"Global Jihad": The Canadian Experience

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'Global Jihad’: The Canadian Experience

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A Brief History of Canadian Terrorism

Canada has, on the whole, been fortunate in its experience of terrorism. During the 1960s through to the early 1970s there were overlapping waves of terrorism primarily perpetrated by two distinct movements.1 The first was the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, who were part of a Russian religious sect that had settled in British Columbia at the beginning of the 20th century.2 Their beliefs brought them into conflict with organised society and they protested by way of public nudity, arson and bombings, peaking in the early 1960s.3 The second group was the far more well-known Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) thought to be responsible for the majority of Quebecois separatist violence, which peaked from about 1968 to 1971.4 FLQ violence declined following the ‘October Crisis’ of 1970 when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau implemented the War Measures Act in response to the kidnapping of British Trade Commissioner James Cross and Quebec’s Labour Minister Pierre Laporte (who was subsequently murdered).5 Following the military-led round-up of suspected militants, the loss of popular support combined with improved political opportunities hastened the group’s demise.6

According to Ross’s calculations, from 1960-1985 the Sons of Freedom and the FLQ were responsible for 296 acts of terrorism on Canadian soil (although some estimates are much higher7), with close to 200 additional incidents attributable to a variety of other groups and individuals.8 Within those 25 years, just 10 people (including 2 terrorists) were killed as a result of terrorist violence in Canada. The Global Terrorism Database reports just 39 acts of terrorism in Canada for the period 1986-2010, including just 3 domestic fatalities (none of which are assigned to known groups).9

Figures on domestic attacks, however, reveal little of Canada’s involvement in terrorism. It has been used to plan, support and even launch attacks against foreign interests, most notably the bombing of Air India Flight 182 by Sikh separatists, which exploded en-route from Montreal to London on June 23rd 1985, killing 329 people.10 Canada has also been used extensively as a base of operations for fundraising and support activities by a wide variety of international terrorist organizations on an ongoing basis. “By 1998, every major terrorist group in the world was operating in Canada” and there were few legal measures in place to prevent it before December 2001.11

The Evolving Islamist Terror Threat

Islamist militants have also taken advantage of Canada since at least the 1980s. Individuals have been linked to a range of terrorist organizations (including Hamas and Hezbollah12),
although the focus here is upon the ‘Global Salafi Jihad’ advanced by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The most prominent among these early Islamist ‘entrepreneurs’ was Ahmed Said Khadr who first came to Canada in 1975, was awarded citizenship, and became a fundraiser for the Afghan mujahideen beginning in the mid-1980s. Among his associates were Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and many other senior al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He raised thousands of dollars in Canada, ostensibly for charity, and in December 1995 was arrested in Pakistan on suspicion of having funded the Egyptian embassy bombing in Islamabad the previous month. Although then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien intervened to secure his release, intelligence continued to implicate Khadr and in January 2001 he was designated as an al-Qaeda financier by the UN. The realisation in hindsight that Chrétien had erred created what is known as the ‘Khadr effect’ - a reluctance among Canadian politicians to intervene on behalf of citizens held abroad on suspicion of terrorism, should they cause future embarrassment. Indeed, Khadr continued his activities and raised his family in the same environment (three of his sons – all Canadian citizens – are included in the current database alongside their father). But they returned to Toronto whenever required and Khadr senior was well known among Canadian-based militants. He was ultimately killed in a shootout with Pakistani soldiers in October 2003 near the Afghan border, after which a pro-jihadi website described him as a “founding member of al-Qaeda”.

Another well-known early example is Fateh Kamel who came to Canada from Algeria in the late 1980s and married a Canadian. Over the next decade he spent time in Afghanistan and Bosnia, travelled extensively in support of the mujahideen (working closely with Sheikh Anwar al-Shabaan of the Islamic Cultural Institute of Milan) and established a network of jihadi supporters in Montreal. Members of the network engaged in organised theft and dealt in false passports and other fraudulent papers which were used to support the activities of militants in Europe and elsewhere. Kamel was eventually arrested in Jordan in March/April 1999 and extradited to France where he was convicted for being part of a criminal-terrorist conspiracy and providing false documents to terrorists behind the 1995 metro bombings and the Roubaix gang armed robberies of 1996.

More significant still was the arrest of Ahmed Ressam on December 14th 1999 as he was entering the United States with explosives in the trunk of his car, intending to bomb Los Angeles airport. After starting out as a thief in the Kamel network Ressam had gone on to train at militant camps in Afghanistan and had been acting on behalf of the al-Qaeda leadership. His arrest was a watershed moment for Canadian counter-terrorism, stoking
fears in the US that its northern neighbour was lax on security and therefore a potential threat. It simultaneously served as a wake-up call for Canadian authorities who had been monitoring Islamist militant networks but—as was the case in most Western countries—had failed to grasp the seriousness of the threat. The result was a lasting and acutely felt need to avoid making the same mistake again, and, after 9/11, to demonstrate to the US that Canada was a reliable partner in the ‘War on Terror’ (termed the ‘Ressam effect’).

In the ensuing years the Islamist terror networks that had been allowed to develop during the 1990s were dismantled by way of arrests, deportations and the use of security certificates to detain suspected terrorists without charge, often on the basis of secret evidence (similar to control orders in the United Kingdom). The Canadian government strengthened its capacity to combat terrorism by way of enhanced legislation (beginning with the Anti-Terrorism Act, passed on December 18, 2001) combined with structural reforms and budgetary increases for national security, which by 2011 exceeded CAN $92 billion.

Canadian commandos took part in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and combat troops officially supported the war-effort beginning in February 2002 (ending in July 2011). Predictably, this led to Canada being named as a target for attacks by Osama bin Laden in a speech broadcast in November 2002, thus redefining Canada’s status among global jihadis. And although Canada did not directly participate in the war in Iraq, this did not earn it exemption from the ire of Islamist militants— in March 2004 Canadians were rated the fifth most desirable Western target in an article posted online by jihadists.

Despite these words Canadians were not singled out for attack in the same way that some of their allies were, but rather continued to be ‘caught in the cross-fire’ in attacks aimed at others or at the West in general, such as the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, the Mumbai attacks in 2008 and the bombing of the Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in 2009. Canada was targeted most directly outside of a warzone by a group of British militants arrested in August 2006, who had been planning to bomb several airplanes using liquid explosives, but even then the Canadian targets were secondary to American airlines.

Similarly, Canadian citizens arrested or suspected of involvement in Islamist terrorism in the early post-9/11 years suggested a continuation, rather than a clear break from the past in that they continued to focus their activities overseas. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, for example, (arrested in Oman in March 2002) had been planning to bomb Western embassies in South East Asia; and Mohammad Momin Khawaja (arrested in Ottawa in March 2004) had been assisting a group of British jihadis planning to attack targets in the
It may have been surprising that these men had grown up in Canada, as opposed to immigrating as established adult militants, but they had not seemingly intended to harm their countrymen.

The nature of the threat was, however, changing. A Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) briefing for the year 2004-2005 reported that “[w]hile the threat remains concentrated overseas, an attack on Canadian soil is now probable”. Little more than a year later the ‘Toronto 18’ arrests took place, ultimately resulting in eleven convictions – all young men who had spent most of their lives in Canada- including four convictions for planning domestic terror attacks. One of the group leaders, Zakaria Amara, had constructed a functioning detonator and two of his followers were arrested as they unloaded 3 tonnes of what they thought was ammonium nitrate fertilizer in a police sting operation. They are believed to have been targeting the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS headquarters and/or a Canadian military base for bombings intended to force the government to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.

Since then there have been three more alleged Islamist terrorism plots aimed purely at domestic targets (Hiva Mohammad Alizadeh, Misbahuddin Ahmed and Khurram Syed Sher, arrested in August 2010, Matin Abdul Stanikzy, arrested in November the same year; and John Nuttall and Amanda Karody, arrested in July 2013). A fourth plot, uncovered in April 2013, allegedly involved a plan to derail a passenger train travelling from Toronto to New York. These cases, in addition to continuing reports and arrests in relation to Canadians involved in terrorism overseas have eroded the lingering assumption that Canada is somehow immune to violent radicalization at home. This realization is supported by findings from opinion polls of Canadian Muslims, which reveal that although the vast majority report positive attitudes towards Canada, a significant minority nevertheless express support for terrorism.

For example, one report in 2006 found that 5% of those who were aware of the Toronto 18 case felt that the attacks would have been completely justified had they gone ahead, and a further 7% felt they would have been somewhat justified. There has also been concern among security analysts about the potential for ostensibly non-violent groups such as Hizb-ut Tahrir (which had its inaugural meeting in Canada in a Mississauga community centre in July 2009) to foster anti-Canadian sentiments. Coupled with the fact that the Canadian Muslim population, currently at 940,000 or 2.8% of the population, is estimated to triple by 2030, there appears to be a growing sense of uncertainty among policymakers about the potential for further radicalization among subsections of some communities.
Within this context CSIS has reported that “religious extremism” is its primary counter-terrorism concern on the domestic stage, a sentiment echoed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who in September 2011 confirmed that Islamist terrorism continued to present the main threat to Canadian national security. This was yet again reiterated with the unveiling of Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy in February 2012. Yet despite this obvious concern, there has been very little in the way of empirical research to examine Islamist terrorism in Canada, leaving a significant deficit in current understanding of the threat. Questions remain as to the demographic backgrounds of those involved; how and why they have radicalized; what precisely Canadians have been doing in support of violent jihad; how the phenomenon has developed over time; and how the Canadian experience compares to other Western countries? Based on an exhaustive sample of publicly known cases dating from the 1980s through to 2011, the present study attempts to answer these questions.

**Methodology**

The immediate issue in any study of terrorism is how the term is defined. It is well known that there is not (and likely never will be) a universal definition of terrorism, therefore the focus of research and the limits of validity and possible generalization are defined by the research question and sample. The overarching research question here was ‘What have people living in, or from, Canada been doing to support or advance violent jihad either at home or abroad?’ The sample is restricted to cases pertaining to the ‘global Salafi jihad’ referring to the al-Qaeda ‘brand’ of Sunni Islamist terrorism whereby jihad is believed to be necessary violence against the perceived enemies of Islam. Restricting the sample in this way maintains analytical focus and facilitates comparison to previous studies which have utilised similar criteria.

The inclusion -or exclusion- of individuals in this study is not a judgement of guilt or innocence and has no bearing whatsoever on legal proceedings. It is an objective analysis of publicly available information intended to improve understanding of a certain type of behaviour. The terms terrorist, militant and jihadi are used interchangeably to describe the individuals in the sample based upon their (alleged) behaviour, which included the following non-mutually exclusive categories: 1) Membership in a terrorist organization, where no other specific offences could be determined (e.g. Mohamed Harkat); 2) Promoting jihad (e.g. Salman An-Noor Hossain); 3) Fundraising (Ahmed Said Khadr); 4) Facilitating jihad (e.g. Faruq Khalil Muhammad 'Isa); 5) Domestic training (members of the Toronto 18 group); 6) Attempted overseas training and combat (e.g. Mohamed Hassan Hersi); 7) Successful
overseas training with no further offences (e.g. Amr Hamed); 8) Jihadi fighter in foreign conflicts (e.g. Abdullahi Afrah); and 9) Planning/conducting attacks (e.g. Hiva Mohammad Alizadeh et al).

