

2010

# The West Papua dilemma

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## Recommended Citation

Rollings, Leslie B., The West Papua dilemma, Master of Arts thesis, University of Wollongong. School of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 2010. <http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/3276>

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School of History and Politics  
University of Wollongong

**THE WEST PAPUA DILEMMA**

Leslie B. Rollings

This Thesis is presented for  
Degree of Master of Arts - Research  
University of Wollongong  
December 2010

For Adam who provided the inspiration.

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## **DECLARATION**

I certify that this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university and is not currently being submitted for any other degree or qualification.

I certify that any help received in preparing this thesis and all sources used have been acknowledged in this thesis.

Leslie Bryne Rollings

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

My sincere thanks are due to my supervisor, Professor Edward Wolfers, for his guidance and advice and other special considerations extended during the course of the preparation of this thesis.

I also wish to record my gratitude to Associate Professor Sarah Ferber for her advice and understanding, particularly during 2010.

I extend my appreciation for the contributions of Dr. Ronald May and Dr. Otto Ondawame who made themselves available for interview and discussion on a range of topics. Their special knowledge was invaluable to this dissertation.

I am also grateful for the support and understanding of my wife, Carolyn, who assisted in researching information and for the preparation of this document.

## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the socio-economic, political and cultural effects on the lifestyles of the indigenous Melanesian inhabitants since the takeover of West Papua by the Republic of Indonesia in 1963. The takeover followed an extended dispute between The Netherlands and the Republic over the sovereignty of West Papua. This also involved the United States of America and, to a lesser extent, Australia and was brokered by the United Nations. To enable the indigenous population of Papua to decide its own future, the Act of Free Choice took place in 1969 and was settled in favour of the Republic of Indonesia. The indigenous people of West Papua claimed that the process of self-determination was flawed and that they had no say in deciding their own destiny.

It has been argued that international influences played a prominent role in this dilemma leading to a position that, in effect, the indigenous population had no say in the determination of their destiny. It was also claimed that the Indonesian government's policies were concentrated towards the subjugation of these particular inhabitants. This raised the possibility of the eventual elimination of their cultural identity. An appraisal was also undertaken of several indigenous groups, bringing under consideration cultural, linguistic and religious characteristics which may contribute in some small way in forming an opinion on their ability to integrate into Indonesian society.


West Papuan nationalism was considered against a background of both theoretical and historical constructs to determine the basis of its origin and the strong sense of nationalism which has developed amongst the inhabitants. In this context the contribution of the separatist group known as *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM), Free Papua Movement, has also been appraised. Papuans suffered human rights violations by Indonesia, resulting in the death and injury of many. Dispossession of their traditional land and severe damage to their environment became a feature of

life for the Papuans as Indonesia pressed forward with development of numerous large-scale resource-based projects in their homeland.

Major conclusions reached are that a review of historical events and important meetings leading to the Act of Free Choice found no evidence that the indigenous inhabitants of Papua were included in the decision-making process and had no influence on the outcome which decided their destiny. There exists evidence of human rights violations and oppressive conduct exercised by Indonesia against some sections of the population of West Papua. This has fuelled the rise of Papuan nationalism.

The oppressive policies of the government of the Republic of Indonesia over four decades have not made any significant progress in its attempts to bring about the forceful integration of West Papuans. Various practices, generally referred to as Indonesianisation policies, including that of transmigration, have served to marginalise the indigenous population in their own land. For the present, the dilemma facing Papuans is a choice between accepting Indonesian government policy or continuing the struggle for Independence. For Indonesia the choices are to continue with present policies aimed at Indonesianising the Melanesian indigenous population or extending consideration such as meaningful special autonomy and eliminating oppressive actions against the indigenous inhabitants as a means of progressing a resolution of the dispute.

Figure 1. Map of West Papua<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> *Papuaweb*, [www.papuaweb.org/gb/.../papua-umum-57k.gif](http://www.papuaweb.org/gb/.../papua-umum-57k.gif). (Accessed 20 November 2010)

## SUMMARY OF ACRONYMS

ABRI	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesi</i> (Indonesia's armed forces)
ALDP	NGO Alliance for Democracy Papua
BAPEDAL	<i>Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan</i> (The Environmental Impact Management Agency)
BAPPENAS	<i>Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional</i> (The Indonesian National Development Agency)
CAA	Consultative Assembly for the Act of Free Choice or Dewan Musyawarah Pepera (DMP)
DAP	<i>Dewan Adat Papua</i> (Papuan Customary Council or Papuan Tribal Council)
DPRD	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> (People's representative council)
DPD	Regional Representatives' Council
DOM	<i>Daerah Operasi Militer</i> (Military Operation Area)
EIA	Environmental Investigation Agency
<i>FOKER</i> <i>LSM PAPUA</i>	<i>Forum Kerjasama Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat Papua</i> – (Co-operative Forum of Papuan Non-government Organisations) and other human rights NGO's.
FUNDWI	Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian
MPRS	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara</i> (People's Consultative Assembly)
LEGCO	Legislative Council
LEMASA,	<i>Lembaga Musyawara Adat Suku Amungme</i> (Amungme People's Tribal Council)
NU	<i>Nahdatul Ulama</i> (traditionalist conservative Sunni Islam group in Indonesia)
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM – Free Papua Movement)

PANSUS	<i>Panita Khusus</i> – Special Committee set up by the DPR to develop a special autonomy law.
PDR	<i>Pengawasan Daerah Rawan</i> (Critical Control Area)
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (Communist Party of Indonesia)
PRRI	<i>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia</i> (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)
RTC	Round Table Conference
TEPENAL	<i>Tentara Pembebasan Nasional</i> (also known as TPN - the army of the people of West Papua)
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> formerly <i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> (ABRI) (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
TPI,	<i>Tebangan Pilihan Indonesia</i> (a selective cutting policy)
TRIKORA	<i>Komando Mandala Pembebasan Irian Barat</i> (Mandala Command for the liberation of West Irian)
UNCI	United Nations Committee for Indonesia
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

## INTRODUCTION

The transfer of sovereignty of West Papua to the Republic of Indonesia occurred more than four decades ago and to this day remains surrounded by controversy. The Act of Free Choice (1969) which was the determining factor in this process has been claimed by many to have been flawed. This historical event is the result of political developments contrived by numerous international participants since the end of World War II, including the United Nations, the United States of America and Australia. Fundamental to this is the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia regarding the future control of all territories in the East Indies previously occupied by the Dutch. At the early stage of the conflict many of the West Papuans clearly rejected integration with Indonesia. The Dutch supported the notion of self-rule for the territory, which was initially excluded from the transfer arrangements to become the subject of extended negotiations involving a cast of many for a number of years.

During the course of these proceedings numerous agreements were reached and some subsequently broken but all directly or indirectly contributed to the fate of the West Papuans. The changing direction of support for Indonesia and the Netherlands from both the United States and Australia as well as the political dynamics of Indonesia's President Sukarno only protracted settlement of the dispute. Many of the decisions taken in this regard have not been in consultation with West Papuans or with due respect for their well being, prompting them to claim that they have been denied the right to determine their own destiny.

The outcome, simply stated, has placed the future of the Melanesians in serious jeopardy due to the policies of the Indonesian government. These policies have been oppressive and there are claims of human rights violations as well as indiscriminate use of violence and force in implementation of government initiatives. Extensive evidence shows that large communities have been marginalised

and existing policies indicate that the indigenous population will become a minority race in their own country with the longer term possibility of elimination of their cultural identity.

It is not intended to undertake an extensive anthropological or ethno-historical analysis of Melanesians in a general sense, however cultural and other observations will be made in relation to several groups to indicate the similarities which exist between communities. This will to some extent highlight the fact that themes on kinship, economy, gender etc. vary considerably. Accordingly, any generalisations arising due to the use of the expression 'Melanesians' are treated with caution. The objective here is to take a step beyond many of the definitions of the Melanesian race and to ascertain the probable reaction to what appears to be the erosion of their cherished values which characterise their way of life.

Transmigration policies of the Indonesian government have resulted in a significant increase in population, with the transfer of thousands of Sumatran, Javanese and Balinese families to West Papua. This serves the purpose for the government of relieving overcrowding on these islands, altering the balance of the population of West Papua and introducing Indonesian culture as a dominating influence. This has caused widespread dislocation as new capital projects encroach on indigenous land and resources. Exploitation of these assets and the failure to adequately engage local inhabitants in the development and operation of new projects has caused serious discontent in affected regions.

Collectively these and other issues continue to fuel separatist activities which have been actioned through Free Papua Movement, OPM which has been active as a guerrilla force since 1965 but more formally organised since 1969. Government policies are enforced through Indonesia's armed forces *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI), formerly *Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia* (ABRI). Its operations in West Papua are justified on the basis of maintaining stability and combating the OPM.

Resistance to Indonesian rule was experienced prior to the takeover but West Papuan nationalism rose dramatically following The Act of Free Choice. In the context of this thesis these two issues are inter-related. It will be argued that this historic event not only marked the formal takeover of West Papua but was also the defining moment for accumulating nationalistic concerns and the source of nationalism in the territory. It is postulated that nationalism remains a strong force in the territory but the increasing pressures of Indonesian and international capitalism as well as Indonesianisation policies may eventually diminish nationalistic enthusiasm.

There are various arguments regarding the world-wide rise of nationalism and theories on the subject have been expressed by some in relation to West Papua. The view taken here is based on the notion that West Papua is/was a non-industrialised, illiterate and ethnically and linguistically diverse society. In such a context received arguments about the origins and spread of nationalism are limited in their application. It is not intended to reconcile views expressed here with those of others whose ideas are nevertheless sincerely respected.

### **Expectations for West New Guinea**

Prior to 1950 government interest in West New Guinea by the Netherlands could best be described as modest to indifferent. This was particularly notable with development activity throughout the territory, although the years of World War II in the Pacific had brought numerous infrastructure benefits, mainly from Allied Forces based in the region. The West Papuan population would have been greatly encouraged with the change in approach by the Netherlands' government when in 1950 West New Guinea was cut off from the rest of Indonesia and became a separate government placed directly under The Hague. New budget initiatives and active development policies enhanced Papuan self esteem.<sup>2</sup> This agreement was subsequently revoked by Indonesia on 21 April 1956.

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<sup>2</sup> P. Drooglever, "*Papua, a multi-faceted history*," Seminar on the Act of Free Choice, The Hague, 15 November 2005, p. 106.

A Dutch initiative throughout the 1950's included efforts to generate an elite body of citizens to take over an independent Netherlands New Guinea.<sup>3</sup> An increased Dutch presence, well funded development activities and increasing budgets were enthusiastically received by the inhabitants, bringing considerable lift to their self esteem and rising national sentiment.<sup>4</sup> The youth of various groups whose association was established by mutual contacts through schooling and the common participation in institutions of the colonial state provided support for the government actions.

Developments during 1961 would also have improved Dutch expectations for a brighter future, with the inauguration of the West New Guinea Council in April 1961 providing a forum for political debate and expression of national sentiment in debates. In December 1961 the Council voted to rename the territory West Papua with a national anthem and flag which was displayed alongside the Dutch tri-colour. Resolutions in support of the Luns Plan calling on all nations to respect the right of self determination were also passed at this meeting.<sup>5</sup>

The transfer of administration of West New Guinea to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) agreed in the New York Agreement of 15 August 1962 may have been met with bitter disappointment by West Papuans as it provided for the eventual transfer of control of the territory to Indonesia subject to the results of the Act of Free Choice. The New York Agreement, however, provided for the explanation and publication of the terms of transfer including the provisions of the act of self determination set out in the agreement.<sup>6</sup>

A reversal of fortunes occurred when West Irian was handed over to Indonesia in 1963. A range of measures introduced by President Sukarno to suppress any aspirations for independence was put

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<sup>3</sup> S. Dorney, *Papua New Guinea – People Politics and History Since 1975*, ABC Books for Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney, NSW, 2000, p. 202.

<sup>4</sup> Drooglever, *Papua, a multi-faceted history*, p. 106.

<sup>5</sup> J. Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua 1962-1969*, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, p. xviii.

<sup>6</sup> New York Agreement, Article X, [www.freewestpapua.org/docs/nya.html](http://www.freewestpapua.org/docs/nya.html). (Accessed 24 May 2009).

into effect. Banning of dissident political activity, censorship of mail and the press and public meetings were among measures taken.<sup>7</sup> These actions were directly in contravention of the provisions of Article XXII of the New York Agreement and created great disappointment for Papuans' expectations created by Dutch administrators.

The period following the Act of Free Choice will be subject to discussion in a following chapter. In the context of Dutch expectations it can be said that the early period was marked by revivals of optimism. Prospects of changes, particularly in relation to justice and improved respect for West Papuans were among considerations generating these expectations. It was not long, however, before the buoyant wave of sentiment gave way to strong disappointment, mainly due to the harsh conduct of the operations of the ABRI.<sup>8</sup>

Other measures initiated by the Indonesian government included the division of the province in 2001 and confirmation of its name as Irian Jaya. These changes were included in the recent legislation which appeared to provide a number of political advantages to the central government but the perceived advantages from division of the province did not materialize in the elections of 2004 when the government was defeated. Subsequent legislation has divided the territory into two provinces named Papua and West Papua. There are also reports of continuing human rights abuses and massive environmental destruction which have taken place as the resource-rich territory is exploited by the Indonesian government to the detriment of the West Papuans. The main resource assets of the territory include gold and copper mining (mainly through the Freeport Copper mine), oil and gas reserves as well as extensive rain forests and their logging potential.

Until 2001 the region offered opportunities for Indonesia to extend its transmigration programmes. This was thwarted by the Asian economic crisis and other changing economic and social changes

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<sup>7</sup> N. Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword, the Story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, Melbourne, 1997, p. 16.

<sup>8</sup> Drooglever, *Papua a multi-faceted history*, p. 35.

by the government. The scheme was officially terminated in August 2002. Transmigration may continue on a local basis (intra-island) at the discretion of local government.<sup>9</sup> The transmigration programme certainly contributed substantially to the government's objectives. This was outlined in the following statement by the Minister for Transmigration, Martono, on 2 March 1986. "With transmigration we are implementing what we have promised: to gather and to unite all ethnic groups into a single people, the people of Indonesia. The different ethnicities will disappear and at the end there will be only one people."<sup>10</sup> There is no specific time frame mentioned in the Martono statement but Elmslie takes the view that West Papuans are faced with either independence or eventual extinction. "Their future is now in question."<sup>11</sup>

Almost certainly indigenous Papuans will become a minority both religiously and racially if current trends continue. In time it appears possible that some Papuans may adopt an attitude of "self identification" as Indonesian citizens and become more culturally assimilated with Indonesian ideals. If, however, the Martono policy continues, a combination of these circumstances may bring about the elimination of an ethnic identity. The population of West Papua, particularly the indigenous people, has not enjoyed any perceptible economic gains or social benefits from their experience with Indonesia. New development may add to the prosperity of the province but this is not shared by West Papuans. In fact this prosperity acts to the detriment of the inhabitants by attracting more Indonesian settlers; further marginalising West Papuans in their native territory.<sup>12</sup>

The territory continues to be subjected to the repressive tactics of the government through the deployment of thousands of army personnel to maintain security. Jakarta justifies the necessity of

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<sup>9</sup> M.A.S. Adhiati, *Indonesia's Transmigration Programme*, edited by A. Bobsien, July 2001, <http://dte.gnappc.org/ctrans.html.tide>. (Accessed 6 June 2010.)

<sup>10</sup> R. Barber, (ed), *Aceh - the Untold Story*, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Bangkok, 2000.

<sup>11</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 267.

<sup>12</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 268.

troops in the province due to the activities of the OPM involvement.<sup>13</sup> These factors summarise the nature of the problems experienced by the inhabitants of the province, particularly the West Papuan nationalists. The dilemma they face is in finding the means of preserving their national identity, protecting the welfare of their people and their resources. Despite some international support for their plight, the major powers which engaged in determining their present position, including the United States of America (USA), Australia and the United Nations (UN), continue to maintain their original conviction that the territory is part of Indonesia. As will be demonstrated in this thesis, the stance taken by the USA, Australia and the UN is, to a large extent, self-serving. The processes and the basis of the transfer of sovereignty of West Papua to Indonesia were flawed.

### **Initiation of Thesis**

This thesis was prompted by previous studies of recent political history of the Republic of Indonesia. Political unity of its provinces throughout the Indonesian archipelago was of prime importance to the Republic and was maintained by a political ideology which was supported by the Indonesian military. Two notable exceptions to the acquiescence to Indonesian rule were the provinces of Aceh and West Papua. Interest in West Papua developed through comparison of circumstances applicable to each in their resistance to Indonesian control. This exercise is not being repeated here even though there are some consistent themes in the experiences and objectives of both provinces.

Superficial examination of the issues applicable to the transfer of sovereignty of West Papua appears to be surrounded by controversy. The changing of American government policy concerning the future of the territory, Australia's vacillating attitude towards Indonesia and the role of the United Nations all affected the outcome. Despite general condemnation of the processes and outcome of the Act of Free Choice the transfer of sovereignty has received international acceptance

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<sup>13</sup> Pickell, *Between the Tides*, p. 34.

of existing political circumstances. The concern regarding the continuing plight of the indigenous people of West Papua under Indonesian rule is the motivation for this thesis. The author of this thesis acknowledges the value of the Widjojo Road Map as a possible guiding source for the planning of its contents.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> M.S. Widjojo, A. Elisabeth, Amiruddin, C. Pamungkas, R. Dewi, "Papua Road Map, Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future". Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) 2008.

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE MELANESIANS

Melanesia is not a country but a 'culture area' in a geographical region where people share many of the same traits. The name 'Melanesian' refers to the dark-skinned curly haired Papuans, as well as occupants of other islands in the neighbouring Oceania regions<sup>15</sup> such as Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Kanaky (New Caledonia), Fiji and the Torres Strait Islands between New Guinea and Australia.<sup>16</sup> Melanesians are descended from immigrants from south-east Asia, starting about 3000 BC, who originally settled the coastal areas of the Islands and later colonized the interiors. It is possible that many of these immigrant descendants see themselves as Melanesians because they were born in the territory but they may have all the physical characteristics of the Papuan Melanesians. Melanesia as a whole comprises a rich variety of cultures about which few secure generalisations can be made.<sup>17</sup>

A 1971 statistic reveals that non-Irian-born people represented 4% of the total population. "In 1990 non-Irian-born people consisted of 21% of a total population of 1.73 million."<sup>18</sup> Descendants from intermarriage of Papuans, Melanesians and Indonesians and migrants from the rest of Indonesia, including those from transmigration programmes, may possibly account for a large proportion of the estimated population of 2,646,489 in 2005. The West Papuan province of 421,981 square kilometers constitutes 22% of Indonesia's total land area and stretches 1,200 km from east to

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<sup>15</sup> World Cultures Norway to Russia, <http://www.everyculture.com/we/Norway-to-Russia/Melanesians.html>, (Accessed 29 April 2009).

<sup>16</sup> Anti-Slavery Society, "West Papua Plunder in Paradise", Indigenous Peoples and Development Series, Report No. 6, 1990, p. 9.

<sup>17</sup> J. MacClancy, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology, Oxford Brookes University, [http://au.encarta.msn.com/1997-2009/Microsoft\\_Corporation](http://au.encarta.msn.com/1997-2009/Microsoft_Corporation), (Accessed 4 May 2009).

<sup>18</sup> J. Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun. Indonesian Economic Development Versus West Papuan Nationalism*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p. 14.

west.<sup>19</sup> Rainforests with their valuable timber cover 85% of the territory and the terrain is variable, from rugged peaks in the north to enormous plains of swamp lands in the south. Being off the main trading routes of the Indonesian archipelago much of the land remains poorly surveyed and unexplored.<sup>20</sup> Rich deposits of copper and gold have been found in the mountains and pockets of oil in the lowlands.

The Melanesians have been inhabitants of West Papua for between 40,000 and 50,000 years,<sup>21</sup> Approximately 80% of these live in the interior<sup>22</sup> and have no ethnic or historical connections to Indonesia, nor are their traditions of song and dance or carving and painting related to the predominantly Muslim Indonesian traditions.<sup>23</sup> There are basically three broad classifications of Papuan people today and their cultures differ significantly from those of most Indonesians. The Papuans are a mixed race of Negrito, Australoid and Melanesian as they have long hair, are well muscled and are of a medium stature. The Melanesians vary considerably in physical appearance as they are taller and lighter than Papuans. The country's racial and cultural diversity has produced a commensurate number of languages.<sup>24</sup> As far as racial characteristics are concerned, the Papuans and Indonesians are as far apart from each other as they are from Europeans<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> D. Pickell, and K. Muller, *Between the Tides - a Fascinating Journey among the Kamoro of New Guinea*, Periplus Editions (HK) Ltd., Hong Kong, 2002, p.18.

<sup>20</sup> G.J. Missen, *Viewpoint on Indonesia. A Geographical Study*. Thomas Nelson Australia Limited, Melbourne, 1972, p. 29.

<sup>21</sup> Anti-Slavery Society, *West Papua Plunder in Paradise*, p. 9.

<sup>22</sup> M. Gault-Williams, Strangers in Their Own Land, *Cultural Survival*, 14:4, Winter 1990.

<sup>23</sup> Westpan, *Cultural Diversity in West Papua*, 10 January 2005, <http://www.westpapua.ca/?q=node/122>, (Accessed 12 January 2009).

<sup>24</sup> P. Hastings, *New Guinea. Problems and Prospects*, Published for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Cheshire, 1973 pp.10-11.

<sup>25</sup> A. Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization. The Dutch and West New Guinea*, Yale University Press, London, 1966, p. 23.

There are three categories of traditional Papuans divided by their lifestyles. The first are those who process sago into cakes or porridge for their staple diet, cultivate land and fish in rivers and beaches. The second group comprises nomads who also process sago trees to produce food but hunt boars and other animals. Fishing is infrequent but supplements their dietary requirements. The third group is valley dwellers from the central mountain range who live in small villages which are usually one extended family and cultivate the land with plants which include yams and canes but do not process sago trees. The daily form of clothing for men is the traditional penis gourd.<sup>26</sup>

In West Papua there is a great diversity of language amongst the ethnic population and there are more than 1,000 languages on the island of New Guinea alone.<sup>27</sup> There are two main language groups of West Papua – Melanesian and non-Melanesian. The non-Melanesian languages are “unrelated to any other language outside Papua except to those in the immediate surrounding islands.”<sup>28</sup> Some of these different languages have very few speakers whilst others such as the Enga group (from the province of Enga in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea) have a few hundred thousand. Many of these have never been described or documented, nor has a native writing system been developed. Oral history from stories passed down through generations is important to them and written literature is a recent Melanesian development. This written literature comprises transcriptions of folklore and oral history.<sup>29</sup> Non-Melanesian languages are often described as the Papuan languages and these are found on both coastal areas and hinterland. Only 43 of more than 234 languages in Papua are Melanesian. The original population of Papua was believed to speak

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<sup>26</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia Canberra, *The People and The Culture*, [http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/s\\_issues/papua/thepeople.htm](http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/s_issues/papua/thepeople.htm). (Accessed 6 December 2009).

<sup>27</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma*, p. 23.

<sup>28</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia. (Accessed 6 December 2009).

<sup>29</sup> World Cultures Norway to Russia, (Accessed 29 April 2009).

non-Melanesian languages but they were driven out of the coastal areas into the hinterland by new settlers.<sup>30</sup>

The West Papuan Melanesians have ethnic and social similarities to Papua New Guineans and are equally diverse in their local identities.<sup>31</sup> In urban Melanesia schools are part of life and education has reached some remote areas whilst in many parts, due to the isolation of villages,<sup>32</sup> there is no access to formal schooling. Traditional ways of life and the values of the society are the focus of education.<sup>33</sup> When Indonesia took over from the Dutch they improved the education system by increasing funding to primary schools. The first university, Universitas Cenderawasih in Jayapura was created in 1963 but after a few years only 7% of students were indigenous.<sup>34</sup> There are 13 private universities but Cenderawasih University was the only state run establishment<sup>35</sup> until November 2000 when the former faculty of agriculture became the Universitas Negeri Papua in Manokwari, in the province West Papua.

School education revolves around literacy (establishing reading and writing skills) in the national language.<sup>36</sup> Bahasa Indonesian is taught in West Papuan schools from grade one onwards. Church schools and missions provide more than 40% of education in private institutions.<sup>37</sup> As a pre-requisite for Christian mission schools to receive government subsidies they are required to teach

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<sup>30</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia. (Accessed 6 December 2009).

<sup>31</sup> Dorney, *Papua New Guinea*, p. 201.

<sup>32</sup> S. Upton, *Inside Indonesia* 86, April-June 2006.

<sup>33</sup> World Cultures Norway to Russia. (Accessed 29 April 2009).

<sup>34</sup> Upton, *Inside Indonesia* 86.

<sup>35</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia. (Accessed 6 December 2009).

<sup>36</sup> World Cultures Norway to Russia. (Accessed 29 April 2009).

<sup>37</sup> Upton, *Inside Indonesia* 86.

Bahasa Indonesia.<sup>38</sup> Education in Papua needs to be further developed as many inhabitants have not received any formal education. Some have not graduated from elementary school, and even fewer Papuans have received higher secondary or university education.<sup>39</sup>

There are an estimated 500,000 occupants of the valleys of the West New Guinea Highlands but in most parts fewer than 200 people make up a village or hamlet. Ecological conditions and social criteria including food resources and marriage customs, govern the size of the various groups. Regardless of size, all groups consider others, even close neighbours who have different cultures and languages, as foreigners.<sup>40</sup> Their political units are generally relatively small-scale and unstable. Traditionally Melanesians survive on slash and burn agriculture, clearing fresh ground every few years.<sup>41</sup> Depending on their location, their staple diet includes root crops such as yam, taro and sweet potato. Some also breed pigs, mainly used on ceremonial occasions, after which their meat is distributed to all participants, and coastal people supplement their diet with fish. Despite using primitive tools there was frequently a huge food surplus.<sup>42</sup> Some of the villagers make money by producing copra (the dried flesh of coconuts) as well as coffee and cocoa.<sup>43</sup>

In Melanesian society there is a great deal of hostility or opposition between men and women, although this hostility is not as dramatic in smaller groups as it is inclined to be among some of the larger ones. Men often spend most of their time in the large men-only houses which are off limits to all women and uninitiated males. Women do play important roles in ceremonial and political

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<sup>38</sup> D. Gietzelt, *Indonesia in West Papua: the Dynamics of Indonesianization* [sic.], BA(Hon) Thesis, Anthropology, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1985, p. 69.

<sup>39</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia. (Accessed 6 December 2009).

<sup>40</sup> Gault-Williams, *Cultural Survival*, Winter 1990

<sup>41</sup> MacClancy, (Accessed 4 May 2009).

<sup>42</sup> P. Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound. A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia*, New York: , Shoken Books, 1968, p. 15.

<sup>43</sup> MacClancy, (Accessed 4 May, 2009).

Melanesian life and are the primary food producers and caregivers to children.<sup>44</sup> Feuds occur between different ethnic groups, particularly involving land rights. These often end in full scale wars if the dispute cannot be settled amicably, but they do not always choose war and may accept compensation in the form of trade items. Pride is just as important as territory.<sup>45</sup>

The beliefs of West Papuans, both cultural and religious, are varied. The predominant religion is a mixture of animist beliefs (the worship of ancestors and spirits), although Christian and Islamic worship has increased.<sup>46</sup> It is generally accepted that animism refers to the belief that non-human entities, such as animals and plants, as well as inanimate (spiritless) objects such as rocks, can have souls. Often these entities must be placated by offerings in order to gain favours.<sup>47</sup> Christian missionaries are very active in this region although native religions are still practised in a modified form.<sup>48</sup> The last three decades have brought profound change to the area, the inhabitants of which have only recently abandoned the stone axe. Christian missionaries have had some success in replacing spirit worship with the Christian gospel.<sup>49</sup> In the 2000 census there were reported to be 78% Christians (Protestant and Catholic), 21% Muslims, and less than 1% Buddhists and Hindu in West Papua.<sup>50</sup>

In 1855 the Dutch first endeavored to spread Christianity in Papua and established a base in the Bird's Head area in Manokwari. It was not until 1956 that the Christian Church of Papua was established on the northern coast and islands. Catholic missionaries in the south established

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<sup>44</sup> World Culture, (Accessed 29 April 2009).

<sup>45</sup> R. Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War. The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, North Sydney, Allen & Unwin Australia Pty. Ltd., 1985, p. 3.

<sup>46</sup> A. Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 46.

<sup>47</sup> [www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Animism](http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Animism). (Accessed 14 May 2009).

<sup>48</sup> World Cultures, Norway to Russia. (Accessed 29 April 2009).

<sup>49</sup> P. P. Karan, *The Non-Western World, environment, development and human rights*, Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 259.

<sup>50</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia. (Accessed 7 September 2010).

themselves in 1894 but no significant results were forthcoming. The first Catholic schools were built in 1923, and in 1930 the Christian Church of Maluku established a mission centre in Merauke.<sup>51</sup> The non-Christian half of the indigenous population adheres to numerous and diverse magico-religious beliefs and practices which are an integral part of their traditional cultures and largely based on ancestor and spirit worship.<sup>52</sup> There has been an increase in Islamic followers due to the transmigration from Java and other islands to West Papua but the province is only one of two in Indonesia with a majority of Christians.<sup>53</sup>

There was an extraordinary number of cults that sprang up throughout the whole of Melanesia without receiving any published mention but they shared very many features.<sup>54</sup> Initiated by prophetic leaders, the 'Cargo cult' myth was promoted around imaginary things, objects, persons, culture heroes and ancestors. Invented stories or myths developed that people could obtain cargo (material possessions) like those acquired by Europeans, by using ritualistic practices. It had been apparent that the practices (rituals) by which the whites had acquired their cargo were very simple.<sup>55</sup> Melanesian cargo cults date back to before the first arrival of Europeans to the region, although documentation did not appear until the mid 1910's. Evidence shows that great value was placed on foreign items before any contact was made with the West. The belief existed that shiploads of these valuables would be brought by a messianic type figure.<sup>56</sup> Cargo cults appear to have flourished in areas where there has been lengthy European contact and low economic development. Due to the

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<sup>51</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia. (Accessed 6 December 2009).

<sup>52</sup> E. R. Hinz, *Landfalls of Paradise*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1999, p. 206.

<sup>53</sup> M.L. McDowell, *The Contextualization of Cargo Cult Beliefs and the Christian Message in Irian Jaya*, PhD Thesis, Oxford Graduate School, 20 July 1994.

<sup>54</sup> Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound*, p. 93.

<sup>55</sup> Hastings, *New Guinea Problem*, p. 27.

<sup>56</sup> McDowell, *The Contextualization of Cargo Cult Beliefs*.

better climate and soil in the Highlands, there has been more rapid socio-economic development and less evidence of Cargo cult, although it does exist.<sup>57</sup>

As we proceed to analyse the characteristics of some of the different groups it becomes apparent that anthropological and cultural differences create difficulties in composing a 'one fits all' definition of a Melanesian from West Papua. Their cultural background is clearly more closely aligned with the peoples of nearby islands of the Pacific than that of the Indonesians who now control their way of life.

### **Ethnic Groups**

As recently as 1998, two previously unknown ethnic groups were discovered living in a remote area of the province. These were the Vahudate and Aukedate groups found in the Jayapura district. Similar to some other tribes, these are tall, have dark skin and curly hair. They only communicate using sign language.<sup>58</sup> However, no information appears to have become available from any in-depth ethnological or anthropological studies. New groups are 'discovered' almost every year. Many still live in isolated areas, far from the reach of the government, in (almost) a near Stone Age existence.<sup>59</sup> Their lifestyles, languages, cultures and beliefs are diverse. West Papua as a whole has an extraordinary cultural and linguistic diversity, with over 250 languages and many more dialects. In other words, 0.01% of the world's population accounts for about 15% of known languages spoken.<sup>60</sup> Some of the many Papuan languages are related to others, but some are completely unique. Most ethnic groups are unable to communicate with others outside of their particular habitat.

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<sup>57</sup> Hastings, *New Guinea Problems...*, p. 29.

<sup>58</sup> Reuters Limited 25 June 1998, *Officials Discover New Tribes in Irian Jaya*, <http://forests.org/archive/indomalay/innewtr.htm>. (Accessed 3 February 2009).

<sup>59</sup> Harvestfield, 12 April 2007 <http://harvestfield.wordpress.com/2007/04/12/1998-new-tribes-found>. (Accessed 4 January 2009).

<sup>60</sup> Westpan, 'Cultural Diversity...' (Accessed 12 January 2009).

In addition to language, each group is autonomous with its own leaders, traditions and belief systems. If even a small number of people are displaced, a unique cultural heritage may be lost forever. Some groups used to practise cannibalism, but they did not eat human flesh for sustenance. It was generally a rite of passage into adulthood.<sup>61</sup> There are groups who live in houses built high up in the trees, often found 25 metres or more from the ground. The highland tribes live in the central mountainous region of West Papua and practise pig husbandry and sweet potato cultivation. The lowland people live in swampy and malarial coastal regions and survive by gathering, hunting and fishing the abundant game. The culture of some groups includes those who hold animist beliefs, live in a pig-based economy and have a tradition of head-hunting. They have very little in common with the predominantly Muslim culture of Indonesia.<sup>62</sup>

Due to limited space it is not possible to analyse and compare each West Papuan ethnic group; therefore, it is intended to compose a limited profile of the cultural and linguistic characteristics of several groups from different parts of the Provinces of Papua and West Papua for the purpose of making a distinction between the indigenous inhabitants and the Indonesian population. This may also serve to create an awareness of the problems faced by indigenous tribes in assimilating with Indonesianisation policies. The selection of ethnic groups was only influenced by the perceived differences between them. The extent to which they had been impacted by the outside world, geographical differences and the misfortunes suffered due to the processes of colonisation were some of the considerations applied. The intention was to demonstrate diversity by the selection.

### *Asmat*

The Asmat inhabit approximately 120 villages throughout a region in the forest of west central Papua which is also a swampy area. The group occupies approximately 20,200 square kilometers of

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<sup>61</sup>        *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup>        *Survival International* 2008, Papuan Tribes, <http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/papuan>. (Accessed 5 September 2008).

land both on and near the coast and their total population is estimated at 70,000.<sup>63</sup> The coastal Asmat are delicately built and short in height. Previously completely naked, today, in contrast, many of them wear Western clothes. They are gatherers and hunters and the cultivation of plants is unknown to them because their land is regularly flooded.<sup>64</sup> The Asmat are famous for their woodcarving, and once had the reputation as a cannibalistic tribe. But, over time, the influence of missionaries brought an end to this practice.<sup>65</sup>

The government has put increasing pressure on the Asmat who wish to retain their traditions. These traditions are intrinsically linked to their land to which they have no official title. This became particularly relevant in November 2001 when the government granted Papua 'special autonomy status'. In this connection the government also promised to give some control to the indigenous people if they could prove traditional claims to the land.<sup>66</sup> The Asmats believe that the key to their survival is in influencing the government as to the manner in which their traditional lands are used. Asmat villages are traditionally built on a bend in the river, the better for spotting canoe-borne raiding parties on the final approach.<sup>67</sup> They build one-storey long-houses (*jeu*), where they live together in groups of up to ten members. These houses are made from sago thatch, pole trees and tree bark and are sometimes 30 metres long.<sup>68</sup> The different sections of a village and their men's

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<sup>63</sup> Hile, J., National Geographic on Assignment, 6 February 2004, *National Geographic News*, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/49860708.html>. (Accessed 28 December 2008).

<sup>64</sup> Asmat Culture, [www.asmat-art.com/asmat-themen/eng-leute.htm](http://www.asmat-art.com/asmat-themen/eng-leute.htm). (Accessed 1 January 2009).

<sup>65</sup> L. Nikolova, PhD Thesis, *Bridging Prehistory, Traditional and Contemporary Rituals and Habits: Cult of the scull*, [sic] International Institute of Anthropology, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA.

<sup>66</sup> Hile, 'National Geographi.' (Accessed 28 December 2008).

<sup>67</sup> M. Anstice, *First Contact – a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Discovery of Cannibals* Eye Books, London, 2004, p. 33.

<sup>68</sup> Hile, 'National Geographi.' (Accessed 28 December 2008).

houses reflect the inhabitants' clan memberships and a man can gather political power and influence by marrying several women from different clans.<sup>69</sup>

Some notable events regarding Asmat history include the famed navigator and explorer Captain James Cook who was the first European to try to enter the Asmat territory when he stopped for water in 1770 in what is now Cook's Bay, a little south of Agats.<sup>70</sup> There have been reports of other explorers visiting the area who have reported on the hostility experienced, but it was in 1925 when the colonial Dutch set up a post just to the north in the neighbouring territory of Mimika. There were also reports in 1930 of an ambush by Dutch police and the Mimikan on an Asmat raiding party of 400 men. They slaughtered all but sixteen.<sup>71</sup> As economic development in the area progressed the inhabitants were to suffer exploitation by being forced to log the very forest that ensured their own sustenance and cultural survival.<sup>72</sup> This is referred to in a later chapter dealing with human rights.

