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To segment or not to segment? An investigation of segmentation strategy success under varying market conditions

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1. Introduction

Despite wide agreement that strategic marketing forms the basis of organisational success and the considerable amount of research that has been conducted over the past decades in areas of strategic marketing, only limited work has investigated the interrelations between market segmentation, product positioning, competition and success in the marketplace.

The aim of this study is to take one step in the direction of filling the gap by researching the interplay between market segmentation strategy and competitive market conditions, a gap that was specifically identified by Eliashberg & Chatterjee (1985) and Kuester, Homburg & Robertson (1999).

We choose a market simulation approach as (1) empirical data of the experimental or pseudo-experimental nature required is not available, and (2) economic and game-theoretic analyses are typically limited to very simple, highly unrealistic settings (for instance, one dimensional product attribute spaces, uniformly distributed consumer preferences, rational players). The simulation approach allows us to investigate selected strategic components under selected market conditions in a controlled experimental setting that is simplified and artificial, but realistic with respect to the main features under investigation.

This paper will firstly review prior research in the areas of market segmentation and competition, from which three research questions are derived. A computer simulation based on an artificial market environment will then be performed to test the three hypotheses and then, using the pre-determined measures of firm success, conclusions will be drawn regarding the optimal strategies for firms operating in markets with varying levels of competition. Limitations of the study and ideas for future work are also discussed.

2. Literature Review

Both areas central to the present study, market segmentation and competition, have been extensively investigated individually in the past.

Within the field of segmentation research three main themes can broadly be identified: (1) research aiming at improving segmentation methodology (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Bailey, 1994; Dolnicar & Leisch, 2000; Dolnicar & Leisch, 2004; Ketchen & Shook, 1996;
Krieger & Green, 1996; Lilien & Rangaswamy, 2000; Mazanec & Strasser, 2000; Milligan & Cooper, 1985; Milligan, 1981; Myers & Tauber, 1977; Punj & Stewart, 1983; Thorndike, 1953; (2) research comparatively evaluating the usefulness of different kinds of segmentation bases (Abbey, 1979; Frank, Massy & Wind, 1972; Haley, 1968; Wedel & Kamakura, 1998; Wind, 1978), and (3) empirically based reports on applied segmentation studies (these segmentation applications dominate in terms of quantity, a summarising report including 243 studies of this kind published in academic journals is provided by Baumann, (2000) and Dolnicar, (2003).

However, few attempts have been made in the area of market segmentation research to simultaneously account for other components of the marketing strategy, as for instance, the product positioning decision or the competitive market pressures faced. This research gap exists both (1) conceptually / methodologically as only few techniques (see below) have been suggested in the literature to analyse market data simultaneously to account for all strategic areas, and (2) empirically, as it is difficult to collect pseudo-experimental data required to investigate the effectiveness of different strategies under different market conditions. The existence of this research gap implicitly suggests that the target segment can be chosen without considering the competitive market environment and the positioning of the own and all competing brands. Two notable exceptions exist: ideal point preference mapping (Myers & Tauber 1977, Myers 1996) and perceptions based market segmentation (Buchta, Dolnicar & Reutterer, 2000; Mazanec & Strasser, 2000) simultaneously explore positioning, segmentation and competition issues based on empirical data. However there is little empirical evidence for success of certain segmentation strategies under specific market conditions, evidence that would be of interest to managers who would get more than purely theoretical guidance with regard to optimal segmentation strategies in given market conditions.

The area of competition research is even more extensive and heterogeneous than segmentation research. Competition research can broadly be classified into general approaches studying the issue in an isolated manner, pure case studies and investigations of interactions between competition and other aspects of marketing.

2.1 General Investigations into the Phenomenon of Competition
Porter (1980) describes different forms of competition in different market settings and suggests generic strategies to choose from. Putsis & Dhar (1998) discuss five types of competitive interaction: cooperative, non-cooperative and independent (all symmetric), leader-follower and dominant/fringe firm (asymmetric).

