Islamist terrorism and Australia: an empirical examination of the "home-grown" threat

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Terrorism and Australia: An Empirical Examination of the ‘Home-Grown’ Threat

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Keywords: Islamist, home-grown, terrorism, Australia

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Introduction

As with most countries, terrorism was far less of a concern for the Australian government prior to 2001 than it is today. Australians were not considered a target for terrorists overseas, and domestic acts of terrorism were generally aimed at officials of other countries, including Turkey, Iran, India and Israel. Yet Australia was not immune to the insidious spread of violent Islamist networks, which expanded around the globe during the 1980’s and ’90’s, and as an ally of the United States and key player in South East Asia it was swiftly identified as a legitimate focus for attacks. As in most Western countries a small number of Australian citizens became actively involved with Islamist extremists almost as soon as they came to their shores. A handful of these young men subsequently left to undertake paramilitary-style training at camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir at the turn of the millennium. Since then -and again paralleling developments elsewhere in the West- so-called ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism (HGIT) has gradually emerged as a primary concern for Australian authorities.

The current article details Australia’s involvement in the ever-evolving violent Islamist movement via a statistical analysis of Islamist terrorism cases from the late 1980’s up until 2010. Working definitions are outlined, followed by a brief account of the Australian context and how Australia emerged as a target for Islamist extremists. The methodology for this study is then described prior to the statistical analysis of key variables. Summaries of the 16 cases included in the analysis (and 9 cases excluded) are provided at the end of the article in chronological order. On the whole –and in line with previous research by Lentini and others- it is found that whilst the Australian context is quite unique, quantitatively speaking and in terms of precise qualitative features (e.g. ethnic backgrounds), overall patterns in terrorist activity are comparable to other Western countries.
Defining the Threat: Home-Grown Islamist Terrorism

A major component of the contemporary security threat in Western countries is understood to be ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism, yet as with terrorism in general, a universally accepted definition of this term remains elusive. Islamist terrorists are by no means a homogenous group, although they share 3 core beliefs: 1) that Islam is under attack from the West, 2) that the world is divided into true Muslims versus infidels, and 3) that jihad is necessary violence against the oppressors of Islam. Key (assumed) features of specifically home-grown Islamist terrorism include: 1) that those responsible are long-term residents, if not citizens, of the country that they are operating in, 2) that they have radicalised in the West, and 3) that they are acting autonomously, with insubstantial ties to any (foreign) terrorist organisation.

In reality there is a great deal of variation in the characteristics of groups and individuals who become involved in this particular brand of violence, and there is not always a clear distinction between ‘home-grown’ and ‘international’/‘imported’ terrorism. Thus, rather than adopting a more or less exclusive analytical framework as a result of rigid definitions, it is prudent to examine the range of Islamist terrorist activity over time in any given context. There has been a general shift in Islamist militancy in Western countries, from being an imported and externally-focussed phenomenon, to being one that is endogenous and also aimed at perpetrating violence domestically. In order to understand how that shift has occurred and how contemporary HGIT is manifest in any given country, it is necessary to conduct an inclusive historical analysis.

It is thus somewhat redundant to dwell on how HGIT is defined, and more useful to simply ask ‘how has Islamist terrorism developed, and how is it manifest today, in this particular country?’ This can be answered by examining the growth of militant Islamist networks and the involvement of citizens and residents of a given country in Islamist terrorist
activity both at home and abroad (since decisions to fight abroad often begin at home). In this way the present article seeks to clarify our understanding of the relationship between Islamist terrorism and Australia.

The Australian Context

Analysts have previously drawn attention to comparatively disadvantaged economic and social conditions of Muslim diaspora communities as relevant to understanding potential grievances and therefore predisposing susceptibility to radicalisation. In 2006 the Australian population stood at 20.7 million people, around a quarter of whom were born overseas. The Muslim population was estimated at 340,393 (62% of whom were born overseas), constituting almost 2% of the overall population. Muslims in Australia are located mainly in Sydney and Melbourne and are ethnically diverse— in 2006 the main country of birth after Australia was Lebanon, representing 8.9% of the Muslim population, followed by Turkey (6.8%) and Afghanistan (4.7%). Despite this diversity it has been reported that overall Australian Muslims are “[a]ffected by a multiplicity of poor social and economic conditions, [leading them to] find a sense of belonging and self-worth within their own communities.”

In accordance with frustration-aggression explanations of terrorism, this implies that there is ample reason for grievances against Australia and thereby increased likelihood of susceptibility to radicalisation and violence. Nevertheless, rates of Islamist terrorist activity in Australia have been relatively low and it is simplistic to rely on explanations that focus solely on socioeconomic conditions and demographic variables. Of course foreign policy is also relevant, especially military support for US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia was quick to support the invasion of Iraq beginning in March 2003, maintaining combat troops there until June 2008, and as of November 2009 had 1,500 troops in Afghanistan, the largest contribution outside of Nato. However, while such factors undoubtedly contribute to
understanding the Australian relationship with Islamist terrorism, there are many more details to consider. In particular it is important to examine the historical development of Islamist militancy in Australia over time, and to analyse the activities of individual terrorist ‘entrepreneurs’ who are likely to be crucial to the occurrence of terrorism.15

Australia as a Target for Islamist Militants

Australia was first named as a legitimate target for attack by Osama bin Laden on November 3rd, 2001 and was referred to at least another five times by bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri over the next three years.16 Australian intervention in East Timor, beginning in 1999, was framed by Islamist extremists as an attack on Muslims17 and its negative image in their eyes predictably worsened as a result of collaborating in the United States’ ‘War on Terror.’ The presence of Australian troops in Afghanistan from 2001 and Iraq from 2003 thus solidified the perception of Australia as an ‘enemy of Islam.’18 Accordingly, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) observed that “[i]n the years from 2000 to 2005 inclusive, there [was] at least one aborted, disrupted or actual terrorist attack against [Australian interests] each year.”19

Of the successful attacks, 10 Australian citizens perished in the September 11th, 2001, attacks in the US and there were 88 Australians among the 202 killed in the Bali bombings of October 12, 2002.20 Another 3 were killed in separate incidents in Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 2003 and 200421 followed by the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta on September 9, 2004, which killed 11 Indonesians.22 4 more Australians were killed in the second Bali bombings of October 1st, 2005, 2 died in the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai,23 and another 3 were killed on July 17th, 2009, when the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta were hit by suicide bombers.24 The rationale for such attacks was made most explicit
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in a web-posting claiming responsibility for the 2004 embassy bombing where it was declared that:

"We, the Jemaah Islamiyah in East Asia, have sent messages to the Christian government in Australia but it did not respond to us or to our call, yet still the Australian Government took part in the war against our brethren in Iraq and supported the invading forces. We have decided to bring Australia, which is considered one of the most vehement enemies of God and the religion of Islam, to account...this is only the first of many replies that are coming, God willing, which is why we advise all Australians in Indonesia to leave or else we will make it their graveyard. We also advise the Australian Government to withdraw its forces from Iraq, and if our demands are not met, we will direct many painful strikes against them, God willing...Our raids will not stop and our jihad will go on until the liberation of the lands of Muslims."\(^\text{25}\)

It is notable that this was the only concrete attack aimed exclusively at an Australian target, whereas in most cases Australians have suffered as part of a strategy to attack symbols of the West more generally in South East Asia. In other instances (such as the plot to attack the Australian High Commission in Singapore, disrupted in 2001,\(^\text{26}\) and the alleged plot to attack the Australian embassy in Bangkok in 2003\(^\text{27}\)) numerous other Western targets were given equal, if not greater consideration.

Meanwhile, on the domestic stage Islamist extremists initially considered attacking Israeli and American interests and/or assassinating a prominent Melbourne-based Jewish businessman in 2000 in a plot involving Australian Jack Roche that was ultimately abandoned.\(^\text{28}\) Indications that Australia itself was being targeted at home surfaced in 2003 when French authorities alerted their counterparts to the presence of Willie Brigitte in
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Sydney. Brigitte had received paramilitary training from Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) and was being assisted by Australian citizens in researching possible attacks against the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor and military bases\(^{29}\) (see below).

