Consciousness and conceptual schema
RIS ID
81056
Additional Publication Information
ISBN: 9789027251572
Abstract
There are two importantly different ways in which consciousness resists incorporation into our familiar object-based conceptual schema which, when analysed, help to explain why it is regarded as such a philosophically recalcitrant phenomena. One concerns the nonconceptual nature of basic forms of conscious experience. The other concerns the fact that attempts to understand the nature of such experience in an object-based schema, as is demanded by some forms of physicalism, is inappropriate. My concern in this paper is to show how certain central problems concerning our attempts to understand consciousness can be recast or dissolved if we take not of these aspects of phenomenal experience.
COinS
Publication Details
Hutto, D. D. (2001). Consciousness and conceptual schema. In P. Pylkkanen and T. Vaden (Eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience (pp. 15-43). Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company.