on those which they believe are loosely constituted, such as those founded upon weak principles or within which there is internal conflict. In this particular case, where William Pik as a Kawelka candidate was popular *qua* Kawelka — an extremely rare position enjoyed by very few candidates in any election — his opponents believed it a waste of time attending the rally (which could be seen as provocative). Moreover, at no stage of the election did they make any serious attempt to lure voters away from Pik's base-vote. Pik accepted it as a sign of respect and reciprocated by staying away from their base-vote areas, except in a few instances where he was specifically requested to attend meetings organised by interest groups.

The rally, as intended, was used by leaders representing various groups from within the constituency to pledge their support for Pik. By assembling them in respective groups, many of which were distinguished by dance costume, it was almost a head count of Pik's supporters, which gave his campaign team a fair indication of what to expect on polling day.

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8 As previously mentioned in Chapter Six, in many ways electioneering involves redistribution of wealth in varying scales, from simple cash handouts inside a *haus-man* (men's house) to ceremonial prestations on a grand scale involving thousands of people. Iambakey Okuk's distribution of 4,000 cartons of beer, together with pork and other goods, at Kundiaowa airport during the 1982 national elections ranks as one of the most spectacular of all time (see Dorney 1990:21-23).
The opening speeches were made by leaders of 'neutral' groups\(^9\) such as clans who had not endorsed their own candidates or those residing in neighbouring constituencies. Most speakers emphasised the need for a more peaceful election and criticised politicians in general for election-related violence and misappropriation of public funds. In short, they were asking for equal distribution of wealth and more accountability in government office.

In a short speech on rural development, or lack of it, William Pik was more direct in his criticism of Kar Kil's performance in office. Whilst serving two consecutive terms as a provincial government minister, Kil, according to Pik, had done nothing for the people of the Kotna-Tiki constituency. Furthermore, Kil was asked to explain how he had spent funds intended for his constituency.

Although Pik's criticism was mild and certainly not unusual of election rhetoric, to the intoxicated mind it can be interpreted quite differently. In this case, Kar Kil was attacked as he came forward to respond to William Pik's queries. The assailant, a Membo man who operates a beer black market even during liquor bans (as in this instance), was drunk. He also damaged the windscreen of Kil's vehicle. Both Pik and Kil have affinal ties with him — one of his sisters is married to Pik while another is married to a man from a clan which is closely paired with Kil's own clan. Because he was said to have been drinking with some Tepuka men earlier that day, Pik believed the incident was deliberate sabotage designed by his political opponents to hinder his election campaign\(^10\).

On the following morning, when asked to explain his behaviour, he blamed it on the alcohol, but failed to make a contribution towards the compensation. A compensation of K200 and a pig was offered to, and accepted, by Kar Kil and his supporters, thus resolving the matter peacefully. Three Membo leaders, led by Yap Pokl who has some Kint-Kengeke connections as well as with the Minembi, were chosen to represent Pik at this prestation. Pik himself being an obvious target for retaliation was advised not to attend the ceremony. It was important to make peace with Kil's group because his Kint-Kengeke clan-pair control access into the Muka valley, which is the heart of Kotna-Tiki politics. Apart from having the capacity to provide an effective barrier into the area, Kar Kil's group would have sought retribution for this cowardly attack on him.

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\(^9\) While their groups can be considered 'neutral', open to courting and being bought by candidates, the leaders who make speeches at such rallies are most often politically aligned to the candidate who sponsors the rally. One of the speakers, Jika Kilampi councillor David Maip, for instance, was throwing his weight behind Pik Ruin. Others, of course, can be spies for opposing candidates but their activities are open secrets since any information worth knowing would have been already made available to the local candidate via personal networks.

\(^10\) William Pik maintains a less than warm relationship with his immediate affines. The assailant was in fact against Pik's marriage to his sister in 1986. She, a high school graduate, became Pik's second wife, which obviously did not sit too well with her brother who had tried unsuccessfully to prevent the marriage by physically attacking Pik.
A One day Poll

During the 1992 National Elections, Western Highlands was one of the four Highlands provinces which opted for a one day poll. It was considered a success logistically but met with considerable security problems (see Standish 1996; see also Ketan 1996). In spite of this, the Western Highlands again opted for a one day poll in 1995 provincial elections. Once again, it resulted in most polling booths operating without police protection, which meant that in many instances voters and polling officials were left at the mercy of candidates and their henchmen. Specific instances of voter coercion, infringement of electoral regulations and the use of violence in elections, and the wider implications of competing legitimacies have already been discussed (see Chapter Six). Here, I deal with events that transpired at William Pik's home booths of Kuk and Mope.

Polling commenced soon after 9:00 a.m. on the 9th of January 1995. The polling station at the old Kuk DPI station was already packed with voters by the time the polling team arrived just after eight. Despite the lack of police presence, polling was mostly orderly, with Pik's henchmen keeping voters assembled in sub-clan blocks and ensuring that all eligible members of a particular lineage or family voted when it was their turn.

Having been personally involved in the updating of the electoral roll as well as in the creation of a supplementary roll, Pik and his campaign team knew exactly how many people were on the roll and made it their business to learn their whereabouts. On polling day they made sure that everyone was present; the young and able were told to walk while the old and physically handicapped were transported to the polling station in a number of vehicles. Following a general pattern in Hagen, voter turnout at home polling booths is very high and this one was no different. Only those living outside the Highlands region did not vote. Just five out of nearly one hundred Kawelka residents in Port Moresby, for example, flew home to vote. The others could not make the trip mainly because of Air Niugini's expensive airfares (K270 return fare in 1994).

One incident which almost resulted in violence occurred at Kuk. The presiding officer was forced to turn away more than 300 voters because of shortage of ballot-papers and the indelible ink used to mark fingernails as people vote. Since it is the responsibility of a Returning Officer to assign the correct number of ballot-papers, the presiding officer in this case was let off lightly and the Assistant Returning Officer, a Tepuka Keitipi clansman, was blamed for this mistake.

It may have been an unfortunate oversight but, in view of the problems associated with Tepuka-Kawelka relations, as previously mentioned, this was interpreted differently. The Assistant Returning Officer, Mr Mapa Konge, was alleged to have conspired with his fellow tribesman and sitting-member, Kar Kil, to jeopardise the Kawelka candidate's chances by supplying less
than the required number of ballot-papers to William Pik's home booth. It was further alleged that the shortage of ballot-papers and ink was deliberate and, in fact, a strategy designed by the Assistant Returning Officer, with full knowledge and endorsement by prominent Tepuka leaders.

Soon after the polling team left for Muglamp station, where ballot-boxes were gathered for safe-keeping, a quick meeting of Kawelka leaders was convened to propose and discuss a course of action. After much confusion and heated arguments, it boiled down to two options: (a) to confront the Assistant Returning Officer directly, thus taking the law into their own hands by handing out tribal justice; or (b) to seek legal advice and trust the introduced state structures to work in their favour. In the end it was decided that further information was required before any action could be considered. Although apparently angry and frustrated by what they considered to be an unfair or unjust treatment from the Assistant Returning Officer, the supporters of the Kawelka candidate decided to investigate further the causes of the problem. More than twenty young men followed the polling team to Muglamp to seek an explanation from the Assistant Returning Officer, while the others gathered around the nearby ceremonial ground, discussing the matter in small groups.

In the evening, amidst the deafening sound of gun-fire from across the valley, where fighting had already begun, some insisted on seeking retribution by way of physical attack but most saw reason; common sense, however temporarily, prevailed. Late that night a message came through that more ballot-papers would be provided for polling to continue on the following day. Many, mostly womenfolk, slept but others stayed up discussing the matter in separate houses, while church-goers stayed up till the early hours of the morning praying for peace.

Polling did continue the next day and voters turned away previously were able to cast their vote. But when the polling team took the ballot-box into town, they were met by rival candidates who protested that this was highly improper and demanded the box be excluded from counting. They even threatened to throw the box out when the Assistant Returning Officer, who by this time was safely inside a police Land-Cruiser surrounded by armed policemen, ignored their complaints. This meant that Pik had to organise his own security to guard the provincial electoral office where the boxes were kept. All rival candidates and their supporters were warned to keep away from the premises. One particular supporter, that of Kar Kil, who did not get the message was manhandled by Pik's supporters and thrown into police custody. Others were chased away.

The poor Assistant Returning Officer was now caught in a 'catch-22' situation as he was sought for retribution by both his own group, for what they considered to be betrayal of tribal loyalty, and those of other candidates' for allowing an 'extra' box from Pik's home booth. Faced with
the possibility of retribution from his own group, especially the supporters of the sitting-member, the Assistant Returning Officer tried unsuccessfully to seek refuge among William Pik's supporters. Given that there is often widespread violence of massive proportions—including murder, rape and plunder, destruction of property and burning of houses—following the declaration of election results in the Western Highlands, the Assistant Returning Officer's fears were real and pressing. His is an unenviable job, especially when he is seen to have compromised his neutrality as a public servant. He should never have been asked to work in his home electorate, where there is clearly a conflict of interest between his job and his tribal allegiances.11

**Results: William Pik's Victory**

As expected in William Pik's case and consistent with a generally observed pattern in Hagen, the conversion of supporters into votes rarely meets with a hundred per cent success rate, even at the home polling booths of candidates. There is no indication that William Pik's performance changed that trend, even though he won the election quite comfortably with 2,421 votes, beating his nearest rival and sitting member, Kar Kil, by more than 300 votes. Even at his base-vote areas of Kuk and Mope, despite close scrutiny from his henchmen, he failed to score a hundred per cent. As indicated in Table 8.6 (see also Table 8.7 and Figure 8.1), the bulk of his votes came from his base-vote areas, Kuk (1,399) and Mope (405) and the rest from Tepuka (265), Minembi Engambo (103), Kopi (95), Welyi (58) and Klamakae (51). Apart from the Kawelka settlements of Kuk and Mope, where he scored 99.71 and 94.19 per cent, respectively, he also did well (in terms of conversion rates; see Table 8.6) amongst the Kopi (95%) and Klamakae (68%), which are both currently in alliance with the Kawelka and were recently compensated for losses sustained while assisting Kawelka during the Kawelka-Minembi War, fought between 1986 and 1990.

As illustrated in Figure 8.1, a total of 1,804 or 76 per cent of William Pik's votes came from his Kawelka base-vote, while 12 per cent of the vote came from Tepuka clans, notably the Keitipi-Oklemba pair and Kelmo. The Minembi and Kopi voters contributed five and four per cent of Pik's winning vote of 2,421.

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11. Returning Officers already operate under difficult situations, many have received threats, some have fled for fear of being killed, others have been physically assaulted. All because of a common, if somewhat misguided, perception that polling officials have not been completely neutral in the conduct of elections. One way of reducing this problem would be to appoint Returning Officers from other provinces, and presiding officers from outside the district or constituency. Previously I have pointed out this problem to the PNG Electoral Commission but no action was taken during the provincial election. Let us hope that this was an oversight and that the problem will be rectified in future elections.
Amongst the Tepuka groups, Kelmbo delivered 63.43 per cent of the promised votes, while Keitipi managed 45.6 and Oklembo 29.17 per cent. William Pik picked up 5 votes from Kar Kil’s home polling booth where it was least expected. The Oklembo promised 120 votes but delivered only 35, which reinforces a widely held belief that Oklembo big-man and former Kotna-Tiki MPA, Kuma Rokla, made a private deal with Kar Kil (who got 138 out of 258, or 53 per cent, of the total votes cast at the Oklembo polling booth of Nunga I (see Table 8.7 and 8.8). Rokla pulled out of the campaign just before nominations opened. He accepted an offer of compensation from some prominent Tepuka leaders who believed that Kar Kil had a better chance of retaining his seat if there was no competition from within the tribe.12

In the other areas, Minembi Engambo delivered 41.2 per cent of the total 250 promised votes, while Welyi managed only 38.67 per cent of the 150 promised votes. However, Pik’s overall performance suggests that his campaign money was well spent and a good percentage of promised votes were actually delivered on polling day. He picked up 78.58 per cent of a total expected votes of 3,081, which is an excellent conversion rate.

While the results clearly show that Kar Kil did not get the rest of the Tepuka Oklembo votes, in fact losing 120 to his rivals, Kit (47), Pik (35), Pana (29), Nema (6) and Apa (3), it does, however, raise an important point here — doubts about the assumption that big-men can control or deliver on at least swing votes in their groups.
Table 8.6: Conversion Rates: Votes Promised Versus Votes Delivered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Groups</th>
<th>Votes Promised</th>
<th>Votes Delivered</th>
<th>Conversion Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kawelka (Kuk)</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>99.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawelka (Mope)</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>94.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tepuka Keitipi</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>45.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tepuka Oklembo</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tepuka Kelmo</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>63.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tepuka Kint-Kengeke</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welyi</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>38.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minembi Engambo</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>41.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minembi Kimbo</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minembi Elyipi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>166.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopi</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klamakae</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>68.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakl</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,081</td>
<td>2,421</td>
<td>78.58</td>
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</table>

*Source:* Based on information supplied by William Pik’s campaign committees assigned to the various target groups and also on tally sheets kept by scrutineers during the count. Despite several attempts to collect tally sheets from the PNG Electoral Commission in Port Moresby, I have been repeatedly told that they were not available. All my data on election results, therefore, is based entirely on tally sheets kept by individual scrutineers.
Table 8.7: Ballot-box Count

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Box No.</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>PANA</th>
<th>APA</th>
<th>KIL</th>
<th>PIK</th>
<th>KIT</th>
<th>NEMA</th>
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<td>Engki</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0181</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Uk</td>
<td>Uk</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Uk</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Kimbiki</td>
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<td>Paklgi</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>99</td>
<td>142</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>2107</td>
<td>2422</td>
<td>1160</td>
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Source: Based on preliminary results, as announced via Radio Western Highlands, and also on progressive tally sheets kept by scrutineers.

There is a slight possibility of minor discrepancies between my data and that held by the PNG Electoral Commission — if such data is still held — which means that ballot-box mapping with
a high degree of precision is not possible here. However, that does not concern us here because the primary aim of the present exercise is to determine the performance of candidates in their respective home-booths. The data on home-booths is fairly accurate for rudimentary analysis, such as the one I attempt here. As indicated in Table 8.8, only three candidates — Pik (98.1%), Kil (94.95%) and Kit (92.68%) — scored more than ninety per cent of the total votes in their home booths.

Table 8.8: Candidates’ home-base performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Home-booths</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>Votes Polled</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Votes Lost</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oikai Pana</td>
<td>Kentkena</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>57.42</td>
<td>195</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kurungua</td>
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<td>9.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>707</td>
<td>64.78</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>35.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kar Kil</td>
<td>Kint (I)</td>
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<td>658</td>
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<td>6.38</td>
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<td>570</td>
<td>96.49</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>1228</td>
<td>94.95</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Pik</td>
<td>Mope</td>
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<td>433</td>
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<td>Joseph Kit</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Nema</td>
<td>Paklgi</td>
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<td>420</td>
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<td>278</td>
<td>66.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenimba</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>87.91</td>
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<td>12.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>55.12</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>44.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on preliminary results, as announced via Radio Western Highlands, and also on information supplied by scrutineers.

An amazing score of 98.1% success at home-booths most certainly laid the foundation for William Pik’s win. He lost just 35 votes, 22 at Mope to Kit but compensated for the loss by picking up 51 at Kit’s Tiki (II) home-booth (see Table 8.7). Pik won because he was able to keep his base-votes almost intact, whilst consistently picking up votes from the other polling booths. Moreover, he scored well in polling booths from within his rivals' tribal bases: over 250 votes
from Kil’s Tepuka, more than one hundred from Kit and Nema’s Minembi, nearly sixty from Pana and Apa’s Wely group.

Despite the differences in base-vote population size and the shifting allegiances of non-aligned voter blocks, the results clearly show that ‘primordial’ factors are at work here. All seven candidates polled more than 50 per cent at home booths, with Pik, Kil and Kit each having scored more than 90 per cent, Oikai Pana managed 80 per cent, while Apa and Nema were not far behind with 65 and 55 per cent, respectively. The candidates’ particularly strong performances at their respective home booths is schematically presented below (see Figure 8.2).

![Figure 8.2: Candidates’ Performance at home-base](image)

In this context, Pik’s performance (compared with others) conforms to Burton’s generalisation that “candidates owe their success (or lack of it) to the occurrence of rifts within their opponents’ tribes and their ability to keep their own tribes united” (1989a:273). He further goes on to note that:

> The structural division of tribes do not determine when rifts will occur or how severe they will be, but — like geological fault-lines — they do determine where the breaks will come. The ultimate reasons for competition between tribes and for splits between the sections of tribes are often found in a history of warfare and alliance (Burton 1989a:273).

