

ANIMAL ISSUES

philosophical and ethical issues related to human/animal interactions

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ANIMAL ISSUES

The aim of this journal is to investigate philosophical and ethical issues related to human/animal interactions. Papers are invited on any topics within this general area.

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Our thanks to Dr Lindsay Duncan for editorial assistance with this issue.

Animal rehabilitation- an exercise in the practice of biodiversity and a tool for conservation

Gisela Kaplan

Introduction

On a recent trip that I took to town, the roads were deserted and a family of woodducks was walking near the edge of the road. Ten minutes later I returned and one dead woodduck was in the middle of the road. As ducks generally walk slowly across the road, it was easy to assume that the driver of a car had, maliciously, failed to slow down for them. The driver had further failed to stop after hitting the duck, not knowing perhaps that the whole family would gather around the dead one and thereby risk death from other reckless drivers. I picked up the duck. It was still warm and carried it off the road. As all of the ducks followed, I placed it near a pond, as far away from the road as possible. Another unnecessary death had occurred and another social fabric of an animal species disrupted. The damage was not just done to one but in this case to several members of the species. Had the duck been alive and not too badly injured it would have been taken into care and then released back into the same group.

Of late, topics of rehabilitation and release of wildlife have come under a good deal of scrutiny in Australia. Some have argued that rehabilitation is a waste of time. The recent article by Glenn Albrecht in *Animal Issues*¹ spoke of the many shortcomings of rehabilitation and it is partly to this paper that I wish to respond, although this is taken largely as a starting point to the general debate about

¹ *Animal Issues*, Vol 2, 1, 1998.

reintroduction, captive breeding and rehabilitation of native Australian wildlife.

The human species has inflicted severe damage on its environment and on other species. In 1981 Special Survival Plans (SSPs) were set up by the International Union for the Conservation of National Species Survival Commissions (IUCN/SSC). At that time, 75 species were listed as endangered and the list has grown ever since. Inevitably, the desire to save species from extinction has led to detailed discussions and research on how best to achieve this.

There have been many successes in protecting wildlife both at individual and species levels, ranging from howler monkeys in Belize, to the Californian condor, to the European peregrine falcon and to the South African vulture programs. A few of the projects have been so successful that they have even caused a glut of the species.² To argue at any level that rehabilitation (including restocking, translocation, and captive breeding) is futile or unsuccessful is to miss the point about what can be done and has already been achieved.

Activities have occurred in all areas of rehabilitation. One is restocking (replenishment of existing stock of species), another reintroduction (reintroducing a species to an area that was known to have been home to a specific species before but had disappeared) and a third common method is translocation (taking species from one area to another). These activities are by their very nature often projects of some magnitude. They usually concern species that are vulnerable or endangered; although intentional translocations (over 700 in new world English speaking countries between 1973 and 1986) also included many game species for sporting purposes.³ There are cases in which a species may become overabundant in one small pocket while, through its natural habitat range, it has actually become rare and vulnerable.

² C.D. Ankney, 'An embarrassment of riches: Too many geese', *Journal of Wildlife Management*, 60, (1996), pp. 217-223.

³ B. Griffith, J. M. Scott, et al., 'Translocation as a species conservation tool: Status and strategy.' *Science*, 245, (1989), pp. 477-480.

Rehabilitation of individuals belonging to a species currently classified as abundant may occur also. We should not overlook this category. Admittedly, it is more dramatic to speak about saving a species at risk of extinction than about saving animals which are abundant or common. Why would one want to save an animal of a species that is plentiful? First, if our concerns focus only on the thin end of the wedge, we would have no mechanisms in place to prevent species from sliding into the risk zone in the first place. Second, we need to stop and ask the humane question: Why ask such a question at all? We do not stop treating humans for ailments, fractures and diseases because of their abundance. The value ranking of species according to numbers and known stock is a dangerous game. It may be temporarily unavoidable as we recognise the urgency for some specific species and specific ecosystems such as wetlands. However, pragmatism itself can create value hierarchies and pave the ground for a particular ethics, i.e. it is possible to associate 'urgency' with value and to attribute value only to things that are rare. Ultimately, such conclusions would be extremely detrimental to biodiversity.

There is no doubt that the last two decades have set all those concerned on a steep learning curve. Mistakes have been plentiful and some efforts perhaps even woefully inadequate. Also, controversy has surrounded some projects and ideas. However, it is clear that over this timespan, we, collectively, have gained a much clearer perspective on strategies, legislature, project planning and complexity. This article embraces at least a cautious optimism that we are beginning to see successes that are worth noting. It deals with some of the controversies and issues.

Assessing the state of species

There are assessment criteria available before any rehabilitation, reintroduction or translocation of wildlife is commenced and these should be used (see Table 1 below). This checklist, which according to Jeffrey M. Black, contains vital information on which rational decisions for the release of wildlife can be made⁴, falls into four main

⁴J.M. Black, 'Threatened Waterfowl: Recovery priorities and reintroduction potential with special reference to the Hawaiian Goose', in *Avian Conservation*.

domains: testing biopolitical conditions, environmental conditions, resources and the condition of the species involved. Our preparedness to follow through on such an assessment is often counteracted by lack of funds, limited by political will and circumscribed by scientific knowledge of the species or of the context. Moreover, behaviour of the species is all too often underrated as an important, if not vital, component in achieving successful outcomes in diagnosis and release. And preempting a later point, one might have to concede that the term 'success' is itself in need of definition and by no means an agreed upon standard.

Ideally, in any attempt of reintroduction of a species, even in translocation exercises, all four assessment criteria for a given species should be thoroughly known and evaluated. Unfortunately, this is not always possible. Sometimes it is a lack of understanding of the need to make such viability assessments.

Table 1

Condition of Species	Details	Human Preparedness in Australia (Ranked 1-5, low-exc.)
Biopolitical conditions	No negative impact locally	
	Community support exists	4 - 5
	GOs/NGOs* involved/supportive	4 - 5
	Conformity with and protection available by laws	4 - 5
Environmental conditions	Removal of cause of decline	2 - 4
	Habitat availability (protected)	1 - 5
	Habitat unsaturated	1 - 4

Research and Management, eds. J.M. Marzluff and R. Sallabanks, (Island Press, Washington, 1998), pp. 125-140.

Resource conditions	Reintroduction technology known and available	
	Knowledge of species (biology, ecology, behaviour, vet. science)	1 - 4
	Sufficient financial resources	0 - 3
Condition of species	Wild population needs supplementation to remain viable	
	New stock available	
	No jeopardy to wild populations	

Source: adapted from Black, 'Threatened Waterfowl', pp. 125-140.

Abbreviations GOs/NGOs refer to government/non-government organisations.

The latter include non-profit, volunteer and charitable organisations that are autonomous in structure and funding but are licensed/approved and abide by standards by governments.

Biopolitics

To address all four criteria of assessment briefly, my first point concerns the biopolitical and the recent criticisms of an ethics of care. Community support for the saving and maintaining of native wildlife in Australia is currently widespread. Government organisations and non-government voluntary organisations have mushroomed throughout Australia. In these contexts, many endeavours in wildlife care have evolved as single species efforts and the focus is on the saving of individuals. Much of this involvement is at first an involvement of the heart, a commitment grown from compassion. Albrecht's paper implied that human compassion as a mere emotion is unfocussed and ultimately useless. He states that such emotion, by implication, is spurious in achievement, narrow in concept, ethical only in appearance rather than content, and finally ecologically 'unjust'. The argument made is that an individual is saved at the expense of broader contexts and

numbers.⁸ One might add that some species frequent several distinct zones and would not necessarily be saved if only just one targetted ecosystem was protected.

Habitat conditions are of crucial importance in Australia where white stewardship of the land over the last two hundred years has led to some of the most catastrophic records. Australia holds the top position on the rate of extinction of native species in the world. It has the world's worst extinction rate for mammals – seventeen species or ten percent in 200 years representing five times the global average, 97 plant species and 2000 more are threatened, again about ten percent.⁹ Particularly the mammals of inland Australia have suffered.¹⁰ Over one thousand native species, as many as a third of all Australian mammals, are in danger of extinction. For instance, it was reported in 1995 that of the eighteen nationally recognised species and subspecies of bandicoot, thirteen are extinct, endangered, vulnerable or threatened.¹¹ Australia also now has the most endangered amphibians and reptiles in the world.¹² Recher pointed out some years ago that, in the past, avifauna has often not even featured in these tallies. We are only now beginning to gain a clearer picture of the 'abundance' and losses of some species.¹³

One third of Australian forest and woodland are gone forever and three quarters of Australia's rain forest has entirely disappeared.¹⁴ It is still disappearing at an alarming rate. Australia has about 550 national parks covering three per cent of the land area.¹⁵ For the remaining 97 per cent Australia has kept cutting vegetation at almost

⁸ C.J. Bibby, 'A global view of priorities for bird conservation: A summary', *Ibis*, 137, (1995), S247-S248.

⁹ G. Dunkley, *The Greening of the Red. Sustainability, Socialism and the Environmental Crisis*, (Pluto Press, Leichhardt, NSW, 1992).

¹⁰ S.R. Morton, 'European Settlement and the Mammals of Arid Australia', *Australian Environmental History*, ed., S.Dovers, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1994).

¹¹ J. Woodford, 'Endangered bandicoot gets second chance at life in a cat-free zone', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 5, (1995).

¹² N. Bitá, 'Environment worth \$663bn to our future', *The Australian*, 3, (1996).

¹³ H.F. Recher, (website), 'Ground-dwelling and ground-foraging birds: the next round of extinctions?', Armidale, NSW, University of New England.n.d.
<http://www.environment.gov.au/life/general-info/biolinks/biolink4.html>.

¹⁴ Dunkley, *The Greening of the Red*.

¹⁵ Bitá, 'Environment worth \$663bn to our future'.

the same rate as in the Amazon¹⁶, specifically rainforest in New South Wales and tropical rainforests in Queensland and the Northern Territory and so-called 'marginal' open woodlands, about 400,000 to 600,000 hectares per annum. Ten percent of all cropland and as much as a quarter of pasture have been destroyed beyond repair and over half of Australia's farmland is salinated or degraded (80 per cent in NSW) and in need of restoration.¹⁷

This overall tally of losses aside, removal of the source of decline of some endangered species can be quite simple – at least in theory. It is well-established that introduced feral species (plants and animals) have created havoc for native flora and fauna. They have created competition and predator-relationships for which the Australian native species are simply not prepared. It is indeed useless to reintroduce koalas into an area that is infested with feral dogs, foxes and cats. The survival chances of the koala would be nearly zero in such an environment. However, there are individuals like John Wamsley who has started investing his money and time into earth sanctuaries. He has become Australia's most successful breeder of endangered species. And the secret to his success is simple. He constructed special fences that formed a reliable barrier for potential predators and then removed all foxes, cats and dogs from the newly created sanctuaries. The natural recovery rate within these precincts was enormous.¹⁸

There is no doubt, that action needs to be taken at all levels and needs to occur simultaneously. To give an example, there is little point in restocking an endangered avian population via captive breeding programs if the cause of the decline is not at least partially removed first. When the cause of the decline is known to be associated with a shortage of suitable tree hollows for nesting, for example, one would need to provide alternative nesting sites (such as boxes) first. At the same time, one would need to implement plans to either protect trees that will provide suitable nesting sites (and food) or plant tree species that will eventually provide suitable

¹⁶ T. Caswell, *The Green Agenda for 1994*, (Australian Conservation Foundation, Fitzroy, Victoria, 1994).

¹⁷ Dunkley, *The Greening of the Red*.

¹⁸ J. Woodford, 'The ravaged country: our shame', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, (1996), p. 25 & p. 28.

nesting sites. For propagation of a species, such as the red-tailed black cockatoo, natural recovery rate would be partially dependent on the availability of large tree-hollows which in turn will develop naturally only in trees older than 100 years, hence long-term planning is involved here. Short-term activities can prove to be valuable measures as a stop-gap, until some essential natural conditions can be restored.

Resource conditions and individual rehabilitation

It is possible to repair some damage to wildlife relatively easily. Other forms of recovery, however, may require substantial funding, and all of the approaches require knowledge of the species and its context. Australia's past approach to gaining and maintaining knowledge of its own native fauna has been marred by colonial status and derogatory European attitudes. We are now beginning to overcome these attitudes but by no means, as yet, has the shortfall of knowledge been redressed. This is especially true for our avifauna.

At formal governmental level, resources and the cost efficiency model offer another vista. In the last year or so, it has been said that there are economic decisions to be made in connection with protecting the flora and fauna of Australia. The argument runs roughly like this: we have only a small pot of money and, given these limitations, we need to think carefully on how we distribute the funds and where we place our financial efforts in order to maximise outcomes. The answer is invariably that saving of single species is not as effective in the long run as is saving of whole ecosystems. In other words, we should not concentrate our resources on saving a stork but on saving the wetlands in which storks and a myriad of other species can continue to exist. The latter is part of a very long-standing and well-established debate world-wide. It is also important not to target merely those species that are currently on the vulnerable or endangered lists but, again, whole ecosystems that might have supported these endangered species before. This point of view can be questioned in several ways, as follows.

Individual rehabilitation and cost

With respect to individual rehabilitation the above argument has several flaws. First, the overall argument on cost efficiency cannot be applied easily to rehabilitation of individual animals. Arguments favouring cost-effective planning for specific ecosystems often imply that wildlife rehabilitation costs a lot of money that would better be rechanneled into ecosystem preservation. The problem is that this attitude implies that there is a pot of gold spent on wildlife rehabilitation in this country.

