First price sealed bid auction without auctioneers

Authors

Shuo Zheng, University of Wollongong
Luke McAven, University of WollongongFollow
Yi Mu, University of WollongongFollow

RIS ID

22285

Publication Details

Zheng, S., McAven, L. F. & Mu, Y. (2007). First price sealed bid auction without auctioneers. International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (pp. 127-131). Hawaii: ACM.

Abstract

We propose two protocol variants for a first price sealed-bid auction, without using intermediatory auctioneers. One version achieves full privacy for the bidders and their bids, the other provides a form of verifiability, at the cost of some privacy. Full privacy protects all bids. In particular the winner's identity and price are only known by the seller. Lesser privacy allows the winner to be known and verified publicly. Both versions provide non-repudiation. We demonstrate correctness and show how computational and communication costs vary with different privacy levels.