The historical military situation is that the Kawelka Membo and Mandembo have paired against the Kundmbo-Kimbo pair in minor warfare but combined against Minembi in major warfare, fought between 1986 and 1990. The Membo-Mandembo pair have in a similar way fought against the Tepuka Keitipi-Oklembo pair in minor warfare but combined against the Welyi and
Minembi in major warfare. As illustrated in Figure 8.3, the Kawelka Membo-Mandembo and Tepuka Keitipi-Oklembo groups have also combined against a similar group, the Tepuka Kint-Kengeke and Miniembi Elyipi alliance (For a more detailed analysis of the historical military situation, see Case 2 in Chapter Five; see also A.J. Strathem 1966b; 1971:Chap.2; 1972:179-80).

All of William Pik's rivals were clearly disadvantaged by rifts within their tribes: the Welyi were split between Pana and Apa (most probably along structural lines); the Minembi were split between Kit and Nema (definitely along structural lines because of the war, although the situation is complicated by the displacement of the population by the same war); and the Tepuka, despite having a single candidate, were fragmented due mainly to the political
aspirations of Matrus Mel and Reuben Parua at the national level. At Ambukla polling station, Mel’s Kelmbo clan gave 197 votes to Kar Kil (whose group is structurally part of their own), 145 to Oikai Pana (who belongs to a group which is structurally different but shares a common border with them)\textsuperscript{13}, and 111 votes to William Pik (a close associate of Matrus Mel; their tribes are also closely associated). Meanwhile, at Nunga (II) polling station, Matrus Mel’s arch rival Reuben Parua’s Keitipi clan gave 272 votes to Kil (whose group is structurally part of their own) and 114 votes to Pik (who is personally associated with Parua’s rivals, Matrus Mel and Melchior Pep, but was corporately sponsored by a clan which has very strong ties with Parua’s clan).

The rift within Tepuka is a significant one which I believe had a major impact on the election and ultimately contributed to Pik’s win and, conversely, just as much as in Kil’s loss. The rift, as illustrated in Figure 8.4, resulted in a three-way split (almost but not entirely along structural lines) between Kil, Pik and Pana.

Pik’s nearest rival, Kar Kil also scored well at home. He lost a total of 62 votes from his Kint home-booths, 22 to Pana, 15 to Nema, 12 to Kit and eight votes to Apa, but reciprocally gained 45, 12, 6 and 46 votes from their respective home-booths. Like Pik, Kil’s overall performance

---

\textsuperscript{13} The Tepuka Kelmbo support for the principal Welyi candidate, Oikai Pana, is an interesting case which reinforces Burton’s assertion that “a principle of social propinquity, taking into account affinal and exchange system ties, clearly does operate when \textit{lan} fails to guide voters in their choice, or has been disabled by hostilities with the structurally nearest candidate’s clan” (1989a:272-273). Accordingly, the Tepuka Keitipi-Oklembo voters were split between the Kawelka candidate, William Pik, and the Tepuka candidate, Kar Kil. Pik’s sponsors, the Kawelka Membo, are closely associated with the Keitipi-Oklembo pair. They share territory, intermarry closely, in the past have given refuge to each other, and have combined against Kar Kil’s Kint-Kengeke clan-pair in pre-colonial warfare.
was good and, whilst securing more than ninety per cent of the votes in his home-booths, he consistently picked up votes from rival candidates' home-booths. His biggest problem, however, was in not securing voters from within his own Tepuka tribe. As a result, other candidates were able to pick up Tepuka votes which otherwise may have gone to Kil. Among the Tepuka Kelmbo (Ambukla), for example, Kil scored 197, compared with Pana, 145, and Pik, 111, and Kit, 47 votes. A similar pattern was continued in the Tepuka Keitipi polling booth of Nunga (II) — where Kil scored 272, compared with Pik, 114, Pana and Kit, 41 each — and other Tepuka polling booths (see Table 8.7). Even at his wife's Kopi polling booths of Kinapkla, his performance was matched by Pik, 70, and Kit, 66, compared with Kil's 70 votes. Similarly, amongst the Minembi, who are traditionally allied to his own Kint-Kengeke clan-pair, he performed no better than his rivals. In Paklgi polling booth, for instance, Kil scored only 45 compared with Nema (142), Pik (103) and Kit (99). Kil did not win because: (1) he failed to secure voters from within his own Tepuka group; (2) he lost his traditional supporters from groups such as Kopi and Minembi; and (3) he suffered from a common problem of incumbency, where the people obviously wanted someone new with fresh ideas. Kil's overall performance within Tepuka polling stations is given below (Table 8.9).

Table 8.9: Kar Kil's Performance within Tepuka polling stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tepuka Clans (and Polling Stations)</th>
<th>Pana</th>
<th>Apa</th>
<th>Kil</th>
<th>Pik</th>
<th>Kit</th>
<th>Nema</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kelmbo (Ambukla)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keitipi (Nunga II)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklembo (Nunga I)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kintke (Kintke)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kengeke (Kengeke)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Tepuka)</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1773</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Kar Kil scored 1,773 out of 2,473 votes cast in Tepuka polling stations (excluding Jikimbo-Wanyembo) compared with William Pik who polled 1,804 out of 1,839 votes cast in Kawelka polling stations. Kil collected 1,166 from within his own Kint-Kengeke pair and a further 607 votes from other Tepuka clans (Kelmbo and Keitipi-Oklembo pair). However, he lost 700 Tepuka votes compared with Pik who lost only 35 Kawelka votes.

The Welyi candidates, Pana and Apa, virtually knocked each other out. Although Pana had an overall success rate of eighty per cent at his home-booths, he lost (or shared) 124 votes to Apa at Kentkena, whilst picking up 131 from Apa's Kimbiki home-booth. Apa managed to poll 64% at his home booths, but, like Pana, failed to perform consistently in other polling booths.
Together, however, they scored over 2,600 votes, which suggests that a single Welyi candidate could have gone close to winning.

Like the Welyi candidates, Kit and Nema may have effectively cancelled each other out at home whilst not being able to perform consistently in other areas. Nema lost a total of 278 votes at Paklgji, 103 to Pik and 99 to Kit, but failed to score convincingly in other candidate's home bases, nor in other areas. He only managed 55 per cent at home. In contrast, Kit did well at home, polling 92 per cent of votes at his home-booths of Tiki, but performed poorly in other polling booths. Both, however, suffered from small base-votes.

Apparently, the Kawelka-Minembi War (see Chapter Five) had an effect on the performance of some candidates in the sense that the size of some candidates' base-votes were reduced through population dispersal, whilst that of one or two others' may have increased. The Minembi Elyipi candidate, David Nema, for instance, may have lost potential voters because of his clan's *el pukl urra*, or 'owner of fight', status. Joseph Kit, owing to his clan's unique position — which is structurally part of Minembi but closely associated with Kawelka Kundmbo clan and which fought against fellow Minembi clans — was caught in between. Consequently, Kit was unable to attract votes either way: Minembi voters obviously considered him an enemy whilst Kawelka voters viewed him as a political opponent. Another candidate who lost votes as a consequence of the war was Kar Kil. He has strong connections with both Kopi, through marriage, and Minembi Elyipi, by way of group alliance. Since both groups were at war against each other, it is possible that one may have suspected Kil of aiding and abetting the other. It is not unusual for rival groups to accuse each other of receiving assistance from politicians. In this case, however, there is no evidence suggesting that Kil favoured one group over another and it is possible that he may have been a victim of circumstances.

Whilst the war may have contributed to Kil's loss, and Nema and Kit certainly did lose votes, it is not clear why Pik scored well amongst his Minembi enemies. This raises an important point in that some candidates may claim solid base-votes, but it requires superior capacity to mobilise support (Ketan 1996), even amongst enemies, as demonstrated by Pik's performance.

Superior capacity best equates with the concept of 'strength', a composite quality, which according to surveys, is made up of factors such as personal leadership qualities, educational background and campaign resources (see Saffu 1989; 1996). 'Strength', therefore is a major factor which determines a candidate's success or failure in elections (cf. Burton 1989a).

In Hagen Open, Paul Pora's success during the 1987 national election, for instance, was attributed to such 'strength' based on his involvement with the formation of the National Party in the early 1970s and continued association with the party into the 1980s, success in business (as
one of the most successful businessmen in Hagen, with interest in the haulage and coffee marketing industries), and his experience in various local and national offices (Burton 1989a). Owing to his status as one of Hagen's first millionaire businessmen and his strong association with the National Party, he was “seen as having the greatest personal campaign resources, as well as having the full weight of the NP party machinery behind him” (Burton 1989a:258).

Like Pora in Hagen Open, William Pik's success in Kotna-Tiki Constituency can also be assessed in terms of personal 'strength'. The basis of Pik's ‘strength’, nonetheless, differs from Pora's in the sense that Pik's leadership qualities were assessed in the context of local conflicts while Pora's were obviously tested in a much broader field. William Pik's previous attempt at political office was an unsuccessful one in 1988 during the provincial elections, but with a strong association with former Dei MP, Melchior Pep, Pik was able to build his influence and extend his network through the disbursement of government resources. His leadership qualities, however, were best displayed during the peace settlement between the Kawelka and Minembi in 1990. In negotiations leading up to the settlement, Pik exhibited exceptional skill in dealing with highly sensitive issues of truce between warring factions and arranging reparation payments between allied groups.

Since most negotiations are public events, witnessed by government officials and leaders from neutral groups, speech-makers tend to choose their words carefully in order to make an impression on the listeners. For an intending candidate such as William Pik, these events provided the opportunity to impress as many people as possible. I personally witnessed two such events, both traditional wua paka (lit: 'uplifting man') formal funeral ceremonies, during which William Pik (among other leaders) spoke to hundreds of people:

- first at Mbukl in January 1987 where at least three thousand mourners from the Kawelka-Kopi-Kimbo-Klamakae alliance, plus several hundred others from friendly and neutral groups, were gathered to present their grievances (amongst other things) to the then Western Highlands Provincial Police Commander, Robert Korus, and his deputy, Jefferry Kera, over the alleged killing of a Kawelka Kundmbo man (which initially triggered the Kawelka-Minembi War) and subsequent deaths during the early encounters;

- then in July 1989 at Kuk where more than two thousand Kawelka mourners and a further hundred or more delegates from neighbouring tribes were gathered to make a similar appeal for justice after Minembi violated a combined Church and state-sponsored truce agreement by killing a Kawelka Kundmbo clansman, Kupakl, at a road-block on the Hagen-Kotna road (see Case 2 in Chapter Five).
The latter event was witnessed by provincial government officials, including the then Acting Provincial Secretary, Oseah John, who also spoke to those present at the ceremony, appealing for peace and promising to look into the matter. William Pik in particular was impressive in presenting Kawelka’s case, pointing out that Kawelka were the aggrieved party here, while at the same time, warning state officials that inadequate or lack of police intervention had in the past resulted in death and destruction of property, a situation that would easily get out of hand if unchecked. In addition to acting as the principal mouthpiece for the Kawelka, Pik was equally impressive in one other area — that of disbursement of economic resources. During Kupakl’s funeral, Pik had in his possession the use of a new four-wheel-drive utility (believed to have been hired by Melchior Pep, then Minister for Correctional Services) which was used to transport food and other items required for the ceremony. Important visitors, such as leaders from neighbouring clans, were accommodated by Pik and his Kundmbo clan leaders, which means that this would have given Pik a further opportunity to make his intentions known in addition to gauging the views of such men of some consequence.

And so it was this particular kind of ‘strength’, coupled with a somewhat misguided perception that Pik had access to corridors of power in Waigani, Port Moresby, and more significantly to a seemingly limitless supply of economic resources, which set him ahead of the less influential and younger rival, Max Poka, during the Kawelka preselection in November 1994 — as well as obtaining assurances of support from clans of other tribes, notably the Minembi Engambo and Tepuka Kelmbo.14

Supposing that ‘strength’ was the only factor determining success or failure in elections, my analysis of the results would most certainly lend me to a predictable conclusion: that the Kawelka candidate, William Pik, won because of superior leadership qualities. Assuming that this is correct, does it mean that the Tepuka candidate, Kar Kil, the incumbent and a provincial government minister, was less ‘strong’ than William Pik? What if all candidates were equal in ‘strength’ (measured in one form or a combination of several factors), would the candidate from the biggest tribe win?

First, ‘strength’, as measured by ‘leadership qualities’ and campaign resources, is in practice not the only factor in election wins or losses. In this respect, Kar Kil was probably as ‘strong’ as Pik, if not stronger, considering his experience as a provincial government minister and his strong association with former Dei MPs, Parua Kuri, and his son, Reuben Parua.15 William Pik won not

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14. Compare with Paul Pora’s success in securing assurances of support from the eastern Mokei of Hagen Open Electorate during the 1987 elections (see Burton 1989a).

15. Apart from political associations, Kar Kil also has kinship ties with Parua Kuri and his son, Reuben. Both Kar Kil and Parua Kuri are married to sisters from the Kopi tribe, which means that Kil is an uncle, or as Hageners say, a father, to Reuben and a brother to Parua Kuri.
because of superior leadership qualities but because of a combination of factors, which I take up later in this section.

Secondly, it is practically impossible for all candidates to be equal in 'strength'; in fact, the candidates here and elsewhere (see, for example, Burton 1989a) differed in 'strength', and their circles of support varied greatly in size. All the candidates did well at home booths, scoring between 50-90 per cent of the vote, but generally struggled at other booths.

Thirdly, the results indicate that the biggest tribe does not necessarily win. This is clearly illustrated by the performance of Kar Kil's, whose group with over 5,000 people outnumbered Pik's with 4,000 (see Table 8.10). From a total of 2,473 votes cast in Tepuka polling booths — excluding the Jimi valley resident Jikimbo-Wanyembo clan-pair — Kil polled 1,773 votes but lost 700 to his rivals: Pik (265), Pana (237), Kit (143), Nema (33), and Apa (22). The situation here generally approximates to Burton's (1989a) 'segmentary enclavement' model of voter behaviour, whereby:

... segmentary enclavement of support is evident, but it is modified by (a) a weighting attributable to 'leadership qualities'; (b) the effect of a factor ... called 'social propinquity' overriding structural closeness; (c) true floating voters; and (d) the shifting allegiances of non-aligned voter blocks (Burton 1989a:279).

Kar Kil's failure to secure Tepuka votes and the rift within his tribe (discussed earlier) fits well into this model, but understanding William Pik's success in holding his own tribe together while at the same time securing significant support from clans of other tribes (including Kil's Tepuka tribe) requires one to go beyond this model and explore the dynamics of the Hagen megacycle. As previously mentioned, Pik's Kundmbo clan were the 'owners' of the Kawelka fight with the Minembi (see Chapter Five). The Kundmbo owed their allies — comprising Kopi, Kimbo, Klamakae and other Kawelka clans — reparation payments for losses sustained while assisting them in fighting against the Minembi-Nguni alliance. The Kopi, Kimbo and Klamakae were recently compensated for war deaths, but in the case of the Kawelka Membo, payment was not forthcoming as easily as it did in other cases, which meant that some 'greasing' was required to speed up the process. Hence, the Membo sponsorship of William Pik's candidacy, thereby 'commoditising' votes as solictory gifts for reparation payments, a significant point to which I shall return later in the concluding section of this chapter.
### Table 8.10: Candidates and Groups: population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>1979 residents counts</th>
<th>1990 pop.</th>
<th>1995 est.</th>
<th>Votes cast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oikai Pana</td>
<td>Welyi</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>3,109⁴</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>2,623⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buldung Apa</td>
<td>Welyi</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kar Kil</td>
<td>Tepuka</td>
<td>2,575</td>
<td>3,351⁶</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,473⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Pik</td>
<td>Kawelka</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>4,168⁸</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kit</td>
<td>Minembi</td>
<td>1,524</td>
<td>2,031⁹</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,452¹⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Nema</td>
<td>Minembi</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,206</td>
<td>12,659</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>8,387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. Data from Rural Community Register (NSO 1982). These figures are for people deemed to be 'residents'.
3. Total votes counted in polling booths within each candidate's tribal group.
4. Rural Non-Village Census Units (Kotna Mission Station and Kitip High School, Penga Station, and the two plantations, Tremearmi and Manggog) have a total population of 897 persons, which brings the overall total to 5,006. These, however, cannot be included here because all of them contain predominantly migrant populations (originally from Simbu, Southern Highlands and other parts of the Western Highlands).
5. There is a strong possibility that this figure may well be far below the actual number of votes cast in Welyi polling booths. For instance, a total of 785 votes from three ballot boxes (Counts 3, 4 and 5; see Table 8.7) were not included here as Welyi votes because of difficulties encountered in matching ballot boxes with the actual identity of voter blocks. Although the principal Welyi candidate, Oikai Pana, performed exceptionally well here, collecting 666 votes and conceding only 119 to his rivals, Kil (53), Kit (38), Pik (19) and Nema (9), the other Welyi candidate, Buldung Apa's failure to score any votes at all suggests that these may not be exclusively Welyi votes but instead a combination of Welyi and possibly Mapke-Palke, Klamakae and a few Tepuka votes. If, however, we were to include these as Welyi votes, on the basis of Pana's strong performance, the total Welyi vote would come to 3,408 — a not too unlikely figure, taking into account a large population of around 5,000 people (including those in Rural Non-Village Census Units who more often than not would vote with their hosts).
6. Suspected underenumeration; Total Tepuka population is believed to be at least 5,000 persons.
8. Including some Tepuka, Poika-Ayka (ex-Nebilyer) and Enga migrants at Kuk.
9. Population data for the Minembi clans — Kimbo, Elyipi and Engambo — which are part of the Kotna-Tiki Constituency. The rest of the Minembi belong to the Gumanch Constituency. The total Kimbo-Elyipi-Engambo population is believed to be at least 3,000 persons — underenumeration is 1990 Census is very likely to have occurred mainly due to population dispersal through the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990).
10. Minembi Kimbo, Elyipi and Engambo votes.
The data presented in Table 8.10 and Figure 8.5 reinforce an important point made in Chapter Three of this thesis that there is a tendency for smaller groups to be more united than large ones. In other words, the level of cohesion within groups is largely dependent on factors of size, historical military alliances and contemporary social relations. In this context, simplistic assumptions about size, social class, political parties, and policy platforms as factors in elections were easily discredited here — an important point to which I shall return in the concluding section of this chapter. I now turn to some specific problems faced by William Pik, in order to highlight the effects of powerful external forces on local politics.

