In this chapter I plan to situate the concept of situated cognition within the framework of antecedent philosophical work. My intention, however, is not to provide a simple historical guide but to suggest that there are still some untapped resources in these past philosophers that may serve to enrich current accounts of situated cognition. I will include embodied cognition as part of the concept of situated cognition. One often encounters these terms used togetherembodied cognition and situated cognition - and it is clear that situated cognition cannot be disembodied, although some authors emphasize one over the other or provide principled distinctions between them.1 Philosophical thought experiments notwithstanding, however, the often-encountered brain in a vat is, to say the least, in a very odd and artificial situation. Given what seems to be an essential connection between embodiment and situation, I will take the more inclusive and holistic route and view them accordingly.
History
Citation
Gallagher, S. (2009). Philosophical antecendents to situated cognition. In P. Robbins and M. Aydede (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (pp. 35-51). United States: Cambridge University Press.