Two Wittgensteins too many: Wittgenstein's foundationalism

Authors

Daniel Hutto, University of Hertfordshire

RIS ID

80685

Publication Details

Hutto, D. (2004). Two Wittgensteins too many: Wittgenstein's foundationalism. In D. Moyal-Sharrock (Eds.), The Third Wittgenstein (pp. 25-41). Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate.

Additional Publication Information

ISBN: 978-0754630241

Abstract

Apparently, Polish logicians count differently from most people. This is because they operate with different munerical criteria. Disagreements between them and us about how many objects there are in a room will look not only insuperable but also unintelligible unless the differences between their system and ours are brought into the light. Similarly, if we are to put the debate about how many Wittgensteins there are on a proper footing, it will be important to establish the criterion according to which we are making our count.