Archive Fever in a Typingspace: Physicality, Digital Storage, and the Online Presence of Derek Motion

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For Jacques Derrida, the archive is primarily a means of controlling texts by subjecting them to authority – positioning the written word within a social space in which sanctionedarchive-makers determine what literary artefacts are physically held and culturally upheld. This paper endeavours to illuminate some of the frictions between the Derridean formulation of the archive and hypermedia theory as outlined by George P. Landow. Both the Derridean archive itself and the text which is subjected to the archival process are explicitly physical, and, as such, stand in contrast to hypermedia, which exists as virtual information carried by electronic code. This division between the physical and the virtual is deeply problematic for hypermedia studies, and, as such, Derrida’s archive exemplifies some of the characteristic divergences between digital and print-based texts.

By examining Derrida’s theory of the archive through the lens of the ‘three Cs’ of archival desire – commencement, commandment, and consignation – I hope to demonstrate the particularly ‘analogue’ technologies on which the Derridean archive is founded. In particular, this paper focuses on the issues of self-authority and self-legitimacy faced by authors operating within a digital context, and the unorthodox place that self-publication occupies within Derrida’s model of textual commandment. The online presence of authors such as Derek Motion, via his self-run blog Typingspace¹, emphasises the ability, and choice, of contemporary authors to publish their own work in digital form. Given the continued rapid expansion of one particular digital system, namely, the internet, it is necessary to determine which tools for textual analysis might remain relevant in a digital context. Derrida’s archive is rooted firmly in the technologies of the printed page, the book, the encyclopaedia and the library. The digital world, in contrast, is not physical but physicalised: a network of intangible virtual information accessible via physical means (the hardware interface). The disharmony between Derridean text and Landowian hypertext can be seen as symptomatic of this shift away from the print form, and self-published texts are one facet of a new model for a non-physical archive.

The term ‘hypertext’ is a deeply contested one – owing partly to the legacy of ‘text,’ itself a fluid concept that has been applied to almost any artefact with which humans can make meaning, and partly to the emergent electronic space that hypertextual artefacts inhabit. Landow defines hypertext as a system ‘composed of blocks of text … and the electronic links that join them’ (3). This node and link model characterised the experiments with narratives ‘created in online environments like Apple’s HyperCard or Eastgate’s Storyspace’ (Johnson-Eilola and Kimme Hea 416) in the late 1980s and early 90s, including, among others, Stuart Moulthrop’s ‘Victory Garden’ and Michael Joyce’s ‘An Afternoon.’ Programming and interface technologies have advanced exponentially in the past two decades, however, the basic model of hypertextual navigation – selecting a path from one node to a discrete, and
distant, other – continues to characterise contemporary digital interaction. Thus, our navigation within the virtual archive may well depend upon following hypertextual links, and may in fact be shaped by the possibilities inherent in a link-based, non-spatial model of information.

‘To guard and to gather’: archival desire

In Archive Fever, Derrida is not seeking to define ‘the archive’ as a single object – rather, he is offering an outline of the archival process, or archival desire, that may be present in any number of distinct cultural artefacts. In summary, this process is described by Derrida as operating thus:

1. An archon, a culturally and legally sanctioned archive-maker, authorises an archive as proper and true. This is the principle of commandment, by which ‘social order is exercised’ and the archive obtains validity and status within a social, collective context (1).

2. Given their authority, archons also determine the consignation of the texts and materials which comprise the archive: the ordering and ‘gathering together [of] signs’ to present a unified and homogenous whole (3).

3. This archival process is motivated by a desire to discover ‘the originary, the first, the principal, the primitive’ form of the text (2): to unearth or excavate its origins and find its point of commencement, the point at which the text is first constituted and thus established as distinct from all other texts.