Twelve cultural groups, several languages and a multitude of dialects can be found in Asmat. Their languages belong to the Papuan language family known as Asmat-Kamoro which has over 50,000 speakers. The central Asmat now have a written form of their spoken language and a version of Bahasa Indonesian is spoken by many Asmat men.<sup>73</sup> Village communities do not necessarily share the same linguistic or cultural background. Language and culture may influence each other.<sup>74</sup> The Asmat's spiritual beliefs centre around the use of woodcarvings in the form of ancestor poles,

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<sup>69</sup> Asmat-art, (Accessed 1 January 2009).

<sup>70</sup> Hile, 'National *Geographi*.' (Accessed 1 January 2009).

<sup>71</sup> Anstice, *First Contact*, p.19.

<sup>72</sup> P. King, *West Papua & Indonesia Since Suharto. Independence Autonomy or Chaos?* University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2004, p. 123.

<sup>73</sup> Countries and Their Cultures, <http://www.everyculture.com/wc/GermanytoJamaica/Asmat/html>, (Accessed 5 May 2009).

<sup>74</sup> Asmat-art. (Accessed 1 January 2009).

shields, canoes, drums, masks and ancestor figures. *Fumeripitsj* is a mythological culture bringer or creator and is strongly associated with the carving of wooden figures. Their rituals are used to maintain worldly balance and maintain contact with the ancestors.<sup>75</sup> Even though the Asmat interaction with the outside world has increased, they are still relatively isolated and their most important cultural traditions are still strong. Some have received higher education in other parts of Indonesia and some in Europe.<sup>76</sup>

### *Korowai*

The ethnic group Korowai is found in the south-eastern part of West Papua and it is estimated that there are about 3,000 members. “Until the 1970’s they were unaware of the existence of any other people except for some immediate neighbouring tribes.”<sup>77</sup> For reasons of safety the Korowai have chosen to live in the treetops. This offers them protection from enemies, from perceived evil spirits lurking around the ground and from heat as well as insects.<sup>78</sup> They access their houses by means of a springy climbing pole which can be pulled up if danger threatens. This means that intruders have little chance of making a successful attack. Family life takes place entirely within the tree house, which has separate areas for men and women, each with their own entrance.<sup>79</sup>

It was in the 1970’s that the Korowai came into contact with outsiders and since then only a few of them have become literate. They are hunters and gatherers, horticulturalists and fishermen who have a few gender-specific activities which are exclusively for adult males. These include the

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<sup>75</sup> *Absolute Astronomy*, <http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Animism>. (Accessed 14 May 2009).

<sup>76</sup> *The Asmat People – Irian Jaya Indonesia* [www.indonesia-tourism.com/east-papua/asmat.html](http://www.indonesia-tourism.com/east-papua/asmat.html). (Accessed 18 August 2008).

<sup>77</sup> Korowai Facts Discussion Forum , *Korowai* <http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Korowai>. (Accessed 9 February 2009).

<sup>78</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> *Indahnesia,[sic].com. Populations-Head-hunters* [http://indahnesia.\[sic\].com/indonesia/POPKOR/the\\_korowai.php](http://indahnesia.[sic].com/indonesia/POPKOR/the_korowai.php). (Accessed 6 January 2009).

preparation of sago and the performance of religious ceremonies.<sup>80</sup> Both women and men fish to supplement their diet. Sago and bananas are their basic food items and they have excellent hunting and fishing skills. Women raise domesticated pigs and men hunt for wild pigs with bows and arrows. Their lifespan is less than thirty years as they die at a young age, mostly from malaria and parasites.<sup>81</sup> It would appear that some of the more primitive practices of their history have not been entirely eliminated. Reports of cannibalism, although not entirely substantiated, cannot be ruled out.

Dramatic change came when the Indonesian administration imposed the *kampung* (Indonesian style) village system. The Korowai had to live together in Indonesian style, in houses close to the ground in neat rows amongst different clans or tribes.<sup>82</sup> This was radically different from their traditional form of living in tree houses. Since 1980 some have moved into villages at the Becking River banks. Other villages were opened in other areas in 1987, 1988 and 1989, but, due to the relatively long distance between the settlements and food resources, the village absenteeism rate is high.<sup>83</sup> Due to the imposed changes to their living conditions, the initial stage of living in the *kampung* is usually conflict ridden. Their world was turned upside down when their lifestyle changed to the use of iron axes instead of stone, the wearing of Indonesian clothing instead of penis gourds and skirt as well as the introduction of the institutions of local government, church, clinic and school and the money economy.

The language of the Korowai belongs to the Awyu-Dumut family (southeastern Papua). The language is called *Koluf-aup* (*aup* meaning 'voice'). *Kolfo-yanop* denotes Korowai persons or

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<sup>80</sup> Korowai Facts Discussion Forum. (Accessed 9 February 2009).

<sup>81</sup> *Country Information* [http://www.korindo.co.id/eng/localinfo/indoinfo\\_02\\_04.asp](http://www.korindo.co.id/eng/localinfo/indoinfo_02_04.asp). (Accessed 4 January 2009).

<sup>82</sup> G. Van Enk, L. de Vries, *The Korowai of Irian Jaya*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, pp.3-4.

<sup>83</sup> Korowai Facts. (Accessed 9 February 2009).

people who share the same language.<sup>84</sup> The Korowai beliefs are relayed through sayings and stories. They do not have belief in a single god but recognise *Ginol*, a powerful spirit whom they believe created the present world. They do not usually leave their tree houses after sunset, believing that evil spirits are most active at night. Eventually, as the younger members move to other settlements, only the aging group members will be left in the tree houses.<sup>85</sup> It is perceived from viewing video tapes and DVD's relating to Melanesians that the Korowai are the most primitive of the tribes discussed in this paper, an impression which appears to be supported by the condition of their cultural lifestyle.<sup>86</sup>

### *Dani*

The Dani have been chosen for this study because they represent the most populous and probably the most discussed of the ethnic groups in the province and are known for their distinctly different rituals and traditions.<sup>87</sup> Whilst population data cannot be guaranteed, available information places figures at around 250,000 spread throughout the highlands. The Baliem Valley has one of the highest densities of population in the province. Linguists identify a least four sub-groupings of Dani:

Lower Grand Valley Dani  
Mid Grand Valley Dani  
Upper Grand Valley Dani and  
Western Dani.<sup>88</sup>

The Dani first came to the attention of the west in 1938 following their discovery by an American adventurer, Richard Archbold, who landed his expedition in the Baliem. This followed sightings

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<sup>84</sup> van Enk, *The Korowai*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>85</sup> P. Raffaele, "Sleeping with Cannibals", *Smithsonian Magazine*, September 2006.

<sup>86</sup> Film Australia National Interest Programme, *Land of the Morning Star* (VHS) M. Anstice, *First Contact. A 21<sup>st</sup> Century Discovery of Cannibals*, 2004 (DVD)

<sup>87</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia...

<sup>88</sup> *The Dani Tribe – Baliem Valley* <http://www.indonesia-tourism.com/east-papua/dani.html>. (Accessed 18 August 2008).

of numerous farms and villages when the Dutch were flying over the Baliem Valley and occurred shortly before the Pacific war when they carried out aerial expeditions.<sup>89</sup> This was also the first contact that the Dani had with non-Melanesians.<sup>90</sup> The Dani live in village hamlets which are round in shape and are scattered throughout the valley. Only a few years ago the Dani lived in a Stone Age culture. Their tools were made of stone, bone, wood and bamboo. The digging of irrigation channels was carried out with wooden digging sticks. They are renowned for their sophisticated gardening systems which sometimes grow on steep slopes so sheer that women have to tend them suspended on vine ropes. Today steel implements have replaced most of the primitive tools with which their cultivation and gardening tasks were carried out. Cooking and eating implements have been similarly upgraded.<sup>91</sup>

As with numerous other ethnic groups, the pig features very strongly in local Dani culture. It is used in bartering and in dowries. Important events are celebrated with pig feasts and the local standing of a village chief or organiser is gauged by the number of slaughtered pigs.<sup>92</sup> After people, pigs are the most important living creature to the Dani. They represent wealth and social importance, and to own a large herd is an important goal. For a man, possessing several wives is as important as possessing a large herd of pigs as the wives are necessary to tend them. Owning and use of pigs is almost exclusively a male prerogative although the women and children are responsible for their care. The women also tend their sweet potato gardens whilst the men keep watch for enemy raids from a watchtower.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> R. Mitton, *The Lost World of Irian Jaya*, Oxford University Press, Australia and New Zealand, 1983, p. 12.

<sup>90</sup> Anti-Slavery Society, 'West Papua Plunder in Paradise', p. 11.

<sup>91</sup> L. Thompson, *Fighting for Survival. The Dani of Irian Jaya*, Reed Library, Port Melbourne, Australia, 1997, p. 20.

<sup>92</sup> *The Dani Tribe – Baliem Valley*. (Accessed 18 August 2008).

<sup>93</sup> R. Gardner and K.G.. Heider, *Gardens of War*, Andrew Deutsch Limited, London, 1969, p.41.

Whilst there are many similarities between the four sub-groupings referred to above, the focus of attention here will mainly relate to two groups – the Grand Valley Dani and the Western Dani. The former consists of the southern group extending into the Baliem Gorge, and the Central Group. The Western Dani inhabit the main and northern ranges.<sup>94</sup> Missionaries and government initiatives had a marked degree of influence on change to traditional habits concerning dress. The missionaries stressed that it was shameful to wander naked. Whilst it is the practice of Javanese to cover most of their bodies and they are affronted by overt sexuality, for most indigenous Papuans, near nudity is the universally respectable and not sexual practice. Consequently government initiatives with Operation Koteka formally banned this form of dress for Koteka is the Indonesian word for ‘tail’ and is a term used to describe the *balim* or phallocrypt worn by Dani men.<sup>95</sup> The objective of this initiative was to induce the Dani to wear modern type clothing as well as to teach them to speak Bahasa Indonesia, being part of the process to integrate them into Indonesian society. Whilst there are mixed views on the success of this project there is evidence that the dress of the Dani has changed dramatically. Incentives offered by the government in this venture included agricultural help, health facilities and social welfare. It is not possible, however, to determine the outcome of this undertaking. Dani living in villages close to roads or in villages frequented by tourists have, to a certain extent, adopted modern types of clothing.<sup>96</sup>

Another particular difference between Javanese and the Dani is that Javanese respect authority which is typically Asian in its obsequiousness. The indigenous West Papuans, on the other hand, are fiercely intolerant of attempts at domination. Tim Flannery explains that “no Dani man will ever let another lord it over him as a *tuan* prince does a Javanese *putani* (peasant). It is hardly surprising

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<sup>94</sup> Mitton, *The Lost World of Irian Jaya*, p 12.

<sup>95</sup> S. Codrington,, *Planet Geography*, Edition 3, Solid Star Press 2005, p. 743.

<sup>96</sup> Thompson, *Fighting for Survival*, p. 23.

that these differences have led to explosive situations.”<sup>97</sup> Some of the more notable differences between Dani tribes are in the cultural characteristics of the Western Dani from the Baliem Dani. The Western Dani have been more positively responsive to government policies and are far less warlike than their Baliem neighbours. One theory is that, due to their preoccupation with farming activities brought about by far less fertile soil, they have far less time to expend on warfare. On the other hand, their traditional opponents, the Baliem Valley Dani, have the benefit of superior soil and agricultural techniques, providing the time to engage in aggressive pursuits against their neighbours and possibly government policies. Warfare between the Dani was mainly driven by disputes over women and pigs (but also occasionally over land rights). The outcome of these conflicts was at times ambiguous due possibly to the exhibitionism of the parties.<sup>98</sup> A clear winner was never actually apparent from these conflicts which involved a great deal of posturing and aggressive mannerisms.

The spirit world of the Dani, which used to exist in their natural environment, is progressively bending to the influence of the numerous bands of missionaries who brought a variety of spiritual beliefs to the Baliem Valley. After years of rejection there is a greater interest by the Dani in Christianity to the detriment of traditional ideas. This is particularly so with the younger generation as the ranks of the older members gradually diminish. Due to geographical advantages including the early establishment of a major trade route in the vicinity, the Western Dani received a greater number of missionaries. Religious groups were widely represented by Protestants; Catholic missionaries entered the valley in 1958.<sup>99</sup> There is a view that Christianity has brought a greater degree of calm to the valley people, the consequence being that valley tribes fear less of ghosts or

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<sup>97</sup> T. Flannery, *Throwim Way Leg*, Text Publishing Company, Melbourne, Victoria, 1998, p. 225.

<sup>98</sup> Pickell, *Between the Tides*, p. 32

<sup>99</sup> Pickell, *Between the Tides*, p.48.

the magic of witches and sorcerers.<sup>100</sup> This may also negate the practice of Dani warriors who sat tense in their six metre watchtowers within range of their gardens and women in the spacious Baliem Valley.<sup>101</sup>

### *Amungme*

The Amungme are sometimes referred to as the Amung. There are several translations for their name but these appear to have no relationship with each other which creates uncertainty as to which is correct. In Carolyn Cook's dissertation relating to the *Tsinga* Valley people in West Papua she advises that the "me" in the name Amungme means man. She is inclined to leave off the 'me' unless specifically referring to Amung men and to use the word Amung-in for describing women.<sup>102</sup> The Amung are a Melanesian group of about 13,000 living in the highlands of West Papua on the southern side of the Sudirman Mountains. Population statistics could prove to be unreliable due to the fluctuating influx of people from neighbouring ethnic groups seeking opportunities, including employment arising from the Freeport mine operations. These groups include Dani and Asmat as well as several others within range of the Timika area. The Dani from the Baliem Valley (200 km northeast of Timika) are the dominant group that now constitutes up to 60% of Timika's highland population. This endangers the privileged position the Amung enjoyed as the original benefactors of Freeport's generosity. Prior to the dramatic change in local demographics occasioned by Freeport, Mimika (the district surrounding Timika) was mainly occupied by Amung and Kamoro tribes. The influx of outsiders to the area has been a source of friction with the Amung and has

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<sup>100</sup> Thompson, *Fighting for Survival*, p. 35.

<sup>101</sup> G.W. Trompf, *Melanesian Religion*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 20.

<sup>102</sup> C. Cook, *The Amung Way: The Subsistence Strategies, the Knowledge and the Dilemma of the Tsinga Valley People in Irian Jaya, Indonesia*, PhD. Thesis University of Hawaii, August 1995.

been marked by open conflict. In one incident between them and Dani intruders, eleven people died in the fighting.<sup>103</sup>

There is a wide variety of food comprising the Amung diet and they apply the practice of shifting agriculture. The primary means of subsistence is sweet potato supported by Taro and they also include a wide selection of greens and fruits. Other sources of food include that provided by trapping of birds and hunting in local forests. Pig does not constitute a major food source but pig husbandry plays a prominent role in the life of the Amung, particularly in tribal economics and rituals. The Amung have a strong sense of attachment to their ancestral land and consider the surrounding mountains to be sacred<sup>104</sup>. Their traditional spiritual beliefs relate to the appeasement of spirits of both the earth and their ancestors. Their first contact with Christianity appears to have been Catholicism introduced by Dutch sources, Evangelism appears to have been primarily developed by the Dutch when educating the Amung and returning them to villages to teach others. Caring for pigs is usually the task of women as well as planting, harvesting and cooking, which are also part of their family role, whilst men clear land, cut firewood and hunt.<sup>105</sup>

There will be further discussion regarding the Amung in a later chapter dealing with economic development issues, particularly relating to the Freeport mine. Maintenance of cultural traditions in this context will be reviewed as well as human rights, land rights and environmental concerns which have impacted on their way of life. A question of interest will relate to the compromises which the Amung will have to accept in order to capitalize on potential benefits from Freeport's occupation of their territory. They will have to accept issues upon which compromise is unlikely, such as the

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<sup>103</sup> J. McBeth, Asia Times Online::Southeast Asia news – 8 September 2006, *Papua: Bows, arrows, and a tense gold mine*, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast\\_Asia/H108Ae01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/H108Ae01.html). (Accessed 5 May 2009).

<sup>104</sup> Indonesia- tourism.com. (Accessed 18 August 2008).

<sup>105</sup> Cook, *The Amung Way*, p. 58.

allocation of land to Freeport by the government. They can, perhaps capitalize on employment opportunities.

### *Conclusion*

Whilst no firm conclusion can be drawn from such a small sample of Melanesian cultures, it does, however, demonstrate that there is a degree of differences and similarities between them. It also reveals that some characteristics may form cultural barriers to their smooth integration into an Indonesian construct. Prime examples in this respect are that there is a strong 'pig culture' among groups, an issue which may be a critical one in dealing with a predominantly Muslim nation. A second matter of concern is that some of the ethnic groups have a reluctance to be dominated by people in authority outside or even inside their own group. The result in this context can only create a propensity for conflict, particularly in the face of authoritarian rule.

Government initiatives to change the dress habits of the indigenous people have been successful to a certain extent – mainly with the youth. However, many Dani men still cling to the traditional dress of the Koteka. Visual evidence<sup>106</sup> indicates that Bahasa Indonesia is used to some extent amongst the groups reviewed but it appears that where this is the case it is a 'second language' only. In some groups there is a low level of literacy, partly because of resistance or, to a certain extent, lack of schools. Changes to the nature of their domestic dwellings have already caused discord where this has been imposed and in some cases where people have been dispossessed of land there is strong resentment.

Whilst the Korowai in particular maintain the traditional practices, other tribes have made considerable progress towards assimilation with modern behaviour and ideas. This is possibly due to developments in their region and the influence of missionaries. There is reason to suspect that the dominant physical environment (in this sense capital development) has exerted a powerful

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<sup>106</sup> Anstice, DVD, '*First Contact*'.

influence. This may be interpreted, on the one hand, that the practices of the government benefit the indigenous population and achieve government objectives. On the other hand, if this trend were to permeate all ethnic groups to the same extent it could possibly lead to the complete elimination of the Melanesian cultural identities in the province. Before passing from this analysis it is perhaps instructive to record the view of George Monbiot on the people of West Papua.

They were said by anthropologists to have evolved a social structure and a welfare system more stable and more accommodating than anything we know in the modern world. They had lived in more or less the same way for something like fifty thousand years and learned to use the forests they inhabited without destroying them. They had in those forests developed a culture of extraordinary colour and complexity, distinct in every way from that of other people.<sup>107</sup>

With reference to the definition of a Melanesian from West Papua raised at the outset, I now offer the following contribution (which remains a generalisation) based on the aforementioned criteria: An indigenous Melanesian from West Papua is a dark-skinned frizzy-haired individual possessing strong cultural ties which differ from group to group. They have varying physical characteristics, and are generally resentful of authority and protective of their traditions, but particularly resentful of the Indonesian government's oppressive control.

The limited analysis suggests that Melanesian nationalism remains evident by their resistance to changes imposed by the government authority which affects their way of life. Progress of the Indonesian government to subjugate the indigenous population does not show remarkable success after 45 years of control.

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<sup>107</sup> G. Monbiot, *Poisoned Arrows. An Investigation in the Last Place in the Tropics*, Michael Joseph Ltd, Great Britain, 1989, pp.4-5.

## CHAPTER TWO

### SOVEREIGNTY OF WEST PAPUA TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

#### *Early Colonialism – Foundational Developments*

The present status of the Provinces of Papua and West Papua<sup>108</sup> has evolved from a series of events commencing with the arrival of the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago at the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, staking their claim in 1606 and establishing their first settlement in 1828. This established a base from which they could protect their lucrative assets in the Dutch East Indies.<sup>109</sup> Due to the presence of other international powers in New Guinea the Dutch proclaimed, in 1848, the eastern boundary of the territory of West Papua at 141 degrees longitude. Correspondingly, the British and German governments acknowledged the West Papua border as the western boundary of their respective territorial interests in 1884.<sup>110</sup>

Dutch administrative control was later extended with government posts being founded at Manokwari and Fak Fak in 1898, in Merauke in 1902 and Hollandia in 1910. In 1927 the first interior post of the Dutch was located at Tanah Merah in the South. There were no serious signs of Dutch settlement until well into the twentieth century.<sup>111</sup> The potential for development of the territory's natural resources (oil) was discovered in 1907 although entry to the territory by oil

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<sup>108</sup> During its history the territory has had several name changes. Over time it has been referred to by officials, authors and others, sometimes inconsistently, as West New Guinea, Irian Barat, Dutch New Guinea, Netherlands New Guinea, West Irian, Irian Jaya and Papua. Until recently the territory has been more commonly referred to, particularly by many writers and inhabitants, as West Papua, irrespective of the official name. For the purpose of eliminating confusion in the narrative, the name West Papua will be used unless it becomes necessary to specify an alternate name.

<sup>109</sup> Tapol, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, London, Tapol, 1983, p.10.

<sup>110</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 20.

<sup>111</sup> Tapol, *West Papua*, p.11.

interests was refused for many years.<sup>112</sup> It is possible that knowledge already existed in this era of large deposits of nickel, cobalt ore together with chromites in the Cyclops Mountains. Gags Island near Bird's Head is also reported to hold ten percent of the world's known nickel and large deposits of copper are said to contain high concentrations of gold. Geological teams, who had arrived with allied troops commanded by General MacArthur, had the project of evaluating these pre-war discoveries which were made as early as the 1920's and 1930's. Their conclusions were never widely publicised before the Dutch were ousted.<sup>113</sup>

Prior to the Japanese occupation in 1942, Dutch control was limited to the coastal areas and the interior post in the Wissel Lakes region.<sup>114</sup> Only fifteen Dutch government posts and a number of mission sites were operating at this time.<sup>115</sup> Commercial activity was represented mainly by coconut plantations amounting to a few thousand acres and small scale production of copal<sup>116</sup> by Japanese companies. Traditional craft was traded to Indonesia and Chinese entrepreneurs were also active but this was on a small scale. In the period prior to World War II modern business activity was insignificant.<sup>117</sup> At this stage colonial rule by the Dutch may be described as one of its less intensive periods of industrial and administrative activity. This would change dramatically as post-war developments were to unfold.

The advent of the war in the Pacific brought a number of developments, particularly in Hollandia. Because of the excellent harbour it was used as a Japanese base and grew significantly following the counter-offensive by Allied troops in 1944. The massive influx of troops, ships, planes and

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<sup>112</sup> Tapol, *West Papua*, p. 11.

<sup>113</sup> Tapol, *West Papua*, p. 17.

<sup>114</sup> D.J. Neilson, '*Christianity in Irian (West Papua)*', PhD thesis, Sydney University, 2000.

<sup>115</sup> R. Garnaut and C. Manning, *Irian Jaya, the Transformation of a Melanesian Economy*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1974, p.11.

<sup>116</sup> Copal is a brittle aromatic resin used in varnishes, printing ink and paint.

<sup>117</sup> Garnaut and Manning, *Irian Jaya*, p. 11.

other equipment and supplies created the need for improved infrastructure and labour. Infrastructure included new roads, bridges, hospitals, barracks, theatres and stores. A major airstrip, connected by petroleum pipeline to Hollandia was laid at Sentani.<sup>118</sup> Rewards for labour are unclear. Garnaut and Manning note that “all effective males in surrounding areas were liable to labour service and one third was in service at any one time.” Villagers were given trade goods for performing odd jobs but it is not clear how the huge labour force (obviously embracing indigenous personnel and perhaps others) was rewarded.<sup>119</sup> Most of the development activity took place on the coastal fringes and centres such as Biak, Merauke and several others benefited from these externalities. The majority of the capital initiatives were funded by the government.<sup>120</sup> As a result Hollandia (now Jayapura) progressed to a level to provide it with the capacity to function in post-war years as the capital of Netherlands New Guinea.<sup>121</sup>

A great deal had changed for the Dutch in the post-war era. They had lost significant territorial advantage in New Guinea to the Japanese during World War II which they were unable to recover. They were also denied access to the considerable natural resources of West New Guinea. The Dutch position was frustrated by administration arrangements for New Guinea which was the responsibility of United States and Australia acting under a United Nations Trusteeship (1948). The territory was re-occupied by the Allies in April 1944. It was to become the US base (in Jayapura) for General MacArthur’s South East Asia Operations. At this stage both the United States and Australia were taking a more favourable view towards Indonesia in the dispute with the Netherlands. The issue remained deadlocked for a further thirteen years. Both Indonesia and the Netherlands took their case to the United Nations with negative results. Retaliatory action was later

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<sup>118</sup> Garnaut and Manning, *Irian Jaya*, p.12.

<sup>119</sup> Garnaut and Manning, *Irian Jaya*, p. 96.

<sup>120</sup> Garnaut and Manning, *Irian Jaya*, p. 26.

<sup>121</sup> Garnaut and Manning, *Irian Jaya*, p. 12..

initiated by Indonesia opening a military phase to the process of negotiations.<sup>122</sup> The Dutch were, however, extremely successful in negotiating the delay in the transfer of sovereignty of West New Guinea which was not included in the general transfer that passed to the United States of Indonesia on 27 December 1949.<sup>123</sup>

### *The Fundamentals of the Conflict*

The dispute over the sovereignty of West New Guinea has an extensive history with the parties to the dispute engaging in constructive but not always persuasive strategies to secure control of the territory. To immediately focus on the event which arguably sparked the conflict between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, obscures an important chain of events which underpinned the final outcome. The historic developments evolved from a series of treaties commencing in the seventeenth century. The Netherlands emerged as the leading power among a group of European contenders for control over the Moloccas, an island group at the eastern end of Indonesia.<sup>124</sup>

The basis of Dutch claims which sought to define the territories of the Sultans of Tidore, Ternate and Batjan may be found in the 1660 treaty between Tidore and Ternate under the auspices of the Dutch East India Company. Clause seven of the treaty stipulated that...”the King of Tidore pledges in (the interest of) doing good, that his dependant Papuans in every respect will definitely be restrained in their raids on the lands and peoples of Ternate or of the dependencies of the Company. Variants of this clause were incorporated in treaty after treaty with Tidore for almost two centuries.”<sup>125</sup> The task of settling competing territorial claims of several vassal states was initiated, including their claims to sovereignty over parts of New Guinea. The effect of this treaty was that

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<sup>122</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 21.

<sup>123</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization*, p. 23

<sup>125</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization*, p. 13.

“Papuan islands or all of their islands” belonged to the king of Tidore. The contract placed the Papuan islands in general under the King of Tidore without being specifically listed but was later detailed in a government communication of 14 January 1671.<sup>126</sup> However, this part of a “particular series of treaties with Tidore over a period of almost three hundred years furnished but one thread in the weaving of that curiously feudal pattern by which the Dutch ruled over the Indonesian Archipelago.”<sup>127</sup> This may well have fitted to the body of evidence described as the “official policy to maintain the polite fiction of Tidorese Sovereignty over Western New Guinea”<sup>128</sup>

In the treaty of 1872, Tidore recognised the full supremacy and sovereignty of the Netherlands over both Tidore and its dependencies, and also acknowledged “the indisputable right of the Netherlands Indies government to bring the administration of the entire realm or part thereof under its own control.”<sup>129</sup> The indisputable right was not exercised until 1949 incorporating Western New Guinea under direct control of the colonial government.<sup>130</sup> Dutch claims in relation to the transfer of sovereignty were based on the agreement reached at the Round Table Conference which was ratified on 2 November 1949. The agreement was that the Dutch were to transfer political sovereignty over the territory of the former Dutch East Indies with the exception of West New Guinea to the United States of Indonesia by 30 December 1949. This was exercised on 27 December 1949 and was contrary to Indonesian claims that *de jure* independence of the Republic was effective on 17 August 1945.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> R.C. Bone, Jr., *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem*, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1958., p. 11.

<sup>127</sup> Dorney, *Papua New Guinea*, p. 21

<sup>128</sup> A comprehensive historical analysis of the legal basis of Dutch claims to Western New Guinea is outlined in Bone (1958).

<sup>129</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization*, p. 24.

<sup>130</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>131</sup> B. Hutagalung, (Founder and Chairman of the Committee of Dutch Honorary Debts), *Indonesian Sovereignty Abused*, 2005, <http://www.kukb.nl/new/detil.php?id=20>. (Accessed 26 September 2010).

Indonesian interpretations of the treaty of 1660 are, in part, in agreement with those of the Dutch. They offered subsequent argument concerning two residencies in the province of the Moluccas, claiming that both residencies (Ambon and Ternate) had always been recognised as part of Indonesia. A map of the Government of the Netherlands is said to support these views. Indonesians say that “Papua was never mentioned as being separate from the Netherlands East Indies.”<sup>132</sup>

It appears possible that Indonesia could have laid claim to sovereign rights to Western New Guinea based on the historical unity of Tidore and New Guinea. However, an official report to the Indies government in 1906 stated that the relationship between Tidore and New Guinea was merely theoretical. The claims of historical unity were therefore regarded as nothing more than a legal fiction.<sup>133</sup> At one stage in the dispute Holland suggested the case be taken to the International Court of Justice. Indonesia disagreed with the proposal, claiming that the issue required a political rather than a legal resolution.<sup>134</sup> Still a matter of intrigue in the twentieth century following the Round Table Conference of 1949, the sovereignty of the territory was finally transferred to the Republic of Indonesia following the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969. Yet to be ascertained is whether this proves to be beneficial to the inhabitants of the Province. As pointed out by Robert C. Bone (1958) “It is difficult to see that anyone would gain from the creation of yet another unviable and essentially artificial miniature state. A Republic of Papua would have dubious life expectancy...; there seems to be only one course left.”<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, 2003, *Questioning the Unquestionable: An Overview of the Restoration of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia*, New York, p.10..

<sup>133</sup> *ibid*

<sup>134</sup> Dorney, *Papua New Guinea*, p. 203.

<sup>135</sup> Bone, *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea*, p. x.

There have been a number of independent states smaller than West Papua which have attained statehood since Bone made this statement. These included Samoa in 1962 (estimated population 193,000), Republic of Nauru in 1968 (estimated population 9322) the Solomon Islands in 1978 (estimated population 571,900), and the Republic of Vanuatu in 1980 (estimated population 224,564).<sup>136</sup> It is not clear if Bone's reference to "unviable and artificial miniature states" includes any of the above but omission of a 'Republic of West Papua' from such a list can be argued on the basis of its natural assets (gold, copper, oil/gas and timber). However, the political difficulties to be faced with the Republic of Indonesia would, in all probability, render the unfettered development of the economic potential very doubtful. Bone's viewpoint was that "a Republic of Papua would have dubious life expectancy...there seems to be only course left." Bone saw the historical and cultural ties as West Papua has had, all pointing in the direction of the territory becoming part of the Republic of Indonesia.

#### *Historical Background 1945-1969*

The most eventful and important period of West Papuan history is that of the 20<sup>th</sup> century when international powers engaged in negotiations concerning the control of the territory. These events had a significant bearing on the creation of the dilemma it now faces. With the exception of a few necessary digressions into earlier history, the analysis of events relating to the present status of West Papua as a province of Indonesia will commence from the year 1945. The surrender of Japan on 15 August and the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia by President Sukarno on 17 August in the same year were not only of historic importance but also marked the beginning of conflict between the Netherlands and the new Republic of Indonesia. This conflict involved the future control of territories within the Indonesian archipelago.

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<sup>136</sup> Central Intelligence Agency [US], *The World Factbook*, 11 April 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nr.html>. (Accessed 9 May 2011).

The Dutch quickly re-established control in West Papua after the withdrawal of the Japanese following their defeat in several locations in the territory in 1944 and the ultimate surrender in 1945. The Indonesians were also quick to assert their identity in the territory following the declaration of independence in August of 1945 with a number of incidents of the raising of the Indonesian flag in Hollandia and Biak.<sup>137</sup> The colonisation of West Papua by the Netherlands commenced another phase which was to last until September 1962,<sup>138</sup> when it was placed under control of a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). The colonisation of West Papua continued when its sovereignty was transferred to Indonesia commencing 1 May 1963. The transfer agreement contained provisions as to the exercise of the right to self-determination termed an Act of Free Choice to be held within five years.

#### *Principal Developments in the Dispute for Control of West Papua*

The future of West Papua had been raised in early post-war negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia commencing in 1945. At a conference in October 1946 at Pangkalpinang it was recommended by Eurasian representatives that separate constitutional status be granted to West Papua under continued Dutch rule. This was for the purpose of creating a viable new homeland for many Eurasians who were unwilling to subject themselves to Indonesian control.<sup>139</sup> Any action on this issue was deferred due to other uncertainties regarding Dutch-Indonesian negotiations concerning the future status of New Guinea.

#### *The Linggarjati Agreement*

On 12 November, 1946, the Linggarjati Agreement was concluded between the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. It provided for the establishment not later than 1 January

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<sup>137</sup> Neilson, *Christianity in Irian*,

<sup>138</sup> The period of the Netherlands control of West Papua was interrupted by Japanese occupation during World War II from 20/3/42 to 15/8/45.

<sup>139</sup> C.L.M. Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia 1945-62*, Crawford House Publishing, Adelaide, 2002, p. 62.

1949 of a federally organised United States of Indonesia exercising authority over the whole of the territory of Netherlands India.<sup>140</sup> This constituted a rather elementary blueprint of a sovereign Indonesian federation, the outcome of which was laid down in a draft contract.<sup>141</sup> The agreement was signed on 25 March 1947, the protracted period of negotiation being principally due to delays by the Republic.<sup>142</sup> The intent of the Linggarjati meeting was to solve disputes arising between the parties concerning remaining Dutch interests in the archipelago. Following concessions by both the Netherlands and the Republic, agreement was reached which resulted in the de facto recognition by the Dutch of Indonesian sovereignty over Java, Sumatra and Madura.<sup>143</sup> Importantly, the agreement also contained provisions relating to the self-determination of regions and states, including the right to decide not to join or secede from the United States of Indonesia. A similar provision was also included in the subsequent Renville Agreement.<sup>144</sup> With regard to New Guinea, the Dutch successfully argued that “self determination was not practicable for the time being since the population had not developed far enough to make such far reaching decisions”<sup>145</sup>. Although possibly not a planned strategy, the Dutch argument set the stage for the Papuans to speak for themselves at an appropriate future occasion – The Act of Free Choice. The agreement in essence meant the starting point of the dispute with the Indonesian nationalists who refused to accept the Dutch amendment.<sup>146</sup> Many Indonesians viewed the Linggarjati Agreement as a violation of Indonesia’s independence proclamation of August 1945 which implied sovereignty over the whole territory of the republic.

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<sup>140</sup> G. Souter, *New Guinea. The Last Unknown*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1963, p. 213.

<sup>141</sup> P. Drooglever, *Papua, a Multi-faceted History*, p. 107.

<sup>142</sup> Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*, p.62.

<sup>143</sup> *Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia London, Official Handbook 1996*  
[http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/unv\\_aug\\_4html](http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/unv_aug_4html). Accessed 31 January 2010.

<sup>144</sup> Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*, p. 45.

<sup>145</sup> Drooglever, , *Papua a Multi-faceted History*, p. 107.

<sup>146</sup> *ibid.*

### *The Renville Agreement*

Disputes soon arose between the parties regarding the interpretation of the Linggarjati Agreement which resulted in further hostilities. Within a week and based on information of a possible breakdown of negotiations between the Republicans and the Dutch, Australia and India sought the intervention of the United Nations Security Council in the dispute. A ceasefire order was immediately put in place together with an instruction for both the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to submit to arbitration of the dispute by a third party under the terms of the Linggarjati Agreement.<sup>147</sup> The United Nations Security Council established a committee consisting of representatives of Belgium, Australia and the USA to help find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The subsequent negotiations resulted in the signing of the Renville Agreement in January 1948. Under the agreement, the Republic conceded to the Dutch the territories that it had lost in the attack in return for another Dutch promise of eventual independence.<sup>148</sup> The future political status of West Papua would be determined through negotiations.<sup>149</sup>

Netherlands-Indonesian relations continued to deteriorate, with the Dutch launching a further attack against the Republic in December 1948. The realisation of the cost of continuing the campaign, together with pressures applied by the UN and the USA, brought the Dutch to the negotiating table once again. The decision by USA in 1948 to support the Republic brought about the Netherlands' judgment to end its colonial rule in December 1949.<sup>150</sup> The outcome of the Renville Agreement benefitted both the Dutch and the United States. The US had engineered a result bringing about control of economically wealthy parts of the Netherlands East Indies. In addition to diminishing the

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<sup>147</sup> D. Goldsworthy, (ed.), *Facing North. 2001, A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p. 155.

<sup>148</sup> C. Brown, *A Short History of Indonesia. The Unlikely Nation?* Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003, p. 167.

<sup>149</sup> C. Fernandes, *Reluctant Indonesians. Australia, Indonesia and the Future of West Papua*, Short Books, Melbourne, 2006, p. 52.

<sup>150</sup> Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*, p. 39.

destabilizing influence of the Republic, it had also kept the Soviet Union out of the decolonization process.<sup>151</sup> For the Dutch, in the tradeoff for a few plebiscites in Republican territory seized by the Dutch, they had been forced to acknowledge Dutch sovereignty. Extension of control over important parts of Papua and Sumatra was also legitimized by the agreement.<sup>152</sup>

Based on political principles contained in the Renville Agreement of 1948, sovereignty of the Netherlands Indies was to remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands for a prescribed period. The Kingdom of the Netherlands was then to transfer its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. The Renville agreement also provided that neither party would object if any state decided not to ratify the constitution and desire in accordance with the principles of Articles 3 and 4 of the Linggarjati Agreement to enter into a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Indonesia may have been gratified by acknowledgement of the stipulate of the eventual transfer of sovereignty throughout the West Indies. From their perspective the transfer implied the inclusion of West Papua.

