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## **Abstract**

After examining both the interday and intraday return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock Index, it was found that the open-to-open return variance is consistently greater than the close-to-close variance.

Examining the volatility of interday returns and variance ratio tests with five-minute intervals reveals an L-shaped pattern, or more precisely, two L-shaped patterns, starting with a small hump during both the morning and the afternoon sessions, with the morning session having a much higher interday volatility than the afternoon session. This L-shaped interday volatility is supported by the similarly shaped intraday volatility pattern. This result suggests that the high volatility of intraday returns for the market open is not entirely due to the trading mechanisms (call auction in the market opening) but also due to both the accumulated overnight information and the trading halt effect. The five-minute breaks after the auction and blind auction procedures are the two major driving forces which exaggerate the high intraday volatility observed at the market open.

## **Keywords**

Interday and intraday volatility, order driven market, Shanghai Stock Exchange

## **Disciplines**

Business | Social and Behavioral Sciences

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## **Interday and intraday volatility: additional evidence from the Shanghai Stock Exchange**

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After examining both the interday and intraday return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock Index, it was found that the open-to-open return variance is consistently greater than the close-to-close variance. Examining the volatility of interday returns and variance ratio tests with five-minute intervals reveals an L-shaped pattern, or more precisely, two L-shaped patterns, starting with a small hump during both the morning and the afternoon sessions, with the morning session having a much higher interday volatility than the afternoon session. This L-shaped interday volatility is supported by the similarly shaped intraday volatility pattern. This result suggests that the high volatility of intraday returns for the market open is not entirely due to the trading mechanisms (call auction in the market opening) but also due to both the accumulated overnight information and the trading halt effect. The five-minute breaks after the auction and blind auction procedures are the two major driving forces which exaggerate the high intraday volatility observed at the market open.

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**JEL Classification: G12, G14, G15**

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## **Interday and intraday volatility: additional evidence from the Shanghai Stock Exchange**

### **1 Introduction**

A very important issue in market microstructure analysis is the interaction between trading procedures and security price formation. The latter is associated closely with the evolution of security's return volatilities. Empirical studies on the interdaily evolution of return volatilities typically find that daily open-to-open volatility is higher than daily close-to-close volatility. Three general explanations have been offered for this phenomenon: the difference in trading mechanism between the market's open and close (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987), the monopoly power of the specialist (Stoll and Whaley, 1990), and the long halt of trade before the market's open (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991).

In this article, we examine the behaviour of both interday and intraday return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock Index in order to shed additional light on the issue. There have been no empirical studies made on the microstructure of the Chinese stock markets using intraday data. China's stock exchanges are relatively new players amongst the world's financial markets. The two official stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, were established in December 1990 and July 1991 respectively. Since their establishment, they have expanded rapidly in terms of capitalization, turnover, and number of firms listed. In terms of market capitalization, the Chinese stock markets are now the second largest in the Asia-Pacific region after Japan, and are ahead of such major markets as Australia, Hong Kong and Korea (Eun and Huang, 2005). Recently, in order to liberalize its stock markets, China's domestic equity markets were opened to selected international institutional investors, designated as the so-called qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) in 2003. The market capitalization of the SHSE was 3,009.7 billion yuan (about US\$367 billion) in 2003, 77.8% of total market

capitalization in all Chinese stock markets. It is obvious that the SHSE plays a dominating role in Chinese stock markets, which is also the reason why the Shanghai Composite Index was selected for this study.

Like many other emerging markets, the SHSE is a limited order-driven market using electronic trading without market makers. However, the SHSE is unique in its institutional setting. First, there is a five minute break between the call auction open and normal morning open of continuous trading. We are not aware of any other market in the world that has such an arrangement. All other markets start with a call auction opening procedure and then switch to continuous trading straight away after the auction finishes. Second, there is a lunch break in the mid-day between the morning and afternoon trading sessions, the same as in all other Asian stock markets. Thirdly, as a result of the first and second points, there are technically three sessions in the Chinese stock market: the pre-open auction session, the morning trading session and the afternoon session. Both morning and afternoon sessions are thoroughly continuous markets similar to the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK), which opens as a continuous market and remains a continuous market up to and including the close of trading. While most other markets (which adopt call auction for the market open) change into a transparent auction procedure in which information regarding order books are available to investors during the auction process, Chinese call auction is still totally without any information dissemination except for the final clearing price generated at the end of the auction. Meanwhile, China still maintains its unique five-minute break between morning call auction and morning open with continuous trading. The merits of these trading procedures are constantly debated among both academics and policy makers (Wang et al 2005, p. 7). In addition, unlike many other emerging markets which have stronger equity market integration with major markets such as through dual listing of Hong Kong stocks on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), Chinese stock markets are relatively isolated and more independent than other markets. Therefore, the markets provide a clear and simple case for the research of the relations between volatility and trading mechanisms because there is much less correlation of both the return and

return volatility between the SHSE and other markets, which affects the pattern of the volatility of the markets under research. Thus, the SHSE offers an ideal setting to analyze the relations between volatility patterns and other factors such as trading procedures because of its unique features.

Empirical findings based on the volatilities of interday returns and variance ratio indicate that the high volatility of intraday returns at the market opening is not mainly due to the trading mechanism (call auction) but rather due to the overnight trading halt. The results further suggest that the return variance in the active trading period (open-to-close) of the stock market is larger than that in the nontrading hours (close-to-open). The intraday returns and volatility provide further support for the results achieved by the interday data. The intraday returns broadly follow a U-shaped pattern (Wood et al., 1985) while the volatility of returns broadly follows an L-shaped pattern. This result is consistent with the previous findings on the Hong Kong market (Lam and Tong, 1999; Tang and Lui, 2002).

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review on interday and intraday return volatility; Section 3 discusses the institutional background for the SHSE and the data; Section 4 reports and analyses the empirical results; In Section 5, a conclusion is made.

## **2 Literature Review**

In an early study on the NYSE, Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) compare the effects of a call auction market and continuous trading market on return volatility. The opening procedure of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is essentially a call auction mechanism while all other trades are by the continuous trading mechanism. In the call auction mechanism, the buy and sell orders accumulated overnight are executed at a single price at the market opening. They reported that the interdaily stock returns computed using open-to-open prices have greater variance and show more evidence of reversals than comparable returns computed from close-to-close prices. Amihud and Mendelson (1987) attribute the result to differences in trading mechanisms between the

opening and closing transactions and Stoll and Whaley (1990) attribute the result to the monopoly power of the specialist system.

