A provably secure authenticated key agreement protocol for wireless communications
Designing elliptic curve password-based authenticated key agreement (ECPAKA) protocols for wireless mobile communications is a challenging task due to the limitation of bandwidth and storage of the mobile devices. Some well-published ECPAKA protocols have been proved to be insecure. We notice that until now none of the existing ECPAKA protocols for wireless mobile communication is provided any formal security analysis. In this paper, we propose a novel protocol and conduct a formal security analysis on our protocol. Compared with other ECPAKA protocol, our protocol meets all basic security properties and is the first ECPAKA protocol with formal security proof for wireless communication. We also explore the suitability of the novel protocol for 3GPP2 specifications and improve the A-Key (Authentication Key) distribution for current mobile cellular systems.
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