This implied message of cost to government and to the broader public is bordering on gross misinformation. Not all but most endeavours of wildlife rehabilitation in Australia are undertaken by volunteers, some of them on an individual basis and most others now within rehabilitation and rescue organisations that may be under the auspices of government departments (such as National Parks and Wildlife). Typically, they receive no funds, equipment or any other assistance from government sources (state or federal). Some of the wildlife rehabilitation and rescue organisations are now rather large and well organised, particularly in New South Wales and Victoria.

Economically, the argument that rehabilitation of individual wildlife is a waste of time is particularly misleading and certainly false by any economic measure. First, it is important to stress that much of the work and cost is borne by people who do not get paid for the work they do. They are certainly not a burden on government funds or taxes. Funds are raised in the community and channelled directly back into care for wildlife (as for expensive medical treatment or equipment). Wildlife organisations are self-funding and usually have the status of charitable organisations. They do some fund-raising through the year, often by selling products with a wildlife message and very occasionally by donations. The rest of the income is derived from membership fees. Running costs, at least in Wildlife Information and Rescue Services (WIRES), one organisation that I know very well, are kept to an absolute minimum and are largely confined to such things as stationery, telephone costs and postage at the local branch level. At branch level, all members of the organisation are unpaid.

All members provide for the animals out of their own pockets. This may involve aviaries for birds, pens for kangaroos, gunyahs for koalas and a whole host of 'hospital' accommodation, including sheets, blankets, electric blankets, heating, boxes, pouches, terrariums for reptiles and so forth. Then there is medication to be paid for, appropriate food to be provided, petrol costs for rescuing, collecting and releasing an animal—again, these are items that are paid for out of the pockets of the volunteers. During late spring and summer, we may each travel as much as 200km per week solely for wildlife rehabilitation work. This is of course more of an issue in rural areas than in city environments, but petrol costs alone may be considerable. The cost for the volunteer, apart from a membership fee, may range from \$50 a year to anything in the hundreds or even thousands.

Funds spent on individual wildlife rescue and rehabilitation add up when counting all individuals involved. WIRES in New South Wales, for instance has currently about 1,500 members. If each member spends only \$100 per annum (including membership fees), the annual expenditure for animals exceeds \$150,000 by one organisation alone, a sizeable outlay of costs to help our wildlife. Even if all costs outlayed privately by wildlife carers were added together, the cost of rehabilitation of wild-born species is considerably cheaper than any zoo captive breeding program could ever be. Indeed, species maintenance costs in captive breeding programs have been calculated as being about 300 per cent higher than conservation costs in the wild¹⁹ and this is a measure of public expenditure. The true conservation cost is even lower in Australia because of the large commitment of voluntary wildlife care groups.

These costs are not costs that anyone can debate and include in any theoretical or financial discussion *as if* they were public funds. The cost being met by the individual carers comes from their private pocket. There are species re-introductions masterminded by funded and paid labour as well but, so far, these are minute efforts compared to individual rehabilitation of wildlife by volunteers, even though they attract a good deal more media attention.

¹⁹ A.P. Dobson, *Conservation and Biodiversity*, (Scientific American Library, New York, 1996).

Human intervention in the natural world and rehabilitation

My third argument concerns the implied criticism of human intervention in animal survival. This set of arguments is, of necessity, pragmatic, anecdotal and informed merely by my own longstanding practice of rehabilitation of Australian wildlife and by considerable time spent writing about and observing wildlife rehabilitation outside Australia.

In my own practice of caring for birds, about 65-78 per cent of birds brought into care get released. Of the 22 percent who do not make it to release stage, about 5 percent have died whilst in care while 17 per cent have to be euthanased. My own figures compare well with Wildlife Rehabilitation Statistics from the USA made available in the last few years. Between 1995-1997 they show that at least half of the admitted animals were released, while additional others, which presumably have also been successfully released, were transported to more suitable care sites.²⁰

Rehabilitation of wildborn injured adult animals

Causes of death vary from overload of parasites to severe traumatic events, the latter being the predominant cause of misadventure. The nature of the injuries or damages that ground the birds in the first place are of some importance here. The most important of these are traumatic events. They can be subdivided into several categories:

1. human induced and human caused
2. feral/domestic animal induced and caused
3. natural events
4. disease

In my own experience, the most common cause of coming into care are traumatic events caused by humans (presented in category 1). This tallies well with the results of a detailed study of birds of prey in another part of the world. They studied the causes of admission to

²⁰ Website, 'Wildlife Rehabilitation Statistics', (1998).
<http://www.ndsu.nodak.edu/instruct/devold/twrid/html/stats.htm>.

the zoo animal and exotic pet clinic of the veterinary faculty in Zurich between 1 January 1985 and 31 December 1994. Forty-seven per cent of all admissions in that period were trauma and half of them suffered from fractures, caused usually by car accidents.²¹

Human induced and human caused traumatic events can be subdivided into malicious and intentional, preventable and accidental. Fortunately, today, most harm inflicted by humans on wildlife is no longer malicious or intentional. But there are still examples of this. Recently I received an Australian Hobby (Australia's smallest falcon) whose legs were both cleanly snapped off high at the thigh. The type of cut suggested the use of a now illegal rabbit trap. Some farmers (very few now) still falsely believe that birds of prey are enemies of their livestock and a few have been suspected of placing baited rabbit traps on fences. The birds caught in these traps die a most cruel death of starvation which may take up to a fortnight. Needless to add that the Hobby was euthanased. Shooting of wedgetailed eagles also does occur still in some parts of Australia and this too is based on ignorance or misinformation, and sometimes on callousness.

Many birds and indeed other Australian native wildlife suffer or die from human induced acts which are preventable. The largest category of injuries I receive come from road accidents, including broken limbs and bones, concussions, lacerations – indeed the whole range of injuries that humans may also sustain when hit by a car. In addition, injured animals suffer from shock and dehydration. Occasionally, birds are brought in that have been caught in barbed wire fences or have flown against a window at high speed.

Preventable categories of injuries to birds concern also the poor habit of poisoning either to catch introduced pests and predators such as foxes or rodents. Unfortunately, baits are not marked 'foxes only

²¹ J.M. Hatt, R. Baumgartner, et al., 'Diagnosis and therapy of raptors with a compilation of cases 1985-1994', *Schweizer Archiv fuer Tierheilkunde* 138/9, (1996), pp. 434-440.

Latest data from WIRES show that approximately 11 percent of animals in WIRES care (all animal groups) are a result of motor vehicle accidents. (The rate of accident survivors and deaths may be considerably higher for some avian species, see later).

please' and birds on the upper end of the food-chain may die as a consequence of poisoned bait. Another preventable cause of death concerns the group of herbicides and insecticides that are sometimes sprayed excessively. Tawny frogmouths, for instance, are extremely susceptible to poisoning by insecticides. I have used humidicribs and oxygen support to treat poisoned Tawny frogmouths with symptoms similar to dyptheria and accompanied by general paralysis.

These damages described above are human induced and show the conflictual side of the encounter between human civilisation activities and the natural world in the most dramatic and visible form. The question is, what conclusions we draw from this information?

The argument that opponents to wildlife rehabilitation either imply or even state is that interference in the natural order of things is a bad thing. They argue that there is a high attrition rate of young offspring in many species that is natural. That is certainly true, both of avian and mammalian species. For instance, in drought years, ringtail or brushtail possums and red or eastern grey kangaroo offspring may have a mortality rate above 65 per cent or even higher in their first months or year of life.²² There is also a 'natural' selection by disease and levels of skill that each individual member of the species needs to develop. Those that do not develop them to high levels will perish. A bird of prey that is not a good hunter will die or at least not reproduce. Generally, the argument is implied or stated that the weak, the sick and the old will perish. Only the healthy, the strong and/or the resourceful will survive and will therefore maintain a healthy 'gene-pool' and levels of skills ensuring survival for future generations. The argument goes on to say that wildlife rehabilitation interferes in the natural selection of species by supporting the weak, the sick and the old and it therefore contributes to weakening the wildlife generally.

²² A.S.I. London, 'Lactation and neonatal survival of mammals', in *Advances in Animal Conservation*, eds. J.P.Hearn and J. K. Hodges, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985), 54, pp. 183-207.

The problem with this view is not that there may be a process described by the name of 'natural selection' (where do accidents rank in the 'natural' selection process?) but that it is assumed that the victims of injuries belong into the category of the weak, sick, old or unskilled. Here we have the strongest error of logic. Suffering an accident as a consequence of contact with humans does not necessarily denote individual weakness or unsuitability. Quite often, the victims are the healthy ones, selected out already through the natural processes to carry on their species. I do not wish to overstate the case, particularly in the absence of robust statistical evidence, but I suspect that the birds I treat may often be the healthiest, the fittest, the mature.

The damage we cause to our environment has often been described in terms of environmental degradation, encroachments on ever decreasing areas of wilderness and remaining stands of secondary forests, and in terms of pollution and human self-assertion for space. The damage to our wildlife has also been understood as being caused partly by the introduction of feral species. However, one set of causes of the current demise that is so often left out even of environmental debate concerns technology itself. In only a few places around the globe are there any deliberate and funded programs that will address the effect some of our modern technology has on wildlife. Powerlines, the car, airplanes, boats, tracking stations, wire, barbed wire and electric fences are structures that kill animals in their hundreds and thousands. One newspaper pointed out recently that the road toll in New South Wales alone claims 7000 victims of native animals daily.²³ How many are there really, if one includes all other areas of technology and how many thousands more would we count per day if we add pollutants in water, soil and air? And how many tens of thousands would we

²³ A recent study of road kills in New South Wales by WIRES in conjunction with Professor Cooper of Macquarie University, also showed that the majority of animals killed on roads consist largely of native animals (80 different species in a sample size of 381). The species which are most affected are the grey kangaroo, the swamp wallaby, brushtailed and ringtail possums, wombats, bearded dragons, blue tongue lizards and two species of birds: the magpie and the galah (all these species occurred more than ten times in the sample of 381 road kills), cit. 'LifeWires', Summer, 99, in D.W. Cooper, 'Road Kills of Animals on some New South Wales Roads – Final Report on Data Collected by WIRES Volunteers in 1997', WIRES Head Office, PO Box 260 Forestville NSW 2087, p. 16'.

need to add to the already known carnage if we counted hunting, habitat loss and introduced exotic species?

In evolutionary time, technological structures are not environmental features to which we can expect full adaptation by animals. It is not a sign of their lack of skill or of maladaptive behaviour if they get electrocuted on power-poles (in the gap between the wooden bar on top of a pole and the wire connection). It is not a sign of visual impairment if birds do not always detect metal wire fences. It requires no sickness or weakness to get blinded by an oncoming car, and it cannot be called stupidity when animals need to cross a road to get to water or to another part of their own territory.

There are ways of fixing quite quickly and relatively cheaply at least some of the problems associated with technological structures. For instance, there are reflectors that can be placed on roads to warn animals, there are wind/sound creating devices to fit on bumperbars of cars to warn animals of oncoming traffic. Such devices could be fitted routinely to every car. Barbed wire could be outlawed because birds sustain horrific injuries from such fencing and usually have to be euthanased. There is a multitude of design possibilities for a whole host of things but the efforts are few and far between, either in terms of marketing and actual use, or in terms of design. We need to think more cleverly and compassionately about animals also in terms of the things we put in the environment for human use and convenience.

I personally believe that human intervention, i.e. thinking of making modern technology safer for wildlife as well as wildlife rehabilitation itself, is vital as damage is so often caused by human intervention in the first place. My work, as I see it, is merely a very small attempt to correct for the ravages of human actions. This, I think, holds true both for injuries caused through human technology and structures, as well as for damage incurred by feral animals.

The solutions concerning feral animals and the disappearance of suitable habitat are more complex problems to solve and have to involve several agencies or at least several processes simultaneously. The point here is that in a number of demonstrable cases,

intervention at the level of wildlife treatment and care is not sufficient by itself to make a difference in all cases. I would not therefore conclude that we should stop treating injured koalas but I would propose that programs for the control or elimination of feral animals are a case in point where public funds might be usefully spent.

Rehabilitation and success rate

Finally, the opponents of wildlife rehabilitation argue that this activity is a waste of time because only a minute proportion (figures of 1 to ten per cent of successful releases are usually cited) of wildlife coming into care are supposedly surviving in the wild thereafter. I challenge anyone to say that we can trust any of these pessimistic figures at all and use them in debate about the value of wildlife rehabilitation. First, there are very few studies so far undertaken that systematically follow animals post rehabilitation, and the few studies are concentrated on even fewer species. Yet these figures are at times presented as if they concerned ALL rehabilitation efforts of ALL species anywhere in Australia. This is blatantly incorrect.

We have few trustworthy examples of proven rehabilitation success and one of the reasons why we have so few is that it is often difficult to follow animals post-release. Tracking by transmitter devices is expensive and requires funding. Moreover, tracking devices are not always very good for the animal. Many of the wildlife rehabilitators specialising in birds have ensured that their birds get banded before release, so that their fate can be recorded should they fall into human hands again. In the years that raptors in my care were banded (by a licensed birdbander) only one bird has ever come to my attention again.