While the greater volatility at the open may be attributed in part to trading mechanisms used by the NYSE, research into other exchange settings suggest that the noisiness of opening prices may well be due to the large amount of ‘unprocessed’ information that had accumulated overnight before the market open, rather than to the call auction opening procedure. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) examined the Japanese market where there are two trading sessions: the morning session and the afternoon session. Each session is based on the call auction for the opening and then the continuous trading session to the close. They find that the morning open-to-open volatility is high, but not the afternoon open-to-open volatility, and conclude that it is caused by the preceding long period of non-trading rather than the trading mechanism. Similarly, Amihud et al (1990) found that on the Milan Stock Exchange, where the market opens with continuous trading and moves to a call market, the call trading actually exhibits lower volatility. It is also consistent with Choe and Shin’s (1993) findings in the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) that the close-to-close volatility is higher when the market closes (in the morning) in continuous trade than when the market closes (in the morning) in call auction.

All the above-mentioned markets, including the NYSE, the AMEX, the LSE, and Asian markets including Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), the KSE and the SHSE to be discussed in this paper, open with a call market and then switch to a continuous market. Unlike these markets, the SEHK opens as a continuous market and remains a continuous market up to and including the close of trading. If halt of trade were the major reason, open-to-open volatility in the SEHK would be higher without a call auction. What Lam and Tong (1999) found is that the open-to-open volatility is actually a bit lower than the close-to-close volatility. Using one-minute interval interday data, they found two humps in the interdaily volatility pattern, a large one in the morning session and a small one in the afternoon session. They then argue that this is probably due to clustering of trading at these particularly times.

Gerety and Mulherin (1994) estimate transitory volatility throughout the trading day based on forty years of hourly Dow Jones sixty-five Composite price index data. They hypothesize that if the opening auction is responsible for higher open-to-open volatility, a sudden drop in interdaily variance after the open should be observed. Instead, their findings are in contrast with their hypothesis and the interday 24-hour volatilities decline steady, reflecting information processing. Hence, halt of trade seems more likely to be the driving force rather than a call auction process as argued by Amihud and Mendelson (1987). Overall, although there is still no consensus, the majority of the research works support the notion that it is overnight trading halt rather than an auction procedure that is the source of the higher open interday volatility.

In addition to the examination of the interday return volatility, intraday return volatility of share prices has been found to follow a particular pattern, which is associated with the market microstructure characteristics of the stock exchange. Wood et al. (1985) are the first to identify the distinct U-shaped return and return volatility pattern over the trading day. Later, both Harris (1986) and Jain and Joh (1988) reported a significant U-shaped intraday return and return volatility patterns in stock trading in the NYSE.

Recently, Ozenbas, et al (2002) have examined intraday share price volatility over the year 2000 for five markets: the NYS, Nasdaq, the LSE, Euronext Paris and Deutsche Borse. They observed a U-shaped intraday volatility pattern, a particularly sharp spike for the opening half hour, and a general level of intraday volatility that is accentuated vis-à-vis volatility over longer differencing intervals in each of these markets. They suggest that the volatility accentuation is attributable to spreads, market impact, price discovery and momentum trading.

The theoretical explanations for the behaviour of these variables of the U-shaped patterns are not easy. Kyle (1985) suggests that traders can be classified into three classes: private information traders, random liquidity traders, and market makers. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) add a fourth type of trader to Kyle's model: discretionary liquidity traders. They take into account the impact, the costs, the size and the time of the trade. They



suggest that public and private information, and trading noise are the causes of a systematic pattern in return volatilities, which leads traders to minimize trading during the periods of the open and close of the market.

When public information is released during the non-trading period (overnight), the liquidity traders (random liquidity traders and discretionary liquidity traders) would be more active at the open of the market. When the market is near to close, the informed traders, who get access to private information during the trading hours, would be more active towards the close of trading before the information becomes public during the overnight non-trading periods. This public/private information and noise trading hypotheses are well supported by the empirical evidence of a U-shaped pattern in return volatilities (French and Roll, 1986 and Stoll and Whaley, 1990).

In addition to the evidence from the US market, there are some studies on emerging markets, particularly the Asian stock exchanges with their two trading sessions during a day. Chang et al. (1993) analyzes intraday returns and return volatilities for the index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and find a double U-shaped return pattern corresponding to its two trading sessions. Consistent to that reported for the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Cheung et al. (1994) also reported a double U-shaped volatility pattern for 15-minute intervals using the Hang Seng Index during the period April 1986 to December 1990. Examining the intra-daily seasonalities of the stock returns on the Turkish Stock Market in the period from 1996 to 1999, Bildik (2001) finds that stock return volatility follows a W-shaped pattern over the trading day, or more precisely a U-shaped pattern for the morning trading session and an L-shaped for the afternoon session on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Copeland and Jones (2002) provide evidence that for the intraday effects in the Korean market, there exists a U-shaped pattern over the day. They find that both volume and volatility are found to be consistently higher at the start of the trading day. Without market makers in these Asian markets, relatively higher mean return and volatility (measured by standard deviation) at the openings of the trading sessions in these markets, irrespective of whether either auction or continuous procedure or both are used for their market open, are found

by a majority of authors to be significantly generated by the accumulated overnight information and the closed-market effect (halt of trade).

Recently, the Singapore Stock Exchange (SSE) introduced a pre-trading routine (a periodic auction) that allowed brokers to place orders into the Exchange's computerized matching system for a period of 30 minutes prior to market's opening. Using 5-minute intraday data of the thirty-two most actively trading stocks for the period of six months prior to, and after, the introduction of this new system in August 2000, Young et al (2002) investigated the impact of the changes on volatility and the price discovery process and found that the pre-trading session significantly reduced opening stock market volatility, therefore helping in the price discovery process and the development of a more efficient and transparent market. The Opening vitality in the SSE dropped by over sixty-percent after the introduction of the pre-trading routine. Overall, although an intraday volatility pattern does not relate a higher open volatility to any driving forces, it does reveal the price discovery process and the pattern of the volatility, which provides further evidence to support the results found by using interdaily volatility.

Similar to Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990), we compare open-to-open and close-to-close volatility. However, this investigation is not adequate because even in the NYSE it is not clear whether or not the opening is unique while the closing is similar to other times of a day. When there are two trading halts during a trading day: one one-and-half hour lunch break and one five-minute trading halt after the morning call auction in the SHSE, comparisons between open-to-open return variance and close-to-close return variance do not reveal much about trading mechanisms. Thus, following Gerety and Mulherin (1994), Lam and Tong (1999) and Choe and Shin (1993), we expand our tests to compare open-to-open return variance to interday return variance measured at each 5-minute interval during a trading day as well as five-minute intraday return and return volatility in the following sessions.

### **3 Trading Systems and Dataset**

#### **3.1 Trading Systems**

The trading system in the SHSE is based on the electronic consolidated open limit order book (COLOB). Trading is carried out on the exchange in two sessions: the morning session from 09:30 to 11:30 and the afternoon session from 13:00 to 15:00. Before the morning session, there is a 10-minute open call (consolidated) auction session, which starts at 09:15 and ends at 09:25, for the determination of the centralized competitive opening price. During this 10-minute call auction period, investors can place limit orders and participate in the opening auction, but no orders will be allowed to be withdrawn during this period of time. There is also no information regarding order books available to investors during the auction process, except for the final clearing price generated at the end of the auction. Therefore, the morning call auction is totally without any information dissemination. Orders that are not executed in the opening auction are automatically transferred to the period of continuous trading. The determined opening price at 09:25 is continued to 09:30.