Initiatives by the Dutch in 1948 in altering the Dutch Constitution and in 1949 by exercising their legal right under the Treaty of 1909 with Tidore brought West New Guinea under the control of the colonial government. This provided a definite basis upon which West New Guinea status could now be determined.<sup>153</sup> US influence in ensuing negotiations may have been present due to warnings by the US to Indonesian Prime Minister Hatta and other Republican leaders that it would only support a stable and friendly (ie anti-Communist) pro-US government.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Goldsworthy, *Facing North*, p. 160.

<sup>152</sup> Goldsworthy, *Facing North*, p. 159.

<sup>153</sup> W. Henderson, *West New Guinea. The Dispute and Its Settlement*, American and Asian Educational Exchange, Seton Hall, University Press, 1973, p. 19.

<sup>154</sup> J. Southward, and P. Flanagan, *Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror*, London, Z. Press, 1983, p. 25.

### *The Round Table Conference*

At the Round Table Conference (RTC) which was brokered under the auspices of the United Nations at The Hague on 23 August 1949, it was agreed that Holland was to transfer the sovereignty of the Dutch East Indies to the Republic of Indonesia. The notable exception to the transfer of the territories was West Papua. In this respect it was agreed that the status quo should be preserved temporarily, pending the final resolution of the matter within twelve months of the recognition of Indonesia's independence. The decision may well have developed as a compromise suggested by the United Nations Committee for Indonesia (UNCI).

After seven weeks of conference negotiations (out of a scheduled completion time of two months), the participants remained diametrically opposed. Difficulties over financial and economic issues contributed but the major issue was that of West New Guinea. The delay would allow for negotiations to be held in an atmosphere in which political decisions might not be so important. These circumstances presented the situation that for reasons of prestige and political positions it would be difficult for the parties to withdraw. For the sake of its own responsibilities under its own terms of reference the United Nations Commission was advised (possibly by Lieutenant Governor-General H.J. Van Mook due to his personal viewpoint and to placate Federalist opposition)<sup>155</sup>, to arrange a compromise. The main strategy was to specifically exclude the West New Guinea issue with the proviso that it could be subject to further negotiations within a specified time.

The period from 1950 to 1960 commencing from the time when the dispute was due to be settled by the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty was marked by numerous bilateral and multilateral conferences, negotiations between the parties and appeals to the General Assembly of the United Nations. By 1957 a stalemate was reached but continued after 1957 in an atmosphere of increasing

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<sup>155</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization*, p. 14.

tension between the parties.<sup>156</sup> The Indonesian government encouraged anti-Dutch sentiment initiating strikes by Dutch industries as well as a number of demonstrations. Failure of Dutch appeals to the UN General Assembly and an attempt on the life of the then President Sukarno escalated Indonesian sentiments against the Dutch. This culminated in the seizure of Dutch assets by Indonesia and expulsion of most of the Dutch nationals living in Indonesia (approximately 50,000 people).<sup>157</sup>

Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands broke down in 1960 following a major emphasis on the use of force by Indonesia. In this phase of the dispute Indonesia's armed forces were being aided by the US, the Soviet Union and the UK. "The Dutch reacted to the build-up of Indonesia's potential by strengthening their defence forces on New Guinea in order to maintain a balance of power."<sup>158</sup>

As the matter of West New Guinea had not been resolved within one year, as stipulated in the Round Table Agreement, a further major conflict developed between the Dutch and Indonesia. A concern for Indonesia was that if West Papua was granted independence other regions within the Republic such as Aceh and the Moluccas would also be encouraged to seek independence. A claim to the territory was subsequently made by Indonesia to the UN. This was unsuccessful as it did not secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly which was necessary to force the UN to act.<sup>159</sup> The dispute was brought before the UN by Indonesia in 1954, 1956 and 1957. On each occasion the claim failed on similar grounds. The action was, however, a moral victory for Indonesia as it drew the attention of the international community to the dispute over West Papua but

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<sup>156</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization*, p. 16.

<sup>157</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization*, p. 18.

<sup>158</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization*. p. 19.

<sup>159</sup> R. Cribb, and C. Brown, *Modern Indonesia. A History since 1945* Longman, London and New York, 1997, p. 66.

the Dutch remained in control. The lack of sufficient support for Indonesia's claims by the United Nations also precipitated Indonesia's actions which led to nationalisation of Dutch firms in Indonesia in 1958. Although Dutch influence had prevailed to this point in time Indonesia had not conceded its claims to West Papua.<sup>160</sup> In fact it was to be thirteen years from the date of the Round Table Agreement before a defining action occurred which triggered a chain of events that was to alter international opinion on the future control of the territory.

### *The Luns Plan*

A Dutch initiative in September 1961 was a proposal put before the UN on the future of West Papua. Presented by the Dutch Foreign Minister Luns, the 'Luns Plan' called for Dutch withdrawal from the territory with replacement by a 'commission', the role of the commission being the supervision of administration and organising a plebiscite to decide the territory's final status. The Assembly was divided on the issue with thirteen Black African, countries, all formerly ruled by France, as well as the Soviet bloc, supporting a competing draft saying "that any solution..must be based on the principle of self-determination of peoples." It also called for further bi-lateral negotiations and proposed an investigation by a United Nations commission to investigate the situation in the event of a failure of negotiations. This draft was accepted by the Dutch, primarily because of the inclusion of the self-determination clause as well as the concept of direct bilateral negotiations.<sup>161</sup>

Despite dissent from those supporting the case for Indonesian control, the US voted with the Dutch on the UN resolution, principally due to the condition set by the Netherlands for the inhabitants of the territory to be afforded the right to exercise freedom of choice in regard to the future control of

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<sup>160</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 10.

<sup>161</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, pp. 106-107.

the area.<sup>162</sup> Underlying this proposal was a notion developing in Dutch political circles during the 1950's towards 'internationalising' the West New Guinea problem with the objective of relieving the Netherlands of exclusive responsibility. The initial idea to form a trusteeship agreement between the Netherlands and the United Nations was rejected in the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament. Then, in 1960, a more detailed proposal was put forward in the Second Chamber, along the same lines as the 1958 motion. This provided that the Netherlands would continue to administer West New Guinea in an arrangement involving the United Nations and the Netherlands in trusteeship capacity to administer West New Guinea for a period of ten years after which the General Assembly would decide on the future of the territory.<sup>163</sup>

As late as 1960 the Dutch Foreign Minister, J.M.A.H. Luns, rejected the notion of the United Nations' involvement with Dutch administration in the territory. However, a further escalation of tensions with Indonesia regarding new development plans for the territory by the Dutch brought about a change in attitude. This was formally confirmed in an address to the General Assembly. On the subject of West New Guinea, Luns stated "The Netherlands is prepared to subject its policy and its actions, aimed at the speediest possible attainment of self determination by the Papuan people to the continuous scrutiny and judgment of the United Nations."<sup>164</sup> Behind Dutch initiatives was the confidence that when faced with the necessity of choice, the autochthonous population would reject Indonesian control.<sup>165</sup>

The main elements of the Luns Plan, as outlined in the Foreign Minister's address during the general debate, were as follows:

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<sup>162</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 125.

<sup>163</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, pp. 100/101.

<sup>164</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, pp. 100-101.

<sup>165</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 103.

First, the Netherlands is prepared to bring the administration and the development of the Territory under the active supervision of the United Nations and is prepared to accept a decision of the General Assembly which clearly guarantees the right of self-determination of the population.

Second, to this end the Netherlands is prepared to relinquish sovereignty to the people of Netherlands New Guinea.

Third, in this connexion the Netherlands is prepared to transfer its present powers, to the extent required by the above purpose, to an organization or international authority established by and operated under the United Nations, which would be vested with executive powers and which could gradually take over tasks and responsibilities and thus prepare the population for early self-determination under stable conditions.<sup>166</sup>

The response in favour of the resolution based on the Luns Plan did not achieve the required majority to be passed by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).<sup>167</sup> A thirteen member draft resolution supporting a solution on the principle of self-determination did win a majority of votes cast. Unfortunately the resolution did not achieve the two-thirds majority required for adoption.<sup>168</sup> It would appear that the US support for the resolution was to be interpreted as a vote in favour of the right to political self-determination for West Papua which did not compromise its position in relation to policy decisions concerning the Netherlands and Indonesia. In fact, for the US, political influence had decidedly turned in favour of Indonesia following Sukarno's meeting with President Kennedy in the US in April of that year. Although the Luns Plan was not to proceed, the concepts raised would have a significant bearing on the formation of the subsequent Bunker Plan. Luns protested the provisions relating to the transfer of the territory to Indonesia prior to self-determination. He finally gave the plan his support on the basis that it could be used as a basic framework from which to secure political advantages for the Papuans.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>166</sup>        *ibid.*

<sup>167</sup>        Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p. 11.

<sup>168</sup>        Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 204.

<sup>169</sup>        Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p. 12.

*The Bunker Plan*

On 17 January 1962 an invitation by U. Thant, Secretary-General of the UN, for the Netherlands and Indonesia to meet with him to discuss the possibility of direct negotiations on West Papua was unsuccessful. This was due to Indonesian insistence that any negotiations were to be based on the precondition that West Papua will eventually pass to Indonesian control. In the following month the discussions were reconstituted due to the persuasive efforts of US Attorney-General Robert Kennedy in visits to both the Hague and Jakarta.

The bilateral agreement reached under the Bunker Plan was the culmination of numerous political initiatives and meetings held over several decades on matters of significant importance to the future of West New Guinea. Although the Agreement was actually agreed to by the Netherlands and Indonesia, the contributing participants included the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, Attorney-General of the United States, Robert Kennedy, President Sukarno of Indonesia, Foreign Minister Subandrio of the Republic of Indonesia and Ambassador Bunker as mediator representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations. By the time the Netherlands and Indonesia had reached the negotiating table on 20 March 1962, a great deal of informal preparatory work had been accomplished by others. The United Nations and the United States had already contributed significantly to the search for settlement. Establishing a basis for discussions and creating an environment in which the negotiations could take place were important contributions. Notable in this respect were the visits by Robert Kennedy to both Jakarta and The Hague in February 1962.<sup>170</sup> According to William Henderson, the United States “asserted an effective leadership role over the course of discussions, which took place in the presence of Ambassador Bunker as mediator.”<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p. 12.

<sup>171</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 180.

Although diplomatic reports on the progress of the talks were encouraging and conducted in an atmosphere of co-operation, the reality was that the talks had not gone well. Both sides were, at this stage, rigidly following pre-set programmes with the Indonesians confining discussions to administrative matters and the Dutch striving to safeguard the rights of Papuans to self-determination. The Indonesians subsequently announced their withdrawal from the talks. A government spokesman advised that “We are awaiting further diplomatic developments”. He also denied that the door was closed to further talks. At this time Indonesia continued to increase military pressure in West New Guinea.<sup>172</sup> A possible motive for this was to create further United States involvement in the dispute, thus putting more pressure on the Dutch with favourable strategic advantages to Indonesia.<sup>173</sup>

Disturbed by the stalling tactics, President Kennedy wrote to President Sukarno urging that talks be resumed, but Indonesian military activities continued for the period to August, which was the date of the final settlement.<sup>174</sup> The intervening months were also punctuated by the Soviet military aid programme and delivery of arms to Indonesia. General Nasution used the occasion to promise that the current offensive would continue. He also stated the government “had no more faith in negotiations with the Netherlands” and “We have only one reply now – to step up our policy of confrontation – especially in the military field.”<sup>175</sup> The military action by Indonesia did not really amount to a significant operation with only a small number of troops employed.

On 2 April, Bunker submitted a comprehensive programme to resolve the West New Guinea dispute. Fundamental to this was that the Netherlands’ government would “stipulate the transfer of administrative authority over West New Guinea to a temporary executive authority under the

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<sup>172</sup> Souter, *New Guinea, the Last Unknown*, p. 183.

<sup>173</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, pp. 181-182.

<sup>174</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 182.

<sup>175</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 183.

Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations at a specified date.”<sup>176</sup> A mutually acceptable non-Indonesian would also be appointed to administer the territory for a period of not less than one year but not more than two. Termination of the Netherlands’ administration was to be arranged to give the West Papuans their rights to freedom of choice as prescribed in the agreement. Indonesia would have the responsibility to make arrangements with the assistance and participation of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations and United Nations’ personnel, to give the people of the territory to exercise the freedom of choice not later than six years after Indonesia has assumed full administrative control of West New Guinea.<sup>177</sup>

Arising from final negotiations, and on the insistence of Foreign Minister Subandrio, the duration of the United Nations’ administration was shortened drastically and the transfer of authority was to be completed by 1 January 1963. It was to be the responsibility of Indonesia to arrange an act of free choice before the end of 1969 to determine whether or not the West Papuans wanted to remain under Indonesian jurisdiction.<sup>178</sup> During this period, the UN and Indonesia had to guarantee fully (under Article 22 of the New York Agreement) the rights of the West Papuan people to free speech, freedom of movement and freedom of assembly.

Subandrio also requested that the Indonesian military forces presently in the territory be allowed to remain. These issues were finally resolved in line with Indonesian requests. A concession won by the Dutch was agreement to fairly detailed provisions relating to the act of self-determination by the Papuans.<sup>179</sup> Thus, the Bunker Plan became the means of overcoming the main points of difference between the Netherlands and Indonesia and resulted in the New York Agreement which was signed on 15 August 1962 by the Foreign Minister Mr. Subandrio as the representative of the Government

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<sup>176</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 184.

<sup>177</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 184.

<sup>178</sup> *Human Rights in Indonesia. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations*, <http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/HumanRight/irianjaya.htm>. (Accessed 29 November 2009).

<sup>179</sup> *ibid.*

of Indonesia, Mr. J.H. von Roijen and Mr. C. Schurmann, as the representatives of the Netherlands Government at the United Nations in New York.<sup>180</sup> Saltford states that “it was a great victory for Indonesia”. For the Dutch, “the only achievement was to avoid war.”<sup>181</sup> The benefits for the inhabitants of West New Guinea remain debatable.

#### *Sukarno Dynamics 1945-1965*

Indonesian President Sukarno obviously tired of Washington’s non-committal attitude through the 1950’s. Frustrated by the tactics of the Netherlands in relation to the settlement of the West Papuan issue, he introduced initiatives which would have a major effect on international relations and policy decisions of the major players. The American apparent indifference was due, to a certain extent, to the Netherlands’ membership of NATO and maintaining the alliance. The escalation of tensions between the Netherlands and Indonesia around 1957, in addition to internal criticisms, induced the United States to rethink its position on West Papua.<sup>182</sup>

There was growing concern that the West Papua issue could lead Indonesia towards a Communist coalition. Sukarno had, by 1959, developed close association with Communists, including Ho Chi Minh.<sup>183</sup> There was also evidence of increasing Communist influence on the Indonesian government which was generated by the Indonesian Communist Party, *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI). Sukarno’s anti-Western rhetoric only added to international concern. A gifted and verbose orator, Sukarno had a profound ability to raise the nationalist fervor of his followers and encourage mass participation in political rallies and parades. Without a similar regard for truth he sometimes appealed to the nationalist psyche based on mythical historic events with the obvious intent of

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<sup>180</sup> Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Seoul South Korea, *The History of the Return of Irian Jaya (West Papua) to Indonesia*, [www.indonesiaseoul.org/archives/archives.htm](http://www.indonesiaseoul.org/archives/archives.htm). (Accessed 29 November 2009).

<sup>181</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover...*, p. 13.

<sup>182</sup> Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*, p. 294.

<sup>183</sup> P. Edwards, and G. Pemberton, *Crisis and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965*, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1992, p. 201.

stimulating the visions of Indonesians for the future. His views that West Papua should belong to the Republic were strongly supported by a vast majority of Indonesians.<sup>184</sup>

President Sukarno was considered by some to be an unpredictable leader<sup>185</sup>. His statements in November and on 19 December 1961, including his now famous *Trikora* speech calling for a general mobilization to defend national independence and unity, implied that he was going to take the territory by force. This may have finally persuaded the Kennedy administration to support Indonesia's claim.<sup>186</sup> This meant that Australia and the Netherlands would also have to be persuaded to fall in line with the US change of policy. Due to its military limitations, Australia would continue to need US support to maintain its position as a regional power,<sup>187</sup> therefore it was entirely predictable that Australia would follow US policy on West Papua. Diplomatic efforts by the US in this respect soon became effective as evidenced in statements made by Australia's new Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, who argued in 1962 that Australia's principal interest was to secure Indonesia's friendship and for that reason Australia should support moves through the UN to transfer the sovereignty of West Papua to Indonesia.<sup>188</sup>

Barwick also appeared to reverse previous strategic assessments of the importance of West Papua to Australian interests in saying that he saw no evidence whatever of any threat to Australia from Indonesia.<sup>189</sup> This action certainly reduced Australia's profile as one of the major participants in the dispute, at the same time losing prestige on the international stage as a result of its major reversal of

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<sup>184</sup> Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle*, p. 287.

<sup>185</sup> Sukarno's actions to nationalise Dutch businesses in 1957 and withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations in 1965, could be considered as examples.

<sup>186</sup> Edwards and Pemberton, *Crisis and Commitment*, p. 230.

<sup>187</sup> C. Mackerras, *Eastern Asia*, second ed., Longman Australia Pty. Ltd., Australia, 1995, p. 619.

<sup>188</sup> B. Ross, *Australian Involvement in the Vietnam War, the Political Dimension*, Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia, 1995, <http://www.vvaa.org.au/bross-2.htm>. (Accessed 21 May, 2009).

<sup>189</sup> *ibid.*

policy. Sukarno had achieved his goal in the face of Australia's opposition. By the end of 1961 the Dutch also appeared to have agreed with American diplomatic initiatives concerning West Papua but nevertheless remained defiant in relation to the precondition of the right of self-determination.

The 1960's for Sukarno must have surely tested his management ability; he sustained the political initiative in both domestic and foreign policy and was at the forefront of several international conflicts including the West Papua campaign (1960-1962) and the confrontation against Malaysia (1963-1966). In 1962, having approved of the broad outlines of the American attempts to solve the West New Guinea problem peacefully, he declared that he would reject critical conditions of the all-important Bunker Plan to which he had previously agreed. This was accompanied by threats of military action if his demands were not met.<sup>190</sup>

In 1965 he made the decision to withdraw from the United Nations as well as from the *berdikari* (economic initiative) campaign.<sup>191</sup> In May 1965, consistently provocative, Sukarno ruled out conducting the act of self-determination for West Irian, claiming that the Irianese (Papuan) considered it was not required.<sup>192</sup> His demise as President also came in this period following an attempted coup by a group of army officers. The coup was subsequently defeated by the military headed by General Suharto. At this time the nation was in a state of political and economic turmoil. Nevertheless, from an Indonesian perspective, Sukarno's political guile and unflinching determination in relation to the West Papuan dispute saw him outsmart significant international opposition to retain the unity of its territories within the archipelago and secure an extremely valuable asset for the nation. From 1969 until 1998, the entire province was designated a Military Operations area (*Daerah Operasi Militer*, or DOM). Following the fall of the Suharto regime the

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<sup>190</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 187.

<sup>191</sup> H. Dick, et al., *The Emergence of a National Economy*, Allen & Unwin and University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2002, p. 186.

<sup>192</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p.xxi.

status of the province was lowered to “Critical Control Area” (*Pengawasan Daerah Rawan*, or PDR).<sup>193</sup>

#### *Australia and Vacillating Policy*

An examination of Australia’s relations with Indonesia and the Netherlands for a fifteen year period since World War II would not enable a conclusion to be drawn as to where allegiance truly lay. In 1950 there was political unrest in the area of the Moluccas arising from centralizing policies of the Indonesian Republic. A separate ‘Republic of the South Moluccas’ was proclaimed with the intention to secede from Indonesia. The Dutch government, however, did not recognise this event. Although unsuccessful the revolt, which had been met by forceful resistance by Indonesia, continued for many years. There was a large influx of Ambonese to the Netherlands and their cause drew widespread sympathy. This formed Dutch opinion that Indonesians could not be trusted.

The circumstances of the Ambonese rebellion had a flow-on effect on Dutch policy attitude towards New Guinea. The rebellion had demonstrated that the Dutch had betrayed the minorities by reaching an agreement with the Republicans. This was an event never to be repeated in the case of West New Guinea where Dutch control was to be maintained.<sup>194</sup> Australia had been one of the major critics of the Dutch in the Indonesian crisis, even though it had shown clear support for Indonesia with the United Nations. From 1950, Australia changed course in relation to West New Guinea, giving the Dutch their support for control over the territory. This was a development which may have strengthened Dutch resolve in relation to its stance on the West New Guinea issue.<sup>195</sup>

Australia continued to give strong public and diplomatic support throughout the 1950’s. Significant in this respect was a joint statement in 1957 by The Hague and Australia towards progressively

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<sup>193</sup> Pickell and Muller, *Between the Tide*, p. xix.

<sup>194</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonisation*, p. 127.

<sup>195</sup> *ibid.*

closer bonds until such time as the inhabitants of West New Guinea could intelligently exercise the right of self-determination. Australia also supported the Dutch in various debates at the United Nations in this era.<sup>196</sup> No military agreement between Australia and the Dutch was ever concluded.<sup>197</sup> A change in Australian politics in 1949 provided further comfort to the Dutch position when the “Liberal-Country Party coalition significantly modified the pro-Indonesia policy of its Labor predecessor.”<sup>198</sup> The Menzies government was strongly opposed to the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesian control.

As the crisis entered 1962, the United States abandoned its previous position of neutrality and began to exert pressure on the Dutch to withdraw.<sup>199</sup> Sukarno’s confrontational approach had been successful in August 1962 but only after the United States had made the position of the Dutch more difficult to effectively involve itself in the contest.<sup>200</sup> The early 1960’s brought about increased pressure from Indonesia, with visits by President Sukarno to Washington and by General Nasution to Canberra. The Australian government reiterated to General Nasution the statements made to Dr. Subandrio in 1959. Sukarno also placed significant orders for Soviet arms during this period. In mid 1961, Australia was being criticized by Indonesia for “having become tougher than the Dutch”. Australia remained intransigent in its objective in keeping West New Guinea out of Indonesian hands until the joint intervention of the United States and the United Nations.<sup>201</sup>

In December 1961 General Nasution contradicted a previous assurance to Australia that Indonesia would not resort to force by announcing that Indonesia was ready to liberate New Guinea “even if it

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<sup>196</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 65.

<sup>197</sup> Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonisation*, p. 64.

<sup>198</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p.64

<sup>199</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 112.

<sup>200</sup> Souter, *New Guinea the Last Unknown*, p. 229.

<sup>201</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea*, p. 69.

means starvation, hardship and death”.<sup>202</sup> In 1962 Australia confirmed the extent of its neutral position in a statement by Sir Garfield Barwick, the Minister for External Affairs. This was followed by a more concise policy statement by Prime Minister R. G. Menzies which, in part, stated “we act in close collaboration with the great free Powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States of America”.<sup>203</sup> He also reiterated Australian policy of self-determination and agreed to recognise any settlement freely reached between Indonesia and the Netherlands including a decision from the International Court of Justice. The aforementioned traces the principal changes of policy by Australia to the end of 1962 without attempting to fully explain the rationale behind the decisions taken.

There has been much debate as to the reasons that convinced Australia to abandon support for the Dutch in 1962. One explanation was that Australia was forced to stand aside due to diplomatic and international pressures. Sir Garfield Barwick advanced the reason for a change in policy as the need to cultivate friendly relations with Indonesia. “Archival documents from Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States do not reinforce this view. In fact, “the Americans and the British presented Australia with a *fait accompli* – they were determined that Indonesia should get West New Guinea regardless of Australian preferences.”<sup>204</sup>

Another perspective on the issue of the consolidation of the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch is a well supported argument that “defence of New Guinea is really integral to the defence of Australia”.<sup>205</sup> Richard Casey (Australian Foreign Minister 1951-1960) advanced another security concern, that “the major threat to Australia is the Southward movement of communism and that

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<sup>202</sup> Souter, *New Guinea the Last Unknown*, p. 227

<sup>203</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>204</sup> S. Doran, *Toeing the Line: Australia's abandonment of 'traditional' West New Guinea Policy*, *The Journal of Pacific History*, Volume 36, Issue 1, June, 2001, pp.5-18.

<sup>205</sup> J. Andrews, J. Wilkes, (eds), in *New Guinea and Australia*, Australian Institute of Political Science, 24<sup>th</sup> Summer School, Angus & Robertson Ltd., Canberra, 1958, p. 183.

Dutch administration in Western New Guinea is the best guarantee of its exclusion from the area”<sup>206</sup>  
But for Australia there may have been a developing awareness that it could not support the Netherlands if America did not unconditionally hold the same view.<sup>207</sup>

Australia’s preoccupation with considerations of national security in relation to the dispute under discussion may well have started at the commencement of the 1950’s. Sir Percy Spender, in an address to the First Committee of the General Assembly, said (in part) that “New Guinea has been shown to represent the very key to Australia’s defence.”<sup>208</sup> There is thus a time-honoured emotional concern expressed by politicians of different political persuasions that arguments surrounding Australia’s security loom largely in the Australian psyche. It is argued, however, that the idea “if we lose New Guinea we lose the war” may be an outmoded concern due to advancing techniques and technology of war.

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<sup>206</sup> Andrews and Wilkes, *New Guinea and Australia*, p. 183.

<sup>207</sup> P. Drooglever, “*Een Daad Van Vrije Keuze*,” Project SafeCom.Inc, Edited by TAPOL, November 2005, [www.safecom.org.au/drooglever.htm](http://www.safecom.org.au/drooglever.htm). (Accessed 15 December 2009).

<sup>208</sup> Drooglever, “*Een Daad Van Vrije Keuze*,” (Accessed 15 December 2009).

## CHAPTER 3

### TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY

#### *Processing the Solution*

The United States elections of November 1960 introduced a new dynamic to the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia with the election of John F. Kennedy as President,<sup>209</sup> the perception being that developments relative to the settlement of the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia moved more quickly towards a conclusion. The Luns Plan which played a significant part in developments leading to the formation of the New York Agreement was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations within a year of Kennedy's appointment as President.<sup>210</sup> This played a part in developments leading to the formation of the New York Agreement and the Act of Free Choice.

The New York Agreement laid down the conditions of the transfer of administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia. It is noted that "throughout it all no Papuan had been involved in, or was party to, the Agreement".<sup>211</sup> To facilitate the establishment of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) the Secretary-General of the United Nations quickly moved to arrange cease-fire operations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. This included communication to Indonesian troops in the jungle which was carried out by United Nations' personnel.

The Secretary-General appointed Brigadier Indar Jit Rikhye , a Major General in the Indian army, military adviser. Six member states (Brazil, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Nigeria and Sweden) agreed to provide twenty one observers for this purpose. All actions concerning hostilities had been

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<sup>209</sup> Drooglever, *Een Daad Van Vrije Keuze*. (Accessed 15 December, 2009).

<sup>210</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>211</sup> Anti-Slavery Society, *West Papua Plunder in Paradise*, p. 29.

completed by 21 September 1962. With aerial support being supplied by the United States Task Force and the Canadian Air Force, the United Nations helped supply Indonesian troops with food and medicine as well as assisting with regrouping them in selected places. Over 500 Indonesian political detainees were repatriated as part of this initiative.<sup>212</sup>

The administration of the territory by the UNTEA commenced on 1 October 1962 and it was to transfer its authority to the Republic of Indonesia on 1 May 1963. Following the cessation of hostilities, priorities for the administration became the maintenance of law and order. To this end an internal law and order security force was established which became the ‘police arm’ of the UNTEA, the internal law and security force with responsibilities of ensuring the smooth implementation of UNTEA’s mandate to supervise the build-up of a viable local police force.<sup>213</sup> To assist with the maintenance of law and order approximately 1,000 Indonesian paratroopers who had previously been in the jungle were permitted to stay as Indonesia’s West Irian Contingent.<sup>214</sup>

A peacekeeping force of 1,500 Pakistani troops was also made available at the request of the Secretary-General. “This was an unexplained decision and considered by some to be questionable in view of their Muslim faith contrasting with Christian, animist and strongly pig-oriented culture of the Papuans”.<sup>215</sup> This could be construed as an insensitive act of the United Nations “and points to another failure on the part of those entrusted with decision making at the United Nations”.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> United Nations Security Forces, *West New Guinea – UNSF Background*, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unsfbackgr.html#four](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsfbackgr.html#four). (Accessed 5 September 2009).

<sup>213</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>214</sup> Anti-Slavery Society, *West Papua Plunder in Paradise*, p. 30

<sup>215</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>216</sup> *ibid.*

Following the Dutch withdrawal from Papua in November 1962, the Indonesian army disarmed all members of the Papuan Volunteer Corps.<sup>217</sup>

The period of UNTEA facilitation in the administration of the territory and the transfer of its control from the Netherlands to that of the Republic was of such short duration that it would be difficult to judge its effectiveness. Drooglever's view was that "the UN administration lacked the necessary power, the will and the expertise to bring about a truly interim phase".<sup>218</sup> In describing events in West New Guinea during the UNTEA period of administration Saltford stated "It is easy to understand why the UN and the world in general was untroubled by events in New Guinea and the undermining of an agreement [NY] that was in reality only a face saving device for a minor European power".<sup>219</sup> In summary, the period of the UNTEA was never very important. Papuan involvement or influence was non-existent.

The period of the UNTEA merged into a continuum with the conduct of Indonesia after the takeover. The status quo was virtually maintained by locals of Indonesian extraction. "No top echelon was really needed because the only policy was non-policy".<sup>220</sup> The growing number of Indonesian armed personnel introduced an atmosphere of oppression. This was demonstrated when the West Papuan flag and anthem adopted by the New Guinea Council under Dutch sponsorship were deemed to be subversive by the Indonesians. Any material which was of Papuan culture was similarly classified. Clashes by Indonesian soldiers and demonstrating Papuans were violent and the United Nations personnel were powerless to intervene.<sup>221</sup> President Sukarno was still in power but his eventual successor was in control of the Indonesian Contingent, *Kontindo*, in West New

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<sup>217</sup> Anti-Slavery Society, *West Papua Plunder in Paradise*, p. 30.

<sup>218</sup> Drooglever, *Een Daad Van Vrije Keuze*, (Accessed 15 December 2009).

<sup>219</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p. 46.

<sup>220</sup> K. Lagerberg, *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*, C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1979, p. 107.

<sup>221</sup> *ibid.*

Guinea at this time. It was noted by Ortiz Sanz<sup>222</sup> that Indonesia exercised tight political control over the Papuans in the period up to 1969 and thereafter.<sup>223</sup> Lagerberg said that “there is no doubt that in Biak in the days of the Act of Free Choice some 400 people were executed”.<sup>224</sup> Suharto made no secret about the expectations of the proposed vote when he announced to a gathering of paratroops about to leave for Irian to combat a new rebellion “that the return of West Irian into the fold of the motherland” was irreversible.<sup>225</sup>

### *The Act of Free Choice*

The Act of Free Choice (AFC) which was conceived during the Sukarno era was carried out by Indonesia in 1969 under the New Order of President Suharto. The transfer of sovereignty of West Irian to the Republic which followed meant, in effect, that all of the former Dutch East Indies was part of Indonesia. The principal claim of West Papuans is that the act of self-determination was invalid. Indonesians claim that representative councils of West Irian were consulted on the appropriate procedures and methods to ascertain the will of the people and that the Act of Free Choice was carried out in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1962 New York Agreement.<sup>226</sup> In fact, by the agreement, the ‘Act of Self Determination’ was to be carried out in accordance with international practice, “all adults male and female, not foreign nationals” resident at the time of the signing of the agreement at the time of the act of self determination would be

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<sup>222</sup> Ortiz Sanz of Bolivia was the head of the UN mission sent by secretary-general U Thant to observe and supervise the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969.

<sup>223</sup> Lagerberg, *West Irian and Jakarta*, p. 117.

<sup>224</sup> Lagerberg, *West Irian and Jakarta*, p. 111.

<sup>225</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 41.

<sup>226</sup> Human Rights in Indonesia. (Accessed 29 November 2009).

eligible to take part.<sup>227</sup> The fact that this was not strictly adhered to has attracted widespread condemnation of both the procedures used and the outcome of the vote.

The population of the territory may well have been surprised by developments leading to the holding of the proposed plebiscite even though it had been announced by Suharto on Independence Day, 17 August 1968 that it would be held the following year. Indeed the United Nations' special representative to West Irian, Ortiz Sanz, who arrived in the territory the month after the announcement was shocked that there was relatively little awareness that the plebiscite was to be held. Clearly Suharto's announcement had not been widely publicised in West Irian.

Ortiz Sanz' surprise continued with the realisation that some West Papuans were to be excluded from discussions about their future.<sup>228</sup> Ortiz Sanz' role in the conduct of the Act was to advise, assist and participate in accordance with the New York Agreement of 1962. The agreement specified certain conditions which would apply but it was the application of these conditions in relation to the voting process that remain controversial in the minds of many to this day. The process of voting was to be conducted by consultation with representative councils of the eight administrative areas (*kabupaten*) that had been created after the transfer from the UNTEA.<sup>229</sup> Indonesia's decision to rely on 'consultative assemblies' for the Act was met with a response from Ortiz Sanz in the form of a press statement making clear the acceptability of the Indonesian decision was based on three pre-requisites:

1. That the consultative assemblies should have sufficiently large membership.
2. They should represent all sectors of the population.
3. The additional members for the assemblies should be clearly elected by the people.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> Political Awakening in West New Guinea, *Journal of Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring, 1963, p. 69.

<sup>228</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 38.

<sup>229</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 40.

<sup>230</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p. 128.

Shortly before the arrival of Ortiz Sanz in West Irian Indonesian leaders had affirmed their position that the process of self-determination would only take place on their terms. The ‘one man one vote’ system was clearly not an option with Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik who declared that the system was not suitable for the primitive conditions of the people in West Irian.<sup>231</sup> The method to be applied in conducting the voting process was *musyawarah* (reach consensus). Instead of holding a referendum the Indonesian authorities chose 1,026 ‘representatives’ almost at random. Held as virtual prisoners, they voted unanimously in favour of the incorporation of West Papua into Indonesia. It was also seen as a cynical betrayal of West Papuans by the United Nations’ officials who were charged with responsibility of ensuring a genuine act of self-determination was conducted.<sup>232</sup>

The Eight Regional Councils’ meetings were duly conducted between 22 March and 11 April 1969. On the agenda were Jakarta’s proposals for the Act. Contrary to Ortiz Sanz’ report to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) “one third of the speakers rejected the whole exercise as a legacy of Dutch colonial policy. The majority of other speakers emphasized the result of the Act should not favour separation from Indonesia,”<sup>233</sup> Ortiz Sanz only reported that in Jayapura four members supported a one man one vote system and that in Paniai there was one member in dissent from the government’s proposal.<sup>234</sup> A Dutch journalist later described the proceedings (in Merauke) as an elaborately stage-managed affair.

In the official report on the implementation of the Act of Free Choice, the Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Machmud, stated that: “The success in Merauke regency was celebrated by the

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<sup>231</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p. 101.

<sup>232</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto*, p. 22.

<sup>233</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p. 130.

<sup>234</sup> *ibid* .

people and local government in a grand and joyous way with people's parades and festivities. He said that a slanderous report was launched by a Dutch journalist who had witnessed the proceedings at Merauke as being obviously false and a mere fabrication".<sup>235</sup>

It was also claimed that "the session of the CAA<sup>236</sup> of Djajawidjaja regency at Wamena two days later was not less enthusiastic".<sup>237</sup> The CAA session in Wamena "concluded unanimously in a sphere of brotherhood and unity they never had known and experienced before, that they...desired to remain with the Republic of Indonesia and did not want to be separated from the family of the Indonesian nation."<sup>238</sup> Not dissimilar claims were made in relation to the outcomes of the sessions conducted in other regencies. When the next Assembly was conducted two days later in Wamena, a similar pattern to that which was followed in Merauke took place. Indonesia's views on the AFC and matters incidental thereto are made clear in this report.

Such then are the so valuable lessons which we have to draw from the holding of the AFC. We need not measure it by the standards of Western democracy which is based on individualistic, egocentric society... This "exercise in democracy" creates a feeling of responsibility amongst the people towards their Government, Nation and Country, in order that the people can participate actively and assume responsibility in government and social institutions in the interest of the common people... AFC itself is not important; the main point is development. Thus was the People's Message...The Government was indeed paying full attention to this message; most important indeed is what to do after the AFC is over.<sup>239</sup>

In a report to the General Secretary of the United Nations, Ortiz Sanz expressed reservation regarding the implementation of Article XXII of the Agreement relating to rights, including rights of free speech, freedom of movement and assembly of inhabitants of the area. He also commented on the tight political control exercised at all times over the population. "The UN has never

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<sup>235</sup> A. Machmud, *West Irian: Implementation of the Act of Free Choice*, Official Report on the Implementation of the Act of Free Choice, Home Affairs, Djajapura, Republic of Indonesia, 1969, p. 9.

<sup>236</sup> The CAA is the Consultative Assembly for the Act of Free Choice or *Dewan Mushawarah Pepera* (DMP)

<sup>237</sup> Machmud, *West Irian*, p. 10.