The question is also how one measures rehabilitation success or survival success? What are the markers for such success? How long need an animal have spent in rehabilitation before being considered part of a rehabilitation statistic and how long need it have survived in the wild post-release to become a success or a failure in the statistics?

For instance, a sparrow-hawk suffered a concussion by flying into a window of a house nestling in Australian bush. The bird spent one week in care and was then released in the same spot where it was found. From my hand it flew vertically high into the sky and soared there for half an hour until it was lost from sight. Is the one week care counted as a rehabilitation case? On what grounds would anyone want to argue that this release was unsuccessful or its survival chances slim as a consequence of rehabilitation or some prior disposition? The bird was in splendid health. It would seem difficult in those cases to make the point of failure of rehabilitation or of waste of time.

Another example: a barn owl (banded) was killed by a car at night on a lonely rural road three months after release. The bird was an adult when it came into care and remained in care for two weeks. Would anyone count the death of this bird three months post-release as a failure of rehabilitation or not? I would say that it was not a failure. This nocturnal bird might have attended to a roadkill and was then in turn surprised and blinded by a car, suffering the same fate. The fact that the bird came into care in the first place for an injury likely to have been sustained by another car accident is at least noteworthy. I would not speak of predisposition but there is a point to argue that the bird occupied a poor territory through which a gravel road wound in several places. These two examples are not exceptional cases. Rather, they may well be typical.

The majority of animals requiring care usually remain in care for a period of three days to three weeks. Are these all excluded from measures by those willing to seriously propose that only 1-10 per cent of wildlife rehabilitation is successful? And even if, for argument's sake, my own tally of 65-78 animals successfully released per hundred is challenged as being inflated. I might reply: what if one were to be ultra pessimistic and ventured to think that in fact per annum only 20 of the rehabilitated birds continued to live to old age? This may seem a small number. However, there is strength in numbers here. If everyone of the 1,500 members of the wildlife organisation just saved 20 animals per year (and this is an ultra-conservative estimate) this would bring the annual net gain to a respectable tally of 30,000 saved animals.

This is not to say that other methods, as proposed above (animal friendly counter-technology), could not ultimately achieve more. But we do not have it at the moment. I am convinced that there would not be one person working in rehabilitation or even in captive propagation and reintroduction programs who would not welcome such technological change. But such tasks have to be left to other groups and organisations with other focal points of activity.

Rehabilitation and release of wildborn orphaned animals

In another category there are animals coming into care which not only require longer care before release but also have to be trained by a human foster carer. These are animals that arrive as infants, nestlings or juveniles and would die if not cared for. Handraising Australian wildlife is now done quite successfully by a large army of people from very different walks of life. Here is not the place to cite the hundreds of examples of successful reunions with parents or flocks or the returns of handraised birds a year after release, or to marvel at the observable and repeated return of handraised birds to my backyard with new partners in tow. All of these stories, while heartwarming, could be dismissed as anecdotal and as statistically insignificant successes.

In the case of raising and then releasing animals, there may indeed be a host of problems which affect the survival chances of the handraised individual. These problems ought not to be down-played and it is in this group that some of the negative press may most likely arise. Depending on the species, it is mostly not just a matter of feeding and caring but often of training the animal into all the right behaviours that are essential for that individual's survival. This is often easier said than done. It is relatively easy to teach food recognition, provided that the carer has sufficient knowledge of the foods that a species eats. Usually, however, foster care offers only a limited variety of the foods that are available in the natural environment and here lies one substantial problem. The few foods that the animal has learnt to identify may not be the foods that are available all year round or plentiful all the time and the animal could

therefore starve to death. It can also be relatively difficult to teach the skills necessary for finding the right food. For instance, I have handraised many magpies and I know that they survived for at least 5 months post-release because they stayed in the area. But how does a human teach a magpie that it needs to listen to the sound of a scarab larvae underground and then pierce the beak into exactly the spot of the sound? We usually find ways around it, such as hiding worms under leaf litter, or, if one is lucky enough, find an older animal of the same species to act as tutor. It is difficult to teach predator recognition and social behaviour towards conspecifics. One magpie I had to raise without conspecifics was rather skilled in finding food but hopeless in social interaction with other magpies and therefore not exactly acceptable in magpie society. Release can also pose problems, as to time of year, territory and even time of day.

The host of problems associated with handraising wildborn animals that are then being released is also strongly associated with our lack of knowledge of native species. Here I concur entirely with Glenn Albrecht. Knowledge of our wildlife is just in its infancy and patchy at best. We need to improve this situation urgently. While this is widely recognised, the implementation into education programs has been relatively slow and difficult. There are many native species about which one cannot find anything written beyond the purely descriptive. Behaviour, ecology, diseases are often poorly understood. There are still many species of mammals and especially of birds on whom we have the most rudimentary knowledge-insufficient to deal effectively, i.e. from a knowledge base, with the species. To give an example here: on the much adored kookaburra, there exists only one book and a hand-full of articles that have ever been published and most on ecology, not on behaviour. On the magpie, another icon of Australian culture, I have found 35 scientific articles written in the last 100 years - and only a handful are on behaviour. Our knowledge of behaviour for most other native bird species is woefully lacking and in this context, much of the work is being carried out in a 'hit-and miss' style. We have all learned by trial and error—and even if we feel successful cannot say whether our preparation was sufficient to carry the individual to adulthood

and mating success. Within such context it is not difficult to see how rehabilitation, translocation and captive breeding programs may fail.

On the other hand, we have probably the highest incidence of grassroots knowledge of local species of any western nation. Countless voluntary organisations consisting of individuals who have often devoted their lives to the welfare of native species, have also amassed vast amounts of experience and knowledge. Sadly, the practitioners are often not the writers and valuable knowledge is constantly being lost and replenished in endless cycles of rehabilitation practice. By contrast, tertiary offers of programs in animal behaviour of Australian native species are still in their infancy, and this is often so because there is no teaching material available. There is thus not just an urgent need for more knowledge of native species, especially avian, but it seems well overdue that there needs to be a systematic endeavour to break out of the many 'catch 22' situations that surround the gaining and dissemination of knowledge concerning Australian wildlife.

Captive breeding programs have some similar issues attached to wildborn orphaned rehabilitation programs but unlike the rehabilitation programs run by volunteer organisations which accept any native animal in need of attention—whether abundant or rare—captive breeding programs are usually reserved for endangered species. These captive breeding programs are indeed largely and almost exclusively undertaken by institutions, such as zoos, with special breeding licenses. They are cost and labour intensive.

At the same time, all studies have shown that any relocation, reintroduction or other schemes are more successful with wildborn species than with species born and bred in captivity.²⁴ The questions that the failures raise are surely fruitful questions—as long as we remain willing to be flexible.

Perhaps they also show us that we need to be vigilant even with our abundant species. Wildlife rehabilitation of wildborn species is still

²⁴ Griffith et al. 'Translocation as a species conservation tool', pp. 477-480 and T.J. Cade & S. A. Temple, 'Management of threatened bird species: Evaluation of the hands-on approach', *Ibis*, 137, (1995), S161-S172.

the cheapest and most effective method to date. It would be a mistake, in my view, if all efforts went into the end of the decline phase of a species. Keep them abundant and many of the enormously time and cost consuming efforts of saving species from the brink of extinction would not be necessary. For this it is necessary to refocus attention to all species, not just the endangered ones.

Conclusion

The US National Committee for Biology has a program underway called 'DIVERSITAS'. This is an international program and involves scholars around the world. It is a program that attempts to integrate conceptually (and functionally) all aspects of protecting and increasing biological diversity in the world.

They understand that humans play critical roles in this. These roles are themselves diverse. What the biologist would like to do is to build into the DIVERSITAS program a set of specific roles for humans. The questions that they ask are 'What are the possible roles?', 'How might these roles be fostered', 'By whom?'. And we might also ask, 'For whose benefit?'. There is a need to pull together, to form teams of researchers, field practitioners and specialists in many diverse areas. P.J.S. Olney and colleagues argued in 1994 that we need to show creativity in conservation. Creativity here also involves the willing partnership and interface between education, public relations, fund raising, behaviour, genetics, captive breeding and care, ecology, population dynamics and conservation politics.²⁵ This is happening now, at least in some corners of Australia and for some species. There is little gained in one group 'knocking' another, or one activity receiving disparaging comments only to defend its own.

There are many shortcomings indeed in our present state of knowledge and in the overall management of the Australian native

²⁵ P.J.S. Olney, G. M. Mace, et al., eds., *Creative Conservation: The Interface between captive and wild populations*, (Chapman & Hall, London, 1994) and Black, 'Threatened Waterfowl', pp. 125-140.

wildlife. My reply would be: there are many steps that need to be taken in order to walk a mile. Compassion for animals is surely the first step in any endeavour. Another step is rehabilitation, another is protecting habitat, yet another is to create laws and policies designed to apportion some rights to the natural world and to animals, and not just to the human species and yet further important steps concern the creation of an educational environment which fosters the knowledge and dissemination of knowledge of our wildlife. Why condemn anything that is a step in the right direction? We all know that it cannot be the only step.

The ultimate aim must surely be that we do not just want animals to survive but to have a quality of life commensurate with their needs—physical, psychological, social and cultural. The rehabilitation programs that have been referred to here are an exercise not just in compassion but in the practice of biodiversity.

Biography

Gisela Kaplan pursues a double interest in social science and in ethology. She is professor of social science in Education Studies and research fellow in Biological Sciences, both simultaneously at the University of New England in Armidale, NSW. In animal behaviour (research focus on primate behaviour and avian communication), she has so far published two books (jointly with Lesley Rogers) called 'Orang-utans in Borneo' (1994), and the second entitled 'Not Only Roars and Rituals. Communication in Animals' (1998). A new book called 'The Tree Apes. Evolution, Behaviour and Future of the Orang-Utan' will appear later in 1999 (all in the Allen & Unwin Science series). She is also widely known for her writings on ethnicity and gender. A prolific writer, Professor Kaplan has published over one hundred papers and six books in social science, including 'Contemporary Western European Feminism' (1992) and 'The Meagre Harvest. The Australian Women's Movement 1950s-1990s' (1996). Her personal life has been constructed around rehabilitation of Australian wildlife, as a volunteer and a very active member for many years of New England WIRES (Wildlife Information and Rescue Services). She holds special licenses to rehabilitate Australian native birds and birds of prey.

Whither rights? Animal rights and the rise of new welfarism

Nicola Taylor

The notion of an animal rights *movement* is one which has the potential to mislead since those fighting for animals come from a variety of different ideological backgrounds and advocate many different ways to achieve many different aims. Gary Francione¹ argues that animal *rights* have become subsumed in what he terms 'new welfarism'. New welfarism is a hybrid approach which advocates more 'traditional' welfarist aims in the short term with the ultimate goal being one of animal rights and animal liberation in the long term. It is a sort of 'crisis management' whereby initial welfare problems are dealt with on a daily basis but the ultimate goal of liberating animals is never forgotten. Francione is critical of this 'soft option' and argues that to ever achieve anything the animal rights movement needs a return to its roots, ie. (direct) action towards the ultimate goal of total animal liberation and nothing else. This article takes issue with these sentiments and, based on three years of fieldwork within the animal rights community, argues that it may be the case that some of the larger animal rights charities have adopted this approach, but that the movement at the local activist level remains united in believing that direct action is the only method desirable or indeed effective in achieving its goal, which is one of complete animal liberation.

The generic term 'animal protectionism' is perhaps a more apt and a more relevant one to explain the vast numbers of people concerned with issues of animal abuse, cruelty and rights today since these people often come from diverse ideological backgrounds. One way to categorize these different backgrounds (should we wish to do so) is to argue that there are those involved in animal welfare and that

¹ G. Francione, *Animals, Property and the Law*, (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1995).

there are those involved in animal rights and that the two are fairly self-contained and are fairly distinct. The only problem with this is that there seems to be a third 'movement' growing out of a merger of these two, hitherto fairly discrete, positions. This hybrid position is what Gary Francione terms 'new welfarism'.²

Animal welfare has always, somewhat mistakenly, been characterized as a group of elderly, overly emotional women who are eccentrically too concerned with their pet cats. Sexist connotations aside, this stereotype is fundamentally misplaced. The animal welfare movement came into being on a large and mobilized scale for the first time during the nineteenth century in Britain. This movement was born out of the wider humanitarian movement popular at the time and yet, in many ways, became stronger and more enduring than its predecessors. The animal welfare movement of the nineteenth century was almost exclusively concerned with the issue of vivisection, although there were a small number of exceptions to this. Vivisection raised its head as an issue of public debate from about the mid-nineteenth century and stemmed from the fact that many scientists were only too happy to conduct live experiments on animals in public places as a way of displaying their newly gained knowledge and techniques. This in turn led to the institutionalization of the so-called 'scientific method,' ie. the idea that the most productive and efficient way to gain biological knowledge was from experiments conducted on live animals. It was this institutionalization that the nineteenth century anti-vivisectionists were fighting against.

A number of commentators³ have argued that this anti-vivisection campaign was based on a deeper anti-science sentiment, and certainly the main players in the anti-vivisection crusade didn't hide the fact that they were highly sceptical of science in general and of medicine in particular. Much of this came from the fact that many of those prominent in this movement were women who felt that

² *ibid.*

³ R.D. French, *Anti-Vivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society*, (Princeton University Press, 1975); H. Ritvo, *The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age*, (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1987) and J. Turner, *Reckoning With the Beast: Animals, Pain and Humanity in the Victorian Mind*, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1980).

medical science (and the growth of gynaecology at this time) was taking huge liberties with both women's and animals' bodies.

