Title

Partnership with partial commitment: a game theoretic approach

Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Details

Levy, A. (2007). Partnership with partial commitment: a game theoretic approach. International Mathematical Forum, 2 (57-60), 2951-2961.

Abstract

This paper derives the Nash-equilibrium degrees of commitment to a partnership where lack of full commitment fuels suspicion and increases potential losses for partners. The Nash-equilibrium commitment of each partner increases with her internal return, quitting cost and costs of being deserted and with her counterpart's external return and intrinsic capacity to detect lack of full commitment, but diminishes with her external return and intrinsic capacity to detect her counterpart's lack of full commitment and with her counterpart's internal return, quitting cost and costs of being deserted.

Link to publisher version (URL)

International Mathematical Forum

RIS ID

21707

Please refer to publisher version or contact your library.

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