<sup>238</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>239</sup> Machmud, *West Irian*, p. 15.

endorsed the outcome of the Act nor recognised West Papua as an integral part of Indonesia.”<sup>240</sup> In defence of the *musyawarah* system used to conduct the vote Ortiz Sanz described it as ‘practical.’ Right from the outset most West Papuans opposed the incorporation of their territory into Indonesia. “The Act of Free Choice was carried through under conditions that denied the Papuans even the smallest chance to speak for themselves”.<sup>241</sup> There was an immediate upsurge of conflict, mainly between the OPM separatist movement and the Indonesian security forces. “The infiltrating Indonesians were seen by most Papuans as enemies that formed a threat to their security.”<sup>242</sup> A campaign of guerilla warfare against the Indonesians by the OPM has continued over four decades after 1969.

Whilst there continues to be widespread condemnation of the processes and outcome of the Act of Free Choice, there is, nevertheless, international acceptance of the existing political circumstances. Underlying the official status of Papua as a province, however, is that its transfer of sovereignty has been achieved under circumstances which were contrary to UN resolutions which existed at the time. Notably UN Resolution 1514-X which states: “Sovereignty in a colony or in a non self-governing territory does not lie in the hand of the colonial power or in the hand of an administrative authority, but in the hand of the people of this colony”.<sup>243</sup> Within the scope of the same resolution is that sovereignty over a colonial territory is not transferable by the colonial power to another power. The same resolution makes clear that it is not within the authority of a colonial power to transfer the sovereignty of the colonised territory to another power. The power must be returned to

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<sup>240</sup> Dr. O.J. Ondawame, “West Papua’s Past and Future” Chapter 7 in M. Sakai, (ed) *Beyond Jakarta. Regional Autonomy and Local Societies in Indonesia*, Crawford House Publishing Pty Ltd., Belair, South Australia, 2002, p. 127.

<sup>241</sup> Drooglever, ‘*Papua, a Multi-faceted History*,’ p. 111.

<sup>242</sup> Drooglever, ‘*Papua a Multi-faceted History*’, p. 106.

<sup>243</sup> Ondawame, in Sakai, *Beyond Jakarta*, p. 124.

the native people of each territory.<sup>244</sup> The silence of the ‘international community’ on these issues is surely questionable.

#### *Overview of Suharto Administration*

The beginning of the Suharto era was a political upheaval of extraordinary measures for the Indonesian nation as the New Order took initiatives to control all social and political power within the state. Particularly relevant to the incoming president Suharto was Sukarno’s legacy of outstanding debts, galloping inflation, stagnant production and political chaos. The institutions of government remained but their effectiveness was doubtful, given evidence of government mismanagement. Political considerations were high on the list of priorities for Suharto for these were to determine the framework for politics under the new regime. Its first measure was to ban the Communist Party followed by a bloody purge across the nation of PKI members and sympathisers.<sup>245</sup>

Suharto also wasted no time in revisiting important foreign relations issues which had arisen during Sukarno’s presidency. Although he was not formally appointed President until March 1968, he dispatched Foreign Minister Malik to New York to arrange Indonesia’s re-entry to the UN. Contrary to Sukarno’s statement of 1965 it was also announced that Jakarta would permit an act of self-determination in West Papua. It was considered by some that this action would re-stimulate the interest of Jakarta regarding claims of economic neglect and anti-Indonesian sentiment but at the beginning of 1968 the economic and political prospects for the territory were clouded with uncertainty. This was particularly the case in relation to the political and human rights of West Papuans.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>244</sup> Ondawame, in Sakai, *Beyond Jakarta*, p. 124.

<sup>245</sup> Dick, et al, *The Emergence of a National Economy*, p. 190.

<sup>246</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, pp. 89-90.

Earlier history, such as Sukarno's Guided Democracy in the 1950's had established a mindset in the military of the need to re-establish a strong state with little opportunity for external influences. The philosophy of the military in this era was that "popular participation in politics must be strictly limited." This limited the possibility of interference in the affairs of government by social groups such as those with grievances arising from religious, ethnic or other institutions. This was recognised as the initiatives necessary to establish order in society and the essential condition of present day industrialization. The New Order thus positioned itself as the defender "of normality and the rule of law"<sup>247</sup> in Indonesian society.

The government's power was strongly supported by Indonesia's armed forces, *Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesi*, (ABRI) which was to develop a dual role in Indonesian society. This involved both political and physical security of the state and was achieved by appointing military officers to key administrative positions within the state bureaucracy and industry. The armed forces were also guaranteed representation in the parliament. The involvement of ABRI in this manner was the government's strength in maintaining political stability in all facets of society in Indonesia.

Over the next twenty five years government and political power became increasingly centralised.<sup>248</sup> In West Papua the ABRI<sup>249</sup> faced a difficult management test in the period between the takeover of the territory from the UNTEA in 1963 and the Act of Free Choice in 1969. By the end of 1968 the majority of the inhabitants of the province did not favour the prospect of Indonesian control. Economic issues (mainly in relation to the 1967 Freeport mine development) and the contemptuous

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<sup>247</sup> A. Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting. Indonesia's Search for Stability*, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1999, p. 29.

<sup>248</sup> T. Kell, *The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992*, Cornell University, New York, 1995, p. 13.

<sup>249</sup> The armed forces previously known as ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia) became the TNI (Tentara National Indonesia) in April 1999. This included the army, Air Force and the Navy.

attitude of Indonesians towards the indigenous West Papuans<sup>250</sup> culminated in a revolt by the OPM. The ABRI was the leading opponent of the self-determination process and continues to be a prime beneficiary of the exploitation of the territory's rich natural resources. Throughout Suharto's administration the West Papuans were subjected to military violence, particularly in cases where there was resistance to Indonesian policy. They were also left without compensation for loss of land which had been appropriated to meet the needs of foreign companies, for Suharto's cronies and for government-sponsored transmigration schemes.<sup>251</sup>

After the fall of Suharto in 1998 the generals continued to be a dominating force in Indonesian politics and society. This may well be attributed in part to the lack of ability of subsequent presidents to exercise control over the armed forces. In this respect some defence must be offered on behalf of President Wahid who took a number of initiatives to reduce the power of the ABRI in Indonesian society but clearly lost the battle as a number of controversial issues plagued his administration and forced his withdrawal.

#### *Suharto and West Irian*

Suharto's direct involvement with West Irian began as Commander of the Mandala operation. On 19 December 1961 President Sukarno decreed the establishment of *Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikorra)* (Peoples Triple Command) calling for the total mobilization of the Indonesian people.<sup>252</sup> The operational command of Trikorra was called *Komando Mandala Pembebasan Irian Barat* or the Mandala Command for the liberation of West Irian. Suharto's primary task was to regain control of West Irian by 1 January 1963. This was to be carried out by combined land, sea and air operations in West Irian. For Suharto the main task was to plan a "full scale joint amphibious assault to

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<sup>250</sup> Cribb and Brown, *Modern Indonesia*, p. 123.

<sup>251</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto*, p 28.

<sup>252</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p. xvii

liberate West Irian by conquering Biak, the enemy's main power base".<sup>253</sup> This attack never eventuated due to a negotiated settlement brought about by US pressure on the Dutch. Suharto attributed the result to "our strong determination and drastic action taken. With the Jayawijaya Operation we broke through the diplomatic impasse and returned West Irian to the protection of the Republic of Indonesia".<sup>254</sup> The agreement by the Dutch to begin direct negotiations with Jakarta was based on a request by UN Secretary-General U Thant. The Dutch were also obviously motivated by the threat of invasion of West Irian by the Republic of Indonesia. Importantly, the Dutch also agreed to begin talks on the basis of dropping a pre-condition regarding the Papuan right to self-determination.<sup>255</sup>

These developments were to set the style of confrontational tactics in future negotiations with the Dutch and indeed the US, leading to the New York Agreement of 1962. The drastic action referred to by Suharto in relation to the Trikora operation in West Irian became a characteristic of his response to dissent throughout the period of his administration. "In Papua he maintained an army of occupation that treated the indigenous people as 'sub-humans' whose loyalty had to be won by violence."<sup>256</sup> In the eyes of Papuans, their only image of Indonesians was that of the army. In the counter insurgency campaign which ran from the late 1960's to 1998, many thousands of Papuans are reported to have been killed.

With a well-planned strategy Suharto became head of the armed forces and in March 1967 the Indonesian parliament, the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara* - MPRS), named him acting president. A year later in March 1968 he was appointed

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<sup>253</sup> B. Singh, *West Irian and the Suharto Presidency: a perspective*, Seminar on the Act of Free Choice, The Hague 15 November, 2005, p. 86.

<sup>254</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>255</sup> Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover*, p. 11.

<sup>256</sup> J. Roosa, "Suharto (8 June 1921 – 27 January 2008) A career soldier who commanded a country," *Inside Indonesia*, January-March 2008.

the second President of the Republic of Indonesia. This was the commencement of a 32 year presidency.

### *Suharto's Development Policy*

Following the takeover Suharto was preoccupied with stabilizing the overall economy of Indonesia. Turning to the West for assistance, he was aided by technocrats who were to play an important role in Indonesia's development programme. The International Group for Assistance was installed and Suharto changed the investment programme with the aim of attracting foreign capital.<sup>257</sup> To this end the Foreign Investment Review Law which was passed in 1967 contained generous provisions on the questions of local control and sending profits abroad.<sup>258</sup> Change for West New Guinea was centred on attracting capital for the exploitation of the province's considerable resources. These include the leading export earners such as the mining industry, oil and gas and forestry products. In 1967 Jakarta signed the initial contract with Freeport (Freeport-McMoran Copper and Gold Inc.) giving it concessions to exploit copper and gold minerals. Expansion throughout the 1970's and 1980's together with a huge new deposit found near the original Ertsberg mine extended its future prospects. The revenue from these operations represented 92.8 per cent of total mineral exports for 1996 and dominated the economy of Irian Jaya.<sup>259</sup> Suharto secured his own interests in Freeport by way of a "unit of the Nusamba Group which was 80% owned by three charities (*yasasans*) headed by Suharto. These charities had, in effect, become his investment vehicles by the 1990's."<sup>260</sup>

The increasing demand for logs throughout South East Asia meant that the production of logs increased by more than tenfold in the decade up to 1996. The demand had been generated by the

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<sup>257</sup> Lagerberg, *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*, p. 119.

<sup>258</sup> Cribb and Brown, *Modern Indonesia*, p. 116.

<sup>259</sup> A detailed expose on corporate developments in this era is beyond the scope of this chapter. A comprehensive account can be found in Elmslie Part 2, pp. 90-99.

<sup>260</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 93.

Asian economic boom. The industry had proven to be very lucrative but, in response to market forces, began to fall away in 1997 as an economic crisis developed. Suharto's Look East Policy of 1990 which included Irian Jaya with other eastern provinces provided access by government and business sectors to Irian Jaya's resources. This initiative resulted in increased logging of Irian Jaya's forests. Forest Services of Irian Jaya's 1996 statistics reveal that 66.3% of the land area of Irian Jaya was available to timber companies.<sup>261</sup> This is based on timber concessions that have been granted for either current or future harvesting.<sup>262</sup>

In addition to foregoing observations in relation to mining, oil and timber must be considered when evaluating economic growth of the Suharto era. The performance "was largely accomplished by wildly selling off the country's natural resources. It was a predatory unsustainable type of growth."<sup>263</sup> The oil and timber industries, in particular, were extremely mismanaged because of the corruption involving the Suharto family and business associates of the President. The environmental consequences of mining and logging operations are discussed in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. In 1962, possibilities had emerged for development assistance to various industries throughout the province when US\$30 million was made available through the Foundation of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian (FUNDWI). These were funds which had been made available by a farewell gift from Holland to assist the Papuans. Use of the funds was, however, held back pending Indonesia rejoining the UN in November 1966.<sup>264</sup> Due to the parlous state of the Indonesian economy serious funding could not be expected from the government. Available funds were therefore mainly utilized in Manokwari and Biak which represent

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<sup>261</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 87.

<sup>262</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 128.

<sup>263</sup> Roosa, *Inside Indonesia*, 2008.

<sup>264</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 116.

approximately 30% of the Melanesian population and which, in the opinion of FUNDWI authorities, had shown most resistance to Indonesian rule.

Revised development plans were drawn up for a five year period following a first draft that had proved to be unworkable due to Indonesia's high inflation rate. The UN expressed reservations about the plan, only being prepared to use it as guidelines. On appraisal by a team of UN consultants and Indonesian planners it was realised that a substantial amount of the FUNDWI funds would be needed to restore capital assets that had been ruined in the period since the transfer to Indonesian control. An assessment of funds needed for this purpose was at least twice the original FUNDWI grant.<sup>265</sup> A compromise plan called the Irian Jaya Joint Development Fund was set up by the consultants in communication with the Indonesian planners. The aim was to establish agricultural activities in the villages. This foundation was still operating in 1984. Longevity suggests success but the scheme favoured the more aggressive of participants to the detriment of areas most in need of assistance.

Foreign journalists who had the opportunity to observe the results of the FUNDWI operation commented that "it had achieved little to date and felt pessimistic about future prospects".<sup>266</sup> On the other hand, for Melanesians "a frequent complaint was that the pace of development was too relentless"<sup>267</sup>. The Indonesian National Development Agency (*Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional* - BAPPENAS) incorporated the funds into the first five year development plan (*Repelita 1*) 1961-1974. In 1970 US\$21 million was allocated for FUNDWI assisted programmes largely focusing on infrastructure and rehabilitation.<sup>268</sup> Improving economic

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<sup>265</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 116 .

<sup>266</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 117.

<sup>267</sup> M.R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto. Order development and pressure for change*, Routledge, London, 1993, p. 96.

<sup>268</sup> J. Timmer, "Spectres of Indonesianisation and Secession in Papua", Seminar on the Act of Free Choice, The Hague, 15 November, 2005, p. 26.

conditions underpinned by oil revenue, particularly towards the end of the Repleta 1 period, would have facilitated planned expenditure on projects in the province. In economic terms, the final FUNDWI report in 1975 stated that (at the community level) the influx of immigrants from other Indonesian islands was the most potent influence in the private sector. They were heavily involved in the timber industry as well as local fisheries, retail trade and the supply of labour generally. This brought about one of the important social disruptions which was later exacerbated by the government's transmigration policies which caused displacement of Papuans (among other issues) from the local communities in both jobs and place of residence.<sup>269</sup>

An overall assessment of development plans implemented in Irian Jaya shows successes in several areas and people have experienced genuine benefits. There are, however, instances where some programmes brought disadvantage to the people of the province. These brought about varying reactions from the inhabitants, some being disappointment and dissatisfaction and in some extreme cases there were acts of resistance against the government. Requisitioning of land traditionally owned by local communities is an example. These lands were being used to develop forestry concessions and to facilitate transmigration programmes.<sup>270</sup> A summary of some of the adverse effects of transmigration policy and normal migration includes:

1. Unfair trading methods.
2. An imbalance in business competition between migrants and local people.
3. Depletion of marine and terrestrial resources.
4. Land conflicts.
5. Business oriented marriages.
6. Crime.<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>269</sup>     ibid.

<sup>270</sup>     D. Bourchier, V.R. Hadiz, V.R., *Indonesian Policy and Society: a reader*, Routledge Curzon, London, 2003, p. 262.

<sup>271</sup>     Bourchier, *Indonesian Policy*, p. 263.

Disadvantages were also experienced by university and high school graduates seeking employment who have to compete for job vacancies with migrants from other provinces. The case of the newly opened (1966) Irian Jaya Development Bank is an example where not even one of the 23 employees was an indigenous West Papuan.<sup>272</sup> It would appear that most of the newly created employment opportunities brought very few benefits at all to the indigenous population. Since the early 1980's approximately one third of the development budget has been allocated to education but without a corresponding increase in employment. Demonstrators in Jayapura claim that only a fraction of this money ever gets spent on education.

There has, however, been significant improvement in primary school participation (up from 80% in 1972 to 97.5% in 1992, together with an increase in the number of primary schools from 1,200 to 2,095 and the number of teachers to a level of one to every 21 students. Poverty in the province is also prevalent, especially in remote villages. "Of the 11 provinces Irian Jaya was the worst affected".<sup>273</sup> Compared to other provinces in Indonesia Irian Jaya has been given special treatment in terms of development priority and funding, nevertheless remains behind them all in terms of actual development.<sup>274</sup> The region's resources suggest that there is justification for a special policy and development assistance. This would be the responsibility of the Minister of Home Affairs and is a political decision.

To form a comprehensive view of Suharto's role in West Irian the analysis must go beyond economic considerations and consider the implications of social, cultural, environmental and military security policies that were adopted in the New Order era. The following evaluation by

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<sup>272</sup> S.J. Browne, "Irian Jaya: 30 years of Indonesian control", Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, 1998, p. 10.

<sup>273</sup> Browne, "Irian Jaya: 30 years of Indonesian control", p. 263.

<sup>274</sup> Singh, *West Irian and the Suharto Presidency*, p. 87.

Bilveer Singh on Suharto's role in West Irian contributes to this analysis.<sup>275</sup> A number of factors have caused West Irian to emerge as a flashpoint in Indonesia. These include the political control by Jakarta over the locals; the threat of Islamic Indonesia to their mainly Christian lifestyle; the implementation of Government-sponsored transmigration programmes; the loss of traditional lands now occupied by foreigners; the increased use of force by the military against the locals and the rising distrust of Jakarta at all levels.<sup>276</sup>

### *Post-Suharto Era*

#### *B. J. Habibie 1998-1999*

After 32 years of authoritarian rule under Suharto which concluded on 21 May 1998, the Republic of Indonesia had the experience of four presidents with a further election pending. B.J. Habibie took up his appointment as Indonesia's third president immediately following the resignation of Suharto. As a direct beneficiary of Suharto he immediately faced criticism from those disenchanted with the Suharto regime and was also disliked by *ABRI* and many Muslims. His failures in relation to the Indonesian aerospace industry, whilst Minister for Research and Technology, did little for his reputation. He is also said to have been unpopular with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and international money markets.

In the days after Habibie took office, he made a number of moves towards establishing his reform credentials. His personal involvement in a massive industrial project damming the Mamberamo River also evoked a great deal of criticism. The purpose of the project was to provide power to service heavy industry and agricultural projects. The consequences would cause flooding to a virgin rainforest with one of the highest biodiversity rates in the world. An estimated 6,000 people from seven different tribes would be forced to resettle elsewhere. The president gave the project a

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<sup>275</sup> Expanded detail supporting this summary may be found in Singh's paper presented at the Seminar on the Act of Free Choice on 15 November 2005 in the Hague.

<sup>276</sup> Singh, *West Irian and the Suharto Presidency* p. 90.

high priority status.<sup>277</sup> "Labour unions previously banned under Suharto were legalized, there were moves towards liberating press regulations; there was a start to disassociating government and business and resolving other conflicts of interest; and it was announced that all political parties could contest future elections. Another move was the selective release of political prisoners."<sup>278</sup>

Being initially pre-occupied with the legacies left to him by his predecessor, new cabinet selections and pressure from reform groups, he was unable to make any initial impression on expected political reforms. Indeed his limited time of tenure in office did not allow for great achievement. One of his more notable accomplishments was the planning for the holding of free general elections which took place on 7 June 1999. He is also credited with abolition of restrictive rules on the media, labour unions and political gatherings. Political parties proliferated during this period and the development of a system which could produce a democratically elected president was launched.<sup>279</sup>

Separatist organisations in trouble spots such as East Timor, Aceh and West Papua may have perceived the change of administration as an opportunity to advance their causes. Disturbances immediately sprang up in all of these locations.<sup>280</sup> Habibie's main concern in this regard was for the developments in East Timor. A highly contentious and potentially explosive issue in many respects, the East Timor problem also had the capacity to establish precedents which could be later pursued by other provinces. West Papua provided substance to these concerns when activists demanded the same deal as offered to East Timor.<sup>281</sup> This refers to President Habibie's

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<sup>277</sup> R. Spencer, "Pet project bites (construction of a dam in Indonesia is certain to pose a threat to the local environment through flooding)", *New Internationalist*, January 1, 1999

<sup>278</sup> D. Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Victoria, 1999, p. 253.

<sup>279</sup> Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting*, p. 309.

<sup>280</sup> Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting*, p. 420.

<sup>281</sup> Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting*, p. 424.

announcement on 27 January 1999 that he was willing to hold a referendum on independence for East Timor.<sup>282</sup> In August 1999 the UN-run Popular Consultation gave East Timor a chance to choose between autonomy within Indonesia or independence.<sup>283</sup>

In mid 1998 public figures in Papua established a well organised independence movement. Under the name of the Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society they called on the government to open discussions about the territory's political status. They also accepted the possibility that compromise may be required in these negotiations. B.J. Habibie subsequently held a National Dialogue with one hundred Papuan leaders but their assertive tactics brought about a crackdown on independence supporters.<sup>284</sup>

The transitional administration of Habibie also legalised regional Law 22/1999 on regional governance and Law 25/1999 on fiscal issues. Law 22/1999 is more specific about the role of regencies and municipalities than was Law 5/1974 which left many details to be finalised in following legislation. It dealt with the devolution of government authority and the process of decentralization and also stipulated that the transfer of functions to the regions must include facilities and infrastructure, personnel and funding. Law 22/1999 "could also potentially enhance democracy, community participation, equitable distribution and justice as well as take into account the region's potential and diversity."<sup>285</sup> This law was considered to be revolutionary but supplementary legislation was expected to follow the introduction of this law to facilitate smooth

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<sup>282</sup>       ibid.

<sup>283</sup>       I.M. Eich, *UNV in East Timor. Six months after the post referendum violence*, 4 March 2000, <http://www.unv.org/en/news-resources/news/doc/unv-in-east-timor.html>, (Accessed 17 October 2010).

<sup>284</sup>       "Irian Jaya/Papua" *Southeast Asian Affairs*, January 2001.

<sup>285</sup>       D.R. Nurrochmat, *The Impacts of Regional Autonomy on Political Dynamics, Socio-Economics and Forest Degradation, Case of Jambi Indonesia*, Goettingen: Institute of Forest Policy and Nature Conservation, University of Goettingen, 2005, p. 47.

implementation.<sup>286</sup> Further discussions concerning the application of Law 22/1999 is included in Chapter 5 under Regional Autonomy. The process of democratic reform and the major social and political challenges facing Indonesia at the end of Habibie's term in office on 20 October 1999 had not made any significant progress.

#### *Abdurrahman Wahid 1999 – 2001*

On 20 October 1999 Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as the fourth president of Indonesia. Wahid came to office with the reputation as leader of the *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU) which has in excess of 35 million members, making it the largest Muslim organisation in the world. During his term in office Wahid supported the convening of the Second Papuan People's Congress, a gesture which created political tension and played its part in his fall from power in July 2001. Among the resolutions adopted by the Congress was "The Papuan Nation has been sovereign as a people and state since 1 December 1961"<sup>287</sup> (the date of the First Congress). Other items adopted referred to the New York Agreement (said to be legally and morally flawed), also rejection of the Act of Free Choice and calling for revocation of the UN Resolution 2504 which was adopted on 19 November 1969. President Wahid was obliged to state the government's failure to recognise the results of the conference was because its organisation was not in line with the agreement reached by the government and the Congress' organising committee.<sup>288</sup>

It can be said that the policies implemented by Wahid at the beginning of 2001 were concessions to Papuan nationalism delivered with the intent of reconciliation. Included in this gesture was to confer the name 'Papua' on the province. Wahid also approved that the West Papuan Morning Star flag could be flown with the proviso that it should be alongside and slightly lower than the

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<sup>286</sup> R. Nurrochmat, *The Impacts of Regional Autonomy*, p. 47.

<sup>287</sup> *West Papua Action*, 4 June 2000, <http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/CONGRESS-RESOLUTION-4-6-2000>, (Accessed 6 April 2010).

<sup>288</sup> *West Papua Action*, (Accessed 6 April 2010).

Indonesian flag. Although independence was not to be considered, the door was left open for further talks over regional autonomy. Both Habibie and Wahid were sympathetic to the introduction of regional autonomy for the provinces and to extending the status of “Special Autonomy” to those politically difficult provinces such as Aceh and West Papua which continually pressed for independence. In practice this became an unacceptably conditional exercise for these particular provinces. This was exemplified in the advice of Gus Dur to both West Papua and Aceh that “if they want self autonomy they need to stop the troubles in their areas and return them to normality.”<sup>289</sup> Special Autonomy offers economic benefits as well as greater political independence and controls, the details of which are discussed in Chapter 5.

Wahid’s approach was well received by West Papuan nationals, stimulating the independence movement towards new initiatives for arising from this meeting was the *Musyawahar Besar* (big consultation) or Mubes which was held in Jayapura on 23-26 February 2000. This was attended by thousands from across the country but Wahid’s moves were condemned by Indonesians as appeasement of West Papuans.<sup>290</sup> A weight of criticism was building against Wahid. He was accused by conservative elements within Indonesia of encouraging separatist elements, mainly due to his role in funding the organisation of *The Kongress Rakyat Papua II* (Second Papuan Peoples’ Congress) \$A172,000. He was also criticized for failing to address important state responsibilities including economic, social and separatist problems.<sup>291</sup> He had, at this stage, delegated responsibility for the West Papua issue to his Vice-president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. By mid 2001 the Wahid presidency had collapsed. A detailed explanation of the institutions and structure of Papuan politics is outlined in Chapter 5.

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<sup>289</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto*, pp. 72-73.

<sup>290</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto*, p. 60.

<sup>291</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. xvi.

#### *Megawati Sukarnoputri 2001-2004*

The former Vice-President to Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was sworn in as President in July 2001. Firm in her ideals of maintaining territorial integrity she moved quickly to reverse Wahid's decisions on West Papua, particularly those relating to concessions regarding the name of the province and the use of the Morning Star flag. The former name was restored as Irian Jaya and a deadline was made for the flags to come down or be forcibly removed. This provoked immediate reaction by the West Papuans across the province as police and the military moved to enforce the ban. Scores of people lost their lives and many were injured in affrays between Indonesian government forces and West Papuan nationalists in relation to this issue. The matters raised here will be revisited in Chapter 4 where West Papuan nationalism will be explored in greater detail.

Megawati's most significant involvement with the Province was the implementation of *Impres* (Presidential Instruction) No. 1 of January 2003 which revived a number of uncertainties concerning the matter of special autonomy. The decision contradicted special autonomy legislation of October 2001 as well as provisions relating to consultation on all future constitutional changes with the Papuan legislature. This also provided the opportunity to reintroduce the name of the Province as Irian Jaya. A further change was the introduction of Law No. 45 of 1999, the implementation of which had previously been suspended following West Papuan protest. The result in this instance was the division of the Province into three. New Provinces were to be called West Irian Jaya, Central Irian Jaya and the third renamed Irian Jaya.

It is reasonable to speculate that some of the changes were made with the 2004 general elections in mind. It was to the political advantage of Megawati's party to weaken the Golkar Party<sup>292</sup> election prospects through broadening the base of provisional patronage throughout the territory.<sup>293</sup> Changes brought about by *Impres* No. 1 of 2003 produced benefits to a number of interested parties

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<sup>292</sup> Golkar – a federation of army-sponsored associations and trade unions originally used as an electoral vehicle for the Suharto government.

<sup>293</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 92.

including the TNI and the Army generals; however it proved to be of little advantage to Megawati's party. The defeat of the Democratic Party, *Parti Demokratik Indonesia-Pergulatan* (PDI-P) at the 2004 elections is now electoral history for Indonesia.

*Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 2004 –*

The principal political characteristics which pervade Indonesia under Yudhoyono are democratic electoral politics and decentralisation. The breakdown of authoritarianism has opened up channels of opportunity for change where once stood the unyielding ideology of Suharto. Change has been slow in the making, starting with developments progressing through the Habibie, Wahid and Megawati eras with marked advances being achieved through President Yudhoyono. Some of the achievements in recent years, particularly in relation to West Papua and Aceh, include the truce with the separatists in Aceh. Yudhoyono indicated his intention to use the same tactics in Papua as those he applied in Aceh. It was anticipated by some that Papua may be a more difficult proposition as the rebel movement was more fragmented than that of Aceh.<sup>294</sup>

Providing funding for the establishment of Special Autonomy was a constructive gesture which was intended to bring welfare benefits to the people as well as human resources. Education and health were the more likely targets of this expenditure. In 2009 Yudhoyono also presented RP 154.72 billion in financial aid under the National Self Reliant Community Improvement Programme (*Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat - PNPM*) to the province. It is not clear whether this assistance was for specified projects or to be applied at the discretion of the West Papuan Governor Abraham Atururi.

Details of other Yudhoyono initiatives designed to bring progress to the provinces of Papua include the issue of Presidential Decree No. 5/2007. In lieu of implementing the Special Autonomy Law on

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<sup>294</sup> AP Worldstream 2006, "Papua killings underscore obstacles to peace in Indonesia region" *Associated Press*, March 18, 2006, HighBeam Research <http://www.highbeam.com>. (Accessed 24 January 2010).

16 May 2007 the Decree that was issued was an instruction to eleven ministers, two governors and all regents in Papua. The objectives included the improvement of health services and education, food security and poverty reduction as well as improvement to basic infrastructure.<sup>295</sup> Law No. 35/2008 was passed to assist with the establishment of West Papua province, legalising the implementation of Special Autonomy. The President hoped that collectively these decrees, together with the law on Special Autonomy initiated in 2001 would enable Papuans themselves to progress overall development in the region.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>295</sup> Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, *Indonesia: peacemeal approaches to systematic and institutionalized discrimination*, August 2007, [www.ohcr.org/English/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/AITPN.pdf](http://www.ohcr.org/English/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/AITPN.pdf). (Accessed 18 October 2010).

<sup>296</sup> *ANT-LKBN ANTARA (Indonesia)*, “President Presents Community Empowerment Funds to West Papua”, Highbeam Research, [www.highbeam.com](http://www.highbeam.com), (Accessed 24 January 2010).

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **WEST PAPUAN NATIONALISM**

The field of nationalist phenomena includes significant diversity of elements. Nations, nation-states and ethnic identity are among basic considerations which widen into a range of other related subjects including ethnic conflict, immigration, language, religion, genocide, ethnic cleansing to name only some of the possibilities. The variety of national identities and cultural values are all part of the national framework. To provide a theoretical underpinning to all of the significant concepts and elements is a task beyond the scope of this dissertation. An attempt will be made to explain some of the relevant items on this subject to aid in providing an informed background against which theoretical considerations can be better measured or understood.

There are many authorities on the subject of nationalism but attention will be mainly directed to some prominent authors who provide conflicting but informative viewpoints on various issues. There are also a number of momentous events in the history of West Papua which have not only fuelled the growing nationalist cause but in some cases have attracted international condemnation. These will be reviewed in the course of this dissertation. The socio-political issues which have fuelled the nationalist drive for independence will also be examined.

Since the colonisation of their territory by the Dutch in the 17th century, West Papuans have been subjected to intrusion by numerous external forces which have shaped the social, political and economic destiny of their homeland. This has caused significant detriment to the peaceful lives and well being of the inhabitants who have been denied a fair and just opportunity to participate in deliberations regarding their future. In the 21st century their plight has deteriorated. This is due to exploitation of the territory's natural resources and environmental degradation as well as human rights' considerations. After forty years of Indonesian rule, West Papua has been granted Special

Autonomy which has been rendered almost totally ineffective by government administration. It has shown relatively few benefits for the inhabitants of the territory. Their experiences have engendered a high level of widespread political support for the separatist organisation Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) which was formed in the 1960's. The prime objective of the OPM is to achieve independence from Indonesia. Claims by West Papuans of continuing human rights abuses and oppression by the Indonesian military only serve to heighten the already strong nationalist sentiment and promote the cause of separatists.

Nationalism in West Papua has received a great deal of both international and local attention in recent times but opinions are divided on a number of issues, particularly in relation to its origins. It has been claimed that nationalism had its foundations in pre-colonial times based on existing relations with Malays. Christianity also contributed to the rise of nationalism. This came by way of its 'institutionalisation', linking it to a World System with which West Papua came into contact.<sup>297</sup> Another view is that nationalism did not exist before colonial times and that it came into existence due to the acts of colonisation by the Dutch, together with the Indonesian takeover of sovereignty in 1969.<sup>298</sup> These, together with other ideas, will be examined to determine the basis of the claims of the respective authors.

### **Nations and Nationalism**

It is not possible to provide a comprehensive appreciation of the concepts of the nation and nationalism with a series of brief explanations. In drawing on the analysis of leading writers on these topics, it is hoped that a general view of the major considerations will be achieved. This may also serve to eliminate some of the ambiguities which arise due to terminology being used inconsistently or interchangeably.

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<sup>297</sup> S.G. Rizzo, 2004, "*From Paradise Lost to Promised Land: Christianity and the Rise of West Papuan Nationalism*", PhD Thesis, University of Wollongong.

<sup>298</sup> Dr. O. J. Ondawame, 2001, "*One People One Soul: West Papuan Nationalism and the Organisasi Papua Merdeka/Opm/Free Papua Movement*", PhD thesis University of New England,

*Nations, States and Nation-States*

Nations can originate by various means depending on the circumstances which exist in each case. This can occur by the process of nation-building under the administration of a political community or territorial state. In these circumstances the objective may be to create a culturally homogenous population. An alternative relies upon the existence of an identifiable community of culture. Nationalists who believe that their cultural communities are, or could become, nations may seek to promote their cause on this premise.<sup>299</sup> This option closely aligns with a definition of the nation as a group of people who feel that they are a community bound together by ties of history, culture and common ancestry.<sup>300</sup>

Definitions of the nation will vary according to the perspective from which they are constructed. To demonstrate the diversity of opinion, it is important, therefore, to widen the consideration of the nation by referring to the views of several leading authors on the subject. In doing so, one particular issue is made clear - that is regarding the intangibility of the 'nation'. In this regard Connor (2004) refers to the essence of the nation which he sees as a psychological bond that joins people. The nature of that bond remains shadowy and elusive.<sup>301</sup> Ernest Renan (1882) refers (in part) to a subjective idealist conception of the nation that is largely a product of the mind, an abstraction that emerges from the collective imagination.<sup>302</sup> Anderson defines the nation as an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.<sup>303</sup> It is not proposed to attempt to reconcile these views except to highlight that in conceptualising the nation one can deduce that it is, in all of the above perceptions, a way of thinking; an idea born in the

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<sup>299</sup> A.D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, p. 18.

<sup>300</sup> J.G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1991, p. 2.

<sup>301</sup> W. Connor, W., in B. Berberoglu, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, Class, State and Nation in the Age of Globalisation*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Inc. Maryland, USA, 2004, p. 10.

<sup>302</sup> E. Renan, in Berberoglu, p. 4.

<sup>303</sup> B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Under Introduction. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso Editions and New Left Books, London, 1983, p. 1.

minds of people who constitute the nation. The perception of the nation, however, becomes more complete with the appreciation of the elements one would expect to associate with modernity.

Smith describes nations as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.<sup>304</sup> There are differences between the characteristics of the modern and pre-modern nations but the importance of this is subject to debate. It is arguable as to whether such pre-modern ideas collectively constitute 'nations' or some other form of looser collective identity. Nevertheless the modern form reflects legacies of the pre-modern era. Different authors form alternative views on these issues.

A confusing anomaly of more recent times is the practice of substituting the word 'nation' with the word 'state'. In fact the state is a more easily understood concept if considered as the major territorial political unit.<sup>305</sup> A more comprehensive description is that by Smith that the state is a legal and political concept; states can be defined as autonomous, public institutions of coercion and extraction within a recognised territory.<sup>306</sup> State borders more or less correspond to the geographically accepted description of a named country. A state can frequently encompass more than one nation, a position which can arise in several ways. Gellner (in Smith 1981) shows that this can arise by division of an existing nation due to the irreconcilable cultural cleavages<sup>307</sup>. Political cleavages may develop which may also bring about a similar result. One must be cautious in accepting this generalisation too readily.

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<sup>304</sup> Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, p. 18.

<sup>305</sup> W. Connor in J. Hutchinson and A.D. Smith, (eds), 1994, *Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, 1994, p36

<sup>306</sup> Smith, A. D., Nations and their pasts, *The Warwick Debates: The Nation: Real or Imagined*, (1995), [www.lse.ac.uk/collections/gellner/warwicko.html](http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/gellner/warwicko.html). (Accessed 9 May 2009).

<sup>307</sup> Gellner in Smith, p. 48.

For Karl Deutsch, who derives his ideas from the key notion of social communication (based largely on a cultural community concept), if a people also possesses its own state apparatus and wields autonomous power then it can be regarded as a nation. The implication is that the state and the nation are synonymous, also, that if a cultural community or other collective identity has not established its own state, it cannot be called a nation.<sup>308</sup> There is, however, ample historical evidence to show that since the 19<sup>th</sup> century many nations have existed which have not had the respective state apparatus. In some cases the nation and nationalism preceded the development of the nation state, (e.g. Germany) for a considerable time. The situation also exists where the state and the nation can be regarded as synonymous. This will be discussed in relation to nation-states.

