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Shame, Poverty and Development Studies

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Abstract
Development studies have been slow to explore and embrace the burgeoning field of emotions research, yet increasingly development interventions are adopting emotions-based strategies, including the deliberate use of shaming. This article reviews the implications of a new three volume collection on poverty and shame for development studies, arguing that it offers a fruitful avenue for research that focuses on understanding the lived experiences, perceptions and feelings of the poor, as opposed to conventional uncompassionate qualitative analysis.

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SHAME, POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

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Erika K. Gubrium, Sony Pellissery and Ivar Lødemel (eds), *Shame of It: Global Perspectives on Anti-Poverty Policies* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2013)

The intertwining of shame and poverty has been understood for a long time yet shame has not been examined in depth by development studies. This is despite the fact that shaming policies have become more common in recent decades in welfare programs and, most recently, in sanitation interventions. This is a gap that the three companion books reviewed here go some way to addressing. The three books are part of a large project led by Robert Walker, which reviewed the role of shame in seven developed and developing countries – Britain, China, India, Norway, Pakistan, South Korea and Uganda. This review essay aims not just to examine these books but to explore some avenues for a research agenda on emotions and shame, in particular, in development studies.

A key inspiration for the books was a seminar presentation by a graduate student of Robert Walker’s – the leader of the project and the author of one of the books. The student, Lindsey Richardson, drew attention to Amartya Sen’s reflections on shame and poverty. In particular, Sen has quoted, a number of times, a passage from Adam Smith in which he differentiates between luxuries and necessities on the basis of shame. In discussing absolute versus relative poverty measures, Sen (1983: 161) concludes that one of the absolute requirements or capabilities for ‘escape from

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1 The passage, which gives shame a central position in distinguishing between necessities and luxuries, runs:

By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person, of either sex, would be ashamed to appear in public without them [Smith 2007/1776: 676].

Shame is actually more of a focus in *Theory of Moral Sentiments* than in *The Wealth of Nations*, where it makes only this one appearance.
poverty’ is avoidance of shame, ‘[n]ot so much having equal shame as others, but just not being ashamed, absolutely.’ This component of Sen’s work was not forgotten: it was examined in the well-known World Bank *Voices of the Poor* study, which identified shame as a key means through which the poor understand and experience poverty (Narayan *et al.*, 1999: 6-7, 15). Apart from these studies, shame has had remarkably little attention development scholarship, so its re-discovery is timely because it is such a key dimension of poverty. Further, it ties in with the growing interest in emotions research in areas as diverse as computer science, economics, history, neuroscience, philosophy, psychology and sociology. Emotions research is broadly driven by the idea that humans are ‘emotional beings and that emotions are, Silvan Tomkins, wrote forty years ago, “primary human motives”’ (Frevert in Forum: History of Emotions, 2010: 67). This literature has not made much of an impact in development studies. Quite the contrary, the use of shame as a tool for development has become somewhat of a fad with the emergence of Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), which uses shaming as a key tool to get communities to construct their own latrines. Thus, these books should be seen as an important contribution to current debates about both the theory and practice of development.

The Walker book provides an overview of the research; it starts out with a discussion of conceptions of poverty and on the construction of shame and the understanding of it, which is the focus of the next section of this paper. The edited collection by Elaine Chase and Grace Bantebya-Kyomuhendo has chapters on each of the case study countries examining respectively cultural conceptions of poverty and shame, experiences of it and the role of the media and public in constructing poverty-related shame. This is the focus on second section of this review essay, though I concentrate on the experiences in developing countries. The third section of the paper turns attention to social welfare

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3 These are some of the areas that the interdisciplinary journal *Emotions Review* calls for papers from. Crozier-De Rosa (2010) outlines some of the growth in history, highlighting that publications on emotions have proliferated and a range of major research centres have been established, for example the Center for the History of Emotions at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Germany established in 2008 along with the Centre for the History of the Emotions at Queen Mary, University of London, UK. In 2011, the Australian Research Centre Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions was established. There is also an interdisciplinary International Society for Research on Emotions.

4 In terms of what emotions are, Scherer provides a comprehensive (though of course debated) approach, as episodes of related, coinciding responses in five different sub-systems in response to external or internal stimuli. The components are bodily symptoms, action tendencies, expressions, feelings and, the more controversial inclusion is cognitive appraisal (Scherer, 2005: 697-698).