Rather than distinguish between ‘home-grown’ and ‘foreign’ militants (which is by no means a clear-cut affair) individuals were included in the sample regardless of their nationality or place of birth, as long as their offending (i.e. relevant behaviour) occurred after they had taken up residence in Canada. There were no restrictions otherwise in terms of when offences occurred. This is in line with the research goal of conducting as comprehensive an analysis as possible.

Included individuals (see Appendix A) were classified according to the following categories, which may be treated with varying degrees of confidence in terms of reliability of allegations: 1) Confirmed domestic prosecutions (e.g. Said Namouh); 2) Killed in action (government confirmed/ news reports, e.g. Rudwan Khalil Abubaker); 3) Foreign convictions (e.g. Mohamed Warsame); 4) Offender confessions (e.g. Abdurahman Khadr); 5) Legal allegations (domestic/ foreign, e.g. Ferid Ahmed Imam and Maiwand Yar); 6) Extra-judicial sanctions (domestic/ international, e.g. Mahmoud Jaballah); and 7) Public allegations (e.g. Abderraouf Jdey).

Individuals excluded (see Appendix B) were those classified as visitors (i.e. did not live in Canada for a prolonged period or whose time in Canada could not be confirmed as significant, e.g. Mohamedou Ould Slahi, Nizar bin Muhammad Naser Nawar); those for whom only previous offending before coming to Canada is alleged or confirmed (e.g. Ahmed al-Kaysee, Hassan Almrei); non-Sunni militants (e.g. Mohammad Ashraf Siddiqui); those for whom there was insufficient information (e.g. Aumar Alsorani); any cases where individuals were explicitly cleared, acquitted or had charges stayed (e.g. Maher Arar); and any individuals more appropriately included in samples for other countries that the author is currently working on (e.g. Tahawwur Hussain Rana- included in a sample of US-based militants).

The total number of individuals considered for inclusion in the sample (prior to any exclusions) came to 178 individuals, which was then reduced to 64 as per the above criteria. These 64 individuals represent the most comprehensive sample of Canadian jihadists to date. However, as is often the case in terrorism research, missing information was a problem. This is explicitly acknowledged throughout the analysis, and is furthermore reflected in the way that percentages are reported. Researchers sometimes ignore missing information and express percentages as a function of the number of cases on which they do have data (%n), rather
than the true total. A problem with this is that it ignores the general likelihood of certain outcomes and possible bias in the availability of information, thereby potentially distorting the picture. For example, where level of education is unknown, it is less likely that this will include completed university qualifications because these are a statistically less likely outcome anyway, and it is also less likely that this would go unreported if known (since these sorts of details are of interest to the press). It is therefore more accurate to present percentages as a function of the true total and to include information on missing data, which is the practice adopted herein. The reader is encouraged to bear these details in mind when interpreting the analysis.

The primary sources of data were open source records consisting of news reports, court records, law enforcement press releases and other published accounts. Detailed chronological accounts of each case were constructed and data were entered into an Excel spread-sheet including 45 predetermined variables of interest per person, relating to background information, operational (behavioural) details and details of the investigation and outcome. Following the initial database construction, the author conducted field research in Canada consisting of interviews with relevant and informed individuals who were asked about specific cases (in relation to missing or uncertain information) and/or about recent developments relating to Islamist terrorism and counter-terrorism in Canada. Those interviewed included an undercover operative in the Toronto 18 case, now counter-terrorism consultant (Mubin Shaikh), two individuals from within the Canadian intelligence community, an academic researcher (Michael King), two journalists (Michelle Shephard and Isabel Teotonio), and two individuals involved in counter-radicalization efforts in the Toronto area (Muhammad Robert Heft of CanBridge Consulting and Sayyid Ahmed Amiruddin of the Al Sunnah Foundation). Others were approached but declined to participate. The sample of interviews was small, occurring over just 10 days, and was limited by opportunity, but nevertheless helped achieve the stated aims.

Once the database was complete the data were analysed according to whether individuals began offending before or after September 11th 2001, regardless of when they ceased offending. The rationale for this is that it is more relevant to understand the context within which individuals began offending, as opposed to when they end, since this is usually involuntary. And although the 2003 invasion of Iraq has previously been described as a key turning point in the development of Islamist terrorism in Western countries, the 9/11 attacks were chosen as an equally, if not more significant, point in time. This choice makes little difference in the overall analysis while still allowing an assessment of change and
development. It is, however, also prudent to note that the overall sample of 64 is thus divided into two: the ‘pre-9/11’ sample (n = 35) and the ‘post 9/11’ sample (n = 29). Percentages are easily skewed when dealing with such small numbers and therefore any conclusions that we draw from these data are necessarily tentative. Nevertheless, developments observed in the Canadian data are broadly in accordance with previous findings from other Western countries (detailed below), thus lending mutual support to one another.

As a final caveat, it is important to note this study was completed in early 2012. Since then, as of mid-2013, another ten jihadi terrorism cases (including at least 15 Canadian residents/citizens) have been reported. Although it has not been possible to update the quantitative analysis to include these cases, they are briefly referred to in text/footnotes where relevant, and the overall analysis remains largely unaffected.

The following sections present the analysis for background variables (including a statistical summary, individual classifications, geographic distribution, demographic profiles, radicalization and ideological classifications), followed by operational variables (including group characteristics, offence periods, operational roles, international dimensions and associations, the role of the Internet and stated motivations) and investigative variables (investigations and legal outcomes). This is followed by the summary and conclusions.
Analysis Part 1: Statistical Summary and Background Variables

Table 1 summarizes the analysis of background variables of individuals included in the sample, each of which are discussed below, beginning with the statistical summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistical summary</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 confirmed individuals (32 cases); 2.2 individuals (2 cases) per year</td>
<td>29 confirmed individuals (15 cases); 2.6 individuals (1.4 cases) per year</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual classifications</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 domestic prosecutions; 45% overseas prosecutions; 11% killed; 17% own admissions; 11% legal allegations; 26% extra-judicial sanctions; 9% public allegations</td>
<td>45% domestic prosecutions; 3% overseas convictions; 7% killed; 3% own admissions; 31% legal allegations; 0 extra-judicial sanctions; 9% public allegations</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic distribution</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54% based in Montreal; another 32% based in the Greater Toronto Area.</td>
<td>66% based in the GTA.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Demographic profiles</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tr>
<td>Males in late 20s/early 30s; 97% born overseas; 71% permanent residency; Mainly Algerians &amp; Egyptians; Education levels mostly unknown (at least 17% have degrees); 11% students; 11% in skilled occupations; 6% unemployed; 1 convert; 37% confirmed married; 34% confirmed criminal records; No histories of mental illness</td>
<td>Males in early-mid 20s; 72% born overseas; 100% permanent residency rights; Top 3 ethnicities- Canadian, Pakistani, Somali; Most have at least completed high school (24% university); 24% students; 14% in skilled occupations; 17% unemployed; 16% converts; 38% confirmed married; 14% confirmed criminal records; 1 individual with history of mental illness</td>
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<tr>
<th>Radicalization</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Largely unknown. Very little evidence of online role</td>
<td>Largely unknown. Available information indicates combined importance of social dynamics and online activities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Ideological classification</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85% Jihadi; 9% Hardcore; 3% unknown</td>
<td>85% Jihadi; 3% Hardcore; 3% criminal opportunist; 7% unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Numbers of Canadian residents/citizens involved in Islamist terrorism according to when they began and ceased offending.

*Note that since it is unknown when/if some individuals have ended their terrorism careers, the number of individuals ended (55) is less than those who began (64).

Figure 1 shows the frequency of individuals in the sample according to when they began and ceased to offend. It is noteworthy that although we often have reliable information about when individuals cease to offend (usually by arrest or death) there is much less reliable information about when individuals begin to offend, even though this is perhaps of greater interest. If we focus only on when individuals are arrested, this gives a delayed impression of when levels of radicalization and terrorist activity are actually peaking, potentially obscuring analysis of additional factors that might be contributing, and arguably telling us more about counter-terrorism than terrorists.

The starting points for offending are based on the first known overt behaviour in support of terrorism (e.g. travelling to Afghanistan). Thus they do not capture earlier processes of radicalization and almost certainly underestimate offence periods in some cases. Although not exact, this information nevertheless approximates the beginning of individual jihadi careers and allows an assessment of levels of offending against wider contextual factors. The initial peak in the 1990s relates to North African networks, which grew in the context of intense conflicts in Algeria, Bosnia and Chechnya at a time when the camps in
Afghanistan were thriving. The apparent drop in individuals beginning to offend after the 1990s is at least partially a product of the way that the graph is constructed (i.e. the first two time-points represent full decades, after which the graph is divided into single years). However, it is worth noting that very few individuals began their jihadi careers in the years immediately following 9/11. This may relate to the previous dismantling of jihadi networks following the arrest of Ahmed Ressam- in other words a removal of human infrastructure that otherwise might have facilitated swifter mobilisation. It may also reflect the collective psychological impact that the September 11th attacks had in Canada combined with restrictions brought about by the ‘War on Terror’. The fact that there was not another peak until 2005 (the Toronto 18 case) likely relates to the fact that Canada did not overtly support the invasion of Iraq (as compared to Australia and the UK where there were peaks in 2004), combined with gradual disillusionment with the war in Afghanistan. Rates of terrorism also undoubtedly relate to the presence of individual terrorist entrepreneurs or recruiters and the localised spread of extremist ideology, which may appear to occur almost at ‘random’, but are also tied to much wider global developments.

As shown in Table 1 above there has been an average of 2.2 individuals (or 2 cases/groups) per year in the pre-9/11 period, compared to 2.6 individuals (1.4 cases) post-9/11, up to and including 2011. Bearing in mind that there were likely more individuals offending in the pre-9/11 era that we simply don’t have information about, at face value these figures reflect a practically identical rate of individuals. They also superficially indicate an apparent tendency to be part of slightly larger groups (although this also reflects the way that individuals were grouped into cases- because members of the Kamel network in fact led quite distinct offending careers they were largely treated as separate cases, but in reality they were closely associated with one another and could arguably be classed as a single case). This highlights the fact that figures by themselves can be misleading, and must be combined with in-depth qualitative understanding of the different individuals and cases.