A further example of inconsistent use of terminology is that of nation-state, the word being arbitrarily used for both states and nation-states alike. Some states are correctly called nation-states due to the state being largely composed of one ethnic nation.<sup>309</sup> Most states are multi-ethnic and multi-national. Connor confirms that the vast majority of states are not nation-states; this is supported by a 1971 survey of 132 entities which indicated that less than 10% could justifiably be described as nation-states.<sup>310</sup> The subsequent demise of the USSR and the creation of the European Union and subsequent ethnic conflict around the world may have formed a new dimension to a similar updated survey. This brings one to the conclusion that the nation-state implies the parallel occurrence of state and nation, that is, in the ideal model they coincide exactly. The views expressed here serve to highlight the differences to a certain extent between the nation, the state, and the nation-state. It also demonstrates in a small way the diversity of viewpoints which can arise on this topic.

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<sup>308</sup> P. Alter, *Nationalism*, London, Edward Arnold, 1989, p. 11.

<sup>309</sup> Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism*, p. 52.

<sup>310</sup> Connor, *Nationalism*, p. 39.

### *Nationalism and Ethnicity*

The number of publications on nationalism, in some cases numerous volumes by noted authors, indicates that conditions effecting change throughout the world are so constant to justify ongoing updates and possibly re-consideration of existing data on the subject. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the restructuring of Europe with the formation of the European Union and the dynamics of the ever widening global economy which has cut across state boundaries as well as increasing ethnic conflict, are some of the causal factors for change to previously received ideas.

Ethnic conflict is clearly demonstrated by that which frequently occurs within West Papua where, as shown in Chapter 1, there exist in excess of 300 ethnic groups. Reasons include cultural and economic differences and grievances created due to the changing socio-economic patterns in the Province. There are also conflicts which occur within individual ethnic groups, the Dani of the Baliem Valley being one example in this instance. Conflicts which have become known as 'ritualistic warfare' occur from time to time. As will be discussed hereunder, ethnic nationalism, due to demographic changes occasioned mainly by transmigration, has caused considerable ethnic unrest in the territory. This has also become an issue for concern.

It is therefore appropriate at this juncture to offer an explanation as to the meaning of the expressions ethnic, ethnicity and ethnocentrism which are integral to the study of nationalism. Ethnic refers to a people grouped according to a common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural origin or background.<sup>311</sup> Studies show that very few researchers of ethnic relations ever define the meaning of ethnicity and that the authors who do not provide a definition never provide any reasons for not doing so. One of the difficulties encountered may be that any definition may either be too narrow and therefore inapplicable to the ethnic group under

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<sup>311</sup> Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary <http://www.merriam-webster.com>. (Accessed 9 May 2009).

consideration or else too general and therefore devoid of substantive meaning.<sup>312</sup> Accordingly there are those who may prefer to simply define the concept of ethnicity as the condition of belonging to an ethnic group. Ethnocentrism is a behavioural characteristic of the individual associated with an ethnic group usually showing bias and prejudicial attitudes towards other ethnic groups<sup>313</sup>

The formation of ethnic groups is yet another topic which raises fundamental differences among commentators, particularly in relation to the classifications of groups and the processes by which they (ethnic groups and nations) are formed. One such classification is a primordialist formulation which is based on the idea that every person carries with them through life attachments derived from place of birth, kinship, relationships, religion, language and social practices. These characteristics provide common ground for people with similar background and are the basis of shared identity. Some share the opinion that such attachments that form the core of ethnicity are biological and genetic in nature<sup>314</sup> Those who consider primordialist ideas fundamental to the building of nationalism see the concept of nationalism as an historical phenomenon providing the emotional binding by which political communities originally emerged .It is also the means through which the ethnic community finds its historical expression and maturity.<sup>315</sup> There are, however, those who believe that there has been no ‘natural’ evolution from the traditional community, ethnic or otherwise, to the nation. Alternative theories of nationalism form a later part of this chapter.

It is also necessary to distinguish between ethnic groups which in this dissertation will be depicted as ethnic group (meaning local or an individual) and multi-ethnic groups (representing all or some of those within the territory of West Papua.) Within this context, local nationalism, referring to a

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<sup>312</sup> W.W. Isajiw, 1974, *Definitions of Ethnicity*, University of Toronto, <http://eprints.utsc.utoronto.ca/archive>, (Accessed 23 May 2009).

<sup>313</sup> Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism*, p. 5.

<sup>314</sup> P.R. Brass, in J. Hutchinson and A.D. Smith, *Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 83.

<sup>315</sup> W. Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations. Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1993, p. 14.

single group, means ethnic nationalism. Multi-ethnic nationalism will represent more than one group and the term nationalism will refer to 'the nation'.

Within the different characteristics of the individual ethnic groups lies the basis for conflict. The ethnicity of a group is in itself a sense of being different from others. It may arise because of any of the group characteristics such as cultural differences or perhaps history, religion or other reasons. It can be said that, due to human nature, innate and instinctive forces emerge in ethnic identification and ethnocentric behaviour which may cause conflict.<sup>316</sup> Sometimes it may be necessary to determine the social characteristic mental makeup of a group to understand the nature and extent of ethnocentrism. Language divisions (rendering communication difficult) and group differences such as skin colour, facial appearance, etc. are factors which will increase the likelihood of heightened group hostility.<sup>317</sup> Ethnic conflict is also frequently about territory which continues to be an issue engendering emotions of nationalism.<sup>318</sup> It is also possible that in extreme circumstances ethnic nationalism can bring about national instability. Due to transmigration, which has altered the demographics of the territory generally, it could be said that this type of situation is arising in West Papua in some areas. This raises the possibility of creating instability in the Province (see comments by Richard Chauvel, *Future Considerations* in this chapter). If the centre becomes rich while the periphery is still poor, this disequilibrium will create a social gap which encourages sub-nationalist sentiment.<sup>319</sup>

#### *Primordialism versus Modernism*

The theories supporting each of these concepts are concerned with the rise of nationalism from opposing perspectives. This is an argument which is so extensive it almost places itself beyond the

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<sup>316</sup> Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism*, p. 160.

<sup>317</sup> Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism*, p. 162.

<sup>318</sup> E. Gellner, *Nationalism*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1997, p. 48.

<sup>319</sup> R.H. Chilcote, *Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p. 26..

limits of this thesis. I consider it necessary, however, to provide an outline of the differing points of view in relation to each idea to establish a fundamental understanding of the issues involved.

In primordialism we think of a cultural phenomenon with fundamental elements which are seen to be essential to the ethnicity or even the very existence of a group. These elements may be (among others) language, religion, bloodlines (caste, race descent) and territory.<sup>320</sup> These factors are more or less consistent with those which Geertz describes as the ‘givens’ – of social existence: mainly with those in immediate contact and kin connections but also, the ‘givenness’ that stems from being born in a particular religious community, speaking a particular language and following particular social practices. The ethnic community see their language, or general connections and other primordial attachments, as bonds, the particular character of which differ from person to person and from society to society.<sup>321</sup> One draws the conclusions based on the account of Geertz that these primordially constructed bonds form very strong sentiments which may induce a form of nationalism that could be difficult to contain in some circumstances.

For those that advocate the primordialist approach to support arguments concerning the rise of nationalism, they claim (as does Walker Connor) that national consciousness was evolving throughout the medieval period and was already developed in England, France and Germany by the year 1100. These factors work towards their main contention that nations existed well before the modern era of nationalism.<sup>322</sup>

Modernists, on the other hand, take the view that the nation is a peculiarly modern institution. At the same time writers who subscribed to modernist ideas have differing opinions on some issues.

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<sup>320</sup> H. Schiffman, *Language, Primordialism and Sentiment*, Professor of Dravidian Linguistics and Culture, University of Pennsylvania, 1998, <http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~haroldfs/540/handouts/emotion/sentimen/LGSPSENT.html>, (Accessed 23 May 2009).

<sup>321</sup> C. Geertz in J. Hutchinson, and A.D. Smith, *Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

<sup>322</sup> J. Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism*, London: Fontana Press, 1994, p. 3.

Among this group are Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner, E.J. Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson.<sup>323</sup> Collectively they identify several reasons which demonstrate that the chain of continuity presented by primordialists include new nationalist political visions arising in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. The rise of print capitalism facilitated communication amongst the masses. It supported theories of imagined nationhood, the nation being an anonymous, socially differentiated and large-scale collectivity. Pre-modern societies on the other hand were localised, small-scale kinship groups that were relatively illiterate and culturally heterogeneous.<sup>324</sup>

*The Warwick Debates – Nations and Nationalism*

The evolution of nationalism would appear to be a logical point to commence an analysis of this concept for it would place its origin in a period in history and perhaps enable the sociological developments and other critical features to be traced. In this respect some fundamental differences arise between the opinions of some authors. The views of two prominent authors engaged in debate on the subject of nationalism highlight some of the different views expressed on the subject.

For Ernest Gellner who describes himself as a modernist, most of his ideas emanate from a set of circumstances he claims have transformed the world since the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Smith claims that “even if nations could be found before the advent of modernity, most nations are modern in the sense of being relatively recent in time.”<sup>325</sup> Smith also disputes Gellner’s claim that “the nation is also the product of specifically modern conditions”<sup>326</sup> including early industrialisation, mass literacy and public education. In Smith’s view “it is the application of these specifically modern conditions which creates the transition from non-literate ‘low’ cultures to highly cultivated, literate

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<sup>323</sup>       ibid.

<sup>324</sup>       Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism*, p. 5.

<sup>325</sup>       Smith, *The Warwick Debates*.

<sup>326</sup>       E. Gellner, Nations and their pasts, *The Warwick Debates: The Nation: Real or Imagined*, (1995), [www.lse.ac.uk/collections/gellner/warwicko.html](http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/gellner/warwicko.html). (Accessed 9 May 2009).

and specialised ‘high’ cultures that engenders nationalisms and nations.”<sup>327</sup> In response, Smith said “Now it is not that I find this account wrong – only that it tells half the story.”<sup>328</sup>

There is an element of agreement between Gellner and Smith that “nations as well as nationalism are modern phenomena, in the sense that the basic features of the modern world require nations and nationalism.”<sup>329</sup> Smith defines nationalism as “an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.”<sup>330</sup> From another perspective it is seen as one of the most powerful forces in the world. He expands his critique of modernist theories in relation to the role of materialism (seen as a characteristic of Gellner’s ideas) with a reference to Benedict Anderson’s support for the contribution of the rise of reading public engendered by the spread of technology of print–capitalism.

These processes of modernisation contribute to the formation of nations and nationalism. They are regarded as, more or less, an inevitable consequence of a progressive modern industrial society. There is also an inference here that ‘regrettable consequences’ may arise from these assumptions but this is not explained. Smith takes issue with certain aspects of Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ model suggesting that they (those who support Anderson’s ideas) would not regard the nation as wholly imagined yet they “ridicule nationalist views as somehow ‘primordial and perennial’.”<sup>331</sup> Smith appears to agree that this is quite proper provided we do not ridicule “its [the

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<sup>327</sup> Smith, *The Warwick Debates*.

<sup>328</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>329</sup> Gellner, *The Warwick Debates*.

<sup>330</sup> Smith, *The Warwick Debates*

<sup>331</sup> *ibid.*

nation's] reality or consider it a fabrication."<sup>332</sup> In his justifying explanation Smith equates the concept of nation with the Parthenon as being "no less real and tangible"<sup>333</sup>.

It does seem that an idea which exists in the collective minds of a community could not be described as real and tangible in any respect. Smith believes that there is nothing contradictory about saying that something is both imaginary and real. He argues that "although we can often discern elements of deliberate planning and human creativity in their formation, nations and nationalism are also the products of pre-existing conditions and heritages which have coalesced over the generations."<sup>334</sup> Further criticisms of modernist theories by Smith include their generality and level of abstraction and inability to illuminate actual historical instances relying only on exceptional circumstances "like the religious factor or a history of ethnic antagonism."<sup>335</sup>

The criticism begs the question as to whether the response to questions of historical instances by modernists is deemed to be inadequate, incorrect or merely conflicting with primordialists' theories. Certainly the factors on which the primordialists are said to rely have a definite relationship with historic events and nationalism. What Smith sees as the most crucial problem of the modernist approach is that it overlooks the persistence of ethnic ties and cultural sentiments in many parts of the world and their continuing significance for large numbers of people. He believes "modern political nationalisms cannot be understood without reference to these ethnic ties and memories and, in some cases, to pre-modern ethnic identities and communities."<sup>336</sup> These are the issues which underpin his ethno-symbolic approach to understanding the growth of nations, the rise of ethno-nationalisms and conflicts.

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<sup>332</sup> Smith, *The Warwick Debates*.

<sup>333</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>334</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>335</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>336</sup> *ibid.*

Gellner concedes a number of points in relation to culture, in particular that they were important even in the pre-industrial age. But there is not always a flow-on effect from this. In a rather unconvincing manner he makes the point that nothing before that (the 18<sup>th</sup> century) makes the slightest difference to the issues we face. He believes that “sometimes there is continuity between the cultures which were loved in the pre-industrial age and sometimes there is discontinuity.”<sup>337</sup> He cites an example of discontinuity of cultural connection in relation to modern Greece, claiming that there is neither genuine folk memory nor any preoccupation with Periclean Athens. Where continuity does exist, on the whole it is not important. “The cultural continuity is contingent, inessential.”<sup>338</sup>

#### *The Implications of Theories of Nationalism*

A number of alternatives have been explored with the objective of deciding the origin and rise of nationalism in West Papua. Included have been the theoretical determinants by the respective authors Anderson, Smith and Gellner representing both modernist and primordialist schools of thought on this subject. While these authors find a small degree of consensus on some issues they are in conflict over some of the more important ones. An outline of the views of Susanna Rizzo has been included, which provide a religious perspective to the subject, and ideas by Otto Ondawame (who brings the practical experience gained as a member of the separatist movement OPM) are also contributed. Some fundamental information relating to ethnicity generally is incorporated to complement understanding on theoretical considerations. What conclusions then can be drawn from the foregoing analysis concerning the origin and rise of nationalism in West Papua?

Anderson’s idea that a strong case can be made that print capitalism was the key element in the rise of nationalism falls into the category of those theories of nationalism developed around conditions

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<sup>337</sup> Gellner, *The Warwick Debates*.

<sup>338</sup> *ibid.*

of 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe. He believes that print capital made possible the communication necessary for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves and relate to others, thus creating the basis for national consciousness. He notes that 20 million books had been printed by 1500 and that print knowledge lived by reproducibility and dissemination.<sup>339</sup> One can see the relevance in Anderson's ideas in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe with the spread of print capital. However, this is an unlikely possibility in what must be regarded as a relatively traditional society such as West Papua in any period prior to the 20th century.

Anderson's theories do show a greater degree of relevance to West Papua in a later period in history. He shows that Dutch colonial logo-maps quickly spread across the colony showing a West New Guinea (West Papua) with nothing to its east, thus unconsciously developing the *imagined* ties. The map became a logo for West Papuan nationalism.<sup>340</sup> Dutch missionaries also contributed to a national consciousness in their attempts to unify tribal groups in establishing schools, expanding communication networks and sub-government tribal structures. Also in this era a common language (based on a form of Malay) was introduced in West Papua by the colonial authorities. The language which they shared with Indonesia later became codified as Bahasa Indonesia and the lingua franca of West Papua.<sup>341</sup> It is probable that print was a key element in all of these developments.

For West Papua we reach the conclusion that, in all probability, in colonial times Anderson's theories of imagined communities were not relevant to the territory. There was no evidence of a national consciousness. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, his ideas on the importance of print capitalism to the development of nationalism were sustained. Nationalism became established by events arising from colonial occupation and the Indonesian takeover of the territory in 1969. Gellner's

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<sup>339</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities...*, p. 33.

<sup>340</sup> D. Webster, *Pacific Affairs* 74, No. 4, Winter 2001.

<sup>341</sup> Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 177.

ideas suffer from the same deficiencies as those of Anderson in relation to the pre-twentieth century period in West Papua. The spread of Dutch colonial administration had progressed during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries but there is some doubt as to the level of development of the specifically modern conditions which are fundamental to his theory. Factors such as social mobility, the need for mass literacy and public education, which he claims facilitate the rise of nationalism, would be slow to permeate West Papuan society, even allowing for the work of government, missionaries and other agencies mainly due to the remoteness of many villages and the vastness of the territory.

Gellner's theory reads not like a theory of nationalism but assimilates more with theories of economic development. Nationalism suggests an emotional involvement of a people which I believe would not necessarily be generated by his ideas. Why should a people be prepared to die for what is, in this analysis, an imperative of a rational economic system of industrialisation.<sup>342</sup> Like many others, Gellner's ideas were based on European conditions, in his case the development of the industrial society in some parts of Europe in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

Smith, on the other hand, places importance on ethnic ties and cultural sentiments and the influence of these elements on the rise of nations and nationalism. He takes, according to his own definition, an ethno-symbolic approach, characteristics of which include a longer term analysis of social and cultural patterns with attention focused on earlier forms of collective identity.<sup>343</sup> Smith takes the view that modern political nationalisms cannot be understood without reference to these ties and in some cases pre-modern ethnicities and memories.

The application of Smith's theories to explain West Papuan nationalism sees him at once in contradiction to both Gellner and Anderson who are essentially modernist in their ideas. There is also a subjective factor in Smith's approach, which was earlier referred to as an emotional element,

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<sup>342</sup> Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism*, p. 42.

<sup>343</sup> A. D. Smith, *Nationalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, p. 60.

missing from Gellner's theory. Those who regard ethnic ties and cultural sentiments as important to the rise of nationalism will also regard Smith's idea that collective passion and attachment are important issues when addressing this topic. Modernists usually fail (as does Gellner) to give adequate recognition to this matter which has a significant bearing on the understanding of ethnicity and nationalism.<sup>344</sup>

In summary of the three theoretical considerations on the genesis and rise of nationalism we find the following position. For Anderson it was the spread of print capitalism which was responsible for this occurrence but it has been deemed unlikely that this contributed in the case of West Papua. For Gellner it was the specifically modern conditions that were required for the rise of nationalism but it was believed that these had not been present in this case. Although Smith's theory on the influence of ethnic ties and cultural sentiments etc. cannot be firmly established as the reasons for the rise of nationalism in West Papua, there is a very real possibility that it was responsible for creating a national consciousness which may have been stimulated by events of subsequent eras ultimately leading to nationalism.

From this analysis and rather inconclusive result, we inevitably arrive at the question of the suitability of the approach. The application of theories based on the highly developed societies of Europe to those which are relatively undeveloped needs further consideration. This practice suggests that the traditional theories have universal application. This can lead not only to convenient interpretation and misunderstanding but incorrect conclusions concerning nationalism in a particular setting. It is therefore inappropriate to search the field of theories on nationalism for a key to understanding the rise of nationalism of a nation. Each nation has its own characteristics which include ethnicity, historical, economic, cultural, political, ecological, religious and other special issues which may be applicable. These represent the basis and impetus for all kinds of

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<sup>344</sup> Smith, *Nationalism*, p. 58.

nationalist activity which should be considered in their distinctive setting to provide indications for the genesis and rise of nationalism.

### **An Alternative Perspective**

#### *Religion and Nationalism*

Following the transfer of sovereignty of West Papua to Indonesia in 1969 it became a territory with a majority of Christians in a nation dominated by Muslims. Indonesian government initiatives since that time, including introduction of transmigration schemes, would have served to increase the Muslim population in its new acquisition. Statistics on West Papuan religious representation reveal that Protestants number 1,338,064, Muslims 491,811, Catholics 505,654, Hindus 6,869 and Buddhists 3,400. The figures do not indicate whether the division between Christian denominations and Muslims as shown here are similarly divided along ethnic lines, ie., indigenous West Papuans who are perceived to be predominantly Christians and Muslims who are seen to be mainly immigrants from other Provinces of Indonesia. This particular aspect is noted only to recognise the potential it generates as a vehicle for ethnic conflict if exploited by those with vested interests.<sup>345</sup>

The introduction of Christianity in the territory is generally accepted to be in the 19<sup>th</sup> century with some marginal variations in the opinions of different authors. Benny Giay (Walter Post Theological College)<sup>346</sup> notes that various churches have been working among the people in West Papua from 1855 until now. By 1920, most of the coastal areas and islands had been contacted and the beginning of a church organisation had been established by the Protestants in the North, and by Catholics in the south.<sup>347</sup> Churches were regarded as a 'liberating institution' during the three decade rule of the authoritarian Suharto regime commencing in the 1960's. The contribution and

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<sup>345</sup> Franciscans International Org., *West Papua Facts Sheet*, published December 2008, [www.franciscansinternational.org](http://www.franciscansinternational.org) (Accessed 17 October 2009).

<sup>346</sup> B. Giay, "Towards a New Papua," *Inside Indonesia* (July-September 2001).

<sup>347</sup> Neilson. *Christianity in Irian Jaya*.

influence of the church throughout Melanesia generally has also been significant in the socio-economic development of the region, particularly since the end of World War II. Education, health services, transport services, printing and translation of languages were only part of their endeavours.<sup>348</sup> It was through education, in particular, that the missionaries and church groups were most effective in bringing about cultural and social change.<sup>349</sup>

Mission activity in West Papua was probably no more progressive than it was in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century when Dutch colonial pretensions were also at their highest. There are other accounts of German Lutheran missionaries in the Biak area in 1885 who were to prepare the way for a long line of Dutch missionaries. Although the work of the missionaries is well recognised, the interrelations between the inhabitants of the territory and the outside world were expanded by the traders, explorers, miners, settlers and others who entered the territory for different reasons<sup>350</sup>. These may in some way have introduced a secular influence, but nevertheless facilitated education, industrialisation, printing and other benefits of progressive modernisation.

The expansion of the Dutch Government and the missions was mutually beneficial. Dutch military expeditions between 1907 and 1915, as well as the pre-war scientific expeditions, increased the knowledge of the West Papuan and contact with local people was established to the benefit of the missionaries. Demographic changes around 1910 saw the immigration of small numbers of Moluccans, Arabs and Chinese who formed ethnically-based groups. These were accepted by the missions, and contributed to the presence of religious activity. The efforts of the missionaries were

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<sup>348</sup> Trompf, *Melanesian Religion*, p. 159.

<sup>349</sup> Trompf, *Melanesian Religion*, p. 154.

<sup>350</sup> Trompf, *Melanesian Religion*, p. 141.

also assisted by Dutch soldiers spreading their knowledge of religion. It is possible that European traders who followed the Dutch military may also have helped spread Christianity in some areas.<sup>351</sup>

Historically, it has been established that religion is a well-trying method of creating close relationships between people who otherwise have little in common.<sup>352</sup> It is, therefore, not surprising that the links between religion and national consciousness can be formed and that religion can aid the dissemination of nationalism over time. According to Trompf, in those situations where independence has not been secured, theology can also provide the inspiration for nationalism or for accommodation of difference and spirit of co-operation where ethnic divisiveness is pronounced.<sup>353</sup> It would seem that this may have met with difficulty in reconciling the neo-colonial Indonesian rule with the population in West Papua if for no other reason than that Indonesia has an overwhelming Muslim population and West Papua has a predominantly Christian representation.

Theoretically, Trompf's ideas appear to have the possibility of greater success where religious differences have not become entrenched as they have in a number of the Provinces of Indonesia, particularly in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Nevertheless the comments offered by Trompf underscore the influence that religion may have on nationalism. One particular example of this may apply in the case of the Indonesian Province of Aceh where Islamic ideas provided an idiom by which unity of various groups, despite social distinction, could be expressed. Culturally diverse, the region has shown that its cohesion in times of adversity has been strength with its large Islamic following being the binding element.<sup>354</sup> In the Aceh war the Dutch administration endeavoured to create a division between religious and secular elites of Aceh society. Acehnese resistance was

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<sup>351</sup> Neilson, *Christianity in Irian Jaya*.

<sup>352</sup> E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 68.

<sup>353</sup> Trompf, *Melanesian Religion*, p. 265.

<sup>354</sup> L. B. Rollings, 2004, "The Aceh Problem" B. Asian St. (Hons), University of New England, p. 114 .

considerably strengthened under the direction of the Ulama. Desperate Muslim groups became united as Muslims, despite other differences which existed between them.<sup>355</sup>

Trompf's ideas are supported by similar sentiments by Susanna Rizzo who postulated that religion plays a functional role in the rise of both historical consciousness and nationalism. Rizzo's thesis which examines the role that Christianity has played in the genesis and rise of West Papuan nationalism is positioned in antithesis to traditional primitivist approaches to the study of this territory. She demonstrates how existing theories of nationalism have failed to consider its role and how religion is intrinsically tied to the existence of historical consciousness embedded in myths, in stories and in ritual performances.<sup>356</sup> The links between religion and national consciousness can be very close<sup>357</sup> and it is not surprising that Rizzo found that Christian institutions played a facilitating role through which some Papuans were able to communicate and articulate communal sentiments of belonging.<sup>358</sup>

A second alternative viewpoint on West Papuan nationalism is that of Otto Ondawame, who is a member of the West Papuan separatist movement OPM. In his PhD Thesis on nationalism in West Papua, he concludes that nationalism for Papuans has emerged on the basis of common historical experiences over more than two centuries. He claims that West Papuan nationalism did not exist before Dutch colonialism began in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and has grown as a response to socio-political injustice, and is rooted in a sense of common identity, race, religion culture and historical experience.<sup>359</sup>

When discussing ethnic nationalism during a recent interview with Otto Ondawame he said:

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<sup>355</sup> Rollings, *The Aceh Problem*, p. 52.

<sup>356</sup> Rizzo, *From Paradise Lost*.

<sup>357</sup> Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 67.

<sup>358</sup> Rizzo, *From Paradise Lost*.

<sup>359</sup> Ondawame, *One People One Soul*.

Timika is my own tribal area. In the general area of West Papua we are not talking about ethnic nationalism. It is the people's nationalism. We Papuans consider we are people who have a right to determine our future. In my book I have discussed ethnic nationalism. We call it people's nationalism. Different ethnic groups are united to fight against foreign occupation forces but ethnic nationalism that I refer to is nothing more than local sentiment of certain ethnic groups against anyone they consider to be enemies. This could be the Government of Indonesia or a foreign company that occupies our land. This is part of the people's nationalism. The Papuans believe that they are the people who have equal rights, the same rights as Indonesians, the Dutch and Australians who have been guaranteed by international law to determine their own future. That is the basic principle. Papuans consider themselves as a people, Melanesians who lived there for 70,000 years; we have a right to determine our future. Indonesians are just newcomers. We are proud. This is our land and what are they doing here?<sup>360</sup>

In a similar theme to that of Ondawame, King narrows the time element of the first stirrings of nationalism in West Papua to 1938-43 following the great 'cargo movement' that spread throughout the Biak region.<sup>361</sup> Nationalist sentiment had been directed against the colonising Dutch and subsequently the invading Japanese. This resentment was also taken against the *Amberi* who were mainly from Ambon in the neighbouring Moluccas. They had served the Dutch in various capacities and were believed to have collaborated with the Japanese.<sup>362</sup>

### *Future Considerations*

Richard Chauvel warns of an emerging ethnic nationalism which is driven by the dramatically changed demography in Papua under Indonesian rule. By 2000 the percentage of non-Papuans had reached 35% of the population. This fuelled Papuan nationalism by creating a feeling among Papuans of having become marginal in their own homeland in its political and economic life.<sup>363</sup> The relationship between Papuan identity and Indonesian identity is raised by Chauvel, stating that

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<sup>360</sup> Dr. Otto Ondawame, West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCCL). Interview at Sydney University, 7 July 2010.

<sup>361</sup> For an understanding of Cargo cults see N. Mc Dowell, A note on cargo cults and cultural constructions of change *Pacific Studies* 11, 1988 pp121-122 and Lindstrom, L., *Cargo Cult. Strange Stories of Desire from Melanesia and Beyond*, University of Hawaii, Honolulu Hawaii Press, 1993, p63.

<sup>362</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto*, p. 30.

<sup>363</sup> R. Chauvel, "Divide and Who Rules? Ethnic nationalism under siege in West Papua", *Inside Indonesia* 78, April-June 2004.

“the difference between the two is different from that between regional, ethnic and national identities elsewhere in the archipelago.”<sup>364</sup> The experience of Papuan societies with each other and the outside world through the dealings with the Netherlands and Indonesia has contributed to shaping Papuan identity and nationalism. Chauvel claims that there is a basic incompatibility between being Papuan and being Indonesian. “Papuans identity has been created by people whose contact with each other has been both limited and recent. Papuans do not have the assurance of a shared common community and historical experience like the Minangkabau or Buginese.”<sup>365</sup> Nationalism as seen by John Plamenatz (in Kamenka 1975) “is the desire to preserve or enhance a people’s national or cultural identity when that identity is threatened, or the desire to transform or create it where it is felt to be inadequate or lacking.”<sup>366</sup> It is thus a cultural phenomenon although it can and often does take a political form

In the case of West Papua, a great deal has occurred “over the past 150 years to shape Papua’s identity and nationalism”.<sup>367</sup> If the central government continues to prosecute its present strategy which appears to be the nationalist imperative for Indonesia – one-state-one culture - a great deal of political and cultural engineering may be required in the Province of Papua. It may in fact amount to more of the ‘same thing’ for West Papuans including human rights abuses and oppression. History has shown that these policies have been counter-productive in the past and can only create further oppression and suffering in the future. In this context, a view taken by Ernest Gellner based on an essay on nationalism by John Plamenatz (1973) should be recognised.<sup>368</sup>; in conditions which may exist in many parts of the world “culturally homogeneous nation states such as are held to be

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<sup>364</sup> Chauvel, “Divide and Who Rules?”, *Inside Indonesia* 78.

<sup>365</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>366</sup> J. Plamenatz, ‘Two types of Nationalism’ in E. Kamenka, (ed), *Nationalism. The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1975, p. 24.

<sup>367</sup> Chauvel, “Divide and Who Rules”, *Inside Indonesia* 78.

<sup>368</sup> J. Plamenatz, in E. Gellner *Nationalism*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1997, p. 55.

normative and prescribed by history in nationalist theory, can be produced only by ethnic cleansing.”<sup>369</sup> I take the view that this idea corresponds largely with circumstances currently existing in the Indonesian/West Papuan dispute. The objectives voiced by Martono (see Chapter 2, page 41 of this thesis) and the policies of the government over four decades which underpin this objective are characteristic of ethnic cleansing.

In his chapter *The Challenge of Multiculturalism*, Laitin outlines his ideas on cultural heterogeneity. He takes the position that the costs for eliminating heterogeneity are surely higher than the costs of accepting heterogeneity; costs may include poor public services and low economic growth. It is claimed as “imperative to learn how best to overcome the negative consequences of heterogeneity without subjecting minorities to any form of ethnic cleansing or coerced assimilation”.<sup>370</sup> Clearly there is a need for quantitative evaluation but based on Laitin’s arguments one of the mitigating factors for a “multicultural political agenda” is that it enriches the public sphere which in itself is a democratic achievement.<sup>371</sup>

### **The Origins and Activities of the Separatist Movement**

The nationalistic passion and resistance by West Papuans against Indonesian rule is manifested through the West Papuan separatist organisation OPM. The origins of the OPM lie mainly with the Arfak people from whose ranks many had been trained in the Dutch-created Papuan Volunteer Corps. In negotiations with the Dutch concerning the building of a large barracks in Manokwari in 1960, the Arfak leaders had insisted that the Dutch allow for a number of Arfak recruits. Initial

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<sup>369</sup> E. Gellner, *Nationalism*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1997, p. 56.

<sup>370</sup> D.D. Laitin, *Nations, States and Violence*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 112.

<sup>371</sup> *ibid.*

supplies of weaponry had been obtained from equipment left by US and Allied forces from World War II.<sup>372</sup>

Confrontation between West Papuans and Indonesia which erupted in serious conflict following the takeover by Indonesia in 1963 is the main focal point of initial West Papuan resistance against the Indonesian government. Tensions had been fuelled in the lead-up to the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia with several smaller scale rebellions having occurred in the period to December 1962. A number of issues relating to the key events in the take-over and Indonesian conduct in the period following the transition will be dealt with in the following chapter.

Two major uprisings occurred in 1964 and 1965. The first was attributable to an initiative of then President Sukarno following the withdrawal of Indonesia from the UN over its policy of *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia. Sukarno then declared that as he had no further association with the UN, he was no longer obliged to conduct the Act of Free Choice for the people of West Papua. Seen as the elimination of their opportunity to determine their own future by peaceful means, there were large scale uprisings by West Papuans against the government. The major conflicts were located in the Arfak Mountains near Manokwari and a further attack was launched on several army outposts by Kebar tribesmen.<sup>373</sup> The second major conflict of this period occurred in 1965. After failed attempts at negotiations with authorities concerning unemployment, lack of food and other necessities the Arfak people, with the support of the people from the nearby village of Ransiki, launched attacks against the Indonesian military.

The rebellion took place just before the end of the Sukarno regime and was to last two years with many thousands of ABRI as well as mountain-based guerillas engaged in the conflict. The forces of Arfaks and others engaged in these revolts against the government were, in some instances, quite

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<sup>372</sup> R. Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War. The Geurilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin Australia Pty. Ltd., North Sydney, 1985, p. 35.

<sup>373</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 34

significant. In 1967 a force of Arfaks numbering around 1,400, led by Lodewijk Mandatjan, was involved and in the Wissel Lakes region it was reported that a force of approximately 30,000 was involved in fighting the Indonesians. Whilst resistance against the government was widespread “the revolts against the Indonesians therefore proved fruitless and large- scale open resistance was on the decline by the late 1960’s.”<sup>374</sup> The resistance in West Papua inspired Papuans in other parts of Indonesia and “from then on many students spent time training with the OPM.”<sup>375</sup> West Papuan resistance was synonymous with the beginning of Indonesian occupation and control of their territory and the OPM “is the only organisation which has operated in West Papua since 1965 with a clear national political agenda.”<sup>376</sup>

Defeats at the hands of ABRI following numerous revolts discouraged resistance by West Papuans towards the end of the 1960’s but a resurgence of OPM activity came with the arrival of Seth Rumkorem in 1969, who became involved in establishing a resistance group in the Keerom area which was to later be the foundation of the modern OPM. Rumkorem was to become one of its most important military and political leaders. He was a former intelligence officer with ABRI who defected from the Indonesian forces and was initially involved in setting up TEPENAL (*Tentara Pembebasan Nasional* also known as TPN) which became the army of the people of West Papua. On 1 July 1971 he proclaimed independence using a captured Indonesian radio. His announcement, and the accompanying constitution, was accepted by all the various groups operating under the OPM banner.<sup>377</sup>

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<sup>374</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, pp. 35-36.

<sup>375</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War*, p. 36.

<sup>376</sup> O. Ondawame and P. King, *West Papua: Reconciliation as a Way of Promoting Peace Dialogue*, The West Papua Project Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, [www.arts.usyd.edu.au/centres/cpacs/wpp\\_pos\\_paper\\_02092001.htm](http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/centres/cpacs/wpp_pos_paper_02092001.htm). (Accessed 1 October 2009).

<sup>377</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 38.

The following decade saw no diminution of OPM resistance activities, and contrary to the claims of the Indonesian government, there was considerable opposition to Indonesian rule during this period. No military successes over ABRI were recorded but notable success in the propaganda war against Indonesia was achieved. The year 1984 in particular marked a major uprising in Jayapura following an incident involving the raising of the Morning Star flag outside the provincial parliament. This was attempted by a West Papuan corporal in the Indonesian army who was shot dead during the incident.

Numerous uprisings throughout the Province ensued and these were met with the swift reaction of ABRI rounding up any known supporters of OPM and searching for approximately 100 Melanesians deserters who had defected from ABRI's 751 Battalion. The fighting continued for some months and was responsible for a surge of refugees crossing the border into Papua New Guinea for reasons of safety.<sup>378</sup> If any unity was achieved by OPM factions during this conflict it was to be short-lived returning to the intensifying inter-faction rivalry of 1980-83 which was fanned to a considerable extent by West Papuans in Europe and PNG.<sup>379</sup> Factional leadership and the activities of Seth Rumkorem and his alleged attempts to 'dominate the resistance' were contentious issues in this period.<sup>380</sup>

The years reaching from 1988 to 1995 was a period of change within the OPM, with new personalities arriving on the scene. Many of the previous leaders were either dead, in prison or had left the country. Zone commanders appear to have operated independently until overall leadership was once again established in 1992 under John 'Neknek' Somer. He was the Chairman of the OPM and Major-General of TEPENAL. Although there was limited participation in the electoral process for the position of Chairman, Somer emerged with 65 per cent of the vote. The goals of the new

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<sup>378</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 46.

<sup>379</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 80.

<sup>380</sup> *ibid.*

regime were consistent with that of the “old” OPM: the establishment of an independent state of West Papua. His organisational objectives were to overcome the factionalism which existed and to achieve discipline and unity. His political agenda was detailed in a thirteen point plan which was to be implemented in several stages. This embraced preparation, consolidation with a congress and military victory. Although the strength of his organisation is contentious, Somer claimed the number of combatants to be almost 50,000 but most observers considered this to be quite excessive.<sup>381</sup>

In what may be described as a disruptive period for the OPM, in December 2000 they withdrew from a July 2000 agreement which recognised the authority of the Papuan Council Presidium.<sup>382</sup> This was due to initiatives by the central government which thwarted the implementation of declarations of the June Congress. The winding back by the government of several decisions taken by the Wahid administration such as changing the name of the Province and the ‘flag flying’ policy concerning the Morning Star flag underpinned OPM actions.

