Consciousness

Anyone who is looking for a clear, concise and accurate lay of the land with respect to contemporary, analytic, theories of consciousness would do well to get hold of this book. Its first half contains a handy survey and critical assessment of current theories of (1) qualia, and (2) what awareness of qualia involves. Yet it is not a textbook. For its second half, beginning at Chapter five, develops a new, representationalist theory of consciousness. Building on the insightful, but underdeveloped, ideas of Gilbert Harman, Hill’s main ambition is to defend a thorough-going representationalism about consciousness, while, along the way, refuting dualism and establishing that materialism, specifically a central state materialism sort, is still in good nick. He explores the implications of his new theory not just to the central cases of visual awareness and qualia, but also for pain, emotional experience and introspection.