Finally, it is also important to note that the apparent decline in cases beginning in the last few years is potentially misleading because if there are in fact such cases (which would include numerous unnamed individuals believed to have gone to Somalia to fight for al-Shabaab) their information is unlikely to become public knowledge until they are captured or killed.
**Individual Classifications**

In terms of the classification of individuals, Table 1 reveals that close to 50% of those who began their jihadi careers before 9/11 (16/35 individuals) were subject to overseas prosecutions\(^68\) (including Egypt, France, Algeria, Tunisia and the US); a further 26% (9 individuals) were subject to extra-judicial sanctions (mostly issued from 2001-2003), consisting of 4 security certificates, 2 UN sanctions, 2 individuals detained in Guantanamo and 1 individual deported as a “danger to the public”\(^69\); the remainder involved limited confessions, people killed overseas, legal allegations (all foreign); and public allegations. Nobody was prosecuted in Canada. Among those who began offending after 9/11 the picture is very different. Almost half (13 individuals) have been successfully prosecuted in Canada; another 31% are currently facing legal allegations (all but 1 in Canadian courts); and the rest are made up of a handful of public allegations, overseas fatalities and offender admissions. None of the post-9/11 starters have been subject to extra-judicial sanctions. Overall, these results quite clearly demonstrate a more proactive and effective counter-terrorism apparatus in Canada over the past decade.
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of Canadian residents/ citizens involved in Islamist terrorism (1980s-2011). Numbers indicate individuals who began offending before and after 9/11.

Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of individuals in the sample. The sets of numbers indicate the number of individuals in each city/ town according to whether they began their jihadi careers before or after 9/11. The totals are artificially increased due to individual mobility, meaning some individuals are counted more than once (true sample total = 35n pre-9/11: 29n post-9/11). There are two main findings of note. First, Islamist militants in Canada are primarily located in major urban areas, and in particular in Montreal (34% of the overall sample) and the Greater Toronto Area (47%). This also reflects the distribution of the Canadian Muslim population (located primarily in Quebec (21%) and Ontario (60%)) which should not be surprising as it is from within this much larger population that jihadis emerge. The second finding of interest is that there has been a geographical shift in the distribution of cases over time. Montreal has become less significant with the dismantling of the Kamel network, while Toronto has comparatively increased in significance. At the same
time more-or-less isolated cases have occurred in a more diverse range of locations (Edmonton, Winnipeg, Pembroke and Maskinonge) while in other locations cases have not reoccurred over time (Leduc, Hamilton, St Catharines and Chicoutimi).

These findings are significant for understanding the social transmission of terrorism, since they demonstrate that cases can occur in new locations and will not inevitably reoccur in the same places over time (i.e. jihadi networks can be dismantled with seemingly lasting effects). However, the continued significance of Toronto (and in particular the Scarborough area) over time, suggests that lasting pro-jihadi subcultures can develop, creating enduring ‘hotspots’ which cannot be extinguished by arrests alone. As described below, there have also been changes in the ethnic profile of individuals involved in terrorism in Canada which correspond to global developments and to the respective populations of Montreal and Toronto. Specifically, while North Africa used to be a more prominent global hotspot in the 1990s (and North Africans make up the larger proportion of Muslims in Quebec), Pakistan and Somalia have become globally more significant since 9/11, and these ethnicities make up larger percentages of Muslims in Ontario.

**Demographic Profiles**

Table 1 confirms that the entire sample, both before and after 9/11, is made up of young males. The average age range (corresponding to the start and end of offence periods) was 28.6-32.9 in the pre-9/11 period, compared to 23.6-24.5 in the post-9/11 period. These ages are in the same average range (i.e. twenties to early thirties) as found in global, European, Australian, and British and American samples of Islamist militants. They are consistent with shorter offence periods (see below) and they also confirm, as other studies have, that there has been a decrease in average age over time. This is likely the product of a combination of factors, including wider exposure to jihadi ideology (in particular by way of the Internet, which has become ubiquitous in the lives of young people), missing information about when some of the earlier individuals began their careers (overestimating these ages), and the fact that Islamist militants are far more likely to be detected and apprehended more quickly now than in the past.

The fact that the sample is dominated by males is also not surprising, although we might have expected to find at least some females involved in terrorism in Canada since this has occurred in other Western countries, particularly in the post-9/11 period (e.g. Colleen LaRose in the US, Roshanara Choudhary in the UK). There are, however, signs that Canadian females are getting involved in Islamist terrorism also, despite their absence from the current
sample. A peripheral example comes from the Toronto 18 case, where Fahim Ahmad’s sister-in-law reportedly fuelled discussions on the merits of jihad with Ahmad and a now convicted British terrorist, Aabid Khan. In mid-2011, it was reported that two unnamed females (one later identified as Asli Nur) from within Toronto’s Somali community are believed to have gone to Somalia to join with al-Shabaab (excluded from the sample pending more reliable information). Similarly, a mid-2012 report suggests that one Fadumo Jama, aka ‘Mama Shabaab’, from Toronto, had been running an al-Shabaab safe-house south of Mogadishu for at least four years. More recently still, Amanda Karody became the first female to be charged with planning a jihadist-inspired, domestic terrorist attack. Based on this, and taking into account the experience of other Western countries, it is reasonable to expect confirmed cases of female participation in Islamist terrorist activity in Canada in the future.

Residency and nationality are further demographic variables of interest. For those who began offending prior to 9/11, 29% of individuals (10 people) entered the country by illegal means (false passports) but 71% acquired permanent residency rights (including being granted asylum) or full citizenship. In the post 9/11 sample there have been no confirmed cases of illegal entry and everyone in the sample had permanent residency or full citizenship. Somewhat surprisingly, the increase in number of individuals born in Canada over time is not as large as might have been expected (1 individual (3%) pre-9/11 versus 5 individuals (17%) post-9/11). Similar studies of Islamist militants in the US, Australia and the UK indicate that these percentages are much higher in these countries (46%, 57% and 64% respectively). The situation in Canada might partially be a reflection of a relatively young, still growing immigrant population but it is unclear if this is much different to the US and Australia. This raises the question of whether there is something unique about growing up in Canada that might serve as a ‘protective’ influence. However, it is also important to recognise that many of those not born in Canada nevertheless grew up there. In other words, as in other Western countries, Islamist terrorism in Canada is indeed ‘home-grown’ in the sense that individuals are radicalizing and turning to terrorism there, as opposed to coming to the country for that purpose. In terms of nationality, pre-9/11 offenders were more often North African (31% Algerian, 23% Egyptian, 9% Moroccan) while more in the post-9/11 era have been Canadian (17%), Pakistani (17%) or Somali (14%). It was mentioned above that these changes correspond to changes in the global jihadi context, but it is worth elaborating that –as the percentages show, and as is the case more generally- ethnicity has become a more diverse affair among Canadian militants over time. This of course means that ethnic profiling is
unlikely to be a productive investigative technique, although this does not preclude geographical profiling of ‘hotspots’.

Given that most pre-9/11 offenders came to Canada from foreign countries and were not subject to the same levels of scrutiny as individuals are today, there is often less available information about their backgrounds, including education. This was available for only 40% of the pre-9/11 sample (13 individuals) compared to 79% (23 individuals) post-9/11. With this in mind, at least 20% of the earlier offenders had completed high school and at least 17% had completed university, compared to 52% and 24% respectively since then. Whilst at first glance this may appear considerably lower than some studies have found, this is at least partly due to differences in the way that figures are reported (i.e. whether they are expressed as a percentage of the number for whom there is information, or the total sample). Where the same method of reporting is used, based on similar sampling techniques, focusing on the US, UK and Australia, the results are more directly comparable. Regardless of these comparisons, it is clear that Islamist terrorists in Canada generally have at least basic education, and a significant minority go on to complete degrees at university. This seems to contradict the notion that individuals become involved in terrorism because of lacking education.

Looking at occupations, information was available for 57% (20 individuals) and 79% (23 individuals) of the respective samples. Although not explicitly shown in Table 1, among pre-9/11 starters the largest proportion (20%, or 7 individuals) were in semi-skilled occupations such as truck-driver or shop-keeper. This was followed by skilled occupations (such as computer technician or school principle) and students. In the post-9/11 period more individuals were students or unemployed, and more were in unskilled occupations (such as security guard or fast-food worker). The same numbers of individuals across time periods were found in high school (2) and in skilled employment (4). These results indicate that there is a consistent minority of high achievers among Canadian jihadis, albeit within the context of an overall slight reduction in socio-economic standing. This is likely related to changes in age (see above) and, bearing in mind differences in reporting, is generally consistent with findings from previous studies.

Another area showing some evidence of change is in the religious background of individuals. 100% of the sample were Muslims, but there have been more converts involved over time (1 person or 3% compared to 4 people or 14%) which is again comparable to previous findings from other Western nations. There was not enough information about individual upbringings and religious practices to offer a more informative analysis of
religion; however it was not uncommon for reports to mention that people (including ‘born’
Muslims) had lived previously Westernized lifestyles and had only become more noticeably
religious in the years or months prior to offending. This suggests that levels of religious
knowledge were generally lacking and offers some support to the argument that having
greater religious knowledge and understanding from a young age may well help guard against
radicalization (and in line with this, recent research has shown that non-violent Islamist
‘radicals’ are more likely to have a more nuanced understanding of their faith than those who
turn to violence).\textsuperscript{88}

Marriage, on the other hand, does not appear to be a protective factor against
involvement in Islamist terrorism. Practically the same proportion (37\% and 38\%, or 13
individuals vs. 11), both before and after 9/11 were married, and although there was more
missing information (40\% vs. 14\%) among the earlier cohort, this has very little implication
for the analysis (in fact most individuals for whom marriage is not reported are likely to be
unmarried, since this is a ‘human interest’ detail that the press often report when present).
This is also congruent with previous research, confirming that marriage is common among
jihadis.\textsuperscript{89}

Information about previous criminal records was generally lacking (60\% unknown
versus 72\% unknown) although it is worth noting that where criminal histories are present
they are likely to be reported if significant. Among the 34\% (12 individuals) in the pre-9/11
period who had criminal records, 92\% of these were for dishonesty-related offences-
primarily fraud, use of false identity documents and theft. This is a reflection of how some of
these offenders entered Canada in the first place, and also relates to the significant criminal
activities of the Kamel network in particular. It is also worth noting that some members of the
Kamel network were prosecuted on similar criminal charges in relation to their terrorism
convictions. One person (Hassan Zemiri) had also been previously arrested on drugs
charges.\textsuperscript{90} By contrast, just 4 individuals (14\%) of the post-9/11 sample had confirmed
criminal records, including a drugs charge (Maiwand Yar\textsuperscript{91}), a domestic violence charge
(Said Namouh\textsuperscript{92}), shoplifting (Nishanthan Yogakrishnan\textsuperscript{93}) and illegally possessing and
importing firearms (Mohammed Ali Dirie\textsuperscript{94}). This is clearly not the whole picture (e.g.
several members of the Toronto 18 group successfully shopped to chocolate bars during a
training camp expedition\textsuperscript{95}) yet it raises some interesting questions.