A further consequence of government action was a flood of refugees, mainly comprising settlers and civil servants from the regency of Jayawijaya who poured across the border into Papua New Guinea. Some estimates put the number of refugees as high as 10,000. The refugee exodus in particular generated a great deal of publicity with adverse impressions for Indonesia on the international stage as well as providing continued exposure for OPM. The separatist organisation continues to threaten the state ideology for a unified Indonesia. Unless a settlement of the long running dispute with the central government was reached there was every reason to expect their activities would continue. As Elmslie stated in 2002, “The OPM is not a spent force, but is alive

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<sup>381</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 53.

<sup>382</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 62.

and well in the hearts and minds of West Papuans.”<sup>383</sup> There is every reason to suggest that this is as true today.

#### *The OPM and West Papuan Nationalism*

It is pertinent at this juncture to make an observation as to the role of the OPM in West Papuan nationalism. Nationalism was demonstrated in the numerous uprisings by various elements of West Papuan society and was invariably linked to dissatisfaction with the actions of the Indonesian government. These pockets of resistance were geographically dispersed and mostly of short duration.<sup>384</sup> They were not all conducted under the banner of the OPM. The declaration of independence can be described as a crystalising event bringing a high level of consensus by all the various groups under Seth Rumkorem in 1971 and generating perhaps for the first time a condition which can be described as West Papuan nationalism. This was generated by the leaders of the New Guinea Council ((Markus Kaisiepo and Nicholas Jouwe) based on well known national symbols. They asserted a right to self-determination and independence. Future resistance activities could be conducted through the OPM in an organised and co-ordinated manner if some ideological differences in approach with some other elements of West Papuan resistance elements could be achieved. There are claims that the OPM was never really a unified body but goals and activities were supported by the majority of West Papuans.<sup>385</sup> The organisation is not only a vehicle through which West Papuan resistance is expressed but also appears as a symbol of nationalistic emotion, ambition and opposition to Indonesian rule.

#### *The OPM and West Papuan Politics*

Since its inception the OPM has been wracked with internal power struggles which have created different factions and undermined unity within the organisation. Notable among these are disputes

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<sup>383</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 29.

<sup>384</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 65.

<sup>385</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 31.

within the regional commands of the National Liberation Army of the OPM in the north in 1984 and 1988 and in the south in 1988. Difficulties also arose between the OPM and the fourteen Stars Movement in the 1980's.<sup>386</sup> This lack of unity suggests that the OPM could not have achieved the complete trust of the people or external support organisations in the struggle for freedom from Indonesian control. When leadership passed to the Papuan Council Presidium, its new approach created space for political interaction among Papuans and between Papuans and Indonesians. Most OPM leaders, whether at home or in exile, have only given partial or conditional support to the Presidium. Ondawame, who had been in exile for six years, took the view that "there is and has been only one legitimizing thread in the national struggle: the movement led by active Papuan resistance fighters who have waged the struggle and sustained the symbols for nearly 40 years..."<sup>387</sup>

On these issues, at a personal interview, Ron May said:

A characteristic of West Papuan movement, like a lot of these movements, is that it has always been very fractured. From the start the OPM was probably a more correct description of various active groups. Once it became more organised there were two major camps and they were built partly on ethnic lines and partly on the basis of personal animosities between people. There were differences between people like Dr. Otto Ondawame who is from the Amungme people near Freeport and the people from Sentani who were fairly well educated and amongst the elite nationalists, and the people from near Birdshead area and Biak. These differences have always existed. Even at the height of OPM activity there were various people claiming to be leaders. There has always been this tension, even when the Indonesians were possibly genuinely prepared to make some concessions. There was a strong feeling that people who participated in the discussions were giving in to the Indonesians and were perhaps being compromised by them. As an organisation the OPM has never been strong. It has never had any significant backing from international sources as opposed to most other separatist movements that have received support from Muslim countries. Nobody has ever wanted to back West Papuans so they had very few weapons other than those captured from Indonesian troops or police. Also, the movement was factionalised and overall numbers were small and it was never very well organised. Their strength was mainly identified with the flag, everybody identified with the flag. It is not so much how strong the OPM is, it is how strong the

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<sup>386</sup> The Fourteen Stars Movement seeks independence for Papuan people and their unification with the Melanesian race which is spread throughout the Southwest Pacific.

<sup>387</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 66.

general sentiment is and how it can be mobilised. Even in those terms it is not very strong. It has always been up against a very well organised army in huge numbers.<sup>388</sup>

The differences in the approach by the OPM and the Presidium producing a favourable outcome for the West Papuans have been detrimental to their objectives. “The OPM emphasizes the relevance of both military and peaceful approaches as a means to addressing the struggle, while the Presidium uses peaceful approaches alone.”<sup>389</sup> The relationship problems “have resulted in a loss of trust among the people, solidarity groups and sympathetic governments.”<sup>390</sup> These differences can also serve to weaken the negotiating strength of West Papuans in their quest for West Papua to become an independent state. The unhealthy relationship between NGO’s and the OPM is based on mutual claims of each attaching blame onto the other for bringing about social chaos and many casualties.

In his capacity as Vice-Chairman of the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation Ondawame expressed the views on the current strength of the OPM and recent developments involving the Vanuatu government.

OPM is the major resistance movement in West Papua since 1965. I was a member of the OPM. However, in the past 20 years OPM was not strong enough to challenge the Indonesian presence in West Papua. Because of their weaknesses, there emerged new organisations within West Papua such as Papuan Presidium Council, National Coalition, National Authority and a few other political organisations and social organisations such as churches, traditional council of chiefs, women’s organizations and others but generally speaking all of them support the aspiration of the OPM, that West Papua must be an independent state. That aspiration has already inspired the people of West Papua. Now the question is how we want to negotiate with the Indonesian government if the people of West Papua are not united in the one body. So in the last seven years we have developed a new idea to reform the orientation and that means that we bring in all the resistance movement into the one body which we call West Papua National Coalition for Liberation. Even I am a member of OPM but we feel that we have to control our struggle inside West Papua. However, we believe that unity is so important to convince our friends, to convince Indonesians that we are united and ready to fight for independent West Papua. So for that reason we have all together to respect different factions’ views and independency of each organization but we have to unite our common perception on what

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<sup>388</sup> Ronald J. May, Emeritus Fellow, State, Society & Governance in Melanesia Program; Convenor, Centre for Conflict & Post-conflict Studies, Asia Pacific, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, ANU. Interview at Australian National University, Canberra on 11 May 2010.

<sup>389</sup> Ondawame and King, *West Papua: Reconciliation*.

<sup>390</sup> Ondawme and King, *West Papua Reconciliation*.

strategy is applied for the future. We are already successful to have this formation of West Papua National Liberation.[sic] I am now talking as Vice Chairman of West Papua National Liberation [sic] because of that international community is now stronger positively. For example the Vanuatu government has a clear foreign policy on West Papua to support the independence of West Papua by passing the motion at the parliament of Vanuatu. It is clear that Vanuatu will subscribe the issue of West Papua to the Melanesian Spearhead Group and Pacific Islands Forum Meetings and General Assembly of the United Nations this year. Now we must lobby member countries to support this position. This is because the West Papuans are united under the Coalition. Because of that consequence and also international legal system, Vanuatu wants to raise the issue of West Papua to the UN asking the International Court of Justice to provide an advisory opinion on the political status of West Papua, particularly on the New York Agreement of 1962 and also the conduct of the so called Act of Free Choice 1969. So it will be a long process but we think this is the right way.<sup>391</sup>

A recent development involving West Papua and the Vanuatu government arose following a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly which was attended by Vanuatu's Prime Minister, Edward Natapei. The Prime Minister confirmed that he did not take the opportunity to raise the issue of the status of Papua at the meeting, primarily due to the sensitivity of the matter. He considered it was not the right time to raise it at UN level. He thought that the issue should be first raised at the Melanesian Spearhead Group Leaders level. The motion passed by the Vanuatu parliament in June 2010 was to request General Assembly support for the International Court of Justice to provide an advisory opinion in which the former Netherlands New Guinea was to cede to Indonesia in the sixties. Some members of the Vanuatu parliament considered that Mr. Natapei could be held in contempt of parliament for failing to follow through on the motion which he had originally sponsored.<sup>392</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> Ondawame, interview.

<sup>392</sup> Radio New Zealand International, "Vanuatu Mum on West Papua at U.N. General Assembly", 4 October 2010.

## CHAPTER 5

### WEST PAPUAN POLITICS

#### *A Formative Year*

In a move which marked a major shift in Dutch policy the Netherlands government under the prime ministership of J.E. De Quay in April 1960 introduced a plan to accelerate the political development of West New Guinea. The principle of a New Guinea Council had been conceived in 1949, having been laid down in Administrative Regulations which acquired force of law on 29 December of that year. It was only in 1960 that real preparations for an election were made. For this purpose the Province was divided into constituencies, allowing for each constituency to elect its own candidates.

The election was based on a mixed system of nomination, indirect voting and direct elections. Direct elections took place in some of the larger cities, the one man one vote system applied elsewhere. West Papua's new parliament possessed new powers that exceeded initial expectations. "These actually surpassed those of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) in Port Moresby."<sup>393</sup> Legislative authority was to be exercised (although progressively) through a newly established central New Guinea Council which comprised a Papuan majority membership. The purpose of the initiative was to hasten the training of Papuans in the required skills to enable them to effectively participate in various representative functions and for service in administration.

It was envisaged that responsibilities in the creation of a small Papuan military corps and implementation of a greatly expanded economic and social development programme would be encompassed by these elite Papuans. Emphasis had always been placed on the backwardness of the population and the length of time envisaged before they could intelligently respond to the

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<sup>393</sup> A.J. Marey, "My experiences as a civil servant in West Papua (New Guinea)", Seminar on the Act of Free Choice, The Hague, 2005, p. 95.

responsibility of determining their future destiny.<sup>394</sup> The programme was very well received by the Dutch parliament which indicated a growing popular desire to be rid of the West New Guinea issue as soon as possible. The plan to establish a New Guinea Council was approved by the Second Chamber of the parliament with an overwhelming majority vote.

There was an almost immediate response to the Dutch political policy initiatives as new political aspirants emerged to contest elections for the proposed New Guinea Council. There were also applications for several new regional councils. One of the more radical parties to contest the election was the Nationalist Party. Their “programme called for rapid progress toward self-government, Papuanisation of the administrative services and greater education opportunities for the autochthonous population.”<sup>395</sup> On the other hand, the more conservative Democratic Peoples Party supported the notion of a “long continued period of Dutch tutelage and an eventual Melanesian federation.”<sup>396</sup> Important facts emerging from the elections were that “Papuan comprised an overwhelming majority of the Council installed in April 1961,”<sup>397</sup> there was a surprising political awareness among the emancipated segment of the population and also a growing indigenous interest in the colony’s constitutional future.<sup>398</sup>

The New Guinea Council was inaugurated on 5 April 1961 marking a successful experiment for the Dutch in the development of West Papuan politics. A meeting of Council members set up a National Committee of about 70 Papuans who met at Hollandia on 9 October 1961. They adopted a new name for the territory – *Papua Barat* (West Papua), expressed support for the Morning Star

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<sup>394</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea. The Dispute*, p. 94.

<sup>395</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea. The Dispute*, p. 95.

<sup>396</sup> For details of other parties contesting the election for the New Guinea Council and results see pp.96-97 Henderson, 1973, *West New Guinea. The Dispute and Its Settlement*.

<sup>397</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea. The Dispute*, p. 97.

<sup>398</sup> Henderson, *West New Guinea. The Dispute*, p. 96.

flag and an anthem, 'My Land of Papua'. These steps were ratified by a special meeting of the New Guinea Council to which Holland added its approval.

The lead-up to the events of December 1961 was a period of rapid political change and increasing national awareness. International conflict, rival claims to sovereignty and the issue of self-determination for West Papua all contributed to the tensions which prevailed. On 19 October 1961, the Papuan National Committee (*Komite Nasional Papua*),<sup>399</sup> comprising four of the leading Papuan members of the New Guinea Council, issued a political manifesto. It outlined requests for the Government of the Netherlands to consider including permission for the Papuan flag to be flown beside the Dutch flag and that the Papuan anthem be sung with the Dutch 'Wilhelmus'. Perhaps, more importantly, it demanded that the Papuan people be given a place among the free peoples of the world, live in peace and contribute to the maintenance of world peace.<sup>400</sup>

On 1 December 1961 the Morning Star flag was officially flown beside the flag of the Netherlands, the colonial ruler of the territory. This may be considered as a foundation event upon which political aspirations were created. In fact, there was no legal or international recognition of independence for West Papua arising from this. Many Papuans regarded this as their 'Independence' but in fact there was no official declaration.<sup>401</sup> Nevertheless, Papuans would re-assert their independence as a sovereign nation since this date at their conference in the year 2000.

Although these developments had the backing of the Dutch, they created controversy amongst members of the Papuan elite. It was also obvious that there was an immense gap between the Papuan elite and the village majority. After a period of only eight months, approval to fly the

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<sup>399</sup> R. Chauvel, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity and Adaptation Policy*, East West Center, Washington, 2002, p. 22.

<sup>400</sup> R. Chauvel, "Where Nationalism Collides: History is Central to the Politics of West Papua, *Inside Indonesia*, July-September 2001.

<sup>401</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 29.

Morning Star flag was withdrawn.<sup>402</sup> The positive political progress in this period for Papuans was the imprint of their national identity in the face of Indonesian oppression. This was, however, at the instigation of a minority. There was no evidence of political cohesion emerging from the political factions of Papuan society which comprised educated Papuans, those who held pro-Indonesian sympathies, those of a pro-Dutch viewpoint and others.

An obvious political change followed the Indonesian takeover in 1962, but, with the withdrawal of the Dutch, the Province was under intense political scrutiny, any apparent dissent being classified as subversion. The Papuans were surrounded by military divisions and Indonesian migrants who rendered progress in political development for Papuans virtually impossible.<sup>403</sup> What followed was a national liberation struggle manifested mainly through the OPM, the first act of rebellion being “performed not with foreign arms but with bow and arrow and traditional clubs”. Some revolts and rebellion were met with counter attacks but the resistance in West Papua inspired Papuans in other parts of Indonesia, particularly students, many of whom were ultimately arrested. From that time they spent time training with the OPM.<sup>404</sup>

The withdrawal of the Dutch in 1962 also resulted in a reduction in leadership of the Papuan resistance as a number left the Province to set up their activities from other locations abroad. Generally referred to as ‘Papuan leaders in exile’ they still had a positive influence in their areas of origin. Included in this group were Nicholas and Markus Kaisiepo who had already become national identities. The group of exiles also comprised representatives from other Provinces, some of the most prominent having served as members of the New Guinea Council.

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<sup>402</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 25.

<sup>403</sup> Lagerberg, *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*, p. 13.

<sup>404</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, pp. 35-36

Some of these leaders were involved in representations to the United Nations and they also began political groups. Jouwe and Kaisiepo established operations in the Netherlands where Jouwe formed the Committee for Freedom for West Papua (KKPB) and a National Liberation Council. “Kaisiepo declared himself president-in-exile and formed the Chamber of Representatives”.<sup>405</sup> Despite differences of views, the two men collaborated to form a united resistance, the National Papuan Front, (FPN) in their homeland. They carried out covert operations through established links with Papuans at home to convey information and propaganda materials. These links were known to be operational for several decades and the existence of the Netherlands-based nationalists was important as late as 1984.<sup>406</sup>

### *Regional Autonomy*

Regional autonomy is a term generally used in relation to the transfer by governments of authority to regional governments, often with the objective of extending government control and promoting operational efficiency.

According to explanatory notes to Law 22, this should be implemented along democratic lines, with community participation, equity and justice and taking into account the diversity of the regions. Under the laws, regional authority is expected to give these areas greater powers and responsibilities over ‘national assets’ and to change the financial relationship between central and local governments.<sup>407</sup>

The term ‘regional autonomy’ is also used in other political contexts and accordingly the following, more specific terms and explanations may prove instructive in this application.

Regional Autonomy is not entirely a new concept, having been practised in Nusentora (Indonesian archipelago) since the pre-colonial period. In this era there were many independent monarch states (including Majapahit) which co-operated with each other, not only in commercial undertakings but in conflicts, war and agreements. As a means of increasing administrative effectiveness, in 1903

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<sup>405</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 32.

<sup>406</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>407</sup> *Down to Earth International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia*, “Down to Earth”, August 2000.

the Dutch colonial government enacted a decentralisation law named “*Decentralisatie Wet*”. Pressure from European capitalists to open the Dutch Indies for global investment and lack of financial investments fuelled the Dutch motivation.<sup>408</sup> Improvement to the Dutch decentralisation law in 1922 made it possible for *pribumi* (indigenous Indonesians) to participate in political education. These laws were framed during the anti-colonial struggle for independence and because the Dutch were still in the process of implementation they were considered unsatisfactory as they did not apply to all of Indonesia. This was still in progress at the time of the Japanese occupation in 1942.<sup>409</sup>

Regional rebellions commencing in February 1958 under the title of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI 1958) brought about some changes to constitutional democracy. The rebels issued demands for then President Sukarno to return to a figurehead role as President and the formation of a new government under Hatta and Yogyakarta Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. Permesta rebels in Sulawesi made common cause with this group. Sukarno was given the opportunity to replace constitutional democracy as a result of these regional rebellions under the 1960 provisional constitution with presidential rule.<sup>410</sup>

Discontent with the highly centralised administration of the New Order government has been a prominent issue between the Provinces and Jakarta for a considerable time. Prior to the advent of the Habibie government many regional protests had been met with accusation by Suharto that separatist motives were the basis of any regional aspirations or demands.<sup>411</sup> Habibie’s enthusiastic attitude to decentralisation and actions in legalising regional law created opportunities for

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<sup>408</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War*, p.45.

<sup>409</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War*, p. 46.

<sup>410</sup> Nurrochmat, *The Impact of Regional Autonomy*, p. 46.

<sup>411</sup> Nurrochmat, *The Impact of Regional Autonomy*, p. 20.

considerable powers to be devolved to provincial and sub-provincial levels.<sup>412</sup> From a political viewpoint, the essence of regional autonomy is to return the ‘dignity’ of the regions, which, until the passing of the legislation of 1999 concerning Local Government and the Regions had been overrun by the Central Government.<sup>413</sup> Regional autonomy policy regulates the relationship between the various levels of government as well as the practical relationship with the people. Through local representative assemblies (DPRD) they manage the organisation of their local government. The practice of monitoring government performance, including the representatives in the local legislature, is becoming a practice throughout Indonesia.<sup>414</sup>

## **Definitions**

### *Decentralisation*

Political, or democratic decentralisation occurs when powers and resources are transferred to authorities representative of and downwardly accountable to local populations. Democratic decentralisation aims to increase public participation in local decision making. Through greater participation, democratic decentralisation is believed to help internalise social, economic, developmental and environmental externalities; to better match social services and public decisions to local needs and aspirations; and to increase equity in the use of public resources.”<sup>415</sup>

### *Fiscal Decentralisation*

Fiscal Decentralisation is the decentralisation of fiscal resources and revenue-generating powers. It is also identified by many analysts as a separate form of decentralisation. “While fiscal transfers

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<sup>412</sup> See Chapter 3, page no.74 for details of the relevant legislation of 1999.

<sup>413</sup> S. Usman, *Regional Autonomy In Indonesia: Field Experiences and Emerging Challenges*, Bali, SMRE Research Institute, June 20-21 2002, p. 1.

<sup>414</sup> Usman, *Regional Autonomy*, p. 21.

<sup>415</sup> J.C. Ribot, *African Decentralization. Local Actors, Powers and Accountability*, Paper No. 8, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, UNRISD Programme on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights, 2002, p. i.

are important, they constitute a cross cutting element of both decentralisation and political decentralisation rather than a separate category.”<sup>416</sup>

### *Devolution*

“Devolution is often used to refer to any transfer from central government to any non-central government body, including local elected governments, NGO’s, customary authorities, private bodies and so forth.”<sup>417</sup>

### *Deconcentration*

Deconcentration concerns transfers of power to local bureaucrats of the central state. “These upwardly accountable bodies are appointed local administrative extensions of the central state.”<sup>418</sup> Generally, the deconcentrated units are delegated by the supervising ministries.<sup>419</sup>

In the post Suharto era regional and local leaders became more assertive in voicing their demands for greater regional control over political and economic affairs. Consequently decentralisation became an important issue on the reform agenda. Proponents of decentralisation viewed the process as a necessary step to involve community participation in public affairs.<sup>420</sup> Whilst one of the perceived benefits of decentralisation is that it brings government closer to the people, it can in some instances produce serious defects which could be damaging to national interests.

Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 formed the regulatory framework for regional autonomy in Indonesia. These laws were supported by a multitude of implementing instructions in order to become fully operational. There are also presidential decrees, ministerial decrees, circular letters (*Surat*

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<sup>416</sup> J.C. Ribot, *African Decentralization*, p. iii.

<sup>417</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>418</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>419</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>420</sup> M. Bunte and D. Ufen, *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, Hoboken, Routledge, 2008, p. 105.

*Edarahan*) and other guidelines. The laws placed regional autonomy on five fundamental principles: democracy, peoples' participation and empowerment, equity and justice, recognition of the potential and diversity of regions and the need to strengthen the regional legislatures. These principles underpin Indonesia's ideology of *reformasi* which has, as its objective, the eradication of the practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism which prevailed during the Suharto era.<sup>421</sup> The implementation and operation of the laws involved many changes in Jakarta's governance. Serious defects in these laws not addressed by implementing instructions "allowed or encouraged local governments to create trade and citizenship barriers damaging to Jakarta's national interests."<sup>422</sup> Efforts to revise Law 22/1999 by the government were made as early as 2001; however the process was discontinued because of resistance from the regions and lack of political support from the DPR. Further efforts by the government to revise the laws were commenced in 2003.<sup>423</sup> A number of issues which were under scrutiny at that time were the clarification of regional functions, (*Kewenangan*) the introduction of the Head of Regions and the attendant accountability mechanisms. Other issues included personnel management and organisational structure of regional governments.<sup>424</sup> The revised Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 have contributed quite significantly to producing a more ideal form of legislation. Continuing problems which emerged during the first three years of implementation have now been revised.<sup>425</sup>

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<sup>421</sup> Usman, *Regional Autonomy*.

<sup>422</sup> D. Ray, and G. Goodpaster, "Indonesian decentralization. Local autonomy, trade barriers and discrimination" in D. Kingsbury, and H. Aveling, (eds) *Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia*, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003, p. 75.

<sup>423</sup> "Decentralization in Indonesia since 1999 – an Overview", *Embassy of Indonesia Ottawa*, 15 February 2010, [www.indonesia-ottawa.org/page.php?s=2010background](http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/page.php?s=2010background). (Accessed 16 February 2010).

<sup>424</sup> "Decentralization in Indonesia since 1999 – an Overview"...

<sup>425</sup> B. Brodjonegoro, 'Indonesian Decentralization After Law Revision: Towards a Better Future', *Department of Economics, University of Indonesia*. <http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~kokyo/APPPsympo04/PDF-papers-nov/Indonesianpaper.pdf>. (Accessed 21 November 2010).

The key features of Law 22/1999 are the governance authorities given to regional authorities and those retained by the central government. It deals with the devolution of a wide range of public service delivery functions to the regions and strengthening of the elected regional councils, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, (DPRD) which received wide ranging powers to supervise and control regional administration. The law was enacted on 7 May 1999 and consisted of 16 chapters and 134 articles which contained the general guidelines of the decentralising government administrative system. It was, to a certain extent, anticipated by regulators who commenced implementing various regional regulations prior to the official starting date in 2001. This left little time for appropriate development and revision of bills.<sup>426</sup> The provisions define the respective authority of regional administrative bodies and the central government. Articles 7(1) and 7(2) outline which areas are to remain a ‘national concern’ and therefore not to be devolved to the regions. Article 7 (1) includes international politics, defence, justice, monetary and fiscal policy, religion, national planning, national macro economic development, national administration, human resource development, exploitation of natural resources, strategic high technology, conservation and national standards.<sup>427</sup> Internal trade (and even foreign trade) are not explicitly mentioned in either of these articles.

There appears to have been weaknesses at both national and regional levels in relation to laws regulating regional autonomy. In the first instance the DPR was sometimes revising bills that had been submitted by the President and developing bills without waiting for the President to submit them. At the regional level, local governments were developing laws that did not conform with policies of the central government.<sup>428</sup> Part of the problem was the ambiguity in Law No. 22/1999 and the conflict it created with the pre-existing legal framework. The language used in setting up authorisation of districts and municipalities to manage their affairs created what has been termed

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<sup>426</sup> J.M. Patlis, “The role of law and legal institutions in determining the sustainability of integrated coastal management projects in Indonesia”, *Ocean & Coastal Management*, No. 48 (2005), p. 453.

<sup>427</sup> Ray, et. al., ‘Indonesian Decentralisation’ p. 76.

<sup>428</sup> Patlis, “The role of law”, p. 453.

“regional euphoria” – a sense that regional governments have virtually unfettered authority to manage their own affairs independent of pre-existing sectoral mandates that were centralist in nature and not all clearly superseded by Law 22/1999.<sup>429</sup>

The need for more carefully considered restrictions on local authorities is demonstrated by actions of numerous local governments which may have resulted in serious damage to the national economy, inter-regional harmony and equality of citizenship. In Sumatra the Provincial Council took action to privatise a key subsidiary of a company which had committed 51 per cent ownership to a foreign investor in a crucial element in the country’s much needed privatisation programme. North Sulawesi banned all non-local investment in pharmaceutical retail and procurement. In another instance a large number of local governments in Sumatra and the eastern islands began imposing tariffs and other tax type distortions on the internal movement of agricultural produce. Employment opportunity was also an area where discrimination was exercised in favour of local dominant ethnic groups to the detriment of other local citizens.<sup>430</sup> In the absence of government regulations many other opportunistic and copy-cat type practices may have proliferated. There are role models, including Australia, which could have assisted in developing sound and co-ordinated domestic and international trade and labour policies.

Law No. 25/1999 dealt with the Fiscal Balance between the central government and the regions. In effect this law changed the entire mechanism of intergovernmental and local finance. The objectives of the legislation were to empower and raise regional economic capabilities, creating a financial system which was “just, proportional, rational, transparent, participatory, accountable and provided certainty.”<sup>431</sup> The funding system which embraced grants from the central government to the regions would be abolished and replaced by other means. Presumably the intention of the

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<sup>429</sup> Patlis, “The role of law”, p. 454.

<sup>430</sup> Ray, et. al., ‘Indonesian Decentralisation’, p. 77.

<sup>431</sup> Ray, et. al, “Indonesian Decentralization.”

government was to introduce a funding system that reflected the division of functions between the government and regions and also reduced regional funding gaps.<sup>432</sup>

Under this system regions would receive 25% of revenues from oil exploitation carried out within their borders and 30% of revenues from natural gas exploitation. Regions will receive 80% of government revenues accruing from mining other than oil and gas, and regions may, with the permission of the regional parliament, borrow domestically to finance part of the budget. Foreign borrowing is also permitted but should be done through the central government.<sup>433</sup>

The functions which have been devolved from the central government are to be financed from several sources. These include transfers from the General Allocation Fund (DAV) and the Specific Allocation Fund and Revenue Sharing (DAK). The DAV component is expected to complete most of the devolved functions from the central government and to ensure that every local government balances its fiscal needs and fiscal capacity by filling any emerging deficit. The 25/1999 version of the law allocated a minimum of 25% of net domestic revenue (total domestic revenue minus revenue sharing) in the budget (APBN). In the revised law this percentage was to increase to 26% at the beginning of 2008. With the exception of resource-rich regions, Revenue Sharing and DAK contributed a minor share of overall revenue (probably less than 10%).

#### *Revision of Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999*

Efforts to revise the laws commenced almost as quickly as confusion erupted between local and central government or among local governments. Political tension regarding the revision efforts further interrupted and halted the process. Accusations by the association of local governments of attempts to recentralise the government authority by not involving local government participation in the revision efforts underscored early attempts. Former drafts of the original version of Law 22/1999 claimed that imperfections in the decentralisation process were due to inadequacies of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the implementation process. It was widely anticipated that the two

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<sup>432</sup> Ray, et. al, "Indonesian Decentralization", p. 70.

<sup>433</sup> *ibid.*

revised laws which were eventually passed by parliament would provide new direction of Indonesian political administrative, fiscal and economic decentralisation.<sup>434</sup>




Figure 2. Framework of Government According to Law 22/1999.<sup>435</sup>

It is necessary that Regional Autonomy Laws remain flexible to accommodate necessary amendments through legislation and, where practical, through Government Regulations. Central government institutions must abandon centralised decision-making practices and allow democratic approach for regional government and community participation in legislation change to develop.

<sup>434</sup> B. Brodjonegoro, "The Indonesian Decentralization After Law Revision: Toward a Better Future?" *International Symposium on Fiscal Decentralization in Asia Revisited*, Tokyo., 2004, pp. 1-3.

<sup>435</sup> Usman, *Regional Autonomy*, p. 3.

“In fact, central government institutions that have the responsibility to revise legislation should actually take into account regional opinions and community demands.”<sup>436</sup>

A special task force had been formed by the DPR in December 2003 to coordinate a revision of the decentralised framework. The draft of the revised laws was received by the DPR on 10 May 2004 with the expectation of ratification by the end of September. “Law 32/2004 on Regional Governance and Law 33/2004 on Fiscal Balancing between the Central Government and Regional Governments were ratified by the DPR on 29 September and signed by President Megawati on 15 October 2004.”<sup>437</sup>

Regional Law 32/2004 supersedes Law 22/1999. This Law has, as its stated purpose, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the regional administration in order to enhance the welfare of the people (preamble to Law 32/2004). Some of the outstanding features of the legislation include its aim of giving the Central Government power to intervene in local affairs and making regional governments act more responsibly. There is also provision for strengthening the role of the governor in ‘guidance and supervision’ of district governments. Arguably the main feature of the new Law is the introduction of district elections for the heads of regional governments (governors/district heads). The national government has, however, retained power over foreign relations, monetary and fiscal affairs, defence, internal security and religious affairs as per the provisions of previous legislation.<sup>438</sup> In fact, many of the basic provisions of the 1999 and 2004 legislation are similar. Nevertheless there are grounds for extensive analysis to determine the amount of power now devolved to the local level, and other changes, to assess the effect in addressing previous weaknesses in the decentralised framework and remedying the perceived problems caused by regional autonomy. Some criticisms remain that the 2004 Law revision does

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<sup>436</sup> Usman, *Regional Autonomy*, p. 22.

<sup>437</sup> Bunte and Ufen, *Democratization*, p. 111.

<sup>438</sup> Bunte and Ufen, *Democratization*, p. 112.

not go far enough in addressing the problems caused or not resolved by regional autonomy. The most important regulation was concerning power-sharing between the centre and the regions. Mandated to be issued in October 2006, it was still not effected in late 2007.

### *Political Parties*

Amendments were also introduced in Law 33/2004 in relation to the system of voting. The proportional representation system of voting which is applied at both national and regional assemblies had the characteristic (under Law 22/1999) of having voters cast votes in favour of political parties. The people, therefore, did not elect their local members. Accordingly many of those who were elected under the system owed their position to the respective political parties rather than election by voters based on local knowledge and/or their technical skills.

The lack of transparency and accountability of candidates not only placed personal integrity of elected members in question but had the potential for providing a basis for corrupt practices. Compounding this, “parties at the district and municipal level do not always have sufficient control over their representatives in the local assembly.”<sup>439</sup> Organisational weaknesses of political parties at the local level generally showed this characteristic which was due to lack of the development of a strong party system and training. Political parties had not developed clear guidelines and policy platforms for conducting party business in the assembly. The revision of Law 2004 introduced the direct election of regional government heads which should change the structure of accountability at the local level by introducing an element of transparency in future elections.

A regular reporting system had also been introduced where the regional government head accounts for his duties to the DPRD, the central government and the people.<sup>440</sup> Continued recognition of

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<sup>439</sup> Usman, *Regional Autonomy*, p. 13.

<sup>440</sup> Bunte, and Ufen., *Democratization*, p. 111.

organisational weaknesses will lead to development of a more modern approach by political parties which will contribute towards creating a stronger democratic society.<sup>441</sup>

### *Special Autonomy*

It has been noted earlier (see Chapter 3) that in the period following the fall of Suharto, the incoming President, Habibie, was under significant pressure from pro-independence supporters who perceived the change of administration as an opportunity to advance their cause. In response to the disturbances and pressure from reform groups that permeated Indonesian society, the government offered Special Autonomy laws which contained significant concessions for Aceh and Papua. Together with East Timor these were the leading pro-independence Provinces at this time. There was, however, always a preoccupation among national leaders that Special Autonomy concessions could generate a wave of demands from other Provinces with separatist agendas.

Special Autonomy laws were seen as part of the solution in diverting secessionist demands at a time when the government was facing multiple crises and central authority was at a weak point. As the political situation eventually became more stable and the government reconstituted central authority, the imperative of Special Autonomy was viewed from a different perspective. This involved a move away from adoption by DPR's of bills devised by provincial elites in preference to government drafts. Lack of technical capacity to draft legislation which still resided in the bureaucracy was a factor receiving DPR effectiveness in this respect. Bills drafted in the regions and adopted by the DPR were contrary to the previous pattern of legislative/executive relations. Failure of local governments to effectively implement legislation had provided opportunity to

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<sup>441</sup> Bunte, and Ufen., *Democratization*, p. 111.

reverse or change original initiatives. The central government chose alternative strategies of a less accommodating nature to subdue separatist demands.<sup>442</sup>

Earlier (2001) criticisms of Special Autonomy for Papua were that it had been vacuous and that many of the benefits were not being received by long-suffering Papuans who were subjected to corrupt practices by the Jakarta elite. Many Papuans had the opinion that the funds were being spent on security services, Freeport mining company and other foreign investors rather than the needs of ordinary Papuans for education and health in particular. The views of two major groups of Papuans are, first, for the majority of inhabitants, only a referendum for independence can deliver freedom for Papua; second, the view of those who are not ethnic Papuans,... that the best future for Papua is a status quo of full integration with Indonesia.<sup>443</sup>

Papuans had developed a negative attitude to Special Autonomy claiming that “they enjoy no more of a semblance of rule of law under Indonesian rule than they did when the UN acquiesced in what they call the Act of Free Choice.”<sup>444</sup> Special Autonomy was interpreted by many Papuans as Papuan elite capitulation to Indonesian insistence that independence is no longer an option. Contrary to the claims of ‘elite capitulation’ were the efforts of a team of Papuan intellectuals formed under the initiative of Governor Jap Salosa. Salosa appointed the Rector of UNCEN (Universitas Cenderawasih) Frans Wospakrik to “form a team of Papuan intellectuals to draft a bill on special autonomy.”<sup>445</sup>

Among its objectives the Rector’s team, headed by Agus Sumule, was to “accommodate independence aspirations to the maximum”. Sumule clarified the goals of the team in stating “M

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<sup>442</sup> R. McGibbon, *Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?*, Policy Study 10, Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2004, p. 22.

<sup>443</sup> J. Braithwaite, et. al., “Peacebuilding Compared Project”, *Papua and Indonesia*, no.1, Canberra, ACT, Australian National University, July 2008, p. 36.

<sup>444</sup> Braithwaite, et. al, *Papua and Indonesia*, p. 38.

<sup>445</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 82.

(Merdeka) independence and O (Otonomi – Autonomy) were not to be posed as contradictory or mutually exclusive but “both M and O were the rights of the people”. Preliminary drafting was carried out which involved input from various activists and academics<sup>446</sup> “including those involved in the umbrella NGO, *Foker LSM Papua (Forum Kerjasama Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat Papua – Co-operative Forum of Papuan Non-government Organisations)* and other human rights NGO’s.”<sup>447</sup>

At a later consultation event held at a Study Forum on Special Autonomy to Achieve a New Papua (*Kajian Otonomi Khusus Mencapai Papua Baru*) a large scale dispute developed following the influx of approximately “500 people including Congress Papua Panel members whose leaders had publicly insisted all along that the Papua Council Presidium had no mandate to discuss or support special autonomy – only independence.”<sup>448</sup>

Agus Sumule’s draft outlining his criterion of “not either M or O but both M and O” however “*Pansus ( Panitia Khusus)*, a special committee set up by the DPR to develop a special autonomy law, firmly crushed that draft M and O philosophy in its own version of the law. It was ultimately unwilling to rise much above past perspectives in dealing with the Papuan problem.”<sup>449</sup> In support of independence are those who hold that “proper implementation of the Special Autonomy Law will benefit the local Papuan people by effecting changes in social and economic conditions in the territory.”<sup>450</sup> This creates potential for dialogue of a more expansive nature as opportunities present in the future. Another perspective is “that autonomy is an important step toward independence or

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<sup>446</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p.82-83.

<sup>447</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 82

<sup>448</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>449</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 85

<sup>450</sup> P. C. Gilbert, 2008, *NGO’s and Human Rights Promotion: Socialisation, Framing and the Case of West Papua*, M.A. Thesis, Political Science, University of Canterbury, University of Canterbury, Canterbury.

could be used as a means of attaining recognition of aspirations to independence.”<sup>451</sup> The two perspectives represent broad outlines which can be broken down into further aspirations but care must be taken in this respect. The inclusion of a political element that includes the Act of Free Choice, such as argument based on the validity of the text, may well be an issue that, in hindsight, could be a strategic error. This represents an ‘all or nothing’ ultimatum to the government with the likely result of the loss of political advantage already achieved under special autonomy being sacrificed. It is suggested that a longer term objective must be taken in progressing these matters to a satisfactory conclusion.