These three principles – of commandment, commencement, and consignation – govern the way in which the archive is constructed. However, what is arguably the most vital characteristic of the archive is that it is explicitly physical. From the outset, Derrida emphasises the significance of the arkhē – etymologically, as the word from which ‘archive’ comes, and physically, as the site which the archive occupies (1-2). The arkhē is a shelter, and as such, relates both to the physical nature of consignation, the ‘gathering together’ of signs (3), and the cultural protection offered by archontic commandment. The archival text, the ‘valuable’ text, requires both ‘a guardian and a localization’ (2), both an archon to protect it and a space in which to be housed.

For Derrida, the archive is concerned with ‘objectivisable storage’ (26) – in other words, the archive requires a physical site in which to be stored. By implication, this means that the archived text is itself a physical object. Text, in Derrida’s model, is embodied in a physical artefact; however, digital hypertexts do not necessarily have this same physical requirement. Derrida emphasises the importance of the archive’s physicality, claiming that ‘there is no archive without a place of consignation … and without a certain exteriority’ (11, my emphasis) and positioning the place in which texts are drawn together as a fundamental feature of the archival process. Indeed, as Lev Manovich has suggested in relation to new media art, the distribution of ‘one-of-a-kind’ art objects ‘takes place through a set of exclusive places: galleries, museums, auctions,’ rather than through the ‘network distribution’ made possible in a digital context (14). In direct contrast to the one-of-a-kind object that is subjected to the exclusivity of the archive, hypertexts are virtual, consisting simply of electronic signals that are distributed by physical hardware but which possess only the most minute physical presence themselves. Furthermore, the electronic text is not located in a single physical space – rather, the data can be stored across multiple servers and disseminated to computer terminals within an electronic network, all in geographically distinct locations.
This is a consequence of the process of digitization, in which all textual data is contained within the electronic digital code. This applies not only to hypertexts in the sense of written objects, but also to ‘images, maps, diagrams, and sound’ (Landow 3), all of which can be readily interlinked as hypermedia. Indeed, as Landow states, ‘everything [in a hypermedia system] is mediated, represented, coded,’ simply in order that it can be ‘read’ and transmitted digitally (196). Our interaction with a virtual text is physicalised, because ‘we who read it are still physical, to read it we rely on physical devices, and it has effects on the real world’ (Landow 36), however, the text itself is digital and virtual.

By Landow’s argument, it is this ‘digitality [that] … permits hypertextuality,’ primarily because it enables linking (196). Digital works that are written in the same code can be interlinked, and this linking is what Landow claims distinguishes hypertext from regular text – unlike the static, physicalised print text, an object, symbol or word in a hypermedia can be altered to include a link to any other digital object. Landow describes hypertext as ‘blocks of text,’ in the traditional sense, combined with ‘the electronic links that join them’ (3). Thus, a hypertext can be thought of, at its most basic, as a textual field that encompasses other texts.

A second defining characteristic of hypertext is, to put it simply, magnitude. As J. Hillis Miller states, ‘a hypertext … is a hyperbolic text, a text to a higher power, squared or cubed’ (35). It is larger, it can encompass more, than a print text. Because hypermedia is non-physical, it is possible to link to vast amounts of digital information without requiring vast amounts of space – or, indeed, any at all. In comparison to the archival site, which has physical limitations on how much material can be archived or stored at any given time, the hypermedia archive can be exponentially larger. Even when more servers are required to store digital information, any hypermedia object can link to data in other servers. And, unlike a physical archive, digital archivisation does not take the archived works out of circulation – each analogue text can only physically exist in one site, but the digital object can be accessed, transported and shared across texts and across networks with far more ease and speed than is possible with analogue texts. One implication of this is that all digital objects, regardless of the locations of servers, authors or programmers, are experienced by the reader as present: the digital hypertext ‘moves fast enough that it doesn’t matter where it ‘is’ because it can be everywhere … and nowhere’ (Landow 38, ellipsis in original). The virtual nature of hypermedia allows a single text to be disembodied, to be available on-call for multiple readers in different locations, all at the click of a link.