There were approximately 70 other ongoing terrorism investigations during 2003\(^{30}\) and since then a small number of Australians actively involved in Islamist terrorism both at home and abroad have surfaced almost every year. It is of particular concern that there is a demonstrable and persistent desire amongst a minority of Australian residents to carry out terrorist attacks against their home country, as evidenced most clearly in the Operation Pendennis raids in Melbourne and Sydney in November 2005, and confirmed by the Operation Neath arrests in Melbourne in August 2009 (resulting in three convictions in December 2010). In a general sense, the emergent trend in Australia thus parallels developments elsewhere in the Western world since the invasion of Iraq, with an increasing range of countries having to deal with Islamist extremists, often long-term residents and citizens, seeking to perpetrate acts of violence and destruction in response to perceived injustices against Muslims.\(^{31}\) Greater understanding of the unique relationship between Australia and the ever-evolving global *jihadi* movement will be achieved via systematic examination of events.

**Methodology**

This study involves a statistical analysis of all cases of alleged Islamist terrorist activity, which adhere to the sampling criteria, involving Australian residents and citizens at home and abroad. It relies exclusively on open source materials. Firstly, an exhaustive search of press reports and online sources was conducted in order to identify all cases where terrorist involvement had been alleged. As much detail as possible was then collected for each case, relying primarily on online newspaper articles, and in some instances legal documents and
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other ‘official’ reports. A detailed chronological account of each case was constructed and
details were entered into a database using Excel. A decision was then made whether or not to
include each case in the analysis (see below for brief case synopses).

To be included in the sample, cases had to involve individuals who espoused rhetoric
or justification for their actions in terms of Sunni Islamist, jihadi ideology and were involved
in one or more related activities including: 1) Promoting jihadi ideology, 2) Recruiting others
to the jihad, 3) Engaging in paramilitary-style terrorist training, 4) Planning acts of violence
in furtherance of jihad. Individuals do not have to have been convicted of any terrorism
offence to be included in the analysis, nor do they have to have been part of any identifiable
terrorist organisation. However, the allegations against them must have resulted in criminal
charges being filed and/or have been consistently reported up until the time of writing with a
level of detail that leaves little doubt that the individuals in question did in fact carry out the
alleged behaviour. So, for example, although charges against Izhar Ul-Haque (see below)
were dropped, this was because evidence was deemed inadmissible due to the conduct of
ASIO officers rather than because the fact that he trained with LeT in Pakistan was called
into question.32 His actions thus remain relevant for understanding Islamist militancy in
Australia.

Non-Sunni Islamist cases were excluded as were those where charges were dropped
or individuals were found not guilty because allegations were not supported by the available
evidence (as opposed to being for technical/legal reasons). This applies to Mamdouh Habib;
Hany Taha, Bassam Raad, Majed Raad and Shoue Hammoud; Hassan Kalache and Jill
Courtney; John Amundsen; Warye Kanie; Muhammad and Abdullah Ayub; Ahmed Elomar,
Muhammad Basal, Hussein Elomar and Bassam El Sayed; Mohamed Haneef; Yacqub
Khayre and Abdirahman Mohamud Ahmed. One other individual (Muhamed Mubayyid) was
excluded because the crimes he was convicted of—tax fraud—do not shed any real light on the
nature of his personal involvement in violent Islamism; similarly, six others were excluded because sufficient information was lacking to be able to confirm their involvement in terrorism (namely, Abdul Zoud, Matthew Stewart, Marat Sumolsky, Ibrahim Sabouh; Walid Osman Mohamed and Hussein Hashi Hemed Farah).

Included cases were analysed according to variables identified as relevant from reviews of the literature on home-grown terrorism. These included demographic variables, presence of leadership within groups, foreign organisational contact, domestic vs. overseas focus of activities, the invasion of Iraq as a significant point in time, and legal outcomes of cases.

Despite the potential utility of this approach, limitations must also be acknowledged. The present study is based on open-source information that is varying in reliability and often lacking in detail. Aside from the methodological problems this creates (meaning that the conclusions drawn here are necessarily tentative) it means that the overall picture is skewed according to which cases present more data. Nevertheless, terrorism researchers routinely rely on open-source material, and previous studies utilising similar data have shed light on the demographic background and processes of radicalisation of convicted Islamist terrorists in Australia and elsewhere.

Only the tip (and most extreme point) of the iceberg of Islamist activity within Australia has been covered here; however this is an initial step towards more thorough research, which will require more in-depth examination of particular social contexts and communities. Finally it must be re-emphasised that the aim of this study has been to cover all cases of alleged participation in Islamist terrorist activities involving Australians and people living in Australia. The subsequent report should be treated as an analysis of publicly available information and has no bearing on legal judgements as to the guilt or innocence of named individuals.
Statistical Analysis

In all there have been 25 publicised cases of suspected Islamist terrorist activity involving Australians (totalling 61 individuals).\(^{36}\) 25 individuals (see above) were removed from the analysis as the original allegations against them have been disproven or cannot be confirmed with any certainty.


Table 1: Age, group size and nationality of Australian Islamist terrorists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average age*</th>
<th>% Australian citizens</th>
<th>% Dual nationals**</th>
<th>% Born in Australia</th>
<th>Average group size***</th>
<th>% 'individual' cases part of wider network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28-29</td>
<td>94% (34/36 individuals)</td>
<td>86% (31/35 individuals)</td>
<td>57% (19/33 individuals)</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Around time of known first involvement relating to offence and at time of arrest. (n=40).
**Non-Australian heritage.
***Greatly underestimated since most ‘individual’ cases were part of much larger networks.

Table 1 shows that the average age of individuals (rounded to the nearest whole number) around the first known time that they began to actively pursue or promote violent
*jihad* was 28 years old and at the time of arrest was 29. 65% were aged 30 or under at the time of arrest, the youngest was aged 20 and the oldest was 47. By comparison Sageman reported an average age for those ‘joining the *jihad*’ of 25.7 years based on a global sample of 172 individuals, and Bakker reported an average age of 27.3 at the time of arrest based on a European sample of more than 200.\(^{37}\) The Australian average arrest-age of 29 is thus slightly higher than these previous studies (thus confirming Lentini’s findings using a smaller sample\(^{38}\)).

More recently Sageman has suggested that the average age of *jihadi* recruits in Europe and Canada has “dramatically decreased” down to about 20 years old (based on a sample of those detained since 2006).\(^{39}\) He divides the global Islamist movement into three waves: those who joined in the 1980’s and fought the Soviets in Afghanistan; those who joined in the 1990’s; and those who became involved after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.\(^{40}\) Studies of *jihadis* in Denmark and the Netherlands support Sageman’s claim that recruits are getting younger, a trend which appears to be facilitated by the growing accessibility of violent Islamist messages on the Internet.\(^{41}\) By dividing the Australian sample according to whether individuals became active in the pre- vs. post-Iraq era (defined here as prior to 2003 and 2003 onwards), the respective average ages at the time of arrest are 31 and 29. Hence the slightly higher average age of Australian *jihadis* is maintained, although there is some indication that this is decreasing in absolute terms, thus showing conformity to global trends.

Table 1 also shows that 94% of the sample are Australian citizens, 86% are of non-Australian heritage (more than half being Lebanese) and 57% of individuals for whom data is available were born in Australia. The majority had also lived in Australia for more than 10 years prior to taking part in terror-related activity. This is in accordance with observations that contemporary Islamist terrorists in the West tend to be citizens and long-term residents of Western countries. Hence Silber and Bhatt describe typical *jihadis* as being male Muslims.
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-aged under 35, often second or third generation immigrants and of unremarkable background.\textsuperscript{42}

An analysis of Leiken and Brooke’s dataset of 373 Islamist terrorists shows that 18% were Western-born from 1990-2001, compared to 24% from 2002 to 2004, illustrating an increase in the numbers of ‘home-grown’ terrorists over time.\textsuperscript{43} Again dividing the current sample into pre- vs. post-Iraq cases further reveals that 36% (4/11) of pre-Iraq individuals were Australian-born compared to 72% (16/22) of post-Iraq individuals for whom there is data. While the exact percentages may be skewed by the low numbers involved, clearly more people born in Australia have become involved in Islamist terrorism over time.