Aftermath: Problems for a new Member

Following the declaration of the election results in Western Highlands and in the subsequent process of government formation William Pik was elected Deputy Premier in a predominantly National Party-based government led by Premier Lucas Roika. Pik was chosen ahead of more experienced politicians backed by major political party-aligned groups such as Jika and Yamka. This was a major victory for William Pik and his small Kawelka tribe because Pik had contested as an independent and this was his first term in office.

In an ideal situation, after his victory Pik’s Kundmbo clan, with assistance from Membo, would have hosted a large pig festival in which several hundred pigs and some cows would be slaughtered for mass distribution amongst his supporters. Following that, his Kundmbo clan were to make reparation payments in the form of a large moka to the Membo for losses sustained, including many deaths, while assisting Kundmbo in their fight against the Minembi.
Election Case II: Kotna-Tiki Constituency

That was the plan, as agreed upon by Kawelka leaders, before the election. Alas, it was not to be! Pik’s plan to reward the Membo and other supporters was thwarted by unforeseen events: two murders and the abolition of the provincial government system in Papua New Guinea.

The compensation payments for both murders were covered by the British Broadcasting Corporation who were making a film on Kawelka big-man, Onkga, in May 1995. Charlie Clay, who was researching for the film, called *Ongka II*, reported that:

The Kawelka were embroiled in two considerable compensation payments. Both were efforts to settle murders... The first murder was within the [tribe]; a young man was arranging his third marriage when his second wife fought and killed his bride to be. The second murder was not an intra-[tribe] affair. Two Kawelka lads had become involved in a drunken brawl with men from another Hagen group, the Mokei. This had resulted in the death of one of the Hagen men. Life had become very difficult for the Kawelka; threats of payback killings meant that they were forced to stay within their own clan territory. For a prominent Kawelka politician, such as William Pik, this was disastrous. He was unable to go to town and carry out his job until the situation was settled (Clay 1996:10).

In the first murder, the victim was a young Membo girl. She was stabbed to death at a small market beside the old Kuk DPI station. The assailant, originally from the Kumdi tribe, was the second wife of a Klambo man. Contrary to Clay’s statement, the Klambo man was not arranging his third wife. The assailant had struck merely upon suspicion that her husband may have been courting the girl. However, when confronted at an informal hearing in November 1994, both the girl and the man denied having had a relationship or having one. Both were warned at the time to keep away from each other. Given this background, the Membo, as told to me by Membo big-man, Kont, were furious when the young woman was killed by the same man’s wife. As it were during the Pik versus Poka confrontation, the Klambo were again the target of combined Membo and Kundmbo anger. The assailant’s husband was Poka’s brother. And Poka, according to Pik’s supporters, had failed to deliver his supporters to Pik, as agreed during Max Poka’s compensation. The following is part of a veiled speech delivered by Membo Kont during the compensation ceremony:

```
You were the one who dipped your cassowary plumes in water;
You were the one who smashed your axe on stone;
You were the one who drove the car;
You were the one who made the telephone calls;
You were the one who stole cash and pigs from us but did not help secure votes as promised;
Now you have taken my girl’s life;
What have I not seen that you will give me?
```

The first two points, referring to cassowary plumes and axe-smashing, were made in reference to the Kawelka-Minembi War, in which Klambo leaders made war speeches inciting warriors to go to war against the Minembi but failed to supply any warriors. The second and third points refer
to Eki's death in Port Moresby when he was driven by a Klambo man to the house of the 
assailant's house where he was killed and Klambo's telephone calls which warned the assailant's 
clan members who thereby escaped possible payback killing. The fourth point is in reference to Max 
Poka's compensation, in which it was agreed that Poka would deliver his supporters to Pik in 
exchange for reimbursement of election expenditure. Here it is alleged that Poka and his 
Klambo clansmen lied and in a way stole from Pik's supporters. The sixth point is in reference 
to the actual killing of the girl, while the last point is in fact a warning that Membo would not 
settle for less than maximum homicide compensation16.

The pre-eminent Klambo big-man, Ongka, who had been trying to get his son, Namba, to 
hospital in Australia for heart surgery, was yet again distancing himself from his clansmen who 
had failed to support him17. A segment of Ongka's clan, the Poka-Pekaem lineage, has PMV 
businesses in both Hagen and Port Moresby. Ongka expected but did not receive assistance 
from this group. It was this particular group who were causing much worry for the clan, first 
with Max Poka's candidacy and, now with the murder of a young girl. Furthermore, much of the 
speech directed at Ongka was not because of Ongka's personal failures but largely because of 
actions of the Poka-Pekaem segment, particularly Max Poka's immediate brothers who made the 
telephone calls and were alleged to have deliberately delayed getting the message of Eki's death 
to his Membo kinsmen. Yet again, Ongka was the centre of unwarranted attention.

There are two general points worth mentioning here. First, there is the general shift of balance 
of power from traditional big-man, such as Ongka, to entrepreneurs. This has been largely 
attributed to access to cash — those with large amounts of cash can command considerable 
power and influence. Secondly, a successful big-man, like Ongka, cannot be completely 
outrioeued. Owing to his position, he constantly shields his group from attack from other 
groups, just as he can be an arrow-head for his own group's attack on others. He can take credit 
for group achievements, just as he takes blame for group failures. That is the way of the true big-
man.

In the end, the matter was resolved peacefully. The assailant was jailed and Ongka's Klambo clan 
came up with a compensation payment that was agreeable to the Membo. As reported by 
Charlie Clay:

16. While there is no set amount for homicide compensation, the average size for Hagen would be within the 
range of K10,000 to K50,000 and a hundred pigs or more. Homicide compensation payments for men are 
usually higher than that of women because of their higher status in Hagen society.

17. Without the support of his clansmen, Ongka was not able to raise funds to send Namba to Australia for 
heart surgery and sadly lost his eldest son soon after the conclusion of the compensation. Despite Pik's 
initiative and my own efforts to have Namba sent to Australia (where I had hoped to take care of him), all 
was in vain because of an apparently higher corporate priority placed on homicide compensation.
By the tune the [BBC film] crew was ready to film, Ongka in his own indomitable style had wrapped up the first compensation. Ongka had organised nearly 100 pigs, K10,000 and a [15-seater] bus to help settle the murdered [girl's] group. The situation was still tense, but people were once more free to go about their daily business (Clay 1996:10).

The correct amount, according to the Membo councillor, Nicholas Namba Komorui, was in fact 80 pigs, a cash sum of K9,600 plus a PMV bus, valued at K5,000, and a cassowary.

Although Clay makes no mention of William Pik's role in this particular compensation, it is understood that Pik, as a newly elected MPA and Deputy Premier, played a significant part here. He mobilised neutral groups of mainly Kurupmbo and his own Kundmbo and even some Membo to contribute towards the compensation, while Ongka worked within his own Klambo group. Also, Pik urged Membo youth to exercise restraint, especially after the PMV 15-seater bus was forcefully taken by the victim's paternal uncle.

The second homicide compensation directly involved Pik because the young man principally held responsible for the murder of the Mokei man was a Kundmbo clansman. Pik's involvement here was motivated by several factors: (1) the crises, albeit a local one, in the Hagen world view, was an ideal test of character for him as a relatively inexperienced provincial politician; (2) he was an obvious target for payback killing, which meant that he had little choice but to mobilise resources for the compensation; and (3) this provided yet another opportunity for him and his tribe to better the previous record compensation payment in a seemingly never ending game of one-upmanship.

In hindsight, William Pik did quite well. Together with Ongka and other leaders, he came up with a compensation payment that was not only acceptable to the Mokei but also widely acclaimed as a record payment in Hagen. Homicide compensation, owing to various implications — including the ever present threat of payback killing and its potential to escalate into armed conflict — is a serious and complex matter. It requires strength and courage on the part of leaders, such as Pik, who must accept responsibility for the actions of their tribesmen. In this case, Pik's task was made even more difficult when the culprit went into hiding. Charlie Clay reported that:

The lad held principally responsible for the second murder had run away. He had disappeared and nobody knew where he had gone, not even his reputed partner in crime. This was bizarre behaviour and almost social suicide. The man in question's only real hope of rejoining society was to go to jail and take his chances with the courts while his clan settled the dispute through compensation. The Mokei wanted those responsible in jail and were waiting for the court system before they were prepared to talk compensation. This was quite a headache for Pik, and he tried every available means to find his clansman. Cars were hired to scour the Highlands Highway, photographs distributed, and local radio station ran the story and a substantial reward was offered. But to no avail. Common sense prevailed and finally the compensation got off the ground without the satisfaction of the accused being behind bars. Ongka and Pik
mobilised the various men's houses and factions within their group to raise an amount that dwarfed the previous month's payment. It was a hard and tricky task, fraught with many difficulties, but finally things came together. Ongka cajoled, persuaded and bullied the Kawelka to donate pigs and money while Pik scoured the Dei Council area in his red pick-up truck, visiting other clans, calling upon old alliances and debts to add to the total (Clay 1996:10-11).

Although Clay did not mention the total number of items included in this compensation, according to Councillor Namba Komorui, the Kawelka gave K28,000 in cash, a total of 150 pigs, together with 4 cows, 4 cassowaries, 2 horses, and a egg of a wild cassowary as a symbol of peace and friendship, in a ceremony witnessed by the Premier, Lucas Roika, and other senior officials from the Department of Western Highlands.

If the murder cases were only stumbling blocks to William Pik's plans, then the real knockout blow was yet to come. It was one that Pik probably least expected. The abolition of the provincial government system by the PNG National Parliament in July 1995 broke his heart and shattered a collective dream. Like his colleagues in government, Pik's campaign effort costing massive amounts of economic resources and thousands of man-hours was for a full five year-term investment, but lasted only five short months. When I last spoke to him in June 1995, it was a despondent William Pik who lamented that:

What we say about possum hunting with dogs is true; the trail is warm and the dog has a good strong scent, but the possum is not at home.

Pik used the Melpa phrase, owa mukl etpa, kui namboketpa etim ni mel em > which literally translates as 'the dog was hot on its trail but the possum was not home'. Here, William Pik was referring to how close he had come in his attempt to become the link between his people and government resources. What appeared to be a promising prospect, almost a dream start in provincial politics with the second highest post in the new government, was to end cruelly. Since hunting is commonly a team effort and major game-meat is shared, Pik's election campaign was his hunting and his subsequent win and ministerial appointment can be seen as getting close to the prey, which is access to government funds and economic resources for his supporters, but unexpectedly the metaphorical possum bolted away!

Needless to say that William Pik's term in office was prematurely terminated and, consequently, his supporters were robbed of their pig-killing ceremony, while the Membo clan will have to wait much longer for their moka from the Kundmbo.18

18 Recent reports from Mount Hagen, however, indicate that the Kundmbo clan had made a large reparation payment of 400 pigs to the Membo clan in October 1996 for the Membo men who died fighting alongside the Kundmbo against an alliance of Minembi clans, including Elyipi, Engambo, Papeke and Ruprupkae (personal communication; and The National, October 16, 1996, p.2). For details of this event and its political implications, see discussion on The Merging of 'Traditional' Mount Hagen and Modern PNG Arenas of Competition and Cooperation in Chapter Nine.
Conclusion

What I have tried to show here is that election campaigning in Mount Hagen society is a much more complex process than meets the eye. There is more to it than just fanfare, beer parties and violence. Election campaigns are highly coordinated events involving meticulous planning and deliberate exploitation of underlying social and political relations between local groups. Existing relations of military alliances, strengthened by intense intermarriage and frequent moka exchanges, are prime targets of aspiring politicians. This is because election campaigns are essentially tied in with moka sequences, reparation payments, and military alliances. It is based on the principle that once you fight one way, you are bound to vote the same way because it speeds up the reparation payment process. It is a sound principle and one which had been previously used by several politicians, including former Dei MP, Parua Kuri (see Chapter Seven) and William Pik in his first attempt during the 1988 Western Highlands provincial elections.

However, a major problem lies with the fact that a 'fight-root-man' (el pukul wuia) does not always attract enough supporters because his group already owes allies reparation payments for losses sustained in war. Sometimes a 'fight-root-man' is able to persuade supporters from allied groups to vote for him, thus 'commoditising' votes as solicitory gifts for reparation payments, but, as both Parua and Pik will attest, this is a rather tricky game and very few have claimed success.

The way around this, as in Pik's case, would be to seek sponsorship from another group, preferably a kui wuia ('dead man') group, one which is owed reparation payment. In this case, Pik was sponsored by the Membo clan, which is the only group among Kundmbo's allies yet to be compensated (see discussion on Reparation Payment in Chapter Five). This leads us to the next point on how local relations can be affected by national and provincial events.

William Pik's political aspirations and his group's relations with the Membo and other supporters now hangs in the balance because of the abolition of the provincial government system by the national government. After having reached the second highest post in Western Highlands, Pik's next step would be to contest the Dei Open seat in 1997, and his clansmen would argue at least on sentimental grounds that the tribal 'name must not go down' (mbi mana napanka), but that remains an extremely difficult task.

Pik and his Kundmbo clan have now caused a situation of disequilibrium in their relations with others. To balance the system would require correct reciprocal action in terms of reparation payments to allies, rewarding voters for their votes, repaying supporters for their campaign contributions, and settling debts with creditors, such as those who contributed towards the Mokei homicide compensation. Even if all these tasks were successfully accomplished, or alternative arrangements were to be mutually reached, Pik would still need to convince his
political mentor, one Melchior Pep, to step aside in his favour. Pep, however, may consider Pik as a more attractive alternative than Matrus Mel as a political stooge. Pik may even prove more effective in splitting Reuben Parua’s votes during a contest for the Dei Open seat.

Melchior Pep opted to resign before the June 1992 election in order to avoid facing charges under the Leadership Code. Pep was then no longer subject to the Leadership Code, nominated in April and won his old seat back. The Leadership Code then applied to him and he was found guilty of breaking the Code and expelled from Parliament, creating a vacancy in Dei Open. Following Pep’s dismissal, Reuben Parua (the son of former Dei MP Parua Kuri) then won the 1993 Dei Open By-Election (Ketan 1996).

Both William Pik and Matrus Mel are closely associated with Pep, almost in patron-client manner, and have in the past received assistance from him: Mel received a Land-Cruiser wagon from Pep’s fellow Kombukla tribesman and Pangu Party president, Pati Wamp, during the 1992 National Elections in an attempt to split Reuben Parua’s votes; and Pik has worked mostly as a henchman for Pep. The danger for Pep is that Matrus and Pik in particular could break with Pep and get strong enough to defeat him in a future contest for the Dei Open. In fact, Pik did contest the 1997 elections, but, as indicated in Chapter Seven, Pik and Pep both lost to Puri Ruing.

In an attempt to secure assurances of support for William Pik during the 1997 elections, the Kundmbo clan in October 1996 made a reparation payment of 400 pigs to the Membo clan for three men who died while fighting alongside the Kundmbo during a recent fight against an alliance of Minembi clans. According to one informant, the Kundmbo did not include some key individuals, including an important fight-leader, who have since shifted allegiance from Pik to rival candidates, especially the incumbent, Reuben Parua. Furthermore, Pik did not honour his commitment to the Membo leader, Kont Klent, to whom he had promised wua omhil (‘man’s bones’), or reparation, payments but failed to deliver after the provincial elections. Apparently dissatisfied over Kundmbo’s reparation payments in 1996, Kont and his sons, Ami and Ben, shifted allegiances to Reuben Parua after receiving a cash sum of K2,000 from Reuben, ostensibly as an additional compensation for the death of Kont’s son, Eki, in 1988. In the aftermath of the 1997 elections, Pik’s supporters expressed their anger over this apparent betrayal of tribal loyalty by assaulting Kont and his sons.