After a lunch break, the market reopens in the afternoon directly with a continuous auction without the consolidated auction. During the two continuous trading sessions, the electronic system is based on the matching of orders for the consecutive bidding according to price and time priorities. Closing prices of the stocks of the trading day in the SHSE are generated by taking a weighted average of the trading prices of the final minute of each trading day<sup>1</sup>. The information of the best three offers and bids and their associated volume as well as the price and volume for the latest transaction on the stock exchanges during the continuous trading sessions must be displayed on computer terminals viewable by investors on and off both exchanges. The market is closed on Saturdays and Sundays and other public holidays announced by the exchange.

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<sup>1</sup> Before December 1, 2001, the Shanghai Stock Exchange uses the last trading price as the close price.

There are no designated dealers (specialists) to intervene in trading in the market. Investors place their orders with the brokers in the form of either a market order or limit order, and only good-to-day limit orders are accepted by the trading system. At the end of the trading day, all orders are purged from the COLOB. There are no other sophisticated order types, such as trading-at-open, trading-at-close, stop orders, buy-at-minus and sell-at-plus, which are supported by the trading system. The minimum tick sizes for all stocks are 1 cent (RMB0.01 Yuan). Shares can't be sold on the same day once they are bought. The minimum trading size for purchase is 100 shares, while there is no minimum requirement for selling shares. Floor trading among member brokers, and short selling are strictly prohibited. During trading sessions on the SHSE, a stock is allowed to trade at a price plus or minus 10% from the previous day's closing price in order to avoid sharp price increases caused by 'buy manias' and sharp declines caused by 'sell panics'.

Overall, the operation of the SHSE is different from some other two-session order-driven markets. For example, the SEHK has a thoroughly continuous order-driven (i.e. no opening call market) trading, while in the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the periodic auction is used twice a day at the opening of both the morning and afternoon session and continuous order-driven trading markets in both the morning and the afternoon sessions in the trading day. In addition, there are also some differences in trading rules such as price limit, tick size and short-selling restriction between the SHSE and those more similar order-driven Asian markets. The Chinese stock markets are also different from all the other markets with morning auction opening procedure: not only due to the fact that there is no specialists involved in the markets, but also the Chinese stock markets take five-minute break between the periodic auction and the morning session with continuous trading mechanism.

A further difference lies in the broader nature of the trading environment. Like many other emerging markets, the SHSE has a relative immature infrastructure such as an inadequate disclosure, an opaque legal and governance framework, and an inexperienced regulator. The co-existence of an inexperienced

regulator with a limited number of informed investors with financial strength, and an enormous member of uninformed and unprotected investors with budget constraint, gives informed investors an opportunity to manipulate stock prices to earn a profit at the expense of the uninformed investors (Lu and Lee, 2004).

### **3.2 Dataset**

This paper uses intraday data from the Shanghai Composite Price Index, which is a value weighted index of all common stocks listed on the SHSE<sup>2</sup>. The Shanghai Composite Index took December 19, 1990 as its base day to calculate the base market capitalization. The index is the most widely-quoted index of the Chinese stock markets, both locally and internationally. We examine the five-minute interval Shanghai Composite Index series covering the three-year trading period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2002, a total of 716 trading days with more than 30,000 observations. The data were provided by the SIRCA. The dataset of the Shanghai Composite Index records information on the time-stamped transactions, including the code, the order of time interval, the trading date, the day, trading time, the opening value, the highest value, the lowest value and the closing value in each time interval in each trading day.

### **3.3 Returns**

Interday returns are calculated as the logarithmic percentage returns of the Index on day  $t$ . Three interday open-to-open returns at the auction open at 09:25, the morning open at 09:30 and the afternoon open at 13:30 are computed as

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<sup>2</sup> All the common stocks issued and traded in the SHSE include both the A-shares and B-shares. The A-shares are domestic ordinary shares denominated and traded in RMB by Chinese citizens while the B-shares are ordinary shares offered to foreign investors, denominated in RMB, but traded in foreign currency. Moreover, while there is a separate auction procedure implemented five-minutes before the normal morning opens with continuous trading at 10.00 each trading day for the A-share market, the B-share market just opens at 10.00 with a continuous trading mechanism. However, the market capitalization of the A-shares is about 10-20 times larger than that of the B-shares and also the A-shares are much more actively traded each day. For this reason, we treat all the shares constructing the Shanghai Composite Index trade the same way as the A-shares in the SHSE with a separate auction procedure prior to the market open.

$\ln[\text{open}(t)/\text{open}(t-1)]$ , while the interday close-to-close return at any other 5-minute interval is calculated as  $\ln[\text{close}(t)/\text{close}(t-1)]$ .

Intraday interval returns are computed by taking the first difference of the natural logarithm of the successive interval values of the indices.  $R_t$ , the return on stock indices at the interval  $t$ , is computed as  $\ln(P_t / P_{t-1})$ , where, for each interval during the trading day,  $P_t$  is the closing value of the interval at time  $t$  and  $P_{t-1}$  is the closing value of proceeding interval at time  $t-1$ .

As there are two sessions in the trading day, the 5-minute returns consist of 48 observations over the two sessions from 09:30 to 11:30 and from 13:00 to 15:00 in a trading day with 34,368 observations over the three years. The first and last 5-minute intervals for the morning session are from 09:30 to 09:35 and from 11:25 to 11:30, respectively. The first and last 5-minute intervals for the afternoon session are from 13:00 to 13:05 and from 14:55 to 15:00, respectively. Thus, the 48 5-minute intervals throughout the trading day break up into 24 intervals for the morning session and 24 intervals for the afternoon session.

For calculating the 5-minute intraday returns, if there is no trading at the end of the 5 minutes, the closest trading price to the end of the 5-minute is the closing value of that 5-minute interval. The return for the first 5-minute interval of the trading day is calculated by comparing the closing value at  $t_1$  (09:35) with the closing value at time  $t_0$  (09:30) when the trading starts. The close-to-open (overnight or non-trading) return is computed by comparing the closing value at time  $t_0$  (09:30) with the last value (closing value) at time  $t_{48}$  (15:00) of the previous day-end. Open-to-close returns are computed by comparing the last value (closing value) at time  $t_{48}$  (15:00) with the opening value (closing value at time  $t_0$ ) at 09:30 of the trading day<sup>3</sup>.