It has been previously suggested that criminality among jihadis has been on the
increase since 9/11 because autonomous or semi-autonomous groups can no longer take
advantage of central handouts from al-Qaeda, meaning they must fund themselves.\textsuperscript{96} At first
glance, the results here do not seem to show much support for this. However, it is worth noting that both Yogakrishnan and Dirie committed their offences in furtherance of terrorism. There are also several others among the post-9/11 cohort who earned criminal convictions in conjunction with their terrorism offences, which are more revealing. One of Mohammad Momin Khawaja’s convictions was for instructing an unwitting female associate to open a bank account and transfer funds to a female in Britain who was in turn acting on behalf of terrorists there\(^{97}\) (essentially fraud); Fahim Ahmad also pleaded guilty for complicity in Dirie’s attempt to smuggle firearms into Canada from the US\(^{98}\); Steven Chand of the Toronto 18 was convicted for counselling to commit fraud over $5,000\(^{99}\); Said Namouh was convicted for extortion in association with a terrorist group\(^{100}\); and Matin Abdul Stanikzy was convicted with counselling a female associate to commit theft in his attempt to obtain explosives.\(^{101}\) Overall, these findings show that most Islamist terrorists in Canada are not career criminals.\(^{102}\) This is especially the case more recently, following the demise of relatively well-established criminal-terrorist networks that functioned during the 1990s. Based on the available information, the recent wave of militants are less likely to have a previous record, and where they do, it may well be unrelated to their involvement in terrorism.\(^{103}\) However, it is also apparent that criminality –generally related to funding or availability of materiel-sometimes forms a part of terrorist conspiracies.

The final background variable here is mental health. Previous studies have shown that mental illness only appears to occur in a very small minority of Islamist militants and on the whole it does not help explain their behaviour.\(^{104}\) Although specific information on this variable is lacking (over 90% unknown) this can quite reasonably be regarded as a general failure to report on its absence. Only 1 person in the entire sample (Asad Ansari of the Toronto 18\(^ {105}\)) was reported to have experienced some form of illness (depression) prior to offending. These findings are in accordance with the majority of recent research on this issue\(^ {106}\) and offer no support to the idea that involvement in terrorism might be generally explained by some form of psychopathology.

**Radicalization**

There is an unfortunate, but acute shortage of reliable and meaningful information pertaining to individual pathways of radicalization (defined here as the psychological, emotional and behavioural process preceding involvement in terrorism\(^ {107}\)). This of course should not be surprising though, given that these processes are necessarily pieced together in retrospect, often years after the fact. For the purposes of this study, the primary aim here was to assess
whether processes of radicalization could be classified as primarily virtual (online), social (face-to-face) or a mixture of the two. Unsurprisingly, there was very little evidence of any online activity in the pre-9/11 period. Only 2 individuals (the Jabarah brothers) were classed as having radicalized via a mixture of social and virtual processes, since they were known to frequent jihadi websites in addition to being influenced by social contacts. The remainder were either classed as having radicalized primarily via social processes (37% or 13 individuals) or were unknown (57%, 20 individuals). However, in reality the vast majority of ‘unknowns’ would of course have radicalized in social situations since the Internet either did not exist or was largely unavailable and offending often occurred in the context of established organizations.

In the post-9/11 period there was still a great deal of missing information (55%, 16 individuals) but 2 individuals (7%) were classed as primarily socially radicalized (referring to Omar Khadr and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed). The remaining 38% (consisting of the 11 convicted members of the Toronto 18) were classed as having radicalized via a mixture of online activity and social interaction. Fahim Ahmad, one of the group leaders, was active in online Islamic forums since at least 2002 and online jihadi propaganda became “the de-facto catalyst” for the radicalization of the group. Ahmad created and distributed his own highly emotive DVDs; he would print out online texts and give them to members of the group to read; and he would instruct them to check out websites promoting jihad, in addition to playing speeches by Anwar al-Awlaki and others in group situations. Online jihadi propaganda was absorbed both individually and collectively, and served as the basis for face-to-face group discussions.

Although no ‘virtual only’ cases were confirmed in the Canadian sample, there are others, such as Said Namouh, who was seemingly acting alone in Canada and who offended primarily online, suggesting that the Internet may well have played a wider role in radicalization than the current data reveal. It is safe to conclude that face-to-face social interaction still appears to be an important factor in radicalization, but that it is likely to be supplemented and enhanced by online jihadi propaganda. The fact that individuals in other Western countries (such as Ryan Anderson in the US or Nicky Reilly in the UK) do seem to have radicalized online almost entirely by themselves, means that this cannot be ruled out in the Canadian context. Moreover, the spread of ideology via the Internet may also have contributed to the geographic spread of cases out-with hotspots, discussed above.

**Ideological Classification**
A related point of interest is whether individuals can be classified according to levels of ideological commitment. There is insufficient information to enable a refined and reliable system of classification on this variable; however, it is generally possible to distinguish between a) individuals who show at least some evidence of adhering to jihadi ideology (the vast majority, here simply termed ‘Jihadi’), b) those who appear to be particularly committed to the cause (‘Hardcore’) as evidenced by such factors as sustained and varied activities in support of terrorism, often including first-hand experience of violence, and c) ideological outliers (individuals who appear to be involved for distinct reasons such as personal motives or financial gain).

89% of the earlier cohort (31 individuals) and 86% of the latter cohort (25 individuals) were classed as Jihadis, meaning that they appeared to subscribe to jihadi ideology, but –with the exception of the ‘Hardcore’ sub-category- no further judgement was made as to differing levels or types of commitment within that very broad category. Just 3 individuals (9%) in the pre-9/11 sample were classed as Hardcore (these were Ahmed Said Khadr, Fateh Kamel and Karim Said Atman) although numerous others might arguably be included. Only 1 individual in the post-9/11 sample was classed as Hardcore, namely Faruq Khalil Muhammad ‘Isa, who is accused of working over a relatively lengthy period of time to send suicide bombers to Iraq. ‘Isa allegedly encouraged recruits to persevere when they showed signs of doubt, made enquiries about conducting violence himself, and told his sister “Go learn about weapons and go attack the police and the Americans. Let it be that you die”. The fact that a minority of individuals were classed as Hardcore is consistent with previous analyses which suggest that the jihadi movement on the whole is driven by a minority of ideologically committed ‘entrepreneurs’, although it is quite possible that other highly committed individuals were missed, since this classification relies on sufficient information.

Judgements about ideological outliers are more reliable. Among pre-9/11 starters this included just 1 individual, Abdurahman Khadr, who was known for being a reluctant participant at the al-Qaeda training camps and seems to have rejected the idea of violence. In the post-9/11 sample Abdurahman’s little brother Omar was classed as ‘unknown’ because he was a minor at the time of offending, essentially making him a child soldier and unlikely to have been genuinely ideologically informed. In addition, Shareef Abdelhaleem of the Toronto 18 was classed as a criminal opportunist as well as being Jihadi, since he appeared to be at least partially motivated by a desire to try and make money. Lastly, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, who fought alongside al-Shabaab in Somalia, seemed to be motivated
by nationalism and apparently disagreed with their ideology even then.\textsuperscript{118} He has also since spoken out against al-Shabaab in support of counter-radicalization in Canada. Taken together, these ‘outlier’ cases are too few to indicate systematic differences between earlier and more recent generations of Canadian militants, but they confirm previous findings\textsuperscript{119} showing that not everyone involved in Islamist terrorism is necessarily committed to jihadi ideology.

\textbf{Analysis Part 2: Operational Variables}

Table 2 below summarizes the findings in relation to operational variables of Canadian Islamist militant- in other words, what exactly they have been doing in support of terrorism.

\textit{Group Characteristics}

Terrorism is generally a group phenomenon, making group characteristics a key area of interest. Even basic descriptive features such as immediate group size are, however, difficult to determine due to ‘fuzzy boundaries’, individual mobility and fluid networks. Because of this, quantitative figures as presented in Table 2 tell us little, except that Canadian Islamist militants tend to offend in relatively small groups, and that most cases are connected to wider offending networks (although a small number of seemingly lone actors have emerged over time).
Table 2. Operational variable information of Canadian Islamist militants beginning their careers before and after 9/11 (1980s-2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group characteristics</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average size: 3.9; 100% of cases part of wider network; Leadership tied to foreign terrorist organizational structures in all cases, but not rigid control</td>
<td>Average size: 3; Most cases part of wider network; At least 67% of cases tied to foreign organizational structures; 1 case of exclusively within-group leadership; 1 case with no leadership; 3 cases unknown</td>
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<tr>
<th>Offence period</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average: 5.5 years; Mode: 10 years</td>
<td>Average: 1 year; Mode: 6 months</td>
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<tr>
<th>Operational activity/roles</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tr>
<td>55% facilitating jihad; 29% overseas training; 17% jihadi fighters; 17% planning attacks; 9% membership in a terrorist network only; 9% fundraising; 6% promoting jihad; 86% focused overseas; 86% of individuals travelled overseas</td>
<td>38% facilitating jihad; 31% planning attacks; 24% jihadi fighters; 21% domestic terror-training; 14% promoting jihad; 10% fundraising; 7% overseas training; 7% attempted overseas training/combat; 45% focused overseas; 41% travelled overseas</td>
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<tr>
<th>International dimensions &amp; associations</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% of cases linked to foreign terrorists; Most individual links to Af/Pak (66%); Other key locations include France, Egypt, Bosnia, UK; 71% of individuals have named foreign associations; 74% have named domestic associations</td>
<td>73% of cases linked to foreign terrorists; Most individual links to Af/Pak and Iraq (14% each); Other key locations include UK, US, Somalia; 34% of individuals have named foreign associations; 13% have named domestic associations</td>
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<tr>
<th>The role of the Internet</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tr>
<td>89% unknown; Known uses include accessing propaganda, communication, and fundraising</td>
<td>31% unknown; Top 3 uses: accessing propaganda/forums; communication; creating/distributing materials</td>
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<tr>
<th>Stated motivations</th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
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<tr>
<td>69% unknown; Primary known motivations include combination of foreign policy/religion/altruism/revenge</td>
<td>34% unknown; Primary motivations unchanged; Also evidence for generalized negative perceptions of the domestic context</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
In terms of leadership, this is also difficult to determine since it is rarely explicitly manifest and quality data are generally lacking. The data that are available do not support the contention that operational leaders and ‘spiritual sanctioners’\textsuperscript{120} (religious ideologues) are universal roles within groups. There was also very little evidence, either before or after 9/11, that demonstrated issuing and following of orders, although a notable exception on these points is the Toronto 18 group where Fahim Ahmad and Zakariya Amara played quite clear leadership roles. More recently, it has been alleged that Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, (accused of the train derailment plot), were being supported by al-Qaeda elements in Iran, however the nature and extent of that support is presently unclear.\textsuperscript{121} In general, groups appear to have been informally organized and leadership appears to have emerged by way of consensus based on individual initiative, experience, knowledge, connections and capacity to organize group activities.