Additional demographic information would preferably be included here also, such as religious background, educational achievement, occupation, marital status, criminal record and any history of mental illness, which are addressed by both Sageman\textsuperscript{44} and Bakker\textsuperscript{45} (two of the most comprehensive empirical studies of Islamist militants). Unfortunately there is insufficient information available at present to give an accurate portrayal of these variables in the current sample. Of 38 individuals, 5 (12%) were converts to Islam but little is known about the religious background of the rest of the sample, except to say that several individuals –in line with other research\textsuperscript{46}- showed a significant increase in religiousness around the time of getting involved in \textit{jihadi} activities. Currently available figures on educational achievement here show that 3 out of 20 (15%) of individuals had completed university-level education. 42% of Sageman’s original sample had finished university, compared to 30% \textsuperscript{(14/47 for whom information was available) of Bakker’s sample.\textsuperscript{47} In later research Sageman observes that educational achievement has declined with each successive wave of Islamist terrorists.\textsuperscript{48} As more reliable information emerges the Australian picture will be clarified, however, it is suffice to say at present that most have not progressed much further than high
school or college, although there is a wide range of educational attainment represented, including vocational qualifications.

With regards to occupation, just 5 of 24 (21%) of individuals in the Australian sample for whom there was information can be classed as having a skilled occupation, the majority being semi- or unskilled. Although based on incomplete data these figures are quite different to Sageman’s original study in which 57 of 134 (43%) had skilled occupations.\(^49\) However it is much closer to Bakker’s findings in Europe that more than 70% (of 103) held semi- or unskilled jobs,\(^50\) and is also in line with Sageman’s assertion that there has been a gradual decline in socioeconomic status of \textit{jihadi} terrorists.\(^51\)

Marital status is also of interest, partly because it seems so counterintuitive for someone with family responsibilities to get involved in terrorism, and yet this is not uncommon. Sageman found that 83 out of 114 (73%) were married,\(^52\) while Bakker found that 39 out of 66 (59%) were married at the time of their involvement, with another 8 previously divorced\(^53\) (although Bakker does emphasise that many on whom there was no specific information appeared to be single, implying that marital status is mostly only reported when a relationship is present). In the current sample, 17 of 23 (74%) of individuals on whom there was data were married (including 1 third-time marriage and 1 marriage of convenience) and 2 others had previously been married and were either separated or divorced. Most who were married also had children. As in Bakker’s study the percentage may be inflated due to the lack of available data, however it clearly confirms that having a wife and family does not protect against terrorist involvement.

Since terrorism is a form of crime, criminal history is another factor worth considering. Sageman reported that around 25% of his first sample had a petty criminal record relating to crimes such as forgery, document trafficking, fraud and drug dealing,\(^54\) and more recently asserts that criminality is more common as a form of fund-raising without
being able to rely on organisations such as al-Qaeda Central for handouts.\textsuperscript{55} Bakker likewise reported that around a quarter of his sample had been previously convicted in court for a criminal offence, mostly for relatively petty crimes.\textsuperscript{56} There is currently only information available for 11 individuals in the current sample, of whom 2 (18\%) had unrelated criminal records prior to their \textit{jihadi} activities, involving fraud, burglary, criminal damage, theft and intentionally causing injury (the latter four all committed by Fadl Sayadi\textsuperscript{57}). Pending more information the Australian sample thus seems to confirm that only a minority of Islamist terrorists tend to have criminal records, and these are varied and relatively minor. However, it is also relevant that Mohamed Elomar (of the Sydney Pendennis group) utilised his connections to the criminal underworld in order to try to obtain weapons, despite having no prior record himself.\textsuperscript{58} Criminal associations should not therefore be regarded as insignificant.

Lastly, to address mental illness as a possible contributory factor behind terrorist activity, it is now well-established that this is not a useful explanation for why people become terrorists.\textsuperscript{59} Sageman has roundly criticised the notion that Islamist terrorists are suffering from psychological disorder.\textsuperscript{60} He found that only 4 of 61 (7\%) of his original dataset showed any evidence of childhood conduct disorder,\textsuperscript{61} and then from an updated sample of more than 500, only another 4 (<1\%) exhibited signs of psychotic symptoms.\textsuperscript{62} Likewise Bakker reports that only 11 in his sample appeared to be suffering from mental illness, but qualified this statement by the fact that 4 of these had become ill after their arrest.\textsuperscript{63} Among Australian \textit{jihadists} (for whom there is specific information on just 12 individuals) there are no confirmed cases of mental illness where some form of medical/psychological intervention was involved prior to their arrest. Izzydeen Atik of the Melbourne Pendennis group had been claiming benefits for a psychiatric illness for some time, however the sentencing judge in that case was of the opinion that these claims were fraudulent to the extent that it was “probably
totally feigned”. The most serious known instance that appears to be genuine is that of Khaled Sharrouf of the Sydney Pendennis group, who was deemed to be suffering from a “serious mental disorder” at the time of offending but was later found fit to enter a plea of guilty. In a separate case, one psychologist opined that Zaky Mallah may have been suffering from Adjustment Disorder, however another psychologist disagreed. In the remaining cases any previous psychological distress appears to have been relatively minor, and any current, more serious symptoms the result of incarceration. As with marriage, where there is no history to report it is simply not reported, thus making it a reasonably reliable assumption to say that, as previous studies have shown, mental disorder is not prevalent here either.

Returning to the final portions of Table 1, it is shown that the average group size of Australian terrorism cases is less than 3 people. However, this is potentially very misleading since most cases (with the notable exception of Zaky Mallah) involved a wider support network which played an integral –sometimes controlling- role in their radicalisation and operational functioning. Hence in 77% (10/13) cases involving ‘lone’ individuals or pairs the available information confirms or at least strongly suggests that the persons involved were in fact part of a network that was significant to their offending behaviour. The cases not counted as part of a network include Zaky Mallah, Feiz Mohammed and Belal Khazaal (and the last two cases were most definitely immersed in wider networks even if they acted alone as far as their documented activities go).

Only three of the Australian cases can be considered groups with relatively finite boundaries, namely the two Operation Pendennis groups (each with 9 members) and the Neath group, (involving 3 confirmed individuals). These figures compare to an average group size from Bakker’s European sample of operational jihadis of 8 members. On the face of it, distinct groups of terrorists forming in Australia are thus a rarity, especially in comparison to
other parts of the world; however, it is even rarer for the functioning of individuals and dyads to be completely removed from Islamist networks.

Table 2: Leadership, external influence and domestic vs. overseas aims in cases of Australian Islamist terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Cases with identified leaders*</th>
<th>% Cases with external 'handlers'***</th>
<th>% Foreign organisational contact</th>
<th>% Domestic focus***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13% (2/15 cases)</td>
<td>40% (6/15 individuals) OR 88% (14/16 cases)</td>
<td>55% (18/33 cases)</td>
<td>38% (6/16 cases)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Leaders have only been clearly identified in the two Operation Pendennis groups. Information suggesting possible leaders within the Operation Neath group has yet to be confirmed and is thus presently excluded.

** Cases include: the Ayub twins, Roche, Hicks, Thomas, Brigitte and Lodhi, and Ul-Haque. Note that these figures count remaining (unknown) cases as having no handlers.