Models of perfect competition focus on the outcome of competition rather than the actual act of competing and suggest that perfectly competitive firms operate independently and without consideration of competitors (McAfee & McMillan, 1996). Neoclassical economists believe perfect competition to result in the efficient allocation of resources and the maximisation of social welfare (Hunt & Duhan, 2002). Conventional business theorists however believe that greater competition results in more effective outcomes because organisations that are able to operate more effectively and offer customers more value for money will receive more profits and flourish (Hunt & Duhan, 2002). Hunt & Duhan (2002) developed the interdisciplinary resource-advantage theory which allows firms to act both efficiently, as suggested by perfect competition and effectively, as proposed by conventional business wisdom.

Game theory is the dominant paradigm used in marketing to analyse the interaction between organisations operating in oligopolistic markets (Moorthy, 1985; Putsis & Dhar, 1998; Weitz, 1985), whereby the focus is on the actual act of competing (McAfee & McMillan, 1996). According to this view the actions of a firm are at least partly in response to the other players in the ‘game’, or competitors in the market, and competition is viewed as a process of decision-making that is done in an uncertain environment. Evolving from game theoretic models have come ‘new markets’ of competition which allowed decentralised decision making in situations where it had previously been done centrally and inefficiently (McAfee & McMillan, 1996).

2.2 Case studies based on specific industries

Wesson & De Figueiredo (2001) explore the microbrewery market and find that aggressive entry is most successful when no budget constraints are faced and the degree of focus chosen by the new entrant significantly influences market success. Smith et al. (1991) investigate competition in the US domestic airline market focusing on firms’ responses to competitor initiatives, later extended by Chen & MacMillan (1992) who take a more fundamental and game theoretic approach to competitive response behaviour in the industry. Clearly the limitations of these studies lie in the low generalisability.

2.3 Interactions between competition and other aspects of marketing

Weitz (1985) noted the general lack of research into the affect of competition intensity on marketing activity. However in recent decades researchers and managers have increasingly recognised the importance of understanding the different types of competition across categories, marketing instruments and strategic groups (Putis & Dhar, 1998). Henderson (1983) notes: ‘the success of any marketing strategy depends on the strength of the competitive analysis on which it is based’ (p. 7).

Some theorists have examined the relationship between competition intensity and the overall marketing mix (Dutta & King, 1980; Gatignon, Anderson & Helsen, 1989; Hauser & Shugan, 1983; Kotler, 1965; Oxenfeldt & Moore, 1978; Robinson, 1988). Kotler (1965) presented a duopolistic dynamic competitive model which included advertising, distribution and pricing decisions, while Dutta & King (1980) used ‘metagame’ analysis to develop a framework for competitive strategy development. Slade (1995) investigated the nature of competition amongst competing brands by developing a dynamic model of product rivalry in a market where organisations have a number of competitive tools including price and advertising intensity. Carpenter & Lehmann (1985) used not only the marketing mix variables but also brand switching and product features to develop a model to investigate patterns of competition and market structure.

Although empirical research in the area of market defence strategies to respond to increasing competition is relatively thin (Kuester, Homburg & Robertson, 1999) some researchers have begun to investigate this issue. Perhaps most significantly, Hauser & Shugan (1983) developed the ‘Defender’ model which provided a framework for how firms should modify their marketing mix to respond to new entrants. The interaction between competition, positioning and segmentation was further explored by Hauser (1988) in the extended Defender model where equilibria conditions were identified and maximum differentiation was found to maximise profits. Gatignon, Robertson & Fein (1997) investigate defence strategies for incumbents facing increased competition in the form of new entrants and recommends that the response strategy should include as few elements of the marketing mix as possible in order to avoid underspending on each element relative to its marginal utility.

2.3.1 Competition & Positioning

Interaction between positioning and competition was studied by Hotelling (1929, principle of minimum differentiation) and d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz & Thisse (1979, principle of maximum differentiation) focusing on the case of unidimensional product feature space including price in a duopoly market setting. Vandenbosch & Weinberg (1995) extended the one dimensional Hotelling model to two dimensions, still assuming uniform distribution of consumer preferences and looking at the duopoly situation exclusively resulting in an equilibrium positioning where one attribute is at its maximum level and the second one at the minimum level for one firm and exactly the opposite for the competitor. Carpenter (1989) investigated the same interaction emphasising organisation’s expenditures for advertising and distribution, finding that positioning and optimal marketing mix in terms of these expenditures are highly dependent. Stearns et al. (1995) studied the effect of different positioning approaches under varying competitive market situations using empirical data of new entrants and found significant interaction with inconsistent findings for different settings.