In the study, parametric tests, such as the mean equality test, and the non-parametric tests (such as Kruskal-Wallis test, Levene test and modified Levene test, Brown and Forsythe test), are applied. Nonparametric tests are shown to be

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<sup>3</sup> Another way is to standardise return series by subtracting each observation from the mean of the sum of all corresponding intervals and then dividing the difference by the standard deviation of its corresponding 5-minute interval. The results may be obtained upon request.

statistically superior to parametric tests in detecting abnormal price reactions for small time intervals (Mucklow, 1994). Kruskal-Wallis tests report the asymptotic normal approximation to the U-statistic (with continuity and tie correction) and the p-values for a two-sided test. The Levene test (Levene, 1960) and the Brown and Forsythe (1974) test (a modified Levene test) are used for testing the equality of variances. The Levene test is based on an analysis of variance of the absolute difference from the mean. The Brown and Forsythe test employs absolute deviations from the class means. When empirical distributions are not normal, the Brown and Forsythe test can provide robust results based on deviations from the median.

## **4 Empirical analysis**

### **4.1 Interday return volatility**

We first analyse interday mean return and return variances measured at various times of the day by rolling the time from the auction open to the afternoon close by 5 minutes. Table 1 and Figure 1 shows the interday descriptive statistics of mean interday returns, variances and the tests of variance ratio for the call auction open (09:25), the morning open (09:30) (in the continuous trading), first interval at 09:35, other related 5-minute intervals. In Figure 1, the bottom line represents the plot of interdaily mean return through time. The mean return has a big drop at the morning open at 09:30 after the minor negative opening at the call auction. Within the next half hour until 10:30, the mean return first jumps back to near the auction open level and then constantly declines before a slightly rise at the market close.

The line at the top shows the interdaily volatility through time. Variance ratios for each interday return compared to the afternoon close-to-close are reported as the line in the middle. According to Amihud and Mendelson (1987), one would expect that the variance ratio test of the call auction would be larger and significantly different, but the variance ratio test of all other interday returns

in the continuous trading period, are not larger and significantly different compared to the close-to-close interday return; the market volatility in the call auction may indeed be affected by the call auction method alone.

When we compare the variance ratios between the call auction and the afternoon open, the result may suggest that call auction trading alone increases return volatility. The result (1.23) is basically consistent with the variance ratio of 1.20 found by Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and of 1.13 found by Stoll and Whaley (1990), who show that the interday 24-hour open-to-open return variance is higher than the interday 24-hour close-to-close return variance in the US stock market. We think that the pattern documented here is different from that in the US market although there is not any study that analyses a less-than-hourly intraday pattern of interday return volatility in the U. S. markets.

Our results reveal that the return variance is the second highest at the auction open at 09:25, 5min later when the markets start with continuous trading, the variance reaches its highest during the morning open, before falling back at 09:35. The variances at these three points of times (2.535, 2.671 and 2.517) are the greatest, and the variance ratio tests indicate that all these first three interday return variances are all significantly different from the interday close-to-close interday return variance. After the lunch break, interday return variance increases and the variance ratios are larger than one for the first three 5-minute intervals (although they are not significantly different from the interday close-to-close in the SHSE) before the ratios fall below 1 for the rest of the afternoon until the market's close. It is interesting to note that the variance of open-to-open returns in the continuous morning opening at 09:30 is actually higher than the variance of the open-to-open returns at the auction opening. The higher open-to-open return variance at the morning open than that during the auction open might be caused by the halt-of-trading effect, rather than the accumulated information during that five-minute period. It is too short a time period between these two openings to judge the effect of the auction open and the morning open with continuous trading. However, the arrangement of a five-minute break between the call auction and the beginning of the continuous trading is more than necessary and



should be cancelled due to the extra volatility created by this mechanism which certainly fails to improve the market quality.

[Insert Table 1]

[Insert Figure 1]

Thus, the hypothesis that the volatility is entirely caused by trading mechanisms at the market open is rejected because there was no observed sudden drop in interdaily variance after the market open according to the hypothesis suggested by Gerety and Mulherin (1994). Rather, this result provides evidence to suggest that on the Chinese stock market, the accumulated overnight information not the halt of trade is the driving force for higher return volatility at the market open. The highest volatility at the morning open with continuous trading is more consistent with the effect of the lack of trading continuity due to the trading halt. To a much lesser extent, a high level of interday volatility at the afternoon market open could also be attributed to the lack of trading continuity and the information accumulated during that lunch break. The effect of these factors should be much less than the other two breaks due to the statistical insignificance of the high volatility ratio tests during the afternoon open.

#### **4.2 Volatility in Trading and non-Trading Periods**

Studies focused on the volatility in trading and non-trading periods will help us to understand the price formation of security and its association with trading mechanisms the exchange adopts. Existing studies found that the return variance in the active trading hours (open-to-close) of the security market is larger than that in the nontrading hours (close-to-open) (French and Roll, 1986; Barclay, et al, 1990; Stoll and Whaley, 1990). French and Roll (1986) test the private information hypothesis and report that return variances are reduced by both the election day closing and the exchange holidays, whereas Barclay et al. (1990)

support the same hypothesis using an opposite case in which return variances are increased by Saturday trading on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The large difference between the variances of the trading and the non-trading periods is mainly attributable to the greater intensity of information arriving during the business hours. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of mean return and variance during the overnight period (close-to-open or C-O), morning session, lunch break, afternoon session, and daily trading period (open-to-close or O-C).

**[Insert Table 2]**

In Table 2, we show that the volatility in terms of the variance of the open-to-close period is more than four times that of the close-to-open (overnight) period (1.703% versus 0.388%). This is consistent with the U.S. results as reported by Lockwood and Linn (1990) in that the open-to-close return variance exceeds that of close-to-open return by a factor of 2.34 to 3.37. The results also support the hypothesis that private information is disclosed during trading hours. It should be noted that the return volatility in the morning trading session (0.604%) is greater than the volatility measured during the afternoon trading session (0.529%). This confirms further that private information is not produced at a constant rate even during the trading period. It also implies fewer price reversals occur as trade proceeds.

In terms of unit time volatility, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find that the two-hour midday break in Japan has a higher return volatility than the overnight break. They argue that this difference could result from the greater intensity of information arrival during the day compared to the overnight period. In contrast, Lam and Tong (1999) show that an overnight variance of 0.027 is more than double the midday break variance of 0.001 in terms of unit time volatility. They argue that the higher overnight variance was attributed to probably the trading of some component stocks in London overnight. The results in Table 2 also show that the per-hour overnight volatility is five times greater than the lunch break in the Shanghai index (0.021% vs. 0.004%), which is

consistent with the findings of Lam and Tong (1999) for the Hong Kong market but inconsistent with those of Amihud and Mendelson (1991) for the Japanese market. Without the complication like Hong Kong market, a lower volatility during the 11:30 to 13:00 period could just reflect a lower intensity of new information arriving over these one and half hours than that overnight.