5 Critiques of this approach are just emerging see Bartram et. al. (2012), Engel and Susilo, (2014) and Galvin (2015).
policies and their use of shame, the focus of the edited book by Erika Gubrium, Sony Pellissery and Ivar Lødemel – again the focus here is developing countries.

**SHAME AND POVERTY**

The first two chapters of Walker look at the historical origins of the idea of the term poverty in different cultures and the history of measuring the political construct of poverty, in particular ideas of relative and absolute poverty.  

Walker highlights the political nature of these measures, arguing that absolute measures promote the logic that government action is only needed to promote economic growth, which is what will get people out of absolute poverty. In contrast, using relative measures of poverty demands a focus on redistributive justice. Martin Ravallion’s (2012) work, which aims to combine relative and absolute measures by asking whether people are ‘poor, or just feeling poor’, is seen to contravene a human right’s approach to poverty, which focuses not just on resources but on dignity. Walker concludes that we know ‘more about how much poverty there is than about what it means to be poor’ (31). The key contribution of this chapter is that it demonstrates that relative measures of poverty are vital, because the psychosocial impacts of poverty are as important as the material ones and, poverty cannot be combated without understanding these. This capabilities approach shows the similarities of aspirations across cultures, which demonstrates the ‘legitimacy’ of linking debates about poverty in the North and South (183). Otherwise, these are sound but rather general chapters that cover material widely researched in development studies.

As noted earlier, the more interesting discussion in Walker is on shame. He noted it has been most studied in psychology and in sociology but that, even in these fields, it has been less studied than the other self-conscious emotions of guilt, embarrassment and humiliation (32). There is general agreement on what shame is and how it works, but less on causes and effects. The modern view of shame in psychology draws heavily on the early work of Helen Lynd (1958) and Helen Lewis (1971), while in the 1990s June Tangney (Tangney et al., 2007; Tangney and Dearing, 2004) and Thomas Scheff (1997) were key to empirical and theoretical developments in shame research. In contrast to the other self-conscious emotions, shame comes about due to an assessment of the self and can be

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6 Chapter One explores the idea of poverty and development in the longue durée and across different cultures from Confucian China Vedic, Indian culture to Ancient Rome before turning to the modern creation of poverty. This is interesting material but ends up being a bit of an historical smorgasbord rather than a detailed analysis.

7 Most of this work derives from the symbolic interactionist tradition in sociology though social constructionism has also been an influence. Jon Elster (2007) has also discussed shame extensively from a rational choice theory perspective.
distinguished from guilt, which is an assessment of specific behaviours. Shame is regarded as a self-conscious emotion that requires self-awareness and representation and hence develops later in childhood than guilt and other basic emotions, further it ‘entails a negative assessment of the core self, made with reference to one’s own aspirations and the perceived expectations of others, that manifests itself in a sense of powerlessness and inadequacy…’ (Walker, 2014: 33). Shame often relates to long existing circumstances, characteristics and attributes that cannot be easily changed. Overall, this suggests that people have little control over their shame in comparison to guilt and that shame has both intrinsic negative components and can produce undesirable actions and non-actions.

The prevalence of shame across different societies has led to the widespread idea that shame helps construct functioning societies. The theory is that it works through moral outrage, which ‘is an important sanction in enforcing conformity and expressions of shame by persons who have transgressed social rules may reduce this…’ (Walker, 2014: 55). Yet, these volumes strongly suggest that shame is not an effective avenue in constructing a good society. One important issue not addressed by the volumes then, is what is necessary for a good society? This is a big question, the volumes and other research offer a couple of avenues for research, first other reflexive emotions such as guilt and pride that motivate self-control without the damage associated with shame and, second empathic emotions such as empathy, sympathy and pity that can ‘motivate prosocial behaviour’ (Thoits, 1989: 328).

