Kemp Smith's account of Kant's transcendental deduction

I have found it necessary to provide as a background to my critique of Kemp Smith's commentary to Kant's transcendental deduction a statement of my own views on the deduction. This statement amounts largely to a catalogue of what to me are obscurities in the argument. There is a detailed examination of A98-112, in the course of which the largely parallel argument of B129-43 is also examined. Some topics dealt with are the senses in which Kant uses 'synthesis' and 'unity', the paragraph at A1G4-5, the doctrine that the analytic unity of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception, the arguments for the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception, and the argument in 520 to show that it follows from this principle that the categories relate to all objects. Brief discussions of the second half of the first edition deduction and the second half of the second edition deduction are given. My discussion of Kemp Smith's views on the deduction starts with a discussion of his views on the roles of the objective and subjective deductions. Then his paraphrases of the first and second edition deductions are discussed. Lastly his view that two conflicting doctrines - phenomenalism and subjectivism - are to be found in the deduction and his views on the relation between phenomenalism and the analysis of the concept of consciousness are criticised.