A final point worth emphasising here is that the lower the level of political competition, the greater the chance of a tribe splitting. Overall, though Pik was able to sustain group unity and get most of the votes from within his tribe (plus external ones) and so was able to lift up Kawelka’s name in a modern arena of competition, in a similar way as older big-men such as Ongka, Kont and Goimba did more than a couple of decades ago. These three outstanding leaders — all of which represented their tribe in the local government council — have been particularly
successful in lifting up the name of Kawelka. The Membo leader, Goimba, Kawelka's first councillor, reclaimed the Kawelka territories in the Upper Wahgi Valley (at Kuk and Baisu) after defending his land claim in a colonial court, which is no mean feat for someone with knowledge of neither the courts, nor the Tok Pisin language. His successors, Ongka and Kont, have been innovative in incorporating new resources such as motor vehicles in *moka* exchanges.

In the final analysis, simplistic assumptions about size, social class, political parties, and policy platforms as factors in elections were easily discredited here. William Pik won because of skillful use of the Hagen megacycle and its sub-cycles such as warfare and reparation payment as political resources.
CONCLUSIONS: THE INCORPORATION OF THE PNG STATE INTO THE HAGEN MEGACYCLE
Introduction

This study has thus far presented what is essentially a micro-analysis of processes of political competition in the Mount Hagen area of Papua New Guinea, relating these to a combination of interests in the arenas of sociocultural anthropology and political science. The combination of approaches was essential because of the difficult and highly complex nature of the data and the problems inherent in their interpretation. An effective strategy applied here was the methodical shifting of the voluminous anthropological literature on the New Guinea Highlands, especially Hagen, and arriving at independent conclusions regarding social structure and leadership, which were then fed into this account of political competition in the 1980s and 1990s. The dynamics of local-level politics, covering the main arenas, fields and sub-fields of political competition and the principal actors, have formed the central focus of analysis in this thesis.

In the final chapter we shall consider the main findings and conclusions of the Hagen case studies in the context of wider theoretical issues. A major aim here is to demonstrate how revealing local-level politics can be in our understanding of national political cultures. Such an exercise is especially vital in our scholarly pursuit of knowledge of kinship-based societies such as those in Papua New Guinea, where the state at the local level is a minor player and parochial struggles, nepotistic patronage and the pervasive practice of one-upmanship represent the main game.

This concluding chapter of the thesis is organised into three major sections: the first contains a summary of the main issues raised in the study; and the second deals with a process described earlier as the incorporation of the PNG state and its events into the Hagen megacycle. The third section looks at the relevance of these findings and associated issues for the future of PNG, compared to other Third World states, and contemplates some of the issues involved in state collapse in tropical Africa to assess their relevance for PNG. Thus, the discussion, correspondingly, moves from a fine-scale empirically-based analysis to a more broad level of abstraction. At times it may even appear somewhat over-stretched, but this is necessary to place the Hagen case studies on political competition into a broader context and draw out their broader implications. The cumulative effects of globalisation, and the powerful and effective roles of external forces in Third World societies, provide a compelling justification for analysing the dynamics of Hagen society in the wider context of developments and problems in PNG and the Third World.
My study on local-level politics has been to provide a Papua New Guinea corrective to assumptions in Western theory about the centrality of state institutions in regulating society. It is also, I hope, a corrective to any tendency to think of politics in non-Western societies, especially in the PNG Highlands, as ‘tribal conflicts’. Contrary to the stereotypical and highly prejudiced view of PNG Highlanders as belligerent warriors, my study shows that politics is highly integrated in the Highlands, where even the state and its agencies and political cycles have now been incorporated into the local megacycle. More significantly, this study shows that state politics is firmly connected to local politics chiefly because of the interstitial role of politicians. In Hagen, nationally prominent leaders such as Paul Pora, Michael Mel and Paias Wingti operate in the nexus between parallel moral worlds.

While concentrating on the dynamics of Hagen politics, I have shown how the PNG state and Hagen society feed off each other through an exchange of ideas and values, economic resources, and political practices. The principal agents of transmission here are leaders who operate at both local and national levels. In Ekeh’s (1975) terms, the local power-base of a politician represents the ‘primordial public’ while the state forms the ‘civic public’. The primordial public, comprising members of the primary kin-group, clan or tribe, is moral while the civic public is amoral which means that it is morally acceptable to milk the state in order to feed the primordial public (see Ekeh 1975:100). Ekeh’s theory is based on studies on Africa and more specifically Nigeria. My study has shown that the phenomenon of conflicting moral realms is not unique to Africa, since Hageners, too, have moral concepts and values regarding what is right and wrong, which contrast strongly with state-sponsored ones.

My examination of the patterns of political competition and cooperation in Hagen indicates that the modern state of Papua New Guinea faces difficult problems — mainly of conflicting identities and allegiances, which create competing legitimacies; of limited state penetration, as

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1. Admittedly, Highlanders can be fierce competitors and have therefore been extraordinarily successful in business, politics, and in other spheres, but so are the Tolais, Bougainvillians, and Sepiks. As Ted Wolters constantly reminds me, we need to ask whether Highlanders are in any way more different than Keremans, Morobeans, or Manusians are from the rest of Papua New Guinea? Surely, this is a moot issue. It would be quite pointless to carry the argument further along these lines. Suffice it to say that there are remarkable similarities between the various ethnic and regional groups in Papua New Guinea, just as there are important differences between them, yet there is no outstanding characteristic that can be used to distinguish one ethnic group from other PNG groups.

2. Others have made similar observations: See Standish (1992) for comparable discussion of Simbu leaders benefiting themselves and their groups by “working in the nexus between the state and clan” (p.246); See also A.J. Strathern (1993b) for a discussion of the conflicting roles of contemporary Hagen politicians, as tribesmen and national leaders.
evident in the state's inability to regulate society; and of glaring social, political and economic disparities. The resurgence of inter-group conflicts, an escalation in crime and violence, and the subversive actions of militant landowners in Bougainville and economic sabotage in other parts of the country are manifestations of these problems. The discussions in this study, though solidly based on empirical evidence, also reflect my informants' hopes and fears about the prospects and problems of the country.

Political stresses, such as those arising from the secessionist movement in Bougainville, the persistence of group warfare in the five Highlands provinces, and the escalation of urban crime and violence in Port Moresby, Lae and other metropolitan centres, are of course quite well known through extensive media coverage, both locally and internationally. But international observers in Australia, North America and Europe hear little about the enduring trials and tribulations of the liberal democratic process in the modern nation-state of Papua New Guinea. My overall case study shows that state formation is a difficult process, with political pitfalls which must be overcome by Third World leaders and peoples in attempting to construct national identities from politically, culturally and linguistically fragmented societies. It also shows that, despite the best intentions of national leaders, the nation-building process in PNG has been constrained in a number of ways by Melanesian cultural values and indigenous political practices, quite apart from the well known problems of limited resources, poor management, the pillage of state resources and limited capacity for policy planning and implementation, which are collectively all problems of governance.3

State-Society Relations

Case studies on 'traditional' arenas of competition and cooperation such as warfare and the payment of compensation demonstrate the resiliency of indigenous Hagen political institutions, whilst at the same time emphasising the weakness of state capabilities. On the one hand, the incorporation of new resources — such as cash, cattle, beer, motor vehicles and guns — into local arenas of competition does indicate cultural innovation, which is simultaneously a

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3. The relative strength and resiliency of Melanesian kastom and the relative weakness of the post-independence state has already been explored in Chapter Six. It will suffice here to say that many of the problems currently faced by PNG are in fact manifestations of a weak state, driven by competing legitimacies and conflicting loyalties. Other studies have reached similar conclusions (see, for example, Standish 1992, 1994 and 1996; Dinnen 1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b and 1998; Regan 1997d; and May 1998). See also Kabutaulaka (1998) for comparable discussion of the importance of kin-group, regionalism, and the wantok system in state politics in the Solomon Islands. Larmour ([ed.] 1995 and [ed.] 1998) provide useful discussions on issues of 'governance' and 'good government' in the South Pacific generally.
Conclusions: Incorporation of the State

dimension of incorporation into the global economy. On the other hand, however, the use of Hagen ideologies in justifying dubious political action at national and provincial levels suggests that Hagen values dominate state values. In analysing such processes, a number of factors have been identified as pertinent: the state as an entity with alien values; the resiliency of indigenous institutions; competing legitimacies and competition for the allegiance of individuals; powerful parochial loyalties and nepotistic patronage (as manifest in the Melanesian cultural practice called the wantok system); and the weakness of the state and the relative strength of local society. The latter has been a major focus of discussion in Chapter Six, so I shall deal with the other issues here.

The State as an Alien Entity and the Resiliency of Indigenous Institutions

An obvious conclusion to be derived from analysis of the Hagen case studies is the resilience of indigenous political institutions and the use of Melanesian cultural practices and values in modern arenas of competition and cooperation. Also apparent is the alien nature of the state. But since imposition of the state and the subsequent incorporation of Hagen and other small-scale Highlands societies into the global economy starting sixty-five years ago, the people have neither explicitly rejected nor fully accepted the state's claims of monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, sovereignty over territory, and authority to enforce its laws. Rather, they have contested with the state for the allegiances of individual citizens, and, at times, have subverted the state when it suits them. The decisions people make in dealing with the state are largely motivated by self-interest and group interest, rather than fear, respect, or a sense of loyalty and attachment to the state. Whilst the state is recognised as an important source of resources, it is rarely now seen as an entity for which an individual's rights or group rights should be limited in return for security, a situation which may only be possible in a remote future when, as Peter Lawrence has speculated, the average individual has completed his "metamorphosis from kinsman to citizen-isolate" (1969:37). For the present time, however, this seems highly unlikely because a closer scrutiny of state activities in PNG will reveal that the state, through its clumsy and retributive reaction to crime and violence, has in effect consistently waged war against its own citizens (see Chapter Five; see also Mapusia 1986; Mangi 1992; Standish 1992, 1994 and 1996; Dinnen 1996b and 1998). The Hagen case study suggests that individuals have in fact gone back into the relative safety of their tribal cocoons rather than metamorphosing into citizen-isolates. Selective engagement with, and withdrawal from, the state thus emphasise the contradiction between the state as an alien entity and its subsequent incorporation into the Hagen megacycle.
Conclusions: Incorporation of the State

Parochial Loyalities

The case studies on elections show that parochial loyalties override national sentiments, and that official responsibilities of state officials are often neglected. Politicians, for instance, occupy ambiguous and interstitial roles between local and national politics; their situation is very much a case of playing conflicting roles in which their loyalty is pulled in opposite directions by the state and by their local groups. Since politicians are local creatures as much as national leaders, where do we draw the line between social obligation and bribery when it comes to cash handouts? The use of cash, as indicated in Chapter Six, is a major factor in elections, but it must be used cleverly because handouts do not automatically open eyes or win votes. Cash must be given in the context of historical relations and personal networks. In other words, cash given within the 'moral community' of a candidate can be justified as honouring social obligations, while cash given outside such a boundary can be construed as bribery, just as crime and violence committed against people from outside a certain group (subclan, clan, or tribe) is acceptable (even praised) while similar offences committed against the members of one's close groups are not acceptable (see Yamka Kor's case in Chapter Five). The Hagen ideology of group solidarity and particularly the 'us-versus-them' principle has been used to justify theft, especially armed robbery against businessmen, and the misappropriation of public funds by politicians.

The Hagen Megacycle

The PNG state, like its colonial predecessor, is unquestionably weak in terms of institutional capabilities. Its claims of legitimate authority to regulate society are broad in scope but severely limited by a distinct lack of capacity for policy planning and implementation and by a political culture largely based on nepotistic patronage. Like a wide blanket of morning mist over Highlands peaks and valleys, the state's claim of jurisdiction spreads over the land and society, yet its presence makes little or no difference to those beneath and within it. There is a kind of institutional vacuum in which the Hagen mode of politics takes shape. The Hagen megacycle, comprising a chain of positive and negative exchange cycles, is a local institution which can be interpreted as almost a pre-emptive response to the state's impotence in restoring public order.

In the expanded Hagen field of competition, a number of processes are at work. The first is the actual merging of spheres, where one event (a reparation payment) follows another (warfare) and
is timed to finally culminate in elections which are a test of group strengths. On the one hand, local events are built around elections, while, on the other hand, elections have been incorporated into the local megacycle of competition. Secondly, what appears to be an example of integration into the modern PNG state system is in fact a process of ‘tribalization’, where new indigenous power blocs are continually created as a result of the incorporation of the Mount Hagen people into a centralised national state (see A.J. Strathern 1992). A third process at work is the physical widening of the sphere of competition, where ‘traditional’ fields of competition have been expanded to link into other fields, beyond electoral boundaries. In this thesis an expanded field of political competition, involving a network of confederacy-type alliances, linking three electorates — Dei, Mul and Hagen — has been described in the context of large-scale alliance warfare (see Chapter Five). My case studies on elections indicate that, ultimately, the state itself — the national government and its resources including business resources — enters this expanded field of competition, yet it is important to realise that it does so through a process of selective engagement on the part of the people rather than effective penetration by agents of the state.

Discussion

The Hagen that I know is full of paradoxes, where the distinction between ideology and sociological facts can be difficult to separate. On the one hand, Hagen is a classic case of a small-scale, historically stateless society caught in the seductive and powerful grip of externally controlled forces, while on the other hand, the innovative manner in which Hageners have included the state as one of the prizes in their political competition suggests that the Hagen case may provide us the analytical tools with which to understand some of the complex processes currently at work in other Third World societies.

Despite considerable acculturation and western-style education, the dominant trend is still the Hagen mode of politics, where components of the state and its events have been fitted into the local megacycle. Yet, paradoxically, significant factors like the timing of elections, world commodity prices, acculturation, education, parliamentary motions of no-confidence, and vital economic resources (and their value) are all controlled by external forces. Are Hageners losing control of the new megacycle they have constructed? If so, will the powerful external forces prevail and thus transform and possibly marginalise Hagen society completely? Or will Hageners find ways to co-exist with them — win or lose? In the context of such short- and long-term
dichotomies, will the Hagen mode of politics last? If politics in PNG turns into something akin to collapsed state politics, with the only rule by state warriors such as army brigands and police gangs, then what role would remain for Hagen politics, or in fact local politics everywhere in PNG? Or will there be rule by millionaire businessmen (who can ignore the welfare of the state and the ‘name’ of the tribe)? These and other similar questions are considered below.

Whilst there is no doubt that Hageners have successfully incorporated the state into their own political competition, such incorporation itself may contain the seeds of its own destruction: the bigger the megacycle, the more likely the chance of it collapsing as it becomes increasingly difficult to manage — as occurred when the old shell money economy was superseded by cash in the 1960s. Clearly the dynamics of capitalist accumulation are a disincentive for the conduct of traditional Hagen institutions such as the *moha* exchange system. Furthermore, Hageners may choose different paths — such as the university or the military — to gain control of components of the state rather than merely incorporating bits of it into their local megacycle. These processes have much wider implications. Is this already a case of successful adaptation or one system triumphant over another? It is still only a single generation since political independence. In the longer term, are we observing the strengthening or the destruction of Hagen society and the *moka* system as we know it in Hagen? Those who are familiar with the great Highlands pig ceremonies would know that pigs put up one hell of a fight before succumbing to death. Is the analogy of the spasms of a dying pig appropriate here? Forecasting the future is problematic, but those who care about their country do ask: *Mipela strong yet long go bet, o pasin nogut bilong mipela bai bakarapim yumi olgeta?* (Will we prosper as a nation or will we be destroyed by our own excesses?). Apparently there are no straightforward answers to such questions, but they are worth raising here and it is useful to discuss some of them in light of the cases presented here as well as in the context of more recent crises involving issues of probity at the highest levels of national politics in PNG.

The strengths of small-scale societies, such as Hagen, Enga and Simbu, lie in their tremendous capacity to absorb, adapt and influence change, through innovative mechanisms such as the Hagen megacycle. Considering that such societies exhibit a considerable degree of internal fragmentation, it is perhaps amazing that in Hagen a megacycle requiring an exceptionally high level of political integration has been achieved. The conflicting political goals and interests of local and national leaders, taking into account the rivalries between local groups, mean that such a level of integration would be difficult — but not impossible — to replicate at either the
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provincial or national level. Here lies the major weakness of the megacycle: it revolves around the activities of a small group of prominent individuals, mainly politicians and local leaders engaged in patron-client relations. The political ambitions of aspiring leaders and power struggles between factional leaders often undermine the stability of groups and coalitions within the megacycle. The fragility of the megacycle is reflected in the complaints made by local leaders against politicians for exploiting the megacycle for votes without honouring their obligations (see Chapter Eight). In addition to the shifting allegiances of voter blocs led by disgruntled local leaders, there is a virtual certainty that truly floating voters in elections, like mercenaries in warfare, will disregard corporate policy to sell their votes to the highest bidder. Because such action is considered a betrayal of group loyalty, defectors are consistently punished, so far. Destruction and deaths resulting from such retributive actions will be a crucial test for the megacycle, as they could erupt in a payback cycle, which could even break down into unstructured conflict.