Despite the fact that this anti-vivisection movement was one largely comprised of and led by women the sexist stereotype referred to above is a poor misconception of a movement and an issue which had the strength to 'divide a nation'.⁴ The anti-vivisection movement of the Victorian era is one which had many public and powerful advocates.

I give this brief foray into the history of animal welfare for three reasons. The first is to contest a misconceived stereotype; the second is because until the 1970s this was the most important, powerful, successful and popular movement pertaining to animals and their treatment and the third is because many see a logical progression from this early humane movement to the animal protection movements we have today.

The impetus of the nineteenth century anti-vivisection movement largely died with the beginning of the first world war and, although there were still a number of animal welfare charities running and a few new ones coming into being, none had the powerful hold over the public of this early anti-vivisection movement. There was a resurgence of interest in animal issues from the late 1960s and early 1970s but this was a different kind of interest involving a different kind of supporter.

The tone of these new animal protection movements was radically different to that of the early humane movement. Instead of advocating the welfare of animals under our care and for our use, this movement argued that it was not morally right for us to consider animals our inferiors and therefore it was not morally right for us to make use of them. This later movement came to be known as the animal rights movement because it was predicated on a belief in the natural rights of animals. With this change in ideology came a change in tactics. Compared to the animal welfare movement's campaigning methods the methods of this new breed of animal

⁴ P. Mason, *The Brown Dog Affair*, (Two Sevens Publishing, London, 1997).

rights activist were far more radical. The majority of animal rights campaigners believed in the need for direct action. The notion of direct action is a tricky one and, due to the inevitable exclusivity of media attention on the illegal forms of direct action, is often one which conjures up its own stereotype of a masked raider sending car-bombs to known vivisectors and spraying paint over fur-coats. This is a huge misconception. The majority of direct action undertaken by animal rights activists is legal, taking the form of protests, marches and leaflet campaigns.

Garner⁵ argues that the issue of direct action is one which must be treated carefully since 'the association between these extreme methods and the radicalism of animal rights and liberation views has resulted in a simplistic dichotomy between, on the one hand, traditional animal welfare and constitutionalism and, on the other hand, the equation of animal rights/liberation with violence and illegality'. Not only is this a misconceived notion but most animal rights activity is peaceful and law abiding.

When the law is broken in the name of animal rights there are three ways in which this is done. Garner typifies these as: 'the classic form of non-violent civil disobedience involving sit-ins and vigils' – also included here are break-ins into laboratories which test on animals in order to gather information; 'those actions which set out deliberately to cause damage to property' such as the wrecking of laboratory equipment and the shooting of butcher's windows – to this second one I would add theft, ie. the theft involved when animal rights activists 'liberate' animals from laboratories; and 'the much more serious actions which involve threats to human life and safety', such as the firebombings of department store furriers in the 1980s and the letter bombing campaigns of the 1980s.

Although the new animal rights movement from the 1970s onwards was one which was radically different in philosophy and action from that of the 1870s, its collective belief in the need for direct action and direct action alone to secure the liberation of animals is one which

⁵ R. Garner, *Animals, Politics and Morality*, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993), p. 215.

has not been sustained by all involved with the same amount of fervour into the 1990s.

The 'new welfarism' which Francione⁶ identifies is not actually that new. In 1959 two British scientists, Russell and Burch⁷, advocated a number of changes which could potentially replace the use of animals in laboratory experiments. In the meantime, however, they called for a number of changes which could either reduce the numbers of animals being used or refine their use resulting in less pain. Stephens argues that this 'Replacement, Reduction and Refinement constitute the three R's of the alternative approach to laboratory practices'.⁸ He goes on to point out that 'the ultimate goal of this approach is the complete replacement of laboratory animals with non-animal methods that are at least as scientifically sound (some would say unsound) as animal based methods'.⁹

The 'new welfarism' which Francione identifies¹⁰ is remarkably similar to the 'alternative approach' identified by Stephens.¹¹ Francione argues that the rights position is based on the notion that some animals at least have rights and 'that treating them solely as means to human ends violates those rights', whereas the 'welfare position maintains that animal interests may be ignored if the consequences for humans justify it'.¹² He argues that the two main problems which arise out of the welfare approach are firstly that it propagates the myth that animal welfarism actually works, which he believes to be false. He gives the example of a reduction in the number of animals used in research and argues that the recording of these numbers is highly suspect and even if this were not the case then it would be difficult to see animal welfare measures as the sole causal factor which accounts for the reduction in the number of

⁶ G. Francione, 'Animal Rights and Animal Welfare', 48 *Rutgers L. Review*, 397 (1996), <http://www.animal-law.org/library/araw/html>.

⁷ W. Russell, & R. Burch, *The Principles Of Humane Experimental Technique*, (Methuen, London, 1959).

⁸ M. Stephens, 'Replacing Animal Experiments', in *Animal Experimentation. The Consensus Changes*, ed. G Langley, (Macmillan, London, 1989).

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 144.

¹⁰ Francione, 'Animal Rights and Animal Welfare'.

¹¹ Stephens, 'Replacing Animal Experiments' p. 144.

¹² G. Francione, 'Animal Rights: An Incremental Approach' in *Animal Rights. The Changing Debate*, ed. R. Garner, (Macmillan, London, 1996).

animals used in research. The second problem he sees with the welfare approach is that it implies that animal rights is not a realistic alternative to animal welfare which he clearly believes to be false.¹³

He believes that there is a way to take an incremental approach to animal rights without resorting to a warfare position. This incremental approach involves 'the use of deontological norms that prohibit rather than regulate certain conduct, that recognise that animals have certain interests that are not subject to being sacrificed'.¹⁴ He further believes that 'each incremental measure erodes the status of animals as property'¹⁵ which is necessary if animal rights are ever going to be taken seriously and if animals are ever going to be afforded some protection by the law.¹⁶

Francione sincerely believes that the 'new welfare' position is a poor alternative to the rights position and, furthermore, he argues that a number of animal rights concerns have 'sold out' to this position. He explains:

It appears as though the new welfarists believe that some causal connection exists between cleaner cages today and empty cages tomorrow.... As a result the animal 'rights' movement, despite its rhetorical use of rights language and its long term goal of abolishing institutionalized animal exploitation, continues to pursue an ideological and practical agenda that is functionally indistinguishable from measures endorsed by those who accept the legitimacy of at least some forms of exploitation.¹⁷

¹³ *ibid.*, pp. 55-58.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁵ *ibid.* p. 57.

¹⁶ For a further discussion on the status of animals as property see G. Francione, 'Animals as Property', *Animal Law*, 2 (1996), <http://www.animal-law.org/library/anmlprop.htm> and Francione, *Animals, Property and the Law*.

¹⁷ Francione, 'Animal Rights and Animal Welfare', p. 2.

It is with these sentiments that I wish to take issue. Francione may be correct in arguing that 'some' of those involved in the animal rights movement have adopted this hybrid approach to animal protection, but those involved in the movement at a grass roots level still take the view that the only acceptable outcome of the struggle is liberation of animals from human oppression which is necessarily predicated on a belief in the rights of non-human animals. The two are inextricably linked in that action taken to liberate animals is based on the ideology of their rights.

As Garner notes:

The growth of mass activism is clearly linked to the belief, derived from an animal rights perspective, that since so much more is wrong with our treatment of animals than was previously thought, only permanent and sustained activism will help put things right. Likewise it is no accident that the use of - sometimes violent - direct action has corresponded with the development of a rights position.¹⁸

The field work on which this article is based spans three years and involved my regular participation in both animal welfare and animal rights networks. The animal welfare data was gained from working in two animal shelters over a period of 3 years and then following this up with interviews with the staff at the two shelters and with the managers of five other animal sanctuaries. I also regularly attended the meetings of one animal shelter which were held with the general public every month in order to inform interested parties, and financial contributors, about what was currently taking place at the sanctuary. The animal rights data comes from my participation in a local grass roots animal rights group over a period of three years and from a number of interviews conducted with the animal rights

¹⁸ R. Garner, 'The Road to Shoreham: Ideological and Political Aspects in the Evolution of the British Animal Rights Movement', unpublished paper given to Alternative Futures and Popular Protest Conference, Manchester Metropolitan University, March 1995, p. 12.

activists belonging to this group. I also subscribed to two larger animal rights groups, Animal Aid and British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV), in order to receive their newsletters and information regarding their campaigns.

A small number of those involved in the animal shelters (ie. animal welfare) advocated an animal rights position and saw no contradiction in the fact that they were working in an environment which condoned, if not supported, the use of animals as pets. The rationale behind this was that they were working to better the welfare of specific animals and whilst, in an ideal world, they may not condone animals as pets, the current situation demanded that they do something about it. As one interviewee explained:

Its our fault in the first place, I mean we domesticated them and now we can't even take care of them. It should be our duty to do that at least seeing as though we did this to them in the first place. In an ideal world, no, there'd be no pets, but right now there are and about 300 of them are being destroyed on a weekly basis because we aren't dealing with what we've done so, no, there's no contradiction between what I'm doing now and my animal rights beliefs. I'm still fighting for animals' rights just in a different way. At least here I can be sure that this dog or this cat which can't survive on its own gets to live out the rest of its life in plush surroundings. It's the least we can do.

The majority of those involved in animal welfare were not involved in animal rights and didn't particularly feel the need to address these issues. For example it has been pointed out that one of the key elements in the adoption of an animal rights agenda is in taking a vegan/vegetarian diet¹⁹ and nearly all of those working in the animal shelters were meat-eaters. The only two exceptions to this

¹⁹ R. Garner, *Animals, Politics and Morality*, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993) and H. Guither, *Animal Rights: History and Scope of a Radical Social Movement*, (Southern Illinois Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1998).

were both moral vegetarians who supported animal rights philosophy and were involved in peripheral animal rights campaigning such as sponsored dog walks to raise money for charities such as NAVS (National Anti-Vivisection Society).

The rest of the workers involved in animal shelters advocated a welfare position based on the notion that it is our responsibility to care for animals properly, although they tended to be solely concerned with pet animals. This usually took the form of providing information about the care of pets and becoming involved in issues which directly affected the status of animals as pets such as anti-quarantine appeals. Most of the staff at the shelters took the line that animal rights might in theory be a good thing but for now it was fairly unobtainable and at least they were doing something worthwhile and productive in the meantime, actions for which they could clearly see an end result that improved the status of a number of animals, ie. seeing them placed in caring homes. Despite an overall agreement that the ideals of animal rights might be something worthwhile in the future, the majority of the sanctuary workers saw animal rights activists in terms of the media stereotype, ie. as violent law breakers single-mindedly intent upon the foolhardy liberation of all animals no matter what the effect on the environment or the population.

The people involved in the animal rights group however had radically different views. The composition of the group was as diverse as other studies have led us to believe. There was a small number of students which possibly flies in the face of folklore concerning animal rights activists. Indeed, one member of the group explained that it is difficult to attract younger people to the group and if they do come it is difficult to get them to come again. He put this down to the fact that the group was often very insular and did not particularly welcome newcomers. Being based in a city with a number of universities, attracting student interest should have been fairly easy and yet there were only one or two current students in the group. Most of the group were between 25 and 35 and had been students themselves at one time or another. There was a significant number of activists who fell outside this age bracket with the oldest being in her fifties. Similarly the activists came from radically

different backgrounds. There was a schoolteacher, a university lecturer, a number of women who worked at home with children, an accountant and a social worker. Those routinely involved in the day-to-day activities of the group tended to be unemployed which allowed them more time to commit to their actions on behalf of animals.

All of the group were involved in activism in some way although there was a central core of a smaller number (around ten to fifteen) who were involved in nearly all the campaigns being run and who tended to take responsibility for the organizing of the day-to-day activities needed to run a campaign such as allocating the van to various areas, ringing round other activists to arrange times and venues etc. It has been well documented that the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in particular and the grass roots animal rights movement in general is a non-hierarchical 'organisation.'²⁰ Although, the term 'organisation' itself is misleading, considering that each local group sees itself as part of a larger movement but there is little formal contact with the rest of the 'movement' and certainly no centralized command structure. Different local groups were in contact with each other as many of the activists attended more than one group meeting. Similarly the different campaigns were fertile meeting grounds for those in different groups. There was also, on occasion, a call for all groups to attend a particular campaign when it was felt that more pressure would be productive, such as the call for a 'national hit' on a particular hunt meeting. These would occur for a variety of reasons such as one meeting which was infamous for its brutality to the point that the 'sabbing' of this particular hunt was considered too risky for the activists. In this case every year at the beginning of the season this hunt was made the target of a 'national hit' where all groups would send as many bodies as possible to make their presence felt. It was openly admitted that not much would be achieved at these hits for the animals in question. They were more a way of letting those involved in the hunt know that they hadn't been forgotten and that their violence was in vain.

²⁰ D. Henshaw, *Animal Warfare: The Story of the Animal Liberation Front*, (Fontana, London, 1989) and I. Newkirk, 1992, *Free the Animals! The Story of the American ALF and its Founder, Valerie*, (The Noble Press, Chicago, 1992).