2.3.2 Competition & Price

Rao & Shakun (1972) developed a static pricing model with price as the only decision variable. Others such as Thompson & Teng (1984) later proposed dynamic models which consider price as a control variable in deriving equilibrium strategies. A study by Rao & Bass (1985) explored how competition influences dynamic pricing of new products by focusing on the development of industry pricing in different competitive settings. They modelled competition as a dynamic Nash equilibrium and extended analysis of dynamic pricing to an undifferentiated oligopoly by addressing the problem analytically, numerically and empirically.
Ansari, Economides & Ghosh (1994) explored the interaction of positioning and price in a competitive environment in a game theoretic manner. They relaxed the assumption of uniformly distributed consumer preferences illustrating the difference in results if this assumption is made. The investigation included competitive situations with different numbers of competing firms and found that differentiation reduces price competition and increases profits, optimal positions depend on the number of organisations and the level of consumer heterogeneity. McAfee & McMillan (1996) also discuss the value of the game-theoretic approach to marketers and the affect of competition on product positioning and pricing. They emphasise the value of creating competition for a new product as an effective way of ensuring low prices in the longer term.

Ramaswamy, Gatignon & Reibstein (1994) focus on price and selling and investigate cooperative and retaliatory competitive strategies, discussing the extent to which different levels of competition influence marketing behaviour. Clarke & Dolan (1984) simulate a range of pricing strategies in a sequential entry context where the entry date is known, while Spence (1981) also considers sequential entry in developing a dynamic model of competition focusing on the issue of declining costs.

2.3.3 Competition & Product

Ballou & Pipkin (1980) developed a framework for modelling competition and investigated product positioning strategies in oligopolistic markets that are highly competitive and uncompetitive. Interaction between product quality and competition was also studied by Moorthy (1988) in one dimensional product attribute space, while McGuire & Staelin (1983) focused on competition and product substitutability using a linear duopoly model and established equilibrium conditions for different channel structures. Lane (1980) investigated the relationship between product positioning and pricing and levels of competition in oligopolistic markets with sequential entry.

2.3.4 Competition & Advertising Expenditure

Friedman (1958) used game theory as a basis for a static model of advertising expenditure using different scenarios, which was later developed by Shakun who introduced interdependencies between segments, and Gupta & Krishnan (1967) who included multiple competitors and additional controllable variables. Schmalensee (1978) proposed a dynamic model of advertising expenditure in which he recognised the ongoing nature of advertising decision making. This was later extended to include finite planning horizons and the investigation of duopolistic situations for growing and non-growing markets (Deal, 1979; Erickson, 1985; Wang & Wu, 2001), and oligopolistic situations with pricing included as an additional control variable (Thompson & Teng, 1984).

2.3.5 Competition & Market Segmentation

The interplay between organisational market segmentation strategy and different competitive market situations has so far received little attention (Eliashberg & Chatterjee, 1985), although recommendations for managerial decision making on a strategic level cannot be made in an isolated manner.

Lilien & Rangaswamy (2000) introduce the STP approach, a stepwise procedure integrating segmentation target choice and positioning in a sequential manner. Mazanec & Strasser (2000) and Buchta, Dolnicar & Reuterrer (2000) propose and illustrate an integrated approach of analysis including segmentation, positioning and competition based on empirical three way data (PBMS, perceptions based market segmentation). Wesson & De Figueiredo relate the issues of competition and market segmentation to each other in a case study, empirically finding that new entrants into the microbrewery industry are better off serving small market segments.

3. Research Questions

The central issue to be investigated in this study is the interaction between different segmentation strategies and the level of competition within the market in which a firm is operating. As opposed to most previous studies on this interaction, we do not investigate the effects of market entry (Gatignon, Robertson & Fein, 1997; Hauser & Shugan, 1983; Lane, 1980; Spence, 1981; Stearns et al., 1995; Wesson & De Figueiredo, 2001). Three hypotheses are to be tested in this study.