A further weakness is that the megacycle is strongly constrained by electoral, geographical and cultural boundaries. The megacycle is effective only within a specifically defined local political field, such as the Dei Council field described earlier. The chances of a megacycle being extended beyond electoral boundaries are limited. Whilst individual cycles of *moka* exchange, military alliances and business networks can cross-cut electorate and local government council boundaries, a megacycle such as the one described here cannot be consistently linked up across many or even several electorates or provinces.

**Implications for PNG and the Third World**

The trends and patterns of political competition in Hagen indicate that the political and economic transformations promised by political development and modernisation theorists have been proven highly unrealistic. The Hagen case studies also expose unrealistic assumptions by state agents about state power and authority. The colonial state, for instance, exaggerated the range of its control outside the major urban centres and neglected or ignored the extent to which local groups, factions, and coalitions could act to protect their interests, at all levels — local, provincial and national. As a result of this historical legacy, the post-colonial state commands, yet fails to cultivate, obedience and loyalty among its citizens. Clumsy efforts by the police force in attempting to restore order through retributive action has often antagonised citizens, thereby turning them against the state rather than winning them over.
Despite the superimposition of a centralised state structure on PNG societies, the kind of cohesion still found at the very local level has not been replicated at the national level. Thus, two decades after political independence, the contemporary nation-state of Papua New Guinea still remains at a very rudimentary level of integration and its leaders face great difficulties in dealing with mounting problems of public order. An escalating level of violence during elections, the resurgence of tribal warfare in the PNG Highlands region, coupled with increasingly violent crime in urban centres, indicate that the PNG state, as Standish (1994) says, exists in the midst of a turbulent society. These are clearly manifestations of an ongoing and momentous struggle between the colonially-imposed state and indigenous political units — with both sides ultimately competing for the allegiances of individuals.

At the core of this struggle is Weber's ideal type model of the state's legal-rational authority and the state's claim as the ultimate regulator of the legitimate use of force within its territory (Weber 1964 [1947]:156; see also Hague, Harrop and Breslin 1992:6; Dahl 1976:10). By implication, this particular claim of a monopoly over the legitimate use of force has been consistently contested by PNG Highlanders in the arena of tribal warfare, where all signs indicate that the PNG state, despite its impressive raw power (the army and police), is losing the struggle for control. If the state, as suggested by some observers (see, for example, Burton 1989b, 1990a, 1990b), has not paid enough attention to warfare, then that may well be because its leaders see no real point in continuing an engagement in which the only outcome will be defeat for the state. At times in central government circles it was thought in the early 1970s that for as long as the tribal warfare issue was tucked away in isolated pockets of the Highlands, there would be no real danger to the state's proclaimed legitimacy (Bill Standish, personal communication, 1996). However, with the opening up of the Highlands region, through agricultural development and more recent major gold and oil projects, the region is no longer isolated from the rest of the world and provides crucial revenue for the state. If, however, the dent made by persistent Highlands tribal warfare in the armour of state authority has been minimal so far, then the magnitude of the Bougainville secessionist problem, with economic and fiscal costs and loss of life, and the amount and level of negative media coverage it attracts, most certainly does rank as a major blow to the state's legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. The Highlands conflicts have huge destructive potential, yet, as described for Hagen, the people have found ways to limit their escalation and make peace — notwithstanding the widespread introduction of guns — usually without direct state help.
Despite the apparent weakness of the state, the country of PNG has shown a remarkable capacity for surviving crises. The evidence presented in this study and in other similar studies suggests that the PNG state has failed to assert its authority in key areas of public order and safety, including urban crime and violence, in tribal conflicts, election-related violence, and of course the Bougainville rebellion (see, for example, Clifford, Morauta and Stuart 1984; Harris 1988; Gordon and Meggitt 1985; May and Spriggs ed. 1990; Standish 1992 and 1994; Dinnen 1996b; Dinnen, May and Regan ed. 1997). The March 1997 Sandline controversy, which arose when the Chan government hired mercenaries to kill rebels (and probably civilians) on Bougainville, clearly indicated the desperation of a state with flawed decision-making capacity and limited military capability. Street demonstrations supporting the military (which opposed the mercenary contract) and massed protests at Parliament showed popular hostility to government (O'Callaghan 1997a; see also Dinnen, May and Regan eds 1997; Martin 1997; Standish 1997). At a different level, in November 1997 televised videos exposed some of our most powerful leaders drunk, boasting of violence by and allegations of corruption against Prime Minister Bill Skate and Police Minister Thomas Pelika (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 28 November 1997; see also O'Callaghan 1997b; Skehan 1997a; 1997b). These are contrasting examples from a range of political crises that PNG is now facing. They appear to result from limited political capacity and state weakness, the rural origins of which have been demonstrated in this thesis.

Reacting to crises, rather than preventing them through coordinated pro-active policy implementation, is a common practice in Port Moresby (see Regan 1997), but the normal demand and response procedure in politics can be a painfully slow process. Hegarty (1989) has flagged some useful concepts to describe PNG's situation. At times Charles Lindblom's (1959) notion of 'muddling through' crises, with a definite tendency toward the 'slow fix', or even 'no fix' rather than the 'quick fix', is appropriate. Hegarty also mentions Myrdal's (1968) idea of a 'soft state' and Tinker's (1965) concept of a 'broken-backed' state. The lack of capacity for policy implementation and difficulties involved in enforcing laws and the general maintenance of public order are clear manifestations of a 'soft state', and an increase in corruption correspondingly matched by declining standards of probity among high-placed politicians and officials are both instances and causes of the lack of political legitimacy and societal integration found in a 'weak state'.

Tinker's concept of the 'broken-backed' state, as argued by Standish (1994:61), is applicable where the state cannot exert its authority throughout the country and the application of law is
uneven. The case studies given here clearly demonstrate the state's lack of control. Furthermore, there is a widely held view in rural areas like Hagen that officials in the capital have little regard for people in rural areas. This is largely based on the somewhat misguided view that Port Moresby is a separate world, far removed from the rest of the country and its problems. The over-inflated bureaucracy, for instance, is almost like a big jungle in itself, where constituent departments and divisions often do not know what the others are doing and consequently end up replicating tasks and responsibilities, thereby wasting scarce resources. That government officials in Port Moresby in early 1998 were still politicking over food-aid intended for drought-stricken areas, while many people in rural villages were suffering starvation, is indicative of not only an isolated, insensitive, divided and obstinate government but also an indication of a state with limited capabilities.

It is precisely this kind of government incompetence that has had a major influence on Highlands people's decisions regarding engagement and disengagement with the state. It has in fact led rural people to see the post-colonial state as largely irrelevant to their lives, choosing to engage with the state only when opportunities for personal gain are most clearly pronounced, for instance at election times. Tinker's 'broken-backed' model resonates again here. Despite considerable violence and disorder, diminishing legitimacy of the state and frequent breakdown of the national machinery, society need not disintegrate into a state of anarchy according to Tinker (1965:117). Life, as he says, will continue (as usual) in the rural areas, which I suggest is perhaps because of the 'strength' and resilience of indigenous societies. Tinker attributes this continuity to the 'loose' (or generalised) nature of non-western societies (1965:118), which appears similar to Migdal's notion of the strong society, one which has strength because of its autonomy.

Yet, in spite of all the evidence of weak state capabilities, or 'softness', in terms of the difficulties involved in delivering services or enforcing law and order, and in spite of all doomsday or apocalyptic predictions, the PNG state is far from collapsing. State collapse, as evident in parts of Africa, the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, is a much more serious problem than political disintegration, or even a combination of any of the conditions described above. It is in fact a more narrowly defined political phenomenon with serious social and economic implications. As recently argued by William Zartman, "state collapse is a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup, or riot. It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or
Conclusions: Incorporation of the State

Collapse means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed, as analysed in various theories of the state. As the decision-making centre of government, the state is paralysed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced. As a symbol of identity, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social action. As a territory, it is no longer assured security and provisionment by a central sovereign organisation. As the authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs. As a system of socioeconomic organisation, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed; it no longer receives supports from nor exercises controls over its people, and it no longer is even the target of demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing supplies. No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the right to rule (Zartman 1995a:5).

An emphatic “no” would be the answer if we were to ask whether the Papua New Guinea nation-state is in a condition of collapse. Even in rural areas like Hagen, where the state is weak and often absent, it has not collapsed and the strengths, as I have defined them, of local society everywhere as a kind of state substitute. Despite the stresses, the syndrome Zartman describes has so far not occurred in PNG. Despite its weakness in PNG, there is a state that functions, in an uneven fashion. Yet there are signs suggesting that we could possibly be starting to go down the same well-worn path which many African countries took before reaching their present predicament. A major characteristic shared by PNG and African countries (under their old regimes) is the primacy of what has been called the 'political kingdom', a situation where the economy is not treated as a separate sphere where people can wheel, deal, and enrich themselves even if they have no control over the levers of political power (see Ottaway 1995:243). The economy becomes so politicised and subject to political patronage that, as Ottaway says, there is little to be fought over except political power (ibid). Also relevant here is Zartman's (1995a:6) assertion that politics and economics are localised; and the centre becomes peripheral to the workings of society. The evidence from the Hagen case studies suggest that such a situation may already have taken root in Hagen and other parts of the country. The actions of nationally prominent Hagen leaders such as Paias Wingti, Paul Pora and Michael Mel are fundamentally dictated by local agendas and interests rather than national policies and issues.

Although the PNG state is still functioning, it is on trial in all parts of the nation and there are warning signs of impending disaster. In the concluding section we shall discuss such warning signs by looking at other Third World nations, and whether there are parallels with Papua New Guinea. How do we know that states are in danger of collapsing? As pointed out by Ng'ethe (1995:261), one of the most important signals of collapse is the failure of the state to pay salaries
Conclusions: Incorporation of the State

At times, recent Papua New Guinea governments have had difficulty finding funds to pay their servants, but have so far avoided systemic collapse.

Conclusion

The Papua New Guinea nation-state, like many other Third World countries, can be seen as part of a flotilla embarking on a journey into uncharted waters. Some of the craft may turn out to be unstable canoes, others may be dangerously overloaded, and a few may seem unseaworthy, but all of them are taking this trip. Notwithstanding workmanship and weather, the survival of each craft will depend crucially on the capabilities of the crew and the captain, especially their skills in making running repairs and undertaking ships reconstruction. Those with myopic captains however will be among the first ones to sink.

Among Third World countries there is considerable variation in terms of their economic resource bases, political practices, cultural values, demographic composition, and potential for development (see Chazan et al. 1988). Yet, all of them are in our metaphorical flotilla because of their shared history of colonialism. As Chazan et al. (1988) reported for African countries, most, if not all, Third World countries inherited at independence a number of shared historical constraints, including "the burden of economic weakness" (p.25), "a history of external dependence" (p.25); "a small, Western-educated elite, quite distinct from the bulk of the population" (p.26), "fragile state institutions" (p.26), and an "absence of a constructive political culture" (p.27). PNG matches these descriptions. Completing the journey for these ex-colonial countries depends on a shared sense of purpose in constructing statehood and a common desire for economic prosperity and social well-being. However, whether such goals can be achieved is debatable. At this stage of development or progression whether Third World peoples can ever qualify for First World or other industrialised status is, again, debatable. Considering that First World countries, for example, do not stop and wait for Third World countries to catch up and are happy to continue neglecting and/or exploiting them, it seems ludicrous to think that it is possible for many Third World countries to progress in the foreseeable future to the level of development now experienced by Western countries. The Second (socialist) World role model seems to have vanished in confusion in the last decade. Will social scientists invent new models to cover options such as the Asian (paper-money) Tigers or the authoritarian developmental regime of Latin America? Such unknowns can be seen as uncharted waters.
Leadership in politics and administration remains a significant factor in each Third World country's direction of development. Competent, far-sighted, enlightened and selfless leaders are assets while incompetent, myopic and selfish ones are liabilities to their countries. The experiences of some countries in Africa, for instance, show that political leadership — whatever styles (and modes of operation) there may be: charismatic, patriarchal, autocratic, populist, or tyrannical — is a key variable in effective state formation and also in state collapse (see, for example, Zartman ed. 1995).

Clearly, there are lessons here for PNG as well as other Third World countries. Surely, PNG is much wealthier in terms of mineral deposits and other resources than many African countries, and we have been so far lucky in not having tyrannical monsters as leaders; but we must always remember that African countries, such as Kenya, were once rich, too, with coffee and other agricultural commodities. Others have fish and are rich in minerals such as copper and gold, and even diamonds and uranium. Their situation and strength comes down to the question of management, accountability for and equitable distribution of scarce state resources. As recently noted by Ottaway (1995:235), the collapse, or threatened collapse, of many African states at the present time has its ultimate cause in the mismanagement and pillage of resources, and in abuses by authoritarian regimes that leave the majority of the population without a stake in the existing system. In addition to mismanagement, corruption, and mediocre leadership, PNG shares with Africa other characteristics. As pointed out for Africa by Ng'ethe (1995), social scientists of the early 1970s modernisation school warned that successful state formation would confront numerous crises:

These were (1) the crisis of identity, through which people learn to identify themselves as citizens of the nation-state rather than as members of a particular ethnic subgroup; (2) the crisis of legitimacy or the development of the sense, on the part of the governed, that the government in power has the right to rule; (3) the crises of penetration or the development of the state's capacity to enforce all decisions within its territorial jurisdiction; (4) the crises of participation, or the provision of means and opportunities for the citizens to influence state decisions; and (5) the crises of distribution, or the evolution of the will and the means to solve at least the most glaring aspects of social, political, and, especially, economic inequalities (1995:254-255).

The evidence presented in this case study — of parochial loyalties overriding national sentiments, of nepotistic patronage, of serious challenges to the writ of centralised authority, and of the significance of primordial factors (or localised support) in elections — shows that the PNG state is currently experiencing these crises in Hagen, and, I would argue, across the country of Papua New Guinea. Firstly, the PNG state has yet to overcome the crises of identity, as most
Papua New Guineans still actively maintain a mind-set of primary attachment to kin-group, language, and cultural identities which they hold to be emotionally and materially more significant than the ones sponsored by the state. This is compounded by the fact that the primary kin-group, unlike the state, offers the individual a stronger sense of security and purpose than any other political attachment. Unlike in industrialised countries, where individuals depend mostly on the state for personal security, social welfare and the provision of economic opportunities, in predominantly kinship-based societies like Papua New Guinea, individuals regularly identify with, and naturally owe their first loyalty to, the entity which can perform these functions. This is especially true in rural areas where people's livelihood is entirely based on the land and relations with local groups. The state promises but rarely delivers in these areas. In contrast, the kin-group is most effective in fulfilling absolutely fundamental requirements.

Secondly, the crisis of legitimacy stems from the first condition, which is the issue of the primary identity. As pointed out by A.J. Strathern (1993b), we cannot expect an automatic acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the state from people who depend on their kinsmen, wantoks, and friends for their livelihood. At the very least, it is perplexing for people dependent on these types of social relations to comply with rules made by a state which, in their view, is irrelevant to their needs. Whether or not the government in power has some internationally ordained right to rule is of little consequence to those who feel that their basic needs are not met by state officials sheltered and pampered by a faceless power structure based in the capital, Port Moresby.

Thirdly, the crisis of penetration stems from the state's inability to enforce its laws evenly throughout the country. As a self-proclaimed guarantor of internal security for its citizens, the state has failed miserably. It has neither the capacity nor the resources to maintain public order, and has very limited capabilities in policy implementation. Its major law enforcement agencies — notably the police force and the courts — are overwhelmed by the escalating rate of crime and violence. As also noted by Standish (1994), this is compounded by the fact that the police in particular suffer from inadequate training, poor salaries, and poor discipline.

Fourthly, the crisis of participation partly derives from political parties' inability to develop

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4. For comparable discussions, see Standish (1994); Dinnen (1994, 1996b); See also Clark 1997 for an impressionist approach to the analysis of identities in PNG (from a Wini and Tari perspective); Kabutaulaka (1998:132) for parochial loyalties in Solomon Islands; and especially Ikech (1975) for an excellent discussion on conflicting identities, loyalties and moral realms from an African perspective.
followings at the local level and to be accountable to their supporters. A further contributing factor is the rudimentary nature of civil society in Papua New Guinea. Apart from isolated episodes such as the active role of the churches and NGOs in the recent Sandline crises which led to the rejection of the use of mercenaries on Bougainville, the kind of “developed civil society” considered by social scientists as “essential for a functioning and viable democracy and for good and efficient governance” (Standish 1997c:78), such as is found in the advanced liberal democracies of the West, is virtually non-existent, or is at a rudimentary level of development, in Papua New Guinea. Both conditions can be attributed to the fact that approximately 85 percent of the country’s four million citizens are rural-based, predominantly illiterate, and have little access to mass media and communication services. As recently pointed out to me by Dei MP, Puri Ruing, “our people are far too ignorant about government policies and role played by their elected representatives” (personal communication, January 1998). Hence, their inability to influence state decisions. Recent events, however, suggest that even if they tried there is no guarantee that the outcome would be necessarily in their favour. The 1997 elections were a case in point. Many voters believed that they had successfully voted out the ruling coalition, and indeed half the seating MPs were defeated, but what they got was a government in which many of the same people were back in power (either as part of the current government or as behind the scenes power-brokers).