*** Cases include: Roche, Mallah, Brigitte & Lodhi, Pendennis, Neath.

Table 2 shows that there have been clearly identifiable within-group leaders in only two of the Australian cases so far. These were the Operation Pendennis groups, which in fact were interlinked and collectively led by Abdul Nacer Benbrika, although each group had its own day-to-day ‘operational’ leaders. It was suggested that El Sayed and Fattal played leading roles in the Operation Neath group, and later that an individual on the run in East Africa, named as Hussein Farah, may have been the overall ‘mastermind’ but these details have yet to be confirmed and so this case has been excluded from the analysis. On the face of it this would seem to refute Silber and Bhatt’s, and also Nesser’s contention that top-down
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influence plays a key role in the formation and direction of groups of Islamist terrorists in the West.

However, to suggest that none of the remaining cases have involved some kind of leadership would be inaccurate. There is little information available about how exactly individuals in the sample radicalised, and to what extent they were influenced by others or acted independently. Nevertheless, external ‘handlers’, i.e. associates of individuals included in the sample who played facilitating and controlling roles concerning those individuals’ actions, can be identified in at least six other cases. These are the Ayub twins, who answered to Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdulla Sungkar; Jack Roche, controlled by numerous others including Abdul Rahim Ayub and Abu Hafs; David Hicks, who was an agent of LeT and al-Qaeda; Jack Thomas, influenced by Abu Bakar Bashir and by Khaled bin Attash; Willie Brigitte and Faheem Lodhi, who were seemingly influenced by the mysterious ‘Sajid’ in Pakistan; and finally Izhar Ul-Haque, who was apparently guided by Faheem Lodhi and then trained with LeT. Furthermore, the 40% figure may be an underestimation of external influence since it counts unknown cases as non-occurrences. In reality the cases of Noorpolat Abdulla, Tallaal Adrey, Ahmed Ali and Omar Hadba (possibly the Neath group as well) may all have involved considerable levels of external facilitation, in some cases verging on control.

The significance of links external to these groups is also illustrated by examining contact with foreign terrorist groups or organisations. More than half (55%) of individuals for whom there is adequate data are alleged to have trained with, been part of, or at least been in communication with, foreign organised terrorists. Moreover, if this is examined according to cases rather than individuals, 88% (14/16) of Australian cases have included members with foreign organisational affiliation. The only two cases deemed not to have made foreign
contact are those of Zaky Mallah (who was certainly acting alone) and Feiz Mohammed (who is nevertheless deeply involved in wider Islamist networks and left Australia for Lebanon).

On the one hand the Australian sample reflects given wisdom about home-grown terrorism in that it is primarily made up of Australian citizens and long-term residents. On the other hand, the rather high levels of contact with organised overseas terrorists contradicts the assumption that Western-based Islamist terrorists are mostly removed from foreign terrorist entities. Then again, despite the apparent commonality of communicating, training with, or in some cases fighting for *jihadi* organisations, for those individuals who stayed in/ returned to Australia the role of those organisations (JI, al-Qaeda, LeT and al-Shabaab) seems to have been at most one of encouragement and/or limited facilitation rather than substantial support or outright control. In the most serious domestic cases (Pendennis and Neath) the available information thus far indicates that these groups acted with autonomy despite instances of organisational contact. Higher levels of control resulting from organisational affiliation appear likely only where individuals were apparently absorbed into foreign conflicts and did not return home (Abdulla, Hicks, Adrey, Ali and Hadba). It would thus appear that while organisational contact is unexpectedly high, levels of autonomy also remain high, especially on the domestic stage.

Finally, Table 2 shows that it is a minority of cases (38% or 6/16) that have involved an explicitly domestic focus. Even then it is important to qualify those cases. Jack Roche was planning to hit targets in Australia, albeit symbols of the US and Israel, before giving up. Mallah’s idea was to target government officials (specifically former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and former ASIO Director General Dennis Richardson) but he was acting alone based on personal grievances and might arguably even be excluded from the analysis altogether. Brigitte and Lodhi showed a more wilful desire to carry out attacks, focussing on possible infrastructure or military targets. The Pendennis groups were also eager
to carry out attacks at home but despite speculation the most concrete information about their possible target(s) relates to one instance of surveillance at the Lucas Heights nuclear research facility (thought to be a low-impact target). Lastly, the Neath group are alleged to have been planning a *fidayen* operation at an Australian military base.

What is striking about these domestically-focussed cases is that no definite target was ever identified (the closest being Jack Roche), relatively few weapons were acquired and very little was accomplished as far as actually manufacturing explosives is concerned. There is also nothing more than conjecture to suggest that purely civilian targets were ever seriously considered by any domestic Australian terrorists (excepting Roche’s surveillance of foreign embassies and a Jewish businessman). This stands out in contrast to the eagerness displayed by Islamist terrorists in Europe and North America to attack soft, civilian targets, which has been repeatedly demonstrated in both foiled and successful attacks. Hence most Australian cases of Islamist terrorist activity have involved overseas aims, and among domestically-focussed cases potential targets have primarily been restricted to infrastructure or military sites.

**Table 3a**: Organisational contact in Australian cases of Islamist terrorism before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total individuals pre-Iraq</th>
<th>Total individuals post-Iraq</th>
<th>Foreign organisational contact pre-Iraq</th>
<th>Foreign organisational contact post-Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 (=9 cases)</td>
<td>25 (=7 cases)</td>
<td>91% (10/11 individuals) OR 89% (8/9 cases)</td>
<td>36% (8/22 individuals) OR 86% (6/7 cases)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that organisational autonomy is thought to have increased as a consequence of counter-terrorism efforts after 9/11, and that the growth of Western HGIT was spurred on by
the invasion of Iraq, it makes sense to examine whether there is more or less contact with foreign terrorist organisations in the pre- vs. post-Iraq periods. Table 3a shows that 11 Australians, constituting 9 cases, were actively involved in Islamist terrorism prior to 2003, compared to 25 individuals constituting 7 cases (and thus larger identifiable groups) after 2003. 10 of 11 (91%) of individuals, or 8 out of 9 (89%) of cases in the pre-Iraq era had contact with foreign terrorist organisations (assuming that Noorpolat Abdulla was indeed part of a larger network as alleged by Kazakh authorities, only Mallah stands out as having no international connections).

This compares to 8 out of 22 (36%) of individuals for whom there was available information, or 6 out of 7 (86%) of cases in the post-Iraq era. Absolute numbers of people making contact with foreign terrorist organisations thus seem to have changed little (10 vs. 8) although with more people getting involved after the invasion of Iraq, the relative percentage has decreased. As far as cases go, there have been numerically fewer since 2003 but the relative percentage of cases where at least some members have had organisational contact has remained high.

Having said this it is important to note that the pre- vs. post-Iraq division is not easy to make since there is some disparity between when individuals became involved with violent Islamists and when they began specific offence-related behaviour. Specifically, the Operation Pendennis individuals are counted in the post-Iraq era since their offence-planning did not appear to begin in earnest until sometime in 2004. And yet the four individuals reported to have trained with terrorists overseas (Kent, Mohamed Elomar, Khaled Cheikho and Moustafa Cheikho) did so prior to 2003. The post-Iraq case figures are thus somewhat inflated as a result. Adjusting the statistics to account for this, the number of individuals with organisational contact in the pre-Iraq era goes up to 14, compared to just 4 since then. This
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adds support to the observation that it is now more difficult to make contact with foreign terrorist organisations. Table 3b illustrates the adjusted individual figures.