The group meetings I attended certainly adhered to this egalitarian de-centralized principle. The chair of the group changed with each meeting and within meetings according to who knew the most about the topic up for discussion. Thus one person would lead the report on the recent hunt sabs that had occurred in the region and this would be someone who had been at all, or nearly all of them and someone else would lead the discussion about street collections and this would be someone who had been involved in the most recent street collections and so on. Anyone could contribute to any of the discussions and anyone could raise new topics for discussion, even newcomers.

Francione, in his argument that the fight for animal rights has adopted a 'new welfarist' approach, seems to be basing his argument on the larger national and international groups involved in animal rights campaigns such as the BUAV and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). He argues that even the so-called more 'radical' animal rights groups have recently distanced themselves from animal rights and quotes²¹ Ingrid Newkirk, director of PETA, as saying that the 'all or nothing' approach of animal rights is 'unrealistic'.

A further example of this line of argument comes from the President of the Humane Society of the United States who argued that animal rights threatens the 'kind of respectability that HSUS and a number of organizations have worked hard to achieve in order to distinguish the legitimate animal protection movement from the more radical elements'.²² Francione makes the point that not all advocates embrace a welfarist position and that there is a new breed of animal advocate who accepts and fights for reform in the short term but still sees rights as the ultimate goal: the new welfarist. Although Francione's examples drawn from the larger animal rights charities seem to support this argument he does not take into account the grass roots activist.

²¹ Francione, quoted in 'Animal Rights and Welfare', pp. 4-5.

²² Quoted in Francione, 'Animal Rights and Welfare', p. 6.

All of the grass roots activists I met with, interviewed and observed, without exception, advocated a 'rights' approach based on direct action. None of the people involved in grass roots animal rights felt the need to belong to any other larger (more mainstream?) animal rights charities. As one animal rights activist explained when asked if she was a member of any of the larger animal rights groups:

Not cos I'm not interested but I think I'm more useful here. The BUAV and the NAVS used to be really good, used to do a lot for grass roots stuff but when the raids started happening they stopped, to the point where they'd make damaging statements about grass roots in the press. They criticize us and don't use the opportunity to criticize vivisection or whatever it is. They don't have to condone it but they don't have to condemn it either. I think that's really damaging cos it's not helping animals to do that. It gives the press the idea that it *is* just a bunch of extremists rather than talking through the issues. That's why I can't be bothered with it. I think it's a shame to split it. I wouldn't condemn what they do either cos I don't think we should split it, we all want the same things. It's just a shame that they feel they have to condemn us.

Similarly the ALF advocates a strict animal rights approach as explained in the animal rights magazine *Arkangel*:

The Animal Liberation Front carries out direct action against animal abuse, rescuing animals and causing financial loss to animal abusers, usually through the damage and destruction of property. Their short term aim is to rescue as many animals as possible and directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse; their long term aim is to end all animal suffering by forcing animal abuse companies and individuals out of

business. It is a non-violent campaign, activists taking precautions not to harm any person or animal. Because ALF actions are against the law. Activists work anonymously, either in groups or individually, and do not have a central contact address or any centralized organization or co-ordination.²³

Although the ALF members, according to the statement above, have immediate and long term goals, their immediate goals could never be seen to fall into the category of welfarism, and neither could their philosophy be summed up by the hybrid approach of 'new welfarism'.

The ALF is not the only direct action animal rights group in Britain but it is certainly one of the more infamous if for nothing else than its unfavourable media treatment over the last 20 years or so. The ALF claim that anyone who carries out actions in line with ALF guidelines designed to further animal rights and who is a vegetarian or vegan can consider him/herself a member of the ALF. The ALF guidelines are:

- to liberate animals from places of abuse, ie. laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc., and place them in good homes where they may live out their natural lives, free from suffering
- to inflict economic damage on those who profit from the misery and exploitation of animals
- to reveal the horror and atrocities committed against animals behind locked doors, by performing non-violent, direct actions and liberations

²³ F. Wicklund, (website), 'Animal Rights in Britain', (1996), http://envirolink.org/arrs/ar_uk.html.

- to take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human and non-human

This means, technically, that all the people involved in the animal rights meetings I attended could consider themselves members of the ALF if they so chose. I raise this issue not to cash in on the sensationalism surrounding the ALF but to offer an idea of the philosophy behind animal protection groups which frequently use direct action groups and to make the point that it could not be considered 'new welfarism'.

The activists I met all played a huge part in direct action in one way or another, from actively helping on hunt sabs and taking part in demonstrations whose sole purpose was to destroy property, to helping out at money raising and petition signing stalls. The ethos of direct action was so strong within the group that those who attended meetings and did not take part in any action were marginalised and always maintained the status of 'outsider.' One activist who was involved in the various campaigns on a daily basis explained that she felt guilty about not doing enough even though she was one of the most committed members of the group: 'I don't feel as though I'm doing enough because there's so much to do I suppose. Ideally I'd like to be everywhere and do everything but you can't.'

None of the activists I met could be considered 'new welfarists' since they not only believed in the philosophy of animal rights and believed in acting in line with these philosophies but because they also openly eschewed the notion of animal welfare:

Welfare stops short of what I want. It's asking for compromise and I don't like that. I don't want to say can that hen have a bigger cage, or can you stop eating meat but keep drinking milk. It seems like a betrayal to animals. A lot of the welfare stuff is about living a normal life as well, campaigning about cruelty but not making enough changes in your life to support that whereas rights demands a change in your

lifestyle. What you eat, drink, wear and even think all have to change.

In line with this notion that a commitment to animal rights involves a change in lifestyle comes the idea that supporting animal rights, unlike supporting animal welfare, is critical of much more than cruelty/wrongdoings to animals and that there is a series of interlocking oppressions which form the root cause of animal exploitation.

Biography

Nicola Taylor is currently a part time lecturer in the Department of Social Policy at Salford University, UK. She also lectures part time in the Department of Sociology at the Manchester Metropolitan University, UK, where she is in the final stages of her Ph.D. thesis. The thesis, entitled 'Animal Welfare as Moral and Social Decision Making' is concerned with human-animal interaction in three areas: animal rights activism; animal welfare work; and human-companion animal interaction.

One crow, sorrow

Simone Poirier-Bures

Something moved in the grass at the edge of the road. Black against bright green. A young crow. It fanned its wings as I approached and tried to scurry into the tall weeds. A fledgling pushed out of the nest too soon, perhaps? Its tail feathers looked ruffled, mangled. My first impulse was rescue: I would bring it home, nurse it, maybe keep it as a pet.

It resisted at first, so I spoke to it softly. When I picked it up, it stared at me sideways, the way birds do, with a dark, purplish-grey eye. Then it curled a foot around my little finger - it felt like the grasp of a baby's hand. We were more than a mile from my house, so we began walking. The crow made half-hearted struggling movements, but after a few moments it settled its throat against my hands, so I could feel the warm thud of its pulse. It smelled, oddly, of wet dog. What had happened? Most likely it had been struck by a car, misjudging the speed of some roaring machine hurtling itself down this busy road. I thought of the things a young crow would need to learn to survive in this world. Velocity. Who was a friend? Who wasn't?

I tried to imagine how the crow must feel, being carried like this. It could hear the usual sounds - the chirping of other birds, the soft swishing of the leaves and pine branches, the distant bark of a dog. But the feel of my hands around it, the sound of my breathing, were alien sensations. I thought of rabbits and rodents being borne away by a hawk or an owl. For them such flights always end in death. Crows fly, so what could being carried mean to it? It could not imagine its own death in the way that humans do, though animals and birds clearly sense danger and know fear. This crow, however, seemed to be practicing Zen. Resting serenely, breathing low and steadily, it seemed ready to accept whatever befell it. Now and then it blinked, its veiled eye turning milky blue.

I thought of many things during the 20 minutes I carried the crow. But mostly, I felt its presence, the satiny feel of its feathers, the pulse

of its warm life. I felt privileged to be on such intimate terms with a creature who had never before been touched by a human, who experienced the world in a completely different way than I did, and who now rested peacefully in my hands.

As we entered my garage, the crow tensed, gripping my finger more tightly. I placed it gently in a laundry basket with a pan of water, and covered the basket with a screen. Because the crow was agitated now, I draped an old table cloth over the basket, the way people cover a parrot's cage, to calm it. I thought of bringing it food, but what did crows eat? I knew about carrion, but couldn't imagine myself scraping the remains of dead things off the road. What else? Worms? Corn?

My husband, I was sure, would know. When he came home, an hour or so later, we lifted the cloth. The crow partly opened its wings—the basket was too narrow for its full wingspread—and stared at us warily. The water in the pan had turned bloody, as had a small pool on the bottom of the basket. Blood dripped slowly from the crow's hindquarters. This startled me, as the crow had not bled earlier. Perhaps the way I'd held it had kept the wound closed.

My husband looked at the crow and shook his head. There was nothing we could do for it. I picked up the crow and looked into its purplish-grey eye, into its tiny black pupil, and told it it was dying. It seemed to know. But it didn't thrash or cry out as humans do in pain, so it was hard to tell if it was suffering; it simply watched us, with that one wary eye. And every three seconds or so a thick drop of dark red blood fell from its body.

Would it be more humane to give it a quick death, I wondered. My husband, who kills and eats fish and wild ducks and the occasional deer, said he couldn't bring himself to kill it. I doubted that I could either. But if we left the crow in the basket and let nature take its course, the crow would die in a strange human enclosure, confused and fearful, unable, even, to stretch its wings. How, then, to give it a good death?

I thought of my own death, what I would want. I would like to feel death come and not fear it. I would have death touch me gently, surrounded by the things and people I love. So I carried the crow out to the field behind our house, down through the tall grasses, to the huge blue spruce. Under the low branches where it was shady and cool, out of easy view of hawks or cats, I smoothed out an area and laid the crow there. It blinked at me and kept very still.

All afternoon I pictured the crow in its sheltered nook under the fragrant branches, among the grasses and wildflowers. From its cool, shady bed it could watch the drifting sunlight, hear the humming of insects, the conversations of birds overhead. And softly, softly, death would come, like a shifting shadow, like dappled light, like wind moving slowly through the trees.

Biography

Simone Poirier-Bures is the author of two books: Candyman (1994), a novel set in her native Nova Scotia, Canada, and That Shining Place (1995), an award-winning memoir of Crete. Simone's stories and essays have won numerous prizes, and have appeared in more than two dozen literary journals in the United States and Canada as well as in eight anthologies. She is currently working on a book of stories (fiction and personal narratives) about human relationships with animals and the natural world. She teaches in the English Department at Virginia Tech, U.S.

In what respects, if any, should the primates be equal?

Elizabeth Murphy

Human beings are undoubtedly blessed with the most extraordinary gift of nature—the most sophisticated consciousness. However, it is also this superb awareness which shackles some *Homo sapiens* with an abject humiliation - an irrational horror of their animality. The human animals' realisation of their biological, hence finite, condition can impel them to fearfully disclaim their ancestry and strive to 'transcend' their natural condition. The human species' claim to superior physical and moral status in the natural world on the basis of either their 'unique' rationality, dignity or worth, is specious. Traditional western philosophical, religious, scientific and literary ideologies have initiated and sustained a myth that the other animals, including the Great Apes other than *Homo sapiens*, are inferior members of the natural world. These ideologies have contributed to our primate cousins' exclusion from the opportunity to relish a life suffused with physical, intellectual and emotional dignity.

In this article I intend to briefly appraise some of the areas within western traditional ideologies which have perpetuated the attitude that all animals, other than human, are not entitled to be treated with even the minimal degree of respect accorded to some human beings. I also intend to evaluate contemporary sources which indicate that in view of recent field studies and scientific research on the non-human primates, existing objections to the extension of equality (implying moral obligations) to the other primates¹ can no longer be sustained. Recorded attempts of the search by western scholars for an explanation of the origins of the species, particularly the existence

¹ References in this article to 'the other primates', 'non-human primates', 'other Great Apes' refer to those primates other than human presently taxonomically categorised within the order Hominoidea as chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans.

and nature of the human species, reveal that theories have been swayed either by disarming ignorance or misplaced conceit. From audacious beginnings as humble 'prickly barks'² (c.500BC), the human animal has become elevated in status to the extent that humans generally consider themselves to be the sublime result of the biological evolutionary process. The notion of the human animal's supremacy over inanimate and all other animate living forms gained credence, in part, because of the acceptance of the influential works of the Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384-322BC).³

Following his categorisations differentiating plants, animals and humans, Aristotle concluded that what clearly differentiates humans from the other animals is that the human alone, of all animate things, has the capacity to reason. Whilst other animal beings and plants have the ability to perceive or respond to environmental factors, they do not have consciousness, that is, they lack self-awareness and the ability to reason abstractly. Rather than use reason, plants respond to stimuli, and animals 'obey their instincts'.⁴

Furthermore, Aristotle's claim of the existence of a 'principle of rule and subordination in nature at large' also contributed to sanctioning the idea that animals exist without any intrinsic worth.⁵

Plants exist to give subsistence to animals, and animals to give it to (men). Animals...serve to furnish man not only with food, but also with other comforts...Accordingly, as nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must have been made by nature for the sake of men.⁶

² Anaximander, quoted by Plutarch, in *Early Greek Philosophy*, J. Barnes, (Penguin, London, 1987), p. 73.

³ Aristotle, 'Parts of Animals' in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, Book 1, Chapter 1, 645b, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991), p. 998.

⁴ Aristotle, *Politics*, trans E. Barber, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977), I.V., 9, p. 6.

⁵ *ibid.*, V, 1, p. 91.