Fifthly, the crisis of distribution. In terms of natural resources, PNG is wealthy by international standards. It has, for instance, some of the largest gold and copper deposits in the world, in addition to large oil and gas reserves. Distribution, or, more precisely, equitable distribution, however, has been a big problem. Some of our leaders and their expatriate cronies have become very wealthy, while the vast majority of our people still live under *kunai* grass and *sago* leaf thatched houses in villages and hamlets, without clean water supplies, electricity, schools, or medical services — the basic essential services that most people in Port Moresby and elsewhere in the developed world take for granted. Clearly, the political will and means to solve at least the most glaring social, political, and, especially, economic disparities have yet to developed in PNG.

Overall, as Ng’ethe (1995:256) says, the crises of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution — and the overall failure of economic development — all have something to do with the collapse of the state in Africa, and all are conceptually linked to leadership and governance. Many Third World countries in Africa and Latin America, despite the influence of Christian moral values and considerable wealth in natural resources, have almost completely
been destroyed by their leaders through mismanagement and systematic looting.

What does all this mean for PNG? Things are certainly not yet falling completely apart. But the country's political problems are accumulating and taken together may be far more serious than they currently appear to us. The crises experienced by the country can be explained in terms of a modified version of Zartman's (1995) car crash analogy. In the Highlands of Papua New Guinea a most common practice during the 1970s coffee boom was the competitive purchase of motor vehicles. As a reward for contributors, respective Hagen clans regularly organised trips to Goroka and Lae. Often these vehicles were overloaded with men, women and children. Large quantities of alcohol were often consumed during these journeys. Inexperienced drivers, rough roads, fatigue and intoxication almost inevitably resulted in many accidents. Sometimes when a vehicle goes off the road on a steep hillside like Daulo Pass it collides with rocks and trees, then the driver may appear to regain control till the next little cliff and the car may appear to right itself again. Apart from dents and scratches, the vehicle may still function and may be driven off, but every time such an accident happens, the vehicles systems are breaking down and eventually the vehicle cumulatively reaches a stage where recovery is impossible and it can go nowhere. This car is in a collapsed state. So far the PNG state has largely recovered from its upheavals.

In closing I should mention that this study has been about political competition, covering various local arenas, fields and sub-fields of competition which impinge on the country as a whole. Groups and individuals in human societies everywhere compete for things which people hold dear to their hearts. In this respect, Hageners are no different from Papuans, Africans, or Australians. Perhaps what is most striking about Hageners is their conviction that their ‘name must not go down’. There are different ways in which the ‘name’ can go down, depending I suppose on whose or which name we are thinking of: the tribe, Hagen, the Highlands, or Papua New Guinea itself. So that fundamental conviction remains an important issue. In seeking to support their own name, Hagen groups, and other strong groups elsewhere in the country, have to be aware of the danger that their efforts could help bring down the ‘name’ of the whole country. They may be strong, at one level, but, as the Tok Pisin song of a self-proclaimed Hagener, Nadia Dubrowski, says, **Yumi mas noken spak na longlong olem ol Highway driver, nogut bai yumi ogeta bakrap long rot!** (‘We must not behave like drunken Highway drivers because we can easily end up destroying ourselves [and our country]’).
APPENDICES
Appendix I

SEGMENTARY STRUCTURES OF SOME DEI TRIBES
Figure 1.1: Tepuka Segmentary Structure
Figure 1.2: Kawelka Segmentary Structure

KAWELEKA

Kundmbo

Roklambo

Kumapei

Kurupmbo

Mandembo

Klambo

Pumembo

Oyambo

Membo

Keiyambo

TRIBE

MAJOR SECTION

CLAN (EXOGAMOUS)

SUB-CLAN
Figure 1.3: Kombukla Segmentary Structure

KOMBUKLA

- Wakimakae
- Kaimengke
- Mando
  - Aundpei
  - Pukainembo
  - Mandong (Mandou)
  - Kumane
Figure 1.4: Minembi Segmentary Structure

MINEMBI

<table>
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</tr>
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<td>Napakae</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ruprupkae</td>
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Appendix II

POPULATION DATA OF SOME DEI TRIBES
### Table 2.1: Tepuka population data

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>Clan Section</th>
<th>1979°</th>
<th>1990°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>Ambuga</td>
<td>Kelimbo-Wamebe</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>933</td>
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<td>016</td>
<td>Kina 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>017</td>
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<td>Kintke</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>033</td>
<td>Nunga 2</td>
<td>Kinti-Oklembo</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>661</td>
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<tr>
<td>037</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Likembo-Wanyembo</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>713</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,575</td>
<td>3,351</td>
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</table>

**Source and notes:**

a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b. Data from 1990 Census (NSO 1993).
c. Suspected underenumeration in 1990 Census; total Tepuka population is believed to be at least 4,000 persons.

### Table 2.2: Kawelka population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
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<th>1990°</th>
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<td>002</td>
<td>Buk (Mbukl) 1</td>
<td>Mandembo</td>
<td>994</td>
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<td>Buk (Mbukl) 2</td>
<td>Membo</td>
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<td>992</td>
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<td>045</td>
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<td>Kundmbo</td>
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<td>050</td>
<td>Kuk-Bagla</td>
<td>Membo</td>
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<td></td>
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**Source and notes:**

a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b. Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
c. Including some Tepuka, Poika-Ayka (ex-Nebilye) and Enga migrants at Kuk.

### Table 2.3: Kombukla population data

<table>
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</thead>
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<td>010</td>
<td>Kenembo 3</td>
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<td>011</td>
<td>Kenembo 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>044</td>
<td>Bitam</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>2,939</td>
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</table>

**Source and notes:**

a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
b. Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
c. Rural Non-Village Census Units, such as Bitam Plantation (CU 502), Kerenga Vocational School (CU 506) and Kenembo Station (CU 519), with a total population of 358, were not included here (which would otherwise bring the overall total to 3,407 persons).
### Table 2.4: Minembi population data

<table>
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<th>CU Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>013</td>
<td>Keta</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>921</td>
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<td>018</td>
<td>Komapana 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>991</td>
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<td>Koraldung</td>
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<td>029</td>
<td>Mogal</td>
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<td>035</td>
<td>Palgi</td>
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<tr>
<td>039</td>
<td>Tigil 1</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>630</td>
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<tr>
<td>040</td>
<td>Tigil 2</td>
<td>520</td>
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<td>Yatem</td>
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<td>047</td>
<td>Kenembo</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,596</td>
<td>4,609'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source and notes:
- a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
- c. Suspected underenumeration in 1990; total Minembi population is believed to be at least 5,000 and approaching the 7,000 mark in 1997.

### Table 2.5: Welyi population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>007</td>
<td>Keia</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>021</td>
<td>Koma 1</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>022</td>
<td>Koma 2</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>046</td>
<td>Kenamb/Keiya</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>049</td>
<td>Kerkana</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>051</td>
<td>Kurunga</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>058</td>
<td>Rulna/Plage</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>061</td>
<td>Tsepump</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>3,109'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source and notes:
- a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
- c. Rural Non-Village Census Units, such as Koma Station (CU 509, pop. 117), Tremami (CU 515, pop. 247), Mamagol Plantation (CU 521, pop. 303), and Penga Station (CU 522, pop. 238), which have a total population of 897 persons, were not included here because of a predominantly migrant population (originally from other provinces). If, however, we were to consider them as part of the Welyi (as is often the case at election time when they vote with their hosts), the overall Welyi total would come to 5,006 persons.
### Table 2.6: Kentpi population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>1979*</th>
<th>1990b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>014</td>
<td>Kinjibi</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>015</td>
<td>Kinjibi 1</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>024</td>
<td>Mala 1</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>1,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>025</td>
<td>Mala 2</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>026</td>
<td>Mala 3c</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>3744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>055</td>
<td>Romanga</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>056</td>
<td>Rombanga</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>1,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,554</td>
<td>5,532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source and notes:**

a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).

b. Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).

c. A total population of 514 Kumungaka have been included here with the Kentpi in 1979 and 374 in 1990.

d. Underenumeration suspected here; total Kumungaka population is believed to be at least 1,000 persons.

e. This figure includes the small Prandike, Gulke and Punti groups which share territory with, and have almost been incorporated into, the Kentpi tribe. It also includes 374 Kumungaka in 1990. The Kinjibi plantation (Rural Non-Village), with a predominantly migrant population of 254 persons, has not been included here (which would otherwise bring the total to 5,786 persons).

### Table 2.7: Kimka-Roklaka population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>1979*</th>
<th>1990c</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>005</td>
<td>Gumants 1</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>006</td>
<td>Gumants 2</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source and notes:**

a. Data from PDS (1982).

b. Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).

c. Underenumeration in 1990 Census; Gumants 2 has been unaccounted for — a population of 781 in 1980 virtually disappeared in 1990.
### Table 2.8: Remdi ('Lower Remdi') population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>1979*</th>
<th>1990*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>030</td>
<td>Muglamp 1</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>031</td>
<td>Muglamp 2</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>988</td>
<td>587*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes and sources:**
- Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
- Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
- Suspected underenumeration in 1990 Census; Muglamp 1 population of 649 in 1979 drastically reduced to only 84 persons in 1990. Rural Non-Village Census Units, such as Gumant Plantation (CU 504, pop. 832) and Muglamp Station (CU 512, pop. 168), which have a total population of 1,000 were not included here because of a predominantly migrant population. If, however, we were to include such population, the total would come to 1,587 persons. Taking into account of underenumeration, a more likely estimate would place the Remdi village population at more than 2,000 persons in 1997.

### Table 2.9: Roklsaka-Waklupka population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>1979*</th>
<th>1990*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>023</td>
<td>Kuringa</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>036</td>
<td>Penda</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes and sources:**
- Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
- Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).

### Table 2.10: Nelka population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>1979*</th>
<th>1990*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>032</td>
<td>Nunga 1</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>057</td>
<td>Ruti</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>770</td>
<td>1,116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes and sources:**
- Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
- Data from 1990 Population Census (NSO 1993).
Table 2.11: Kopi population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>1979°</th>
<th>1990°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>041</td>
<td>Tigi 3</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>042</td>
<td>Tigi 4</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>964</td>
<td>514c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source and notes:
- a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
- c. Population dispersed by the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990); Kopi Kungumbi clan residing at Engki were not counted in 1990 Census. A more realistic Kopi population figure would therefore be around 1,500 persons.

Table 2.12: Klamake population data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>1979°</th>
<th>1990°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>038</td>
<td>Rodilba (Ruina)</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>335c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source and notes:
- a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
- c. Suspected underenumeration in 1990 Census; a more likely figure would be around 1,500 persons.

Table 2.13: Minembi (Kimbo, Elyipi and Engambo clans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CU Number</th>
<th>Census Unit</th>
<th>Clan Section</th>
<th>1979°</th>
<th>1990°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>035</td>
<td>Palgi (Pekli)</td>
<td>Engambo</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>039</td>
<td>Tigi 1</td>
<td>Kimbo</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>040</td>
<td>Tigi 2</td>
<td>Kimbo</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>047</td>
<td>Kenembo</td>
<td>Elyipi</td>
<td>Not counted</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,524</td>
<td>2,031c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source and notes:
- a. Data from PDS (NSO 1982).
- c. Engambo and Elyipi population were dispersed by the Kawelka-Minembi War (1986-1990); total Engambo, Elyipi and Kimbo population is believed to be at least 3,000 persons.
Appendices

Appendix III

SELECTED DEI CLANS AND LEADERS

Key to Symbols:

+++ Outstanding leader ('super-big-man')
++ Major big-man
+ Big-man
++ Aspiring big-man
- Not a big-man
3.1. TEPUKA CLANS AND LEADERS

Nine Tepuka Clans: Kiteipi-Oldembo pair, Jikimbo-Warembo pair, the tiny Eitimbbo group, Keimbo-Waimbe and the Kint-Kengeke pairs (segmentary structure is given elsewhere; see Appendix II: Segmentary Structures; see also Appendix II for population data).

Table 3.1.1: Tepuka Kiteipi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parua Kuri</td>
<td>Former Bosbor, President of Dei Local Government Council, MP for Dei Open 1972-97, and businessman</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Major big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuben Parua</td>
<td>Former MP for Dei Open (1993-1997) and Port Moresby-based businessman</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Former MP for Dei (see Parua Kuri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konge Kundi</td>
<td>Former MP for Dei Open (1993-1997) and Port Moresby-based businessman</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pep Kuri</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukla Kuri</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huahta Lama</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engdi Ok</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uki Ok</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangk Mek</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Papa Ugl</td>
<td>District Coordinator, Hagen North, and former Sports Officer with Provincial Youth Affairs, Western Highlands Province</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Koiya</td>
<td>O.I.C., Kona Health Centre, and church leader</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerowa Rop</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumint Mel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rokpa Nikiint</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaip Nikiint</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wai Diting</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Rumint</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapir Jins</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puklem Numdi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-trou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moti Koldop</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Reikka</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.1.2: Tepuka Oklembo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuma Rukla</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor, Provincial Government Member and a National election candidate (1972)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulii Kont</td>
<td>Aid-post Orderly (APO)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaep Kews</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merowa Dos</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napil Wanke</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muld Rukla</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pen Eik</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kongo Eik</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gou Goi</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuimb Kit</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakupe Mel</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wamp Mara</td>
<td>Church leader</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1.3: Tepuka Jikimbo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Onn—</td>
<td>Former L.G. Councillor</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man &amp; Ex-Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumint Onn</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eink—</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muka Pana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pep Meka</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moen Waema</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuni Paeng</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miti Paeng</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- +</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1.4: Tepuka Wanyembo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukhwang Dos</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wamp Pank</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reiya Tiki</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puri Pena</td>
<td>Church Leader</td>
<td>- +</td>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WusanPena</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- +</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.1.5: Tepuka Eltimbo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goimba Kot</td>
<td>Businessman, former Chairman of Dei Development Corporation, former Lutheran Mission Worker, and a National election candidate (1972 and 1987)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kui Kot</td>
<td>Lawyer, Public Solicitor's Office, Goroka, Eastern Highlands Province</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.1.6: Tepuka Kelmbo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Konga Dickni</td>
<td>Village Court Peace Officer</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulk Mel</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pem Manga</td>
<td>Small businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rung Rumba</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kipa Rumba</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kova Okti</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opum Kol</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fold Wat</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koi Konga</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kont Ruang</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apel Nema</td>
<td>Church Elder</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opa Nori</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moka Kes</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konga Rai</td>
<td>Church leader</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rai Tei</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nine Kas</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mokes Anda</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunnum Mokar</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councilor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pum Kayf</td>
<td>Church leader</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.1.7: Tepuka Waembe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nukunt Kumi</td>
<td>Chairman, Dei Council Peace and Good Order Committee</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wubana Bushui</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pouya Keipa</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kain Gung</td>
<td>Small businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gong Konga</td>
<td>Small businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1.8: Tepuka Kengeke

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yei iimi</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romrui Kop</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rai Rips</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moudi El</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rack Rumba</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tit Rumba</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapi Rumba</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rak Moep</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Monga</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Rumba</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kauti Rai</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kewa Rai</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dami Kokkarui</td>
<td></td>
<td>- +</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolarui Kokkarui</td>
<td></td>
<td>- +</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huldui Lama</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 3.1.9: Tepuka Kintke

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kar KI</td>
<td>Councillor and Former Provincial Government Member</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moti Miti</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalp Mokes</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurwewa Kumi</td>
<td>Aidpost Ordery (APO)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puri</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dami Nikiet</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuie</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Rumba</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengk Onn</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2. KAWELKA CLANS AND LEADERS

Four Kawelka clans: Membo, Kurupmbbo-Klambp pair, and Kujimirbo (see Appendix I for segmentary structure and Appendix II for population data).