Table 3b: Numbers of Australian individuals with foreign organisational contact before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq (adjusted for when individuals trained as opposed to when they became operational).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total individuals pre-Iraq</th>
<th>Total individuals post-Iraq</th>
<th>Foreign organisational contact pre-Iraq</th>
<th>Foreign organisational contact post-Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>93% (14/15 individuals)</td>
<td>22% (4/18 individuals)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Temporarily putting aside these analytical issues it is also useful to examine the qualitative nature of organisational affiliation before and after Iraq. In the pre-Iraq period the Ayub twins occupied leadership positions in JI. Roche received money, training, advice and direction from JI and al-Qaeda. Hicks received training and participated in combat. Thomas received training and money. Izhar Ul-Haque trained with LeT. The Frenchman Willie Brigitte received training and direction, while Lodhi maintained communication with LeT. Moving into the post-Iraq period for when cases began, four members of the Pendennis network had previously trained with Pakistani terrorist organisations (prior to 2003). Tallaal Adrey was allegedly a member of the Peninsula Lions in 2005. Ahmed Ali died fighting in 2006, presumably as part of a Somali terrorist group. Omar Hadba was accused of being a member of Fatah al-Islam and being actively involved in the insurgency in Lebanon during 2007. Finally in 2009, Saney Aweys is said to have acted as a recruiter for al-Shabaab (meanwhile one of his acquitted associates –excluded from the analysis- was alleged to have trained with them and sought operational/ spiritual advice).71
Prior to 2003 it was thus more common for individuals to be acting as agents (in some cases leaders) of foreign terrorist organisations within Australia. This applies to the Ayubs, Roche, potentially to Thomas and Ul-Haque, and almost certainly to Brigitte and Lodhi. The level of support was quite substantial in some of these cases too, with both Roche and Thomas receiving money to facilitate travel and (potentially) for planning of attacks. The four Pendennis men who trained with JeM and with LeT do not appear to have received any further support from these organisations. They trained between 1999-2002 but did not become operational until around 2004, after the invasion of Iraq. Their experiences in this regard are thus relevant to both the pre- and post-Iraq periods and illustrate the fact that organisational contact can be fleeting and should not be assumed to be ongoing. As for the remaining post-Iraq cases, they are mostly examples of involvement in foreign conflicts. The final case, Operation Neath, requires more information but at present suggests the renewed possibility of organisational agents within Australia (if indeed Aweys was a bona fide al-Shabaab recruiter) and yet an advisory, rather than more active supporting or controlling role of foreign organisations.

Overall, in terms of organisational affiliation the Australian sample does not contradict the notion that home-grown terrorists are largely autonomous. Contact with established overseas entities is still sought after (including an increasing range of countries, most notably Somalia) and is achieved to varying degrees. Since 2003 the level of direct support and control –especially ongoing support after training for those who return to Australia- appears to have diminished. Nevertheless, in cases where there is a more substantial history of contact with foreign terrorists, this may be indicative of a more serious threat to national and international security. These patterns conform with what is happening in North America and Europe, where foreign travel remains popular among jihadis willing to go to an expanding list of countries including Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia in addition to
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traditional destinations such as Pakistan. At the same time it is rare for such Western home-
grown terrorists to be considered agents or ‘real’ members of foreign organisations.

Table 4: Legal outcomes of Australian Islamist terror cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Charged</th>
<th>% Sentenced on terrorism charges</th>
<th>Average sentence on terror charges</th>
<th>Average sentence including non-terror charges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86% (31/36) individuals</td>
<td>90% (27/30) excludes pending</td>
<td>13.89 years (for 19 known individuals)</td>
<td>12.75 years (for 22 known individuals)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legal outcomes are a final variable of interest. The vast majority of Australian *jihadis* were charged with terrorism offences. Those never charged, or where the case was dropped, include the Ayub twins, Ul-Haque, Feiz Mohammed and Ahmed Ali. Terror, but not criminal, charges were ultimately also dropped in the cases of Jack Thomas and Zaky Mallah. A no-verdict was originally returned for Shane Kent although he later pleaded guilty to being a member of a terrorist organisation and making a document in preparation for an act of terrorism and was sentenced to 4-and-a-half years. Excluding one case pending (Omar Hadba) of 30 people charged, 28 (93%) were, or are due to be, sentenced on terrorism charges. The average sentence on terrorism charges ranged from a minimum 4 years (delivered for Tallaal Adrey in Kuwait) to a maximum 28 years (for Mohamed Elomar in Sydney), giving an average sentence among 20 individuals of 13.65 years. This is slightly higher than the average sentence in the US, which is reported to be 12.7 years (based on a sample of 370) but the Australian sample is somewhat skewed by the high sentences given in the Sydney Pendennis trial and in any case the difference is minimal. The legal penalties for terrorism in Australia thus appear to be comparable to those in the United States.
Summary and Conclusion

The present study has presented an analysis of the unique history of Australian involvement in Islamist terrorism over the past 30 years. Beginning in the 1980’s JI began to encroach upon Australian territory. Partly as a consequence of this, and apparently also as a result of the adventurousness of young men such as David Hicks, combined with simmering global conflicts during the 1990’s, a (relatively small) number of Australian men travelled abroad to train with al-Qaeda and affiliated organisations. For the most part these individuals engaged in paramilitary training and sometimes combat overseas but showed little motivation to attack their own country.

Beginning around 2003 there was evidence of more serious intent to carry out attacks within Australia, albeit from individuals who were affiliates of overseas organisations and were not Australian, or at least had not grown up there (Brigitte and Lodhi). Accordingly, speaking in 2003, the then-AFP counter-terrorism chief Ben McDevitt remarked, “I think it is fair to say we don't have home-grown terrorists in this country... as yet... But what we definitely do have is people here who are sympathetic to causes offshore.”

However, the situation changed in the post-Iraq invasion period with the discovery of the Pendennis network in 2004 (arrests taking place in November 2005), which featured mostly life-long Australian residents plotting to carry out attacks in their home-country. Since then, aside from some false-alarms which turned out to be relatively isolated individuals who cannot be considered Islamist terrorists (and who were thus excluded from the analysis) Australian involvement in violent Islamist activities has been mostly limited to overseas countries including Kuwait, Somalia and Lebanon. Most recently, the Operation Neath convictions are confirmation of the fact there is nevertheless a persistent ‘home-grown’ *jihadi* element within Australia.
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The current statistical analysis of Australian terror cases reaffirms previous research by Lentini (an examination of the Melbourne and Sydney Pendennis groups), confirming a profile that is at once unique and yet reflective of worldwide Western trends. The prevalence of Lebanese heritage among home-grown terrorists is unique to Australia and indicative of its immigration history in much the same way as Pakistanis dominate in the UK or Moroccans in Spain. These individuals are mostly long-term Australian residents or citizens of quite unremarkable backgrounds, thus paralleling jihadis in North America and Europe. The average Australian age is slightly older than other (larger) samples have revealed but shows a decrease since the invasion of Iraq, which is in line with other analysts’ observations.

The average group size among the current sample is relatively small but this can be deceptive since the majority of individuals were very much part of wider networks that were important to their terrorist activities. Contact with foreign terrorist organisations has also remained quite prevalent even in the post-9/11 and post-Iraq eras. This is surprising given the common general emphasis on a lack of organisational affiliation. However, it does appear that the nature of organisational contact has changed over time from being more involved (supportive and sometimes controlling) to being more inspirational (offering training and advice only). This is in line with commentaries of HGIT in the West more generally. Finally, legal statistics also show similarity to other Western countries, with most individuals being charged and sentenced in relation to terrorism legislation, while others have been convicted under ordinary criminal law only.

The biggest difference between Australia and countries such as the UK and US relates to the size of the problem. There have been just two serious domestic plots to carry out attacks within Australia since 2003, with nearly a four year gap in between when those arrests took place. By comparison, multiple plots have been discovered in the post-Iraq era with alarming regularity each year in both the UK and US. Given a larger population size, the rate
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of Islamist terrorism in the US is less than that in Europe, a difference which has commonly been explained in terms of better integration of the Muslim population (supported by the fact that America’s Muslims are largely on an equal socioeconomic footing to the rest of the population, while European Muslims are often significantly disadvantaged). Canada and Australia have also been depicted as ‘countries of immigration’ which encourage integration and are therefore thought to have some protection against the likelihood of terrorism. More recently the view that the US has been somewhat immune to Islamist terrorism at home has been called into question as plots continue to surface. This has been posited to be the result of continued and escalating participation in the ‘war on terror’ as 30,000 more American troops have been committed to go to Afghanistan while US military operations elsewhere also continue. In light of this, Australia’s decision of May 2009 to send an extra 450 troops to Afghanistan may go some way to explaining the persistence, yet smaller-scale, of Islamist terrorism in Australia. Moreover, although Australians have so far demonstrated more interest in terrorist activities abroad it is likely that additional plots to attack at home will be discovered in the future.