⁶ In this article, the generic 'men' or 'man' is retained solely for the purpose of quoting ad verbatim. See Aristotle, *Politics*, V111, p. 95.

As animals exist within nature without the capacity to reason (being guided instead by instincts) they are, therefore, provided by nature for the use of the human being.

Apart from the influence of ancient Greek writers such as Aristotle, the writings of the ancient Hebrews and later of Christian theologians were also instrumental in the formation of a demeaning attitude towards the other animals within western culture. In the ancient Hebrew text The First Book of Moses, called Genesis⁷, two aspects in particular warrant attention. The account of the origin of the human within the world: 'So God created man in his *own* image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.'⁸ reflects an existing cultural belief in the pre-eminence of the human species, especially the male of the species. Furthermore, instructions to humans to 'have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth'⁹ authorises humans to adopt authority over all the animals.

Later Christian doctrines also reflect the disparate relationship between humans and the animals. In his work *Summa Theologica*, St. Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274) advises 'There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect...things, like plants which merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man.'¹⁰ In addition, Aquinas' ruling 'it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power'¹¹ would have undoubtedly contributed to reinforcing cultural beliefs of the mental and moral supremacy of the human and exacerbated existing exploitative practices against the animals. As a result of these doctrines, the other Great Apes, in particular, have been especially maligned within western cultural discourse and symbolism.

⁷ Genesis, *The Holy Bible*, (King James version, 1611), pp. 5-64.

⁸ *ibid.*, 1:27, p. 6.

⁹ *ibid.*, 1:28, p. 6.

¹⁰ Aquinas, from 'Summa Theologica', quoted in *Animal Liberation*, P. Singer, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1976), p. 211.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 213.

Of all the animals, the non-human primate has been most 'deeply involved in western ideas on human nature, morals and origins'¹² and consequently occupies a prominent, yet paradoxical, position within western cultural symbolism. In traditional eastern cultures monkeys and apes were accorded respect as they were considered to be mediators between the human and a deity, or alternatively were personified and revered as a deity.¹³ In comparison, apart from a period in the eighteenth century when apes were pictured as gentle, 'human-like creatures', western culture has tended to stereotype the primates as savage, brutal beings; beings personifying licentious or evil behaviours—behaviours deemed as uncivilised or immoral within human societies. Furthermore, the primates were generally the objects of derision, being perceived as either intriguing zoological exhibits or as creatures deserving extermination.¹⁴

The non-human primates have long endured being the 'object' of human fascination. Fascination itself, if applied with consideration and courtesy towards the being who is viewed, is not necessarily a problem. However, the present ambiguous biological¹⁵ and moral standing of the other primates within western communities is *not* a reflection of our society's 'fascination with the primates', but rather an attitude which reflects the fact that our fascination has mostly been perverse. Unlike the other animals, however, the non-human primates *do* occupy a unique position in the psyche of humans and in the natural world. To the consternation of some humans, the non-human primates alone of all animals other than human, most resemble in form and behaviour the human animal. 'They are neither completely human, nor completely animal, but both at once'. None *but* the other primates 'inhabit the margins of humanity'¹⁶, a

¹² R. Corbey, 'Ambiguous Apes', in *The Great Ape Project*, eds., P. Cavalieri & P. Singer, (Fourth Estate, London, 1993), p. 129.

¹³ *ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 131.

¹⁵ I am of the opinion that the present taxonomical categorisation of the chimpanzee primate and the human primate does not honestly reflect the human's kin relationship to them. In evolutionary terms, the chimpanzee and the human share a 'recent' common ancestor, are genetically dissimilar by less than 1% and yet are classified within separate families, namely Pongidae and Hominidae respectively.

¹⁶ Corbey, 'Ambiguous Apes', p. 130.

collective of privileged primates reluctant to accept, let alone approve, a change in status for our cousins from 'object' to *subject*.

The realisation within recent times of the Great Ape's capacity to be self-aware, to reason and to feel has gradually altered, to a degree, cultural perception of them and given rise to the dilemma regarding their disenfranchisement from the moral domain. The rigid distinction traditionally assumed to exist between the human and other animals has proved difficult to maintain, especially in light of indisputable evidence of the primate origins of humankind.¹⁷ In addition, a more sophisticated understanding gained through the scientific disciplines including genetics and molecular biology has led to a reappraisal of the existing taxonomic systems, particularly with regard to the human/animal distinction. Furthermore, recent field studies and scientific research have contributed to scientific and ethical challenges to existing theories and beliefs in relation to our kinship with, and our unethical treatment of, the other Great Apes.

Results from studies conducted to assess the cognitive abilities of the primates have issued a challenge to the most cherished 'hallmark' of the human—the ability to reason. The ability to reason arises from the faculty of consciousness, the origin of the experiences referred to as thought, self-awareness, emotions, intentionality etc. The human's claim to be entitled to occupy a privileged and dominant position within the natural world, including the animal kingdom, is based upon the belief that the human animal alone has the 'unique' ability to reason. This claim, however, is contested by researchers Roger Fouts and Deborah Fouts¹⁸ following their studies with chimpanzee primates. The researchers claim that demonstrations of an array of a complex set of abilities, and spontaneous communication amongst themselves and with human researchers, verifies the undeniable existence, within the chimpanzee primates, of non-human thought.

¹⁷ Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, (Faber & Faber, London, (1889), 1979). Whilst Darwin did not emphatically state that the human being was indeed an ape (p. 217) his explication of the origins of vegetative and animal species (being both a biological and an evolutionary process) resulted in altered cultural perceptions and eventual scientific acceptance of the primate origins of humankind.

¹⁸ R.S. Fouts and D.H. Fouts, 'Chimpanzees' Use of Sign Language', in Cavalieri & Singer, *The Great Ape Project*, pp. 28-41.

In one particular investigation¹⁹ of the cognitive abilities of chimpanzees, Fouts and Fouts conducted a remote videotaped study of chimpanzees using American sign language in over five thousand instances. According to Fouts and Fouts, demonstrations of certain behaviours previously considered unique to the human and associated with the human's reasoning process were demonstrated to be present within the chimpanzees. For example, like humans, chimpanzees are able to use what is referred to as 'referential communication', that is, the chimpanzees have the ability to think about, and comment on things and events in their environment. In addition, the employment of 'informative signing' indicates that the chimpanzees are able to ask for things not in their immediate environment.²⁰ The ability to refer to things and events not in an immediate environment was previously thought to be an ability that only humans are capable of possessing. Also, the use by the chimpanzee subjects of 'expressive signing' to spontaneously express an emotion when upset or excited by something²¹ is an indication that chimpanzees, as well as humans, subjectively experience emotions. Furthermore, according to Fouts and Fouts, chimpanzees not only displayed evidence of imagination and memory but are able, following the acquisition of human sign language, to pass the language on to following generations.²²

It is apparent from results of this particular study by Fouts and Fouts that chimpanzee beings are able not only to communicate within their own kind, but possess the capacity to reason to the extent that they have the ability to 'adopt' a human language to reciprocate the human's attempt to communicate with them. The study further indicates that chimpanzee beings are capable of acting with a sense of purpose, that is, intentionally, and that they too experience emotions. The study therefore negates the human being's claim to what was previously considered an ability unique to the human—reason. It also provides an opportunity to challenge another human presumption: on the basis that humans are biologically unique because of their capacity to reason and are therefore intrinsically

¹⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 33-39.

²⁰ Fouts and Fouts, 'Chimpanzees' Use of Sign Language', p. 35.

²¹ *ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

²² *ibid.*, pp. 36-39.

valuable, the human alone of all creatures is the sole creature eligible and entitled to claim the right to a life infused with physical, intellectual and emotional dignity.

If acceptance into the community of equals is on the proviso that one be a conscious being, that is a *being* able to reason, having the capacity to feel emotions, feel pain and suffering, and be self-aware, then the evidence from the above study alone indicates that calls to include the other Great Apes within the human moral domain are not based upon theoretical delusion or misplaced sentimentality, but upon empirically verifiable facts.

According to the '*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*'²³ the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world depends upon recognition of not only the inherent dignity of the human being but the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.²⁴ The fundamental rights accorded to humans: 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' (Articles 3 and 5)²⁵, were intended as a common standard by which nations could promote respect for the intrinsic value of all members of their communities and the human species universally. These particular rights are vital to human beings, particularly if they are living within societies reluctant to recognise the intrinsic worth of an individual. Without them their hopes of living a life with some sense of security and general well-being are diminished.

Needless to say, if the human scientific establishment eventually managed to recognise the human being's kinship with the other Great Apes, the human moral community also needs to do some research. The universal human moral community is in a position to use its moral agency to recognise that a number of 'our family' are being denied the opportunity to exercise *their* inalienable rights to life, liberty and freedom from torture.

²³ The General Assembly, United Nations, '*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*' (1948), in *Human Rights*, C. Freeman, (B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1990), pp. 66-68.

²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 66.

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 11.

In 'A Declaration on the Great Apes'²⁶, a group of persons concerned with the current status and plight of the other Great Apes is lobbying for the 'extension of the community of equals to include all great apes: human beings, chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans'.²⁷ The 'community of equals' is defined as the moral community within which its members accept certain basic moral principles or rights as governing their relations with each other and which are enforceable at law.²⁸ Amongst these principles or rights are included:

- **The Right to Life**

The lives of members of the community of equals are to be protected. Members of the community of equals may not be killed except in very strictly defined circumstances, for example, self-defence.

- **The Protection of Individual Liberty**

Members of the community of equals are not to be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.

- **The Prohibition of Torture**

The deliberate infliction of severe pain on a member of the community of equals, either wantonly or for an alleged benefit to others, is regarded as torture, and is wrong.²⁹

As mentioned previously, of all the Great Apes, only the human ape is protected by legislation against denial of the above three basic rights. The human ape also has recourse to anti-discrimination laws, unlike our cousins, who are dependent upon others to combat the crime of 'speciesism'.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁹ *ibid.*

Speciesism, as defined by Singer, is 'a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species'.³⁰ Given that there are differences between humans and non-human primates, and that the capacity to reason within the other primates is not as 'sophisticated' as the humans' ability to reason, it needs to be recognised that there are also members of the human community with varying degrees of mental capacity.³¹

Human individuals such as infants, comatose and brain-damaged persons and those afflicted with mental illness are protected by statutory rights from being excluded from the human moral community regardless of their mental capacities and/or ability to exercise their autonomy. 'If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his(sic) own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same purpose?'.³² It stands to reason that on the basis that the other Great Apes possess consciousness, self-awareness, and have the capacity to reason and experience emotions, they are just as entitled to be included within the community of equals as are the able and less abled members of our species.

It is beyond dispute that the primates, including the human, share a specific morphological feature - the central nervous system - a product of which is the physical experience of pain. Considering that it has been scientifically proven that the other primates also have self-awareness, one could safely infer that they, along with the human primate, share not only the feeling of pain but also the experience of misery arising as a result of it. Apart from physiological evidence, common sense should enable the human species to acknowledge that suffering as a result of experiencing pain is an experience common to both us and the other primates. This knowledge does not generally appear, however, to impel

³⁰ P. Singer, *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals*, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1976), p. 7.

³¹ Heta Hayry and Matti Hayry, 'Who's Like Us?', in Cavalieri & Singer, *The Great Ape Project*, p. 176.

³² Singer, *Animal Liberation*, p. 7.

human beings to exercise their moral agency in a manner humane to our kin.

A human being in possession of his/her faculty of consciousness is aware that there is a limit to the endurance of pain. Upon reaching a point at which endurance is insufferable, at least the human can physically *and* verbally articulate his/her anguish. Recognition of the commonality of the experience of misery resulting from suffering pain does not appear to be a primary concern in the attitude of some humans conducting experiments upon other sentient animals, including the other primates. As Singer has succinctly noted '[w]hile we overlook our savagery, we exaggerate that of other animals'.³³

The human species, let alone a human community of equals, is somewhat of a misnomer. In spite of nations uniting and declaring a charter of universal human rights, historically, some western individuals and their societies have not always managed to behave in an egalitarian manner. The subjugation of women and enslavement or genocide of indigenous peoples, for instance, are prime examples of some peoples' attitudes to certain members of the species. Human resistance to change is understandable to the degree that those occupying positions of power and dominance are reluctant to alter the 'status quo' and forgo their privileges. Some humans' propensity to assume a recalcitrant attitude is, I believe, rather accurately reflected in the following quote:

Man usually either considers himself a self-made animal and consequently adores his maker, or assumes himself to be the creation of a supreme intelligence, for which the latter is alternately congratulated and blamed. An attitude of humility, abasement, contrition, and apology for its shortcomings is thoroughly uncharacteristic of the species *Homo sapiens*, except as a manifestation of religion. I am convinced that this most salutary of religious attitudes should be carried over into science.

³³ Singer, *Animal Liberation*, p. 248.

Man should confess his evolutionary deficiencies, and resolve that, in future, he will try to be a better animal.³⁴

Given that our understanding of biological beings has advanced, especially since the advent of molecular biology, and given the scientific evidence of the existence of reason and self-awareness in the non-human primates, contemporary society is now in a position to seriously consider evidence repudiating former views which were detrimental to the well being of the primates. As Hooton states, the human animal could indeed be a better animal. Rather than presuming that *Homo sapiens* is positioned at the pinnacle of the evolutionary process, the human species could extend consideration to all the other animals. The other animals could be viewed as successful adaptors of their specific species, animals who *too* can reason and feel. At the very least, the other Great Apes could be extended the courtesy of being treated as the subjects they are and receive their due entitlements of 'the right to life, the protection of individual liberty and freedom from torture'.³⁵

As the present situation stands, intervention in the non-human primates' lives in human controlled situations is not without attendant complications. It is obvious upon reading the concerned, even passionate, accounts³⁶ of their encounters with the other Great Apes, that some researchers, observers and carers hold these special Beings in the highest esteem. However, by imparting specifically human cultural behaviours and concepts to the other primates there is, I believe, the possibility of some members of the human species attempting to impose our culture upon them.