Critical of the lack of benefits flowing from Special Autonomy funds (since 2002), Papuans cite the absence of tangible proof of so-called benefits by the inadequate provision of schools, hospitals, roads, etc. This is a view shared by the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura who stated that “the education sector is getting worse, especially in the hinterlands.”<sup>452</sup> Author and scholar, Peter King, shared the view that “such data that we have suggests that a tiny proportion of the money has gone on the peoples’ priorities – education and health – perhaps as little as 7 per cent on education and 15 per cent on health.”<sup>453</sup> There is evidence that little effort has been made by Melanesian society to approach reconciliation with the military but in an atmosphere of oppression it is easy to understand why positive approaches may be considered as imprudent.

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<sup>451</sup> Gilbert, *NGO's and Human Rights Promotion*.

<sup>452</sup> Braithwaite, et. al, *Papua and Indonesia*, p. 39.

<sup>453</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 90.

Ondawame takes the view that Special Autonomy is not a product of negotiation. He said:

When you go into negotiation you need some form of compromise. It has become clear that Special Autonomy in West Papua has only been lip service because Jakarta fears the impacts of the increasing demand for independence urged by the people of West Papua. Jakarta therefore may lose face and also West Papua. Therefore they have to take into consideration the heart and mind of the people of West Papua by offering Special Autonomy. Normally, Special Autonomy should come at a negotiation table under the mediation of an international third party and then one of the decisions should be that we deal with reference to autonomy.<sup>454</sup>

In 2010 there remains a great deal to be done to complete the Special Autonomy package for the Province. “The people are fed up with corruption caused by the Province’s special autonomy status” were the comments of an academic and informal leader.” A spokesman for the assistance team for Special Autonomy claimed that there was support for the law when it was launched in 2001 but after seven years since its implementation the promises have not become a reality.<sup>455</sup>

The Province is said to have a huge sum of Special Autonomy funds but most people are getting poorer. Many cannot afford education, health service and medicine. Deputy Chairman of the Papuan Tribal Council (DAP) Fadal Ahmid, accused the government of viewing special autonomy as a money making exercise. There appears to be reluctance by government to issue 1980 governmental regulations to assist the implementation of special by-laws in Papua. Sophie Maipauw, Regional Representatives’ Council (DPD) from Papua, said “We ask Home Ministry to prioritise the 1980 government regulations. The Special Autonomy status [for Papua] has been running for eight years but it was not backed up by special regulation for its implementation.”<sup>456</sup> This lack of regulation opened up opportunities for corruption. The present situation places regents in a potentially corrupt position arising from disbursements to people asking for funds which are

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<sup>454</sup> Ondawame, interview.

<sup>455</sup> N.D. Somba, “Papuan ‘fed up’ with special autonomy”, *The Jakarta Post*, Jayapura, 8 March 2010.

<sup>456</sup> N.D. Somba, , “Regulations ‘needed’ to back Papua autonomy”, *The Jakarta Post*, Jayapura, 8 March 2010.

presently being paid from the Special Autonomy fund.<sup>457</sup> “If what the regents do is considered as corruption based on the latest regulation, then all the regents could be incarcerated.”<sup>458</sup>

Theoretical constructs abound on the reason for lack of success of Special Autonomy for Papua. Among the claims are that “the elite and bureaucrats have received autonomy package funding but the majority of West Papuans and their community have not.”<sup>459</sup> Another claim is that “the President, who possibly has the good faith commitment to making Special Autonomy work but so far has been too politically weak to stand up to the military so that it can be allowed to work.”<sup>460</sup> Some Papuans have taken the view that there was no trust in the Indonesian State or its agents in Papua. Reasons given are that “the Special Autonomy Law permitted the raising of a Papuan flag, yet the security services prevented raising the Morning Star flag under any conditions. A similar circumstance applied in relation to the singing of *Hai Tanahku Papua* (Oh Papua My Homeland).”<sup>461</sup>

On these issues Ron May expressed his opinion that:

a lot of the West Papuans were prepared to accept the Indonesian autonomy law as the best offer they have had to date. It gave them something to work within and the Presidium was seen as something that could further the dialogue. But then there developed a belief that some of the people on the Presidium were actually there for Indonesia’s benefit. This caused some splits among West Papuans and gradually the Presidium lost its influence. At that stage the key issues of the autonomy had not been completely implemented. Eventually the autonomy law became a source of frustration rather than a concession to the West Papuans. Under President Yudhoyono there has been an effort to improve the implementation but I am not sure how effective this has been. There is probably some sense in the view that the autonomy law was a result of Papuan capitulation to Indonesian resistance that independence is no longer an option. They were convinced that there was nowhere

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<sup>457</sup> Somba, “Regulations ‘needed’

<sup>458</sup> Somba, “Regulations ‘needed’

<sup>459</sup> “Special Autonomy and the division of West Papua”, *West Papua Information Kit*, <http://wpik.org/Src/autonomy.html>, (Accessed 8 February 2010).

<sup>460</sup> Braithwaite, et. al., *Papua and Indonesia*, p. 40.

<sup>461</sup> Braithwaite, et. al., *Papua and Indonesia*, p. 38.

to go with the question of independence so the elite, whoever they may be, rolled over on it and that is how the autonomy law came into being.<sup>462</sup>

Rodd McGibbon took the view that failure to engage popular elements of their Province undermined the opportunity to build popular support for Special Autonomy. “The NGO Alliance for Democracy Papua (ALDP) believes the Papua Land of Peace campaign neglects dialogue with the military at the village level.”<sup>463</sup> A bottom up approach to reconciliation with the military may have some merit but it is difficult to imagine that village-level negotiations would not be inhibited in the presence of military commanders. The present generation of Papuans has experienced a great deal of disappointment since the Provinces became part of Indonesia. It may well be in the hands of a future generation that differences may be eased bringing forth an acceptable solution. For the present, “as the Papuan anthropologist, historian and prophet of Papuanisation, Benny Giay, would insist, it is important for Papuans to understand and manage or overcome the divisions on their own side – particularly over the issue of autonomy versus independence.”<sup>464</sup> This could help to avoid divisive tactics by Indonesian officials in future negotiations.

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<sup>462</sup> Ronald J. May, interview, ANU.

<sup>463</sup> McGibbon, *Secessionist Challenges in Aceh*

<sup>464</sup> King, *West Papua and Indonesia*, p. 69.

## CHAPTER 6

### INDONESIANISATION

The object of this chapter is to explain a number of processes which have been introduced by the government as policies and practices designed to acculturate the indigenous population. The expression which has emerged in a wide range of written material to describe this process is 'Indonesianisation'. There is a need, however, firstly to distinguish this concept from the term 'Javanisation' which is similar in some respects to Indonesianisation but which arises from different and rather specific circumstances.

Javanisation has in its foundation a security objective arising from an Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia. Indonesia saw fit to station combat units and their families strategically in numerous locations along its border. It was a plan to improve its defence capability. A similar scheme was implemented by President Sukarno in the settlement of Javanese transmigrants in Provinces which indicated preference for independence. The scheme had been applied in the past in both West and North Sumatra and in Kalimantan but has not appeared as an element of major policies since 1969. In principle the idea is a positive aim to create a state of enduring stability.<sup>465</sup>

Indonesianisation is a social construct which has as its objective the forced acculturation of the Papuan people by abandonment of their traditional way of life and acceptance of socio-political and cultural characteristics of Indonesian society. A distinction should be drawn between the social trends which can lead to social change such as industrialisation, population growth, etc. and a process which has as its outcome the elimination of an ethnic identity. The Minister for Transport, Martono, on 2 March 1986 stated, in relation to Aceh, "With transmigration we are implementing what we have promised: to gather and unite all ethnic groups into a single people, the people of

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<sup>465</sup> K. Fasbender and S. Erbe, *Towards a New Home: Indonesia's Managed Mass Migration. Transmigration between poverty, economics and ecology*, Hamburg, Verlag Weltarchiv GMBH, 1990, pp-31-32.

Indonesia. The different identities will disappear and at the end there will be only one people.”<sup>466</sup>

It is claimed that government policies, particularly in the post 1969 era, have been developed with this objective. On this topic, Ondawame stated that:

Indonesianisation policy started in 1967 when Sukarno came to power and huge numbers of migrants were moved into West Papua. Indonesians have a policy that Indonesia should be one great nation and that indigenous people should not exist in West Papua so they have to remove them from their own ancestral land. The Indonesian Minister for Information said “we come here not to develop your people but we come here for your land. Maybe if you would like independence you just move to the moon to be independent.”<sup>467</sup> It has been predicted that 52% of the total population in 2011 will be Indonesians and 48% will be Papuans. We will be a minority group in our own land. That is very clear.

Asked if he believed that the Indonesian government had a definite plan in this regard he said:

Yes, in different ways such as discrimination, unemployment, poverty, property and deadly disease. If we would like to prevent the people of West Papua from total extermination, then we must work hard in the next four or five years. The average Melanesian person knows what is happening, of course. The Papuans have to speak in Malay. They cannot develop their own Papuan language. The Papuan culture and tradition, for instance, taro and yam, which traditionally we eat, they consider to be uncivilised food, therefore we have to eat rice. Indonesian language is used in the schools and in the city. The culture is not allowed to develop. Local beliefs on Christianity are not allowed to develop. It becomes clear that Indonesians are trying to wipe out Papuans in many ways - military ways - which is very obvious. They have killed over 100,000 Papuans in the last 47 years of occupation. Now they declare social warfare to exterminate the Papuans using, among them, imported prostitutes with AIDS and health disease. Discrimination in the workplaces, in the health services, education and other forms of intimidation.<sup>468</sup>

The process of Indonesianisation can embrace a number of instruments through which it can inculcate the Indonesian ethos to the Papuan people. This includes various forms of media, incentive schemes, the education system, political policies, preferential employment initiatives to mention just a few. The broadest scope is that provided by the principles of the Pancasila which is

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<sup>466</sup> M.N. Dyuli, ‘The Process of Ethnic Dilution in Aceh’, *Tripod*, December 1999, <http://acehnet.tripod.com>, (Accessed 26 April 2010).

<sup>467</sup> R. Tanter, ‘Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia 1966-1989’, PhD Thesis, Department of Politics, Monash University, 1991. The statement was reported to OPM’s Henk Joku by Rev. Origines Hokojo. Cited in Malcolm Gault-Williams, ‘Organisasi Papua Merdeka: the Free Papua Movement lives’, *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 19,4 (1987), p.34. There is no confirmation that Moertopo actually said these things. But then, the metaphors of the reported speech are reasonable descriptions of much of what followed in the years to come.

<sup>468</sup> Ondawame, interview.

the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. It consists of five principles which are social justice, a just and civilised community, belief in one God, Indonesian unity and government by deliberation and consent. It is to be noted, however, that the meaning has been interpreted differently by the Sukarno and Suharto governments, in fact, “the Pancasila is so vague that it can be held to mean whatever the government of the day says it means or wants it to mean.”<sup>469</sup> It is underpinned by Presidential decree No. 11 of 1963 “the intention or which is known or reasonably to be considered to be known of distorting, stirring up trouble or digressing the state ideology Pancasila or the course of the state...”<sup>470</sup>

The Anti-subversion law has long been used to arrest and imprison peaceful government critics. The law includes the so-called “hate-sowing” articles which are Articles 154, 155 and 156 of the Indonesian Criminal Code.<sup>471</sup> The Law was first issued as a Presidential Decree No. 11, 1963 during the administration of President Sukarno and as such had legislative power. The overthrow of Sukarno, far from undermining the Presidential Decree, led to its ratification and incorporation into law (1969) and has rendered this legislation as an ideal tool in the hands of a repressive regime.

Here it is enough to mention the provision of the death penalty, arrest and imprisonment for peaceful expression of opinion, detention for up to one year without charge or trial, imprisonment of witnesses, failure to inform detainees of charges against them, denial of legal representation, prohibition of family visits to prisoners, denial of defence lawyer access to court documents and the widespread use of torture. There can be little doubt that the Law is intentionally repressive.<sup>472</sup>

The most effective process of Indonesianisation is arguably the transmigration scheme which contributes significantly to solving twin objectives for the government: firstly to alleviate population pressure in Java and other overcrowded territories by settling numbers of Javanese and others to the outer islands and secondly the objective of Indonesianising the indigenous inhabitants

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<sup>469</sup> Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, (1999), p. 42.

<sup>470</sup> G. Simons, *Indonesia, the Long Oppression*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 2000, p. 235.

<sup>471</sup> The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), A Briefing for Government Members and Donor Agencies, 1 July 1988, <http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA210741998>. (Accessed 2 May 2010).

<sup>472</sup> Simons, *Indonesia, the Long Oppression* p. 9.

of Papua. Denial of human rights and militarism support the entire process of Indonesianisation. Various elements will be examined in some detail and comment provided on the socio-cultural, socio-economic and political impact on the indigenous inhabitants of the Province.

### *Education*

The growth in education has improved since the Province was handed over to Indonesia. It funded a primary school system and created the first university (*Universitas Cenderawasih*) in 1963. Since that time education benefits for the indigenous population have been only slight.<sup>473</sup> During the Suharto regime education was clearly not a priority for investment and educational infrastructure was neglected. This led to a shortage of teachers with the result that the quality of human resources in the Province was deficient. Under the subsequent and centralised system of the Suharto regime the government played a more positive role in the provision of funding at the provincial level.<sup>474</sup>

Education would serve a purpose of creating an Indonesian mindset for Papuans born out of the indoctrination by Indonesian teachers speaking Bahasa Indonesia which is taught for the first three years of school. “Nowhere in West Papua are the local languages officially taught.”<sup>475</sup> Instruction in Bahasa Indonesia is “the quickest and soundest means of introducing indigenes to their future as citizens of Indonesia.”<sup>476</sup> The effects of schooling on the process of Indonesianisation of the indigenous population of Papuans are exemplified in the quote: “Every day that a Dani child spends in school is a day away from Dani life. The years of youth, which once a Dani spent learning to be Dani, are now spent in school, learning to be Indonesian.”<sup>477</sup>

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<sup>473</sup> S. Upton, “A cultural carnival? Observing social change in Papua”, *Inside Indonesia* 86, April-June 2006, (Accessed 24 September 2009).

<sup>474</sup> J.A. Mollet, ‘Educational Investment in conflict areas of Indonesia: The case of West Papua’, *International Education Journal*, (Shannon Research Press) 8, No. 2, (2007).

<sup>475</sup> Gietzelt, *Indonesia in West Papua*, p. 68.

<sup>476</sup> Gietzelt, *Indonesia in West Papua*, p. 68.

<sup>477</sup> Gietzelt, *Indonesia in West Papua*, p. 71.

Improvement in education systems and school facilities therefore serve to fuel the process of Indonesianisation from the outset for all new generations of Papuans. It is also fundamental to enhancing the quality of life and ensuring economic progress. In some areas, in particular the Asmat region, parents were reluctant to send their children to school as half the time was spent on *kerja bakti* (cultivating crops for school maintenance), a practice justified no doubt in terms of development strategies of the government.<sup>478</sup> In the same area “schools set up were being used as a means to stamp out traditional marriage customs. The practice of teenage marriages is widespread among the Asmat but prohibited on the basis of disrupting the education system. Those who breached this rule suffer severe punishment. In September 1981 four schoolboys who offended were beaten so severely that one died at the hands of his captors. Parents who complained were accused of subversion. The assault on traditional customs is not incidental and demonstrates the futility of protest and the arbitrary application of penalties in the interests of the state.”<sup>479</sup>

Whilst West Papua is one of the richest Provinces in Indonesia in terms of its natural resources of mining, forestry and fishing which have been exploited by multinational organisations to the advantage of the national economy, benefits have not flowed to the inhabitants of the Province.<sup>480</sup> Based on data from the 2006 Annual Report of the United Nations Development Program for Indonesia, the poverty rate in Papua is 41% compared with a national average of 18%. Truancy is a problem among children trying to integrate with formal education and as a result many graduating from primary school in 2007 (especially in the interior) were illiterate. In that year it was also noted that less than 30% of the adult population had primary school education.<sup>481</sup> In relation to infrastructure of the education system, the quality of buildings varies. Schools in coastal towns are

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<sup>478</sup> Tapol, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>479</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>480</sup> Mollet, ‘Educational Investment’

<sup>481</sup> Braithwaite, et. al., ‘Papua and Indonesia’, p. 4.

better equipped than in the highlands where buildings reflect the near collapse of the education system. Buildings are run down and frequently without furniture, teachers and teaching aids.<sup>482</sup>

Due to the subsequent supply by the government of large numbers of teachers from Java and a change from the Dutch education system to an Indonesian model (a national education system) the foundation was laid for an improvement of the quality of education in the Province. Data from the Department of Education in Papua reported that in 2000 the number of schools in West Papua increased significantly. The total number of primary schools was 2,472; secondary schools 395 and high schools 115. West Papua enrolment rate was below the national average.<sup>483</sup> Despite some improvements in various facets of education over the last two decades much remains to be done. The Special Autonomy Law of 2000 may, if efficiently implemented, contribute to further improvement.

#### *Violence and Oppression 1963-2000*

Since the Province of Papua came under control of Indonesia in 1963 the government has imposed its will in an uncompromising manner and has effectively demonstrated its intention to apply force by military means to achieve its objectives. It has also used violence, often in subtle, secretive ways, to suppress all opposition and keep the populace passive.<sup>484</sup> In examining the regime of violence and oppression exercised by the New Order government of President Suharto, it would prove to be extremely difficult to produce an accurate account of massacres and individual incidents. Due to limited space, reference has been made to several incidents only, to illustrate the culture of violence by the militia that prevailed in this era.

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<sup>482</sup> Braithwaite, et. al., 'Papua and Indonesia', p. 5.

<sup>483</sup> Mollet, 'Educational Investment'

<sup>484</sup> H. Farid, "Political economy of violence and victims in Indonesia" in *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia. Analysis, representation, resolution*, by C.A. Coppel, Oxon, Routledge, 2006, p. 271.

Hilmar Farid classifies the political violence carried out into three categories, which are: the military's war of counter insurgency, attacks on street demonstrations, and violence between or within communities. Many of the latter, referred to as "horizontal violence", is thought to be promoted by the military. Actions by the military involved in instigating these incidents of violence are routinely defended as appropriate and necessary procedures for defence of the state and national integration.<sup>485</sup> There were early reports of rebellion, significantly that which occurred in Biak in August 1965 created by an attempt by locals to sabotage Shell Oil installations.<sup>486</sup> Arfak people in the Manokwari district also began guerrilla warfare in that same year. Government officials came under attack and there were reports of repression and killings. A West Papuan representative in the upper chamber of the Peoples' Consultative Assembly reported that the Indonesian Air Force had killed 1,000 people in strafing raids and rocket attacks on villages around Manokwari. "By the end of 1967 it was being reported that whole villages had been razed in 'Operation Destruction' and that 3,500 villagers had been killed."<sup>487</sup>

A decision by General Suharto (reversing a 1964 edict by President Sukarno) to proceed to hold the Act of Free Choice despite signs of a great deal of opposition was the point of positive reinforcement of the government's ideology. It was announced that "the government would do everything to *mensukseskan* (make a success of) the event". Suharto later declared that those in favour of severance from Indonesia would be treated as traitors.<sup>488</sup> In the ensuing period to the Act of Free Choice "an all-out savage attempt was made to eliminate the active opposition to the regime."<sup>489</sup> In 1968 Suharto despatched General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo to West Irian with personal

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<sup>485</sup> Farid, "Political economy of violence, p. 270.

<sup>486</sup> Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword*, p. 19.

<sup>487</sup> Tapol, *West Papua*, p. 27.

<sup>488</sup> Tapol, *West Papua*, p. 28.

<sup>489</sup> Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword*, p. 19.

instructions to clean up rebel resistance, with particular attention to the Arfak people around Manokwari. The rebels continued their offensive against odds of five to six times their number through 1969 in the period in which the Act of Free Choice was being conducted in Manokwari.<sup>490</sup>

A small but violent incident occurred on the Island of Biak in June 1970. Following an alleged attack by OPM on Indonesian soldiers a group of fifty red berets (Indonesian elite forces) and 36 green berets (Indonesian infantry) surrounded the villages of Wusdori and Kridori on the west coast. After forcing all villagers from their dwellings they killed all of the men in front of their wives and children.<sup>491</sup> On the following day “they captured thirty Papuan men from neighbouring villages. They forced the captives into the boats of those killed the day before, tied stones around their necks, and threw them overboard. These men all drowned.”<sup>492</sup> There was no recorded successful action taken by the National Commission of Human Rights on this event.

A pattern of unchecked human rights violations by the police in Nabire, Papua, was reported by Amnesty International in 2009. This included “unlawful killings, excessive use of force and torture and other ill-treatment. To Amnesty International’s knowledge there has been no investigation by police to any of these allegations.”<sup>493</sup> The foregoing incidents demonstrate a wide ranging culture of non-accountability and apparent impunity of those responsible for human rights violations including possible unlawful killings, excessive use of force and wrongful detention.

Statistical data on death and injured are mostly, at best, estimates and sometimes inflated by vested interests for the purpose of propaganda. Estimates of rape and other forms of sexual violence are

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<sup>490</sup> Sharp. *The Rule of the Sword*, p. 20.

<sup>491</sup> “Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control.” Paper for Indonesia Human Rights Network, Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, 2004. [http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/intellectual\\_life/west\\_papua\\_final\\_report.pdf](http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/intellectual_life/west_papua_final_report.pdf) (Accessed 12 May 2011).

<sup>492</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>493</sup> West Papua Action Network. “Amnesty International: Indonesia police accountability mechanisms crucial to reform process.” WPAN. 27 August 2010. <http://wpan.wordpress.com/2010/08/27/amnesty-international-indonesiaa-police-accountability-mechanisms-crucial-to-reform-process/> (Accessed 12 May 2011).

also difficult to determine because of the nature of the violence and impediments to the investigation process. The aftermath of the violence and, more especially, the fate of the victims, is a matter frequently overlooked in the process of analysis. In relation to the conflict in Ambon, the government recorded deaths of 2,573 people and 3,475 injured in the one year from January 1999 to January 2000 (Government of RI and International Agencies 2000). Van Klinken provides estimates for the entire Maluku conflict of 3,000-4,000 deaths<sup>494</sup> by early 2000 with more than half of these occurring in just a few days in North Maluku.<sup>495</sup> Whilst no data is available in relation to sexual atrocities, a number of reports suggest that rape and violence have formed part of previous military operations in Ambon, Aceh and East Timor.<sup>496</sup>

Other large scale uprisings occurred in the Baliem Valley in 1977 and Jayapura in the mid 1980's resulting in considerable loss of life. The more widely publicised of these was perhaps the 1984 incident following the Indonesian reaction to the raising of the Morning Star flag in Jayapura by members of the OPM. A protracted conflict developed which lasted for "some months and resulted in a mass exodus of some 10,000 refugees crossing the border into Papua New Guinea."<sup>497</sup> It should be pointed out that the expression 'refugee' in this quotation may not comply with the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees' formal definition of a refugee. The exodus referred to may have included people crossing to Papua New Guinea for various other reasons such as the uncertainties of life under Indonesian rule. Included in the first wave of border crossings in 1984 were a cross-section of middle class Jayapura public servants, academics,

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<sup>494</sup> Farid, 'Political economy of violence', p. 272.

<sup>495</sup> G. Van Klinken, "The Maluku wars. 'Communal contenders' in a failing state" in *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia. Analysis, representation, resolution*, by C.A. Coppel, Oxon, Routledge, 2006, p. 130.

<sup>496</sup> Farid, 'Political economy of violence,' p. 273.

<sup>497</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 15.

students and deserters from the Indonesian army. The Papua New Guinea government arrested and charged all the men with being illegal immigrants.<sup>498</sup>

The conflict is believed to have arisen from the intervention by ABRI in a dispute between local ethnic groups which was of no great consequence. This escalated from a traditional dispute into a major incident. The intervention of heavily armed troops “brought to a head the pervasive but latent resentment that so many Dani felt towards the Indonesian government.”<sup>499</sup> The consequence of their action was that considerable damage was caused to airport runways and the gathering of thousands of locals in the Grand Valley to confront government troops. ABRI emerged successful due to modern weaponry and assistance of aircraft to bomb and napalm villages. The conflict lasted two years, with loss of life numbering around several thousand. Indonesia claim that only 900 had died.<sup>500</sup>

The pattern of repression which had commenced in 1963 following Indonesia’s takeover of the territory continued throughout the 1990’s. A number of prisoners convicted in 1988 were serving lengthy prison terms for advocating independence for West Papua from Indonesia. The severity of sentences was seen to be disproportionate and harsh in relation to the alleged crimes. Amnesty International and other human rights bodies criticised the sentences which (among others) included 37 people sentenced to up to twenty years’ imprisonment for participating in a peaceful flag-raising ceremony in Jayapura on 14 December 1988. “At the same time Amnesty and other bodies were producing evidence that civilians continued to be subject to torture, disappearance and extrajudicial execution by Indonesian security forces.”<sup>501</sup>

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<sup>498</sup> Dorney, *Papua New Guinea*, p. 222.

<sup>499</sup> Dorney, *Papua New Guinea*, p. 43.

<sup>500</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>501</sup> Simons, *Indonesia: the Long Oppression*, p. 16.

The post New Order period may have brought high expectation of change for many indigenous people but it was more of the same as human rights abuses continued in West Papua. There were reports of widespread and often systematic abuses. “These included the widespread and, in some cases, detailed documentation of torture and deaths in custody, extra-judicial killings and in some instances massacres of dozens and even hundreds of people.”<sup>502</sup> Restrictions on access for journalists and other interested parties remained in place and lack of transparency on political activities in the territory prevailed. Reports that did come out offered graphic illustrations of the systematic brutality of the Army in particular.<sup>503</sup> In late 1981 at least 2,500 villagers were killed following a Dutch produced film shown of villagers brandishing spears and shouting anti-Indonesian slogans. The scene of this atrocity was in the vicinity of Madi (near Timika) which was “bombed to the ground”. It was recorded that other villages had also been bombed.<sup>504</sup>

In an isolated incident a Swiss journalist who gained access to West Papua on a tourist visa was arrested for taking photographs of a flag-raising ceremony. He later reported events he witnessed while in gaol which included “horrific brutality against 35 West Papuan prisoners in the gaol with him.”<sup>505</sup> On 21 February 2001 he made a statement to the Irish Parliament outlining these atrocities. A judicial system which was “notoriously corrupt and inefficient”<sup>506</sup> facilitated the impunity of those responsible. This system remained unaddressed for more than two years after the first democratic elections in forty-four years.<sup>507</sup> Amnesty International reported a further incident

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<sup>502</sup> D. Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Melbourne, Victoria, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 184.

<sup>503</sup> Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, p. 184.

<sup>504</sup> Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, p. 94.

<sup>505</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>506</sup> Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, p. 167.

<sup>507</sup> *ibid.*

with the murder of numerous West Papuans by security forces, mainly due to attendance at flag raising ceremonies in Wamena, Jayapura and Merauke.<sup>508</sup>

The National Commission on Human Rights suffered from lack of political support and inability to more than just investigate and name offenders.<sup>509</sup> This was exemplified in the instance of what is referred to as the Tanjung Priok killings of 1984 which resulted from a riot which took place on 12 September. Officials entered a mosque to remove a poster inviting Islamic youth to a meeting dealing with issues of hard and declining economic conditions in the area. The protest arose at the arrest by soldiers of Islamic leaders with perhaps 200 being shot in the ensuing conflict.<sup>510</sup> On 18 September 1984 scores of protestors were shot when they gathered at North Jakarta's Tanjung Priok harbour. Others were detained and allegedly tortured in connection with the demonstration. General L.B. Moerdani, Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, later announced that "Irresponsible agitations were the cause of the incident and the inevitable casualties"<sup>511</sup> On the basis that the report by Komnas HAM was not issued until after the end of the Suharto regime suggests that for overt political reasons Indonesia's human rights commission would not dare hold the army responsible for its misdeeds.<sup>512</sup>

In the period 2003-2005 there has been a series of military operations including Kiyawage, Puncak Jaya region and in the Tolikara regency. The Baptist Church of Papua released a report in May 2005 claiming that "military operations such as these have been cynically engineered by the

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<sup>508</sup> Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* p. 182.

<sup>509</sup> HAK Nasional Asasi Manusia (Komnas HAM) (Law 39/1999) aims to develop conditions conducive to the implementation of human rights in accordance with Pancasila, the Constitution in 1945, the Charter of the United Nations as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and improved protection of the whole Indonesian people and the ability to participate in various areas of life. <http://www.komnasham.go.id/portal>. (Accessed 30 May 2010).

<sup>510</sup> Kingsbury, *Politics of Indonesia*, (2002), p. 167.

<sup>511</sup> Voice of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network, *Human Rights Features*, "Indonesia's Tanjung Priok Inquiry: A Safe Harbour for Human Rights Abuses?", <http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF23.htm>. (Accessed 27 June 2010).

<sup>512</sup> Voice of the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Network

TNI.”<sup>513</sup> In a separate case reported by the Baptist Church, soldiers occupied a church building in Monia as a post or living quarters, carrying out the Puncak Jaya operation.<sup>514</sup>

### *Transmigration*

The transmigration programme of today can be traced to the colonisation programme of the Netherlands in 1905. The original intentions of the programme were to transfer people to plantation areas of Sumatra for the purpose of exploitation of its agricultural potential. It also served the purpose of relieving the population pressures of Java.<sup>515</sup> In the era of the New Order government under President Suharto, the policy of transmigration was introduced with the objective of moving people from the overcrowded islands of Java and Bali to relatively under-populated islands of the archipelago. While the main thrust of the concept is attributable to the New Order government of President Suharto, the idea was also vigorously pursued by President Sukarno during the 1960’s, with substantial financial support from the World Bank, when he announced a target of 1.5 million people per annum to be relocated. Later “this program was also funded through Indonesia’s burgeoning oil and gas revenues.”<sup>516</sup>

In 1963 Indonesia passed a new law declaring all land and natural resources the property of the Indonesian state. This effectively denied the indigenous West Papuans who had been forced off their land the right to compensation. This provided the government with the opportunity to grant land to multinational companies as well as many Indonesian companies. “Transmigrants were also given land and financial assistance for resettlement.”<sup>517</sup> The Guidelines for Official Policy issued

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<sup>513</sup> J. Wing and P. King, “Genocide in West Papua”, *Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies*, University of Sydney, 2005, p. 19.

<sup>514</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>515</sup> K. Fasbender and S. Erbe, *Towards a New Home*, p. 29.

<sup>516</sup> R. McGibbon, “Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the Papua Conflict”, *Policy Studies* 13, East-West Center, Washington, 2004, p. 20.

<sup>517</sup> C.S. Yan, “Human Rights in West Papua”, Tok Blong Pasifik People’s Partnership, 2006, *Highbeam Research*, <http://www.highbeam.com>. (Accessed 2 May, 2010).

in 1972 and 1973 detail the objectives of the transmigration policy. These objectives were incorporated into the subsequent national and regional five year *Repelita* plans. The priorities and content of these have varied over time.

On coming to power in 1969 the New Order enthusiastically picked up the concept, possibly with better planning initiatives by surveying and preparing sites in Sumatra, Kalimantan and elsewhere. The object was to move whole families from Java, with their possessions, to alternative locations. In a special edition of *The Ecologist* magazine in the 1980's it was alleged that transmigration sites took over indigenous lands without consent or compensation. Resistance by settlers to requirements to change their ways of life and to submit to re-education was met with violence and human rights abuses.<sup>518</sup>

In the 1980's further World Bank/ADB loans and bilateral assistance made it possible to expand the transmigration programme with the result that ten times more people were resettled than in the previous seven decades."<sup>519</sup> The transmigration policy continued almost unaffected until the end of 1998, with few policy changes. The next few years had been affected by changes in political, economic and decentralisation policy, the outcome of which has not been adequately assessed beyond the period of review but have substantially influenced the transmigration programme.<sup>520</sup>

It was soon discovered by the indigenous inhabitants that little regard had been given to individual family or cultural characteristics of local people. Traditional hunting and shifting agricultural rights were typical of the issues not properly considered. Poor choices of sites such as susceptibility to flooding and unsuitable soil conditions led to further problems for migrants. Some migrants found that no preparatory work had been done to receive them and others found that promises of support

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<sup>518</sup> Yan, "Human Rights in West Papua".

<sup>519</sup> Adhiati, *Indonesia's Transmigration Programme*,

<sup>520</sup> *ibid.*

until they were established in new locations were not forthcoming. Early statistics reveal that it took the New Order thirteen years to move 1.5 million people from Java. This approximates the number Sukarno planned to move in one year. In this period (1969-1982) the population of Java grew by 17 million, indicating that transmigration was not having a significant impact on its population.<sup>521</sup> In the year 2000 the population density of West Papua was just four people per square kilometre and was it practically uninhabited compared to Java's eight hundred people per square kilometre.<sup>522</sup>

In a visit to Irian Jaya's transmigration sites in 1985 Australia's Ambassador to Indonesia, Bill Morrison, said that he could appreciate the government's motives: "There is a compelling attraction to politicians in the notion that there are 1.2 million people in an area as large as Spain. On the island of Java, one third that size, there are a hundred million people. And many of the people have no land."<sup>523</sup> The transmigration programme, which was seen as a partial remedy to Java's overpopulation, was creating problems of similar overcrowding in parts of West Papua. Large population movements soon gave rise to land disputes with local communities who claimed traditional ownership.<sup>524</sup>

McGibbon states that "while land was plentiful in Papua much of it was unsuitable for agricultural settlement." He provides data from Sumule (2002) extrapolated from the index of land acquirement for transmigrants which approximated 2.15 hectares per family head. It was concluded that the area of 160,000 hectares of arable land that had been appropriated was the equivalent of three times the harvested area of sweet potato for the entire Province in 2000, sweet potato being the main staple for Papuans. There was, however, difficulty in finding suitable land for settlements in the outer

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<sup>521</sup> Cribb and Brown, *Modern Indonesia*, p. 118-119.

<sup>522</sup> Dorney, *Papua New Guinea*, p. 201.

<sup>523</sup> Dorney, *Papua New Guinea*, p. 220.

<sup>524</sup> McGibbon, *Plural Society in Peril*, p. 20.

islands which created tensions between new settlers and local communities over available resources.<sup>525</sup> It is not clear if the 160,000 hectares which had been appropriated included land presently used for subsistence purposes by traditional occupants of the land.

There was a major revolution in the transmigration programme in the late 1980's following a downward revision of targets. While land was plentiful in Papua, even allowing for traditional subsistence by indigenous inhabitants, there was difficulty in finding suitable land in the outer islands. Not all of the available land in Papua, however, was suitable for agricultural settlement. The clan-based ownership of land in Papua added to the complexities of issues for government in determining priorities for resource allocation without conflict and resistance from traditional owners. The large numbers of transmigrants settled in the Province in the previous decade had obviously reduced the options for allocations of land for the purposes required. The reduction in transmigration was short-lived. By the mid-1990's transmigration was averaging 15,000 settlers per year. At the height of the pro-independence settlement the provincial government called on the central government to suspend plans to send further transmigrants to Papua.<sup>526</sup>

An indication of Indonesian objectives for the programme is demonstrated in the case of the Merauke district where three million hectares were to be divided up into some 130 separate settlement projects which, it was estimated, would support a transmigration population of four million. The approximate number of indigenous population in the same area was seventy thousand. Outside of the transmigration programme the number of non-Irianese workers who moved to the territory of their own initiative numbered about 100,000. Original plans for Repelita IV, 1983-84 to 1988-89, was to transfer from Java approximately 137,000 families (almost 600,000 people). The

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<sup>525</sup> McGibbon, *Plural Society in Peril*, p. 22-23.

<sup>526</sup> *ibid.*

anticipated effects of numbers of this magnitude would have meant that the Irianese would have been under threat of being outnumbered by other Indonesian ethnic groups by 1990.<sup>527</sup>

### *Un-sponsored Migration*

The impact of un-sponsored migration must also be factored into the population explosion arising from the transmigration programme. In the period between 1970 and 2000 the ratio of spontaneous migration to transmigration was approximately three to one, making it the main generator of population movement to the territory. “The total number of un-sponsored migrants settling in Papua had exceeded 560,000 by the year 2000.”<sup>528</sup>

Sulawesi was the prominent source of migration to Papua, particularly in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Some reservations were expressed by Papuan leaders about certain ethnic groups coming from South Sulawesi, namely the Bugis, Butonese and Makasarese. According to popular stereotypes of Sulawesi migrants they did not adapt to local culture.. The aggressive nature of Sulawesi migrants, particularly in commercial transactions such as petty trade, construction and transport, brought them into direct competition with Papuans. Their methods in dealing with locals were considered to be deceptive. Their contribution was that they were responsible for introducing new consumer goods from other parts of Indonesia to both urban and rural markets in the Province.<sup>529</sup>

Nonie Sharp in her publication of 1977 has applied some of the accepted ideas relating to theories of underdevelopment in analysing the formation of classes in Papua. It is claimed that “the totality of the caste barrier means that there is little movement towards the emergence of a national bourgeoisie, a comprador class, bureaucratic elites, a petit bourgeoisie or a proletariat.”<sup>530</sup> Given

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<sup>527</sup> McGibbon, *Plural Society in Peril*, p. 221.