There is a great deal to be said for adopting an exhaustive chronological approach to understanding Islamist terrorism in any given country. It avoids relying on assumptions based on more general observations that do not take into account the unique context of the country in question. It enables analysis of changes over time. It allows comparison of particular contexts with general trends, and as more country case studies emerge will enable cross-comparison not only of emerging patterns of terrorist activity but of counter-terrorism efforts as well.

The current study does of course have its limitations. Primary among these are the reliance on open source materials for data, which frequently omit details and are of dubious reliability and validity. Moreover, it represents little more than the tip of the iceberg of
Islamist militancy and there is likely to be a great deal more going on than is revealed here. There is thus a great deal of room for expansion and refinement of the current study. One way of expanding this approach that would be useful from a law-enforcement perspective would be to conduct a more detailed geographic analysis of ‘hot-spots’ of jihadi activity. Although it is clear that Sydney and Melbourne have played host to most of Australia’s violent Islamists, there is a need to examine particular suburbs, communities and even certain mosques within these (and other) cities.

Other areas in desperate need of more in-depth examination are specific pathways of radicalisation and patterns of operational behaviour. What different individuals’ life-circumstances were before getting involved, how they met people already involved, how they progressed socially and ideologically? Indeed, a study by Porter and Kebbell (which also utilised open-source materials) recently addressed some of these questions and found that the Australian data is congruent with studies of home-grown Islamist terrorists overseas.79 Moving onto operational characteristics (in cases where this occurred), questions remain such as how individuals made contact with terrorists overseas, what factors affected their choice of focussing on action abroad or at home, why they chose –or discounted- particular targets for attack, and how they went about conducting surveillance and other preparations?

A great deal has been said about the increasing impact that the Internet has had on spreading jihadi ideology and propaganda, opening up global communication networks and acting as a resource library for gathering intelligence and know-how for conducting terrorist operations.80 In the current study the Internet has so far been explicitly mentioned in 9 out of 16 (56%) of cases, namely those of Roche, Hicks, Thomas, Brigitte and Lodhi, Ul-Haque, Khazaal, Feiz Mohammed and the Pendennis groups. Yet more information is needed-especially as to whether the Internet is serving as people’s first point of contact with
extremist ideology and whether it is being used to make social contacts both locally and internationally.

Finally, it is necessary to carry out follow-up research with the growing number of currently imprisoned individuals and those who have been released in order to not only gain richer accounts of their past involvement but also to understand how (if at all) they have changed. This is particularly relevant to potentially developing early intervention programs as well as rehabilitative programs of ‘deradicalisation’ for fledgling and more ‘fully-developed’ Islamist radicals as a way of expanding counter-terrorism efforts in line with contemporary innovations around the world.

Although there is much room for improvement, the potential benefits of conducting this kind of research outweigh the drawbacks of the available data and promise to make a significant contribution to our understanding of Islamist terrorism. The present report is thus intended as a step in the right direction upon which future research can build.

Islamist Terrorism and Australia: A Chronological Summary of Cases

The following case summaries very briefly chart the arrival of Islamist militants in Australia and the subsequent involvement of Australians in violent jihad from the 1980’s though to 2009. The cases are presented according to the chronological order in which they began as opposed to when they became public knowledge. This is judged on the basis of the first known overt action taken in support of violent Islamist extremism with an identifiable link to Australia and in direct relation to the offences which individuals were charged with or are otherwise alleged to have committed. Date-ranges in brackets indicate the duration of active jihadi involvement up until the case conclusion (via arrest, death or other circumstances).

All cases involving Australian residents and citizens where a connection to Islamist terrorism has been alleged were originally covered in as much detail as possible, thus
enabling an appreciation of the entire range of activities and issues relating to this phenomenon. Cases included in the analysis are presented first, followed by cases excluded.

Cases Included in the Analysis (n = 16)

Case # 1: Abdul Rahim and Abdul Rahman Ayub (...1980’s-2002...)81

Key Features:

- Deliberate attempt to expand operations in Australia by Jemaah Islamiyah
- National and international networking and cooperation
- Seemingly dissipated since 2002

Abdul Rahim Ayub, a close associate of Abdulla Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, came to Australia in the early 1980’s in order to run what was later known as the ‘Mantiqi 4’ region of Jemaah Islamiyah. Based in Sydney and married for a time to Rabiyah Hutchinson, he was joined for two years by his brother Abdul Rahman, from 1997 to 1999. Following a dispute with locals they moved to Perth early in 1998. During his time in Australia Abdul Rahim focussed on proselytising, organising visits by Sungkar and Bashir, almost certainly fundraising, and networking with other prominent Islamists (including controversial Melbourne cleric Mohammed Omran and Belal Khazaal). JI are reported to have engaged in firearms training within Australia, and Abdul Rahim also helped arrange for new recruits such as Jack Roche to go overseas for training. Rahim left Australia in the wake of the 2002 Bali bombings.

Case # 2: Jack Roche (...1997-2000...)82

Key Features:
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- Organisational affiliation & top-down control
- Overseas travel & training
- Given $8,000 to finance operation
- Planned domestic attacks on US/Israeli targets
- Use of Internet for researching materials
- Convicted in 2004

Roche came to Sydney from the UK in 1978. He converted to Islam in 1992 and became part of Abdul Rahim’s congregation. Early in 2000 he underwent jihadi training at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan and was dispatched back to Australia in the summer by Abu Hafs and Saif al-Adl. He attempted to recruit others and conducted surveillance of Israeli embassies but Abdul Rahim and colleagues discouraged him from further pursuing the plan and it was abandoned.

Case #3: Noorpolat Abdulla (...1998-2000...)83

Key Features:

- Australian citizen of Uighur heritage
- Moved to Kazakhstan
- Arrested during broad round-up of suspects
- First Australian convicted on terror-charges after 9/11

Abdulla grew up in Adelaide and attended the same mosque as David Hicks. In 1998 he emigrated to Kazakhstan and in 2000 was arrested as part of a crackdown on Uighurs, following the death of two police officers. Two grenades bearing his prints were allegedly
found in his home and in October 2001 he was convicted in a (re)trial in closed court and sentenced to 15 years.

Case #4: David Hicks (...1998-2001...)84

Key Features:

- Foreign organisational affiliation
- Overseas training and combat
- First person to be convicted at Guantanamo Bay
- Released in Australia in 2007

Born in Adelaide in 1975, Hicks left Australia in 1990. He joined the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998/1999, then returned to Australia before leaving for Pakistan in November 1999. He trained and fought with Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT), then trained with al-Qaeda in January 2001. He fought for the Taliban until his capture in December the same year.

Case #5: Joseph ‘Jack’ Thomas (...2001-2003...)85

Key Features:

- Foreign organisational affiliation and overseas training
- Was given $3,800
- Also given a phone number and email address to maintain contact
- Detained en route back to Australia
- Convicted on non-terrorism charges in 2008
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Thomas became involved in Islamism through Mohammed Omran’s mosque in Melbourne. In March 2001 he travelled to Afghanistan and trained at al-Qaeda’s Camp Farouq alongside two other known Australians. He was arrested and questioned by Pakistani police returning to Australia in January 2003. He was arrested back home in November 2004, was cleared of terrorism charges but convicted for falsifying his passport and sentenced to 5 years.

**Case#6: Zaky Mallah (...2002-2003...)**

*Key Features:*

- ‘Troubled’ individual angered at passport refusal
- Made very public threats against ASIO and DFAT
- Convicted on non-terrorism charges

Mallah was born in Australia in 1983. In May 2001 he was refused a passport on grounds of national security, based on his extremist views. Over the next two-and-a-half years he courted media attention, saying he was planning an attack against the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) or ASIO. He was arrested in December 2003 and in April 2005 pleaded guilty to threatening to endanger the life of a Commonwealth official (having been acquitted of two terrorism charges).