Meanwhile, the sum (1.527) of the mean variances of the four periods, including the morning session (0.604), lunch (0.006), afternoon (0.529) and overnight (0.388) is less than 25.73% of the mean daily variance of close-to-close return (2.056)<sup>4</sup>. These results are consistent with Chang et al (1993) and Lam and Tong (1999) but not with Amihud and Mendelson (1991) or Bildik (2001). Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find that the sum of the variances of the four separate time intervals, including overnight, morning session, lunch break, and afternoon session, exceeds the close-to-close return variance by 21.7%. Our result implies that the covariances between each pair of consecutive trading periods are positive. This result supports the results of Lam and Tong's (1999) explanation for the difference between the results of Amihud and Mendelson's (1991) and theirs to the fact the former looked at individual stocks instead of looking at a stock index. Individual stocks tend to exhibit negative autocorrelation due to the bid-ask bounce, whereas stock indices tend to exhibit positive correlation due to various reasons (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990).

### **4.3 Intraday Return and volatility**

Table 3 and Figure 2 provide the 5-minute intraday returns (in percentage) for the year 2000-2002. From the bottom lines of Table 3, negative mean 5-minute returns ("All") are observed during the 3-year period and they are close to zero, equal to -0.0014%. The skewness is generally not obvious but the values of excess kurtosis are larger during the three-year period. The Jarque-Bera and

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<sup>4</sup> The computation for these return series are for Morning: 09:30 – 11:30, for lunch break: 11:30am – 13:00 (afternoon opening price), for afternoon: 13:00 – 15:00 and for overnight: 15:00 – 09:30 next day.

Anderson-Darling tests of normality have p-values less than 0.01, thus each test would reject the null hypothesis of normality. These indicated that the returns data is non-normal and has a fat-tailed distribution on the Chinese stock market.

**[Insert Table 3 Here]**

**[Insert Figure 2 Here]**

The right-hand plot of Figure 2 show that there are large, positive mean returns at the beginning of the trading day and a big upward increase in returns at the end of the trading day, which presents typical U-shaped patterns. These intraday effects are consistent with the previous literature on the US market (Wood et al, 1985; Harris, 1986; Jain and Joh, 1988; Lockwood and Linn, 1990) and other countries such as the Hong Kong market (Cheung, 1995) and the Turkish market (Bildik, 2001). It is interesting to see these price changes (high returns) in the morning open in the Shanghai index. Possible reasons are the overnight halt of trade and the effect of accumulated information released, which reflects the new price-discovery process, and the high returns at the trading closing can be attributed to informed traders with private information for the next day's opening. Different informed and uninformed traders may lead to new price discovery. In addition, large closing returns imply that the specialist-related explanation of Miller (1989) should be refuted in the Chinese stock market since there is no specialist system. The findings show that the large price changes at market openings and closings needs to be improved in the Chinese exchange, which underscores the importance of making the trading systems more efficient.

In Table 4, results of the F-tests for the equality of mean return show that the null hypothesis for equality of intraday returns across the 5-minute intervals is rejected at a 1% level. The results of KW-tests for the equality of mean return median confirm that the null hypothesis for equality of intraday return medians across the 5-minute intervals is also rejected at a 1% level. Both the F-tests and KW-tests have consistent results. This result confirms that there is a strong systematic intraday return pattern existing on the Chinese stock market. It should

be noted that the first two intervals from 09:30 to 09:35 and from 09:35 to 09:40 of the morning session are significantly important at a 1% level for the index.

**[Insert Table 4]**

Table 5 and Figure 2 present the standard deviation of the mean 5-minute returns. With the largest volatility at the beginning of the morning session, the two indices have distinct L-shaped patterns, inconsistent with the U-shaped patterns observed in the US market by Wood et al. (1985), Harris (1986), Jain and Joh (1988) and Goodhart and O'Hara (1997)).

**[Insert Table 5]**

The mean volatility of 0.363% during the opening, or the first 5-minute interval, is almost triple that of the rest of the day. Volatility goes down sharply during the next 25 minutes. The lowest volatility of 0.096% occurs before the 5-minute ending of the morning session. The volatility begins to rise in the last 5-minutes of the morning session to 0.123%. At the beginning of the afternoon session volatility continues to rise to a higher level, 0.194%, in the first 5 minutes, which represents the largest volatility throughout the afternoon session. After that it comes down again (with lowest 0.093% at 13:20) and fluctuates until the end of the day to 0.116%, which is 1/3 of its value at the opening. A large opening volatility supports the fact that the mean return at the opening is significantly higher than that of most other intervals during the day.

In Table 5, the results from the Levene-tests show that the null hypothesis of equality of volatility of mean 5-minute returns across the 5-minute intervals is rejected at a 1% level. The Brown-Forsythe tests have the same results as the Levene tests. Thus, intraday volatility in terms of the variance of 5-minute returns is not distributed equally across the 5-minute intervals and the time-of-day effect on the intraday return volatilities can not be rejected. These results support the observation made before that there are systematic intraday volatility patterns

existing in the Chinese stock market. It could be said that volatility resembles an L-shaped pattern if the slight increase in volatility at the afternoon opening (13:00) were to be ignored, which is in contrast to the U-shaped volatility patterns documented in previous literature in most other markets.

The high volatility at the open would be evidence for price change during the opening processing period. During the trading halts, information released by the central government, related management agencies and the companies, about macroeconomic, social or political news, and the trading information, significantly affect the market's outlook as well as investment decisions<sup>5</sup>. On the other hand, there are slightly higher volatilities at the morning closing; the volatilities continuously fall during the last few five-minutes until the market's close in the afternoon session, which is not consistent with the pattern documented in the US market - rather it is consistent with the Hong Kong market (Lam and Tong, 1999; Tang and Lui, 2002). One possible reason is that the market portfolio's rebalancing force, which causes higher volatility at the close in the US market, does not exist on the Chinese market. The size of the market portfolio funds for investors is still fairly small and the management of these funds is still relatively premature compared to their western counterparts.

## **5 Conclusion**

The object of this paper is to examine the behaviour of interday and intraday return and return volatility in the SHSE, which is a limit order-driven markets using electronic trading without market makers.

The volatility of interday returns and variance ratio tests suggest an L-shaped pattern, or more precisely two L-shaped patterns starting with a small hump during both the morning and afternoon session. During the morning opening, both auction and continuous trading have much higher interday volatility. High volatility of intraday returns for the market's open is not mainly

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<sup>5</sup> In China, most important events, including government policy information and firm-specific information, are released in the evening.

due to the trading mechanisms (call auction in the market opening) but also due to both the overnight trading halt and accumulated information. By comparing the volatility of trading and non-trading periods, we also found that the return variance in the active trading period (open-to-close) of the stock market is larger than that in the nontrading hours (close-to-open), while overnight volatility is bigger than that of the lunch break.