Returning to shame, experiencing shame highlights the tensions between social cohesion and social control, where the latter often hurts the most vulnerable. This has led to questioning the impact of shame in combination with poverty, which is precisely the focus of the volumes reviewed here. Walker concludes that there is a strong poverty-shame relationship and it helps explain why the poor ‘are prone to feel resentful and vengeful at being denied the basic right to an adequate quality of life’ (Walker, 2014: 37). Linda Tirado (2014: 46) explains this response in her recent book about the lived experience of poverty in a rich society: ‘Personally, I think that anger is the only rational response to my world sometimes, but when you’re asking for services you don’t get to pick what they treat you for. Either you agree with them or you’re labeled uncooperative’. Walker

8 The historian Norbert Elias (1978; 1982) provides a different perspective on this argument, as he found that shame became a key means for establishing social order once relatively stable monopolies of violence were established by the emerging European states. In these new courtly states, those who did not follow social etiquette and proper behaviour and hygiene were subject to increased shaming and stigmatisation as a mechanism of control. Thus, structural change was at the heart of the new socialisation and rules about hygiene and manners only served as an after-the-fact rationalisation.

9 Avishai Margalit is another possible avenue for thinking about this issue. He uses the term ‘a decent society’ and suggest that: ‘A decent society is one whose institutions do not humiliate people’ (Margalit, 1996: 1).
acknowledges this, noting that the behaviour produced by shame can in turn, solidify inequalities and increase societal stratification.

Shame appears to be fairly universal and is experienced fairly similarly in different cultures.\textsuperscript{10} The commonality in the human experience of shame-poverty across very different cultures and societies was also a theme in \emph{Voices of the Poor} (Narayan, Patel et al., 1999: 6). It is thought that shame evolved as a way of unifying communities as it is ‘a mechanism to subjugate the possibly divisive interests of the individual to the collective good and will of the community’ (Walker, 2014: 38). Despite being relatively universal, a key point from Walker’s review is that many scholars argue that shame is modified by cultural differences; in particular a distinction is posited between the impact of shame in more individualist versus in collectivist societies. The argument runs that pressures to conform are greater in collectivist cultures, which increases the salience of shame. Western psychology generally argues that shame is bad and guilt is good as shame is linked to low self-esteem while guilt is linked to higher self-esteem and to actions to fix the guilt – reparations. ‘However, in collectivist societies shame is not only more salient but frequently considered to be positive’ (Walker, 2014: 38). Thus, the impacts of shame are likely to be more significant in collectivist societies where behaviours may impact the entire family, tribe, community, caste, religious group, etc.

Walker (2014: 38) notes that in collectivist societies: ‘[m]embers of the social group may correspondingly feel that it is appropriate to shame fellow members who transgress social norms with a view to achieving the collective goal of bringing them into line...’ and that shame ‘is accorded greater import and deployed more knowingly in collectivist societies than in individualistic ones’ (Walker, 2014: 67). One concern with the individualist-collectivist differentiation on shame, which Walker supports, is that it produces an developed-developing binary that, like any system of binary thinking, is open to the danger of producing a set of cascading hierarchies that privilege one set over the other (Said, 1978/2003). Even if this is not the intention in the literature, the problem is that such binaries tend to be understood and operationalised by policy-makers and program administrators in problematic ways, such as the deliberate shaming of poor people who have not constructed their own (unimproved pit) latrines.

In terms of its psycho-social impacts, shame produces a desire for people to make themselves disappear and to turn in on themselves yet, as Tangney and Dearing (2004: 5) have found from extensive empirical studies, there is ‘a strong and consistent link between shame and measures of

\textsuperscript{10} A detailed discussion of the commonalities and diversity in cultural conceptions of shame and poverty can be found in Chapter 5, while Chapter 4 links poverty and shame through a quite detailed discussion of stigma.
anger and hostility’ and people suffering from shame ‘are also inclined to express their anger in nonconstructive ways.’ In contrast, guilty individuals are generally motivated to accept responsibility for their actions. Shame can produce a self-perpetuating negative dynamic and its ‘psychological consequences can be severe... low self-esteem, depression, anxiety, eating disorder symptoms, post-traumatic stress disorder, and suicidal ideation have all been associated with shame across diverse age groups, populations and cultures’ (Walker, 2014: 40). The specific negative actions and non-actions can though, vary with individuals, cultural norms and over time (De Herdt, 2008). People repeatedly subject to shame often try to hide these emotions, which can produce accusations of shamelessness. Tirado (2014: 164) explains ‘that shame is a luxury item, because there is a point at which things are so bad that you lose all sense of shame’.