**Case #7: Izhar Ul-Haque (...2003...)**

*Key Features:*

- Influenced by ‘recruiter’ Faheem Lodhi to train with LeT
- Foreign organisational contact and overseas training
- Kept notes of his activities plus downloaded *jihadi* literature
- Dropped out of training and returned home
- Charges dropped for legal reasons

Ul-Haque was born in Pakistan, coming to Australia in his teens in 1998. In January 2003 (arranged by Lodhi) he returned to Pakistan where he trained with LeT for three weeks. He returned to Australia in March and was arrested and charged in November with knowingly undergoing terrorist training. Charges were dropped after the conduct of ASIO officers was deemed inappropriate and the evidence inadmissible.
Case#8 Willie Brigitte and Faheem Lodhi (2003...)

Key Features:

- Brigitte: Came to Australia from abroad; Foreign organisational contact and overseas training; Deported to France in 2003; Convicted 2007
- Lodhi: Recruiter in Australia; Foreign organisational affiliation; Convicted 2006
- Direction from overseas ‘handler’
- Preparing for attack within Australia, including use of Internet to research targets

Brigitte, a French resident, trained with LeT in Pakistan in 2001. In 2003, at the direction of his LeT contact Sajid Mir in Pakistan, he travelled to Sydney and teamed up with Lodhi. Brigitte was arrested and deported in October 2003 on a tip-off from French authorities, while Lodhi, allegedly LeT’s representative in Australia (resident since 1998) was arrested in April 2004. The two men had downloaded aerial photos of military sites and made enquiries about pre-cursor chemicals. Lodhi also obtained a restricted map of the Australian electrical grid, collected more than a hundred toilet rolls (which can be used for manufacturing the low explosive nitrocellulose), made notes on how to make explosives and had a ‘virtual library’ promoting jihad. Both men were separately convicted and sentenced to 9 (Brigitte) and 20 years (Lodhi).
Case#9: Belal Khazaal (...2003-2004...)\textsuperscript{90}

Key Features:

- Long-term Islamist activist
- Repeated allegations of involvement with violent Islamists
- Sentenced in absentia for terrorist activity in Lebanon
- Use of Internet for distributing terrorist propaganda
- Convicted in Australia in 2008 for making and distributing terrorist materials

Born in Lebanon, Khazaal moved to Australia while in his mid-teens in 1986. He studied Islam diligently, founded the Islamic Youth Movement (IYM) in Sydney and worked as a journalist for the IYM’s controversial magazine, Nida’Ul Islam from 1994 onwards. The CIA claim that Khazaal trained in Afghanistan in 1998 where he met with bin Laden, and he has been accused of sending other recruits to Afghanistan and acting as al-Qaeda’s man in Australia. It has also been reported that he met with the infamous Abu Dahdah and Abu Qatada, and he was sentenced twice (in 2003 and 2005) in absentia in Lebanon for forming a terrorist organisation with the intention of carrying out attacks. Khazaal was arrested in Australia in June 2004 and later convicted for creating and posting an article online, ‘Provisions on the Rules of Jihad - Short Judicial Rulings and Organisational Instructions for Fighters and Mujahideen against Infidels.’ He was sentenced to 12 years in 2009.
Case#10: Feiz Mohammed (...2004...)\textsuperscript{91}

**Key Features:**

- Australian-born extremist preacher
- Made and distributed pro-\textit{jihadi} video
- Use of Internet to distribute propaganda
- Left Australia but never charged

Born in Sydney around 1970, Sheikh Mohammed headed the Global Islamic Youth Centre (GIYC) in Liverpool, west Sydney. In 2007 he was investigated by police for possible incitement of hatred following the discovery of videos he had made and distributed in 2004, in which he declared “Teach [children] this: that there is nothing more beloved to me than wanting to die as a mujahid...Put in their soft, tender heart the zeal of \textit{jihad} and the love of martyrdom.” By this time he had been in Lebanon for around two years already (having left Australia days before the Pendennis raids- see below). No further action was taken but then Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd publicly announced at the time that Mohammed would not be welcome back in Australia.


**Key Features:**

- ‘Spiritual’ leader: Abdul Nacer Benbrika
- Secondary leaders: Joud and Sayadi
- Use of criminal means to raise funds
- One individual (Kent) with overseas terror training
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- Engaged in domestic training exercises
- Use of Internet for downloading jihadist materials
- Allegedly filmed potential targets but were not close to achieving attack capability
- Communicated, met and trained with the Sydney Pendennis group
- Infiltrated by an undercover officer, ‘Ahmet Sonmez’
- Convicted on terrorism charges in 2007

Benbrika came to Australia from Algeria in 1989, settling in Melbourne. A self-taught ‘sheikh’, he was affiliated for a time with controversial preacher Mohammed Omran, although he became more extreme and broke away to form his own group, beginning around 2002. The immediate ‘hardcore’ group of followers around him were primarily of Lebanese descent and most swore bayat (an oath of allegiance) to him as they became increasingly absorbed by his exhortations of jihad. Striving to coerce the withdrawal of Australian troops from Iraq, they made concerted efforts (including a scheme to sell stolen car parts) to raise funds for the group to enable their violent aspirations. They also engaged in training exercises with a group of like-minded individuals in Sydney and allegedly conducted surveillance of possible targets for attack, although the Melbournians did not achieve attack capabilities.

The main wave of arrests (both in Melbourne and Sydney) took place on November 8th 2005, one taking place on the 10th, and a final three on March 31st, 2006. Benbrika was charged with directing a terrorist organisation, and his followers in Melbourne were charged with combinations of intentionally belonging to a terrorist organisation, possessing items in preparation for a terrorist attack, and in some cases also providing resources (helping to direct activities and actively pursue funding for the group). Attik pleaded guilty in June 2007 and in September guilty verdicts were returned for Benbrika, Joud, Merhi, Ahmed and Ezzit Raad, Sayadi and Haddara. A no verdict was originally returned for Kent although he later pleaded
Ismailism

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... guilty to making a document in preparation for an act of terrorism, whilst four others were found not guilty. Sentences (handed down in October 2009) ranged from 6 to 15 years.

**Case#12: The Sydney ‘Pendennis’ Group: Mohamed Elomar, Khaled Cheikho, Moustafa Cheikho, Abdul Rakib Hasan, Mohammad Omar Jamal, Omar Umar Sarif**

**Baladjam, Mazen Touma, Khaled Sharrouf & Mirsad Mulahililovic (...2004-2005)**

*Key Features:*

- Also deferred to Benbrika for spiritual guidance
- Coordinated by Elomar, assisted by Khaled Cheikho
- Several individuals with overseas training
- Also engaged in domestic training, in collaboration with the Melbourne group
- Use of Internet for downloading *jihadist* materials
- Utilised criminal contacts
- Amassed weapons and chemicals for domestic attack
- Convicted on terrorism charges in 2009

It is unclear exactly when and how the Sydney group came together, or how they made contact with the Melbourne group. The coordinating members, Elomar and the two Cheikhos, allegedly trained with LeT sometime between the late 1990’s and 2002. In December 2004 Elomar, Hasan and Touma were stopped by police seemingly conducting surveillance of the Lucas Heights nuclear research facility near Sydney and in 2005 the group gathered pace moving towards acts of violence. Elomar allegedly bought several rocket launchers stolen from the army (which were never recovered), and when the police raids came in November 2005, hundreds of litres of chemicals were found along with scores of detonators and digital timers suitable for manufacturing bombs. Twelve firearms and thousands of rounds of
ammunition are also reported to have been found. The Sydney group faced more serious charges than their counterparts in Melbourne (conspiring in preparation for an attack, vs. membership of a terrorist organisation). Baladjam, Touma, Sharrouf and Mulahalilovic all pleaded guilty, receiving sentences from 3 to 14 years. Elomar, Khaled and Moustafa Cheikho, Hasan and Jamal were all convicted in October 2009 and in February 2010 were sentenced to 28, 27, 26, 26 and 23 years respectively.