Both before and after 9/11 Canadian militant activities can best be described as collaborative and yet most often tied to foreign organizational hierarchies involving recognized figures of authority, with autonomy varying depending on context and role. Whilst operating in Canada individuals have had considerable autonomy to choose and organize their own activities; however they have often maintained communication with foreign militants in order to coordinate their efforts. When overseas themselves (e.g. while training or taking part in combat) they have functioned more directly as part of militaristic structures. Thus, for example, Mohammed Abdullah Warsame would have been fully absorbed into al-Qaeda and Taliban hierarchies whilst training and fighting in Afghanistan from 2000-2001, but his continued support activities in North America were primarily self-organized.\textsuperscript{122} Individuals such as Hassan Farhat\textsuperscript{123} or Mohamed Elmi Ibrahim\textsuperscript{124} who have trained and/or fought overseas since 9/11 have been equally absorbed into foreign organizational structures. Others, such as Mohammad Momin Khawaja (who assisted British militants\textsuperscript{125}), Said Namouh (who was an online Global Islamic Media Front collaborator\textsuperscript{126}) and Faruq’Isa (who allegedly helped send recruits to Iraq\textsuperscript{127}) can best be described as semi-autonomous.

Given the fact that autonomy has been assumed to be a defining feature of Western-based Islamist terrorists in the post 9/11 era,\textsuperscript{128} these results are surprising. It is worth noting though that some cases fit this description more closely than others, in particular the Toronto 18 (who made ultimately unproductive links to British and American jihadis\textsuperscript{129}) and Salman An-Noor Hossain (who independently set up his own anti-Semitic, pro-militant website\textsuperscript{130}). Based on currently available information, the cases of Abdul Matin Stanikzy (allegedly
planning to attack a Canadian military base\textsuperscript{131}) and Mohamed Hassan Hersi (accused of planning to join al-Shabaab\textsuperscript{132}) might also fall into this category. Thus, while it is still common for Canadian Islamist militants to collaborate with overseas co-conspirators, there have also been cases in recent years which demonstrate a willingness to pursue a terrorist agenda in the absence of external support.

\textit{Offence Period}

As mentioned above, the beginning of offence periods are designated by the first known overt behaviour in support of terrorism and do not include preceding periods of radicalization (which would be even more difficult to determine). Offence periods generally end via arrest, death or the apparent voluntary cessation of behaviour in support of terrorism, although some cases appear to be ongoing. Cases where either the start or end-date is unknown are excluded from the analysis (5 cases pre-9/11, 6 cases post-9/11). Based on these calculations Table 2 reveals that the average offence period has decreased from 5.5 years to an average of just 1 year (and most frequently it has been less than this). These figures are in accordance with previous findings from other Western nations\textsuperscript{133} and reflect the fact that while in the past individuals could have quite lengthy jihadi careers without fear of intervention, counter-terrorism resources have dramatically increased since 2001 and individuals are more likely to be arrested sooner.

\textit{Operational Activity}

The largest proportion of individuals in the sample both before and after 9/11 (55\% and 38\%, or 18 vs. 11 individuals) involved facilitating violent jihad. This included a range of activities aimed at enabling others to develop skills (train), travel, or otherwise perform duties in relation to Islamist terrorism. Examples among pre-9/11 starters include Essam Hafez Marzouk, who was an alleged trainer of mujahideen, including two individuals responsible for the August 1998 east African embassy bombings.\textsuperscript{134} Another example is Abdullah Ahmed Khadr who trafficked weapons for al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{135} Post-9/11 examples include Mohammad Momin Khawaja, who built a remote detonator for others to use,\textsuperscript{136} Zakaria Amara of the Toronto 18, who organized the activities of others in the group,\textsuperscript{137} and Nishanthan Yogakrishnan who shop-lifted supplies at the behest of Fahim Ahmad.\textsuperscript{138} These examples show that facilitating behaviours (whether top-down, collaborative, or bottom-up) continue to form a significant part of terrorist activity, while the relative reduction over time may be related to lower levels of organizational integration.
The next most common behaviour in the pre-9/11 sample (29%, 10 individuals) involved overseas paramilitary-style training, but where combat or planning of attacks has not been confirmed. Among others this included the el-Maati brothers Ahmad and Amer, Adil Charkaoui, and Amr Hamed. A further 17% (6 individuals) from the early part of the sample went on to become jihadi fighters who took part in overseas combat (e.g. Ahmed Said Khadr, Abdullahi Afrah and Abdulrahman Mansur Jabarah). By contrast, only 2 individuals in the post-9/11 sample (7%) were classed as having received overseas training without confirmation of combat (Ferid Ahmed Imam and Maiwand Yar, the former who allegedly graduated to providing training, thus making him a facilitator also). However, another 7 people (24% of the post-9/11 sample) underwent some form of training and also became jihadi fighters (examples include Omar Khadr and Saeed and Masoud Rasoul). An additional 2 people (Jahmaal James and Mohamed Hassan Hersi) attempted to go overseas for training and combat, and at least another 6 individuals (all part of the Toronto 18 group) engaged in domestic training exercises without even attempting to go overseas. These results show that overseas training and combat remain popular goals for Canadian militants, but ones that are not always fulfilled, and which may be substituted for domestic activities.

Given that terrorism is synonymous with ‘random’ acts of violence in peoples’ minds, it is perhaps surprising that only 17% (6 individuals including Ahmed Ressam and his helpers, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah and Abdel Rahman Fakhri Abou el-Ila, who was convicted in Egypt) have been directly involved in planning attacks prior to 9/11. This figure has risen to 9 individuals (31%) since then (including 4 members of the Toronto 18, Said Namouh –who was also planning an overseas suicide attack- Hiva Mohammad Alizadeh’s group, and Matin Stanikzy). Notably, all of the pre-9/11 attack plots were aimed at foreign targets, whereas 3 of the 4 (alleged) post-9/11 plots have been aimed at Canadian targets. Again, there is similarity with other Western countries where domestic Islamist terrorism plots have been uncovered since 2001, showing that militancy in Canada has followed wider trends, even if it is on a smaller scale.

Less common –or at least less clearly documented- has been fundraising on behalf of others (9% and 10% -both 3 individuals- before and after 9/11). In the past this appears to have been done more openly and seemingly on a larger scale (e.g. Ahmed Khadr giving speeches and asking people for donations) compared to small-scale funding by individuals relying on their own resources (e.g. Khawaja sending a few thousand dollars of his own money). This is consistent with reports that counter-financing efforts have been successful in reducing the flow of money to al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that terrorism-
financing is often difficult to detect and this part of the analysis in particular may fall short of providing a comprehensive snapshot of the situation in Canada. For example, the Benevolence International Fund Canada (BIF-C, established in Mississauga in 2000) was closely tied to the Benevolence International Foundation in the US, both of which had their assets frozen for suspected ties to terrorism in November 2002. More recently, the Canadian branch of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY, established in Mississauga in 1999 and active until 2005) was closely tied to BIF-C among other suspicious organisations and had its charitable status revoked for failing to comply with Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) requirements. There have not been any specific allegations of fundraising for terrorism and criminal prosecutions have not been pursued against Canadians involved in running these charities. Hence, even where such cases are suspected they may be especially difficult to prove.

Turning attention to the active promotion of jihad (essentially trying to recruit or influence others by glorifying terrorism) there was little evidence of this among Canadian militants within either cohort. In the pre-9/11 sample Ahmed Khadr was known to “praise the bravery” of mujahideen on his trips to Canada and of course raised his sons to be militants. Abderraouf Hannachi of the Kamel network has also beencredited with influencing Ressam to go overseas for training, but beyond these two borderline examples, there is no further specific information on promotional activities (distinct to simply talking about jihad amongst members of a group). Whilst it is quite possible that others in the sample (such as Fateh Kamel) were also active in promoting jihad, there is insufficient evidence to support this in the analysis. After 9/11, there have been 4 individuals that can be reliably described as promoting jihad. These are Fahim Ahmad, Said Namouh, Salman An-Noor Hossain, and Mohamed Hassan Hersi (who is also charged with counselling another person to engage in terrorism). It is significant that Namouh and Hossain were both exclusively online jihadi promoters, demonstrating the way in which the growth of the Internet has opened up new avenues of opportunity for Islamist militants (and confirming that Canadians have adopted technology in similar fashion to other Western jihadists). Perhaps even more importantly though, when we compare Canadian ‘promoters’ to others such as Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza and Abdullah el-Faisal from the UK or Anwar al-Awlaki from the US, there is a marked difference. Canada has clearly not hosted a globally renowned ideologue with established connections to bona fide militants, nor have its online jihadi promoters been as prolific or admired as the likes of Aabid Khan, Younis Tsouli or Samir Khan. This comparative absence
of highly influential individuals dedicated to propagating the ideology helps explain Canada’s relatively low rate of Islamist terrorism.

The final operational role found among Canadian militants was membership in a terrorist network where no further information was available about what exactly they did. This referred to Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, Mohamed Harkat and Mahmoud Jaballah, each of whom began their militant careers in the 1990s and were detained on security certificates. This category does not include others who were members of terrorist networks whose specific role is known and is a by-product of insufficient information. As discussed above in relation to individual classifications, these results also suggest that counter-terrorism in Canada has become more effective over the years since more recent allegations are specific and more clearly substantiated.

Regardless of role differences, Table 2 also shows that 86% (30 individuals) in the pre-9/11 category were focused exclusively overseas in terms of what they were trying to achieve, and a corresponding figure of 86% travelled overseas in furtherance of those goals. By contrast, up until the end of 2011 only 45% of post-9/11 Canadian militants (13 individuals) have been focused exclusively on overseas events while the remainder have shown at least some willingness or desire to affect change by way of domestic operations. Similarly only 41% (12 individuals) in the post-9/11 category have travelled overseas in relation to their jihadi activities. As previously discussed in relation to targets of attack, these findings resonate with the growth of ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism in the West more generally and confirm that Canada has become a legitimate target in the eyes of jihadis. At the same time, we must not ignore the fact that participation in overseas conflict remains a highly sought-after prize. Indeed, this accounts for the majority of known cases uncovered from 2012-2013.

**International Dimensions and Associations**

International connections were discussed in relation to leadership, but are dealt with here in terms of location and type of associations. All cases that began before 9/11 (and almost all individuals within those cases) had established ties to foreign militants. The majority of those ties (66% or 23 individuals) were to al-Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Af/Pak), followed by France, Egypt, Bosnia (14% or 5 individuals each) and the UK (11%, 4 individuals). Other locations included Algeria, Italy, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, the US, Chechnya, South East Asia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Lebanon and Azerbaijan. Among those beginning in the post-9/11 period 73% of cases (but only 48% of individuals) established
contact with foreign terrorists. The top location has remained the Af-Pak region, but this has reduced to 14% (4 individuals), which is equalled by Iraq. This is followed by the UK and US (both 10%, 3 individuals), Somalia (7%, 2 individuals) and Chechnya, Austria and Tunisia (each 1 individual or 3%). These figures are not the entire story, since numerous unnamed individuals thought to have gone to Somalia are not included in the sample due to lacking information, and for that reason there has likely been a more pronounced shift towards the Horn of Africa as a key location. Additional, recent cases involving Canadians who joined al-Shabaab support this assessment; however Canadian jihadis have also since joined or been in contact with militants in Mauritania, Algeria and Iran, and as many as 50 individuals are estimated to have joined the conflict in Syria. Ultimately, the current results clearly indicate a change over time, with international associations becoming less concentrated within one primary region, and more dispersed, according to changing international circumstances and individual opportunities.