Firstly, it has been widely postulated that higher levels of competition favour a concentrated market segmentation strategy, and although this assumption is not surprising, there is so far little evidence for this assertion. Prior work investigating the relationship between competition and market segmentation strategy have either used economic approaches making limiting assumptions or of empirical
approaches and have consequently been limited in their generalisability. For example Hauser’s study (1988) demonstrates higher price equilibria for differentiated product positions. Ansari, Economides & Ghosh (1994) found that greater heterogeneity in consumer preferences results in maximum segmentation and differentiation, increased market share, and less price competition resulting in higher profits. These investigations, however, are limited to 2-4 competitors. Wesson & De Figueiredo (2001), in their empirical study, found an association of segmentation and success of new entrants. Stearns et al. (1995) found that new firm survival could not be predicted by examining an industry in isolation, but that when the location and strategy of the firm were also considered survival chances could be predicted. For example, service industry firms operating in metropolitan locations were far more likely to succeed if they pursued a narrow or niche marketing strategy. Therefore the first hypothesis to be tested is:

Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of competition favour a concentrated market segmentation strategy.

The second hypothesis relates to advertising expenditure levels. Friedman (1958) studied the interaction of competitive strategy and advertising expenditure finding that the optimal advertising expenditure differs for each firm and is proportional to both the potential sales in the area and the share of total advertising in the area; and that when a firm has less advertising funding available than a competitor it should adopt a mixed strategy, increasing the probability of reaching any given customer. Shakun’s study (1965) indicates that the level of advertising expenditure spent selling the product of one firm proportionately influences sales of the corresponding product of the other firm, limiting the investigation to two competitors only. Gupta & Krishnan (1967) assume multiple competitors but limit the controllable variables of the firm to price and promotion, identifying conditions under which competitors with differing levels of resources should use price and promotions as their major competitive tool, depending on their respective resource levels. The knowledge gap however lies in the investigation of high levels of advertising expenditure and the most appropriate segmentation strategy for firms finding themselves in this position. Therefore, we will be testing the following assumption.

Hypothesis 2: Higher advertising expenditure levels favour the concentrated market segmentation strategy more than the mass marketing strategy.

To the authors’ knowledge, no prior investigations of frequency of marketing and segmentation strategy revision on market performance have been undertaken. It has been generally postulated, however, that the periodic reassessment of marketing strategy is a crucial organisational success factor (Kotler, 1999, 2003; McDonald, 2002; McDonald & Payne, 1996; Schnaars, 1998). This is because the customisation to the target group chosen can be optimised steadily. This is reflected in hypothesis three:

Hypothesis 3: Frequent revision of strategy favours the concentrated market segmentation strategy.

4. The Simulation Environment: an Artificial Consumer Market

A market simulation approach has been chosen for this study primarily due to the unavailability of the experimental empirical data required. Using a simulation approach, selected strategic components can be investigated under specific market conditions in a controlled setting.

The computer simulation is based on an artificial consumer market environment (SIMSEG/ACM by Buchta & Mazanec, 2001; Buchta et al., 2004) that is outlined in Figure 3. The main purpose of this environment is to provide a market-like framework, which supports, ceteris paribus experiments in order to gain insight on how successful certain corporate strategies are in a competitive marketplace. The central research question is formalised within this environment by constructing artificial actors (agents) that compete with each other. In the present study, these actors represent organisations. They are designed to make use of different decision rules concerning their market segmentation strategy. The organisations are confronted with each other and each other's market strategies in a marketplace. Over the multiple replications of the simulation the market conditions are systematically varied. By simulating a long period of time (three years), insights are gained about the success of particular strategies under given circumstances. These conditions are defined a priori. In this experiment the following components define the artificial marketplace:

Product: The product consists of 12 attributes that can be perceived by a customer. These could be associations that tourists have with destinations (cool, trendy, relaxing, safe, expensive, etc.) or perceived characteristics of a car (fast, sexy, fancy, luxurious, etc.). These 12 attributes are designed to load on four hidden
dimensions (factors), three attributes per dimension. For instance, the attributes cool and trendy for tourist destinations are likely to load on a different underlying factor than safety. All dimensions represent information that is purely influenced by advertising action, as the production is not of fundamental importance for the question under investigation and was therefore not modelled in the simulation.