Case#13: Tallaal Adrey (...2005...)\textsuperscript{94}

\textit{Key Features:}

- Arrested in Kuwait
- Foreign organisational affiliation
- Convicted on terrorism charges in 2005

Adrey came to Australia from Kuwait in 1997. He and his family (all Australian citizens) moved back to Kuwait in 2002. He was arrested along with 30 others in February 2005 and was accused of being a member of the Peninsula Lions, an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group. He was sentenced to 4 years in jail in December 2005.

Case #14: Ahmed Ali (...2006)\textsuperscript{95}

\textit{Key Features:}

- Killed fighting in Somalia

Ahmed Ali, a Somali-Australian, had come to Australia with his parents in the late 1990’s, settling in Melbourne. He reportedly radicalised in Melbourne beginning around 2002 before leaving for Somalia in December 2006, taking his pregnant Australian-convert wife and child.
with him. He was killed on the front line, aged 25, battling with Ethiopian forces after being there for just three days.

**Case#15: Omar Hadba et al (...2007)**

**Key Features:**

- Arrested in terror raids in Lebanon
- Hadba charged with terrorism offences (including organisational affiliation)

In June 2007 a series of raids took place in Lebanon in which a cache of weapons and military equipment was found. Approximately 90 men were arrested, among them several Westerners. Six Australians were among them: Omar Hadba, Ibrahim Sabouh, Hussein Elomar, Muhammad Basal, Bassam El Sayed and Ahmed Elomar. In March 2009 Hadba was committed to stand trial, accused of being a member of Fatah al-Islam, participating in killing military personnel and civilians and the manufacture of weapons for use in terror attacks in Lebanon. Sabouh was also reportedly charged but was not confirmed to stand trial, while Ahmed Elomar and Basal were released. No further information was released regarding El Sayed or Hussein Elomar.

**Case#16: Operation Neath: Saney Edow Aweys, Nayef El Sayed, and Wissam Mahmoud Fattal (...2009)**

**Key Features:**

- Foreign travel, training and organisational affiliation
- Planned *fidayen* attack on Australian military base
Aweys, Sayed and two others who were acquitted were all arrested in police raids in August 2009. Fattal had already been detained on an unrelated matter, while a sixth man believed to be part of the group, Walid Osman Mohammed was reported to be overseas in Somalia. Later reports alleged that another man, Hussein Hashi Hemed Farah, had acted as the plot ‘mastermind’ and had escaped custody after being detained in Kenya. All are of Somali or Lebanese heritage with Australian passports and a number of individuals involved are believed to have travelled to Somalia to participate in training and combat, and to seek approval for their plans from the al-Shabaab terrorist organisation. Aweys, Sayed and Fattal were convicted in December 2010 for planning a *fidayen* operation at an Australian military base in Sydney, where they planned to attack with firearms until being killed themselves. They have yet to be sentenced at the time of writing.

**Cases Excluded from the Analysis (n = 9)**

1. **Muhamed Mubayyid (...1997-2003...)**

   *Key Features:*
   
   - US-based charity with pro-*jihad* agenda
   - Use of Internet to promote overseas *jihad* and solicit funds
   - Terrorism financing implied but never charged
   - Convicted on non-terrorism charges in 2008

A naturalised Australian citizen of Lebanese origin, Mubayyid was the Treasurer of Care International in the US, which was accused of financing mujahedin overseas. Mubayyid and colleague Emadeddin Muntasser were arrested in the US in 2005 and eventually convicted of
tax fraud, however no terrorism charges were laid. Mubayid was sentenced to 11 months in prison in 2008 and deported to Sydney.

2. **Mamdouh Habib (...2001...)**

*Key Features:*
- Stayed at al-Qaeda guest houses and met with other Australians
- Detained in Pakistan and taken to Guantanamo Bay
- Never charged; released in 2005

Habib came to Australia from Egypt in 1980. He came to the attention of ASIO as an associate of Omar Abdel Rahman in 1993 and in June 2001 travelled to Pakistan. In October of that year he was arrested after admittedly spending time at an al-Qaeda guest house where he met David Hicks, Jack Thomas and Matthew Stewart. He was taken to Guantanamo Bay via Egypt and eventually released without charge and returned to Australia in January 2005.

3. **Sheikh Abdul Salam Mohammed Zoud (...2004...)**

*Key Features:*
- Associate of Mohammed Omran and an alleged *jihadi* recruiter
- Never charged

In June 2004 it was reported that French authorities had named Sydney-based Zoud (a close associate of Mohammed Omran) as a recruiter for *jihad*, based on information provided by Willie Brigitte. Zoud is alleged to have performed Brigitte’s wedding ceremony in Sydney and to have met with Jack Thomas and Abu Bakar Bashir. He denied the allegations and no action was taken.
4. **Matthew Stewart (...2005...)**

**Key Features:**

- Alleged appearance in *jihadi* propaganda video
- Foreign organisational affiliation and training

An Australian ex-soldier who left the army in 2001, it has been alleged that Stewart is the figure who appeared in a 2005 *jihadi* video threatening attacks on the West. It was also reported in 2007 that he had been identified at an al-Qaeda affiliated training camp in Pakistan. Authorities have confirmed nothing except that he is a person of interest.

5. **Hassan Kalache and Jill Courtney (...2006...)**

**Key Features:**

- Discussed plan to bomb King’s Cross in Sydney
- Case dropped in 2008

In 2006 Courtney and Kalache (who was already in prison serving a sentence for murder) were charged with conspiring to cause an explosion at Kings Cross in Sydney, based on intercepted phone conversations between them. The case was thrown out of court in March 2008.

6. **John Howard Amundsen (...2006...)**

**Key Features:**

- ‘Troubled’ individual, constructed bombs
- Book on bin Laden found
• Angry at girlfriend’s parents, psychologically disturbed
• Convicted on non-terrorism charges

Amundsen’s home in Brisbane was raided in May 2006, where police found home-made explosives and a book on bin Laden. However, it emerged that he was suffering from mental health issues and had planned to plant the bombs outside his girlfriend’s parents’ workplaces. He was sentenced to 6 years in 2008 for non-terrorism charges.

7. Warye Kanie (...2006...)104

Key Features:
• Detained in Iraq on suspicion of terrorism
• Released without charge in 2007

An Iraqi Kurd, Kanie came to Australia in 2003 and gained citizenship in 2005. In July 2006 he travelled back to Iraq and in October he was detained on suspicion of terrorism. He was released without charge in July 2007.

8. Muhammad Ayub, Abdullah Ayub and Marat Sumolsky (...2006...)105

Key Features:
• Arrested in terror-raids in Yemen
• Released without charge in 2006

The Ayub brothers (Abdul Rahim’s sons) and Polish-born convert Sumolsky were detained in Yemen in October 2006 along with around 20 others. They were originally charged with
arms smuggling and fundraising for terrorists but the Ayubs were released in December 2006 while Sumolsky’s freedom was reported to be imminent.

9. **Mohamed Haneef (...2007...)**\textsuperscript{106}

*Key Features:*

- Associated with Islamist terrorists in the UK
- Suspicious activity regarding plans to flee to India
- Charges dropped in 2007

Indian-born Haneef was arrested in Queensland in July 2007 as part of the UK investigation into attempted bombings in London and Glasgow on June 29\textsuperscript{th} and 30\textsuperscript{th} of that year. He had been associated with the individuals responsible for the attempted attacks in the UK and appeared to be fleeing the country. He was originally charged with recklessly supplying resources to a terrorist organisation, but all charges were soon dropped.
Notes

1. It is noteworthy that an al-Qaeda attack during the 2000 Sydney Olympics was considered a ‘very real possibility’ but ultimately no concrete intelligence was uncovered (see Sally Neighbour, “The Australian Connections” Four Corners, June 12, 2003, accessed November 25, 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/s878332.htm; Sally Neighbour, In the Shadow of Swords (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2004), 206-207).


6. Ibid.


11. Ibid.


16. Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 66.

17. Neighbour, In the Shadow of Swords, 163-165.

Ibid.


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