Title

Freedom regained: the possibility of free will

RIS ID

112738

Publication Details

Peeters, A. (2017). Freedom regained: the possibility of free will. Philosophical Psychology, 30 (5), 682-684.

Abstract

In Freedom Regained, Julian Baggini draws on a broad spectrum of disciplines to defend the notion that, yes, we do have free will. Baggini targets recent claims from scientists who argue that (neuro)science has supposedly proven there is no such thing as free will. Such arguments depend on mistaken conflations of the self, which is taken as the nexus for free will, with, for example, the brain, the conscious mind, or the rational mind. Such amalgams are then taken to clash with a physically determined world. This opposition of freedom with determinism is the wrong way of framing the debate, according to Baggini. Instead, free will has to be understood as a plural concept, arising from a self which can endorse its own actions and which extends beyond the brain, the rational, and the conscious. These are the main ideas of Freedom Regained, which advocates a compatibilist and pluralistic concept of free will.

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Link to publisher version (DOI)

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1294679