Studies in Bradley's metaphysics

This work is a critical study of some of the fundamental themes of F.H. Bradley's Ap p2.a/iance. and Re.a£.lty. For the most part, the discussion is confined to the subjects discussed in the crucial early chapters of the first Book. It is my contention that the conclusions reached in the earlier chapters of Bradley's work - in particular, Chapters II and III - cannot be sustained by the arguments which Bradley employs in their favour. To the extent which the conclusions of the later chapters do rest upon the soundness of these arguments, they are, I suggest, of questionable merit. But the purpose of this work is not entirely critical. Where possible, I have argued for certain views which, I believe, avoid those aspects of Bradley's critical argumentation which are sound. Among the positive conclusions reached are the following: that reality and existence are co-extensive; that a distinction between reality and appearance can be effected which does not involve the assumption that there are real or existent appearances; that an ontological distinction between substances, qualities, and relations is defensible; that substances, qualities, and relations are real and existent; and, that substances, qualities, and relations are particular, rather than universal entities.