There are moments in the book where Walker seems to suggest that shame may have some positive effects for societies - at times when it is possible for the individuals to actually address the reasons for their shame - but when it results from structural factors that individuals have limited capacity to change, it tends to be damaging. Overall he concludes that shaming is counterproductive and a ‘cement reinforcing structures of inequality and perpetuating poverty’ (191). Perhaps this is why shaming has becoming less common over the centuries – Walker provides a range of references and examples here for example, the end of the workhouse, that criminals are no longer branded or put in stocks and shamed or that shaming of people for pre- or extramarital sex is much reduced (41-3). However, its use remains more prevalent in collectivist societies, where it is sometimes argued to be less disruptive than in individualist ones. However, Walker (2014: 42) finds there is growing evidence that it has ‘negative personal and social consequences’ in these societies too. Gubrium provides a more sophisticated argument on this point in *Shame of It* (2013: 8). Drawing on the work of Jennifer Goetz and Dacher Keltner (2007), she argues that findings of ‘positive’ shame in non-Western settings are generally in cases where ‘the feeling of shame matches the particular cultural norms and expectations at hand, and moreover, when shame is not highly ‘moralised’. This situation is, however, in marked contrast to the experiences portrayed by the low-income respondents we spoke with across seven settings.’ This confirms the dangers of a binary approach to shame in collectivist-individualist societies.

If the use of shame has decreased overall in society, Walker argues its deleterious impacts on individuals when it is used are likely to have increased (43). Given poverty is a visible indicator of failure, poverty-shame seems to be on the rise, yet the idea that people can address their poverty through social mobility is mostly a myth as intergenerational inequality is not just persisting but
increasing. This is only a small point in Walker’s work, yet given the growing literature on inequality and its negative consequences, it deserves closer attention (Ortiz and Cummins, 2011; Piketty, 2014).

Indeed, Walker could have engaged further with Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett’s work, which shows that more unequal societies have greater levels of social and psychosocial dysfunction than more equal ones at similar income levels or even compared to societies at lower income levels. There is a threshold level after which happiness gains from increased income are limited and before which, there is some link to income (Deaton, 2013; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Layard, 2005). For happiness, the threshold in rich countries is around US $25,000 per capita, however, it is also strongly connected to the level of inequality in a society (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011: 8-9). Wilkinson and Pickett found that the relationship between increased inequality and poor psychosocial outcomes held for life expectancy, infant mortality, children’s educational performance, homicide, imprisonment rates, mental illness and social mobility amongst other issues. They argue that the issues they studied are all related to the level of social class gradient in societies, hence the correlation with inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011: 27). From here, it is only a short step to shame, especially when it is the product of circumstances, characteristics and attributes that individuals cannot easily change. Certainly too, the psychological consequences of inequality and shame are remarkably similar: increased anxiety, depression and self-harming, particularly among those with fragile self-esteem.

It is important to note, however, that scholars have questioned Wilkinson and Pickett’s methodology – one line has been to question the reliability of their data analysis though some of this work was funded and published by right wing think tanks. Other scholars question whether the correlation that they find equals causation and further whether the mechanism for causation they specify – status competition, which erodes trust and increases anxiety and insecurity – is viable. John Goldthorpe (2010; 2012) highlights that Wilkinson and Pickett’s argument hangs on two main issues. The first is whether there is adequate evidence for the claims about contextual effects on social inequality and here he finds there is enough evidence. But on the second issue, whether ‘this effect is produced by the “psychosocial” processes’ outlined by Wilkinson and Pickett or by other processes, Goldthorpe finds they have a ‘one-dimensional understanding of social stratification’, focusing on the (clear) relationship between income and class but not on that between income and status.

11 These mostly appear in non-peer reviewed sources too, for example, Christopher Snowdon’s book, The Spirit Level Delusion: Fact-checking the Left’s New Theory of Everything, is published by the right-wing Democracy Institute. Wilkinson and Pickett have responded to these criticisms and there have also been reports from other authors supporting their methodology. Links to the critiques and response can be found on The Equality Trust’s website. However, there are also progressive responses to Wilkinson and Pickett, like that of David Coburn (2015), whose recent paper also provides links to many of the other critiques.
where the correlation is notably weaker in modern societies (Goldthorpe, 2010: 737). Wilkinson and Pickett undoubtedly claim a little too much causality for social status in determining health outcomes, however further research on the inequality-poverty-shame nexus is certainly warranted, including in developing countries where it may operate somewhat differently due to ongoing salience of absolute needs (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011: 30).