Customers: The world consists of many consumers who have heterogeneous preferences with regard to the 12 product attributes. Six such market segments are modelled, the preferences of which are given in Table 1. Every column represents one hidden dimension (factor), every row represents one segment. For instance, Factor 1 could represent safety related tourist destination perceptions and include three attributes (safety, familiarity and low crime rate) and Segment 1 could be the segment of young tourists travelling with friends and mainly interested in an exiting and adventurous holiday. Furthermore, Table 1 specifies whether the Factors are relevant or irrelevant to the segments in the marketplace: an 'I' indicates that the attributes forming this Factor are irrelevant to a segment, whereas an 'R' stand for relevant. Thus, Segment 1 does not care about the first three items (which could mean that young adventure-seeking tourists are not evaluating a tourist destination on the basis of the safety), whereas the information about the last three items is studied very carefully by this group of customers when they make a buying decision. The preferences of the segments remain fixed during the entire simulation. Segment sizes are unequal (with segment 3 including 50 percent of the customers and every other segment 10 percent). Each customer buys exactly one product in each period (non-purchase is not an option).

Competitors: Two kinds of organisations compete in the artificial marketplace where organisational behaviour is assumed to be bounded rational. The two organisational prototypes are therefore developed to follow very simple decision rules.

Mass marketer: They do not construct consumer market segments. All potential buyers are addressed with the same advertising message. The mass marketer creates this message by accentuating product attributes that are strongly perceived among buyers of the mass marketer's product in the past period. The mass marketer thus assumes a continuing causal relation between attribute perception and a buying act in the following period. The functioning of this organisation (the bounded rational behaviour rule) is outlined in Figure 1.

Segmenter: They create a partition of the consumers' based on their perception of the own brand. For advertising message development, the segmenter first chooses the group of individuals with the highest number of buying acts in the past period and then affirms attributes which are perceived by more than 50%. This message is targeted at all buyers of the own brand. An outline is provided in Figure 2.

Simulation cycle: One simulation period starts with organisational decisions that are fed into the artificial consumer market. These decisions include the development of the advertising message and the selection of the market segment to be targeted (in case of the segmenter). After all computations within the artificial world are executed (customers match their preferences with the perceptions of the products in the marketplace as influenced by advertising action), the actors receive a summary of market performance including consumer choices (who bought which product), and the beliefs or perceptions of the customers on all 12 product attributes. A summary of the computations that take place in the SIMSEG simulation environment is provided in Figure 4.

5. Measures of Organisational Performance
The typical performance measures used in segmentation studies are profit, sales and market share. In competition analysis survival dominates the list of criteria explored. In this article the effect of the strategy-competition-interaction is investigated for two different performance measures representing different organisational goals encountered: the number of units sold is the general success measure (representing profit and revenues as

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**Table 1: Consumer preference segments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Segment 1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segment 2</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segment 3</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segment 4</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segment 5</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segment 6</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: I = irrelevant; R = relevant
well in this particular simulation because the price module was excluded) and survival representing the long-term perspective of the organisation.

**Number of units sold:** The simplest way to measure success or undertake success comparisons is to take a look at the total units sold. As price is set fixed in our simulation this would be the equivalent to a sales criterion as well as a market share indicator.

**Survival:** Another common way to evaluate corporate success in a competitive environment is to monitor
which companies survive in the long run (Stearns et al., 1995), an approach very typical for new venture success investigations. This criterion can be measured in a binary manner, allowing the conclusion that surviving companies acted more successfully in the marketplace in the long run than non surviving companies.

6. Experimental Design

Every simulation has a duration of 36 periods with one period representing one month. The number of independent simulations is a result of the full factorial experimental design based on the following factors and factor levels:

- Advertising budget: low (100) and high (200 monetary units)
- Thinking cycle (this is the frequency of the possibility to revise the strategy): every simulation period and every 6th simulation period
- Number of organisation in the marketplace: 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10

Each simulation was repeated ten times. The experimental design is outlined in Figure 4, providing the exact mix of mass marketers and segmenters competing in the marketplace in each scenario.