Table 3.2.1: Kawelka Membo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kont Klents</td>
<td>Former Committee, Local Government Councillor, Village Court Magistrate, and a Provincial election candidate (1980)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gip Andpi</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yan Kael</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Andpi</td>
<td>A.O.G. Pastor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingal Pora</td>
<td>Lutheran Mission Worker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumner Ropa</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kum Kaoka</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konga Moka</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palim Manga</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Rapa</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakla Ken</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man and former committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodla Ken</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pati Manga</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onom Moka</td>
<td>Lutheran Church leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingal Niknit</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yap Pokl</td>
<td>Former Peace Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tengdui Kram</td>
<td>Lutheran Church Worker and small businessman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ropa Nurum</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yap Goimba</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate, former Chairman of Muglamp Village Court Area, gifted orator</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man and former Tultul and Local Government Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goimba Onombo</td>
<td>Former Tultul and Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palim Moka</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apel Kiri</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kui Apel</td>
<td>Important Fight Leader and Orator</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupdi Goimba</td>
<td>Circuit Councillor, (ELC-PNG)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man and former L.G. Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namba Kunn</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor &amp; ELCOM employee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.2.2: Kawelka Kurumbo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ru Kundil</td>
<td>Author of an autobiography and the main character in a documentary film, <em>Amb Kor</em> (Female Spirit Cult)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kei Akel</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemia Nui</td>
<td>Catholic Church Elder</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nema Kor</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldem Kor</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pim Kuppa</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man and Warrior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nykint</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.2.3: Kawelka Kundmbo

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ruin Kapi</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor and skilful orator</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pik Ruin</td>
<td>Former Deputy Premier, Western Highlands Province, and a National election candidate (1997)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rai Kum</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate and skilful orator</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kael Kont</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baeem Mark</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nal Koopee</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamal Muli</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunni Li</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ex-Tultul &amp; Bosboi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damba Kohlpai</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nylant Damba</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiran</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makla Kund</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimbi Kien</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posa Minimbi</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pup Erkla</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Mala</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paldi</td>
<td></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.2.4: Kawelka Klambo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ongka Kaipa</td>
<td>Former Tultul &amp; L.G. Councillor and very skilful orator</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puklum Pundsik</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komoru Kulikup</td>
<td>Lutheran Church Elder</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yap Rolka</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor, currently Chairman of Mend-Want Pty Ltd, businessman, and skilful orator</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paki Rolga</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penge Gekinba</td>
<td>Port Moresby-based PMV and Taxi Service Operator</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakki Kaip</td>
<td>Village Court Peace Officer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3. KOMBUKLA CLANS AND LEADERS

Seven Kombukla Clans: Kumane, Mandeng, Pukaenimbo, Ayndpei, Rongon, Ka’mangke and Waki’makai (see Appendix I for segmentary structure and Appendix II for population data).

### Table 3.3.1: Kombukla Kumane

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mopa Nykint</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bom Nuke</td>
<td>Former Tultul</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimbi Kein</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krai Malt</td>
<td>Member, Peace &amp; Good Order Committee, and former Tultul</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reiya Mok</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mas</td>
<td>Former MPA and L.G. Councillor</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupal Minimbi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Put Krai</td>
<td>L.G. Councillor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moka Kunstl</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunstl</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reiya Moka</td>
<td>Former Village Court Peace Officer and Magistrate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruk Dat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Minor Big-man and Fight-leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korowa (Espat)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yapi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hupre Dat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3.2: Kombukla Mandeng

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pangk Nui</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangk</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roimb Rui</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kat Pasa</td>
<td>Church Leader</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man, Fight-leader and former Tulul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikkint Pangk</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangsa</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukla Kont</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konr Pelga</td>
<td>Peace Officer</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waelge</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3.3: Kombukla Pukainembo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Konga Owa</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruing Keat</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukhum Kuri</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wauldi Rape</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makia Kont</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruk Kaip</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pantea Kaip</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukhum Ok</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakla Kambci</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Yangke</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namha Kuri</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3.4: Kombukla Aundepei

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mulise Kambal</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roimb Kambal</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keing Tei</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plep Kandal</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pei Mel</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3.5: Kombukla Rondong (Rondou)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melchio Pep</td>
<td>Former MP and businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pati Wamp</td>
<td>Pangu Pati President and businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.3.6: Kombukla Mando (Mandong)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pangk Nukunts</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rot Mel</td>
<td>Foreman, Department of Works</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dot Polnei</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.3.7: Kombukla Kaimangke

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kitana Manga</td>
<td>National Election Candidate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikinti Moni</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin Kuri</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manga Kuti</td>
<td>Former Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.3.8: Kombukla Waldmale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Miti Muka</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kewa Kurul</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mama Waktke</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop Kogo</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papa Wozou</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumint Ruk</td>
<td>Peace Officer</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huwa Noki</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roimb Dott</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kewa Miti</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuri Tami</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Some of these live with the Wainke near the Wahgi River (Kindseng and Ari settlements). The Kombukla are sometimes historically linked with the Wainke of Anglaim-South Wahgi as well as with the North Wahgi group, Komblo, of North Wahgi (see O’Hanlon 1989). However, the Kombukla, now paired with the Minembi, have no special ties with the Komblo, but do have some dealings with the Wainke.
3.4. MINEMBI CLANS AND LEADERS

There are some eleven Minembi clans, but only seven are represented here: Papeke, Engambo, Namibikae, Ropke, Rapake, Minikae and Napikae. Not included here are the four clans — Elyipi, Kimbo, Kormonkae and Rupkitakae — which were dispersed through recent warfare during 1986-1990 (see Appendix I for segmentary structure and Appendix II for population data).

Table 3.4.1: Minembi Papeke

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Kewa</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuk Andpei</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tous Kor</td>
<td>Catholic Mission Worker</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poyua Kor</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabar Tei</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mok Tapi</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamb Nukundi</td>
<td>Former Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiptip Tapi</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olga Makinda</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopa Rangk</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4.2: Minembi Engambo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kapis Mulgae</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pik Tapi</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakla Kum</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamb Tei</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punum Koipa</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiki Rakpa</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruk Tei</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mokel Tupa</td>
<td>Peace Officer</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerze Poua</td>
<td>Small businessman and Lutheran Pastor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kouga Moko</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kur Mato</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### Table 3.4.3: Minembi Namkoe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korou Mel</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor and Vice President (Dei LGC)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raina Yopa</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nenitsa Konits</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahali Kuntil</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doit Mange</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Keplga</td>
<td>Driver (PMV)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konga Pena</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runinta Tapi</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikints Pena</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malinta Dopaia</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dapena Olga</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keroua Pel</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baio Opa</td>
<td>Provincial election candidate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wikai Membi</td>
<td>National election candidate and businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fun Kaip</td>
<td>Major, PNGDF and national election candidate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goimba Tapi</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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### Table 3.4.4: Minembi Ropke

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mark Tei</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walowa Kolm</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weimba Tei</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maika Pan</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongka Kupki</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bier Kainkki</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriell Roimb</td>
<td>Catholic Mission Leader</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Table 3.4.5: Minembi Rapake

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilep Nikints</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kund Aants</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kii Dapae</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape Roi</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gapa Wai</td>
<td>National election candidate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesley Ruk</td>
<td>Provincial Government Member</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nema Wai</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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</table>
Table 3.4.6: Minembi Minkae

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rombek Konga</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasemb Tei</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walaya Koim</td>
<td>Former Committee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wangdui Gouya</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
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Table 3.4.7: Minembi Napakae

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pupdi Welya</td>
<td>Small businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goimba Noki</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konga Galdo</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapa Mapa Wai</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5. WELY LEADERS

Table 3.5: Welyi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wara Koi</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apa Korope</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapi Ken</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaipa Miti</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapom Kipa</td>
<td>Businessman and former Director, Wely-Kuta Business Group</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumin Dei</td>
<td>Former President of Dei Local Government Council</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pok Pim</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eln Num</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rombukl Wara</td>
<td>National election candidate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man and L.G. Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaupal Pop</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurum Kudl</td>
<td>Former Village Court Clerk</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokta Mel</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.6. REMDI LEADERS

#### Table 3.6: Remdi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maip Kei</td>
<td>Former Provincial Government Member and Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raem Kei</td>
<td>Nominal director, Pipilka Development Corporation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pen Kei</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Tau</td>
<td>Captain, PNGDF and businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerry Yar Rombins</td>
<td>Ex-Peace corporal &amp; gifted editor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulkma Kopi</td>
<td>Company Secretary, Pipilka Development Corporation, and businessman</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Pil</td>
<td>Former MP (Madang Open), businessman and rugby league administrator</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man &amp; Ex-Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakupa Pep</td>
<td>Village Court Magistrate and Chairman of Muglamp Village Court Area</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fight Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Tiki</td>
<td>Businessman and Agriculture Bank Employee</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Ruminas</td>
<td>Accountant, Mount Hagen Town Authority</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumint —</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koi —</td>
<td>Former police corporal</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Ranpi</td>
<td>Businessman (Highlands Gold Resources)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moni Orm</td>
<td>Port Moresby-based PMV operator</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Only 'Lower' (or Des Council) Remdi leaders are given here. The most notable 'Upper (Mul Council) Remdi leader would of course be none other than Mek Nukuntz, the former MP for the Mul-Baiyer electorate.*
### 3.7. KUMUNGAKA LEADERS

#### Table 3.7: Kumungaka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reiya Mara</td>
<td>Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Wani</td>
<td>National election candidate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kar Mek</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraka Moka</td>
<td>Former Local Government Councillor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mou Mark</td>
<td>Small businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Kumb</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yana Kokpei</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yap Yona</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mit Mek</td>
<td>Peace Officer</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waka Mek</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noni Wakupa</td>
<td>Church leader</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.8. GULKE LEADERS

#### Table 3.8: Gulke Dapei Kakaparambo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Big-Man</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Father’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tei Kumi</td>
<td>President, Dei Local Government Council</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumint Non</td>
<td>Small businessman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man and former Dei L.G.C. President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaemb Non</td>
<td>Small businessman and Supervisor, Works and Supply Department</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koi Nori</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kubs El</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunti Kerowa</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenan Kupa</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eik Kupa</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudi Kupa</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor Big-man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are at least 85 tribes in the Hagen cultural-linguistic area, comprising some 160,000 Melpa and Temboka speakers. The Dei Council area has the highest number of tribes (28), followed by Nebilyer (21), Anglimp (14), Hagen (13) and Mul (9). Most these are either paired or in close association with one or two others, with whom there is frequent intermarriage and exchange relations and may cooperate in warfare, elections, and in other activities. They may even share territories and have common corporate property. A number of smaller groups, after having been dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, share territories with, and are almost incorporated into, the larger groups from which they sought and were given refuge.

### Tribes of Hagen: by Census Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hagen Central</th>
<th>Dei</th>
<th>Mul</th>
<th>Anglimp</th>
<th>Nebilyer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jika¹</td>
<td>Kombulka-Minembi</td>
<td>Kundi-Rendi³</td>
<td>Kuli-Wanke</td>
<td>Uitka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mokei¹</td>
<td>Kimba-Roldaka</td>
<td>Munjika-Neenga</td>
<td>Roni-Maninge</td>
<td>Kulka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamka-Kinjika</td>
<td>Tepoka-Kawelka</td>
<td>Mile</td>
<td>Kenapok-Mungka</td>
<td>Upoka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsi-Penambi</td>
<td>Kumungak-Keni</td>
<td>Milka-Klaka⁶</td>
<td>Tungar-Menji</td>
<td>Mujika-Lauka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemi-Kukika</td>
<td>Maplik-Palke</td>
<td>Kenapka⁷</td>
<td>Andakelkam</td>
<td>Kopia-Kubuka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kungunka-Palke</td>
<td>Epilkae-Dakapkae</td>
<td>Punti⁷</td>
<td>Onombe</td>
<td>Poika-Palimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruruka-Mimka</td>
<td>Munugka-Purke</td>
<td>Lari</td>
<td>Tes-Dena</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Kum' Kopi²</td>
<td>Kopori-Koppi</td>
<td>Nolpa⁸</td>
<td>Tol-Wanaka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rembi³</td>
<td>Mamalke</td>
<td>Nolpa³-Anarnvl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelka³</td>
<td>Koukla</td>
<td>Kasuka-Midipu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulke⁴</td>
<td>Epola-Alva</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dapi⁴</td>
<td>Lalka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punti⁴</td>
<td>Tikla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prandi⁴</td>
<td>Ope</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opoki</td>
<td>Wini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okmoni</td>
<td>Kiamaka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldupka</td>
<td>Kajoupka³</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndlaka⁵</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|   | 13 | 28 | 9  | 14  | 21  |

Appendices
1. The Hagen central area (Hagen Open electorate) is notable for the dominance of two very large tribes, the Jika and Mokei, with estimated populations in 1997 of around 20,000 and 15,000 respectively. These two are sometimes paired as the most numerous groups in Hagen, but their members have little to do with each other, and the pairing is not as strong as it is for the other pairings in the area.

2. The 'Kum' Kopi in Hagen Central are paired with the Anglimp and Nemblyer resident, Nokpa. Although there are two other Kopi groups, 'Kopon' Kopi in Dei and Kopia in Nemblyer, there is little cooperation between them in areas of competition because of divergent political fields.

3. The Remdi are split across the Dei-Mul electorate and local government council border. The 'Lower' Remdi in Dei are closely associated with the Kimka-Roklaka tribe-pair, while 'Upper' Remdi in Mul are paired with the Kumdi.

4. Previously dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, these tiny tribes (or what is left of them) are closely associated with the Kurupi tribe. Gulke, Dapi and Punni are almost incorporated into Kurupi whilst Pandikly acts independently in some events but combines with Kurupi in other areas such as elections.

5. Some members of the Kiklapka and Nmlaka tribes are almost incorporated into the 'Lower' Remdi section.

6. Previously dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, some members of the Mlaka-Klalka pair are almost incorporated into the 'Upper' Remdi section.

7. Also dispersed through pre-colonial warfare, some members of the Knapka and Punni tribes are almost incorporated into the Kumdi tribe.

8. The Nokpa are split across the Anglimp-Nemblyer electorate and local government council boundary. Those in Anglimp are paired with 'Kum' Kopi while the other half in Nemblyer are paired with Anamiyal.
APPENDIX V: SPECIFIC CASES OF MULTIPLE VOTING (1995)

The following is a record of specific cases of double or multiple voting witnessed personally in a number of polling stations during the Western Highlands Provincial Government Elections in January 1995. Gross infringement of constitutional rights and violation of electoral regulations have been pointed out by numerous studies, but no effort has been made towards reducing this and other problems, and it is pointless to carry the argument towards this end. Suffice to say that the PNG Electoral Commission has a lot of work to do before the National Elections in 1997. Instances of double or multiple voting:

- An Engan migrant voted six times, thus causing premature closing of polling station. But the presiding officer was threatened and forced into re-opening and voting continued;

- A woman, also Engan, who voted twice was identified by the presiding officer. Supporters claimed her being an identical twin sister of the one who voted earlier;

- An old woman claiming to be the absentee wife of a youngster followed him into the polling booth to vote. He was mocked by supporters who called: "He who sleeps with old women, hurry up", implying that she was an imposter;

- A female attempting to vote under the name of an absentee male was told off by the presiding officer: "What are you? Male or female?";

- A man taking the place of a woman was turned back by the presiding officer but supporters claimed typographical error, pointing out that the 'F' (for female) marked beside her name should correctly read 'M' (for male);

- Persons thrown into the polling booth to vote on behalf of absentees and the deceased often forgot the names of those they claimed to be when the presiding officer asked for their names;

- An underage school girl, in grade six, voted on behalf of an adult absentee; and

- A husband and wife, both known to the presiding officers, were represented by an Engan man and a Simbu woman. The presiding officer looked up and said: "So, I
see, your name is Jane!”, and to the man, he said: “And yours Jack? Since when did you become Jane and Jack?” Embarrassed, they both were turned away (but believed to have voted later). If only they had known that the presiding officer was Jane’s brother. When the presiding officer met Jack after the polling was completed, he said: “I did not see you earlier, but I think you did cast your vote”, clearly implying that someone else had voted under Jack’s name.

1. Although the events described are real and did occur in a number of polling stations during the 1994/95 Western Highlands Provincial Elections, names of individuals mentioned in the text, like Jane and Jack, are pseudonyms.
APPENDIX VI: PNG NATIONAL PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS (1972-1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Election</th>
<th>Governments formed following elections</th>
<th>Successful no-confidence motions</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Michael Somare as Chief Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td>Michael Somare (Chief Minister)</td>
<td>1972-1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Michael Somare</td>
<td>1975-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Julius Chan</td>
<td>1980-1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paias Wingti</td>
<td>1995-1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rabbie Namaliu</td>
<td>1988-1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information supplied by John Kewa (23 January 1996), as told to him by officers within the office of the Governor of Western Highlands, Paias Wingti.

Note: Only Michael Somare and Paias Wingti, backed PNG's largest political parties, Pangu and PDM, have been able to form governments following national elections, but were replaced twice through no-confidence motions. All of them have been coalition governments.