The major divergence between hypermedia theory and archive theory lies in the difficulty of reconciling the physicality of the print archive with the virtuality of new digital technologies. Arguably, though, the hypertext forms an alternative virtual archive because digitisation negates Derrida’s principles of commandment, consignation and commencement. Despite this, a virtual archive is justified on the basis of the virtual nature of the artefacts it contains – whereas print text is physical and thus requires ‘objectivisable storage,’ hypermedia only require virtual space, the everywhere-and-nowhere space that a digital network provides.

Given that digital objects can link to one another with such ease, and that gathering a text into one archive does not restrict its use at other sites, what becomes problematic is not
consignation *per se*, but the notion that consignation can only happen under the governance of the archons. Commencement is likewise problematic, because, as noted, it is predicated on the notion of distinctiveness, and the hypermedia object blurs the boundaries between originary and secondary artefacts, creating a matrix of data which, at any moment, can be altered, added to or reshaped to form an entirely new configuration without necessarily retaining traces of the old. However, the divergence between Derrida’s theory of archival commandment and the practical potential of hypermedia networks, as exemplified on the World Wide Web, is made most explicit in some of the most commonplace online activities – notably, having the power to publish one’s own material online, whether this is original data or secondary commentary which responds to, adds to, and remixes already existing material.

‘All is now emendation and gloss’: what a digital author can do

From the outset of *Archive Fever*, Derrida makes clear that commandment is tied up in ‘authority’, ‘order’, and ‘law’ – commandment is characterised by what he refers to as the ‘nomological’ principle (1). It is by commandment that the legitimacy and authority of the archive is ensured. Perhaps unfortunately, the internet is too large and unruly to be successfully ordered and places under nomological control. The difficulty of eradicating copyright infringement and piracy within the digital realm is only one example of the failure of commandment – the archive is seemingly defeated when a text can be used in a different context without proper nomological authorisation. As a medium for the transmission of information, digital code is much more flexible, and thus more manipulable, medium than the fixed, physicalised printed page, due to ‘digital media’s ability to represent all kinds of data – text, images, sound, video – with the binary symbolization of ‘one’ and ‘zero’” (Hayles, *Electronic Literature* 93).

Within print culture, commandments are made by authorised figures within the machine of publication: notably, the publishers and editors who determine what is printed and what is not, and the critics who pass further judgement on printed works. Landow correctly identifies ‘status’ as the key property of published texts, particularly those that become canonical (292), and it is act of becoming published which grants status and thus determines the archival value of the text. It is clear that commandment determines the social value of particular texts: those which are lauded by the book industry archons retain higher value than those which emerge through non-sanctioned means, not least because the publishers and editors retain the economic and industrial benefits of publication and can thus control the means of production within a print-based economy.

Due at least in part to the virtual, non-physical nature of digital information, and also to the hyperbolic increase in computational power and decrease in cost, the digital revolution allows any person the capacity to self-publish. As Stuart Moulthrop claims, the ‘global expansion’ of the internet has allowed ‘hypertext, or at least information retrieval from hypertext networks, [to become] a regular experience for hundreds of millions’ of people within the developed world (Moulthrop, ‘Hypertext’, 227). Of course, falling into the ‘digital democracy’ fallacy is tremendously naïve: although the internet is a fairly cheap and easy-to-access tool for the privileged classes within the developed world, there remains a huge disparity between the digital *haves* and *have-nots*, and even within technologically advanced countries the legal and governmental sanctions on internet access and use can be prohibitive. However, under economically favourable conditions, the ease-of-use of networked digital information breaks down the nomological power of the publishing industry by allowing all individuals to self-publish and to engage with other people’s data in subversive and experimental ways.
The nomological ‘powers’ within the print paradigm have little relevance to a technology as malleable and fluid as digital media. In the case of internet publication and with blog writing in particular, it is possible for anyone within internet access to obtain and maintain a personal blog. Blogging allows any individual to self-publish and to take over the controlling role of the archon: authorising publication, initiating it, as well as creating links to form and expand a larger, multitextual and multimedia archival site. This is the role that Derek Motion has taken up in his blog Typingspace. Motion’s posts on his blog in July 2010 illustrate a noteworthy case of self-authorisation, as at this time he published a lengthy close reading of his own poem ‘forest hill.’ This self-analysis also enters into a dialogue with earlier, archontic criticism – in this case, a review of his earlier work, and the commentary of a judge who ‘sanctioned’ Motion’s work by awarding it a poetry prize. As Motion himself acknowledges that he doesn’t have ‘much of a public self out there, one created by the critics’ (Motion, ‘close reading: ‘forest hill’”), however, it is worth noting that one of the extant pieces of criticism is based around a literary prize – a significant mark of status and of archontically-determined social value.