Moreover, the overall quality of connections has also changed. Pre-9/11 offenders were linked to members of established foreign terrorist networks, if not identifiable organizations, who commanded considerable resources. Although individuals have still been able to make such connections (such as Imam and Yar, Faruq 'Isa and the various ‘Jihadi Fighters’), others have managed only fleeting and relatively empty connections to other aspiring militants who were not part of organizations and did not have much to offer in terms of resources. Khawaja’s British friends relied on him for technical expertise and money, and Fahim Ahmad’s connections with American and British militants did not, in the end, yield results. Even among those who have made contact with foreign terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab, there was little evidence that those individuals received the same kind of support as for example, Ressam did- at least not outside of foreign theatres of conflict. Hence, the data up to and including 2011 suggest that foreign connections are not always as meaningful as in the past, lending support to the contention that Western-based terrorists have become more (involuntarily) autonomous and more ‘amateurish’ over time. Practical restraints may have also contributed to the growing domestic focus of operations, suggesting that this may be the result of pragmatic concerns as much as ideological developments. This does not of course mean that we can rule out the possibility that individuals may still be trained up overseas and sent back to Canada to carry out attacks. Indeed, current information on the al-Qaeda-linked train derailment plot indicates that Essaghaier may have received training in Iran before returning to Montreal. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that he had been evicted from his apartment for problematic behaviour and was effectively homeless at
the time of his arrest—factors which are hardly suggestive of sophisticated training or high levels of ongoing support.162

Finally, the degree of connectivity of individuals in the sample can also be crudely measured by examining named associations, both foreign and domestic. As shown in Table 2, 71% of the pre-9/11 sample (25 individuals) had named foreign associations and 74% of them (26 individuals) had named domestic associations (i.e. connections to other Canadian-based terrorists outside their immediate case). This shows a high degree of connectivity both internationally and within the militant community of Canada. In comparison, only 34% of the post-9/11 sample (10 individuals) had named foreign associates, and only 13% (4 individuals) had named domestic associates. This suggests that we know less about the foreign connections of those who have them (as for example when individuals are absorbed into the conflict in Somalia) while on the domestic stage Islamist terrorism has become more fragmented.163

The Role of the Internet

It is now generally accepted that the Internet plays an important role in the lives of Western-based jihadis; however, analysts differ in the emphasis that they place upon this technology.164 In accordance with findings regarding radicalization, no use of the Internet could be determined for the vast majority of pre-9/11 starters, but of course many of them were operating before it was invented. Uses that were reported among the early cohort included accessing propaganda (the Jabarah brothers165), communication (Mohammed Jabarah166; Mohammed Warsame167), and fundraising (Ahmed Khadr168). Others almost certainly made use of the Internet also (for example Kassem Daher collaborated with others who raised funds online169) but it is safe to say that it has become more prominent over time.170

Information was available for 69% of the post-9/11 starters (20 individuals). The top reported uses included accessing propaganda and/or pro-jihadi forums (14 individuals or 48%), followed by communication (applying to 31% of the sample or 9 individuals), creating and distributing pro-jihadi materials (14%, 4 individuals), conducting research related to attacks (Khawaja; Amara), and making purchases for terrorist activity (again referring to Amara, who seemingly purchased IED components online171). Again, percentages are unlikely to be precise given missing information; however, the results clearly demonstrate that Canadian Islamist militants are using the Internet for a variety of purposes. More general and ‘benign’ uses, such as viewing propaganda and communicating appear to be the most
common, while the more ‘assertive’, innovative or operation-specific behaviours are somewhat rarer and depend upon the nature of the case.

**Stated Motivations**

Stated motivations, whether made in private or in public, provide an important window into the mindset of Islamist terrorists. There was not, however, a great deal of publicly available information available for many of the individuals in the sample, especially those who began offending prior to 9/11 and where media coverage has been sparse. The information that was available did not, on the whole, provide any surprising insights. Canadian jihadis, both before and after 9/11 appear to have been primarily ideologically motivated by a combination of anger at foreign policy, a religious sense of social identity along with religiously-framed justifications for violence, an altruistic desire to help fellow Muslims in conflict zones, and a desire for revenge against the perceived enemies of Islam. This motivational melting pot appears to have remained relatively stable over time, albeit with shifts in the specific locations of concern and the targets of anger. In particular, Canada itself became a legitimate target after participating in the war in Afghanistan. But interestingly (in the Toronto 18 case) venom was also directed at Canada by way of “guilt by association” because of ties with the US and because of generalized perceptions that Canada was “discriminating against Muslims”. 172

These findings demonstrate that despite the apparent fact that Canadian Muslims on the whole appear to be satisfied with their country, 173 there are of course a minority who are not. However, it is noteworthy that domestic grievances were secondary to global political issues and members of the Toronto group did not describe personal experiences of discrimination in Canada, suggesting that dissatisfaction with the domestic situation of the home country may well develop as a product of radicalization, rather than necessarily driving it. Consistent with this interpretation, there is evidence that the legitimacy of an attack in Canada needed additional justification, at least for some group members. In one recorded conversation, Stephen Chand stated that Islam did not permit an attack in Canada if a person had accepted the right to stay there, but a way around this was to leave and then re-enter without official authorization. 174 Ahmad’s response to this was that the Canadian government spied on its own citizens, and this voided any implicit covenant. 175 Thus, justification can follow on the desire to attack, rather than preceding it (in line with the idea that practical restraints may shape apparently ideologically-driven behaviour).
Briefly, there were also hints in some post-9/11 cases of additional motivations including anti-Semitism (An-Noor Hossain), financial motivations (Shareef Abdelhaleem), nationalism (Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed), and involuntary participation (Abdurahman Khadr). In line with the above discussion of ideological classification, although jihadi ideology may dominate as the primary source of explicit motivation, there is clearly room for individual idiosyncrasy.

**Analysis Part 3: Investigations and Legal Outcomes**

The final category of interest, as depicted in Table 3, relates to investigations and outcomes. Regarding investigations, information on how they were initiated was recorded, along with the primary source of evidence and the length of investigation from beginning through to arrest (excluding post-charge). As might be expected, missing information was frequent and judgements were sometimes difficult to make. Investigations sometimes seem to start out, only to be abandoned, and then re-initiated down the line. For the purposes of consistent analysis, if the individual(s) concerned were not continually a target of investigation, then the most recent ‘initiation-point’ was used. For example, in the case of Ressam, although he had previously come to the attention of Canadian investigators, he was ultimately not detected until the ‘chance’ intervention of US law enforcement (border security).^176

**Table 3.** Investigative and outcome variables in Canadian Islamist terrorism cases beginning before and after 9/11 (1980s-2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-9/11</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investigations</strong></td>
<td>22% initiated via international CT; 19% via domestic CT; Av. length 2.9 years; Primary evidence: Confessions (25%); Secret (19%); Combined evidence (19%); No reported use of informants</td>
<td>33% initiated via international CT; 20% via domestic CT; Av. length 8 months; Primary evidence: HUMINT (20%); Combined (20%); SIGINT (13%); 1 reported use of informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Of 15 individuals prosecuted; 88% convicted; 12% pleaded; Av. sentence 8.8 years; 3 life sentences; 1 sentence pending; 1 unknown</td>
<td>Of 14 individuals prosecuted; 50% convicted; 50% pleaded; Av. sentence 10.25 years; 4 life sentences</td>
</tr>
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</table>

^176 Investigations
Information on the initiation of investigations was available in 59% of cases/groups beginning prior to 9/11 (i.e. 19/32), and in 80% of cases since then (12/15). The available information indicates that among the earlier cases, 22% of investigations (7 cases) were initiated via international counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, such as the French investigation of the Kamel network, or Amer el-Maati and Amr Hamed, who were identified by documents found in Afghanistan. A further 19% of investigations (6 cases) began via domestic CT efforts, including monitoring communities and individuals (e.g. the Jabarah brothers) and numerous arrests arising from the Ressam investigation (such as Abderraouf Hannachi). The remainder of known cases were either initiated by way of overlapping law enforcement functions relating to border protection, or else were not applicable (Bilal Philips and Abdullahi Afrah were not seemingly investigated).

From what is known about post-9/11 cases until the end of 2011, there is not a huge difference, although the range of sources appears to be somewhat more diverse. International and domestic CT efforts account for 33% and 20% of cases (5 vs. 3) respectively (bearing in mind that we are focusing on cases here and not individuals; 52% of the latter have been detected via domestic CT since 9/11). Other sources include jihadi publications (Mohamed Elmi Ibrahim), domestic law enforcement (Stanikzy), and one public tip-off (Mohamed Hassan Hersi). There was no apparent investigation in the case of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed.

Note that the relatively strong international component to counter-terrorism over time should not be surprising, given continued international links and an emphasis on international CT cooperation. It is also noteworthy that within CT there appears to have been some changes. Although human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in the form of wiretaps are both continued key sources of information, online electronic SIGINT has clearly become more important over the past decade. Indeed, when discussing the importance of the Internet in relation to Islamist terrorism, it is often forgotten that it is a double-edged sword for jihadists and presents opportunities on both sides of the law in equal measure.

In terms of the length of investigations, in accordance with findings that offence periods have shortened over time, so too have investigations (see Table 3). They are also naturally shorter than offending careers, because individuals are not immediately detected.

Primary sources of evidence were identified in 78% of pre-9/11 cases and 93% of post-9/11 cases (i.e. 25 vs. 14). Among known cases beginning before 9/11, top forms of evidence included confessions (25% or 8 cases; though note these are not confessions in a
court of law); secret evidence as in security certificates (19%, or 6 cases), which, from what is known involved a combination of HUMINT and SIGINT; and combined evidence (19%) where no particular form of evidence (HUMINT/ SIGINT/ physical evidence/ surveillance/ other) could be treated as primary over and above the others. In more recent cases, the primary forms of evidence have been HUMINT (20%, 3 cases) e.g. as with Ferid Imam, identified by an American associate\textsuperscript{183}; combined evidence (20%) e.g. Khawaja\textsuperscript{184}; and SIGINT (13%, 2 cases) e.g. Faruq ‘Isa.\textsuperscript{185} In addition, while no pre-9/11 cases were reported to have involved undercover agents or informants (covert human intelligence sources/ CHIS) they formed the core of the Toronto 18 case.

Overall, these findings are congruent with results above showing a relative decrease in the number of confessions/admissions, a decline since 2003 in the use of extra-judicial sanctions, and an increase in the use of electronic SIGINT. Other than these legal and technological changes, which reflect improved CT capacities, there are no obvious systematic differences in investigations before and after 9/11.