EXPERIENCES OF SHAME

Chapters 5-9 in the Walker volume draw on some of the main findings of the Chase and Bantebya-Kyomuhendo book to which I now turn. It explores the experiences and understandings of shame and responses to it in the seven case study countries, through: (a) shame’s portrayal in discourse in particular in school textbooks, film and proverbs; (b) people’s lived experience of shame (through interviews with 30 poor people in each country); and the (c) attitudes of the non-poor to poverty (through focus groups with the non-poor). I focus on key findings from the chapters on developing countries.

The first section of this book explores cultural conceptions of shame through discourse. Each chapter explores the way shame is portrayed focusing on particular mediums and highlighting different aspects of poverty-shame. In terms of mediums, the chapter on Uganda draws particularly on oral sources, like stories and proverbs, whereas the chapter on Pakistan focuses on traditional stories and poetry, the one on India includes a focus on film, while the China chapter just uses literature. The Ugandan chapter by Bantebya-Kyomuhendo is particularly good and from it we learn about the evolving language of poverty. In pre-colonial times, poverty was a term used not just to describe material conditions but also the orphaned, infertile or unmarried. Poverty was seen as a dark force explained by fate, meaning the spirits and proverbs counselled acceptance of fate but at the same time promoted social protections for the poor. Colonialism and independence brought about a significant change in the understanding of poverty, which challenges communal-individualist divides in the shame literature that would place Uganda as a collectivist society. The introduction of money in Uganda saw the role of the spirits in understanding status diminish and a range of new proverbs emerged exalting money. The ‘shameless rich’ could now accumulate money without traditional concerns for the poor and poverty was blamed on social vices (28).

Highlights from the other chapters include Sohail Choudhry’s explanation of how caste and tribe play into poverty-shame in Urdu literature and how shame increases in relation to social obligations like marriage. The theme of honour and shame is also prevalent in Leemamol Mathew and Sony
Pellissery’s chapter on India, which also raises the important issue of gender and poverty-shame. They argue that the fading of women’s symbolic religious roles, along with the increasing commodification of women, has contributed to them experiencing some of the worst forms of poverty-induced shame. One interesting methodological element used throughout the books but given prominence in the study of China by Ming Yan was the use of the secondary school curriculum to assist in the selection of influential Chinese novels on poverty. In terms of new elements, Yan highlights four strategies for coping with shame prevalent in Chinese literature: valuing non-material things; counter-shaming; focusing on spiritual matters; and withdrawing from society.

One thing missing in these chapters is any quantitative data or evaluation of the overall prevalence of poverty-related shame in the large volume of literature, film, etc studied for the project. For example, the interviews with poor adults and children analysed in section two could have included quantitative data on the number of people who reported shame and in what forms. Indeed, there is a lack of data on the incidence of poverty-shame throughout the three volumes, whether it be in policy or in media discourse. This raises the broader issue of measurement and methodology, which is a difficult task in studies of emotions generally (Thoits, 1989). Emotions are somewhat subjective though recent developments in psychology and neuroscience has progressed measuring of things like changes in nervous systems (Scherer, 2005). However, in sociology and related disciplines the two main approaches are: ‘(a) frequencies, intensities, or durations of various emotional experiences, as self-reported in surveys or qualitative materials, and (b) content codes for various emotional beliefs, obtained from documents, records, ethnographies, and media’ (Thoits, 1989: 338). The three volumes here unfortunately provide us with little insight into how they went about coding and interpreting their data.

Section II explores lived experience of poverty based on interviews with the poor. In Pakistan, there was a very strong association between poverty and lack of equality amongst the interviewees along with the experience of both verbal shaming and physical violence from employers. In China, where interviewees were all urban, the majority did not blame themselves for their poverty but rather pointed to economic restructuring, which significantly reduced shame. In some cases, children were also interviewed and some interesting differences emerged between experiences, with poor children in Uganda feeling strong feelings of shame though school attendance where their poverty stood out, whereas in Pakistan, those attending school did not express as strong feelings of shame as child labourers did.