This L-shaped interday volatility is also supported by the similarly shaped intraday volatility pattern, while intraday returns do actually follow the U-shaped pattern as suggested by Wood et al. (1985). The noticeable L-shaped volatility pattern is due to flow of information and market microstructure, which are related to the generation and dissemination of information, the arrival of orders and the rules and institutional features of a stock market that determine how orders are transformed into trades.

Overnight information has an enormous impact on stock volatility. This implies that accumulated information (public and private) from overnight is reflected in prices immediately at the opening of the day. Therefore, in contrast to other 5-minute intraday price changes that reflect the news released during the corresponding 5-minute interval, the first few 5-minute return volatilities reflect the assimilating information that was released and accumulated due to a much longer overnight trading halt. These abnormal trading activities of different traders in the market's opening are related to their different information (public and private) that causes the L-shaped volatility in the markets.

Furthermore, private information is most likely asymmetric among investors. Private information accumulated over the trading halt is incorporated in the stock prices when the trading opens. Traders who have no access to private information would trade on random factors unrelated to information. Insiders including manipulators may try to trade along with the trading activities of private information traders in order to obtain the private information indirectly.

The purpose of using the auction procedure is to stabilize prices after the overnight trading halt. However, the blind arrangement actually defeated the whole purpose of providing this open procedure particularly in the case of the

Chinese stock markets. The Chinese market with its short history is dominated by high share of domestic inexperienced investors in share trading. They tend to show severe ‘herd behaviour’. These small liquidity providers do not have much interest in participating in the morning call auction and even the following first few minutes after the market opens with continuous trading at 09:30 due to the information asymmetry.

Meanwhile, there is wide spread manipulation due to its special shareholding structure and general trading environment. Like many other emerging markets, the SHSE has a relatively immature infrastructure such as an inadequate disclosure system, an opaque legal and governance framework and an inexperienced regulator. The co-existence of an inexperienced regulator with a limited number of informed investors with financial strength, and an enormous number of uninformed and unprotected investors with budget constraints, gives informed investors an opportunity to manipulate stock prices to earn a profit at the expense of the uninformed investors (Lu and Lee, 2004).

The market makers such as the specialists on the NYSE and, to a lesser extent, dealers in the LSE are involved markedly at the market call auction in order to exploit monopolist profits due to the asymmetric information between them and normal liquidity providers. Chinese insiders and manipulators were not able to do this presumably because there is no sufficient liquidity during the open process. Instead, Chinese insiders and manipulators intend to manipulate market prices by placing and withdrawing their offers during the call auction process and when the market opens. That is the reason for a higher volatility at these two opens in the morning.

Having the blind auction reduced an auction’s role of producing an effective market clearing price at the end of the auction, since it pushes away many uninformed investors who are instead choosing to participate in the more transparent continuous trading period. Moreover, the five-minute break after auction creates another trading halt effect. This trading halt effect does not necessarily lead to an accumulation of substantial information during such a short period of time compared to the overnight halt but rather brings uncertainty into



the market when it opens again. In addition to the delaying the participation of uninformed small investors from the blind auction, the interday volatility at the market open at 09.30 thus reaches its highest level during a trading day.

In conclusion, the high volatilities observed at the market open are costly to the market in aggregate, which discourages trade and make investors' returns more uncertain. The five-minute break after the auction and blind auction procedure itself are the two major reasons for the high intraday volatility observed. Converting the blind procedure into a transparent one and eliminating the five-minute break after the auction should improve the market quality in terms of lower volatility at the market open.

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**Table 1** Interday 24-hour returns, return volatility and variance ratio test, the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 - 2002

No	Time	Mean	Variance			No	Time	Mean	Variance		
			Variance	Ratio	P				Variance	Ratio	P
0	<b>Auction Call</b>	-0.0002	2.535	1.233***	0.005						
	<b>Morning</b>						<b>Afternoon</b>				
	<b>Open</b>	-0.0034	2.671	1.299***	0.000		<b>Open</b>	-0.0020	2.062	0.999	0.993
1	<b>09:35-09:35</b>	-0.0003	2.517	1.224***	0.007	25	<b>13:05-13:05</b>	-0.0025	2.189	1.065	0.401
2	<b>09:40-09:40</b>	0.0002	1.997	0.971	0.698	26	<b>13:10-13:10</b>	-0.0030	2.190	1.065	0.398
3	<b>09:45-09:45</b>	0.0006	1.824	0.887	0.110	27	<b>13:15-13:15</b>	-0.0031	2.080	1.012	0.875
4	<b>09:50-09:50</b>	0.0006	1.879	0.914	0.230	28	<b>13:20-13:20</b>	-0.0030	1.995	0.97	0.688
5	<b>09:55-09:55</b>	0.0006	1.908	0.928	0.321	29	<b>13:25-13:25</b>	-0.0031	1.991	0.968	0.668
6	<b>10:00-10:00</b>	0.0006	1.926	0.937	0.385	30	<b>13:30-13:30</b>	-0.0034	2.024	0.985	0.835
7	<b>10:05-10:05</b>	0.0006	1.879	0.954	0.531	31	<b>13:35-13:35</b>	-0.0038	2.024	0.984	0.834
8	<b>10:10-10:10</b>	0.0006	1.908	0.959	0.576	32	<b>13:40-13:40</b>	-0.0039	2.010	0.978	0.766
9	<b>10:15-10:15</b>	0.0006	1.926	0.98	0.790	33	<b>13:45-13:45</b>	-0.0038	2.004	0.975	0.734
10	<b>10:20-10:20</b>	0.0004	1.961	0.995	0.949	34	<b>13:50-13:50</b>	-0.0037	1.980	0.963	0.615
11	<b>10:25-10:25</b>	0.0000	1.971	0.998	0.978	35	<b>13:55-13:55</b>	-0.0038	1.956	0.951	0.506
12	<b>10:30-10:30</b>	-0.0003	2.015	0.98	0.786	36	<b>14:00-14:00</b>	-0.0041	1.915	0.932	0.345
13	<b>10:35-10:35</b>	-0.0003	2.046	0.971	0.697	37	<b>14:05-14:05</b>	-0.0040	1.947	0.947	0.467
14	<b>10:40-10:40</b>	-0.0002	2.051	0.959	0.574	38	<b>14:10-14:10</b>	-0.0038	1.991	0.968	0.668
15	<b>10:45-10:45</b>	-0.0002	2.014	0.959	0.576	39	<b>14:15-14:15</b>	-0.0037	1.977	0.962	0.602
16	<b>10:50-10:50</b>	-0.0004	1.996	0.935	0.368	40	<b>14:20-14:20</b>	-0.0039	1.935	0.942	0.421
17	<b>10:55-11:55</b>	-0.0005	1.971	0.912	0.219	41	<b>14:25-14:25</b>	-0.0044	1.930	0.939	0.400
18	<b>11:00-11:00</b>	-0.0009	1.971	0.898	0.152	42	<b>14:30-14:30</b>	-0.0047	1.926	0.937	0.385
19	<b>11:05-11:05</b>	-0.0011	1.922	0.891	0.125	43	<b>14:35-14:35</b>	-0.0047	1.924	0.936	0.376
20	<b>11:10-11:10</b>	-0.0014	1.875	0.911	0.211	44	<b>14:40-14:40</b>	-0.0053	1.944	0.946	0.457
21	<b>11:15-11:15</b>	-0.0012	1.846	0.916	0.243	45	<b>14:45-14:45</b>	-0.0057	1.982	0.964	0.628
22	<b>11:20-11:20</b>	-0.0013	1.865	0.907	0.193	46	<b>14:50-14:50</b>	-0.0056	2.000	0.973	0.714
23	<b>11:25-11:25</b>	-0.0015	1.868	0.909	0.200	47	<b>14:55-14:55</b>	-0.0056	2.024	0.984	0.834
	<b>11:30-11:30</b>						<b>15:00-15:00</b>				
24	<b>(MorningClose)</b>	-0.0018	1.916	0.932	0.349	48	<b>(Close-Close)</b>	-0.0049	2.056	1	1