7. Results

Results based on the number of units sold as the performance measure: Analyses of variance are computed assuming a linear model where units sold function as the dependent variable and the amount of

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Figure 2: Organisational behaviour under the segmenter strategy

Select data basis for analysis: clusters perceptions and chooses segment with maximum choices of own brand

Determine attributes perceived by the absolute majority: calculate item perception percentage (IPP, percent of buyers that perceive each item as existent)

create advertising message: include attributed with IPP > 50%

does the advertising message include at least one attribute

- NO
- YES

rank order items according to IPP

include attribute with maximum IPP into advertising message

target the derived advertising message to customers chosen in the data basis
advertising budget and the length of the thinking cycle represent the independent variables. First order interactions are included. Separate analyses are computed for each competitive setting (consisting of ten replications under identical conditions).

Figure 5 illustrates these results visualised by means of box plots where the top two quadrants show results under the condition of high marketing budgets and the bottom quadrants for low marketing budgets. The right hand side of the plot provides results under the condition that strategic reorientation of the organisation was possible in every sixth period, whereas the left hand side allowed strategy changes in each period.

The major finding that results from the simulations conducted, is that organisations that choose to segment the consumers and focus on target markets are more successful in highly competitive environments; when two organisations compete (adjusted R squared .88, p-value < .001), the segmenter is significantly less successful than the mass marketer. In addition, longer thinking cycles (every sixth period of time) significantly favour the performance of the segmenters in highly competitive environments. The latter effect is caused by the fact that the segmenter tends to switch market niches and the advertising profile when the choice of possible sub markets is large due to low competition.

In the case of three competing firms (adjusted R squared .48, p-value < .001) the segmenter performs significantly worse then the mass marketers, with high budget additionally decreasing performance level of the segmenter because mass marketers can more efficiently advertise to their large number of customers, whereas segmenters targeting smaller groups of potential buyers reach saturation levels. The linear model including five competitors in general does not fit very well (adjusted R squared .19, p-value < .001). Significance values indicate that the segmenters’ performance is inferior, longer thinking cycles favours them while impairing success of mass marketers. The same is true for the seven-competitors scenario (adjusted R squared .25, p-value < .001), supporting the finding that long thinking cycles are in favour of the segmenter strategy. In the market with ten competitors (Figure 5) all segmenters turn out to be significantly more successful. Marketing budget plays an important role, with higher budgets impairing the success of segmenters and long thinking cycles benefiting them.

Results based on the survival performance measure: Survival was investigated in the last simulation period. Firms that did not sell any products at all (market share equals zero) failed to survive in this marketplace. The results are given in Table 2 where the descriptions of the scenarios are given in columns 1 and 2. The three right-
hand columns provide the number of organisations that did not survive the simulated three-year period of time. Each of the three columns specifies the number of competitors these organisations faced. For instance, if the strategy could be revised each period (thinking cycle 1) and the advertising budget was low (100), 1 organisation died in a highly competitive market and this was a mass marketer.

It becomes apparent from this table that all firms survive in the marketplaces with low competition. Both in the two- and three-competitor-marketplaces all firms operate and sell their products until the last period of time simulated. In all simulation runs except for the five-competitor-scenario, exclusively mass marketers fail to survive. As can be seen, more mass marketers are unable to cope with competition in general (and especially under the conditions of low advertising budget and long periods of time without adaptation of the advertising message and the segment targeted). The reasons are twofold: First, the mass marketer in general suffers more from low budgets than the segmenter does (larger amount of potential buyers the advertising message is addressed to). Second, mass marketers suffer from the fact that segmenters perform better when strategic thinking cycles are longer because the rule of the segmenter supports rapid change that on the long run does not optimally influence the advertising effectiveness and thus the customer perceptions. Exactly the opposite reasoning explains the one death of a segmenter in the five-competitors market environment with high advertising budget and frequent possibility to change the advertising message.

In sum, three findings can be deduced from investigating this performance measure: (1) under the market conditions modelled, non-survival is a rare event in general, (2) the segmenters beat the mass marketers with respect to the survival criterion and (3) the more competitors offer their products in the marketplace, the higher the probability of firms not surviving the entire simulation period.

With regard to the proposed research questions, the simulation results lead to following conclusions:

Hypothesis 1: The concentrated segmentation strategy is found to be more successful under the condition of high competition with regard to organisational performance.