Motion’s poem ‘forest hill’ was initially published on the website of Australia print and online journal Overland, after it was awarded that journal’s Judith Wright Poetry Prize for New and Emerging Poets in 2009. The judge for the prize, Keri Glastonbury, wrote an accompanying commentary which was also published on the Overland site. By responding on his blog with a fairly rigorous academic critique of his own text, Motion adopts an unorthodox position as both an author seeking the legitimacy of publication, and a (self-) publisher and (self-) critic whose archontic pronouncements provide this legitimacy. Under the print paradigm, the author does not occupy a position of nomological power. However, within the context of digital self-publication, Motion demonstrates one method for gaining authority over his work, acting simultaneously as author-critic rather than depending upon an externally-imposed system of value. Motion acknowledges this dual selfhood of author and critic – the one who creates and the other who interprets – when he speaks of the importance of ‘formalising a written response to yourself’ (Motion ‘close reading: ‘forest hill’”). Of course, this dual existence is not without its problems: if the poem itself may act as ‘a virtual black hole where even the smallest acts can contain a universe of import’ (Motion ‘close reading: ‘forest hill’”), then in the act of self-critique it is the author himself who is demonstrating what is ‘of import,’ giving value to the work in a manner that breaks down the nomological controls of the publishing industry but retaining the traditional authority of the author over the reader. Motion is deciphering his own text, and, in a counter to the notion of shared authority which can arise in a digital context, this may be indicate an author clutching tightly to this position of power – the author overthrows the archon, but to maintain authority rather than disperse it.

‘If my me-ness doesn’t relate to your you-ness then tell me’: what a digital reader can do

Digital commandment, in the form of self-publication, is simply a matter of internet access, which is becoming increasingly widespread in the everyday lives of many people. Despite this, the value of a self-published digital text is still often judged by the criteria of print culture: online publication, for literary works in particular, is still often treated as an adjunct to hard-copy print texts. Given that ‘almost all print books are digital files before they become books … [and] this is the form in which they are composed, edited, composited, and sent to the computerized machines that produce them as books’ (Hayles, Electronic Literature 43), it is perhaps unsurprising that online texts tend to be seen as draft versions,
waiting to be sanctioned by the editorial process and ushered into the proper realm of print. In some cases, publishers may produce works simultaneously in print and online versions – Motion’s poem ‘forest hill’ is available on the Overland website but is also printed in the hard-copy version of Overland in issue 199. The poem is, in essence, available in two different forms, and dual publication of this kind allows publishers, and authors, to take advantage of the benefits of both media. The online version can link to, and be linked to, other digital works, changing and mutating in ways that are not governed by the archontic oversight of the publishing industry, and being utilised in a variety of non-sanctioned ways. In contrast, the print version of the text – the version of ‘forest hill’ contained in the multiple matching print copies of Overland issue 199 – stands as an unchanging, and unchangeable, physical artefact. This notion of unchangeability is still closely allied with the principles of commandment: authority, legitimacy, sanctity. As Jay David Bolter explains, ‘we honor important texts by putting them into a medium that will guarantee their survival’ (55), and, as a corollary, it is the texts that can survive, by virtue of being physicalised in the print medium, that are considered valuable and important.