<sup>528</sup> McGibbon, *Plural Society in Peril*, p. 23.

<sup>529</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>530</sup> Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword*, p. 36.

the elapsed period of thirty years since this analysis, the significant economic development, increase in population, impact of government Indonesianisation initiatives which some claim to have had a marked impression on society, a similar analysis to that of Sharp would no doubt change the perspective for the future.

It is suggested that a comprador class (being more compliant with foreign interests and perhaps less interested in developing the national economy) would have developed arising from opportunities created from foreign economic investment but this would be in minority to the class of national bourgeoisie due to a stronger sense of nationalism expected from this class and greater interest in national economic development. It is anticipated that the proletariat, impoverishment and unemployment would have markedly increased due to the progressive marginalisation of this economically challenged class in Papua/Indonesian society.<sup>531</sup>

Added to the list of massacres are the details of personal horrors to which many individuals have been subjected. To mention but a few only demonstrates the nature and culture of those responsible. Included are detentions, sexual abuses, extrajudicial killings, tortures including electric shocks to fingers, toes and genitals and beatings. The acculturative methods such as use of the education system and incentive schemes, wage discrimination and the transmigration programme with its attendant dislocation of the traditional land-owners are not exclusive in the systematic abuse of the Papuans. The pervading effect of the numerous repressive measures adopted to subjugate the Papuan population can only be described as a cruel exercise of power which creates an atmosphere of prolonged oppression over the indigenous inhabitants of the Province of Papua.

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<sup>531</sup> Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword*, p. 36

## CHAPTER 7

### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Throughout this dissertation reference has been made to economic development in West Papua in various contexts as well as the impact of the development on the lives of the indigenous inhabitants of Papua. This chapter concentrates mainly on development and environmental impact of several of the main resource categories, namely petroleum, oil and gas industries, minerals and timber. In the 1970's and 1980's there was a surge of investment in these resource-based industries which account for most of the increase in the value of exports (Refer Figure 3).

Figure 3. *Irian Jaya Exports 1960/1 – 1985 (\$'000)*<sup>532</sup>

	1960/1	1971	1980	1984	1985 <sup>a</sup>
<i>'New' Exports</i>					
Oil	2,780	1,184	540,910	430,600	286,620
Copper	0	0	114,010	123,870	103,400
Prawns (frozen)	0	704	19,770	16,470	15,480
Tuna <sup>b</sup>	0	0	5,180	2,660	4,280
Logs	286	58	29,630	8,400	120
Other	221	26	1,280	2,540	420
TOTAL	3,287	1,972	710,780	584,540	410,320

- a. To November
- b. Various sources provide different figures on tuna exports. These data are based on port of destination figures.

Source: Kantor Statistik, *Irian Jaya Dalam Angka*, Jayapura, various years; Garnaut and Manning 1974, p. 15.

Oil exploration actually began in Irian Jaya in 1906. One of the early attempts which was based on the limited interpretations of surface technology took place on Misool Island in 1929, in Raja Ampat, an island group located off the northwest tip of the Birds Head peninsula. Robin Osborne adds to this early stanza of history advising that, in 1907, the Royal Dutch Shell Company was

<sup>532</sup> Manning and Rumbiak, , *Unity and Diversity*, p. 80.

formed between Dutch and British petroleum interests with the object of exploring the potential of the area. This was a strategic move in opposition to the US company Standard Oil already trying to dominate the oil resources of the Indies. Standard Oil was positioning itself to achieve access to the growing markets of China and Japan.<sup>533</sup> By 1935 fifteen oil seepages had been located giving rise to high expectations of the area's potential for exploitation.<sup>534</sup> An intensive operation was also entered into by Dutch and American oil interests who, by 1954, were employing in excess of 5,000 people, including 441 Europeans.<sup>535</sup> Initially indigenous people made up about 80% of the workers but this eventually reduced to 20% due to dismissals. Some were dismissed because their contracts had expired but others because they failed to turn up to work for a day or two. There were no indigenous personnel employed in a supervisory role.

In 1936 commercial accumulations of oil were discovered when wells were drilled on the Klamono Antic line in western Birds Head. Other successful wells were located on the western part of Birds Head. There were also unsuccessful explorations in the areas of north and south coastal plains in this region. Salawati Island (an island off Birds Head) and the Klamono fields had, by 1960, become the centre of development activities. There was also a small-scale production north of the present town of Inchuni.<sup>536</sup>

The accumulation of rich oil deposits which had been discovered in the Birds Head region in the 1940s had considerably diminished in the 1950s. The discovery of new deposits of extremely desirable light quality oil in the 1970's enabled a reduction in refinery costs in the petro-chemical industry. In this period, the highest producing oil well in the history of Indonesian oil was struck by

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<sup>533</sup> *Cultural Survival*, Winter 1990.

<sup>534</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 8.

<sup>535</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 115.

<sup>536</sup> R. G. Petrocz, *Conservation and Development in Irian Jaya. A strategy for rational resource*, The Netherlands, 1989, p. 94.

Petromer Trend where production exceeded 26,000 barrels per day.<sup>537</sup> The exploration for oil extending through the 1970's into the early 1980's created periodic employment opportunities for several thousands of workers. This growth in employment was not sustained. Low oil prices and high exploitation costs were factors affecting growth expectations. They were also one of the main reasons for the withdrawal of the Mamberamo Shell company in 1985, although the company was also experiencing security threats to their investment in oil exploitation in the Sarmi-Mamberamo region which contributed to the decision.<sup>538</sup>

A number of exploration sites which had been rejected by petroleum geologists in past decades were being re-appraised with the use of more sophisticated and geophysical exploration techniques. Plans had, by 1989, been prepared for full oilfield development, particularly in three major regions of the Mamberamo Basin, southern Birds Head lowlands and mid southern coastal plains. Controlling interest in the partnership with foreign companies was held by the national oil company, Pertamina.<sup>539</sup> This region in particular contains some of the world's most pristine forests. The region's 7,000 people and their communities are spread over 7.7 million hectares of low swamps, vast forests and high mountains. The exotic bio-diversity which exists must raise concerns as to the implications for conservation that it faces in the future due to threats from industrialisation potential which is to be exploited in the region.<sup>540</sup>

Environmental issues arise as exploration plans overlap with plans for protected areas. This overlap already exists in relation to exploration concessions with former nature reserves in the Mamberamo-Foja National Park, Borentz National Park, Bantui Strict Nature Reserve and Danau Baan Wildlife

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<sup>537</sup> Tapol, *West Papua: the Obliteration of a People*, p. 35.

<sup>538</sup> C. Manning and M. Rumbiak, "Irian Jaya. Economic Change, Migrants, and Indigenous Welfare" in *Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Developments in Indonesia Since 1970*", edited by H. Hill, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989, p. 92.

<sup>539</sup> Petrocz, *Conservation and Development in Irian Jaya.*, p. 94.

<sup>540</sup> M. Boissiere, et. al., "The importance of natural resources for local communities in the watershed Mamberamo, Papua, and implications for conservation", *Journal of Tropical Ethnobiology* 1, (2), 2004, pp. 76-95.

Reserve. The Mamberamo Basin in particular and some other areas have an expected high production potential. Important questions arise in relation to environmental considerations in these circumstances which require major policy responses from senior levels of government. Considerations should include whether the economic advantages of production override environmental concerns. The development of assessment criteria to be analysed before any future concessions are granted and the question if future concessions should be granted that overlap into nature reserves are among matters of priority.<sup>541</sup>

The latest oil and gas operation commenced in Papua is possibly the Tangguh project under the control of British Petroleum which is a Production Sharing Contractor (PSC) to the Indonesian oil and gas regulatory body BPMIGAS.<sup>542</sup> The authority to operate the LNG plant was transferred from BP in April 2003. This move was in line with Pertamina's change from its former status as the industry regulator to a stand-alone company. The project comprises three separate PSC's, covering three fields, Mituri, Berau and Wiriagar. Shareholdings in each of these fields at May 2004 were:

	%
BP	37.16
*MI Berau	16.30
CNOOC Ltd	16.96
Nippon Oil Exploration	12.23
Berau Petroleum Corp	10.00
LNG Japan Corporation held by Nissho Iwai Corporation and Sumitomo Corp.	7.35

\*Held by Mitsubishi Corporation and Inpex Corp.  
Production was scheduled to commence in 2007-08.<sup>543</sup>

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<sup>541</sup> Petrocz, *Conservation and Development in Irian Jaya*, p.95.

<sup>542</sup> The Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Business Republic of Indonesia.

<sup>543</sup> HydrocarbonsTechnology.com, "*Tangguh LNG Projects, Bintuni Bay, West Papua, Indonesia*", [www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/tangguh](http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/tangguh). (Accessed 5 July 2010).

In efforts to increase investment and improve production Indonesia placed a new tender in 2009 for 24 oil and gas blocks. The blocks are located in West Berau, offshore of Bintuni near BP Indonesia's current location. Only six oil and gas blocks from Indonesia's most recent tender of 31 blocks were awarded. Those sold were awarded to foreign and local companies including Canadian firms Talisman Energy and Niko Resources. At the time there was no expression of interest on the remaining blocks. Inducements will be offered to oil and gas investors in the form of favourable tax treatment and production splits to encourage exploration and offset a decline in production. These incentives have not proven to be attractive to industry players. This may be due to decreasing reserves, the potential of which has dropped to 8.3 billion barrels from 9.6 billion barrels in 2001.<sup>544</sup>

#### *Human Rights Issues*

The Tangguh project has been carried out with disregard for the welfare of Papuans resident in the localities of mining operations. On the southern shore of Bituni Bay over 120 households involving in excess of 650 people have been relocated to accommodate project facilities. Indigenous residents claim that they had no say in whether the project should go ahead. They say that the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of indigenous peoples to policies, programmes, projects and procedures affecting their rights and welfare was never applied to them. The area has been fortified with troops and police and there are plans to establish a small naval base. The security of the area is under appraisal by the Indonesian National Defence Institute which is considering upgrades to local police posts and sub-district military commands.

Some material benefits by way of new housing and infrastructure have been made available to resettled families but there remain longer term concerns due to the upheaval of their way of life. They have been excluded from access to gardens and forest resources in their locality as well as traditional fishing grounds. BP discounts these arguments as not representative of the overall

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<sup>544</sup> Energy-pedia news, Indonesia: BP eyes new exploration area near Tangguh, West Papua, 3 February 2010, [www.energy-pedia.com/article.aspx?articleid=138860](http://www.energy-pedia.com/article.aspx?articleid=138860). (Accessed 5 July, 2010).

opinion and points to villages made available by the company. Some villagers, however, have been unable to adjust to their new circumstances and have sold their residences and moved from the area. The foregoing generally applies to villagers on the north shore of Bituni Bay where tensions remain high mainly due to unresolved disputes between traditional owners and corporations over claims to land affected by mining operations.<sup>545</sup>

### *Environmental Impact*

There exists an expectation pollution may become may become a hazard due to the problem of CO<sup>2</sup> emissions. Approximately 12.5% of the Tangguh gas reserves comprise CO<sup>2</sup> which is released into the atmosphere. The possibility that an alternative process of emission of the CO<sup>2</sup> by way of reinjection into the grounds is being assessed but it is expected that the CO<sup>2</sup> will be ejected into the atmosphere for at least the first four years of operations. Papuans should ultimately receive a share of royalties under Special Autonomy provisions but not until after projects costs have been recovered, which could be around 2016.

Given the sensitivities of the coastal eco-system to the effects of industrial pollution, this may affect the role. The mangroves also contribute to the variety of plant life in both the waters and onshore. Medicinal plants, honey and fodder are among other benefits derived from the mangrove source. The effects of CO<sup>2</sup> emissions could be devastating to this environment which includes the world's third largest mangrove area.<sup>546</sup>

### *Forestry*

Forestry operations in Irian Jaya commenced in the late 1970's as forest reserves in Kalimantan and Sumatra became less appealing to loggers. These forest reserves had become depleted and the logging operations subject to increasingly tight supervision. This led to a boom in log exports in

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<sup>545</sup> P. Barber, "Tangguh Goes Onstream", *Inside Indonesia*, No. 94, (October-December 2008).

<sup>546</sup> *ibid.*

Irian Jaya which was only to last until the imposition of a total ban on log exports in January 1985. The value of logging exports in Irian Jaya in the period 1979-1981 amounted to \$30 million.<sup>547</sup> Contractual obligations of investors included the establishment of local processing facilities but only three of the six remaining in production by 1986 had fulfilled their contractual undertaking. Most of the contractors had stipulations to establish sawmills but only three complied; all of these sawmills were close to urban centres. The remaining three, from Djajanti group of Jakarta, engaged in plywood manufacturing processes in Maluku.

The environmental impact of uncontrolled logging varies from region to region. In the south, which appears to be one of the most affected (the Asmat region in particular), logging had been sub-contracted by concessionaries to middlemen who then forced the indigenous population to undertake logging on a contract basis.<sup>548</sup> In 1982 environmentalists warned that the Asmat people were on the brink of cultural extinction after a decade of enforced logging. Local communities were relocated from the interior to the river mouth closer to prospective ironwood loading places to facilitate this exploitation. It was alleged that a Jakarta-based logging company, under the protection of the military, subjected the Asmat people to a reign of terror and forced labour.<sup>549</sup> The compulsory logging scheme had a severe impact on the way of life of the Asmats by undermining their social and cultural traditions.<sup>550</sup>

The environmental impact of logging occurs when the soil becomes exposed, leaving the site open to the heavy tropical rainfalls which are common to the forested areas of the region. This causes topsoil to be washed away, accelerating erosion. The activities of loggers have a similar effect on

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<sup>547</sup> C. Manning and M. Rumbiak, "Irian Jaya: Economic Change, Migrants, Indigenous Welfare" in *Unity and Diversity. Regional Economic Development in Indonesia Since 1970*, edited by H. Hill, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989, p. 93.

<sup>548</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>549</sup> C. Budiardjo, "West Papua: Under the Indonesian Jackboot", *Human Rights Defender*, (6), 1996. Australasian Legal Information Institute, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/HRD/1996/6.html>, (Accessed 2 August 2010).

<sup>550</sup> Gault-Williams, *Strangers in Their Own Land*.

the environment as those of farmers, with the difference being that when trees are removed the introduction of a suitable agricultural system can prevent soil erosion. When forests are cleared and not replaced by another appropriate form of vegetative cover (which may be the case with farming practices), a severe loss of topsoil can result.<sup>551</sup> The process of extraction such as the cleared land along skidding roads (a road along which logs are dragged) and log yards also contributes to environmental damage.

In the Indonesian forestry industry focus on government and industrialists has previously been on productive output. The realisation of threats to the future sustainable utilisation of resources led to the introduction by the government of a selective cutting policy, TPI, *Tebangan Pilihan Indonesia*). The policy which was based on a felling cycle of 35 years proved to have the opposite effect to that intended. With the removal of larger trees, considerable damage is caused to those remaining. This is termed “genetic erosion” as the remaining trees produce seeds that tend not only to be smaller but also inferior in quality. The restriction of the term of forestry leases is another factor which contributes to the industry remaining sustainable due to the restriction of loggers looking to long term prospects and to developing methods of ensuring the industry remains sustainable into the future.<sup>552</sup>

### *Illegal Logging*

Despite logging restrictions previously imposed, there is evidence of continued illegal logging. Indications as to the extent that illegal logging prevails may be drawn from figures calculated for the WWF World Bank Alliance (based on conservative figures) which suggested that 78% of timber was felled illegally. Common types of logging include that which is conducted outside concession areas and in protected areas, logging without authorisation, overcutting of trees and obtaining

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<sup>551</sup> H. Hill (ed), *Indonesia's New Order. The Dynamics of Socio-economic Transformation* Allen & Unwin Pty. Ltd., St. Leonards NSW, 1994, pp. 212-213.

<sup>552</sup> *ibid.*

concessions by fraud. Reporting processes of annual consumption by mills are rendered almost meaningless.

Only half of the mills complied in 2001. Untraceable sources of supply to Indonesian timber processing industries operating through brokers also compromise reporting systems.<sup>553</sup> The London-based Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Telepak Jakarta recently detailed an outstanding example of this in a report titled “The Last Frontier: Illegal Logging in Papua and China’s Massive Timber Theft” (2005). The report reveals how one timber species from Papua, merbau (a luxurious dark hardwood), is being widely distributed throughout China’s Yangtze River delta. Many government and military officials are alleged to be involved in this highly profitable trade.<sup>554</sup>

Evidence produced by the Greenpeace organisation also outlines continued illegal logging activities in a suspended logging concession in Kaimana, (a port town in Kaimana Regency) West Papua. The two concessions concerned were previously suspended for permit violations. Fresh evidence revealed shows that illegal operations were continuing in the Nabire area on the north coast of Papua in the centre of the great Cenderawasih Bay. The Agency for Planning in Provincial Region (BPKH *Wilayah*) confirmed that the log ponds were owned by PT Kaltim Hutama and PT Centrico, breaching the suspension orders of the two concessioners involved.

Greenpeace recently (2008) found massive forest clearings in an area south of Jayapura. The clearings were to provide space for large scale palm oil plantations by palm oil giant, Sinar Mas. This fuels concerns for the remaining pristine forests of Papua which are under pressure from the

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<sup>553</sup> Greenpeace *Authors in Crime* 2003, <http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/greenpeace-2003.pdf>. (Accessed 29 July 2010.)

<sup>554</sup> Timmer, *Spectres of Indonesianisation*, p. 29.

logging and palm oil industries.<sup>555</sup> Bio-fuel production is generating the need for huge oil palm plantations, resulting in deforestation in tropical forests globally and now constitutes a threat to the forests of Papua. World demand has induced the Indonesian government to massively expand palm oil plantations in the Province. This could mean the creation of four million hectares of plantations concentrated in the south-eastern districts of Merauke, Boven Digoel and Maoppe and in the Sari, Kerom and Jayapura regencies on the northern side of the Central Highlands.<sup>556</sup> “The Forestry Law is the key to the protection of Indonesia’s last remaining intact forests and must be strictly enforced in order for companies to understand that they can no longer operate with impunity.”<sup>557</sup>

#### *Decentralisation and Management of Protected Areas*

In this context the laws on decentralisation and regional autonomy (No. 22/1999 and No. 25/1999) contain some ambiguity with regard to the separation of jurisdiction between national and regional authorities in the management of natural resources. Reference to conservation and management in the above laws is minimal (Articles 7 and 10). Conservation policy and the management of protected areas (eg. specified National Parks) remain the responsibility of the Ministry of Forestry and Plantations but the management of natural resources is transferred to regional (provincial and district) governments. Several management models have come under review to guarantee more efficient management of National Parks. One argument put forward was that, in practical terms, decentralisation and regional autonomy would have to take into account the development plans of the regional or district governments. This plan also called for priority to community-based models of conservation, management autonomy for the provincial office and a central agency to act as a co-ordinating unit. Any inherent ambiguities arising from the existing framework must be critically

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<sup>555</sup> Greenpeace, *Southeast Asia*, 15 October 2008, <http://www.greenpeace.org.seasia/en/news/greenpeace-exposes-abuse-of-fo>. (Accessed 31 July 2010.)

<sup>556</sup> *University of Sydney West Papua Project*, [http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peaceconflict/docs/Papua\\_Desk\\_the\\_New\\_threat\\_to\\_West\\_Papua\\_forests\\_Oil\\_Palm](http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peaceconflict/docs/Papua_Desk_the_New_threat_to_West_Papua_forests_Oil_Palm). (Accessed 31 August 2010).

<sup>557</sup> Greenpeace, *Southeast Asia*.

examined to provide for new policies and regulations to eliminate the possibility of misunderstanding.<sup>558</sup>

Papua's forestry and current plantations are now regulated by a myriad of agencies and offices at the local, provincial and national levels. This results in poor communications, bureaucratic mismanagement and corruption. The regulatory framework governing Papua's plantations sector is chaotic and non-transparent. Unclear regulations on land use and forestry have produced a legal black hole easily exploited by investors and political interests.<sup>559</sup>

### *Climate Change and Deforestation*

In an era when world attention is drawn to the phenomenon known as climate change the role of forests becomes an important consideration. The destruction of forests and land degradation combined with the generation of CO<sup>2</sup> from motor vehicles and electricity generation for industry and domestic use has led to an increased level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Many claim this process as being the source of increased temperatures and it is commonly referred to as climate change or global warming.<sup>560</sup> Theories that increase in palm oil for bio-fuels will assist efforts to offset climate change are positively refuted by those who claim that felling Papua's forests will cause far greater greenhouse gas emissions than any potential bio-fuel benefits. As one fifth of greenhouse gas emissions are caused by deforestation the global concerns for the fate of Papua's forests is justified.<sup>561</sup>

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<sup>558</sup> C. Eghenter, *State, Communities and Forests in Contemporary Borneo*, [http://epress.anu.edu.au/apem/borneo/mobile\\_devices/ch08s04.html](http://epress.anu.edu.au/apem/borneo/mobile_devices/ch08s04.html). (Accessed 31 July 2010).

<sup>559</sup> Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak, *Up for Grabs. Deforestation and Exploitation in Papua's Plantations Boom*, 8 October, 2009, <http://www.eia-international.org/files/news/566-1.pdf>. (Accessed 3 August 2010).

<sup>560</sup> Ramin Communications 2008 *Ecologically Sustainable Sydney*, 7 July 2010, [www.ramin.com.au/eco-sydney/carbon.shtml](http://www.ramin.com.au/eco-sydney/carbon.shtml). (Accessed 4 August 2010).

<sup>561</sup> Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak, '*Deforestation and Exploitation*'...

### *The Mining Industry*

The mining industry in West Papua not only produces a prodigious contribution to the overall economy of Papua, but it is essentially dominated by one organisation, Freeport. Earlier estimates put the output of the company at 92.8% of the total mineral exports for 1996 of \$US18.07 million.<sup>562</sup> The analysis of the mining industry in Papua is therefore based on the operations of the Freeport organisation. Freeport entered the market in Papua at a time when Suharto was looking to overseas sources for funds. Generous concessions were on offer, including tax concessions and the right to repatriate profits. This was the first of the Suharto government's foreign investment profits. Approval was given on 1 January 1967 under Law No. 1/1967 on Foreign Investment. This coincided with the country's Five Year Development Plans (*Repelita 1, 1969-74*).<sup>563</sup>

Freeport's interests were initially directed at the 4,758 metre mountain which drew attention of a Dutch navigator, Jan Carstensz, in 1623. In 1936 an expedition by J.J. Dozy, a geologist, and a colleague, A.J. Colijn, discovered an outcrop of copper mineralisation which they named 'Ertsberg', Dutch for Copper Mountain. The report on Ertsberg had been shelved, mainly due to wartime involvements of the Dutch. Its remoteness may also have contributed to the delay. Discovered by accident in 1959 the report was passed on to Freeport which negotiated a prospecting concession and by 1969 it announced an unexpectedly high ore grade of 2.5 percent mixed, an indication of extractable gold which is often the case. The development stage of the company, Freeport Indonesia Inc., was to take three years, finally costing US\$160million and was given a projected life of 30-40 years.<sup>564</sup>

Mining operations were assisted by several benefits including a three year tax holiday followed by a special tax rate which was to ensure that Freeport operated at less than the rate applicable at the

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<sup>562</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 90.

<sup>563</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 118.

<sup>564</sup> *ibid.*

time for copper mining. No land rents, royalties or obligations for commitments to development programmes locally or provincially were included in the contract of work. Further, the contract had no equity requirements and in particular did not impose any obligations upon Freeport to the traditional Papuan owners of the land, the Amungme and the Kamoro. The Papuans were also excluded from consultations on any of these issues.<sup>565</sup> There was no transparency as to the profitability of the mine but in 1980 it was revealed that gross sales for the first three quarters of the year amounted to \$US122,973,000. The company paid the Indonesian government US\$22 million in taxes. Freeport had, by this time, attracted criticism, particularly from some who were involved in its operations. The late Robert Mitton, an Australian geologist, was enraged at what he saw at Freeport. In a high level seminar on development in Papua New Guinea he expressed the view that Freeport had an overriding profit motive and a centralist government policy which resulted in a classic situation of colonial exploitation. On environmental issues Mitton said “Remote from criticism they [Freeport] were able to proceed without environmental impact studies and the necessity for developing a social conscience.”<sup>566</sup>

Osborne makes an interesting comparison based on the principles applied in the establishment and subsequent operations of Freeport with two similar projects in Papua New Guinea. In relation to the development on Bougainville Island the Australian-PNG government and BCL Company “paid compensation to the villagers and guaranteed to undertake local development.”<sup>567</sup> The presence of a strong trade union was another feature of its establishment. There was also a public share issue. In the case of Ok Tedi, there are numerous contrasts with Freeport. These include the acquisition by the Papua New Guinea government of 20% equity in the project. An amount of US\$120million was to be allocated for development of the poor western Province, to be funded from receipts from

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<sup>565</sup> D. Leith, *The Politics of Power. Freeport in Suharto's Indonesia*, Honolulu, Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 2003, p. 61.

<sup>566</sup> Mitton, *The Lost World of Irian Jaya*, p. 35.

<sup>567</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, p. 121.

shareholder dividends and taxation expected to be in the order of US\$4 billion over the life of the mine. This was considered to be inadequate by politicians associated with the Province but was to overshadow the Freeport situation. “In late 1981 a five element compensation agreement was concluded between Ok Tedi Mining Limited and the local villagers. The handling of the project, whose scale compares with Freeport’s, outshone its Irian counterpart in every respect.”<sup>568</sup>

The Ok Tedi project did, however, experience numerous set-backs. These included protests from occupants from the actual mine site at Kiunga/Telefomin who sought special consideration regarding employment. Other labour problems arose during the mine’s construction phase resulting in local villages laying siege to the Kiunga airstrip. They resisted all peaceful efforts to disperse them. The leaders of the villagers threatened to seek help from OPM guerrillas but government intervention solved the crisis.

Expansion of operations progressed in line with the discovery of new deposits during the 1970’s and 1980’s. At a time when the Ertsberg ore body was exhausted and operations had moved to an adjacent body, Gunung Bijih Timor, a huge new deposit was discovered close to the original Ertsberg operation. This virtually guaranteed the future of the mine and was the basis for the Contract of Work which was signed on 31 December 1991 for a period of thirty years with two optional ten year extensions. The exploration area extended the original 10,000 hectares to 2.6 million.<sup>569</sup> The discovery of the Grasberg deposit increased Freeport’s potential reserves to \$15 billion, making it the richest gold mine in the world. Copper reserves also increased to more than \$20 billion, making Freeport the world’s second largest open pit copper mine. In March 1995 the world’s biggest mining company, RTZ<sup>570</sup> (formerly Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation) of the United

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<sup>568</sup> Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War*, p. 122.

<sup>569</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 91.

<sup>570</sup> RTZ is the parent company which operated the Bougainville Copper mine via a subsidiary.

Kingdom acquired an 18% interest in the company. The US\$1.8 billion deal enabled a massive expansion of Freeport's operations.<sup>571</sup>

*The Amungme and Kamoro in Crisis*

The Amungme (highlanders) and Kamoro (lowlanders) are the original landowners of the areas on which Freeport has located its mining operations in Timika. Their habitat embraces tropical rainforest, coastal lowlands, glacial mountains and river valleys. They have traditionally practised a subsistence economy based on sustainable agriculture and forest products, fishing and hunting. Their existence is culturally identified with these surroundings. The imposition of Freeport's mining operations has circumscribed or destroyed local communities' economies and livelihoods. This has caused the displacement of entire villages. The combined effects of Freeport's presence has caused a massive and permanent disruption to the lifestyle of the traditional owners of the land.<sup>572</sup>

According to Freeport, the population in their Contract of Work area was approximately 400 when they first arrived in the 1960's but by 2002 the numbers had increased to 60,000. This included many transmigrants and people from other parts of Indonesia living in the Timika locality. Papuans seeking employment also walked into Timika from adjacent tribal lands. The Amungme and Kamoro people dispute Freeport's claims of benefits made available to the traditional people by way of medical and educational services. Both the Amungme and Kamoro people claim that the benefits received have been insignificant and that Freeport has brought a military presence into their lives together with oppression and dispossession. An Amungme leader and spokesman for LEMASA, (*Lembaga Musyawara Adat Suku Amungme*)<sup>573</sup>, Tom Beanal, stated that "The people

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<sup>571</sup> West Papua Information Kit, <http://userweb.cs.utexas.edu/users/cline/papua/core.htm>. (Accessed 9 June 2010.)

<sup>572</sup> Cultural Survival, *The Amungme, Kamoro & Freeport: How Indigenous Papuans Have Resisted the World's Largest Gold and Copper Mine*, <http://www.culturalsurvival.org>. (Accessed 26 January 2009).

<sup>573</sup> LEMASA, Indigenous Consultative Agency Amungme.

don't want the mine. We feel our land has been stolen from us.”<sup>574</sup> From the inception of its mining operations in 1967 Freeport was free of any environmental constraints. Despite the fact that the Ertsberg mine was discharging 25,000 tons per day (tpd) of tailings into the local river and dumping as much as 50,000 tpd of overburden into local alpine valleys<sup>575</sup>, there was no environmental law in Indonesia until 1982.

### *Tailings*

Tailings consist of ground rock and process effluents that are generated in a mine processing operation to extract precious metals. At the Grasberg mill 95% to 97% of the ore ends up as tailings. In 2001 the company was moving more than 750,000 tonnes per day (tpd) of rock, of which approximately 230,000 tpd was processed into tailings which are disposed of into the river system. The remainder is dumped as overburden. Presidential approval had also been granted to increase the output to a maximum of 300,000 tpd without referral to relevant ministries and government utilities or before any environmental assessment had been carried out.<sup>576</sup>

Freeport denies that its tailings are toxic or damaging to the river system. Contrary to the practices of the world's copper mines Freeport uses a physical extraction process as opposed to a chemical one. In Freeport's process the ore is ground and then the metals 'floated off' without the use of chemicals such as cyanide. Tailings go directly into the Aghawagon River from the mill site. Tailings are, however, the mine's greatest environmental problem. They have a visible effect and have caused extensive destruction, particularly in the lowlands. Physical destruction of the land, fauna and flora are the major concerns but the disputed quality of the water remains an issue of

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<sup>574</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, p. 153.

<sup>575</sup> Leith, *The Politics of Power*, p. 163.

<sup>576</sup> Leith, *The Politics of Power*, p. 171.

contention. An ongoing problem is the proposed reclamation and rehabilitation of the tailings disposition area.<sup>577</sup>

### *Overburden*

Overburden in the mining industry refers to the soil, rock and other materials that must be removed to enable the extraction of the metal-bearing ore. The extraction rate in 2001 was 1.5 grams of gold for every five tonnes of rock. It was predicted that the Grasberg mine would produce more than four billion tonnes of overburden at expected throughput rates. This will be dumped in the surrounding valleys and lakes. The major areas of concern regarding both overburden and tailings are storage and toxicity. The overburden and tailings currently produced at Grasberg are naturally high in sulphide and copper and low in the buffering agent limestone. This means that copper leaching and AMD (acid mine drainage) at the overburden sites are common issues. The environmental consultants, Dames and Moore and Montgomery Watson, concluded that the company was processing “best practice for overburden disposal in the circumstances.”<sup>578</sup>

Requirements for participating industries to submit an environmental impact assessment were not introduced until 1986. The Environmental Impact Management Agency, BAPEDAL (*Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan*) was formed in 1990 to police environmental laws.<sup>579</sup> Facing domestic criticism regarding the foreign mining sector on a range of issues including social and environmental concerns, in the latter years of the Suharto government a requirement was introduced for a Business Development Programme, together with environmental and social impact studies, to be lodged by the prospective foreign miner.<sup>580</sup> In Indonesia, international criticism of the country’s

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<sup>577</sup>        *ibid.*

<sup>578</sup>        Leith, *The Politics of Power*, p. 171.

<sup>579</sup>        Leith, *The Politics of Power*, p. 43.

<sup>580</sup>        Leith, *The Politics of Power*, p. 42.

poor environmental and human rights record was the inducement for inclusion of environmental and social impact studies in the Contract of Work in the late eighties.

The legal framework and social considerations specified the compliance requirements within which foreign organisations must operate but lack of willingness to enforce these controls by the Suharto government rendered the environment a poor second to mining, which undermined the effect of environmental legislation.<sup>581</sup>

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<sup>581</sup> Leith, *The Politics of Power*, p. 43.

## CONCLUSION

“This is our land – what are they doing here”<sup>582</sup>, epitomises the sentiments of indigenous West Papuans and underscores the entrenched nationalism which pervades the colony. It stands as a barrier to the complete acceptance of Indonesian rule and is defiant despite international influences and stage-managed events which played a significant role in the transfer of the sovereignty of West Papua to the Republic of Indonesia. This is in antithesis to Indonesian claims of legitimacy of their sovereignty of West Papua based on historic criteria and the Act of Free Choice which decided the future of the territory in 1969.

Leading to this position was the participation by the United States of America and, to a lesser extent, Australia in the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The confrontational role of President Sukarno was highly relevant in his discussions with Washington and the Netherlands regarding the future of West Papua and was a factor of influence in this debate. An analysis undertaken in this thesis of the principal agreements, plans and conferences regarding the future of West Papua involving the key participants does not reveal any representations by West Papuans. Their participation in the conduct of the Act of Free Choice which decided their destiny is alleged to have been under military pressure.

Human rights abuses brought about by maladministration, particularly in connection with agreements undertaken by the Republic of Indonesia arising from the New York Agreement of 1962 have created a great deal of resentment from the indigenous population. Banning of dissident political activity, censorship of mail and the press as well as public meetings were only some of the issues. In their dealings with the indigenous population immediately following the Act of Free Choice the oppressive conduct of the military (ABRI) also escalated. Further human rights abuses were also manifested through a process commonly known as Indonesianisation. The objectives of

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<sup>582</sup> Ondawame interview.

an uncoordinated approach were the forced acculturation of the Papuan indigenous population. Resources used in this process were incentive schemes, education, political policies and others but the broadest scope was provided by the principles of the Pancasila which is the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. Underpinning this ideology was the Anti-subversion law which was considered to be applied rather arbitrarily in many cases at the discretion of the state.

The most effective weapon of the Indonesianisation process was the transmigration scheme used to advantage in the government demographic and development objectives. Resource development projects such as oil, petroleum and gas, the timber industry and mining, critical to Indonesia's economic recovery in the early years of the Suharto administration and economic recovery of the 1980's, created massive environmental destruction with severe implications for the traditional landowners. Corrupt practices were commonplace in many of these initiatives. These policies were largely applied with little concern for the impact on the lives of traditional owners of land resulting in dispossession, dislocation and lifestyle changes. They were not adequately compensated or resettled.

West Papua nationalism has been explored against theoretical concepts of modernism and primordialism with a view to ascertaining influence of these ideas on the origins of nationalism. It was determined that modernism is beyond the realms of possibility in this application. Convincing arguments in favour of the applicability of primordialism as a determining factor could not be sustained. The incorporation of Christian hermeneutics into considerations regarding the building of nationalism cannot be overlooked but is considered as an element of national consciousness which only becomes positive upon the happening of a crystallising event.

A more convincing argument for the rise of nationalism in Papua can be supported on the basis of a particularistic approach involving the colonial history of the territory and subsequent developments. This is closely aligned with a view taken by Ondawame that West Papuan nationalism emerged on

the basis of common historical experiences over more than two centuries and two colonial eras and is rooted in a sense of common identity, race, religion and cultural experience. Nationalism developed in a positive sense following the Act of Free Choice in 1969. This was generated by the disappointment of the indigenous population at the outcome of the event and later fuelled by the oppressive conduct of the Suharto regime supported by the military and through other instrumentalities of government. Serious human rights abuses were recorded during their control of Papua. West Papuan nationalism is manifested through the actions of the separatist group OPM but it is questionable as to the effectiveness of this organisation in its quest for national independence for Papuans. Factionalism within its ranks may have impaired its efforts but it has not had the organisational strength or number of resources to effectively resist the Indonesian military superiority.

Special Autonomy legislation has not been favourably received by many Papuans, mainly due to delays in implementation and the anticipated effectiveness of the new law. If the law can be effectively implemented and accepted by Papuans it may serve as a stepping stone to further concessions in the future. For the present, the dilemma facing Papua is a choice between accepting Indonesian government policy or continuing the struggle for Independence. For Indonesia the choices are to continue with present policies aimed at Indonesianising the Melanesian indigenous population or extending considerations such as meaningful special autonomy and eliminating oppressive actions against the indigenous inhabitants.

The prediction of the possible future outcome of the many variables which cloud the political spectrum of West Papua cannot be achieved by only focussing on current events. Historic issues arising from decolonisation overlay the attitude of West Papuans, and ongoing political policies of the government do little to encourage Papuan trust and respect for authority from Jakarta. A great deal can be achieved towards creating amicable relations between West Papua and the government by efficient implementation of Special Autonomy reforms. This must be complemented by greater

consideration of human rights. The subject of democracy is a fragile one surrounded by uncertainty. The factors which inhibit its progress can possibly be overcome by dialogue over time. The settlement of differences can only be achieved by a mutually agreed agenda and recognition of equality as well as willingness and authority to compromise. Whether democratisation has adequate support from those within the political structure is doubtful but it remains a preferred option as a longer-term objective.

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