Hypothesis 2: Increased advertising expenditure is not found to favour the concentrated segmentation
strategy. On the contrary, higher marketing budget levels for all competitors turn out to significantly impair the success of segmenters in the case of number of units sold used as performance measure. The same is true where the survival criterion is used instead of the performance measure, although the contrary effect is not detected.

Hypothesis 3: The opportunity to review the strategy more frequently does not lead to increased market success of the segmenter. On the contrary, segmenters are found to suffer from the multitude of possible segments when competition is low, for both performance measures.

In sum, the concentrated segmentation strategy seems to provide an advantage in a market with high competitive pressure. Log-file analysis of consecutive periods allows insight into the market developments in every single simulated month over the entire period of the simulation. The fundamental functioning as extracted is as follows: Mass marketers advertise the same product attributes, the attributes perceived most often to apply among the buyers of the total market. Additional competitors that act in accordance with the mass marketing rule thus reduce the market size for this strategy. More competition among mass marketers only therefore decreases the number of units sold for all organisations targeting the entire market. Segmenters that attack mass marketers by choosing to advertise product attributes identical or very similar to those promoted by the mass marketers have stronger advertising effectiveness due to a smaller group of individuals exposed to the advertising message. Segmenters that target a niche market and therefore advertise a product profile that is very distinct in the marketplace take advantage of the fact that there is no or very low competition for the product offered. As
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long as competition is low, mass marketers beat segmenters because they influence a large number of consumer opinions in the favoured product perception dimensions, whereas the segmenter only influences a small number, thus generating less buying acts. With increasing competition the pure size effect vanishes and the segmenter strategy is more successful due to either increased advertising effects or niche targeting.

8. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Work

A computer simulation study was conducted investigating the interaction of alternative segmentation strategies and the competitiveness of the market environment. The artificial world that was developed to represent the aspect of market reality relevant to our research questions is a mature market (with no new entries), containing preference segments with fixed preferences over the entire three simulated years. Each consumer buys exactly one product a year, advertising effects are cumulative, but past organisations’ strategy mistakes cannot be fed back into future strategy. Two kinds of organisations compete in the market place: mass marketers and segmenters. Both follow a simple segment selection and advertising message development rule and can occur multiple times in the market.

The following central conclusions can be drawn from the simulation: (1) the more competitive a market environment, the more successful the concentrated market segmentation strategy; (2) increased levels of marketing budget for all competitors does not favour segmenters, as they reach advertising effect saturation levels earlier; (3) frequently rethinking and modifying the strategy is not recommended for organisations following a concentrated segmentation strategy because cumulative advertising effects over multiple periods of time are not taken advantage of if the target segment is modified too often.

These findings were based on the analysis of two different performance measures: the number of units sold and organisation survival. The latter was found not to be very informative for this particular experiment, as the number of organisations not surviving the simulations was rather low. The number of units sold served well as performance measure for the simulation set up.

Within the constraints of simulation experiments, our study is limited by the following restrictions that were deliberately excluded from investigation but interesting for future simulations with different research questions: (1) price was set equal for all organisations; (2) no agent memory was modelled (learning from failures in the past therefore is not possible); (3) consumers in the artificial world modelled have fixed preferences and therefore do not change aspiration levels in reaction to market development and finally; (4) advertising budget levels were able to be increased for all competing organisations where, for instance, niche marketers may realistically have less resources to do this.

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Table 2: Non-survival Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thinking cycle</th>
<th>Advertising budget</th>
<th>Scenario with 10 competitors</th>
<th>Scenario with 7 competitors</th>
<th>Scenario with 5 competitors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>each period (1)</td>
<td>low (100)</td>
<td>1 (mass marketer)</td>
<td>1 (mass marketer)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>each period (1)</td>
<td>high (200)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (segmenter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>every sixth period (6)</td>
<td>low (100)</td>
<td>4 (mass marketers)</td>
<td>1 (mass marketer)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>every sixth period (6)</td>
<td>high (200)</td>
<td>2 (mass marketers)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
during Sara Dolnicar’s appointment at the Institute for Tourism and Leisure Studies at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration. We wish to thank Christian Buchta and Josef Mazanec for making the SIMSEG/ACM environment available for simulation experiments and supporting us in troubleshooting.

References


Biographies

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