The structure of digital information significantly alters this notion of legitimacy, especially with regard to who has control over the copying or dissemination of texts. Copyright law, which is still held as central to the notion of textual ownership, is significantly undermined by the ease with which digital texts can be copied, for both legitimate and illegitimate ends. The contemporary focus on determining and enforcing ownership through copyright – what one might call the method of Anne after the British Statute of Anne of 1709, which implemented the first legal version of copyright – is not the only possible approach to authorship. However, the historical influences of copyright law make it difficult to disentangle commercial interests and ‘private reward’ from ‘public benefit’ and free literary enterprise (Jamison 201). The industrialisation of printing in the 18th and 19th centuries made it possible to create multiple copies of the same text, converting books from single unique objects to mass market commodities, and this in turn led to the legal protection of the labour and commercial reward of authors. Under the Statute of Anne, and other subsequent models of legal copyright, authorship is intrinsically connected to ownership. A person is authorised as an author if his/her ownership of a text can be proven, and ownership relies upon the identification of single unified authorial entities – when the text is considered as a material commodity, the author can effectively sell the product of his labour, either directly to a reader or to an archontic intermediary such as a publisher. In order to uphold this commercial right, copyright law insists upon the ‘the continuing construct of the author as singular, proprietary, and original’ (Jamison 201) and the devaluation of collaborative efforts in which each individual’s authorial contribution may not be clear-cut. In a context where authorial collaboration is both prevalent, and difficult to atomise based on each individual’s contribution, it is necessary ‘to move beyond the dominant Romantic definition of the individual author and to recognize … alternative formulations or experiences of authorship’ (Hirschfeld 615), including those in which texts cannot be atomistically divided between two or more individuals.

As free software and copyleft activists such as Richard Stallman have argued, the intervention of archontic commercial entities into print publishing has shifted the focus of copyright from protecting authors to protecting and ‘prolong[ing] the existing lucrative monopolies’ of publishers, and by extension, limiting the abilities of new authors to reuse texts freely (Stallman). Copyright has made the unacknowledged copying of other people’s material illegal, and, as such, has demonised what Wilks refers to as ‘benign plagiarism’ in which material is copied and reused in such a way that ‘no one is deceived and no author is
exploited’ (117). One example used by Wilks is the dissemination of news stories by press agencies, from which many newspapers print material more or less verbatim. However, as Wilks points out, benign plagiarism can also cover the field of reusing one’s own work in different contexts, which does not exploit the original author or pretend to be authored by someone else. Motion’s use and reuse of his own material fits into this model of benign plagiarism and self-copying – although it is worth noting that Motion explicitly acknowledges and cites his own work within ‘case study: forest hill’ in the same way that he cites sources authored by others.

It is notoriously easy to incorporate parts of one supposedly original text into countless others, for example by using the technique of reblogging that underpins the popular blogging platform Tumblr, or by retweeting on Twitter. This process blatantly disregards copyright – the literal right to copy – in a way that significantly impacts upon our traditional notion of authorial ownership, particularly in the commercial sense. The constant reiteration and reinterpretation of digital data (both text and other forms such as image and sound) occurs to such an extent that tracing the commencement of any particular fragment becomes an archaeological endeavour a la Derrida, requiring ‘a prodigious amount of archival toil’ (Derrida 110) to trace the origin and to appropriately identify and sanction the rightful author.

N. Katherine Hayles emphasises the long-held tendency to treat ‘literary property as an intellectual construction that owed nothing to the medium in which it was embodied’ (Writing Machines 32), and thus implies that the difficulties of applying copyright laws to digital texts are simply an extension of the inherently flawed logic of creative copyright. Similarly, the concept of proper or respectful citation of sources has been complicated by internet publication, given that a hypermedia environment can allow for a citation to be linked to an external bibliographic record or even a full-text version of the source. However, is linking a significant enough accreditation for the use of someone else’s work? Within the print paradigm, such a question is almost nonsensical – like asking how one writes a citation without writing a citation. Again, the courtesy of using proper citation, meaning an overt, printed bibliographic record, is driven by the traditional desire for authorial status, for social recognition for the author as creator. Overt citation forms one part of textual engagement in an era of copyright, and, as with other forms of copyright infringement, the use of implicit hypertextual citation may reflect a different form of textuality and a more malleable, permeable notion of authorial rights.