Section III examines attitudes towards the poor through focus group interviews with the non-poor and analysis of media discourse. In Uganda, the analysis highlighted a common understanding of
poverty as absolute and involving material deprivation, but it also revealed a gendered analysis of poverty wherein men who did not meet societal expectations regarding marriage, producing offspring and being the household head and provider were characterised as experiencing ‘men’s poverty’ (208). The explanations for poverty in Uganda overwhelmingly targeted individual failings, as was the case in Britain and interestingly in Norway, though in the latter case the media and public discourse used was a little less harsh and pejorative compared to Uganda and Britain. In Pakistan, India and China there was a greater tendency to attribute poverty to structural causes, though in Pakistan those without employment, and beggars in particular, were regarded harshly. In India, the English language media reviewed was generally sympathetic to the poor and blamed the state for poverty, while the non-poor in the focus groups placed causality firmly on the poor. In China, the media generally attributed poverty to broad structural issues and saw urban poverty as ‘an inevitable social problem in any country that was going through dramatic social transition’ (246). The media also generally avoided belittling terms often referring to the poor as ‘groups living in disadvantage’ and calling for care and warmth toward them (248). Chinese interviewees’ explanations of poverty tended to reflect their backgrounds in terms of their use of structural explanations and they all also identified individual factors – overall there was a rough balance between the identification of individual and structural or social explanations for poverty and interviewees tended to be rather neutral in their language to describe poverty.

SOCIAL POLICY AND SHAME

Gubrium, Pellissery and Lødemel’s edited book focuses on the construction of social policy in relation to shame and the research from this part of the project led to the inclusion in the 2012 International Labour Organization (ILO) Recommendation 202 on national floors of social protection that every government should have ‘respect for the rights and dignity of people covered by social security guarantees’ (Walker, xi). The chapters explore a range of different social programs and the broader social policy context.

The chapter on China by Ming Yan focuses on urban poverty and in particular the Minimum Standard of Living Scheme known as dibao (subsistence allowance). This program is designed only to address absolute poverty and thus the level of support provided under it is minimal and the overall coverage of the program remains very limited. The application process is very invasive and potentially stigmatising with neighbourhood committees visiting applicants’ houses and posting the names of potential recipients on notice boards. Community members are then encouraged to detect those not
eligible. Yan argues that the application process mirrors ‘the classical debate concerning the deserving and undeserving poor that is now deeply engrained in Chinese discourse concerning benefit provision’ (28). Nevertheless, research suggests that a majority of dibao recipients do not associate the benefit with ‘losing face’ because it is a vital basic support and dibao is increasingly seen as a basic right. Yan highlights the lack of focus on inequality as a future challenge for the program and linked to this the emergence of poverty traps.

In India, as in China, some social policy challenges derived from the involvement of the various layers of government in programs with the resultant programs designed to be humiliating to recipients. Pellissery and Mathew find they were more about ‘managing outcomes that have been created by the inefficiencies of the state’ than about effective welfare provision (55). In Pakistan, Choudhry argues that one of the main causes of poverty-shame has been neglect by the state: the poor have been effectively forsaken (116). Pakistan did introduce conditional cash transfers under the old military regime and, in 2008, moved to an unconditional scheme, the Benazir Income Support Programme, providing cash transfers to low-income women. This is now the largest social welfare program in the country (116-9). The scheme is unconditional but the selection of recipients by parliamentarians, who could each nominate 8,000 recipients, not only encouraged corruption but is shaming - female recipients needed male family members to lobby the parliamentarians, as male parliamentarians have limited possibilities for any contact with potential beneficiaries. Thus one woman reported having to “beg” several times before her uncle followed up and another reporting having to clean a relative’s house for four months in order that he followed up her application (121). A new, more technical approach to identification of recipients is now under way. The issue of shame in cash transfer schemes is a topic that deserves more attention.

The Uganda chapter raises the very interesting topic of microfinance debt and shame in the context of an agricultural development program. Here shame was linked first to refusal of credit (generally for the poorest farmers), and second, to the shame that arose when farmers could not meet repayment and were subjected ‘to humiliating experiences such as the confiscation of property and personal belongings, prosecution and incarceration or penalisation in the form of increased interest rates.’ One respondent said ‘I’d rather remain poor but free’ (171). Microfinance has been quite extensively studied and some of its negative consequences have come to light but the relationship between microfinance debt and shame has not yet, to my knowledge, had sufficient consideration.

