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Participation in moral hazard problems

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posted on 2024-11-14, 14:19 authored by Guillaume Roger
Two principals engage in Hotelling competition for an agent's services under incomplete information as to her outside option (location). This renders the agent's participation decision probabilistic from the perspective of each principal. Regardless of the market structure at equilibrium the optimal contract features a trade-off between participation probability and incentives. Rent and effort are inversely related and non-monotonic in the agent's transport cost and so in market structures; they increase (decrease) with competition. Uncertainty as to the agent's location may increase or decrease the rent compared to full information. This correspondingly harms or benefits principals.

History

Citation

Roger, G. (2016). Participation in moral hazard problems. Games and Economic Behavior, 95 10-24.

Journal title

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

95

Pagination

10-24

Language

English

RIS ID

112279

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