As the example of unlawful digital copying suggests, with blogging it is not just the author who creates links between his/her own text and others. The blog operates as a ‘read-write hypertext’ (Landow xi) in which readers can follow links and also add links themselves, helping to further build the virtual archive. This authority to modify the archive, to both read and write it, suggests that once again the traditional figures of power within the publication machine do not play the same role in a digital publication system. The reader and author are in a fluid, interactive relationship of textual creation and interpolation that does not require an intervening authority to sanction publication. As can be seen with any number of Derek Motion’s blogged poems, readers are able to engage in a public dialogue with the text, allowing their own textual expressions to take a sanctioned, socially visible space within the digital environment. This may range from simple expressions of interest, as when Ivy Alvarez responds to Motion’s post ‘hourly rate’ with ‘Moody. I like it’ (Alvarez), to more elaborate sentiments such as Bronwyn Meehan’s ‘Derek Motion you have a crazy, brave kind of imagination and you could write the wheels off a Tonka truck’ (Meehan). It can even encompass the kinds of analytical statements traditionally associated with print-based
criticism and archontic sanctioning, as can be seen in Paul Squires’ response to the poem ‘own chef opinion’:

... you continue to explore the boundaries of accessibility, Derek. I love the collapses into the mundane tongue and suburban imagery. But is an elevation or a diminuation? Either way, you are a craftsman of extraordinary ability and we look forward to your full flowering as a poet of importance and impact. (Squires)

Arguably, all of these responses possess a certain casual, tongue-in-cheek tone that tends to characterise online commentary – a tone that can be attributed to that such commentary is ‘inscribed’ upon what Bolter calls ‘[e]raseable, temporary writing surfaces’ (55) and thus often regarded as less important or valuable than fixed print text. However, the potential for dialogue – whether friendly or hostile, casual, collegial, academic, or a mix of the three – creates a new relationship between the author and the reader, and the social visibility of such a dialogue has a significant impact upon the traditional power structures of literary production.

Indeed, this may be one of the great benefits of digital technology: the capacity for readers, or text users, to become active participants within the creation of works, to achieve a kind of power that is not available within the world of print. This is part of what J. Hillis Miller refers to as ‘the inherent democratization of the internet’ (32) in which access to the digital network allows for textual creation, both in terms of original texts and reactive responses such as reblogs or comments. Landow defines this as a form of ‘active reading,’ whereby readers ‘take an existing text and add to it ... [and] because they write in a networked computer environment the commented-on blog ... can link to the active reader’s text, incorporating it into the ongoing discussion’ (9). The reader’s comments and feedback may thus be incorporated into and reproduced in subsequent copies, both by the original author and by other readers. The reader shifts into an authorial role in collaboration with any number of other individuals, and the nominal author is offered the opportunity to continually update and modify his/her work.