Our level of awareness, apart from bringing us our most exquisite joys, also brings us our greatest angst and, at times, awesome sorrow.

³⁴ E.A. Hooton, from 'Apes, Men and Morons' (1937), quoted in *The Evolution of Evil*, T. Anders, (Open Court, Illinois, 1994), p. 73.

³⁵ The Editors and Contributors, 'A Declaration on Great Apes', Cavalieri & Singer, *The Great Ape Project*, p.4.

³⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 1-312.

What does it mean to be a *self-conscious animal*?
The idea is ludicrous, if it is not monstrous. It means to know that one is food for worms. This is the terror: to have emerged from nothing, to have a name, consciousness of self, deep inner feelings, an excruciating inner yearning for life and self-expression – and with all this yet to die.³⁷

Imposition of the 'condition' known as human upon the other Great Apes would be highly questionable, if not inhumane. Far better they, our cousins -

relish their freedom under their canopies and skies
we be relieved of reading their suffering with
mad, bleeding eyes. E.M.

Bernard Rollin's inspirational appeal for the extension of the right to life, liberty and freedom from torture to the non-human primates:

We should let them be...(with) their
inexhaustible wonders and grandeur, And let
the dictum be proclaimed – know without
hunting, see without manipulating, cherish in
itself, not for myself³⁸

captures a notion of equality already implicit in feminist ethics. It is one, I believe, which could foster not only acceptance of, but a universal respect for, *all* living beings regardless of sex, gender, race or species.

One would hope with the approaching millennium and the corresponding two thousandth anniversary of the western ethical system - which claims mercy to be one of its principal tenets - the human species would unfetter, from the criminal arena of speciesism, our primate cousins.

³⁷ E. Becker, quoted in T. Anders, *The Evolution of Evil*, p. 179.

³⁸ B.E. Rollin, 'The Ascent of Apes - Broadening the Moral Community', in Cavalieri & Singer, *The Great Ape Project*, p. 216.

For my cousins -

(especially 'the Girls')

My cousins are wailing, waiting
The earth is listening, weeping
I am hearing, hurting
Learning, believing
Planning.

E.M.

Biography

Elizabeth is a mature-age Arts undergraduate student at Sydney University, majoring in philosophy. Since early childhood she has been 'haunted' by what being human means. She intends to undertake further studies of the human/animal debate, and in particular, a study of the writings of feminists within the field. Elizabeth lives in an inner-city suburb of Sydney and shares her home and small, but precious, leafy garden with four other females: her daughters, Emma and Breeze and two beloved furry friends.

Book Reviews

Ethical approaches to animal-based science: Proceedings of the Joint ANZCCART/NAEAC Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, 19-20 September, 1977, v + 159pp, ANZCCART, New Zealand, 1998.

The Australian and New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in Research and Teaching (ANZCCART) is a body active in the promotion of ethical positions in relation to animal experimentation while continuing to espouse the benefits of such experimentation. In 1997 with the (New Zealand) National Animal Ethics Advisory Committee, ANZCCART convened a Conference on this area and *Ethical approaches of animal-based science* contains the Conference papers.

There are six key themes in these papers. In the first contributors explore the value systems which might operate in 'animal-based science'. The expression has a rather ominous ring as it suggests that the use of animals is necessary to the science to such an extent that the science could not exist without them. Indeed the papers in this section do seem to take it as given that animals will always be used in experimentation in science but in a gentle way they do succeed in at least showing how ethics has a place in science, a position which still does not have complete acceptance in the scientific community.

Two papers take up the topic of societal consensus, public policy and animal welfare awareness looking at public opposition to experimentation and how this has promoted 'respect for individual animals, adherence to the Three Rs, and competent analgesia, anaesthesia, and after-care.' (p. 49) It probably would be true to say there is no societal consensus on this issue. However the opposition discussed is portrayed as rather simple minded. For instance Royce Elliott states that 'It is still contended that animal experimentation has been of no benefit to humans'. (p. 50) One does not have to accept this belief, in order to consistently oppose such experimentation. It is possible to agree that there have been enormous benefits but argue for instance that humans have now reached a state of understanding and sensitivity towards other

beings such that experimenting on them appears a very undesirable option.

The third theme deals with the recognition of animal pain and suffering and refinements of techniques to minimize both of these. This is well done. A short paper looks at how the Three Rs are promoted. This is mainly on the functioning of ethics committees. Some criticisms are mentioned and some interesting legal reforms suggested. The following grouping of papers explores the operation of animal ethics committees further. While some pertinent points are made the question about whether alternatives to animal research are sufficiently well promoted is not adequately addressed, yet *replacement* is one of the Three Rs which many writers say they support.

The fifth theme is on vertebrate pests (eg possums, goats, pigs and deer) and their control. These are important concerns in Australia and New Zealand, with no easy answers. The final section contains an interesting collection of papers on animal welfare, putting animal interests first, people first, science first or the environment first.

Denise Russell

Groves, Julian McAllister, Hearts and Minds, 230pp. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1997.

In *Hearts and Minds* Julian McAllister Groves examines the dynamics of a localised political debate centred around the use of animals in medical experiments at an unnamed US university. The book focuses on two active groups in the debate, an anti-animal experimentation group called Animals Anon and a group of researchers who use animals in their studies and who began responding to the protests staged by Animals Anon. Not aiming to persuade the reader to one side of the debate or the other, Groves is interested rather in how the participants in the debate feel about animals in research, 'why they feel the way they do, and how they feel about their feelings' (p. vii) and to this end offers a vivid and interesting account of a range of activists and scientists, and their interactions.

He begins by outlining the main theoretical tool of the book; the notion of shame, which he sees as central to both 'sides' of the debate. The work of Thomas Scheff is used to identify the presence of shame in the motives and responses of both animal experimenters and protesters alike, this being the first of several similarities Groves constructs between the two groups. He locates himself at length within the debate by expressing sympathy toward Animals Anon and towards 'animal rights' in general though he does not make clear precisely what his views on animal experimentation are.

In chapter two Groves identifies what becomes for him a major dilemma in human/animal interaction, that is the simultaneous use of animals for human purposes and the keeping of pets (where strong affective ties to the pets are experienced). How is it that humans can both love and consume animals? To some, of course, the keeping of pets and the consumption of animals as food and as scientific and technological aids is in no way a contradiction, rather, both may be seen as aspects of an instrumentalist view of animals as available to meet the needs and desires of humans; for food, freedom from disease or companionship. This account of animal use is not investigated however, and the perceived dilemma persists as a theme throughout the book, supporting the primary notion of shame.

The 'dilemma' is particularly evident in Groves' account of the members of Animals Anon, many of whom seem equally concerned with the simultaneous use of animals as commodities and as pets. Members are portrayed as primarily, though not exclusively, middle class women, pet lovers whose initial motivation as a group began over the routine sale of impounded pets to animal experimenters at the university. In relation to this focus on pets, Groves notes amongst these members a wariness toward expressions of sentiment about animals in debating the rights and wrongs of vivisection, and an awareness that rational argument may be a more effective means of securing public support. In contrast, Groves suggests, animal experimenters tend to shy away from scientific or overly rational argument, emphasising their connectedness with animals and their sympathy for the plight of their experimental subjects.

Both 'sides' are acutely aware of the strategic nature of their debate and the need to present themselves in ways that may prove influential to the public. Groves acknowledges this, though more consideration of the implications of the debate as a strategic exercise would have been most welcome. What does it mean that scientists feel the need to appear more compassionate and emotional while animal activists want to appear more logical and dispassionate? Some brief discussion of gender issues is included here, but a deeper look at the dichotomising of 'hearts and minds' both within the debate and in western culture generally might have yielded valuable insights. While Groves claims to investigate how people feel about animals and how they feel about how they feel, by his own account he is more likely to uncover how they *talk* about animals and how they *talk* about how they feel. The relations between feeling and talking in this strategic context needs to be carefully examined.

The book argues for a kind of continuity between the animal experimenters and Animals Anon, suggesting that both groups feel compassion for animals and do not wish to see them suffer. Groves recognises that for scientists, this concern is primarily paternalistic, with scientists viewing themselves as 'stewards' of nature while many members of Animals Anon reject such a relationship. In spite of this he argues that 'animal rights activists and animal research supporters are not as different as they have been made out to be with regard to their feelings about animals'. (p. 28) As feminists amongst others know, the difference between paternalistic concern for the welfare of a dependent and recognition of the inherent integrity of a being is fundamental. Groves' failure to adequately understand the nature and significance of paternalism here relates to his earlier 'dilemma' about consuming animals and keeping them as pets. Where both consuming and keeping are understood to be aspects of a paternalistic or 'stewardly' approach, there is no dilemma.

Groves uses his research into Animals Anon (twenty activists) to generalise about animal activism and to offer insight into ways of solving conflict between experimenters and protesters. Unfortunately his extrapolation from such a small sample is

methodologically unjustified and certainly, his descriptions of the preoccupations and views of some of the activists interviewed present them as relatively conservative within the 'animal rights' political arena. The group is by no means abolitionist in its shared outlook and as such, requires very different analysis and intervention than might groups with an abolitionist agenda. Equally, the theme of shame bears quite differently upon those who eat animals and keep pets yet oppose animal experimentation, compared with those equally opposed who do not keep or eat animals. While Groves creates quite a complex account of the differences amongst the activists, he notes that the only African American activist he saw was excluded from his study as 'atypical'. (p. 151) His own varied descriptions would suggest that a 'typical' activist might be difficult to identify, though as I have noted, generalisations on his part are by no means eschewed.

Broadly, the book performs an interesting shift away from the issue of animal experimentation onto the actors involved in the debate, a shift that is always a risk for those also concerned with the debate itself, as Groves claims to be. Focusing on the protagonists in a struggle over issues of suffering, justice or integrity is valuable where light is shed on the social context around that debate, or on strategies, their meaning for the culture in which the debate is played out and thus the potential for just resolution. Groves concludes by offering advice as to how the conflict between animal experimenters and protesters could have been resolved, suggesting that 'for the grassroots organisations like Animals Anon, it is clear that small, symbolic concessions to the activists can diffuse the controversy'. (p. 192) Here, concern for the just resolution of the issue of experimentation on animals is superceded by the desire to end conflict per se, without concern for changes to laboratory practice or improvement in quality of life for the animals. This may be an effect of the shift away from the issue toward the protagonists, where the issue is discarded, in favour of a different 'problem'; the resolution of conflict between protagonists themselves.

The book ends by focusing on the insights that conflict resolution to be found in the animal experimentaion debate through accounts of specific confrontations that might have proved more fruitful if

handled differently. Clearly, both 'sides' are guilty of inconsistencies both in their material practices and the opinions they profess and perhaps what is most unsettling about *Hearts and Minds* is that while Groves offers suggestions for better ways to respond or communicate in specific situations, he rarely adequately draws out the significance of these inconsistencies to the failure of the situations or makes the inconsistencies central to the problem and its resolution. I have already noted that the book is not about the issue of animal experimentation, but about the protagonists in the debate, so that prolonged analysis of the subjects' views may not seem to be appropriate. However, the value of his insights to other contexts is uncertain. The extent to which the issue of animal exploitation in medical research can be satisfactorily resolved through diplomacy more than through material change remains open, particularly in relation to abolitionist agendas. Certainly, it is not a tactic that remains untried outside Groves' research context.

Suzanne Frazer

*Lesley J. Rogers and Gisela Kaplan. Not Only Roars and Rituals: Communication in Animals, x + 230pp
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998.*

The question of enshrining animal rights in law is currently being debated in the New Zealand parliament. A bill has been proposed which will recognise primates' fundamental rights not to suffer cruel and degrading treatment. In an article in *the Sydney Morning Herald* reporting this debate, the World Society for the Protection of Animals is cited as supporting the recognition of apes' rights for the reason that humans and apes are 97% genetically identical. *New Scientist*, however, is quoted as critical of this idea, stating that this fact of genetic similarity does not justify the recognition of rights. Interestingly, *New Scientist* argues that the test of similarity to humans should instead be based upon language use: 'Language that allows thinking about thinking should be the test of similarity to humans'.¹

¹ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13.2.99, p. 30.

Even overlooking the question of the privileging of thinking in this view (why should thinking about thinking be more important than, for instance, thinking about feeling, or even feeling about feeling?), the question of language use in animals is one which has vast significance for animal rights. A book which deals in detail with animal communication, then, could have direct political consequences for the treatment of animals by humans.

The opening statement, 'Researching animal behaviour is a humbling experience', gives the reader a good guide to the approach of Lesley Rogers and Gisela Kaplan in *Not Only Roars and Rituals*. This is a special book because of its rare combination of scientific learning and detailed up-to-date information with the authors' own experiences in communicating with animals (from scientific field trips and from their domestic environment), and their obvious love and respect for animals. This combination of the personal and the scientific blends in a highly readable and clear account of issues around communication across many animal species (from primates to birds and dolphins, amongst others), and articulates a clear ethical and scientific position on humans' relation to, and understanding of, animals.