**Legal Outcomes**

Only 46% of Canadian Islamist terrorists who began their career prior to 9/11 (16 individuals) have been prosecuted; this figure is 48% (14 individuals) among post-9/11 offenders, although a further 31% (9 individuals) have been charged, with outcomes pending. These figures are in accordance with the individual classifications (see above).

For those who were prosecuted, 88% of pre-9/11 starters (14 individuals) were convicted, with 12% guilty pleas; the average sentence was 8.8 years; 3 individuals received life sentences (in Libya, Algeria and the US); at the time the analysis was conducted, for 1 individual (Ressam) sentencing was still pending after his original sentence was deemed inappropriate (since then he has been sentenced to 37 years\textsuperscript{186}); 1 individual’s sentence (Abdelmajid Dahoumane) is unknown; 1 person (Mustapha Labsi) has been convicted twice, once in France and once in Algeria;\textsuperscript{187} and another, Adel Boumezbeur, was due to stand trial in Algeria after being convicted in France, although the outcome is unknown.\textsuperscript{188} For those prosecuted who began offending in the post-9/11 era, 50% (7 individuals) were convicted and 50% pleaded guilty. At first glance this would seem to contradict the above contention that there has been a decrease in ‘confessions’ as evidence, however, the earlier admissions often occurred under interrogation or other circumstances, often in cases that did not go to trial, and more recent confessions were often in the face of overwhelming evidence. After 9/11 the average sentence has increased to 10.25 years, and 4 individuals have been given life...
sentences (all in Canada), though as in the UK they are still eligible for parole following minimum terms.

Taken together, it is clear that Canadian Islamist terrorists are far more likely to be prosecuted (and to be prosecuted in Canada); they are more likely to plead guilty; and they are more likely to receive a longer sentence.

**Summary and Conclusions**

Since the 1980s there has been a steady rate of individuals becoming involved in Islamist terrorism in Canada. Over time, it has become more likely for these offenders to be prosecuted in Canada. There has also been a geographic shift in Canadian networks as Montreal has diminished in significance as compared to Toronto, with isolated cases cropping up in areas outside of major urban areas.

All confirmed Canadian jihadis have been males, although there have been signs more recently that females are getting involved as well. The average age remains in the 20s, although this has reduced from the late to mid-range, consistent with more proactive CT. Illegal entry into Canada has apparently ceased to become a factor and, over time, more Islamist militants have been born and/or raised there. Ethnic heritage has become less dominated by North Africans, and more diverse, seemingly related to geo-political changes worldwide.

The picture regarding educational attainment is unclear, however it seems as if most individuals in the sample had at least basic high school education and a small minority continue to achieve university qualifications. However, in terms of occupation, there appears to have been a slight overall decline, possibly related to age. There is little information about prior religious practice, but generally this seems to increase as part of the radicalization process (albeit with a narrow focus). Marriage remains common. Most Canadian jihadis do not seem to have a previous criminal record (and therefore have not radicalized in prison) although there have been a few cases that demonstrate a willingness to commit crime in order help finance terrorist operations or acquire materiel. Canadian involvement in Islamist terrorism cannot be explained by mental illness.

There is an overall disappointing lack of reliable information relating to individual processes of radicalization, although the Internet has clearly become more pervasive over time. There are few indications that individuals have radicalized entirely online, rather absorption of online propaganda tends to supplement and invigorate face-to-face interactions. Ideologically, the vast majority of individuals over time can be classed as ‘Jihadis’, with a

S. Mullins 2012
minority who are ‘Hardcore’. There are also a handful of ideological outliers motivated by non-ideological and sometimes personal factors.

Individuals in the sample were often part of relatively small groups, often with some form of external links. Leadership can best be described as collaborative, however it clearly varies by context and recent cases indicate a willingness to proceed with terrorist operations in the absence of any external support. Individual offending careers have become shorter in recent years, again consistent with more vigilant and effective CT.

A large proportion of individuals in the sample, before and after 9/11, have been involved in facilitating terrorism. Overseas training and combat have also remained popular, although some individuals have been willing to train at home rather than attempt international travel. More individuals over time have become involved in planning to conduct terrorist attacks, and there has been a clear trend indicating that domestic attacks in Canada are now deemed viable, even though numbers are low. Fundraising activities have become less visible and apparently smaller-scale. There have been more examples of overt promotion of jihadi ideology, notably online, but it is apparent that Canada has lacked a truly influential jihadi ideologue either before or after 9/11. Across different types of activity there has been a substantial decrease in the proportion of individuals who are focused only on overseas events and a corresponding decrease in international travel. This is indicative of a growing willingness to conduct domestic operations.

There has been a reduction in international links and there has been change in the location of those links—becoming more diverse and less dominated by any single global hotspot. Unconfirmed information indicates that Somalia—and now Syria—have become more prominent than current, reliable data suggest. While the nature of overseas connections may have become more limited (with less support apparently being provided outside of conflict zones) foreign ‘sponsorship’ for attacks launched within or from Canada cannot be ruled out. Meanwhile on the domestic stage, Canadian Islamist terrorism networks have become more fragmented.

The Internet has become more prominent over time in the lives of jihadis. Available information suggests that the most common uses in Canada are accessing propaganda, communication, disseminating material, and researching attacks.

Motives have, on the whole, stayed quite stable over time, primarily revolving around intermingled themes of foreign policy, religion, altruism and revenge. Canada itself appears to be targeted mostly for its support of the war in Afghanistan, but there are signs that jihadis
harbour generalized domestic grievances also. A minority of individuals are motivated by personal or idiosyncratic concerns.

Relating to investigations, there continues to be a combination of domestic and international CT efforts, and the average length of investigation appears to have reduced, in accordance with shorter offence periods. There have been no clear changes in the type of evidence that is used, except for the growth in electronic SIGINT, reflecting advances in technology. Finally, in terms of outcomes, Canadian Islamist militants are more likely to be prosecuted, more likely to be prosecuted in Canada, and to receive longer sentences.

When viewed as a whole, the background variables, operational behaviours and investigations and outcomes clearly demonstrate the ‘home-grown’ nature of Canadian Islamist terrorism. In all three areas, the Canadian homeland has taken on greater significance and changes that have occurred are generally in accordance with existing analyses of home-grown Islamist terrorism in the West (thus lending a degree of support to these conclusions). In particular, the increase in individuals born and/or raised in Canada, the growing domestic focus of operations, and the apparently more limited nature of overseas support for those based in Canada, are significant in this regard. The domestic situation is still shaped by the global context and international links have far from disappeared, but foreign support outside of conflict zones, on the whole, is less substantial than in the past. This is consistent with a reduced threat in terms of likely capacity to perpetrate large-scale, sophisticated attacks, whilst at the same time there has evidently been an increase in Canadian counter-terrorism capabilities. This must of course be viewed in the context of an increased likelihood of domestic attack, regardless of magnitude, and an ever more diverse threat (reflected, for example, in ethnic backgrounds and geographic location of cases). Moreover, given the documented similarities to other Western nations thus far, Canada must be prepared for further challenging developments that have been observed elsewhere, especially so-called ‘lone-wolf’ terrorists and ‘active shooter’ scenarios, which may be especially difficult to detect in advance.

Having pointed out a number of similarities between the Canadian experience of jihadi terrorism and that of similar countries, it is also important to address differences. Of primary significance here are rates of terrorism Although complete, directly comparable datasets are yet to emerge, available information suggests that the rate of Islamist terrorism cases in Canada is not only low in absolute terms, but is also among the lowest in the West, relative to its Muslim population size. In the past, scholars have explained this as part of a more general difference between North America and Europe whereby the former has been
viewed as partially inoculated against ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism due to the more successful integration of Muslim immigrants.\textsuperscript{193} The above discussion of motivations established that domestic grievances may still play a role, and Canada has not been without its controversies relating to the ‘War on Terror’. The use of security certificates, Canadians tortured abroad and the case of Omar Khadr in particular have caused outcry. Yet Muslims report relatively high levels of satisfaction with life in Canada\textsuperscript{194} and this may well have militated against broadly experienced frustrations that might find expression in acts of terrorism. The ‘immigration-integration hypothesis’ thus contributes to understanding of pre-disposing risk, but it does not by itself offer a compelling, comprehensive explanation of differential rates of terrorism. Rather, it seems that a number of factors have combined to afford Canada a degree of ‘protection’.\textsuperscript{195}

In addition to a seemingly successful approach to Muslim immigration, Canada has been fortunate not to play host to more significant jihadi ideologues. Ostensibly non-violent anti-democratic Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir have also been lacking\textsuperscript{196} (and recent activity appears to have been minimal). Moreover, Canada was fortunate to have had an early ‘wake-up call’ with the arrest of Ressam since this led to dismantling of a significant proportion of existing networks. Canada also, perhaps wisely, stayed out of the Iraq war, avoiding what became the ‘icing on the cake’ for justifying domestic attacks as far as militants elsewhere in the West have been concerned.\textsuperscript{197} Given that anger at Western foreign policy has been a key driver of Islamist militancy, and that the necessary conditions for involvement in the ‘Global Salafi jihad’ are a combination of ideological and social exposure,\textsuperscript{198} it is evident that these critical, direct motivators have also been comparatively lacking in Canada.

Of course it should not be assumed that the situation cannot change. This study has clearly established that Canada has become a target regardless of ‘protective’ factors and it can be reasonably assumed that this trend will continue. Furthermore, with rapid growth expected in the Muslim population,\textsuperscript{199} combined with erratic global developments the situation in the future is difficult to predict.

The Canadian security apparatus has successfully contained the threat so far and RCMP, CSIS and other policing agencies have also undertaken encouraging community engagement exercises (some directly related to CT, others much less so).\textsuperscript{200} The Canadian government furthermore recently unfurled its national counter-terrorism strategy, including plans to expand ‘soft’ CT measures.\textsuperscript{201} The Canadian strategy follows a similar format to those of the UK and Australia, identifying four main strands for countering terrorism
revolving around proactive investigation (‘Detect’), target hardening (‘Deny’), contingency planning (‘Respond’) and building community resilience against extremist ideologies (‘Prevent’). The latter element entails countering violent extremism (CVE) by way of community partnerships and represents the most novel development, although similar measures are in place already in the UK and Australia, and the US unveiled a strategic implementation plan for CVE last year. This marks a significant development in Canada. Members of the Somali community in Ottawa have held at least one conference aimed at discussing ways to combat radicalization of Somali youth, and there are a handful of figures in the community in the Toronto area who previously developed their own approaches to countering radicalization. But such ‘grassroots’ efforts have not so far received support from the Canadian government and until the release of the new CT strategy paper there were few signs that Ottawa was considering investing in counter-radicalization (either in communities or within prisons for convicted terrorists) as part of a more comprehensive CT strategy.