Of course, not all authors will modify their text according to the responses of their readers, whether they publish digitally or in print media. and, indeed, the practical fact is that, more often than not, one may not receive significant feedback via a digital network – as with print texts, many blogs have a limited readership, and, as a cursory survey of Motion’s blog shows, the commentary is much more likely to be of the simple love/hate variety rather than the more critically engaged style of commentators like Paul Squires. However, the availability of any kind of commentary – and the ability to link to it from anywhere, including within the writings of the commentators themselves – suggests a processual aspect of digital writing practice. Unlike than a fixed print object, the hypermedia object continually grows and takes in other texts and sources, which are also in the process of growing and morphing, ad infinitum. This emphasis on the ongoing nature of writing is also significant to Derrida’s theory of the archival process, in which anything written about the archive becomes a part of it, ‘inscribing itself into [the archive], ... opening it and ... enriching it enough to have a rightful place in it’ (67). In particular, any comment left on a blog entry will be inscribed upon that entry for subsequent readers, meaning that the commenter has entered into the ‘authorial’ and authoritative role. This process effectively means that the original text does not transmit information hierarchically, from an author to a reader, but instead undergoes a series of mutations in which both authors and readers can add and alter information. The
concept of ‘mutation’ is perhaps more fitting here than ‘evolution’ – the process by which a hypermedia artefact undergoes change is not always strictly positive, nor does it progress in a single linear direction. Rather, a digital artefact can return to an earlier configuration, and the changes that occur can happen in multiple branching directions simultaneously, while still remaining connected to the ‘original’ form. This chaotic, sprawling, multilinear model closely resembles the rhizome as theorised by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: the rhizome is an aggregated structure dominated by ‘[p]rinciples of connection and heterogeneity’ in which ‘any point … can be connected to anything other, and must be’ (Deleuze and Guattari 7). Similarly, textual mutation on the internet does not rely on the traditional hierarchy between author, reader, and publisher-as-archon, but rather operates through the shifting relationships between multiple text users. The physical trope of the rhizome is not unproblematic – as Martin Rosenberg suggests, physical and geometrical rhetoric in discussions of digital literature indicate the ‘limits for hypertextual expression’ (280), rather than its potential, and a physical trope such as the rhizome may indeed be a flawed model for the behaviours of a virtual system. However, the comparison made by Deleuze and Guattari between the arborescent and rhizomatic models of information and logic helps to explicate the fluidity of certain texts, whether this is enacted within a physical or virtual realm. Indeed, hypertext is both rhizomatic and arborescent, sometimes enacting hierarchical linear reading within its nodes, and sometimes deterritorialising by means of links to discrete and distant nodes. The most valuable critical tool that can be gained from Deleuze and Guattari is the ability to identify the areas where arborescence is contested, and, thus, to avoid the ‘hidden unities’ that Stuart Moulthrop fears lie beneath the somewhat idealistic rhetoric of the rhizome (‘Rhizome and Resistance’ 309).

The development of digital textual artefacts allows for a kind of virtual archive – something that did not emerge from Archive Fever, but which displays a more or less radical departure from the principles outlined by Derrida. The grand implication of this, especially within an Australian context, is the possibility for authors and artists to engage in new networks of information, regardless of geographical position and beyond the oversight of the sanctioning bodies of print media. Derek Motion’s work is not necessarily ‘electronic’ in Hayles’ formulation – it tends to replicate the appearance of works in print, maintaining the authority of legacy texts rather than being ‘actively formed’ (Hayles 43) by the digital tools that make possible its online presence. However, Motion’s engagement with the notion of self-sanctioned publication, along with the growing volume of reader commentary and interaction on his blog, demonstrate some of the intermediary positions between pure print and pure digital forms. The space in which authors, and academics, can position their work is growing vastly – in fact, in such a way as to make the concept of ‘space’ almost meaningless. Writing in the digital age has not moved ‘beyond the book’ (Landow 49); rather, text and hypermedia exist side-by-side, and may continue to do so for decades. In order to write within either form, it is necessary to understand the different kinds of textuality emerging from the technologies of each. Archive theory, as formulated by Derrida, remains grounded in the contingencies of print media, however, it may yet provide a valuable foundation for a virtual concept of archive – and for understanding how a virtual text may call for a paradoxically virtual physicality to inhabit.
NOTE
1 since December 2010, Typingspace has been located at www.typingspace.com.au, although all material before this date was located at www.typingspace.wordpress.com and could still be accessed there at the time of writing. All citations in this paper are given to the newer version of the site, although the earlier entries have been replicated verbatim from the Wordpress version.

WORKS CITED


Motion, Derek. ‘forest hill’. Overland, 199 (2010): 45.