1. In September 1993 Wingti resigned while Parliament was in session and was re-elected minutes afterwards. Wingti's play to preserve his position against a vote of no-confidence for a further 18 months was challenged by the leader of the Opposition [Chuis Haivetta] who argued this action was unconstitutional and took the issue to the Supreme Court which rejected the challenge (Tumer 1994:230). The leader of the Opposition, however, won on appeal in August 1994 and Wingti was ousted from office.
APPENDIX VII: INTERGROUP CONFLICTS IN HAGEN (1980-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Proximate Cause</th>
<th>Escalated into War</th>
<th>Peacefully Resolved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Remdi-Minembi</td>
<td>Dei</td>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kawelka-Minembi</td>
<td>Dei</td>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kopi-Ngani</td>
<td>Dei-Mul</td>
<td>Theft of pig</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kimka + Rokika-Kombula</td>
<td>Dei</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tepuka Wanembo-Palke</td>
<td>Dei</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tepuka Kewi-Kawelka Membo</td>
<td>Dei</td>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tepuka Kengeke-Kintke</td>
<td>Dei</td>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kumdi-Nengka</td>
<td>Mul</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Munjika-Kopelka</td>
<td>Mul</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Munjika-Klogioka</td>
<td>Mul</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kumdi Oynamb-Kumdidi</td>
<td>Mul</td>
<td>Children's game</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nengka Elpulimbo + Kakamb-Nengka Kambumba</td>
<td>Mul</td>
<td>Historical</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Jika Andapunts-Remdi</td>
<td>Dei-Hagen</td>
<td>Historical</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Jika Rukumb-Jika Kumb + Akelemb</td>
<td>Hagen</td>
<td>Beer and woman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Jika Maipnget-Kukika</td>
<td>Hagen</td>
<td>Marijuana</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ukla + Ukupka-Kukiga</td>
<td>Nebilyer</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Rokla + Wanek-Teijandena</td>
<td>Tambul-Nebilyer</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kepka + Tepaka-Kuklimint Yapo</td>
<td>Tambul-Nebilyer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Uknii 2-Uknii 2</td>
<td>Baiyer</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Krupka-Kumka</td>
<td>South Wahgi</td>
<td>Rascal gang activity</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Kondika-Komemeka</td>
<td>South Wahgi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Tangika-Kokika</td>
<td>South Wahgi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix VIII

Average number of candidates per electorate (1964-1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Number of Electorates</th>
<th>Number of Candidates</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
<th>Average number of Candidates Per Electorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1513</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2343</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1.5: Number of Candidates (1964-1997)

ELECTION (YEAR) —♦— CANDIDATES —•— ELECTORATES

Figure 1.6: Lowest to Highest Candidate categories in 1997 elections
Figure 1.7: Candidate Categories in 1992 and 1997 National Elections

Table 1.3: Candidate Categories in 1992 and 1997 National Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Categories</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources and notes:


2. Excluding Huon Gulf Open electorate.
This is a classic case of conflict between traditional and introduced ideas about death rites. The denial of a full traditional funeral ceremony to the deceased angered his relatives, especially Jo Mangi and his younger brother, who considered this as an infringement of individual rights as well as a violation of traditional custom. The dispute resulted in Mangi pulling a stunt on his clansmen, which eventually cost him a pig.

Mangi and his younger brother were so upset by the manner in which the funeral was conducted that they decided to teach them a lesson by arranging for a chemically-induced self-illuminating incandescent tube to be tied onto a tree at the cemetery where their uncle's body was buried. Accomplishing this proved easier than imagined. The men were gathered inside the nearest house beside the cemetery, where in groups of three or more took turn in guarding the cemetery against 'witches'. Protection of the corpse against so-called cannibalistic witches (kum kaimb-nui wamp)) is a widespread phenomenon throughout the Wahgi and parts of Hagen. These 'witches', mostly female but some male also, supposedly have supernatural abilities to approach the cemetery in the form of mainly dogs (as well as other animals) to take the body without physically disturbing the burial ground and coffin.

In this case, as one shift was coming off, Mangi and his colleagues kept them busy with debates about elections in general and the approaching 1987 elections in particular and whether or not Wingti would return to Parliament as Prime Minister, whilst Mangi's younger brother and two others offered to take the next shift. They took this opportunity to fasten the candle-like tube onto a branch of a tall casuarina tree in the centre of the cemetery. Soon after the plastic object was bent in half, two separate chemicals contained within the halves merged and the chemical reaction gave out a bright greenish light. It was first noticed by neighbouring groups from other hill-top hamlets. They started yelling, "kaimb ('witch') has arrived", and soon others joined in the shouting. Upon hearing the shouting from across the hills, the men in the house with Mangi came out with their weapons and started firing arrows at the strange light. This went on for several hours, but the light was still up there in the tree. After a while someone suggested that it could not be a kaimb, but instead, the Holy Spirit. And so they called in the church elders and started praying. Soon a pastor from the local Nazarene church and a Catholic priest arrived to conduct a lengthy service which ended at dawn. At first morning light a man discovered shoe tracks leading into and out of the cemetery and following this into the cemetery he noticed the same prints on the freshly dug grave-yard and the unmistakable yellow clay on
the trunk of the casuarina tree, upon which the light hung from a cotton string. The offending object was promptly removed from the tree and in a subsequent investigation blamed the UPNG team for the offence, which we may add was a serious one. None of the UPNG team members claimed responsibility and amidst the confusion we left for Minj town. Later, Mangi admitted to deliberately attempting to playing a practical joke as revenge for lack of respect shown to his uncle, and consequently had to compensate his clansmen with a big pig for offending them.
APPENDIX X: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KAWELKA AT KUK

According to the Kawelka origin-story, the Kawelka tribe originated at a place called Koumpouppukl, near present-day Kelriga mat kundkona (ret-pela graw, ochre), less than ten minutes drive west from Mount Hagen township. One day, an old man (putative ancestor) and his sons were roasting a pig inside the clan sacred grounds when a cordyline (keiya-koem er, tanget in Pidgin) leaf fell upon the earth-oven. Interpreting this as a bad omen, the old man and his sons left the place without eating the pork. Since that day, the keiya-koema became the Kawelka mi or taboo substance, a proscription, or a ‘do not’, which carries with it supernatural sanctions. Oaths of allegiance to group, of innocence when accused of certain crimes, and of similar kind made upon the mi may result in sickness and ultimately death if not honoured, for it is said that the keiya-koema is a taboo substance among the Kawelka (keiya-koema irtim mi).

According to oral historical accounts given to me by the Kawelka big-man, Goimba Onombe, the Kawelka, as opposed to a common perception, are not a Kopott group, but are in fact of Kama origin. He mentioned Kimininga, Kuamp, Dobel and Lganga as Kawelka settlements before Kenta, Mapa and Kuk. The first two (Kimininga and Kuamp) are presently occupied by the Jika Milakamb clan, while third and fourth (Dobel and Lganga) are currently occupied by the Yamka Pepka clan and the fifth, Kenta, is now occupied by the Jika Kilampi clan. The last two are presently held by the Kawelka. There were two brothers, Konga and Makla, still living at Kuamp in the late seventies, but have since migrated to Kuk. Similarly, at Kenta, there was a large Kawelka population in co-existence with the Jika Kilampi and only recently in the early eighties moved to Kuk and Mapa. Some

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2. The observation of taboo substances is common among Hagen groups; the mi substance for the Tepuka, for instance, is the way plant, the mi for the Remdi is the mape tree; and the Misemba mi is the stone. For a more detailed discussion of the Kawelka origin-story and the taboo substance, see A.J. Strathem (1972).

3. Kuma and Kopott appear to be archaic Melpa directional terms for ‘west’ (mi koema) and ‘north’ (mi kapote), but nowadays they are commonly used when referring to different climatic zones: kapote for low altitude temperate areas such as the Baiyer and Jinu valleys; and koema for high altitude areas such as Ogebeng and Tokpa plains. The opposite of koema (west, mi koema), as a directional term, is melpa (east, al melpa), from whence comes the cultural-linguistic labels, the Kuma of the Wahgi and Melpa of Hagen. To the Simbu, the people of the Middle Wahgi, or the Manj-Banu area, are the ‘Kuma’, whilst the middle Wahgi people themselves see Hagen people as the ‘Kuma Hagen’, and the Hagen people, in turn, call those living west of Tokpa as the ‘Kuma’. In a similar way, the people living west of Tokpa refer to those in Hagen as the ‘Melpa’, but the Hagen people themselves refer to those in the Middle Wahgi and Simbu as the ‘Melpa’.
Kawelka still have their coffee gardens at Kenta, but others have planted new coffee trees at Kuk.

While living at Kuk, oral history has it that the Kawelka tribe underwent a massive population explosion; such was the growth that high platforms (paka angtek ik netung) were required for leaders to address public gatherings such as singings and ceremonial exchanges. During such festivities, the dancers who were organised in several rows, were described as a 'sea of men' (wua num pita). There is some exaggeration here, as is usual of Hageners when speaking of their own groups, but there is also some truth in this statement because, eventually, numerical strength brought the Kawelka their downfall. It is said that the tribe grew so large that it became very difficult to function cohesively as a unit, that it was highly fragmented, and more importantly, its members became increasingly belligerent. Strangers who passed through Kawelka territories were said to have been regularly attacked, robbed, women raped, and in some instances, men from other tribes were killed. Some of them were notorious criminals, preying upon the innocent, mostly weaklings such as women and the aged, in packs of two to five young men — something not too different from what our contemporary raskal gangs are doing.

It is said that one day, the Kwi tribes, obviously upset by the constant Kawelka belligerence, formed into a confederacy-type coalition and attacked the Kawelka. Although the attack was initially triggered by a particular incident involving the death of a Jika Andapunts man called Wamnapi, whose death was blamed on the Kawelka after he was found in his house with a cassowary bone-tipped spear lodged in his ribs, the underlying relations between the Kawelka and their Kwi neighbours had significantly deteriorated to such a low level that peaceful avenues of conflict resolution were never considered a viable option. According to one Kawelka informant, Jika Wamnapi was not killed by the Kawelka, but the Kawelka were victim's of their bad reputation; and he pointed out that the real killer was in fact a Yamka Pepka man who was the son of a Kawelka woman.

The subsequent war was an absolute disaster for the Kawelka who were completely outnumbered, overpowered and massacred. An area near the old Kuk DPI station, which was initially expected to become a principal battleground, became a slaughter ground where hundreds of Kawelka are said to have been killed. The DPI station itself was built in the 1960s after the swamp was drained off into the Wahgi river. It was here that hundreds of Kawelka are said to have had their skulls cracked open while half submerged into the swamp. Only a few managed to escape, telling each other: "Mbukl pa, Mbaula pa" ('Go to...
Mbuki, go to Mbakla), the names of the other Kawelka territories in the Sepik-Wahgi Divide.4

The present Kawelka territory at Kuk was reclaimed by Yap's father, Goimba Onombe, then a Local Government Councillor, in the early 1960s. The Kawelka, as mentioned above, were violently evicted from Kuk after losing a war to a confederacy-style alliance of Kwi groups, comprising mainly Jika Andapunts, some Moei and Yamka clans. Yap's grandfather, Onombe, as a young man fled — together with a few lucky ones (including Ongka's father, Kaipa, and Yap's great-grandfather, Kund Mend) — to Mbuki, another Kawelka settlement situated on the Jimi-Wahgi-Baiyer Divide. After hearing stories about Kuk and the war from his father, Goimba decided to return to the former Kawelka territory in the Upper Wahgi soon after pacification had been imposed by the Australian colonial administration in the 1940s.

4. The Mbuki-Mbakla territories were colonised by a Kawelka man called Etemp Wantep, the founding ancestor of the Kawelka 'Kopon-pel' section of the tribe. A.J. Strathern (1972) provides a genealogy of Etemp Wantep's descendants.
APPENDIX XI: BACKGROUND TO EKI'S DEATH

After graduating from the Administrative College, Waigani, in November 1984, Eki was posted to the Southern Highlands Province as an Executive Officer to the Kagua Local Government Council. After two years of employment with the council, he was transferred to the Baiyer-Lumusa Local Government Council in late 1986.

However, the outbreak of the Kawelka-Minembi war in late 1986 prevented him from taking up his new post. Eki, like his peers, took up arms and went to war with the rest of the Kawelka warriors. During the Kawelka-Minembi war, none fought more bravely than Eki, who was feared and hated most by the enemy. Apart from being one of a new breed of warriors with knowledge of gun warfare, Eki's main role, together with one other fight-leader, was that of a roving shield-man, which means that he personally did not kill anyone, yet he played a significant part in the overall Kawelka war effort. He was also involved in the brutal eviction of the Minembi Elyipi, Papeke, Engambo and Ruprupkae clans from their Tiki and neighbouring territories during the inception of the war in late 1986.

During a mutually reached truce period in June 1988, William Pik contested the Western Highlands Provincial Elections for the first time. This was also the first time that Kawelka, as a tribe, had ever sponsored one of their own tribesman to contest in an election for either provincial or national government. Again, Eki felt obligated to offer his specialised expertise in election campaigns. He was used as a campaign coordinator in Pik's election campaign. Pik and the Kawelka gambled and lost a lot of money and other resources during the election. While the ideology of group solidarity was expressed in bloc voting by members of the Kawelka clans, it was however believed that some Kawelka, together with some Tepuka tribesmen who reside with the Kawelka at Kuk, defected to the opposition. As in 1995, Pik's principal rival in 1988 was Kar Kil, a Tepuka Kintke clansman and a protégé of the former Dei MP, Parua Kuri.

According to Pik's supporters, Pik lost by 21 votes, a situation which could easily have resulted in victory if he had the support of the defectors and the Tepuka who live with Kawelka but voted with their Tepuka tribesmen. Consequently, a punitive raid was organised by William Pik's supporters, during which a number of houses were burnt down.

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3. There was one other Kawelka candidate in a previous provincial government election, but he did not have tribe-wide support. Eki's father, Kont, in fact, contested the Koma-Tiki seat during the 1980 Western Highlands provincial elections, but was beaten by Tepuka Okembo clansman, Kuma Rokla.
a woman was allegedly raped, and some people were assaulted. Armed with a shotgun, Eki was one of the leaders of the raiding party. Among those who lost houses and property were three prominent Tepuka Keitipi clansmen, Konge, Kuntil and Ronom, all polygamists, each with three wives. The Keitipi clansmen and their families fled to their main territories in the Muka valley, leaving behind land, pigs, coffee plots and food-crop gardens.

Pik's supporters justified their actions by using the Hagen ideology of group solidarity, expressed in the Melpa language as *Ur tila pek, katkoma tila tek i lek i matikemon*, ('one does not live in one house and have a toilet in another'), which implies that the Keitipi clansmen and their families should have voted with their Kawelka hosts instead of following structural lines.

After these events, Eki took a trip to Port Moresby on 22 August 1988. Only six hours after his arrival in Port Moresby, he was murdered around 9:00 p.m., ironically at the Administrative College, where he had received his training as a council adviser. A Tepuka Keitipi clansman was charged with murder, but sentenced to less than five years for manslaughter, after the defence argued that it was an accident. The Kawelka, however, believed that this was no accident, but a pay-back killing for the defendant's father, a Keitipi big-man, whose death was blamed on the Kawelka big-man, Ongka (who, to this day, denies having anything to do with him). This belief was reinforced by the fact that Eki was directly involved in the election-related violence causing damage to property owned by the three Keitipi clansmen, one of whom was the defendant's brother, and the other was the father of the man who allegedly instigated the brawl in which Eki was killed.

According to Eki's brother, Ben Konts, one of the three Membo witnesses, they were picked up in a taxi at the Jackson's Airport around 3:00 p.m. by a Klambo man who drove them to Eki's uncle's house at the Administrative College. Upon arrival at the college they discovered that the uncle, Kingal, also a Tepuka Keitipi man, was not at home. In the taxi were six men: the Klambo driver, the four Membo men (including Eki), and a Keitipi man (John Berum).

As they turned around and were on their way out when stopped outside the assailant's house by a group of Tepuka Keitipi men, where the one of them attacked John Berum. Berum's attacker, according Ben Konts, was Mapa Konge, the son of one of the Keitipi men who lost property during the 1988 post-polling violence. Eki and another Membo
(John Yap) were the first to get out of the car. Ben maintains that John Yap tried to stop the fight between Mapa and Berum while Eki was only a spectator. Ben claimed that Mapa then attacked him. During the commotion, Eki, according to John Yap, was struck down by the assailant, Hui Rombo. When asked why John Yap did not warn Eki that he was about to be struck, John Yap claims that he thought Hui was only feigning. Ben maintains that Eki was a marked man and his death was no accident. Instead, his murder, Ben believes, was a ruthlessly calculated one; the fight between Mapa and Berum was deliberately staged in order to cause confusion during which the target, Eki, was easily picked out by Rombo. Kawelka informants, including Ben, believe that the assailant, Hui Rombo, had sufficient motive for killing Eki. The murder was widely interpreted as payback killing for both the assailant's father's death and more specifically for the massive loss of property and humiliation suffered by his brother and other Keitipi clansmen at the hands of William Pik's supporters who were led by a gun-toting Eki during the Western Highlands provincial elections in June 1988.

The Klambo taxi-driver and the two Membo men (including Ben Konts) fled in the taxi, leaving the unconscious Eki behind. It is not clear what exactly happened to John Yap, who was also left behind, but Eki was taken to Port Moresby General hospital some six hours after the attack, around 3:00 a.m. on the following day, by neighbours of the assailant. But he died in less than three hours, around 6:00 a.m., at the hospital.
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