**Notes:** \*\*: 5% level of significance. \*\*\*: 1% level of significance.

**Table 2** Descriptive statistics for the returns of the trading and non-trading period of the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 - 2002 (In percentage)

<b>Shanghai Composite Index in Percentage</b>				
	<b>Time</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Variance</b>	<b>Variance Ratio</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Overnight</b>	0.0655	0.388	0.733
<b>2</b>	<b>Morning</b>	-0.1407	0.604	1.142
<b>3</b>	<b>Lunch Break</b>	0.0083	0.006	0.011
<b>4</b>	<b>Afternoon</b>	0.0705	0.529	1.000
	<b>(1)+(2)+</b>		<hr style="width: 50%; margin: 0 auto;"/>	
	<b>(3)+(4)</b>		1.527	
<b>5</b>	<b>Open-close</b>	-0.0665	1.703	3.219
<b>6</b>	<b>Close-close</b>	-0.0049	2.056	3.887

Note: The computation for these return series are for morning 09:30 – 11:30, for lunch break: 11:30 – 13:00 (afternoon opening price), for afternoon: 13:00 – 15:00 and for overnight: 15:00 – 09:30 next day.

**Table 3** Descriptive statistics of the intraday 5-minute returns in percentages of the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 - 2002

No	Interval	Size	Mean	Max	Min.	Std.	Skew.	ExKurt.	J.Bera	Cum.	No	Interval	Size	Mean	Max	Min.	Std.	Skew.	ExKurt.	J.Bera	Cum.
1	9:30-9:35	716	0.0306	2.39	-2.39	0.363	-0.02	12.24	2545.1	0.03	25	13:00-13:05	716	0.0036	1.06	-2.27	0.194	-2.047	32.27	26061	-0.137
2	9:35-9:40	716	-0.0403	1.62	-1.37	0.266	0.615	9.93	1477.7	-0.01	26	13:05-13:10	716	-0.0252	0.73	-0.49	0.091	1.114	15.19	4584.1	-0.162
3	9:40-9:45	716	-0.0110	1.18	-1.09	0.201	0.774	9.65	1390.4	-0.02	27	13:10-13:15	716	-0.0179	1.3	-0.54	0.106	2.93	40.33	42598	-0.18
4	9:45-9:50	716	-0.0025	0.88	-0.83	0.151	0.252	8.19	812.5	-0.02	28	13:15-13:20	716	-0.0049	0.95	-0.71	0.093	0.952	28.76	19911	-0.185
5	9:50-9:55	716	-0.0070	0.74	-0.73	0.151	-0.33	7.78	694.4	-0.03	29	13:20-13:25	716	-0.0002	0.72	-0.42	0.097	0.581	10.48	1711.3	-0.185
6	9:55-10:00	716	-0.0103	0.73	-0.82	0.141	-0.11	9.31	1189.1	-0.04	30	13:25-13:30	716	0.0027	0.68	-0.49	0.109	0.376	9.07	1116.6	-0.182
7	10:00-10:05	716	-0.0080	0.85	-0.76	0.125	-0.22	10.11	1515.1	-0.05	31	13:30-13:35	716	0.0056	0.83	-0.46	0.117	0.463	9.44	1263.7	-0.177
8	10:05-10:10	716	-0.0090	0.87	-1.25	0.153	-0.91	14.45	4013.7	-0.06	32	13:35-13:40	716	0.008	0.9	-0.63	0.114	0.668	12.94	3003.3	-0.169
9	10:10-10:15	716	-0.0062	0.95	-0.67	0.135	0.159	9.51	1268.4	-0.06	33	13:40-13:45	716	0.0124	0.65	-0.58	0.114	0.283	8.41	883	-0.156
10	10:15-10:20	716	-0.0114	0.93	-0.88	0.15	-0.13	11.59	2203.4	-0.08	34	13:45-13:50	716	0.0088	1.06	-1.02	0.134	0.663	18.5	7215.8	-0.148
11	10:20-10:25	716	-0.0071	1.09	-0.74	0.138	0.428	12.22	2560.5	-0.08	35	13:50-13:55	716	0.005	0.72	-0.72	0.124	-0.013	11.38	2095.3	-0.143
12	10:25-10:30	716	-0.0024	0.59	-0.79	0.129	-0.75	9.81	1450.2	-0.09	36	13:55-14:00	716	0.0052	0.69	-0.59	0.126	0.336	9.41	1241.1	-0.137
13	10:30-10:35	716	0.0064	0.82	-1.21	0.136	-0.86	16.43	5472	-0.08	37	14:00-14:05	716	0.0029	0.57	-0.7	0.125	-0.394	8.69	985.1	-0.135
14	10:35-10:40	716	0.0017	0.86	-1.09	0.137	-0.09	14.68	4070.3	-0.08	38	14:05-14:10	716	0.003	0.57	-0.7	0.136	-0.25	7.8	694.6	-0.132
15	10:40-10:45	716	-0.0032	0.98	-0.57	0.131	1.103	12.21	2674.9	-0.08	39	14:10-14:15	716	0.0043	1.12	-0.7	0.136	0.903	15.78	4967.7	-0.127
16	10:45-10:50	716	-0.0088	0.86	-0.65	0.13	0.396	10.74	1807.2	-0.09	40	14:15-14:20	716	0.0032	1.14	-0.65	0.142	0.939	13.29	3266.1	-0.124
17	10:50-10:55	716	-0.0051	0.72	-0.52	0.116	0.524	9.16	1165.5	-0.09	41	14:20-14:25	716	-0.0034	1.01	-1.02	0.144	-0.427	13.06	3038.3	-0.127
18	10:55-11:00	716	-0.0068	0.86	-0.52	0.119	0.94	12.32	2699.3	-0.1	42	14:25-14:30	716	-0.0044	0.57	-0.76	0.137	-0.435	7.81	713.3	-0.132
19	11:00-11:05	716	-0.0141	0.68	-0.98	0.117	-0.19	15.61	4746.4	-0.12	43	14:30-14:35	716	0.0052	0.9	-0.75	0.15	0.245	8.91	1050.9	-0.127
20	11:05-11:10	716	-0.0135	0.57	-0.69	0.111	-0.11	8.75	987.7	-0.13	44	14:35-14:40	716	0.0019	0.88	-0.87	0.154	-0.218	9	1079.1	-0.125
21	11:10-11:15	716	-0.0072	0.53	-0.9	0.112	-0.62	12.42	2692.7	-0.14	45	14:40-14:45	716	-0.0149	0.75	-0.97	0.158	-0.718	9.1	1172.2	-0.14
22	11:15-11:20	716	-0.0107	0.47	-0.76	0.1	-0.59	10.38	1668.6	-0.15	46	14:45-14:50	716	-0.0208	0.67	-1.45	0.148	-1.452	18.15	7096.5	-0.16
23	11:20-11:25	716	-0.0072	0.48	-0.65	0.096	-1.11	12.52	2852	-0.15	47	14:50-14:55	716	-0.0078	0.74	-0.95	0.128	-0.94	13.55	3427.7	-0.168
24	11:25-11:30	716	0.0125	0.68	-1.76	0.123	-4.67	69.55	134743	-0.14	48	14:55-15:00	716	0.1017	0.77	-0.44	0.116	0.193	7.96	738.5	-0.067
	<b>Overnight</b>	715	0.0655	8.70	-2.26	0.623	8.22	101.477	296966			<b>All</b>	34368	-0.0014	2.39	-2.39	0.146	-0.024	22.422	540173	