In light of the continuation of the threat, the potential for localised militant ‘hotspots’ to persist over time and the clearly more developed domestic component as suggested in the current report, plans for CVE within Canada appear well-founded. But while there are grounds for cautious optimism, it is worth noting that CVE in the UK has been fraught with difficulties centred around choosing appropriate community partners and implementing programs in such a way as to avoid inadvertently stigmatizing the very communities which are meant to be engaged and strengthened. The road ahead for Canada thus remains potentially rocky and will depend upon a number of factors including consistent, clear guidelines for community engagement, identifiable goals, and an ongoing commitment to evaluation of interventions.

It is beyond the scope of the current paper to delve further into Canadian CT; however, a first step for effectively countering any threat is to understand it. This research serves as a starting point on which further studies can build and add to what we know about Islamist terrorism in the Canadian context.
Appendix A: Included Cases
Cases included in the analysis are listed in chronological order according to when they began. Case numbers are followed by individual names, brief case description, known offence period, and classification (basis for inclusion).

Pre-9/11


23. **Ahmed Ressam, Abdelmajid Dahoumane, Mokhtar Haouari, Samir Ait Mohamed.** Montreal jihadi network; Millennium bomb plot. Active 1998-1999. 3x Overseas convictions (US/ Algeria), 1x Legal allegations (US)/ Extra-judicial sanctions.


**Post-9/11**

40. **Ferid Ahmed Imam and Maiwand Yar.** AQ trainers. Active 2006… Legal allegations (Canada/ US).
41. **Salman An-Noor Hossain.** Ran extremist website. Active 2007… Legal allegations (non-terror).
45. **Mohammed Elmi Ibrahim.** Fought for al-Shabaab. Active 2009-2010. KIA (Somalia).
46. **Matin Abdul Stanikzy.** Alleged plot to bomb Canadian military base. Active …2010. Legal allegations.
47. **Mohamed Hassan Hersi.** Alleged attempt to join al-Shabaab. Active 2010-2011. Legal allegations.

**Appendix B. Excluded cases**

Notable excluded cases are listed in chronological order according to alleged activities or dates of allegations, followed by reason for exclusion.

1. **Ahmed al-Kaysee.** Alleged Afghan war veteran. 1980s/90s. Insufficient information.

   Unconfirmed.


   Included in US sample (never offended in Canada).


32. Khalid Aden Noor, Mustafa Ali, Ahmed Heybe Ahmed, Abdirahman Yusuf, Mustafa Mohamed, Mohamed Abscir and Mohamed Ali Gacal. ‘Somali 6’- possible associates of Mohamed Elmi Ibrahim. 2009. Unconfirmed. Note- Mahad Ali Dhore was also originally excluded from the sample, however it has since been reported that he was killed whilst taking part in an al-Shabaab terrorist attack in Mogadishu in April 2013.


   Unconfirmed.
Notes


4 Ross, “Attributes of Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada, 1960-1985”.


8 Ross, “Attributes of Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada, 1960-1985”.


12 See Bell, *Cold Terror*.


15 Bell, *Cold Terror*, 174-177, 188; Shephard, *Guantanamo’s Child*, 28-34.


20 Bell, *Cold Terror*, 205.


27 It is, however, prudent to note that Canadian counter-terrorism policy does not simply mimic that of the US, and there is divergence between them also (see Veronica Kitchen and Karthika Sasikumar, “Canada (En)Counters Terrorism: U.S.-Canada Relations and Counter-Terrorism Policy” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21, no.1 (2009) 155-173; Reg Whitaker, “Keeping up with the Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 9/11 in Historical and Comparative Context” *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*, 41, nos. 2-3 (2003) 241-265).


53 Note that Essaghaier et al are not included in the current sample as this study was completed in early 2012.


57 Note that Hamas and other Palestinian groups are excluded because there is little evidence of a global jihad agenda, and Hezbollah is excluded as a Shia organization.


59 See http://can-bridge.com/about.html.

60 See http://alsunnahfoundation.org/Programs2a.html.


63 These are: a) Mahad Ali Dhore—part of the so-called “Somali-6.” Dhore left Canada in 2009 but was originally excluded from the sample due to lacking information. He has since reportedly been killed taking part in a terrorist attack in Mogadishu in April 2013; b) Fadumo Jama (female)—allegedly an al-Shabaab facilitator in Somalia; c) William Plotnikov—killed in Dagestan in July 2012; d) Xristos Katsiarobus, Ali Medlej, and Aaron Yoon—Katsiarobus and Medlej took part, and were killed, in the siege of an Algerian gas plant in January 2013. Yoon was part of the group but was arrested in Mauritania in December 2011. A suspected fourth member of the group, Mujahid Enderi, is unaccounted for; e) In March 2013 an unnamed male from Quebec was reported to have joined the conflict in Syria; f) Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, arrested in April 2013, stand accused of plotting to attack a passenger train in a plot allegedly directed by al-Qaeda in Iran. Esseghaier’s alleged recruiter, Ahmed Abassi, was arrested in New York but was previously living in Canada; g) an unnamed Canadian reportedly killed in Syria in May 2013; h) “Abu Muslim,” a Canadian convert who was revealed to be fighting in Syria; i) John Nuttall and Amanda Karody, who were arrested in July 2013 in Abbotsford, BC, on suspicion of planning domestic attacks; j) Mohammed Ali Dirie, who was previously convicted for his role in the Toronto 18 case and was reportedly killed fighting in Syria in September 2013.
See Kitchen and Sasikumar, “Canada (En)Counters Terrorism” 159.


This includes 17 convictions (1 person convicted on 2 separate occasions), of which 10 occurred prior to 9/11.


More recent cases also support this analysis. Only 1 out of 9 individuals involved in Islamist terrorism between 2012 and mid-2013 was living in Montreal (and 1 other in Quebec City) while the rest were from Toronto. However, it is worth noting that other residents of Quebec are also under suspicion and in March 2013 a Montreal imam stated that he was seeing more and more young people participating in “radical discourse” (“Quebec Mother of Terror Suspect Warns Other Parents” *CBC News*, March 4, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2013/03/04/quebec-homegrown-terrorist-csis-spy-intelligence-syria-islam-muslim.html. Accessed March 5, 2013.

Additional, more recent locations have included Sherbrooke and Quebec City, QC.


88 Bartlett, Birdwell and King, The Edge of Violence.
89 E.g. Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe; Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks; Zammit, Who Becomes a Jihadist in Australia?
95 Interview with Mubin Shaikh, undercover operative in the Toronto 18 case.
96 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 63.
102 A possible exception here is Yogakrishnan, who, although a minor, was described by Ahmad as “addicted” to shoplifting (R. v. N.Y., ¶ 60).
103 An apparent recent example of this is Raed Jaser, arrested in April 2013 in relation to the alleged al-Qaeda-driven plot to derail a passenger train going from Toronto to New York. He is known to have a significant criminal record, in particular relating to fraud; however these offences occurred several years previously and there are no indications at present that they are related to his involvement in terrorism (“Record of a Detention Review under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Concerning Raed Jaser” Immigration and Refugee Board, Toronto West Detention Centre, April 25, 2004, http://www.scribd.com/doc/137969135/Toronto-Terror-suspect-Raed-Jaser-refugee-document#download. Accessed May 19, 2013.
104 Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe; Mullins, A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad; Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks.
105 Teotonio, “The Toronto 18”.
107 Note that radicalization does not inevitably lead to terrorism. Perhaps thousands of people are radicalized in terms of their beliefs but never act in support of terrorism.
S. Mullins 2012


110 Interview with Mubin Shaikh, undercover operative in the Toronto 18 case.


115 United States v. Faruq Khalil Muhammad ‘Isa, Complaint. 


119 Mullins, A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK.

120 Chase, “Army Base Bomb Plot Suspect Denied Bail”.

121 United States v. Faruq Khalil Muhammad ‘Isa, Complaint.


123 Mullins, A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK.


146 “Quebec Mother of Terror Suspect Warns Other Parents”.


152 See Bell, Cold Terror, 140.

153 “RCMP Arrests Individual for Terrorism-Related Offences”.

154 As noted above, additional cases of Canadians planning or taking part in terrorist attacks have since emerged, including two successful attacks overseas (in Somalia and Algeria) and one foiled plot to attack a train travelling between Canada and the US. These more recent cases demonstrate that the desire to take part in terrorism overseas is still strong.


157 “Quebec Mother of Terror Suspect Warns Other Parents”.

158 “RCMP Arrests Individual for Terrorism-Related Offences”.

159 “RCMP Arrests Individual for Terrorism-Related Offences”.

160 “RCMP Arrests Individual for Terrorism-Related Offences”.

161 “RCMP Arrests Individual for Terrorism-Related Offences”.

162 “RCMP Arrests Individual for Terrorism-Related Offences”.

163 “RCMP Arrests Individual for Terrorism-Related Offences”.
Recent cases generally support this assessment.


Bell, The Martyr’s Oath, 41-43.

Bell, The Martyr’s Oath.


Bell, Cold Terror, 187.


Note that this has not gone unnoticed. See, for example, Youth Online and At Risk: Radicalization Facilitated by the Internet (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2011) http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/rad/rad-eng.htm. Accessed December 20, 2011.

R. v. N.Y., ¶ 73-76.

Interview with Mubin Shaikh, undercover operative in the Toronto 18 case.

Focus Canada.

R. v. N.Y., ¶ 79.

Ibid; Note that in this document Chand and Ahmad are referred to as ‘ZZ’ and ‘UU’ respectively. Their identities are inferred from what is known about the case.

In Ressam’s case the investigation was classed as having been initiated by routine international (US) law enforcement. The length of the investigation, however, was classed as unknown because of previous, unclear investigative activities relating to information provided by the French.


Bell, The Martyr’s Oath, 94-96.


R. v. Mohammad Momin Khawaja.

United States v. Faruq Khalil Muhammad ‘Isa.

189 Note that details of investigations in particular require additional study, including input from CT authorities.
190 E.g. Bakker, Jihadist Terrorists in Europe; Manni Crone and Martin Harrow, “Homegrown Terrorism in the West” Terrorism and Political Violence, 23 (4) (2011) 521-536; Mullins, A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008; Mullins, “Islamist Terrorism and Australia”; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad,
191 In this regard, it is important to note that despite the alleged involvement of al-Qaeda in the train derailment plot, the attacks itself was not imminent, and the capabilities of Esseghaier and Jaser are questionable.
192 Mullins, Home-Grown Islamist Terrorism: The US, UK and Australia.
194 Focus Canada.
195 The following discussion was informed via interviews with Michael King, Michelle Shephard, Isabel Teotonio and others.
199 Note that less than 1% of the Muslim population actively supports terrorism. From a statistical point of view, a growth in the population necessarily means that this minority proportion potentially represents a larger number of people.
201 Building Resilience Against Terrorism.
204 Interview with Michael King.
205 Notable individuals include Muhammad Robert Heft. Sayyid Ahmed Amiruddin and Mohammed Shaikh.