In the final chapter of the book, Pellissery, Lødemel and Gubrium come to the important conclusion that development agencies focus mostly on improving the material status of recipients and not enough on the dignity of the vulnerable. The strategies used by agencies ‘have focused primarily on
getting people to engage in prescribed actions in order to surpass a certain economic threshold, often taking the form of *quid pro quo* arrangements*’* (211). Yet, for social protection to be transformative it needs to go beyond economic status and address structural issues of inclusion and exclusion. This has been a theme in anti-poverty discourse in many industrialised countries though the rise of neoliberalism from the 1980s, went quite a way to undermining this discussion in many countries. The growth of cash transfer schemes over the past decade has helped bring this debate to the South but it still has a long way to go.

**CONCLUSION**

These are three important books that deserve to be read by development academics and policy makers. They do have some limitations, some of them noted in the discussion above. Another weakness is that the books are a bit repetitive and self-referential at times. One small point is that the Walker text makes the claim a couple of time that rural areas are ‘generally more benign, offering many ways of getting by’ outside of when there are natural disasters (83). He does not provide substantive evidence for this claim and the continuing high rates of rural-urban migration, which Mike Davis (2006) argued are driven by push factors out of rural areas more than pull factor to urban areas, does not support this benign view of rural area. Although it is a small critique of Walker’s book, it is an important issue in future explorations of shame in development studies as shame is likely to have somewhat different operations, impacts and intensities in rural, peri-urban and urban areas.

The volumes reviewed here are not the first works in this area. The ‘Voice of the Poor’ report noted that ‘psychological dimensions such as powerlessness, voicelessness, dependency, shame, and humiliation’ were key ways that the poor themselves defined poverty (Narayan, Patel et al., 1999: 7). This ground-breaking work is not adequately acknowledged in the books reviewed here, though the World Bank did not follow through on the work as it was too progressive for the institution.12 There are dimensions of poverty-shame in Narayan et al’s (1999) work that do not feature in the books reviewed here, one being that long-term poverty often results in a degree of fatalism, which can exacerbate shame. Though equally they found that the groups where pain and humiliation were most intensely expressed were from the former Soviet bloc where their changes in circumstances were recent (Narayan, Patel et al., 1999: 34, 54). Thus the relationship between duration of poverty

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12 Even the subsequent *World Development Report 2000*, which drew partly on *Voices of the Poor*, was too radical for the Bank (Wade, 2001).
and poverty-shame seems worthy of consideration. Narayan et al. (1999) also point out the importance of maintaining social solidarity with the poor and that being unable to ‘reciprocate with gifts or participate in community events can have very harmful consequence’ (Narayan, Patel et al., 1999: 36). Still, there are few other studies providing such a broad based insight into the experience of the poor in recent years.

In the 1980s, academic literature emphasised the importance of rights based development. However, in the 2010s it feels, at times, as if this focus has been lost, indeed, as Walker notes in the conclusion to his book, academics and policymakers have, of late, tended to focus on counting the poor and ‘their’ supposed successes in reducing the number of poor rather than in understanding the experiences and feelings of the poor and utilising these experiences to inform policy-making (183). These books are a timely reminder of the rights-based development agenda. Inspired by Sen, they add a focus on the emotional and psychosocial dimensions of rights and well-being through the lens of dignity. This agenda fits well with the growing agenda on inequality and its psychosocial impacts. Inequality, as Walker says, has often been justified by a ‘protective and self-congratulatory discourse policed by shame’ about the poor’s supposed lack of work ethic, rather than acknowledging ‘the lottery of birth’ (191). Studying emotions broadly and shame, poverty and inequality specifically is likely to prove a fruitful path for development studies scholars. Likely avenues include studies of donor and government policies and programs not just in areas like welfare policy (the focus of the books reviewed here), but also in seemingly ‘technical’ areas such as sanitation, microfinance, rural development programs and the like. Emotions research has also been growing in disciplines such as history and law and insights from these areas could be bought to bear on development studies. Thus there are a range of avenues to expand a rights-based agenda though emotions research.

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