Note: All does not include overnight returns

**Table 4** Mean intraday 5-minute returns by trading time in percentage of the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 - 2002

No	Time	Returns	No	Time	Returns
1	9:30-9:35	0.0306 <sup>c</sup>	25	13:00-13:05	0.0036
2	9:35-9:40	-0.0403 <sup>c</sup>	26	13:05-13:10	-0.0252 <sup>c</sup>
3	9:40-9:45	-0.0110 <sup>a</sup>	27	13:10-13:15	-0.0179 <sup>c</sup>
4	9:45-9:50	-0.0025	28	13:15-13:20	-0.0049
5	9:50-9:55	-0.0070	29	13:20-13:25	-0.0002
6	9:55-10:00	-0.0103	30	13:25-13:30	0.0027
7	10:00-10:05	-0.0080	31	13:30-13:35	0.0056
8	10:05-10:10	-0.0090	39	14:10-14:15	0.0043
9	10:10-10:15	-0.0062	40	14:15-14:20	0.0032
10	10:15-10:20	-0.0114 <sup>a</sup>	41	14:20-14:25	-0.0034
11	10:20-10:25	-0.0071	42	14:25-14:30	-0.0044
12	10:25-10:30	-0.0024	43	14:30-14:35	0.0052
13	10:30-10:35	0.0064	44	14:35-14:40	0.0019
14	10:35-10:40	0.0017	45	14:40-14:45	-0.0149 <sup>c</sup>
15	10:40-10:45	-0.0032	46	14:45-14:50	-0.0208 <sup>c</sup>
16	10:45-10:50	-0.0088	47	14:50-14:55	-0.0078
17	10:50-10:55	-0.0051	48	14:55-15:00	0.1017 <sup>c</sup>
18	10:55-11:00	-0.0068			
19	11:00-11:05	-0.0141 <sup>b</sup>		<b>Overnight</b>	0.0655 <sup>c</sup>
20	11:05-11:10	-0.0135 <sup>b</sup>		<b>All</b>	-0.0014
21	11:10-11:15	-0.0072			
22	11:15-11:20	-0.0107 <sup>a</sup>		<b>F-test</b>	12.073***
23	11:20-11:25	-0.0072		<b>KW-test</b>	1119***
24	11:25-11:30	0.0125 <sup>b</sup>			

**Notes:** (1) F-test is the F statistic testing the equality of the intraday returns. (2) KW-test is the non-parametric Kruskal Wallis statistic testing the equality of the intraday returns. (3) 10% level of significance: \*. 5% level of significance: \*\*. 1% level of significance: \*\*\*. (4) 10% level of significance: **a**. 5% level of significance: **b**. 1% level of significance: **c**.




**Table 5** Mean 5-minute return standard deviations of the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000  
- 2002 (in Percentage)

No.	Time	Standard deviations	No.	Time	Standard deviations
1	9:30-9:35	0.363	25	13:00-13:05	0.194
2	9:35-9:40	0.266	26	13:05-13:10	0.091
3	9:40-9:45	0.201	27	13:10-13:15	0.106
4	9:45-9:50	0.151	28	13:15-13:20	0.093
5	9:50-9:55	0.151	29	13:20-13:25	0.097
6	9:55-10:00	0.141	30	13:25-13:30	0.109
7	10:00-10:05	0.125	31	13:30-13:35	0.117
8	10:05-10:10	0.153	32	13:35-13:40	0.114
9	10:10-10:15	0.135	33	13:40-13:45	0.114
10	10:15-10:20	0.150	34	13:45-13:50	0.134
11	10:20-10:25	0.138	35	13:50-13:55	0.124
12	10:25-10:30	0.129	36	13:55-14:00	0.126
13	10:30-10:35	0.136	37	14:00-14:05	0.125
14	10:35-10:40	0.137	38	14:05-14:10	0.136
15	10:40-10:45	0.131	39	14:10-14:15	0.136
16	10:45-10:50	0.130	40	14:15-14:20	0.142
17	10:50-10:55	0.116	41	14:20-14:25	0.144
18	10:55-11:00	0.119	42	14:25-14:30	0.137
19	11:00-11:05	0.117	43	14:30-14:35	0.150
20	11:05-11:10	0.111	44	14:35-14:40	0.154
21	11:10-11:15	0.112	45	14:40-14:45	0.158
22	11:15-11:20	0.100	46	14:45-14:50	0.148
23	11:20-11:25	0.096	47	14:50-14:55	0.128
24	11:25-11:30	0.123	48	14:55-15:00	0.116
				<b>Overnight</b>	0.623
				<b>All</b>	0.146
				<b>Levene-test</b>	43.83***
				<b>Brown-Forsythe test</b>	43.021***

Notes: \*: 10% level of significance; \*\*: 5% level of significance. \*\*\*: 1% level of significance.


**Figure 1 Interdaily mean return, variance and variance ratio, the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000-2002**




Note: vratio means variance ratios.

**Figure 2** The mean 5-minute intraday returns in percentage and return volatility based on standard deviations of the Shanghai Composite Index, 2000 - 2002.

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Mean 5-minute intraday return of Shanghai Index



Volatility of 5-minute intraday return of Shanghai Index