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The objective of this paper is to provide an introduction to the economics of controlling the stock of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere. The paper starts with a brief summary of the arguments against a wait-and-see strategy and in favour of controlling carbon emissions. It then provides a basic analysis of the effect of carbon tax on net-cash flow maximising agents’ emissions and offers two possible ways for setting the tax rate. The first one computes an atmospheric carbon-dioxide stocktargeting tax rate with abstinence of some agents, whereas the second considers universal cooperation and computes a welfare-maximising carbon-tax rate. While these computations assume a fixed rate of depletion of the atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide, the last section takes the depletion rate to be dependent on the distribution of the usable land between plants and humans and the change in the usable land to be dependent on the change in the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock. The usable land allocation required for achieving a target stock of atmospheric carbon dioxide is subsequently computed.