Rogers' and Kaplan's credentials in the field of animal communication are impressive. Rogers holds a Personal Chair in Neuroscience and Animal Behaviour at the University of New England, Australia, and is the author of over 200 scientific papers and a number of books (including *Minds of Their Own: Thinking and Awareness in Animals*).² She is well known for her work in the area of brain development and function. In 1994 she and Kaplan also co-authored a book on their field study of orang-utans, entitled *Orang-utans in Borneo*. Kaplan is a social scientist and ethologist who has a special interest in communication in primates and vocalisation in birds. As becomes clear in the book, she is also very involved in wildlife rehabilitation, specialising in native bird rehabilitation. Rogers' and Kaplan's combined experience and knowledge then is scientific, personal, and practical.

² Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1997.

Not Only Roars and Rituals functions as a clear and detailed introduction to the field of animal communication. Many of its chapters are issue-based, and cover the questions 'What is communication?', 'Is animal signalling intentional or unintentional?' and 'Do animals learn to communicate, or is communication genetically based?'. These significant and fundamental questions are explored with numerous examples both from the scientific literature and from evidence from the authors' experience in living and working with animals. Two other chapters focus on communication in birds and mammals respectively, and there is also a final more discursive chapter on human-animal relationships. Issues of scientific methodology and research ethics are addressed in relation to the research reported in each chapter. Rogers and Kaplan give concise explanations of how such research is undertaken, note any problematic ethical considerations, and outline the logic of the research methodologies. They also suggest further areas of research in many instances. For the reader without a background in this field, then, the book's approach is very valuable.

Perhaps the most fundamental question addressed by Rogers and Kaplan is that concerning differences between humans and animals. In their analysis of animal communication they are interested not only in the hundreds of interesting facts cited, but also in providing a point of view on the philosophical and ethical question of the human/animal distinction. In relation to this, Rogers and Kaplan are concerned to point out the error of assuming that just because it does not look as though animals are communicating we can know that they are not. As they argue, animals can be shown to communicate in ways which are neither audible nor visible to humans (these include the use of ultraviolet signals, ultrasonic emissions, odour emissions and seismic signals). The development of innovative research techniques (such as the use of sound spectograms, which can graph the frequencies of animal sounds which are inaudible to human ears) is necessary here, and Rogers and Kaplan give many examples.

Even more basic is the issue of whether animals can be said to communicate in a way that bears any resemblance to human

communication. Using numerous examples, Rogers and Kaplan argue that animals do indeed communicate with intention and do learn to communicate (rather than such communication being simply a product of genetic programming). Citing the well-known examples of Alex the parrot (trained by Irene Pepperberg at the University of Arizona), Washoe the chimpanzee (trained by Allen and Beatrix Gardner of the University of Nevada) and Kanzi the bonobo (trained by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh), and others, Rogers and Kaplan demonstrate that animals can be shown to understand and even to use human language. This destroys one of the most central arguments made for the human/animal distinction, namely that humans use language in a unique way.

Studies of animal-animal communication (as opposed to animal-human communication) also indicate that the complex use of language is not a unique human quality. Rogers and Kaplan cite studies of dolphin and whale communications which show that these animals not only use unique identifying codes for particular animals (which are used like names), but that particular groups share communication elements which are understood only within their groups and by other members of the same species (thus forming animal communication cultures). These findings show that animal communications are not simply genetic but, like human languages, are learned, individually meaningful, and even cultural.

Roars and Rituals leaves the reader with a clear sense both of the complexity of scientific research into animal communication and of the fascinating diversity of communication systems and abilities. My one criticism of this book is that the stories told in relation to these are often overly short and leave the reader wanting more details. The wealth of different tales is great, but it can be a little monotonous if none of these are developed to any great extent. For example, we are given tantalising glimpses into Kaplan's work rehabilitating birds and her resulting knowledge of their communication systems, but these are glimpses only. On occasion I would have liked to read fewer examples, but to gain a more indepth insight into one of the examples cited. The characters of this book are so interesting, some of them deserve a longer story!

In general though, the book makes a powerful and important argument about the complexity of animal interactions and the problematic nature of any clear animal/human distinction based on language use, and should be widely read for this reason.

Celia Roberts

Clark, Stephen R. L., Animals and their Moral Standing, viii + 194pp., Routledge, London and New York, 1997.

In the introduction to this collection of papers, written over a period of some twenty years, Stephen Clark draws attention to two aspects of his work which may be of concern to some readers. First, he points out that those who seek them may well find inconsistencies in the papers, and will certainly find some repetition. While this might be seen as meriting criticism in a continuous work, it would be more worrying, in this context, if the papers showed no sign of change and development over time. Such change is quite compatible with an overall consistency which rests on Clark's unvarying respect for animals and concern for their defence.

A single example will serve to illustrate the point above. Four of the essays deal with the question of rights for animals. All four also include a discussion of utilitarian theory, and of the significance of the inclusion of non-human animals in the utilitarian calculation of the greater good. Although Clark acknowledges that the 'good utilitarian' does not believe in rights, he nevertheless explores ways in which some utilitarians have been prepared to allow rights to both humans and other animals, and he explores other theoretical routes to the same end. At the same time, it becomes quite evident that Clark, himself, is strongly opposed to utilitarianism which, in the final essay, 'Modern Errors, Ancient Virtues', he identifies as a principle 'bereft of rational support', and he shows little more regard for rights-based theories. He is not, of course, opposed to rights for animals, but sees them as being of little significance in practice. One must therefore ask why Clark has spent so much care in the examination of views with which he finds himself increasingly at odds. At one point, Clark seems to suggest that this is simply what

philosophers do, but there is, of course, a purpose underlying the activity. It is often productive to engage with those who seek the same end through different means. It may be even more useful to see that the same theory can be used to serve quite different ends.

The second matter which Clark brings to our attention in the introduction is the fact that he writes as a Christian philosopher. There is little in the following essays which is likely to prove unpalatable to even the most convinced atheist, but this profession of faith is still of some interest. For most of its history, Christian teaching has expressed little concern for the non-human, and Clark specifically rejects what he speaks of as humanist Christianity. When he wishes to give examples of 'ancient virtues', of a time when there was more familiarity between human and non-human, it is to the pre-Christian Scriptures that he turns. These scriptural allusions are, in any case, rare, and Clark is quite ready for them to be treated as metaphor, but there is little doubt that his religious faith gives support to some of his philosophical attitudes, to his confident realism and to his holistic approach to the care for the biosphere. What interests me most in this book, however, is not that Clark is a professed Christian, but that he is a professed zoophile with an interest in both biology and ethology.

Although I do not wish to underestimate the contribution made by Peter Singer to the debate on the treatment of animals, I have always been somewhat disconcerted by his simultaneous dismissal of 'animal-lovers' and his insistence that the moral principle of equal consideration of interests should not be arbitrarily restricted to members of our own species. It is difficult to see how we can give any rational consideration of interests to members of a species about which we know little and care nothing. Like Singer, Clark is fully aware of the dangers of sentimentalism, but he argues that sentiment, that is, personal and unreflective attachment or attraction, may be the prelude to rational discovery. In 'The Consciousness of Animals', he suggests that knowledge arises from a loving attention to what is knowable, a view that he fully recognises as a rejection of the postulates of the Enlightenment. It is just such attention to a creature's particularity that gives us the hope of discovering what it

perceives and how it does so, knowledge which would make us the better able to consider its interests.

Clark does not only link sentiment and knowledge, but argues strongly that natural sentiments are the necessary roots of morality. Morality does not develop through the exercise of reason, but through local and familial concerns for children and friends. As Clark says, aphoristically, we are moral because we are mammalian, and there is much evidence to support his view. Behaviour that we regard as good, care for those in need of care, is to be found in mammals other than humans, and this care is not always confined to conspecifics. Certainly, as Clark points out, the human family, from its beginnings, has included members of other species. Clark is not suggesting that reason has no part in morality, or that moral obligation ends with the family, or even at the threshold of the cities that he sees as the set of households, but, however far our responsibility extends, even if it is over the whole earth and into space, our moral sensibility develops in our immediate family and is extended from there.

There will no doubt be some who find Clark's views objectionable. As he, himself, admits, if he is right, it is not possible to quite eliminate subjective discrimination without destroying the natural roots of our morality. One might argue that this is accurate observation rather than theory, but there will be those who seek greater objectivity and prefer to see morality as the province of rational adults, presumably human, even if their duty of care extends to members of other species.

Tom Regan, whose work is discussed in several essays, shares with Clark the view that there is no discoverable difference between all humans and all non-humans that would license different moral treatment, but he attempts to justify this view in a very different way. Regan makes use of the Kantian notion of the human subject as end-in-itself and therefore worthy of respect. He notes that for Kant the subject is a rational subject and that this excludes some human beings, infants and the senile, for example, and he suggests a different category, subject-of-a-life, which would include the previously excluded, both human and other animals. Clark treats

Regan's arguments sympathetically, but he points out that the only rights that all subjects-of-a-life could have seem to be the very minimal ones of extreme right-wing liberalism. As he says, what concerns him is not abstract political rights but concrete historical ones, and he admits, quite frankly, that he is more concerned about the rights of 'British beasts' than about the natural rights of all other animals. This is wholly in accord with his perception of morality as having its origins in nature, in the family, and I venture to suggest that, in the same way, Australian readers of this review are likely to be concerned about Australian animals. They are the ones closest to us, the ones with which we are familiar, and the ones with which we, sometimes reluctantly, share our territory, and these animals may be the natives who live in our gardens or nearby national parks, the dogs who sleep at our feet, or the farm animals on display at the agricultural show.

Although I have attempted to give some indication of the topics addressed by Clark in this book, I have not been very successful in conveying the flavour of the work as a whole. Clark has indicated that he writes as a Christian, but I would suggest that he also writes as an Aristotelian. The two are, of course, not incompatible, but, in my view, it is the influence of Aristotle that dominates in this context. It can be seen in the frequent quotations, in the belief in the natural origin of the moral law, in the effort to perceive the quiddity of other animals, which is surely nothing other than Aristotelian form by another name. Above all, it can be seen in Clark's constant effort to engage in constructive dialogue, to find a middle way in the many disputes which bedevil those who try to think about animals and about what it is to do good in relation to them.

Felicity Sutcliffe

Book Notes

Orlans, Barbara R., Beauchamp, Tom L., Dresser, Rebecca, Morton, David B. and Gluck, John, P., *The Human Use of Animals: Case Studies in Ethical Choice*, xi + 330 pp., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.

The Human Use of animals is mainly a collection of case studies which raise ethical issues concerning the use of animals in biomedical research, cosmetic safety testing, behavioural research, wildlife research, education, food and farming. It also covers the use of animals as companions and for religious rites. Biomedical and behavioural research receive the fullest coverage. The authors try to expose the strength of argument on both sides. Sometimes this is a little strained as in the discussion of head trauma studies using baboons. Also most of these issues deserve to be treated in a broader framework where the possibility of using alternatives to animals (or not pursuing the research or life style at all) is treated more seriously. Nevertheless the authors do succeed in admirably laying out some of the complexities of the debates over the use of animals.

Skutch, Alexander F., *The Minds of Birds*, xvi + 183pp., Texas A & M University Press, College Station, Texas, 1996.

In reports of his detailed observations of birds over many years, Skutch argues that their mental capacities have been grossly underestimated. In particular Skutch emphasises the capacity of birds to recognize other birds and humans. They have good memories and anticipate the future. They cooperate well, especially when breeding. They are affectionate and playful. They can be taught to count, and have a good sense of time. Some use tools. They appear to have an aesthetic sense, can dissimulate (for instance to protect their young). Skutch claims that this demands 'cool calculation and quick wits'. Pepperberg's remarkable findings with the African Grey Parrot are outlined. This is a beautifully written book, full of fascinating detail with a comprehensive bibliography on the abilities of birds.

Russon, Anne, Bard, Kim A., Parker, Sue Taylor, eds., *Reaching into thought : The minds of the great apes*, xii + 464pp., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.

Reaching into Thought contains 19 articles from psychologists and anthropologists on the mental abilities of the great apes and monkeys. Some classic studies are here, for instance Tetsuro Matsuzawa and Gen Yamakoshi's comparison of chimpanzee material culture between Bossou and Nimba, West Africa and Christophe Boesch's summation of the evidence gathered from the wild supporting the notion of a culture in chimpanzees. The collection also contains one of the best philosophical articles on what self-awareness or self-knowledge might consist in when considering humans, apes and monkeys. Other articles take up issues such as tool use, imitation, pretence and chimpanzees use of rules. This book is a serious challenge to anyone denying the capacity of great apes to think.

Mech, L. David, Adams, Layne G., Meier, Thomas J., Burch, John W. and Dale, Bruce W., *The Wolves of Denali*, x + 238pp., University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998.

Denali is a National Park in Alaska and the wolves there form one of the largest protected populations in the world. Mech and his team have been studying these wolves for nine years and *The Wolves of Denali* presents the results from research in 1986 to 1994 in a detailed yet accessible manner. The findings give an excellent basis for thinking about issues such as the reintroduction of wolves into national parks in the United States, the effect of wolves on prey populations such as caribou in Alaska, the value of national parks to animals, the social relationships between wolves and their intelligence.

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