This paper examines the unique problems posed by cybercrime and considers both "orthodox " responses - such as criminalisation, enhancement of enforcement powers and the use of countering technology - as well as "alternative" strategies, such as those that encourage Internet users to share the burden of securing informational privacy. Rather than focusing upon particular domestic responses, the paper provides an analytical framework enabling an assessment of the costs and benefits of responses to cybercrime in general. Where pertinent, however, comment is offered on New Zealand's recent legislative amendments. Reference is made also to the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime and to the responses of the United States - the country that has pioneered much of the theoretical work in cybercriminology. The paper argues that the traditionall aw enforcement/privacy trade-offi s particularly complicated in cyberspace due to the importance of privacy to the Internet itself Responding to cybercriminality, therefore, requires delicacy.
ANZSRC / FoR Code